TO The right Honorable THE COMMONS of ENGLAND Aſſembled in PARLIAMENT;The humble Remonſtrance of his Excel­lency Lord General Fairfax, and his general Councel of Officers held at St Albans, Thurſday the 16. of Novemb. 1648.

OUR Tender regard to the Priviledges, and Freedom of Parliament on which our hopes of common Freedome and Right do ſo much de­pend, and our late experience what Offence many, (even honeſt men) ſeem to have taken, and what advantage evill men have made of our leaſt interpoſing, in any thing of Civill con­ſideration to the Parliament, hath made us for a long time hitherto, (as it ſhould alwayes make us even to utmoſt extremity,) to at­tend in ſilence the Councels and determinations of Parliament concerning all matters of that nature whatſoever; but finding4 you to have been of late upon thoſe tranſactions of higheſt mo­ment, whereupon the life or death of all our Civill Intereſt does depend, and that the publique affairs in your hands (not without the influence of forcible Impulſions from your Enemies, and ſuch as have been ſtirr'd up by them) are brought to the utmoſt criſis of danger (which calls upon every man to contribute what help he can) and ſeeing no effectuall help from elſewhere to ap­pear, we cannot be (becauſe in conſcience and duty to God and men, we hold our ſelves Obliged in ſuch caſe not to be) altoge­ther ſilent, or wanting in ought we can honeſtly ſay or do to hold off impending ruine from an honeſt people, and a good Cauſe.

We are not ignorant, that that Rule of Salus populi ſuprema Lex, is of all others moſt apt to be abuſed, or miſ-applyed, and yet none more ſurely true, it is too ordinary, (eſpecially of late times) for men who either from intentions of evill, or inordi­nate temper of ſpirit, would break thoſe bonds of Law and Ma­geſtracie which they finde to reſtrain them, to frame pretences of publique danger, and extremity thereof, and from thence imme­diatly to aſſume a liberty to break or elſe neglect, and flye above the due bounds of Order and Government, and ſtir up others to the ſame, pleading priviledge from that vaſt large rule of Salus populi, &c. from ſuch miſ-applications, whereof great diſtur­bances do oft ariſe and confuſion is indanger'd; and yet we know the ſame may be juſtly pretended and followed, and that (where it is from honeſt publique intentions, and upon cleer grounds) with very happy effects: We have ſeen, in this our age, ſeve­rall inſtances in both kinds, and the hand of God bearing teſti­monie, and giving Judgment for ſome, and yet againſt others where the pretenſions have been the ſame, or ſo like as it was hard for humane judgement to diſtinguiſh. And indeed ſince the right or wrong of ſuch proceedings depends chiefly upon the good or ill, publique or ſelviſh, ſircere or corrupt intentions of the parties pretending (which humane judgment cannot ordina­rily reach into) and partly upon the juſtneſs, or cauſſeſneſs, ne­ceſſitie or lightneſs, of th' occaſion taken from thoſe againſt whem the pretence is (which again depends partly upon their5 carriages, and partly upon their intentions, the latter whereof is not cleerly or properly under mans judgement and the former without a full knowledge of particulars not eaſie for man to give a certain judgment of) therefore as the engaging upon ſuch pretences and principles does alwayes imply, and is for moſt part expreſly accompanied with appeals to God for Iudgment, ſo 'tis the proper work of God to bear true wit­neſſe and give righteous judgment in ſuch caſes; and as he is alwayes engaged to do it ſooner or later, cleerer or darker, ſo in this Age and part of the world he hath ſee­med both to make haſte to judgment in ſuch caſes (to give it quick and ſpeedy) and alſo to make bare His Arm therein that men may ſee it; and hath appeared, as a ſevere avenger againſt ſuch pretenders, (where it hath been in falſhood, and with evill or corrupt intentions) ſo alſo a diſcoun­tenancer thereof (even where't hath been with good intentions, if not neceſſary in the grounds, or from im­patient temper of ſpirit,) and yet in other Caſes (where, as the ends have been publike and the intentions upright, ſo the grounds weighty, the caſe neceſſary in relation to thoſe ends, and the proceeding ſober, temperate, and but proportionable to the ends, grounds, and neceſſitie) a juſt aſſertor and Patron of the Right and Vindicator of the hidden Truth and ſimplicitie of the pretenders by a glorious preſence with them, and ſucceſſe to them in ſuch proceedings. Neither wants there ground for men to make ſome judgment therein. For certainly he that engageth upon ſuch pretences really for publique ends, and but upon publique ne­ceſſitie or extreamitie, and with a ſober ſpirit, (all which muſt concur to their full juſtification therein) will both try firſt all honeſt wayes poſſible (with ſafetie in thoſe ends) whereby he may accompliſh them and avoyd the danger (if poſſible) with due regard to, and by concurrence or with preſervation of the Magiſtracie and Government un­which God hath ſet him, before he will flye to wayes of extremitie, neither will he (when ingaged therein) pro­ceed further or longer in that way againſt or without the Mageſtracie then that firſt neceſſitie or ſome other (emer­gent6 upon the proceeding) does juſtly leed, and the ſecuri­tie of the ends require (not driving that pretence of neceſſity further to ſerve or advantage himſelfe or perpetuate thoſe wayes of extremity) but when the neceſſitie or danger is over, and the publique ends ſecured, will return to Magi­ſtracy and Order again, and mean while ſo act in all as carefully to avoyd both injury to the innocent and offence to the weak, and as ſubjecting or expecting, and ready to ſubject all to an indifferent and equall judgment, (even of men) if and when it can be found and really indeavouring to find it. For our parts both prudentiall conſiderations, and the experience we have of the danger that is in the leaſt breaking or letting looſe or entangling the reines of Order and Government, upon ſuch pretences makes us moſt ten­der of it, (as that which is never otherwiſe to be uſed or admitted, then as a deſperate cure in a deſperate caſe, and at the utmoſt perill as well of them that uſe it, as of thoſe for whom) and the experiences we have ſeen of Gods righteous Judgments in ſuch caſes as it makes us not apt (without trembling and fear) to think of ſuch procee­dings, ſo much the more ſtrict to obſerve all the aforeſaid cautions concerning them, and yet where juſt occaſion and a reall publique neceſſitie calls thereunto, not to fear ſuch appeals to God for any outward difficulties or dangers ap­pearing to our ſelves therein; But both from divine and humane conſiderations as we do and ever ſhall avoyde the occaſions by all means poſſible (even to utmoſt extremitie) and do pray and hope we may never come to it, ſo (if ever ſuch extremitie do happen to us) we hope (through the grace of God) we ſhall be carefull and enabled, both in the engaging and proceeding therein; ſo to act as before the Lord, and to approve our ſelves both to God and good men, and as ſubmitting to the judgement of both. And therefore though we are full of ſad apprehenſions of preſent dangers to the publicke intereſt, and the extremity even at hand, yet we ſhall firſt in all humbleneſſe and ſoberneſſe of minde, and with all cleerneſſe (as God ſhall inable us) remonſtrate to you our apprehenſions both of the dan­gers7 at hand, and of the remedies, with our grounds in both.

