Conſiderations upon the Act of Parliament, for reverſing the Judgment in a Quo Warranto againſt the City of London, and for reſtoring the City of London to its Ancient Rights and Privileges.

1. THE ſaid Judgment, and the Proceedings thereupon, are de­clared to be Arbitrary and Il­legal, p. 104. and in purſuance of this De­claration, that Judgment is reverſed; and the City reſtored to all its Ancient Rights, Liberties, and Franchiſes whatſoever; and all Charters, Letters Patents, Grants and Commiſſions, during the time of the avoi­dance of the Charter in the two laſt Reigns, for incorporating the Citizens and Commo­nalty of the ſaid City, or touching, or con­cerning any of their Liberties and Franchi­ſes, &c. are declared and adjudged to be null and void, to all intents and purpoſes what­ſoever, p. 104, to 107.

2. Notwithſtanding this, it was not rea­ſonable, that the City, which was no way conſenting to its own disfranchiſement; but was wholly Paſſive in it, ſhould ſuffer or be prejudiced, as to its main concerns; but that all Proceedings in Law or Equity, all Leaſes made or granted, with the Cau­tions and Proviſoes limited in the Act; all Judgments, Decrees, and Sentences had, and obtained by any Perſon or Perſons, taking upon them to be Truſtees for, or concern­ing any Lands, &c. all Freedoms, to which any Perſons being natural Born Subjects or Denizons, had been admitted ſince the ſaid Judgment given, that all theſe ſhould ſtand and remain in full Force and Effect; ſo far as all or any of the ſaid Proceedings were or would have been, had the Charter not been voided, materially Legal; being tranſ­acted and done according to the uſual Me­thods, and with the uſual Forms of Law and Juſtice, reſpectively belonging and appertain­ing to them, becauſe though all theſe things for want of a Charter, were now tranſacted by Commiſſion from the King; yet if all the Proceedings upon the ſaid Commiſſion, for the ſpace of ſo many Years had been decla­red null and void; the Reſtitution of the Charter would have been a far greater miſ­chief than the avoidance of it, and the incon­veniences would have been unſpeakable, which the City muſt have ſuffered by the nullity of ſo many reaſonable and juſt, as well as weighty and important Proceedings; and accordingly it is wiſely provided by this Act, that all the Proceedings aforeſaid, though Illegal in themſelves, conſide•ing the root of Authority from whence they ſprang, yet ſhall be deemed and adjudged to be firm and va­lid, as if the Charter had been ſtanding, and the ſame Affairs had been tranſacted in the old and uſual courſe, under the Authority and influence of the ſame.

3. When it is ſaid in general terms, that the Judgment given againſt the Charter, and the Proceedings thereupon, is and were Illegal and Arbitrary; and that all Charters, Letters, Pattents, Grants, Commiſſions, &c. For Incorporating the Citizens and Commo­nalty of the ſaid City, or any of them, or touching, or concerning any of their Li­berties and Franchiſes, &c. are declared and2 adjudged to be null and void, to all intents and purpoſes whatſoever.

And when it is then further added, for the reaſon that hath been given, viz. to pre­vent many and great miſchiefs and incon­veniences, that would otherwiſe accrue; that notwithſtanding any thing contained in the ſaid general Clauſes; yet in ſome particular caſes mentioned in the Act, that the Pro­ceedings upon, and after the ſaid Judgment, ſhall be, and are confirmed as to their effect; though in their cauſe, that is, to ſay the Authority from whence they were derived, they are declared and adjudged to have been Arbitrary and Illegal; from theſe two things conſidered and reflected upon, there are theſe ten very natural Corollaries, or deductions to be made.

Firſt, That the general Clauſes would have been in vain, whereby the Judgment againſt the Charter, and the Proceedings thereupon are declared to be Illegal, and the ſaid Proceedings to be null and void; nay, they would have been abſurd and ludicrous, unbecoming the wiſdom and gravity of that great Aſſembly, by which with the Royal Aſſent they were enacted, if after this either expreſly, or by any reaſonable innuendoes, or intimations of ſuch a deſign, all the Pro­ceedings upon the ſaid Judgment, had been intended or implyed, to be by the ſame Legi­ſlators in the ſame Act Authorized and Con­firmed.

Secondly, The Proviſoes themſelves would have been equally incongruous and abſurd; if all thoſe Acts and Proceedings upon or after the ſaid Judgment, which were not confirmed by any ſuch Proviſoes, were not­withſtanding to ſtand good, and remain in full Force and Effect.

