The Firſt Queſtion.

What Meaſures the King of France vvill take, vvith reſpect to the Succeſſion of the Spaniſh Monarchy?

By ſaying what Meaſures he will take, I mean, what He will in all Probability take, or what his Intreſt will lead him to take; for I ſuppoſe, no Man will imagine I am of his Privy Council.

To debate this Matter, 'tis neceſſary to conſider the King of France ▪ wirh reſpect to the Terms He ſtands in with the reſt of Europe.

If the King of France were Abſolute Maſter of his own Meaſures and had no Leagues or Neighbours to regard; there is no Queſtion to be made, but that reject­ing all Conditions of he would immediately enter upon the Dominions Spain as his own undoubted Inheritance, or at leaſt his Sons; annex the the ſame to the Crown of Fran•e and make it one Entire Empire, and any Man elſe wou'd do the like.

But as He has Meaſures to take with Powerful Neighbours, who as Potent as〈◊〉is, are able to give him Diverſion enough; and if He ſhou'd embroil himſelf with them, may make it a Hazard whether he ſhould obtain it or no; He is too Wiſe a Prince not to ſee that his Intereſt will Oblige him to act in Concert with his Neigh­bours. as far as conveniently He can.

The Truth of this Argument is abundantly confirm'd in the Meaſures He took, and the Alliances He made before the Death of the King of Spain.

They who think the King of France ſo Magnipotent that He values none of his Neighbours, and talk ſo big of him, that like Medal-makers they place him among the Invincibles; muſt have forgot the Siege of Namure, and the Vain Effort of the Power of France to relieve it; they muſt paſs over his Deſerting the Late, and Ac­knowledging the Preſent King of England at the Peace of Reſvvick; they muſt o­verlook the low Steps he was oblig'd to make, to draw the Duke of Savoy from the Confederacy, how he was unable to ſave Caſall. which coſt him ſo much Money; how he delivered the Impregnable Town of Pigneroll, which his Father call'd the Righ He and of France, and which coſt him 100 Millions to fortify; how he mar­ied the Fortune of France to a Daughter of Savoy without a Portion ▪ and bought•he Duke of Savoy at the Price of his Grandſtn's Diſhonour; how he ſurrendred the•arge Dominions of Lorrain ▪ and Luxemburgh, and above 100 Fortified Towns to•he Confederates, which though he were always Maſter of the Field, wou'd coſt him•even Years to recover by the Ordinary Courſe of Sieges and Attacks.

Theſe are plain Demonſtrations, that he found himſelf over match'd by the Confederacy; and he is not a Man of ſo little Sence, as not to know it.

Why elſe in the League now made for the Partition of the Spaniſh Monarchy, ſhou'd be content himſelf with the Dominion the Spa­niards had in Italy, and quit the Delicious Morſel of America to the Houſe of Auſtria.

What Reaſon can any one aſſign for it, but that finding the Eng­liſh and Dutch never to be brought to conſent, to his being ſo very powerful at Sea, as that Addition wou'd make him; he was willing to accept ſo large a Portion as the Italian Part aſſigned to him upon Eaſie Terms, rather than venture like the Dog in the Fable, to looſe all by coveting too much.

Upon theſe Terms therefore, in Conſent with the Engliſh and Dutch, his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty has agreed, that on the Deceaſe of the King of Spain the Spaniſh Monarchy ſhould be thus divid­ed,

All the Dominions with the Spaniards poſſeſs in Italy to be given to the French, Millan excepted, which is to be given to the Duke of Lorrain in Conſideration of the Dutchies of Lorrain and Barr, which are to be yielded to the French, and all the reſt ſome few Towns on the Frontiers of Navarr excepted, to be given to the Arch Duke of Auſtria, with other Particulars needleſs to repeat,

This League being Concluded, the King of Spain (as if had lin­ger'd out his Days only 'till it was thus fix'd) dyes according to cur Account on the 22. October laſt.

The Spaniards on pretence, that they would not have their Mo­narchy divided, and taking no Notice at all of the Right of any Prince to ſucceed; has made a Legacy of his Kingdoms, and given them all away to the Duke D' Anjou, a Prince who has no more Right to it, or Pretence of Right, except as before, than the Prince of Wales or the Czar of Muſcovy.