Firſt therefore, we muſt minde You of Your Votes once paſt concerning no more Addreſſes to the King, &c. and our Engagement to adhere to you therein: Concerning which we ſhall not invite you to look back to any grounds thereof, further then to what your ſelves declared and publiſhed thereupon, and what we in that our Engagement did ſumma­rily lay down as our ſatisfaction therein: We ſhall onely wiſh it may be remembred how free you were therein, and what ſtate You and the Kingdome were in then, and how it fared with You thereupon, untill you began to recede, and how upon and ſince your receding.

For the firſt (what ever evill men may ſlandrouſly ſuggeſt in relation to other matters, yet) in this ſurely none can ſay you were acted beyond your own free Judgements, we are ſure, not by any impulſion from the Army; ſince nothing that ever paſt from us to you before did look with any Aſ­pect that way, but rather to the contrary; (we may ſpeak it with ſorrow and ſhame in relation to that unbeleef or diſtruſt in God, and thoſe carnall feares of publique diſtur­bance from which we had before been acted, ſo much the other way) ſo that in that particular the juſter Reſolutions of this Houſe did not onely lead us, but help to reclaim us, from thoughts too much wandring the contrary way.

For the latter you may remember, that when you took thoſe reſolutions, diſcontent (even to diſtraction) did abound all the Kingdome over, in the people, for the bur­then of numerous and unſetled Forces, and the oppreſſion of Free quarter by them, and in the Souldiers for want of pay and ſatisfaction or ſecuritie in point of Arrears and in­dempnitie (their diſcontents increaſing with their Arrears) and indeed the Souldiery (in regard thereof and of ſome harſh provocations to them and your former uncertaintie in any way of ſettlement) ſomething looſe towards your ſelves, and their proper Government, and diſpoſed too much, to diſturbances amongſt themſelves. But upon thoſe8 Reſolutions of yours againſt any further Addreſſes to the King, &c. (which all men underſtood to imply ſome fur­ther intentions of proceeding in Juſtice againſt him and ſet­ling the Kingdome without him) immediatly the unſetled­neſſe of mens minds and jealouſies of ſeverall parties (con­cerning ones complyance with and ſeeking advantage from the Kings partee againſt the other) were greatly allayed, and (together with his opportunities and advantages to cajole, or inſinuate with one or other) did ſeem to be taken away, and it pleaſed God, inſtantly to leade you into ſuch other Councels and wayes, whereby the burthen and grievances of Free quarter were immediatly taken off, ſupernumerarie Forces disbanded, the reſt put into an eſtabliſhed way of pay, the Arrears in ſome meaſure ſecured, and further growth thereof prevented, the diſtempers amongſt the ſouldiery quieted, and they reſetled in good Order and Diſcipline, and their hearts (with all honeſt and ſober mens) firmely knit unto you, and the whole affaires of the Kingdome in an hopefull poſture for a ſettlement.

