Doctor HAMMOND his〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or A greater Ardency in Chriſt〈◊〉love of God at one time, than another PROVED TO BE ƲTTERLY IRRECONCILEABLE With
By HENRY IEANES, Miniſter of Gods Word at Chedzoy in Somerſet-ſhire.
OXFORD, Printed by HENRY HALL, Printer to the UNIVERSITY, for THOMAS ROBINSON. 1657.
1. I Was very willing to hearken to the ſeaſonable advice of many, and to wholly withdraw my ſelfe à foro contentioſo, to ſome more pleaſing, and profitable imployment; but diſcerning it to be the deſire of the Author of the Booke, intituled, A mixture of Scholaſticall and Practicall Divinity, that I ſhould reply to his examination of one paſſage of mine againſt Mr Cawdrey, I ſhall make no ſcruple immediately to obey him; not only becauſe it may be done in very few words, but eſpecially becauſe the doctrine which he affixeth to me, ſeems (and not without ſome reaſon) to be contrary to the truth of Scripture, which I am to looke on with all reverent ſubmiſſion, & acquieſce in, with captivation of underſtanding, and ſo not aſſert any thing from mine owne conceptions, which is but ſeemingly contrary to it.
2. The propoſition which he affixes to me, is this; That Chriſts Love of God was capable of further degrees, and that he refutes as a thing contrary to that point (a truth of Scripture) which he had in hand, viz. The dwelling of fulneſſe of all habituall Grace in Chriſt.
3. By this I ſuppoſe I may conclude his meaning to be, that I have affirmed Chriſts Love of God (meaning thereby that habituall grace of divine Charity) to have been capable of further degrees, ſo as that capacity of further degrees, is the deniall of all-fulneſſe of that habituall grace already in him.
4. And truly, had I thus expreſt my ſelfe, or let fall any words, which might have been thus interpretable, I acknowledg I had been very injurious not only to the verity of God, but alſo to my own conceptions, and even to the cauſe which I had in hand, which had not been ſupported, but betrayed by any ſuch apprehenſions of the imperfection of Chriſts habituall graces.
5. This I could eaſily ſhew, and withall how cautiouſly and expreſly2 it was fore-ſtall'd by me; But to the matter in hand, it is ſufficient, that I profeſſe I never thought it; but deem it a contrariety to expreſſe words of Scripture in any man who ſhall think it, and in ſhort, that I never gave occaſion to any man to believe it my opinion, having never ſaid it in thoſe words which he ſets up to refute in mee, never in any other that may be reaſonably interpretable to that ſenſe.
Whereas you terme your compliance with my deſire, that you ſhould reply unto me, Obedience; I looke upon it as a very high Complement; (for what am I, that my deſire ſhould have with you the authority of a Command?) and ſhall not be ſo uncharitable, as to thinke it a ſcoffe, though ſome of my friends have repreſented it to me under that notion: but ſuppoſe it were meant in way of deriſion, yet this ſhall abate nothing of my gratitude for your reply, which is a favour, and honour, of which I willingly confeſſe my ſelfe to be unworthy.
The beſt teſtimony I can give you of my thankfulneſſe is, to aſſure you, that if in the exceptions, which you ſhall condeſcend to returne unto this paper, you can prove that I have done you any injury, you ſhall find me very ready to make you ſatisfaction. But if on the contrary you ſhall fayle in ſuch proofe, I hope you will be ſo much a friend unto the truth, as to retract your miſtake.
You acknowledg, that to affirme, that Chriſt's habituall love of God was capable of farther degrees, is a contrariety to expreſſe words of Scripture. Now this propoſition, which you thus diſclaime, is the naturall, and unavoidable ſequele of that which you in this your reply §. 21 confeſſe to be your opinion; to wit, that the inward acts of Chriſt's love were more intenſe at one time than another: and this I ſhall make good by an argument, which I ſhall ſubmit unto your ſevereſt examination.
Intenſion & remiſſion are primarily, & per ſe, only of qualities; ſo3 that an action is not capable of degrees of intenſion and remiſſion, but ſecondarily, and mediante qualitate; in regard of that qualitie, which it produceth, or from which it proceedeth rationeaaCollegium Compl. De generat. & corrupt. diſp. 4. qu. 5. §. 11. n. 4•. Scheib. Metaph. l. 2. c. 12. num. 35.36. termini, or ratione principii. The intenſion and remiſſion of actions therefore muſt be proportioned unto that of thoſe qualities, which they regard, either as their termes, or principles; now you acknowledge in terminis, that the inward acts of Chriſts love were more intenſe at one time than at another; and hereupon it undeniably, and unavoidably followeth, that either the terminus, ſome quality that was the product of theſe inward acts of love, or elſe the principium, ſome qualitie that was the principle of them was more intenſe at one time, than at another.
If you ſay, that the terminus, ſome quality, that was the product of theſe inward acts, was more intenſe at one time, than another; why then, firſt, you muſt tell us what this quality is, and in what Species of quality it is placed; it cannot with any colour of probability be ranked under any other of the foure ſpecies of quality than the firſt; and if it be put there, it muſt be either diſpoſitio or habitus; now diſpoſitio is ſuch an imperfect and inchoate a thing, as that I am very loath to think ſo diſhonourably of my Saviour, as to aſcribe it to him. If you make it an habit, then you will run upon that opinion which you diſowne; for it can be no other than a morall habit, and therefore in Chriſt it muſt be a vertuous & gracious habit. To affirme therefore that this quality was more intenſe at one time than at another, will be by juſt conſequence to affirme, that a gracious habit in Chriſt was more intenſe at one time than another. 2 Entia non ſunt multiplicanda ſine neceſſitate: and therefore I ſhall reject this quality è numero entium, unleſſe you can by convincing arguments prove a neceſſity of aſſerting it. I am not ignorant, that it is a common opinion, that omnis actio habet terminum; but how it failes in immanent actions,4 you may ſee (if you will vouchſafe to ſtoope ſo low) in Schieblers Metaphyſicks l. 2. c. 10. t. 3. ar. 3. pun. 1.