Now 'tis a Mighty Diſputed Point among our Politicians, what the King of France will do in this New Juncture of Affairs, whether He will ſtand by the Partition agreed on, or accept of the late King of Spains Bounty, and take the Kingdom as a Gift to his Grandson.

What He will do, as is before noted, cannot poſitively be aſſerted;5 but what Reaſon the State and Nature of the thing, and his own Undoubted Intereſt will dictate, to be done by any Prince in his Cir­cumſtances, any one may judge.

If He be the ſame King of France that he has always been, who has very rarely took falſe Meaſures, or baulkt his own Intereſt, if He be guided by the ſame well-mannag'd Council as he used to be, He will certainly adhere to the Poſculata of his Alliance, and quiet­ly accept the Partition of the Spaniſh Monarchy, as it is agreed in the before-mention'd League. For,

By this Acquisition of Italy He ſecures to Himſelf the whole Abſo­lute Dominion of the Mediterranean Sea; He entirely excludes the Houſe of Auſtria from any farther Concern in Italy, He has the Church ſo abſolutely in his Clutches, that He may make himſelf Pope if He thinks ſit; and whenever He is pleas'd to be diſpleas'tl with the Petty Princes of Tuſcany, Parma, Modena, Mantua, &c. He can blow them away with the Breath of his Mouth, they ſhall lay down their Principallities at his Invincible Feet, and count it more an Honour to be call'd Princes of the Blood or Peers of France, than to be Abſolute Lords of their own Dominions. So He ſhall when­ever He thinks fit, re-eſtabliſh the Old Kingdom of the Lombards, and annex it to the Title of France and Navarr.

And all this without the Expence of Treaſure or Hazard of his Armies, without fitting out a Fleet, or fighting at Sea or on Shore; the Engliſh and Dutch being aſſiſtant to put him into the Poſſeſſion of it.

If the Emperor ſhou'd be ſo weak to oppoſe Him, He muſt ſtand up­on his own Leggs, and in the preſent Circumſtance, his Power does not ſeem formidable enough to make the Matter doubtful.

And now we are come to mention the Emperor, let us ſay a Word or Two to thoſe Gentlemen, who in his behalf ſpeak big and ſay, be is able to baffle all theſe Meaſures.

Firſt, They tell you, how powerful the Empire now is by the Ac­quiſition of the Kingdom of Hungary, and the moſt advantagious Peace with the Turk.

They tell you his Imperial Majeſty has an Army of 120 Thouſand Men, beſides the Troops of the Circles which are 80 Thouſand more that of theſe 50 Thouſand lye ready on the Confines of Italy, and all the reſt of his Forces are drawing down to the Rhine, that the Duke6 of Brandenburgh on Condition of being made King of Pruſſia will joyn him with all his Forces that the Duke of Lunenburgh on account of the Ninth Electorate, will maintain 30 Thouſand Men at his own Charge, and thus all the Princes of Italy, are on his ſide.

By theſe they tell you, the Emperor will immediately on the one ſide ſecure Italy and on the other ſide make ſuch a Vigorous Diverſion on the Rhine, that the King of France ſhall have Work enough to ſecure his own Dominions, while in the mean time the Arch-Duke Charles ſhall be ſent into Spain, where the Spanards who natu­rally hate the French, will immediately proclaim him King

Thoſe are great Things indeed, and if the Emperor be ſo ſtrong, he may cut out a great deal of Work for the Confederates, and I'll ſuppoſe, the Emperor ſhould be ſo blind to his own Intreſt as to attempt it, yet ſeems not at all probable, that his Impereal Majeſty who has hardly been able to ſupport himſelf this War in Conjunction with the whole Confederacy of Europe, ſhould imagine himſelf capable of putting a Check to the Power of France, in Conjunction with England and Holland; for whatever he might do in Italy and on the Rhine, he would never be able to defend Spain and Flanders if he really had them in Poſſeſſion,

Firſt, Flanders always which has been maintain'd by the Conjunction of the Dutch, would immediately be entred by the Dutch on one ſide, and the French on the other; and muſt fall into their hands with little difficulty.