But when, the Houſe being called (as it were) on purpoſe for a ſettlement, in ſtead thereof, upon what jealouſies of ſome amongſt your ſelves, what private animoſities, envy­ings and vindictive deſires of others (giving up themſelves, with diſpending or neglect of the common and publique intereſt, to minde particular intereſts and parties, and to ſeek and take advantages againſt their oppoſites even from hoped (if not formed) compliances of common enemies and appearances from Forraign parts on their behalf, where­by to work out revenge againſt thoſe they immediatly malig­ned,) or from what crafty inſinuations of corrupt members and alwayes falſe to the publique intereſt or upon what other evill principles, we are unwilling to remember or imagine; when (we ſay) upon thoſe (inſtead of a ſettlement upon the former foundation) you began to entertain motions tending to the unſettlement of what you had reſolved, and when by that uncertainty and unſetledneſs of Councels appearing within your ſelves, and the anſwerable inſinuations and influences of ſeverall Members (according to their ſeverall bents and deſires9 unto their reſpective Correſpondents and Friends abroad, the mindes of men without alſo became proportionably unſetled, toſ­ſed too and fro with various apprehenſions & expectations which way things would bend, and all to ſee ſuch vaſt uncertainty of any ſettlement or end of troubles upon the Parliamentary account a­lone: then (and not till then) began the generality of the people to be apt for any new motions, eſpecially ſuch as look'd towards a ſettlement any way; and then began your enemies to conceive freſh hopes and confidences, and beſtirr'd themſelves accordingly, to work your trouble, and their own advantages. The moſt ſubtill and ſober of them (diſſembling the intereſt of their own partie, and reſerving that at the bottom, as cloſe and unſeen as might be, and taking their riſe even from that unſetledneſſe, and thoſe grounds of jealouſies and diviſion they found amongſt your ſelves, and the ſeverall parties pretending to Parliamentary intereſt, and from that diſpoſition they found in one party by any means to take advantage and revenge againſt the other) they made pretences part­ly of publick Intereſt, and partly of the very particular Intereſts of that party which they found moſt diſcontented amongſt your ſelves, the foundations whereupon to raiſe new diſturbances, and therein to ingage a numerous and mixt party; but upon ſuch grounds, and in ſuch a way, wherein the Intereſt of the King and his party were ſo incorporated throughout, as that the pro­ſecution of all the other Intereſts pretended (in the way that was laid) ſhould carry on, and at laſt ſet up that of the Kings and their own above all others. Thus, the Army (which after all poſſible tryals and temptations they found would never be won to be their friends, ſo as to deſert the Parliamentary and Publick In­tereſt to ſerve their turns,) being therefore induſtriouſly by them (with the furtherance of diſcontented parties amongſt your friends) rendered the onely common Enemy, and they themſelves (as it were) friends to all but it, and that ſuppoſed party in Parlia­ment and Kingdom that cordially upheld it: they and their buſie promoters of Petitions (ſtirred up by their Emiſſaries or Agents in all Counties, for the engaging and cementing of this new form'd and intended generall party) being all taught the ſame language, at firſt profeſſe fair. For the Parliament, or nothing a­gainſt it; but to be for a full and free Parliament, and to deliver10 it from the force of an Army; pretend for the Liberty of the ſub­ject alſo (to free them from the oppreſſion and tyranny of an Army) to be for the Law of the Land againſt the Arbitrary power of a Faction in parliament ſetting up and ſupporting themſelves above Law by the power of an Army; (whereas, in truth, their great and lateſt quarrell againſt the Army, was, That it would not force the Parliament to comply with the will and intereſt of the King, to the prejudice of the Kingdoms Liberties, and of the power of Law therein, nor deſert the Parliament in their adherence to theſe againſt the King.) They pretended like­wiſe to be much for the eaſe of the people, to free them from Taxes and Contributions to an Army, to be for the ſettlement of peace in the Kingdom, that there might be no need of an Army; (whereas, 'twas indeed, their reſtleſſe workings, and watching all advantages, by parties within this Kingdom, or Forraign aids, to ſet up their own and the Kings Intereſt, to the ruine of the Parlia­ment, and enſlaving of the Kingdom, that did neceſſitate the Par­liament to continue an Army and taxes to maintain it.) They pre­tended for Religion too, and for Reformation, and the Cove­nant, againſt an Army of Sectaries and oppoſers thereof: yea, they yet pretended even for the Army it ſelf (as to the Body of it, and all but a faction of Officers in it, ſupporting themſelves in power and dominion by it) that the Army might be ſatisfied their Arrears, and go home: And for all theſe fair ends, (preſuming up­on the Parliaments unſetledneſſe and weakneſſe, as not able, or not knowing how to provide for any of theſe things of them­ſelves without the King) a perſonal Treaty with the King muſt be held forth as the onely ſoveraign ſalve. Thus the people being made to depend mainly upon the King for all, and his Intereſt made neceſſary to all, the other pretences were but made uſe of to ſerve his ends, and an eaſie way made to ſet up him and his Inter­eſt above all. As to the hypocriſie of theſe pretences, we need ſay nothing more; The Lord himſelf in our ſilence (even when by ſuch pretexts, and their quick proceedings upon them, they had made ſuch engaging work for us in all parts, as gave us no leiſure to ſay any thing for the undeceiving of men, or vindicating our ſelves, or ſo much as to make any publick verball appeal to him for it) hath yet from heaven judged them, and born a cleer teſtimony a­gainſt11 them in defeating, with a ſmall handful, the numerous parties, they had thus engaged within the Kingdom, and drawn from elſewhere, (under the very ſame pretexts) to invade it; and breaking the force of thoſe deſignes, ſo cunningly and taking­ly laid, and ſo ſtrongly backt with advantages, as 'twas ſcarce imaginable (in humane reaſon,) all things conſidered, how to avoid them.