Thirdly, Thus much therefore is certain, and almoſt ſelf-evident to every Perſon of common underſtanding, that where there is a general clauſe of nullity and avoidance of all the Acts of an Illegal Power, to which there are ſubjoined, ſome particular excep­tions by particular Proviſoes made in that behalf; that all thoſe Acts, which neither come within the Letter of the ſaid Proviſoes, nor ſo much as within the reaſon and inten­tion of them, are by the general Clauſes eva­cuated and annull'd, and the general Rule, in caſes not excepted, is fortify'd and ſtrength­en'd by the exceptions from it, according to that old Maxim, which is grounded upon the higheſt and the plaineſt reaſon, exceptio firmat regulam in non exceptis.

Fourthly, The word Alderman, not being ſo much as named thoroughout this whole Act of Parliament, it is of neceſſity to be granted, that all thoſe Aldermen, that were admitted into that Honourable Court, after Judgment given againſt the City Charter, till the date of this Act of Parliament, for the reverſing of that Judgment, that is to ſay, till the twentieth day of May 1690, were illegally admitted; that Judgment and the Proceedings thereupon or thereafter, till the time of reſtitution, being declared to have been Arbitrary and Illegal.

Fifthly, The ſaid Admiſſions being Arbi­trary and Illegal in themſelves, and not be­ing confirmed by any Special Proviſoe, nor contained within the true reaſon of all, or any of the ſaid Proviſoes; they are by this Act of Parliament made null and void, that is to ſay, thoſe Gentlemen ſo unduly and illegally admitted, have no Right to wear their Gowns, or to Sit and Act as Aldermen any longer, in virtue of any ſuch Illegal Ad­miſſion, not confirmed by this Act.

That they do not come within the Letter of any of the Proviſoes, is plain, becauſe they are not ſo much as mentioned or nam­ed in any of them; ſo that it cannot be ſaid there is any expreſs Proviſion made in their behalf.

That they are not included within the rea­ſon or intention of any of them, (tho this would hardly be ſufficient to give them a Title at Common Law) will be plain to any Man, that ſhall duly weigh, and conſider the reaſon of the Proviſoes, which is two­fold.

Firſt, that the Publick, or the City in common, and thoſe with whom they tranſ­acted3 might not ſuffer, for want of a juſt and reaſonable Confirmation of all thoſe materially Legal Acts and Proceedings, which were had or done from the avoidance of the Charter, to the reſtitution of it.

Secondly, That private Perſons, who had bought Offices within the Mayor or Sheriffs, or in any wiſe in the Cities gift, and who were competently qualify'd for their employments, and capable of them had the Charter ſtood, might not be turned out of them, to the great loſs, if not ruin of themſelves and Fa­milies, only for want of a Juſt and Legal Ti­tle; a defect which the Parliament by their Authority, was very well able to ſupply, as accordingly it hath done; and as in ſtrict e­quity it was obliged to do; but of this a little more ſhall be ſaid in its proper place.

Now as to the Firſt of theſe reaſons of the ſaid Proviſoes; it is manifeſt the Aldermen are not included in it, nor in the ſecond nei­ther, for it could be no diſadvantage to the City in general, nor to themſelves in particu­lar, for them to reſign their Seats in the Court of Aldermen, and put themſelves upon a new Choice in their reſpective Wards, any more than it was in the Caſe of Common Council-men, of whom a new Choice was expreſly enjoined; nay, the Majority have agreed, that it was for the City's Intereſt to chuſe a new Common Council; becauſe they have choſen other Members, for reaſons that do as nearly concern ſome of the preſent pre­tended Court of Aldermen, as they did ſome of the late Common Council.

It could be no diſadvantage to themſelves, to be diſmiſt from their Station of Aldermen of the City, any more than for others, to be diſmiſt from the Common Council, for nei­ther the one nor the other gets any thing by the Bargain, only the trouble of an Alder­man is ſo much the greater, as Courts of Aldermen are more frequent than Common Councils; and there is a charge of congru­ity, though not of abſolute neceſſity attend­ing it, they being obliged for the Honor of the City, to live in ſome greater port and equipage than they did before, and for theſe two reaſons, becauſe they could not well ſpare ſo much time from their private Affairs, and becauſe of a Charge accompanying that Sta­tion, which cannot without diſhonor be a­voided; there are multitudes that have cho­ſen from time to time, rather to pay a con­ſiderable Fine to the Chamber of London, than undergo the unprofitable fatigue and trouble of that dignity, b•ſides the expence and charge, that uſually goes along with it.