Secondly, Spain cou'd never hold out againſt the French by Land, aſſiſted with the Naval Forces of the Engilſh and Dutch by Sea, the Iſlands of the Mediterranean muſt ſubmit to the Maſters of the Sea, and America would lye like the Golden Gar­land to the Wrestlers, to be given to the Conquerors.

No man can imagine, but the Emperor, to whoſe Son ſo Conſiderable a Dominion is allotted will accept of the Partition for his Part, eſpecially when he ſees how impoſſible it will be to make better Conditions by force.

What the Engliſh and Dutch are to do, if he ſhould; remains to be debated un­der another Head.

I'll now ſuppoſe that which to me ſeems very unlekely, That the King of France ſhould accept of this Legacy, and claim the Crown of Spain for his Grandſon the Duke D' Anjou, and attempt th ſet up that Ridiculous Title of a Laſt Will and Teſta­ament, as the Foundation of his Pretenſion.

Let us Calmly conſider the Conſequences.

1. He inevitably renews the War with the whole Con­federacy, that Peace which coſt Him ſo much to procure is immediately broken, upon the firſt Invaſion He makes on the Territories of Spain, who are a Branch of the Confederacy.

2. He renews the War under inſuperable Diſadvan­tages, ſuch as are infinitely greater than He lay under be­fore, and ſuch as loudly tell the World, He never will7 venture to fight the whole Confederacy again. Viz. The Multitude of ſtrong Towns & Cities which he ſurrendred to the Confederates, which are a ſufficient Guar••t•e of the Peace, and the Different Caſe of the Emperor, who is more than 'twice what he was the laſt War, by his Peace with the Turks.

3. If He ſhould make the Duke D' Anjou King, France would really get nothing by the Bargain for in one Age the Race would be all Spaniards again; Nay, in a few Ye­ars Property woul'd prevail, and he woul'd no more let his Brother the Duke of Burgundy when King of France encroach upon him, than the late King of Spain woul'd the preſent King of France, We do not want Inſtances in the World, that Intereſt baniſhes all the Ties of Na­tion and Kindred, when the Duke D'Anjou had been King of Spain ſome time, he would look upon Spain to be his Own, his Native, his Peculiar, and be as far from ſubjecting himſelf to France, becauſe he was born there; as if he had never ſeen it: Poſſibly he might be willing to join Intereſt with France, and it may be join Forces upon Occaſion 'but it muſt be where the Intereſt of the two Nations did not claſh then, and that is almoſt no where, but if ever France encroach upon him, ſhe wou'd find him King of Spain not Duke D'Anjou.

So that all the King of France cou'd get by accepting the Crown of Spain, would be a little preſent Satisfacti­on, to ſee a Son of the Houſe of B•urbon on the Spaniſh Throne, but as King of France he wou'd not be One Farthing the beter for it.

But this would not be all as is before noted, but whenever the preſent Duke of Burgundy comes to Enjoy the Crown of France, it will in all Probability be an Eternal Cauſe of Contention between them: For if the8 Family of France has any Title to Spain 'tis in the Eldeſ•Son of the Family, and there can be no Colour of a Title in the Second Son while the Eldeſt is alive, but what is founded either in the Gift of the One King or the Other.

As to the Gift of the Dauphin to his Second Son the firſt being alive, it cannot be valid; for he has no Po­wer to give away what is his Son's by Inheritance, nor can no more give the Crown of Spain from him than the Crown of France; if Gift could be pleaded, the Grandfather gave it away from them all before they were born: Nay, if the Duke of Burgundy ſhould con­ſent to it, His Children if ever he has any, will declare ▪ he had nothing to do to give away their Right, any more than the preſent King of France had Power to give away the Right of the Dauphin; for ſince the Deficiency of that Action in its own Nature is the whole Ground of the Dauphin's Title now, it will directly deſtroy the Title of the Duke D'Anjou, for what is a good Argu­ment for him cannot be a bad One againſt him.