But however (working upon that unſetledneſs in the peo­ples mindes, which the uncertaintie and Diviſions in your own Councels had occaſioned; and having the advantage of that general diſpoſition, in a burthened and troubled people, to en­tertain any motions, and follow any party, pretending to end their troubles, and eaſe their burthens, againſt the preſent party in power, from whom immediately they apprehend them,) they made a ſhift to engage multitudes to Petition for theſe things; and thence, under the pretence of freeing the Parliament from force, to raiſe Arms and leavy War againſt it (at beſt) to inforce their Petitions, and under the notion of freeing the peo­ple from taxes to the Parliament, and quarter to the Army; to make them incur greater charges and burthens, for the King and his party, and (by withholding their taxes from the Parlia­ment) to neceſſitate free quarter again upon themſelves (which before they were delivered from) and under the notion of ſetling Peace, and the Liberties of the Kingdom, to break that we had, and ingage the people in another War on the Kings behalf, againſt the Parliament and their own Liberties, and to get his party, (with Commiſſions derived from him,) into the conduct and manage of it.

But whileſt therein (with open force) they do their utmoſt to deſtroy and ſubdue you, they omit not the driving on of that ſureſt part in their deſigne (a perſonal Treaty) to deceive you. To promote which, they had (beſides numerous, and daily Peti­tioners from all parts, deluded and drawn in by the aforeſaid ſpecious pretences) the deluded multitude and rabble about the City, with the old Malignants, new Apoſtates, and late diſcon­tented party, both in the City and Parliament it ſelf; the one at your elbows, the other in your boſoms, preſſing you inceſſantly: The Lords, in every thing (relating to the Treaty) cloſing readily12 with the deſires of the City Malignants, the Prince, and all your Enemies; and in their Votes for the ſame, going before you, and haling you after (although in things concerning the proſecution of the War in your own, and the Kingdoms neceſſa­ry defence; (eſpecially in declaring with you againſt thoſe viſible Enemies and Actors therein. (The Scots Army and others) they would neither lead nor follow.) And when, at any thing pro­pounded towards the Treaty (wherein you found the very life of your Cauſe, and the Kingdoms to be concerned,) you were loath to give up that, and thereupon made ſome ſtick; then clamorous Petitions for a concurrence, come thick from the City, with menaces inſinuated; many debaucht Reformadoes, the deſperate Cavaliers, and rude multitude about the City, ring in your ears with raylings and threats, many faithful Members, particularly frighted, or driven out of Town, forces liſted and gathering daily about you; and this, the City, neither taking courſe to re­ſtrain, nor ſuffering their Major General to do it; but oppoſing and incountring his and your Authority, in what he, by it, at­tempted for your ſafety and freedom; and theſe courſes never ceaſed, until you had fully agreed to a Perſonal Treaty, on ſuch terms, as His Majeſtie Himſelf was pleaſed to entertain.