If you take the other way, and ſay that the principle, the quality producing theſe inward acts of Chriſts love of God, was more intenſe at one time than at another; why then you grant that which you ſeeme to deny; for the principle of them is nothing elſe but the habituall grace, or habit of divine love; and therefore if you averre that to have been capable of farther intenſion, you averre that the habituall grace of Chriſt was capable of farther intenſion, and thus you ſee what the reaſon was that induced me to charge you with this opinion.
6. Firſt, I ſaid it not in thoſe words, which he undertakes to refute; Theſe are p. 258. of his Book thus ſet down by him.
7. Theſe words I never ſaid, nor indeed are they to be found in the Paſſage which he ſets down from me, and whereon he grounds them; which, ſaith he, is this:
Dr. H. p. 222.In the next place he paſſeth to the inforcement of my argument, from what we read concerning Chriſt himſelfe, that he was more intenſe in Prayer at one time than another, when yet the lower degree was ſure no ſin, and prepares to make anſwer to it. viz. That Chriſt was above the Law, and did more than the Law required, but men fall ſhort by many degrees of what is required. But ſure this anſwer is nothing to the matter now in hand, for the evidencing of which, that example of Chriſt was brought by me, viz. That ſincere Love is capable of degrees. This was firſt ſhewed in ſeverall men, and in the ſame man at ſeverall times, in the ſeverall rankes of Angells, and at laſt in Chriſt himſelfe more ardent in one act of Prayer than in another.
8. Here the Reader finds not the words [Chriſts love of God is capable of further degrees] and when by deduction he endeavours to conclude them from theſe words, his concluſion falls ſhort in one word viz. [further] and 'tis but this,
That the example of Chriſt will never prove D. H. his concluſion, unleſſe it inferre, that Chriſts love of God was capable of degrees.
9. This is but a ſlight charge indeed, yet may be worthy to be taken5 notice of in the entrance (though the principall weight of my anſwer be not laid on it) and ſuggeſt this ſeaſonable advertiſement, that he which undertakes to refute any ſaying of another, muſt oblige himſelfe to an exact recitall of it to a word, and ſyllable; Otherwiſe he may himſelfe become the only Author of the Propoſition, which he refutes.
10. The difference is no more than by the addition of the word, [further.] But that addition may poſſibly beget in the Readers underſtanding, a very conſiderable difference.
11. For this Propoſition [Chriſts love of God was capable of further degrees] is readily interpretable to this dangerous ſenſe, that Chriſts love of God was not full, but ſo farre imperfect, as to be capable of ſome further degrees than yet it had; And thus ſure the Author I have now before me, acknowledges to have underſtood the words, and accordingly propoſeth to refute them from the conſideration of the all-fulneſſe of habituall grace in Chriſt, which he could not do, unleſſe he deemed them a prejudice to it.
12. But thoſe other words, which though he finds not in my papers, he yet not illogically inferres from them [that Chriſts love of God was capable of degrees, more intenſe at one time than at another] are not ſo liable to be thus interpreted, but only import that Chriſts love of God had in its latitude or amplitude ſeverall degrees, one differing from another. See magis & minus, all of them comprehended in that all-full perfect love of God, which was alwaies in Chriſt ſo full, and ſo perfect, as not to want, and ſo not to be capable of further degrees.
13. The Matter is cleare; The degrees of which Chriſts love of God is capable; are by me thus expreſt, that his love was more intenſe at one time than at another; but ſtill the higher of thoſe degrees of intenſneſſe, was as truly acknowledged to be in Chriſts love, at ſome time, viz. in his agonie, as the lower was at another, and ſo all the degrees, which are ſuppoſed to be mentioned of his love, are alſo ſuppoſed, and expreſly affirmed to have been in him at ſome time or other, whereas a ſuppoſed capacity of further degrees, ſeemes at leaſt (and ſo is reſolved by that Author) to inferre, that theſe degrees were not in Chriſt (the direct contradictorie to the former Propoſition) and ſo that they were wanting in him, and the but ſeeming aſſerting of that want is juſtly cenſured, as prejudiciall to Chriſts fulneſſe. Here then was one miſadventure in his proceeding.
1. He that ſaith that Chriſts love of God was more intenſe in his agonie than before, affirmeth, that his love of God before his agonie was capable of farther degrees, than yet it had; but you affirme the former, and therefore I doe you no wrong to impute the latter unto you: The premiſes virtually containe the concluſion, and therefore he that holds the premiſes, maintaineth the concluſion. I ſhall readily hearken to your ſeaſonable advertiſement, that he, which undertakes to refute any ſaying of anothers, muſt oblige himſelfe to an exact recitall of it to a word and ſyllable; but notwithſtanding it, I ſhall aſſume the libertie to charge you with the conſequences of your words, and if I cannot make good my charge, the ſhame will light on me.
2. If there were any miſtake in ſupplying the word [farther] it was a miſtake of charity, for I was ſo charitable, as to thinke that you ſpake pertinently to the matter you had in hand: I conceived that your ſcope in your treatiſe of will-worſhip was to prove, that there be uncommanded degrees of the love of God, that thoſe large incluſive words thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy ſoule &c. do not command the higheſt and moſt intenſe degree of the love of God; ſo that a man may fulfill this command, and yet there may be roome or place for farther and higher degrees of the love of God. Now this propoſition, Chriſts love of God was capable of degrees, which you confeſſe to be not illogically inferred from your papers will never reach this point, unleſſe you underſtand the word farther, and therefore your cenſure of my ſupplying the word farther as a miſadventure in my proceeding is groundleſſe.
14. But this is but the proemial part of my Reply, there is a more materiall part of it ſtill behind, which may yet ſeeme neceſſary to be added, viz. to mind him of (what he well knowes) the diſtinction between habits and acts of vertues, or graces; and that love, the Genus,7 y doth equally comprehend both theſe ſpecies, and that his diſcourſe of all-fulneſſe belonging to the habituall grace of Chriſt, I ſpeake diſtinctly of another matter, viz. of the degreess of that grace diſcernable in the ſeverall acts of it.