As to the Gift of the Defunct King of Spain, I ſee no­thing in it to build a Pretence of Right on; If He had bequeath'd it to the Right Heir, I preſume, he wou'd not have thought his Title one jot the better for it. And if he had bequeath'd it to the Grand Seignior, the King of France wou'd not have thought his Title the worſe for it: So that it ſignifies juſt nothing at all.

We come now to the grand Queſtion propoſed.

Queſt. 2. What Meaſures the Engliſh ought to take in this Juncture.

The Anſwer muſt be in Two Parts.

1. Suppoſing the French King adheres to the Parti­tion agreed upon by the League before mentioned.

2. Suppoſing the French King for Reaſons which we know not ſhould think fit to quit the Treaty, and puſh for the whole on the Pretence of a Will made by the King of Spain.

'Tis confeſs'd England, ſince her Troops are broke, and her People more divided in Temper than 'twas hop'd they wou'd have been under ſo mild and gentle a Government, makes but a very mean Figure abroad; and were any King at the Head of her Councils as well as Forces, but King William, hardly any Nation would trouble their Heads to confederate with her.

But all the World does not yet ſee our weak Side, and the Reputation of the King makes us more formi­dable a great deal than we really are.

But we are to act according to the Knowledge we have of what our Circumſtances really are not what other Nations may believe them, leſt we let them know our Weakneſs at the Price of our Deſtruction.

However I'll for the preſent ſuppoſe what all good Men wiſh: That we were in the ſame good Poſture as the War left us, united in Council, and ready for Acti­on, and willing to preſerve the Character we had then in the World.

And Firſt, Suppoſing the King of France adheres to the Partition of the Spaniſh Monarchy.

If ſo, without Queſtion England ought to put her ſelf into ſuch a poſture as to be able, in Conjunction with the Dutch, to force the Emperor and Princes of Italy to comply with the Conditions.

At the ſame time ſo to maintain the Banllance in the Partition, as to oblige the King of France to accept of, and reſt contented with the Particulars ſtipulated in their reſpective Leagues, without farther Encroachment,10 and to make themſelves Truſtees for the reſt, in Beha••of the Heir.

It is already ſtarted as a Query, what if the King o•France does accept of the Partition, and the Empero•ſhou'd continue to ſtand out, the King of France is ther•at Liberty to take the whole if he can get it.

No ſuch Matter, I do not pretend to have been privy to the Debates, or of the Council, in the contriving this League, nor to be acquainted with what Proviſion is made, in caſe the Emperor refuſes to come in, but in order to give a Judgment as near as can be done with­out Doors as we call it. I ſhall briefly ſtate the Reaſons, which in my Opinion ſhould move the Engliſh and Dutch to form this League: And the great Reaſon, which, as I conceive, gave Birth to the firſt Project of this League, ſetting aſide private Reaſons of State, was the maintaining the Ballance of Power in Europe.

This has been the Foundation of all the Wars in our Age againſt the French, and in the laſt Ages againſt the Spaniards and the Emperor.

A juſt Ballance of Power is the Life of Peace. I queſti­on whether it be in the Humane Nature to ſet Bounds to its own Ambition, and whether the beſt Man on Earth wou'd not be King over all the reſt if he could. Every King in the World would be the Univerſal Mon­arch if he might, and nothing reſtrains but the Power of Neighbours; and if one Neighbour is not ſtrong enough for another, he gets another Neighbour to join with him, and all the little ones will join to keep the great one from ſuppreſſing them. Hence comes Leagues and Confederacies; thus the German Proteſtants call'd in the Aſſiſtance of Guſtavus Adolphus to m•ch the Power of the Emperor Ferdinard the 2. and founded the famous11 League call'd the Concluſions of Leipſick, which brought the Imperial Power to the due Ballance which it now ſtands at on the Foot of the Treaty of Weſtphalia; ſo the French and the Engliſh aſſiſted the Dutch to bring the Spaniſh Power to a Ballance in the time of Philip the II. when the Spaniſh Greatneſs began to be terrible to Eu­rope, which Ballance was eſtabliſhed in the Peace of Aix la Chappel.