By theſe means, and ſuch continued uſage, from the City, and thoſe in and about it (at whoſe mercy, you were, while your Army was engaged at diſtance againſt your Enemies in arms) by that time God had broke all their forces, delivered moſt of them into your hands and cruſht all their hopes of avayling that way: We finde them at laſt, drawn into this miſerable inconvenience of a perſonal Treaty with him, and his adherents, who had ſo long and unceſſantly tryed all Intereſts, and wearied all friends in this, and many forraign Nations, by force, to deſtroy or ſub­due you. In which, though we ſee more utter and leſs avoyd­able danger to the Kingdoms Cauſe, and to all the godly and honeſt people engaged with you, then before, in your loweſt or worſt conditions, we ever yet apprehended.

Yet conſidering the premiſes, and how great the change is from Votes of no more Addreſſes, to (not your wonted poſitive ſending of Propoſitions anew, but) a Treaty, a Perſonal Trea­ty, without any previous ſatisfaction or ſecurity, and a Treaty13 upon what Propoſitions he ſhould make, as well as your own (all which, both Houſes, yea, both Kingdoms have ſo often, and always before declined, voted, and declared againſt, as deluſive and dangerous, yea deſtructive, while the Parliament was un­queſtionably moſt free.)

We cannot but conceive, That at that time, and in thoſe Re­ſolutions for ſuch a Treaty, the judgment of Parliament, was not with due, and former Freedom. And therefore not diſpair­ing, but that (as men drawn or driven into dangerous ſtraits) you may readily entertain, or at leaſt, favorably reſent, any thing of Light, or encouragement, that may be offered towards the ſaving or extricating of your ſelves, and thoſe you are intruſted for: We ſhall, with all plainneſs and faithfulneſs, repreſent to you our Conceptions, where the main danger ſeems to lie, and where any way to eſcape. And we hope, 'twill be thought no arro­gance in us, or diſparagement to your Wiſdoms, ſince lookers on may (poſſibly) ſee ſomething, the gameſters do not.

For the evils and dangers of this Perſonal Treaty, had it been admitted to be indeed with his perſon in Parliament (eſpecially at London,) and in a full condition of honor, freedom, and ſafety, (which had implyed, That after all the trouble, loſs, hazard, and the expence of blood, and treaſure he had put the Kingdom unto, he ſhould be admitted to his Throne, and Office, without any ſatisfaction before given for what was paſt, or ſecurity againſt the like in future,) the evil and danger thereof had been ſo viſible, as nothing had need to have been ſaid to unfold it. As it is now admitted and qualified for circumſtances (the caſe being as't has pleaſed God to make it, That the King has no power in field whereby to take advantages during the Treaty,) we ſhall ſay nothing to any dangers of that kinde (ſuppoſing no agree­ment) ſave to wiſh you conſider the opportunities of laying Deſignes for his eſcape, or otherwiſe, and of ſetling future cor­reſpondences, which the company and confluence of ſuch per­ſons about him does afford: But we ſhall chiefly conſider, the great evil or danger of ſeeking to him by Treaty, in your preſent caſe, and of an agreement or accommodation to be thereby made with him, including his impunity and reſtitution to his freedom, revenue, dignity, office or government.

Now, as to that, the great Queſtions will be,

1. Whether (as your, and this Kingdoms Caſe ſtands) ſuch an Accommodation would be: (Firſt,) Juſt or good, and ſo de­ſireable, or (if not,) where the injuſtice or evillies? (Secondly,) Whether ſafe, and to be admitted, or (if not) where the danger lies?

2. (Admitting that upon ſome ſuppoſitions, it might be good or ſafe,) Whether yet it can be ſo, or ſuch a one can be had in the way and conditions of this Treaty, as the caſe ſtands?

If either in the General, or in reſpect of your and the King­doms preſent Caſe, and of the way and conditions of this Treaty, it cannot be ſafe, then it concerns the Parliament not to admit ſuch an accommodation or agreement upon this Treaty; and (though it might be ſafe, yet,) if it be otherwiſe evil, or not good, then you have no reaſon, but to uſe any free­dom or juſt grounds remaining to decline it.

To theſe Queſtions therefore, becauſe the ſafety or danger, good or evil in Queſtion, is chiefly in relation to the Publike Intereſt of the Kingdom, and not ſo much to particular mens, (though even the particular ſafety of ſuch as have engaged for the Publike, is not to be neglected,) to lead our ſelves and others to the clearer judgment in the point; we ſhall premiſe a ſtating of the Publike Intereſt in Queſtion, in oppoſition to the Kings, and of his particular Intereſt oppoſed thereto.