Sixthly, Which is the ſixth Corollary, deducible from the premiſes: He that is no Alderman within the meaning of this Act, by which all thoſe Acts and Proceedings, du­ring the avoidance of the Charter, are ex­preſly declared and adjudged to be null and void; which are not by ſome eſpecial Pro­viſoe particularly confirmed; I ſay, ſuch a Perſon, let him be who he will, can be no Lord Mayor, becauſe the Lord Mayor ac­cording to the Ancient Cuſtoms and Uſages of the City, is to be choſen out of the Court of Aldermen, and all thoſe Ancient Uſages, and Cuſtoms, are by this Act of Parliament reſtored and confirmed.

Seventhly, Sir, T. P. who laid down his Gown, while the City Charter was ſtill ſtand­ing, and took it up again without any Legal Warrant after the date of the Judgment, and before that of this Act of Parliament, is no Legal Alderman; and by conſequence, he cannot make a Legal Lord Mayor.

Eighthly, Thoſe Gentlemen, who have continued and ſat as Aldermen, during all this interval of the avoidance of the Char­ter; and were ſo by a due and lawful Ele­ction and Deſignation thereto, before the Judgment given, have ſtill a right to conti­nue, Sit and Act in that capacity, now the ſaid Charter is reſtored, and the ſaid Judg­ment reverſed; becauſe the declared End and Scope of the Act of Parliament, made upon this occaſion, was to ſettle and confirm the Ancient Conſtitution, as it ſtood when the Charter was ſeized into the King's Hands; of which Conſtitution they themſelves were an unqueſtionable Part; and if the Aldermen4 ſince the Judgment do pretend a Right, yet they cannot but confeſs at the ſame mite, that thoſe that were made ſo before it, have, if not a greater, for an abſolute Right will admit of no compariſons; yet a much more plain and manifeſt Right than they.

Ninthly, Thoſe of the Court of Alder­men, that lay'd down their Gowns, and de­ſiſted from any further attendance upon that Court, at any time between the Judgment given, and the Reſtitution of the Charter by the Act of Parliament for reverſing of it, be­ing Legal Aldermen while the Charter was ſtanding, and at the time of its avoidance; may, as many of them as are now ſurviving, take up their Gowns again, and Act in the ſame capacity that they did before; they not making a voluntary ſurrender, but conceiv­ing themſelves under a Moral incapacity to Act, by reaſon of the Illegality of the Com­miſſion it ſelf, or not liking the Company that was obtruded upon them, whom they might not look upon as Legal Aſſeſſors in that Honourable Court; or fearing to be queſtioned in Parliament for what they did; as this very Parliament hath declared, the Seizure of the Charter, and the Proceedings conſequent upon it, to have been Arbitrary and Illegal; and therefore they reſigned, not becauſe they would not Act; but becauſe they thought they could not, being morally diſabled for any further Service, for id ſolum poſſumus, quod poſſumuus de jure; but the Charter being reſtored, the capacity of act­ing, returned together with it, and the ſur­render being an involuntary thing, created by ſcruples which they did not make, and which they could not get over, the Right of acting ſtill remained, whenever the Legal capacity ſhould return; as a Lawyer lays by his Gown, and appears at no Bar in the time of the Vacation; reſerving ſtill to himſelf a Right of doing both, when ever the Term ſhall return.

However, this is ſpoken, and the Author humbly deſires it may be ſo interpreted, without any reflection upon thoſe honeſt and worthy Gentlemen, who continued ſtill to act, during all the time of the avoidance of the Charter; which as it muſt be confeſſed, to have been a ſignal Service rendred to the City and the Nation, by influencing in ſome meaſure the Proceedings of the Court, and by hindering of worſe Men from Sitting in their Places; ſo was it an undoubted Argu­ment of courage and a publick Spirit; and no ſign of want, either of Integrity or Judg­ment; for the Judges and the Lawyers them­ſelves, were not agreed, as to the Legality of the Seizure of the Charter and its Franchi­ſes into the Kings Hands; and much more then might thoſe, who do not profeſs the Law, but depend wholly upon others for their Sentiments in theſe caſes, be divided in their Opinions concerning it; and now in God's Name let them unite together, for the be­hoof and ſervice of their Country in the ge­neral, and of this Famous and Renowned City in particular; ſince they both confeſs the Reſtitution to be Legal, whatever diſputes or controverſies may ariſe concerning the Sei­zure, which there is now no reaſon to keep ſtirring any longer.

Tenthly, and Laſtly, From all that hath been ſaid, there is this further Conſectary to be deduced, viz. that the Legal Court of Al­dermen, now the Charter is reſtored, doth and will conſiſt of three ſorts of Perſons.

Firſt, ſuch as were Legal Aldermen before the Seizure, and have continued ever ſince to act in that capacity.