So the Power of France was brought to a Ballance, but not ſo equal as it might have been, had King Char­les II. ſtood to his own Propoſals at the Treaty of Nime­gune, the Defects of which Peace were in a great Meaſure the Occaſion of this late War, which has been the longeſt, moſt chargeable, and moſt bloody that ever the French Nation has been engaged in ſince the Days of Francis the I. their own civil Wars excepted.

This War has brought the power of France to a Bal­lance, ſhe had fortified her Frontiers with a continued Rampart, a Line of ſtrong Cities from Hunninghen on the Confines of the Swiſs, down the Rhine, the Moſell, and the Maes, to the very Sea-ſide, the greateſt whereof ſhe has been oblig'd to part with, to enable her Enemies to be their own Guarantees; by which in ſome places ſhe is left ſo naked, that ſhe is fain to build new Cities, or fortifie old ones to ſupply the Vacancy, as at Briſack, and in other ſhe lyes wholly open as at Pigneroll; ſhe has ſtoop'd to ſuch a peace, as has made her far leſs for­midable than before.

Now the precarious Life of the King of Spain gave the King of England juſt Umbrage, that this Ballance in which our Safety ſo much conſiſts, ſhould receive a Shock, to the prejudice of the Proteſtant Intereſt, by the Addition of the Spaniſh Dominion to that of France. 12And here I place the Original of the Project, as a pro­bable Conjecture, at leaſt drawn from the Nature of things according to rational Concluſions from probable premiſes, when better Grounds are made publick, I ſhall own my ſelf miſtaken.

When the pretenders to the Spaniſh Succeſſion are conſidered, they are found to be the Emperor and the King of France, the Prince of Bavaria being dead before.

To let the Emperor poſſeſs the Spaniſh Dominions, would be the overthrowing the Ballance made at the Weſtphalia Treaty, by which the Houſe of Auſtria already ſtrengthened by the Conqueſt of Hungaria, and the peace with the Turks would be too potent for the princes of Germany, nor wou'd the French like well that the Em­peror the Eternal Competitor of France upon the Rhine ſhou'd be ſtrengthen'd with ſuch an addition, by which he wou'd ha' been Lord of almoſt half the World.

To let the French poſſeſs the Spaniſh Dominions, would overthrow the Ballance Purchas'd in this War with ſo much Blood and Treaſure, and render fruitleſs the Treaty of Reſwick. Twou'd eſpecially ha' been Fa­tal to the Engliſh and Dutch, by the encreaſe of Wealth from the Maſs of Money returning Yearly from the Em­pires of Mexico, and Peru, which the French wou'd be better Husbands of than the Spaniards, by their encreaſe of Shipping which wou'd make them too ſtrong for all the World at Sea, and by their ruining the Spaniſh Trade which is the greateſt and moſt profitable in Europe; 'twould immediately unhinge all the Settlement of our Merchants and Factories, and turn the whole Channel of Trade; for the ports of Spain being free to the French〈◊〉Subjects, all our Negoce that way wou'd be deſtroy'd, then their Neighbourhood in Flanders, and in the Weſt-Indies, would be intollerable and inſupportable.

O 'twould fill a Volume to ſet down the Inconveni­•ncies which England and Holland muſt expect to feel,•n Caſe the French were Maſters of the Spaniſh Monar­•hy, the Streights-Mouth would be like the Sound, and•ll our Ships ſhould pay Toll at Gibralter, as they do at Elſeneur, your Fiſhing Trade from New-England, and New-foundland wou'd periſh, for the French from the Banks of Newfoundland ſhould go free, and you Pay 23•er Cent. &c. We muſt erect an Admiralty in the Weſt-ln­dies, or mantain a Fleet there, or our Plantations wou'd be always at his Mercy; our Collonies of Virginia, and New-England, would eaſily be deſtroy'd while the French would lye on their backs quite thro' their Country from Ganada to the City of Mexico.

Theſe are ſome of the leſſer Inconveniencies, which as I preſume, were the firſt Motives to the Treaty.