The ſum of the Publike Intereſt of a nation, in relation to common Right and Freedom, (which has been the chief ſubject of our conteſt,) and in oppoſition to tyranny and injuſtice of Kings or others, we take to lie in theſe things following.

1. That for all matters of ſupreme truſt or concernment to the ſafety and welfare of the whole, They have a common and ſupreme Councell or Parliament; and that (as to the common behalf, who cannot all meet together themſelves) to conſiſt of15 Deputies or Repreſenters freely choſen by them, with as much equality as may be, and thoſe Elections to be ſucceſſive and re­newed, either at times certain and ſtated, or at the Call of ſome ſubordinate ſtanding Officer or Councell entruſted by them for that purpoſe, in the Intervals of the ſupreme, or elſe at both.

2. That the power of making Laws, Conſtitutions, and Offices, (for the preſervation and government of the whole) and of altering or repealing, and aboliſhing the ſame (for the remo­vall of any publick grievance therein) and the power of finall Judgment concerning War or peace, the ſafety and welfare of the people, and all civill things whatſoever, without further Appeal to any created ſtanding power, and the ſupreme truſt in relation to all ſuch things, may reſt in that ſupreme Councell: ſo as;

1. That the ordinary ordering and Government of the peo­ple may be by ſuch Offices and Adminiſtrations, and according to ſuch Laws and Rules, as by that Councell or the Repreſenta­tive body of the people therein, have been preſcribed or allowed, and not otherwiſe.

2. That none of thoſe extraordinary or Arbitrary powers afore-mentioned, may be exerciſed towards the people by any, as of right, but by that ſupreme Councell, or the Repreſenta­tive body of the people therein, nor without their advice and conſent, may any thing be impoſed upon, or taken from the people; or if it be otherwiſe a tempted by any, That the peo­ple be not bound thereby but free, and th'attempters puniſh­able.

3. That thoſe extraordinary power or any of them, may be exerciſed by that ſupreme Councell, or by the Repreſentative body of the people therein, and where they ſhall ſee cauſe to aſſume and exerciſe the ſame, in a matter which they finde ne­ceſſary for the ſafety or wel-being of the people, their procee­dings and determinations therein, may be binding and conclu­ſive16 to the people, and to all Officers of Juſtice and Miniſters of ſtate whatſoever: and that it may not be left in the will of the King or any particular perſons (ſtanding in their own intereſt) to oppoſe, make void, or tender ineffectuall ſuch their determi­nations or proceedings; and eſpecially (ſince the having of good conſtitutions, and making of good laws were of little ſecurity or〈◊〉, without power to puniſh thoſe that breake or go about to••••throw them; and many ſuch caſes may happen, wherein one former lawes have not preſcribed or provided ſufficiently for that purpoſe, or the ordinary officers entruſted therewith may not be faithfull or not able, duly to execute ſuch puniſh­ments on many offendors in that kinde; that therefore the ſame Councell or Repreſentative body therein (having the ſu­pream truſt) may in all ſuch caſes where the offence or default is in publike Officers (abuſing or failing their truſt) or in any perſon whatſoever (if the offence extend to the prejudice of the publike) may call ſuch offendors to account and diſtribute pu­niſhments to them, either according to the Law, (where it has provided) or their own Judgement (where it has not, and they finde the offence, though not particularly provided againſt by particular Lawes, yet, againſt the generall law of reaſon or Nati­ons, and the vindication of publike intereſt to require juſtice) and that in ſuch caſe, no perſon whatſoever may be exempt from ſuch account or puniſhment, or have power to protect o­thers from their judgement or (without their conſent) to par­don whom they have judged.