The diſtinction between the habits and acts of virtues or graces I very well know; but that love as a genus doth equally comprehend the habit and act of love, is a thing which I confeſſe that I am yet to learne ▪ and if it be a matter of ignorance in me, you muſt blame my Mr Ariſtotle, for he hath miſguided me herein. He tels me lib. 1. top. c. 15. n. 11. that if a word be predicated of things put in ſeverall predicaments, that then it is homonymous in regard of them,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Now the habit of love is in the predicament of Quality, the act of love in the predicament of Action, and hereupon I cannot but conclude that the predication of love, concerning the habit, and the act, is onely equivocall, and conſequently love no genus to them. No genus can equally comprehend thoſe things which do differ toto genere, and are therefore termed primo diverſa, rather then differentia; but now ſuch are the habits and the acts of the love of God, and therefore love as à genus doth not equally comprehend them as it's ſpecies.
15. This diſtinction I thought legible enough before, both in the Tract of Will-worſhip and in the Anſwer to Mr Caw.
16. In the former the Refuter confeſſeth to find it,pag. 259. reciting theſe words of mine, It is poſſible for the ſame perſon conſtantly to love God above all, and yet to have higher expreſſions of that love at one one time than another. Where the expreſſions at one time, and at another, muſt needs referre to the ſeverall acts of the ſame, all-full habituall love.
The diſtinction, which you thought legible enough before in your tract of will-worſhip, in which you ſay that I confeſſe8 to find it, is ſuch a diſtinction between the habits and acts o•love, as that love equally comprehends them both as ſpecies. Now I utterly deny, that there is any ſuch diſtinction in thoſe words of yours, which I recite: It is poſsible for the ſame perſon conſtantly to love God above all, and yet to have higher expreſſions of that love at one time than another: and the reaſon of this my deniall is, becauſe love, as a genus, doth not comprehend the expreſſions of love equally with the habit. (1) Nothing can as a genus be equally predicated of things put in ſeverall predicaments, but the habit of love, and expreſſions of love are put in ſeverall predicaments; therefore love, as a genus, doth not equally comprehend them both. (2) The habit of love is formally and intrinſecally love; the expreſſions of love (that is, as you expound your ſelfe §. 21, the outward expreſsions of the inward acts of love) are termed love only by extrinſecall denomination from the inward acts of love; and therefore love doth not as a genus equally comprehend the habit, and the expreſſions of love. Raynandus in Mor: diſcip. diſt. 3. N. 144. make smention out of Gab. Biel of a diſtinction of love into affective, and effective: and what is this effective love but the effects and expreſſions of love? but now, that he doth not take this to be a proper diſtribution of a genus into it's ſpecies, appeareth by what he ſaith out of the ſame Author concerning the diviſion. Effectivum dicit ipſum illius àmoris eliciti effectum. Tranſlato quippe cauſae nomine ad effectum, is dicitur amare effectivè, qui non oſtentat in fertilem ac ſterilem amorem; ſed cum ſe dat occaſio, erumpit in fructus dignos amoris. Quam eſſe admodùm impropriam amoris diviſionem fatetur Gabriel, quia amare propriè eſt in ſolâ voluntate tanquam in ſubjecto: ea autem productio effectuum amoris in aliis facultatibus cernitur, eſtque actus tranſiens, non immanents volunt at is. (3) No one word can as a genus equally comprehend the efficient and the effect; the habit of love is the efficient cauſe, and the ſincere and cordiall expreſſions of9 love are the effect; therefore love is not predicated of them equally as a genus. (4) That which is predicated properly of one thing, and tropically of another cannot equally comprehend them both as a genus; but love is predicated properly of the habit of love, tropically, viz. Metonymically of the expreſſions of love, by a metonymie of the efficient for the effect; therefore love as a genus cannot equally comprehend them both.
Onely I gueſſe not what temptation he had to chooſe that expreſſion, which he there makes uſe of, viz. [That there D. H. minceth the matter, and ſpeaketh more cautelouſly] adding [that what he there ſaith is nothing to the matter now in hand.] Whereas 1. thoſe of Will-worſhip being the Firſt papers written on that ſubject, are ſure very pertinent to aſcertain him of the meaning of the latter, written in defence of them.
That your firſt papers written on this ſubject are very impertinent to aſcertaine me of the meaning of your latter is eaſily diſcernable unto any man, that will compare both together; however I ſhall offer unto your conſideration two reaſons, to prove the impertinency of them for that purpoſe. (1) In your firſt papers you ſpeak only of the expreſsions of love (i.e.) as you interpret your ſelfe, the outward expreſsions of the inward acts of love: in your latter papers you ſpeak of love it ſelfe: now the outward expreſsions of love are termed love only extrinſecè, denominativè, & participativè, from the inward act of love, as ſome ſay the imperate acts of the will, are ſaid to be in this ſenſe only free or voluntary. 2ly, That your firſt papers are very ſhort, in explaining the meaning of your latter, is apparent by this your reply, wherein you extend the love of God, which you affirme to be capable of degrees, beyond the outward expreſsions, unto the very inward acts of love.
And 2ly, the early cautelous ſpeaking there, might have made further latter caution unneceſſary.
I had thought that in polemicall writings, it had ſtill been needfull for a man to continue on his caution, for otherwiſe he may expoſe himſelfe unto blowes, and knocks, which he never dream't off. Earely cautelous ſpeaking is no ſalvo unto after unwarineſſe.
And 3ly, I could not be ſaid to mince, (which to vulgar eares ſignifies to retract in ſome degrees, what I had ſaid before,) and againe ſpeak more cautiouſly, when that was the firſt time of my ſpeaking of it.