Secondly, Of ſuch as laid down their Gowns, ſince the giving of Judgment a­gainſt the City; being before it Legal and duly qualify'd Aldermen of the ſame, if they pleaſe to reſume their Gowns and their Poſts again.

And thirdly, Such as ſhall be Legally pre­ſented by the reſpective Wards, and accept­ed by the Court of Aldermen, to ſupply the vacancies in thoſe Wards, where an Alder­man is wanting; but all that took upon them that Stile and Title, during the avoidance, not being Legally poſſeſſed of it before; are by this Act of Parliament manifeſtly prohibit­ed from acting any longer, either to the pre­judice5 of thoſe that have a Legal Right, or otherwiſe, where there is a vacancy, without a new Election.

Fourthly, But in anſwer to all this, there is a Clauſe of proviſion in the Act of Parlia­ment, which is trumpt up in defence of thoſe Gentlemen, who acted under the Name and Notion of Aldermen of this City, whom the foregoing Corollaries would exclude, it will be worth, our while therefore impartially to conſider it; the whole Clauſe is as followeth.

For the right and clear underſtanding of which Clauſe, there are theſe following things to be conſidered.

Firſt, It can never be too often ſuggeſted and reflected upon in this caſe, that the Sei­zure of the Charter, and the Proceedings thereupon, being declared to be A bitrary and Illegal; it muſt needs be very abſurd and incongruous, to ſuppoſe, that any more of the ſaid Proceedings was intended to be confirmed by this Act of Parliament; but only ſuch as could not be annull'd or va­cated without a publick Miſchief; or at leaſt a private hardſhip and injuſtice to par­ticular Perſons, who had a fair title in equi­ty to better uſage, and muſt ſuffer extreme­ly by the repeal of all thoſe Acts, which paſſed from and under the Commiſſion; to confirm the ſaid Proceedings any farther than this, being to Abett Arbitrary, and Illegal things for no reaſon at all, unleſs it were becauſe they were Arbitrary and Illegal; and at that rate, it had been more ſuitable to the ſame deſign to confirm the Judgment given, which would at the ſame time have juſtify'd all the Proceedings thereupon, than to reverſe it.

Secondly, This Paragraph by the very wording and penning of it, however obſcure and ambiguous it may be pretended to be, does manifeſtly contain matter of privilege, benefit, and advantage, and this is the mean­ing of thoſe words, that all Officers and Miniſters of the ſaid City, that rightfully held any Office or Place, &c. are here­by confirmed, and ſhall have and en­joy the ſame, as fully as, &c. and after­wards, that every Perſon, who ſince the ſaid Judgment given, hath been choſen, &c. ſhall be, and is her•by confirmed in his ſaid Office or Employment; and ſhall have and enjoy the ſame, in as full and ample manner as if &c. now the word confirming, plainly implies a Privilege or Emolument, accruing from the Office or Thing confirmed; and looks as if it were ſomething worth contend­ing for, worth putting in a claim of equi­ty, in order to be confirmed; and the hav­ing and enjoying as fully, and in as full and ample manner as, &c. are terms denoting a conſiderable advantage, and ſuch as amounts to a ſubſiſtence for life at leaſt, if it will not add Ornament and Splendor to it, as many of the City Offices are known to do by the Salaries, and Perquiſites reſpectively belong­ing to them, now if any Man will tell me, where the profit or advantage of being an6 Alderman lies, unleſs it be an advantage to ſpend more Money, to keep greater Hoſpi­tality within doors, and to appear with greater Port and Grandeur without; to be at more trouble, and after all, to have no­thing but his labor for his pains; then I will confeſs, that an Alderman is an Office within the meaning of this Clauſe, and that it was worth the while to be confirmed and to ſue and ſolicite to be confirmed in a Station, which ſo many do yearly and almoſt dayly pay conſiderable ſumms of Money to avoid, and which others have laid down, out of mere wearineſs and irkſomneſs to continue any longer in it; and out of a ſenſe of the da­mage and inconvenience, which accrued by ſo frequent diverſions and avocations, to their own private and domeſtick Affairs; but if all this be quite contrary to the very truth; if there be no advantage in it, but a great deal of trouble, fatigue, and unneceſſary ex­pence altogether, for the ſake of others, who are the only gainers by it, then this is not an Office within the meaning of this Clauſe, by which there is nothing more certain, than that a benefit or advantage was intended to be convey'd to all, that have any intereſt or concern in it.