Theſe things contain the ſum or main of publike intereſt, and as they are the ordinary ſubject of civill conteſts in all mixt ſtates, where they happen betwixt the people, and thoſe that have aſſumed or claimed a ſtanding priviledge or prerogative over them, ſo they have been in this of ours. And againſt theſe matters of publike intereſt this King hath (all along his raign) oppoſed, and given himſelf up to uphold and advance the intereſt of his and his poſterities will and power; firſt, That there might be no ſuch Common Councell (no Parlia­ments) at all, to reſtrain or check him, but that all theſe matters of ſupreme truſt concerning ſafety and all things elſe17 might reſt in him and his breſt alone, without limit from or account to any on Earth, and that all thoſe extraor­dinary and Arbitrary Powers over the people, their Lawes, Liberties, Properties (yea, their perſons and conſciences too) might bee exerciſed at pleaſure by himſelfe, and ſuch as hee pleaſed to derive the ſame unto; and as they were aſſumed, ſo how vaſtly and ſadly ill they were exerciſed by him to the prejudice and oppreſſion of the people in gene­rall, and the ruine or perſecution of all the godly of the Land; yea, even of thoſe that were but ſober and honeſt to civill Intereſt, ſurely (unleſſe the greater preſſures here hath ſince wrought himſelfe or brought upon us, by ne­ceſſitating the Parliament thereunto, have ſwallowed up the former in Oblivion) we need not yet make any verball remembrance: To ſupport himſelfe in that ſtate or height of Tyranny and make it abſolute, He raiſ'd his firſt and ſecond Armes againſt his people in both Kingdomes, when hee found hee could not keep up to that height, to have all thoſe extraordinary powers and matters of Supreme ab­ſolute truſt in himſelfe alone, them be fell to play lower; that at leaſt none of them might bee exerciſed by any other without him, no not by all the Truſtees of the Land, nor in any caſe though never ſo neceſſary for the releife or ſaving of the people. That if (according to his former claim) his people and Parliament would not admit him poſitively to oppreſſe or deſtroy them at his will, yet by this latter, they ſhould have no power to redreſſe agrievance, to pro­vide for the freedom welfare, or ſo much as immediate ſafety of themſelves or the Kingdome, but at and according to his pleaſure; and for this (when the Parliament did otherwiſe aſſume in point of immediate ſafety and pu­niſhment of Delinquents without him) he rais'd his third Armes, and held them up ſo long and ſo much, to the ſpoyle and neare deſolation of the Kingdome, till God wholly broke them, and brought himſelfe captive into your hands. And in this, though he raiſed them with the pretence only of oppoſing the exerciſe of thoſe extraordi­nary and Arbitrary Powers by your ſelves or any other18 without him, (which would not be allowed himſelfe to ex­erciſe alone,) yet in the raiſing and having rais'd that force, he did by it aſſume and exerciſe all kinds of abſolute and Arbitrary Powers at his own will alone without Parliament; and how much further he would have gone in exerciſe of the ſame, (had he prevail'd as you) we may eaſily imagine. But as to that part of his claime againſt the publike Intereſt, viz. That there might be no power in Parliament to provide for immediate ſafety, or doe ought elſe for the people but at and according to his will) how obſtinately (even ſince God gave him and his party wholly into your hands) hath he main­tained and perſiſted in it, (even ſo long as from forraign parts, or Allies, from Iriſh, Scots, from your own diviſions or diſcontents of the people (at the burthens he neceſſi­tated you to continue upon them) he had any hopes by force to prevaile againſt you or avoid any conceſſion againſt that claime) and of this his ſo many denials to the Pro­poſitions of Peace, which both Houſes and both Kingdomes have ſo often tendred and renewed, yea, of thoſe foure only Bills, (concerning purely that publike Intereſt, and but a ſmall part of it, together with eſſentiall precautions for a Treaty,) doe aford abundant evidence; As to which laſt tender, it is apparent he had no pretext left for refuſall, from either ſcruple of Conſcience, matter of harſhneſſe to his party, or ought elſe, but the meer Intereſt of will and power, to himſelfe and his, which ſome Scottiſh and other correſpon­dencies (it ſeemes) then gave him hopes, yet by force to uphold; inſomuch as upon that refuſall (added to all the former) you found it neceſſary at laſt to take up thoſe reſo­lutions of no further addreſſes to him, but to ſettle the Peace of the Kingdom without him, and ſecure it and your ſelves againſt him, and in order thereto to keep his perſon in ſafe Cuſtody at Carisbrook Caſtle. But when (his other claimes ſo farre failing) it came to this, He that before would not have allowed the Parliament or Kingdom a Power for ſafety but at his will, would (at leaſt,) make you know, that, nor You nor the Kingdome ſhould have any Peace or quiet without him, and that neither Parliament nor any19 Power on Earth (what ever ills he had done,) might for it attach or meddle with his Sacred Perſon, no not ſo much as to ſecure him from opportunities of doing more; and for this laſt part of his Intereſt his fourth Armes, (the laſt warre) was rais'd (by Commiſſions from himſelfe to the Prince, and from him to as many more as would take any) and for the ſame, the Scotiſh Invaſion was procured. The pretext or quarrell in this laſt Engagement, ſeemed (as it were) to reach no higher then only to reſcue his priviledged Perſon, and force the Parliament, yet in a Perſonall Treaty, to ſeek Peace at his will, and to let them ſee they could not other­wiſe have it, not might doe ought againſt his perſon (no not to ſecure him from doing further miſchief) though he make Warre and refuſe Peace never ſo long: And for this laſt piece of his Intereſt (as oppoſite and deſtructive to that of the Pub­lick as any of the former) though a Divine Teſtimony has been born againſt it, as full and more glorious (if poſſible) then before, againſt any of the reſt as if God would thereby declare his deſigning of that Perſon to Juſtice; yet the Parliament after all this, reſtoring him (without any pre­ſatisfaction or ſecurity) unto a kinde of Liberty and State, only that he might appeare in a capacity to Treat, and then by Treaty ſeeking their Peace, and all their matters (before contended for, and (though God) gained againſt him) to come now as conceſſions from his will, doe clearely yeeld back that laſt piece of his claimed intereſt into his hands againe, and indeed (therewith) ſeem to render a more reall acknowledgement and yeelding to him, and againſt Parli­ament and Kingdome (as to the precedent juſt right of what ever's now demanded or granted as from him,) then all his verball wreſted conceſſions or confeſſions will be underſtood, to be unto Parliament or Kingdome, as to any future clear­ing or aſſurance of thoſe things.