I am very loath to enter into a Conteſt with ſo great a Critick, touching the meaning of a word, however I ſhall adventure to ſay thus much, that a man may be ſaid to mince a matter, and ſpeak more cautiouſly at the firſt time of ſpeaking of it, than afterwards at a ſecond time of ſpeaking of it: neither ſhall I be beaten from this mine aſſertion, by your bare and naked affirmation, that to mince, to vulgar eares, ſignifieth to retract in ſome degrees what hath been ſaid before: for I appeale to both vulgar and learned eares, whether or no we may not ſay truly of divers erroneous perſons, that in the firſt broaching of their errors they mince the matter, and ſpeak more cautelouſly than afterwards, when they are fleſhed and incouraged with ſucceſſe.
17. Mean. while it is manifeſt, and his own confeſſion, that there theſe were my words, and thoſe ſo cautious, that this ſenſe of the words which he undertakes to refute, could not be affixt on them. And this I ſhould have thought ſufficient to have preſerved my innocence, and forſtalled his Ʋſe of Confutation.
Suppoſe that in your tract of will-worſhip, theſe were your words, and withall that they were ſo cautious that this ſenſe of the words, which I undertake to refute, could not be affixt on them, yet this is nothing at all unto the purpoſe, and contributes11 nothing to the clearing of your innocence, and foreſtalling my uſe of confutation; and the reaſon hereof is very evident, becauſe that which I undertook to refute, was affixt by me, not on theſe your ſo cautelous words in your tract of will-worſhip, but on a paſſage in your anſwer to Mr. Cawdrey. Indeed I cenſured thoſe your words in themſelves impertinent unto your matter in hand, and withall proved them to be ſo. But if you had gone no farther then theſe words, you ſhould not have heard from me touching this ſubject; for time is more pretious with me, than to waſt it, in medling meerely with the impertinencies of any mans diſcourſe.
18. But the anſwer to M. C. which occaſioned it was, I think, as cautious alſo, 1. In the words recited by the Refuter, viz. that Chriſt himſelfe was more ardent in one act of prayer than in another. 2. In the words following in that anſwer, but not recited by him, viz. that the ſincerity of this or that virtue expreſt in this or that performance, is it we ſpeake of, when we ſay it conſiſts in a latitude, and hath degrees; where the [this or that performance] are certainly Acts of the virtue, conſiſting in a latitude, and the having degrees (viz. in that latitude) no way implies him that hath virtue in that latitude (viz. Chriſt) to want at preſent, and in that ſenſe to be capable of farther degrees.
19. I am willing to look as jealouſly as I can on any paſſage of my own, which falls under any mans cenſure; and therefore finding nothing in the words (ſet down by him as the ground of the Refutation) which is any way capable of it, I have reviewed the whole ſection, and weighed every period, as ſuſpicioouſly as I could; to obſerve whether I could draw or wreſt that conſequence from any other paſſage, not recited by him.
20. And I find none in any degree liable, except it ſhould be this in the beginning of the Sect. Where ſetting down the argument, as it lay in the Tr. of Will ▪ wor. I ſay tis poſſible for the ſame perſon which ſo loves God (i. e. with all the heart) to love him, and expreſſe that love more intenſely at one time than another, as appeared by the example of Chriſt.
21. And if this be thought capable of miſapprehenſion, by reaſon of the [and] disjoyning love from the expreſſions of it, and ſo the expreſſions belonging to the acts, the love be deemed to denote the habituall love;12 I muſt onely ſay, that is a miſapprehenſion, for that by loving with all the heart, in the firſt place, I certainly meant the ſincere habit of Love, by love in the latter place, the inward acts of love, and by the expreſſions of love, the outward expreſſions of thoſe inward acts, and o•thoſe acts onely I ſpeak, and of thoſe expreſſions, when I ſay they are more intenſe at one time than another.
I ſhall here briefly repreſent unto you that which made me think you guilty of detracting from the all-fulneſs of Chriſts habituall grace, and referre you for confirmation here of unto what I have ſaid in the beginning of this my diſcourſe. The undeniable conſequence of what you ſay in anſwer unto Mr. Cawdrey is, as I have proved, that Chriſts love of God was capable of farther degrees. Now hereupon I thus reaſoned in my mind, you were to be underſtood either of the habit, or of the inward act of love, for as for the outward expreſſions of love, it is without diſpute, that they cannot be ſaid to be love properly, but only by a trope; if you ſhould have ſaid that you ſpake of the habit of love, then you would have expreſly impugned the all-fulneſſe of Chriſts habituall grace; and if you ſhould ſay, as you now do, that you meant the inward acts of love; why then I concluded that you would even hereby implyedly and by conſequence have oppoſed the perfection of Chriſts habituall grace, becauſe the intenſion of the inward acts of love proceedeth from the intenſion of the habit of love, and is therefore proportioned unto it: but of this more fully in the place above mentioned. Thus having ſhewed you what invited me unto my uſe of confutation, I ſhall paſſe over the three other ſections, which you your ſelfe I preſume would have ſpared, if you had been privy unto that which I now acquaint you with.
22. The word love, as I ſaid, is a genus, equally comprehending the two ſpecies, habituall and actuall love, and equally applicable to either of the ſpecies, to the acts as well as the habit of love. And ſo when〈◊〉ſay love is capable of degrees, the meaning is cleare, The genericall word13•ove reſtrained to the latter ſpecies, is conſidered in reſpect of the•cts of love, gradually differenced one from the other, is in that re•pect, capable of degrees, both inwardly and in outward expreſſions: that•ct of love, that poured out and expreſt it ſelfe in the more ardent prayer, was a more intenſe act of love, than another act of•he ſame habituall love, which did not ſo ardently expreſſe it•elfe.
That love is not a genus equally comprehending habituall•nd actuall love, as its two ſpecies, I have already proved by•his argument, becauſe they are in ſeverall predicaments;•abituall love in the predicament of qualitie, and actuall in the•redicament of action. There are, I know, divers great Philoſo•hers and Schoolemen that make all immanent acts, and conſe•uently all inward acts of love to be qualities; they are, ſay•hey, only grammaticall actions, not metaphyſicall actions in•he predicament of action; but this opinion is untrue in〈◊〉ſelfe, and no waies advantageous unto your cauſe in•and.