The Conſederats therefore not being willing the French•houl'd have Spain, and the French being reſolv'd the Em••­•or ſhould not have it, a Medium is propoſed that ſince it was not convenient for Europe, that either of them ſhould have〈◊〉•ll, and both of them had a Title to it, it ſhould therefore b•divided between them in Manner and Form, as aforeſaid.

This is the ſhort Hiſtory of this League, which really has more of Pollicy than Right in it, for ſtrictly Conſidered, the Right of Succeſſion can devolve but upon cue Perſon, let that one be who it will, is not the preſent Buſineſs. But publick good, the Peace of Kingdoms, the General quiet of Europe, prevails to ſet aſide the Point of nice Juſtice, and determine in favour of the Publick Tranquility.

And I crave leave to make Two Obſervations here:

Firſt, Our Jacobites-Proteſtant-Brethren, whoſe Underſtand­ings are ſo blind, that they cannot ſee the Intereſt of their Na­tive Country, have here fairly repreſented to them the Con­dition England had now been in, and Europe in General〈◊〉a Papiſt and Conſederate with France had been on the Engliſh14 Throne; if England had not had a King who cou'd ſo far In­fluence the Ambition of the powerful Prince, as to prevent his ſeizing that Monarchy of Spain, which none but England ▪ cou'd hinder him from.

Secondly, Our Non-jurants who hold the right Lines of Princes ſuch Sacred things, may alſo ſee that even among Hereditary Princes themſelves, the Rights of Succeſſion are oftentimes infringed, and the private Intereſt of Princes and Families ſet aſide when the publick Intereſt of Nations, the Preſervation of Peace, and the keeping a General Ballance of Power among Princes, comes to be the Queſtion, and the Hiſ­tories of all Ages and Nations give Inſtances to Prove it as well as this.

Having thus run thro' the Reaſons of this League of Parti­tion, the Queſtion is anſwered of courſe, that if the Emperor ſhou'd refuſe to come into the Partition and puſh for the whole, then the King of France is not thereby at Liberty to poſſeſs the whole, if he can, for that wou'd overthrow all the Meaſures upon which the League of Partition is built.

The Emperor is not ſo weak a Prince to refuſe the King­dom of Spain with all its & c's in the Ocean, Flanders, and Ame­rica, but upon ſome Expectation to get more; the Conſede­rates therefore are to preſerve that part which is Deſign'd him face, and then effectually to put it out of his power to obtain the reſt, and with all not to admit him into the part Reſerv'd for him, till he agrees to accept it on the Terms propoſed; if he ſhou'd abſolutely refuſe it, which is a ridi­culous Suppoſition, there are other Heirs of that Line to have recourſe too, there's no doubt the Crown of Spain, need not go a begging for an Heir.

It may be anſwered, if it be thus, it is the Emperors beſt Courſe to lay his Meaſurer for the whole, and if he connot carry it, he may accept of the Partition at laſt.

That's more than the Objector may be able prove how far the Confederates may think fit to beſtow the remainder, if the Emperor after a War ſhou'd be reduc'd to accept of it, is more than any one can Anſwer, and more than the Em­peror will try, if he be not infatueted worſe than ever a cer­tain15 King was, who if he had not might ha'been a King ſtill.

The Second Branch of the Anſwer is ſuppoſing the King•f France ſhou'd ſo far forget himſelf as to quit the League of Partition ▪ and claim the Crown of Spain for his Grandſon Duk d'Anjou, by Virtue of the Will of the King Defunct.

It muſt certainly then be the Intereſt of England and Hol­and, firſt to put themſelves in ſuch a Poſture as may prevent•he French King ſeizing of Spain it ſelf, and Flanders in Par­•icular.

And upon the Firſt Invaſion of the Territories of Spain by the French King, to Declare War againſt him in the Name of the whole Confederacy as an Infringer of the Grand Peace at Reſwick.

And then by appearing on the Frontiers in ſuch a formi­dable manner as ſhall give him diverſion enought, that he not be able to enter Spain with any conſiderable Forces.