See a Book Intit. the Preſent State of Lond. and another called the Royal Charter of Confir­mation, &c. True indeed it is, that the Aldermen, beſides that they are Preſidents, or Foremen, or Chairmen of their reſpective Ward­motes; and that they Sit in that Charact•r, upon the Bench at Guild­hall; having the chief Adminiſtration of the Affairs of the City, committed to their Truſt and Care; they are likewiſe Juſtices, or Keepers of the Peace, in their Reſpective Wards, and all that are paſt the Chair, and the three that are next it, have the ſame ju­riſdiction all over the City, and ſome of them all over Middleſex and Surrey; but this though it be indeed a great Honour and Dig­nity; yet it is a greater Burthen, without any proper advantage to themſelves, what­ſoever it may be to the Clerks acting under them; and therefore as ſuch they do not come within the meaning of this Proviſoe; which was to reſtore and confirm ſuch Offi­ces and Rights, as were of advantage and be­nefit to the Poſſeſſors.

And in conſideration of the great trouble, charge and expence they are at,Royal Charter of Confirmation p. 64. by taking the Stile and Character of Aldermen of the City upon them; it is ex­preſly ordained in one of the Royal Char­ters, which is confirmed by, and contained in the great Royal Charter of K. Charles II. that as long as they ſhall continue Alder­men there, and ſhall bear the charge of Al­dermen proper, and alſo thoſe, which before had been Aldermen; and have alſo with their great coſts and expences Born the Offices of Mayoralty, ſhall not be put in any Aſſizes, Juries, or Attaints, Recognizances or Inqui­ſitions out of the ſaid City; and that with­out that City, neither they nor any of them be made Collectors, or Collector, Aſſeſſor, Taxer, Overſeer, or Comptroler of the Tenths, Fifteenths, Taxes, Tallages, Sub­ſidies, or other charges or impoſitions what­ſoever, &c. So, that it ſeems not only the Aldermen, but the Mayor himſelf, notwith­ſtanding any contigent advantages, which may or may not happen, have been always reckoned to be in Stations of great expence and trouble; and though it be a privilege and advantage to the City, to be governed by ſuch Perſons of their own chuſing, and of their own Body; yet, that to the Perſons themſelves, it was, and was looked upon, as an inconvenience and a Burthen; and for this reaſon, neither the Mayor nor Alder­men come within the meaning and deſign of this Clauſe; and the ſame may be ſaid likewiſe of the Sheriffs, who are at a very great charge, in the diſcharge of that weigh­ty and important Truſt, without any pro­ſpect, but what is very remote and very contingent, of any thing like an equivalent advantage in the time of their Mayoralty, when it ſhall come; which depends wholly upon the uncertain lives, as well of them­ſelves as others; of themſelves, becauſe they7 know not whether they ſhall live ſo long; of others, becauſe they know not whether they will dye then or no; the great advantage of the Lord Mayor, conſiſting in the diſpoſal of thoſe Offices by Sale, that fall by deceaſe of the ſeveral Officers that fill'd them, du­ring the time of his Government and Admi­niſtration.

Thirdly, Furthermore, the ſaid Offices hereby confirmed to the reſpective Officia­ries of the ſame, are in this Proviſoe called not only Offices, but alſo Places and Em­ployments; now if a Man ſhould ask the Queſtion, what Place ſuch an one was poſ­ſeſſed of, or was inveſted in? It would be abſurd in this caſe, to ſay he was an Alder­man, becauſe he gets nothing by it; but if you ſay he is Commiſſioner of the Cuſtom-houſe, or he is Poſt-maſter General; theſe indeed are Places in the Engliſh Language; becauſe there is profit and buſineſs mixt to­gether, a Place being generally underſtood by an elliptical or curtailed way of ſpeech a­mong us, of a place of profit or advantage; it cannot be denyed, that this is the moſt uſual, and the moſt natural acceptation of the Word; but whatever becomes of Place, Employment is certainly a Man's livelyhood and buſineſs; that by which he gets his ſub­ſiſtence in the World, and if the Queſtion were asked, what Employment ſuch a one is of? it would be ridiculous to anſwer, he is an Alderman, a Mayor, or Sheriff; becauſe by Em­ployment, is meant that which is a Man's own proper buſineſs, for the acquitting an Eſtate, or for the ſupport of himſelf and Family; whether it be any Craft or Myſtery in the way of Trade, or any Place or Office, with ſalary or perquiſites or both, whether the income or gain be more or leſs, ſo it be that in which a Man's particular buſineſs conſiſts; and by which he endeavours, either to get an Eſtate by honeſt and lawful means, or at leaſt to provide a ſubſiſtence for himſelf, or thoſe for whom he is obliged by Nature, Cuſtom, or Law, to make the beſt provi­ſion he can; but if to be an Alderman, a Mayor, and Sheriff, be not in the Engliſh Language an Employment, then in an Engliſh Act of Parliament; nothing is more certain, than that they cannot come within the meaning of this Proviſoe.