1. It is untrue in it ſelfe; and to confirme this, I ſhall offer〈◊〉your conſideration two arguments out of Scheibler, which•earely prove immanent acts to be true, proper, and•redicamentall actions, in the predicament of Action. 〈◊〉univerſum id ſine incommodo poteſt dici actio, quod ſufficit〈◊〉conſtituendam cauſalitatem efficientis: Atqui dantnr cauſae•ficientes, quibus non convenit alia cauſalitas, quam que〈◊〉actio immanens: Ergo actio immanens vere eſt actio. •ropoſitio patet, quia praedicamentum actionis ponitur ad•candam cauſalitem efficientis cauſae in genere entium, ut•ipra diſputatum, explicando diviſionem praedicamentorum. •t confirmatur quod actio ſit adaequata cauſalitas effi•entis ut ſupra viſum eſt, lib. 1. c. 12. Aſſumptiopatet. Nam•mo abſolutè eſt cauſa efficiens in quantum denominatnr•dere aut intelligere. Et tamen iſti ſunt actus immanen••. That which is the cauſality of an efficient cauſe is14 y a true and predicamentall action in the predicament of actions but immanent acts are the cauſalities of efficient cauſes, and therefore proper and predicamentall actions. Deinde ad actus immanentes ſunt potentiae activae, ſed potentiae activae ſunt per ordinem ad veras actiones, ergo actus immanentes ſunt verè actiones. Et ſi hi ſolum titulotenus ſunt actiones Ergo etiam potentiae illae activae titulotenus ſunt potentiae activae. That which terminates and actuates an active power is a prope•and predicamentall action: but every immanent act terminates and actuates an active power; and therefore every immanent act is a proper and predicamentall action, Met. lib. 2. cap 10. n. 27. You may perhaps ſlight Scheibler, as a trivial author, but I urge his reaſons, not his authority, & if you can anſwer his reaſons, you may ſpeake your pleaſure of him and o•me for alleadging of him. But I can preſſe you with the authority of an author far greater than Scheibler, our great Maſter Ariſtotle, of whom you make ſomewhere in your writings•••norable mention; he l. 10. Ethic. c. 3. tells us roundly, that the o•perations of virtues, & even happineſſe it ſelfe, are not qualities ▪〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but theſ•are immanent acts, & therefore in his opinion immanent acts a••not qualities. But, ſecondly, ſuppoſe this opinion were true i•it ſelfe, yet will it no waies advantage your cauſe, for the patrons of it rang immauent acts under the firſt ſpecies of quality and then they are either dispoſitions or habits. If you ſay the•are diſpoſitions, as moſt of the above mentioned ſchooleme•hold them to be; againſt this I object, that however the•may be ſo in other men, yet they cannot be ſo in Chriſt for a diſpoſition carrieth in it's notion inchoation, and imperfection, and therefore to attribute it unto Chriſt〈◊〉to throw an apparent diſhonour upon him. If you ſa•they are habits, why then, you cannot deny them to be gracio•habits, and ſo you will fall upon that opinion, of which in th•reply, you ſo ſtudiouſly endeavour to acquit your ſelfe, vi•that the ſame habits of grace in Chriſt may be more intenſe15 y at one time than another, and conſequently that his habituall grace was not alwaies full and perfect.
23. I ſhall explain this by the Refuters own Confeſſion. The death of Chriſt, ſaith he, was an higher expreſſion of Chriſts love of us, than his poverty, hunger or thirſt. To this I ſubjoyne, that ſuch as the expreſſion was, ſuch was the act of inward love, of which that was an expreſſion: it being certain that each of theſe expreſſions had an act of internall love, of which they were ſo many proportionably different expreſſions; And from hence I ſuppoſe it unavoidably conſequent, that that act of internall love, expreſt by his dying for us, was ſuperior to thoſe former acts, which onely expreſt themſelves in his poverty, and ſo the ſame perſon that loved ſincerely, did alſo love, and expreſſe that love more intenſly at one time than at another, which was the very thing I had ſaid in another inſtance. But this I have added ex abundanti more than the Refuters diſcourſe required of me.
If you had repeated that which you call my confeſſion full and intire, as it lay in my book, the impartiall and unprejudiced reader would ſoone have diſcerned that there was in it nothing that made for your advantage: my words at large are theſe, There may be a graduall difference in the expreſsions of the ſame love for degree. Chriſts death for us was an higher expreſsion of his love of us, than his poverty, hunger, thirſt &c. and yet they might proceed from a love equally intenſe. Now Sir have you ſaid any thing to prove, that they could not proceed from a love equally intenſe? you ſeeme indeed, moſt vehemently and affectionately to affirme that they could not; but you muſt pardon me, if I entertaine not your vehement aſſeverations, as ſolid arguments, as if they were propoſitiones per ſe notae. Pray Sir, review this ſection, and put your argument into ſome forme; if you can make good that it containeth any diſproofe of what I have ſaid, unleſſe begging of the queſtion be argumentative, you ſhall have my hearty leave to triumph over me as you pleaſe; however untill then, I ſhall take your words aſunder, and examine every paſſage in them.
To this I ſubjoyn that ſuch as the expreſſion was, ſuch was the act of inward love, of which that was an expreſſion, yet being certain that each of theſe expreſſions had an act of internall love, of which they were ſo many proportionably different expreſſions.
That each of theſe expreſſions had an act of inward love, of which they were ſo many different expreſsions, is an obvious truth, but impertinent unto the matter in hand, unleſſe you can prove that they were of neceſſity equall in point of intenſion; and the proofe of this you have not hitherto ſo much as attempted.
And from hence I ſuppoſe it unavoidably conſequent, that that act of internall love, expreſt by his dying for us, was ſuperior to thoſe former acts, which onely expreſt themſelves in his poverty, and ſo the ſame perſon that loved ſincerely, did alſo love, and expreſſe that love more intenſly at one time than at another, which was the very thing I had ſaid in another inſtance. But this I have added ex abundanti more than the Refuters diſcourſe required of me.