The Firſt of theſe things is to be done immediately by fitt­•ng out a good Fleet, which ſhould ſo Scour the Mediteranean•hat the French wou'd not be able to do much on the ſide of Catalonio, for Experience has told us a Fleet at Sea will make•heir War in Catalonia very uneaſie to them, and by landing〈◊〉ſmall Force of about Eight or Ten Thouſand Men at Fon­erabia, which ſhould be ſufficient to Defend that ſide of the Country from the Invaſions of the French.

But this Pamphlet is not wrot to direct Methods, but to Ara gue the general Point.

The Concluſion of the Argument muſt come to that ſort•f People who have appeared Champions for our Engliſh Liberty, as to Damn all kind of force, as uſeleſs, burthenſom•o the Kingdom and Badges of ſlavery, and all Arguments to•e only pretences for ſupporting Arbitrary Deſigns

If the French ſhou'd attack Spain, I am far from ſaying I•m glad they will be convinc'd; convinc'd; but I muſt ſay I am ſorry•he people of England have been deluded by their ſpecious•retences.

F••if the French carry the Spaniſh monarchy for want of our being in a Condition to〈◊〉it; I am bold to tell thoſe Gentlemen God Almighty muſt be put to the trouble of working another miracle to ſave us, or we are reduc'd to a very dangerous Condition.

But ſay they, we hav. a great Fleet, and in that we are ſafe; it is true, Gentle­men, ſo we are from Invaſion, I believe we need not fear all the World; but what is England without its Trade without its Plantation Trade, Turky Trade, and Spaniſh Trade, and where will that be when a French Garriſon is planted at Cadiz, and the French Fleet brings home the Plate from Havana.

What will the Virgina Collony be worth when the French come to be ſtrong in the Lakes of_____and have a free Commerce from Quebeck to Mexico behind ye, what will our Northern Trade be worth in a War, when the ports of Oſtend and Newport are as full of Pivates as Dunkirk and St. Malo.

A wiſe Man cannot patiently reflect upon the formidable power of France with the Addition of the Spaniſh Dominion, and ſhould he at laſt annex it to the Crown of France, who can conſider without Horrour that all the ports from Sluce in Flanders, to the F•r•Meſſina in Sicily, ſhould be in the Hands of the French, which is a Coaſt of near 3000 Miles, Portugal, Genoua and Leghorn excepted; and how long they will bold out, is eaſie to imagine.

I know God can prevnt Humane Contrivances, and I believe he has plac'd King William on the Engliſh Throne, on purpoſe to dſapoint this Invincible Monarch in theſe vaſt Deſigns. but no Thanks to our Gentlemen that have ſo weakned both his Hands and his Intereſt at home, as to make him leſs able to perform for us what is our own Advantage than His Majeſty wou'd be, and than the Caſe requir'd.

As to Ways and Means I meddle not with them, I leave them to the wiſe Heads of the Nation, but with Submiſſion to their Judgment, this I am poſitive in, let our Meaſures be what they will, if we do not keep the Enemy, the French, I mean out of Spain, we are undone.

In all the Hiſtories of Times and Wars, I never read of a General who would not chuſe to be Maſter of the Field, and able to fight his Enemy, rather than to be coop'd up, and bound to defend the Walls of a Town.

If the French get the Spaniſh Crown, we are beaten out of the Field as to Trade, and are beſieged in our own Iſland, and never let us flatter our ſelves with our Safety conſiſting ſo much in our Fleet; for this I preſume to lay down as a fundamental Axiom, at leaſt as the Wars go of late, 'tis not the longeſt Sword, but the longeſt Purſe that conquers. If the French get Spain, they get the greateſt Trade〈…〉World in their Hands; they that have the moſt Trade, will have the moſt〈…〉and they that have the moſt Money, will have the moſt Ships, the beſt〈…〉the beſt Armies; and if once the French maſters us at Sea, where are〈…〉And though I would not leſſen our Fleet, which I believe is now the beſt in〈…〉yet he that looks back to the French Fleet before their Misfortune, will tell〈…〉all our Engliſh was not able look them in the Face if we had no Dutch on our ſide and hardly with the Dutch and us together.