But (to return to our purpoſe) The matters aforemen­tioned being the maine parts of publique intereſt original­ly contended for on your parts, and theirs that ingaged with you, and thus oppoſed by the King for the intereſt of his will and power, many other more particular or ſpeciall intereſts have occaſionally faln into the conteſt on each par­ty;20 As firſt on the Parliaments part, to protect and coun­tenance religious men and godlineſſe in the power of it, to give freedome and inlargement to the Goſpell, (for the en­creaſing and ſpreading of light amongſt men) to take away thoſe corrupted formes of an out-ſide religion and Church government, (whether impoſed without Law, or rooted in the Law in times of popiſh ignorance or idolatry, or of the Goſpels dimmer light) by meanes whereof, ſnares and chaines were layd upon conſcientious and zealous men, and the generallity of people held in darkneſſe, ſuperſtition, and a blind reverence of perſons and outward things fit for po­pery and ſlavery; and alſo to take away or looſen that de­pendance of the Clergy, and Eccleſiaſticall affaires upon the King, and that intereſt of the Clergy in the Lawes and ci­vill affaires, which the craft of both in length of time had wrought for each other; (which ſeverall things were the proper ſubject of the Reformation endeavoured by the Parli­ament.) Contrary wiſe on the Kings party, the intereſt was to diſcountenance and ſuppreſſe the power of godlineſſe, or any thing of conſcience obliging above or againſt humane and outward conſtitutions, to reſtraine or leſſen the preach­ing of the Goſpel, and growth of light amongſt men, to hold the community of men (as much as might bee) In a darkſome ignorance and ſuperſtition, or formality in Religi­on, with only an awfull reverence of perions, offices, and out­ward diſpenſations (rendring them fit ſubjects for eccleſiaſti­call and civill tyranny) and for theſe ends to advance and ſet up further formes of ſuperſtition, or at leaſt hold faſt the old which had any foundation in the Laws, (whereby chains and ſetters might be held upon, and advantages taken a­gainſt ſuch in whom a zeale or conſcience to any thing above man ſhould breake forth) and to uphold and maintaine the dependance of the Clergy and Church matters upon the King and greatneſſe of the Clergy under him, and in all theſe things to oppoſe the Reformation endeavoured by the Par­liament. Alſo on the Parliaments party, their intereſt (as well as duty) was to diſcountenance irreligion, prophaneſſe, debauchery, vanity, ambition and time ſerving, and to pre­ſer ſuch eſpecially as were otherwiſe given, [viz. conſci­encious,21 ſtrickt in manners, ſober, ſerious, and of plaine and publique ſpirits.] Contrary to theſe, on the Kings party, it was to countenance or connive at prophaneſſe, looſeneſſe of manners, vanity, and luxury of life and preferre eſpecially ſuch as had a mixture of ambition, and vain-glory with a ſer­vile ſpirit, rendring them fit to ſerve anothers power and greatneſſe, for the enjoying of ſome ſhare therein to them­ſelves; in all or moſt of which reſpects, it has been the great happineſſe and advantage to Parliamentary and publique in­tereſt, that it hath been made one (very much) with the in­tereſt of the godly, or (for the name whereof it has been ſo much derided) the Saints: as on the otherſide the King's, one with their greateſt Oppoſites, by occaſion whereof God hath been doubly engaged in the cauſe, (viz. for that, and for the righteouſneſſe of it.) And to this indeed (through the fa­vour and preſence of God therewith,) the Parliament hath cauſe to owne and referre the bleſſing and ſucceſſe that hath accompanied their affaires, which (accordingly as they have held ſquare, and been kept cloſe to this) have proſpered glo­riouſly, and (wherein, or ſo oft as this hath been thwarted, ſwerved from, or neglected in their manage,) have ſuffered miſerable blaſtings.