From hence: whence I pray? if from the words immediately foregoing, then your argument ſtands thus. Every of theſe expreſsions had an act of internall love, of which they were ſo many proportionably different expreſsions: therefore that act of internall love expreſt by his dying for us, was ſuperior to theſe former acts, which onely expreſt themſelves in his poverty. And here I muſt profeſſe that the reaſon of your conſequence is to me inviſible, and I ſhall never acknowledg your inference legitimate untill you drive me hereunto, by reducing your Enthymeme unto a Syllogiſme; but perhaps there may be ſome myſtery in the word proportionably, and your meaning may be, that theſe different expreſſions in regard of intenſion muſt be proportioned exactly unto their inward reſpective acts of love equall or paralell unto them; and if this by your meaning, then your argument is guilty of that fallacy, which17 is called petitio principii. It is my deſire and purpoſe to have faire wars with you, and my pen ſhall not drop a diſreſpective ſyllable of you; but yet I am reſolved to ſwallow none of your proofeleſſe dictates: ſeeing you have entered the liſts with me, you muſt not think me irreverent and ſaucy, if (as the ſouldiers ſpeak) I diſpute every inch of ground with you, and be ſo bold as to call upon you for the proofe of whatſoever you aſſert touching that which is in controverſy betwixt us.
24. It now onely remaines, that I conſider whether this Refuter have in the proceſſe of his diſcourſe added any thing, wherein I may be any whit concerned.
25. And 1. ſaith he, the falſehood of ſuch an aſſertion is evident from the point there handled and confirmed, the abſolute fulneſſe of Chriſts grace, which by the generall conſent of the Fathers and School-men was ſuch, as that it excluded all intenſive growth.
26. But to this the reply will be eaſily foreſeen, from the premiſſes, that as the point by him handled and confirmed was diſtinctly the all-fulneſſe of habituall grace in Chriſt, ſo his proofs of it by the conſent of Fathers and School-men belong ſtill to that fulneſſe of habituall grace.
27. Witneſſe one for all, Aquinas••r. 3. qu. 7. art. 12. ad ſecundum. Licet virtus divina poſſit facere aliquid majus & melius quàm ſit habitualis gratia Chriſti, non tamen — though the divine power may make ſomewhat greater and better than is the habituall grace of Chriſt, yet — ſo 'tis plain he ſpeaks of the fulneſſe of the habituall grace. And ad tertium. In ſapientia & gratia aliquis proficere poteſt dupliciter; uno modo ſecundùm ipſos habitus ſapientiae & gratiae augmentatos, & ſic Chriſtus in eis non proficiebat. Alio modo ſecundùm effectus, in quantum aliquis ſapientiora & virtuoſiora opera facit, & ſic Chriſtus proficiebat ſapientiâ & gratiâ; ſicut & aetate, quia ſecundùm proceſſum aetatis perfectiora opera faciebat, — & in his quae ſunt ad Deum, & in his quae ſunt ad homines. One may increaſe in wiſdome and grace two waies, one way according to the habits of them increaſed, and ſo Chriſt increaſed not; another way, according to the effects; when any doth more wiſe and virtuous workes; and ſo Chriſt increaſed in Wiſdome and Grace, as he did in age, becauſe according to the proceſſe of his age, he did more perfect workes, and that both in things belonging to God, and men alſo.
1828. And thus are the School-men underſtood by the Refuter himſelfe, in his producing their teſtimonies, as appeares by the expreſſe words [habituall grace p. 260. lin. penult and holineſſe, and the Image of God in him] p. 261. lin. 13. And ſo 'tis moſt cleare, their conſent belongs not, even in his own opinion, to the matter I had, and have in hand, no way denying but, aſſerting a capacity of degrees among the acts of Chriſts love of God, and the expreſſions of it.
1. They that can ſo eaſily foreſee this your reply, may with as little difficulty foreknow the objection againſt it, to wit, that the intenſion of Chriſts actuall grace is exactly proportioned unto that of his habituall grace; and therefore your deniall of the perpetuall all-fulneſſe of Chriſts actuall grace, is a virtuall and implied deniall of the all-fulneſſe of Chriſts habituall grace: and how you are provided of an anſwer hereunto, the event will ſhew. It is not then ſo cleare as you pretend, that the teſtimony of the Schoole-men belongs not, even in mine own opinion, to the matter you had and have in hand.
2. As for that place you quote out of Aquinas, it is plaine that therein by the effects of wiſedome and grace are meant ſuch as are outward, for theſe are moſt properly termed works. And beſides, an intenſive increaſe in the inward acts of wiſedome and grace would argue and preſuppoſe an intenſive increaſe in the very habits themſelves.
3. Whereas you ſay, in the cloſe of Section the 28, that the conſent of the Schoole-men is no waies denying, but aſſerting a capacity of degrees amongſt the acts of Chriſts love of God, i. e. of the inward acts thereof. There will be little ſenſe in your words in themſelves, and leſſe pertinency unto the matter in hand, unleſſe your meaning be, as you elſewhere expreſſe your ſelfe, that the inward acts of Chriſts love of God were more intenſe at one time, than at another: and if this be your meaning, I muſt needs aſſume the boldneſſe to tell you, that no ſuch matter is viſible unto me in any of the19 Schoole-men. But perhaps you may meane ſuch Schoole-men, as ſuch a Puny, as I, never ſaw or heard of; however you cannot expect beleife, untill you produce their teſtimonies: And I ſhall entreat you to alleadge ſuch, as may be had in Pauls-church-yard, or at leaſt in the Library at Oxford.
29. Secondly, he will heare the Doctors objection, and conſider of what weight it is.
Objection? againſt what? againſt the fulneſſe of habituall grace in Chriſt? ſure never any was by me urged againſt it. And he cannot now think there was. The degrees of intenſeneſſe obſervable in the ſeverall acts of Chriſts love, his praying more ardently at one time than another, was all that I concluded from that text, Luk. 22.44. and that is nothing to his habituall love.