Fourthly, But now if by Office, Place, and Employment in this Paragraph, we un­derſtand all thoſe Offices in the City gift and ſervice, from the Recorder to the meaneſt Officer, belonging to the Lord Mayor, or Sheriffs, or to either of the Compters; receiv­ing wages and perquiſites for the ſame, and having a Legal tenure or poſſeſſion therein, then the ſenſe of this Paragraph is very eaſie, and that is manifeſtly the only true ſ•nſe when all is done; that whereas, by another Proviſoe in this Act, care is taken, that all the Legal Proceedings, that paſſed from, and after the Judgment given againſt the City Charter, that is to ſay, all thoſe Proceedings, either in Law or Equity, that wanted no­thing to make them Legal, but only a Legal Authority and Juriſdiction, ſhould be rati­fy'd and confirmed, as in Reaſon and Juſtice they ought to be, to prevent the diſorder and confuſion, that would otherwiſe enſue up­on their nulling and avoidance, ſo as to pri­vate Perſons, who were legally poſſeſſed of Offices and Employments in the City Gift; while the Charter and its Authority were yet ſtanding, and in full force and effect; which Offices and Employments, were for the moſt part their livelyhood and ſubſiſtence, which they had purchaſed with their Penny; and which they had ſtill continued, to the great Service and Benefit of the City and its Go­vernment, to exerciſe and adminiſter, du­ring all the time that the Charter ſtood null and void, by virtue of the Judgment upon the Quo Warranto; it would have been the greateſt hardſhip in the World, to reward all theſe Services with an ejectment, out of their reſpective Places; or to put them upon the trouble or hazard of a new Choice, when they had already purchaſed and pay'd for their Employments; and when the Charter being reſtored, they were ſo naturally and rightfully reſtored together with it, by having formerly belonged to it, and a­cted8 by and under its influence and vir­tue.

Again, as to thoſe who were admitted, or choſen into any ſuch Offices after the date of the Judgment, or between that and the time of the reverſing of it, coming in upon deceaſe, or upon voluntary ſurrender, or upon ejectment for a juſt and lawful cauſe; they alſo are by this Proviſoe confirmed, as in equity they ought to be, their employ­ments being for the moſt part their lively­hood and ſubſiſtence; they having general­ly purchaſed them with their Money; being duely qualify'd for them, and having ſerved the City, many of them for ſeveral Years, with diligence and faithfulneſs in them. For which reaſons, taken all of them together, they had a great deal of equity on their ſide, and to eject them, or put them upon a new riſque, a new purchaſe, or a new choice in theſe circumſtances, would have been the greateſt and the plaineſt hardſhip in the World: But now nothing of all this con­cerns thoſe Aldermen, that have been choſen or admitted ſince the avoidance of the Char­ter, they have nothing of equity to plead for themſelves; neither can they complain of any hardſhip in being ejected, or put upon a new choice in the vacant Wards, neither have they any thing to plead for themſelves, but only a Poſſeſſion which in its root, ac­cording to this very Act, is Arbitrary and Il­legal; and the Parliament not deſigning to confirm Arbitrary things for no reaſon, but only where the things, though defective in their Authority, were materially juſt, and where there would be cruelty and hardſhip in making them null and void; it is mani­feſt that they, as they do not come within the letter of this Paragraph, where the word Alderman, is not ſo much as mentioned, ſo neither have they any ſhare, or Portion in the true meaning and intention of it; which was to ſhew mercy in ſome caſes, where equi­table reaſons did ſo plainly, and ſo loudly require it; not to confirm Illegal and Arbi­trary things in all, which would have been to confirm and juſtifie the Judgment given, inſtead of diſallowing or condemning it; which was the firſt and greateſt intention of this Act, and bating the little underwood of equitable Proviſoes, is the main timber of which it is built and conſiſts; and if a poſſeſſion ſhould be pronounced firm for no other reaſon, but becauſe it was a poſſeſſion, without regard, whether it were legal or no, this would overthrow and confound all pro­perty in the World, and make it impoſſible for any Man to be ejected out of an Arbi­trary Poſſeſſion, otherwiſe than by Force of Arms, which is not the legal way, and which would introduce a State of War and Hoſtili­ty in all times and places.

Fifthly, Further yet, all thoſe above men­tioned, are City Officers properly ſo called, that is, they all Act by an Authority deriv­ed from the whole Corporation conſidered as one intire Body; they are the conſtant Ser­vants of the City, belonging to the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs for the time being; and it is of ſuch only, that this Paragraph ſpeaks, they are the very words; And be it enacted by the Authority aforeſaid, that all Officers and Miniſters of the ſaid City, that right­fully held, &c. now an Alderman, though in a very large ſenſe of that word, he may be called an Officer; yet is he not a City, but a Ward Officer, repreſenting in the Court of Aldermen, and acting in the behalf of that particular Ward, for which he ſerves: An Al­derman is not properly an Alderman of the City, or of the whole Corporation; but he is Alderman of the Ward, Foreman, or Chair-man of the Wardmote, in a particu­lar Diſtrict or Region of the City, and from thence is ſent as a Deputy or Delegate into that Superior Court at Guildhall; and the Caſe is the ſame with the Common Council-Men; they ſerve alſo ſuch a num­ber of them in the Common Council, for every particular Ward, and are not City but Ward Officers; who all taken together in both theſe Courts, make up a Court repre­ſentative of the whole Corporation, and do tranſact in their ſtead, and on their behalf, but taken ſingly, they are no more City Offi­cers,9 then a Parliament Man, is Knight or Burgeſs for the whole Nation; but a Clerk of the Parliament, and a Speaker of the Parliament, are Servants to the whole Na­tion; becauſe they are Servants to the whole Repreſentative Body; and the difference between theſe things is ſtill further clear, by this, that there are diſtinct Clauſes in this Act of Parliament, relating to the Reſtitu­tion of the City Charter, and the reſpective Charters and Franchiſes of particular Com­panies; and there are alſo diſtinct Proviſoes for confirming the legal and neceſſary Pro­ceedings in the one, and in the other; which is as much as to ſay, what is clear enough in it ſelf, that the whole and part are not the ſame, and that one part is diſtinct from another, that the Charter or the Officers of the City, are diſtinct from thoſe of the Companies of which it conſiſts; that the City Charter or Officer, is not the Charter or Officer of a certain Company, nor Vice versâ, and the Charter or Officer of one Company, is not the Charter or Officer of another; and by the ſame way of reaſoning a City Officer, and a Ward Officer are di­ſtinct things; a Ward Officer is not a City Officer, nor a City Officer as ſuch, the Offi­cer of a Ward, or to reduce the whole mat­ter into plainer terms, that an Alderman is not an Officer of the City, properly ſo cal­led; and by conſequence doth not come within the meaning of this Clauſe.

Sixthly, I have made this compariſon, be­tween an Alderman and a Parliament Man the rather, not only becauſe it is very na­tural, becauſe of the Repreſentation of a certain place or diſtrict, and the Inhabitants thereunto belonging in both caſes; but be­cauſe H. 3. in the 49th. of whoſe Reign ſome of our greateſt Antiquaries will needs have it, that the Houſe of Commons at leaſt had its firſt beginning; was alſo the Firſt Founder of this Inſtitution, of Governing each Ward of the City of London, by its re­ſpective Alderman thereunto belonging; they are the words of Stow, Survey of Lond. p. 696. 1. King John — changed their Bayliffs into a Mayor and two Sheriffs, to theſe H. 3. added Aldermen, at the firſt eli­gible yearly, but afterwards by King Ed­ward III. made perpetual Magiſtrates and Juſtices of the Peace within their Wards; though Mr. Cambden ſeems to be of another mind, and tells us, that the Wittena Gemot or Council of Wiſe Men among the Saxons, was much the ſame with what we call a Par­liament now-a-days; and in this he is follow­ed by the Lord Chief Baron Atkins, in his Learned Diſcourſe of the Antiquity of the Houſe of Commons; but however that be, we do not only read that Hen. III. was the Perſon that ſet Aldermen over every Ward; but in his time, we find mention alſo of the Folkmtoe, which was the ſame with our Preſent Common-Council, who were uſed then upon Emergent occa­ſions to meet at Paul's-Croſs,See Holinſh. in the Reign of Hen. III. p. 262, 263, 264. as they do now at Guildhall, where ſome­times the King himſelf; ſometimes his Chief Counſellors and Miniſters of State; and ſometimes even Foreign Ambaſſadors, and Foreign Kings too, with the Prime of our Nobility and Clergy were preſent, ſo great and venerable an Aſſembly was the Common Council of London reckoned in thoſe days.