That this objection was not intended by you againſt the fulneſſe of Chriſts habituall grace, upon your proteſtation, I readily believe; but, that by conſequence it reacheth it, I thus make good. That objection which is urged againſt the perpetuall allfulneſſe & perfection of Chriſts actuall love, the inward acts of his love of God, ſtrikes againſt the perpetuall allfulneſſe & perfection of his habitual love; becauſe the degrees of the inward acts of his love of God are commenſurate unto the degrees of his habituall love. For they have no degrees at all, but ſecundariò, in regard of the habit of his love: but now this objection is urged by you againſt the perpetuall all-fulneſſe and perfection of his actuall love, the inward acts of his love; for it is brought to prove that the inward acts of Chriſts love were more intenſe at one time than another, and a greater intenſion preſuppoſeth remiſſion and imperfection; for intenſio eſt eductio rei intenſae de imperfecto ad perfectum, as Aquinas very often. Therefore this objection ſtrikes againſt the perpetuall fulneſſe and perfection of Chriſts actuall love of God, and ſo conſequently againſt the perpetuall fulneſſe and perfection of his habituall love.
30. But even to this he is pleaſed to frame Anſwers (though I hope his doctrine of the fulneſſe of Chriſts habituall grace be no way concern'd in it) and to theſe I ſhall briefly attend him, as my laſt ſtage in this no very long voyage.
31. And 1. ſaith he, the vulgar tranſlation renders〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, prolixius; and if this verſion be good, then there is no place for the Doctors objection.
But though I ſeeke no advantage by that vulgar reading, yet thinking it a duty of reverence to that verſion, to take leave civilly whenſoever I depart from it (wherein I have the ſuffrage of Proteſtants as learned in both the Languages Hebrew and Greek, as any) and that I may to the utmoſt obſerve the Refuters ſteps, I ſhall not utterly reject it.
32. Tis certain〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉doth primarily ſignifie extenſion, and that properly belongs to length, and ſo the comparative〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉to a greater degree of that length. And if it be granted that it ſo ſignifie here, there will yet be place equally for my concluſion.
33. For in every act of Prayer, be it but the ſhorteſt ejaculation ſent out by Chriſt, I ſuppoſe (and my Refuter muſt not doubt of it) there was ſome degree of ardency or intenſion; And then ſure according to the multiplying of thoſe acts lengthening that prayer, there muſt ſtill in Chriſt, (I ſay not in every one of us) be a proportionable multiplication of thoſe degrees, and ſo parallel to a greater length, a greater intenſion.
The anſwer here is very eaſy and obvious; the intenſion of the degrees of the inward acts of Chriſts love of God may be ſaid to be greater either in regard of the number, or in reſpect of the intenſive perfection and excellency of thoſe degrees; according to the lengthning of Chriſts prayer there is a multiplying of inward acts of his love, and proportionably a multiplication of the degrees of his love, and conſequently a greater intenſion of thoſe degrees, in regard of their number, but not in reſpect of their intenſive perfection, or excellency. For in Chriſt let them be never ſo much multiplied, they may be and ſtill are of an equall intenſive perfection, and excellency, one is not more intenſe than another; and ſo if this reading21 be retained, there will be no place for your concluſion; That the inward acts of Chriſts love are more intenſe at one time than another, unleſſe you will make intēſion to be a meere coacervation of hōo geneous degrees (i. e) degrees altogether like: the abſurdity of which you may ſee in Suarez Met. diſ. 46. & Pet. Hurtado de Mendoza. de Gener. & Corrupt. diſp. 5. §. 6.
Sir, here I am very confident that you preſumed very much on my ignorance, otherwiſe you would never have gone about to have impoſed upon me ſo poore and ſorry a ſophiſme, as is in the equivocation of the word greater, which is eaſily diſcoverable by a freſh-man: for that you your ſelfe ſhould be ignorant of ſuch an ordinary homonymy, I am loath to harbour ſuch diſhonourable thoughts of your abilities in philoſophy as to imagine.
34. This is cleare, and I need not adde, what elſe I might, that the very multiplication of more acts of any virtue, ſuppoſing it equally ſincere in the habit, and ſuch is the length of prayer, when it is in Chriſt, is more valuable in the ſight of God, and that argues it more excellent, than the ſmaller number of thoſe acts would be, and proportionably more abundantly rewarded by him, who rewardeth every man not only according to the ſincerity of his heart, but alſo ſecundum opera, according to the multiplied acts or workes, the more abundant labour proceeding from this ſincerity. And ſo that will ſuffice for his firſt anſwer.
1. This is an utter impertinency unto that which is in debate between us. For ſuppoſe that the very multiplication of more inward acts of any virtue in Chriſt is more valuable in the ſight of God, and ſo more excellent than the ſmaller number of thoſe acts would be; yet this ſuppoſition will never bring you to this concluſion, that one inward act of Chriſts love of God may be more intenſe than another; and my reaſon is, becauſe in all theſe inward acts of Chriſts love of God (and we may ſay the ſame of the inward acts of22 other virtues and graces) there may be no graduall diſſimilitude.
2. A great part of the Schoolemen will tell you, that the morall value of one ſingle act of any virtue in Chriſt was infinite, and in the multiplication of more acts there is but an infinite value: now one infinite cannot be greater than another infinite in the ſame kind, wherein it is infinite, and hereupon they conclude that the multiplication of acts makes nothing in Chriſt unto an intenſive addition of value ▪ the value of one act is intenſively as great as that of more acts ▪ The firſt act of Chriſt (ſaies Albertinus) habet totam latitudinem intenſivam valoris moralis, ct ſi non adaequet totam latitudinem extenſivam: Corol. tom. 1.150. n. 61. And of this you have a reaſon. p. 145. this act is à perſonâ divinâ, tanquam á forma intrinſecâ; quae intrinſecè denominatur operans, ab〈◊〉ipſâ operatione quae eſt in naturâ humanâ, et ut ſic eſt illimitabilis àconditionibus actûs. Unto Albertinus I ſhall ſubjoine Suarez who ſpeakes to the ſame purpoſe in tertiam par. Thom. Tom. 1. diſput. 4. ſect. 4. pag. 49. Plura opera Chriſti ſunt quidem extenſivè plura merita; intenſivè tamen non eſt plus valoris in multis quam in uno; ut, ſi eſſent plures calores infinitè intenſi, eſſen•quidem plures, non tamen efficerent unum intenſiorem; & par•ratione, ſi in uno opere Chriſti, quod ſucceſſivè per partes fiebat partes cum toto comparemus, intenſivè tantus valor erat in quâlibet parte, ſicut in toto opere, & in uno momento, ſicut in longo tempore; quia forma à quà erat valor, tota erat in toto, & tota in ſingulis partibus.