Seventhly, If Common Council Men, as Repreſentatives of their reſpective Wards, are not Officers within the meaning of this Proviſoe, then neither are Aldermen, be­cauſe they both repreſent, and both of them repreſent the very ſame Perſons and Places, though the one do it in a Superior Orb and Station to the other; and therefore this re­preſentation, if it do not make an Officer within the meaning of this Clauſe in one caſe, neither will it in the other; and eſpe­cially, when both of theſe Officers, ſo cal­led in the largeſt ſenſe and notion of this word, being of the ſame nature, which con­ſiſts wholly in delegation of truſt and repre­ſentation of Perſons; yet neither of them are directly named, and therefore, both of them muſt either be included in it or excluded10 by it. Now that the Common Council are not included in this Paragraph, for the Con­firmation of Officers is manifeſt, becauſe a new Election of them is appointed in ano­ther Clauſe p: 111. and if it be ſaid, that this is only an exception out of that general Clauſe, for the Confirmation of Officers, that cannot be neither, becauſe at that rate the exception would be much larger than the Rule it ſelf; the Common-Council amount­ing with the Aldermen, included, who are a part of it to about 260. which is near an hundred more than the Officers of the City properly ſo called, who receive Salaries and Perquiſites by their Places; now this would be ſo great an abſurdity in an Act of Parlia­ment, that it is abſolutely neceſſary firſt; that the former Paragraph conſidered by it ſelf, be not underſtood of all Officers in the general, in the utmoſt Senſe and Latitude of that word; as it imports any Poſt or Sta­tion whatſoever; wherein there is a Truſt and a Power for the execution of it. 2ly. It is equally neceſſary for the ſame reaſon, that this latter Paragraph compared with the for­mer, be underſtood of Officers of a different nature; and thirdly, if the latter had been only an exception out of the former as a Rule; to prevent the plain claſhing, and contradiction of the two Clauſes with each other; it ſhould have been added, as is u­ſual in the Stile and Method of Acts of Par­liament in ſuch Caſes; any thing in this Act to the contrary in any wiſe not­withſtanding, or words to that effect,

Eighthly, Again the ſame Perſon is both Alderman, and Common-Council Man at the ſame time; for every Alderman is a Member of the Common-Council; now it would be very ſtrange, that the very ſame Perſon conſidered, as a Common-Council-Man; which it is poſſible he would not have been, had he not been Alderman likewiſe; ſhould be excluded out of this confirming Clauſe; and yet as an Alderman be includ­ed, when he is not ſo much as named in either reſpect; and when the Repreſenta­tion is the ſame, and of the ſame Perſons in both caſes, only in the Common-Coun­cil-Man, as barely ſuch, it is but Tempo­rary, in the Alderman it is perpetual, in the Alderman the Repreſentation is more con­ſtant; inaſmuch as Courts of Aldermen, are more frequent and more certain than Common-Councils; and inasmuch as he always Acts in his Ward in that capacity, though neither Court of Aldermen, nor Common-Council be Sitting; Laſtly, an Alderman is a Name of greater Honor, and of a Superior Station; but theſe are diffe­rences only in degree, in dignity, and in duration, not in Nature; but as to the Re­preſentation it ſelf, the delegation and the truſt repoſed, tho in a lower Sphere, they are plainly and manifeſtly the ſame in both.

Ninthly, If it be demanded, why was not a new Election of Aldermen appointed, as well as of Common-Council-Men; the An­ſwer is eaſie, the Common-Council, barely as ſuch, are annual Officers, the Aldermen are perpetual; therefore the Common-Council, in being, at the making of this Act, was alto­gether illegal, being wholly choſen ſince the avoidance of the Charter, during which time, all the Proceedings are declared, by this Act, to have been arbitrary and illegal, though ſome of them, for particular Reaſons, con­tained in the Proviſoes were confirmed; but an Alderman being perpetual, all thoſe Al­dermen that were ſo before the Judgment given, and have continued to act as ſuch ever ſince, or are ſtill ſurviving, are con­firmed, the Charter and Franchiſes being yet upon the ſame bottom, and reſtored as exactly as they could be to the ſame ſtate, upon which they ſtood, and in which they were before the aforeſaid Judgment; and for this reaſon, thoſe City-Officers that were ſo in the ſenſe of the controverted Para­graph, before the Date of the Judgment, would have been confirmed of courſe by the general meaning and intention of the Act, without any eſpecial Proviſoe; but that in ſuch Caſes abundans cautela non necet; the Act could not be too cautious or11 too expreſs in an Affair upon which the Subſiſtence and Livelihood of ſo many Per­ſons and Families depended, but now as for thoſe Aldermen who were made ſo, or took upon themſelves to appear and act as ſuch, ſince the bringing of the Judgment, their Choice being vicious and defective in its Root, and they not being confirmed by any ſpecial Proviſo, or ſo much as named in it, they are diſcarded of courſe, and the vacant Wards are of courſe to enter upon a new Choice, when we have ſeen what Vacancies there ſtill remain, after the old and rightful Aldermen, that ceaſed to act for the Reaſons that have been given, have reaſſumed their Gowns.