35. But then, 2. Saith he, ſuppoſe we ſtick unto our own tranſtation, yet the place may fairely be ſo interpreted, as that it may no waies advantage the purpoſe of the Doctor. For〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, more earneſtly, may be conſidered in reference unto either the object unto whom he prayed, God; or the matter againſt which he prayed, the evills with which he conflicted in his agony.
231. Then, ſaith he, he did not in his agony pray more earneſtly than at other times, if we conſider his prayer in reference unto the object, unto whom it was, God. The religion, and inward worſhip of his prayer, was for degrees alwaies alike equal. His truſt and dependance upon God, love of zeal and devotion towards God, from which all his prayers flowed, were not at one time more intenſe than at another.
But now 2. He prayed more earneſtly in his agony than at other times, in regard of the matter, againſt which he prayed. the evills which he encountred with, which if they were not greater, then thoſe that he deprecated in the former prayer, v. 42. yet at leaſt they made a greater impreſſion upon his humane nature; for they put him into a bloody ſweat. Being in an agony he prayed more earneſtly, & his ſweat was as it were drops of blood, falling down to the ground.
36. Theſe are the words of his ſecond anſwer, and they are in the ſecond part, the very diſtinct confeſſion of all that I pretend in this matter (and therefore I need not make any reflections on the firſt part of them) For whatſoever, or how great ſoever the occaſion of the increaſe of his intenſion was (which I am willing to believe proportionable to the degree of the intenſion, a very weighty occaſion that thus inflamed his ardency) yet ſtill, 'tis confeſt, that on this occaſion, he now prayed more earneſtly than at the other times, that which now approached made a greater impreſſion on his humane nature; which what is it but a proofe of the point by me aſſerted, that Chriſt himſelfe was more ardent in one act of prayer (this in his agonie) than in another.
37. As for the greatneſſe of the occaſion, ſo profeſtlie great as to caſt him into that prodigious ſweat, falling〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as it were drops of blood, that may teſtifie, but it cannot prejudg the ardency which was occaſioned thereby.
38. Twas not in Chriſt, he will eaſily ſuppoſe with me) as it is oft diſcernable in many of us, that thoſe which really have no ſincerity of love or zeal to God, can yet, like the Marriners in the tempeſt, by ſome preſſing fear or danger be awaked to, but formall, and, be they never ſo loud, but hypocritically zealous prayers.
2439. The ardency in Chriſt was ſincere ardency, accompanied with acts of love and truſt of the ſame temper, and the heightning it〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, was an addition of degrees to that act of ardency, and ſo of prayer, and proportionably of love and truſt in God, above either what there was, or what there was occaſion for, at other times.
1. Firſt you pretend in Sect. 21. of this your reply that the inward acts of Chriſts love of God were more intenſe at one time than another. Now this is not contained expreſly, nor can it by any logick be inferred from the words of the ſecond part of my ſecond anſwer, that he prayed more earneſtly in his agony than at other times, in regard of the matter againſt which he prayed, &c. and therefore this ſecond part of my ſecond anſwer is not the very diſtinct confeſſion of all that you pretend in this matter; and therefore notwithſtanding them, you muſt make reflections on the firſt part of my anſwer, or elſe you will never reply thereunto.
2. That the ardency in Chriſt was a ſincere ardency, is not doubted of; all the queſtion is, what ardency it was in Chriſt that was heightned: there was, as I plainly intimated in my anſwer, a twofold ardency in Chriſts prayer, one regarding God, unto whom he prayed, and this was ſeated in the acts of love and truſt tanquam modus in re modificatâ: Another reſpected the matter againſt which he prayed, and the res modificata of this ardency was the acts of feare of, and greife for thoſe evills with which he encountred. I readily grant the heightning of this latter ardency, ſo that there was in his agony an addition of degrees unto his feare of, and greife for thoſe evils againſt which he prayed, above either what25 there was, or what there was occaſion for at other times: but as for the former ardency regarding God, and placed in the inward acts of his love of God, &c. that was uncapable of further heightning: for his actuall love of God was in termino, as they ſay, was alwaies at the higheſt, and moſt intenſe; and this I ſhall not barely dictate: but prove by three arguments, which I preſent unto you to be examined, as rigidly as you pleaſe.
1. The all-fulneſſe and perfection of Chriſts habituall grace.
2. His perpetuall and uninterrupted happineſſe.
3. His impeccability.
1. The firſt argument, which hath been already ſo fully inſiſted upon, is the all-fulneſſe and perfection of Chriſts habituall grace; the habits of all graces and virtues in Chriſt were alwaies full and perfect, moſt intenſe and not capable of farther or higher degrees, and therefore ſo were the inward acts of thoſe graces and virtues too, and particularly the inward acts of the habituall grace of divine charity. The conſequence of this Enthymeme hath been already ſufficiently proved, and therefore I ſhall add nothing for further confirmation of it, but the teſtimony of ſome few Schoole-men. Aquinas, as Capreolus quotes him lib. 1. diſt. 17. qu. 2. fol: 306. hath this paſſage. Nihil inquit aliud eſt qualitatem augeri quam ſubjectùm magis participare qualitatem. Non enim aliud eſt eſſe qualitatis niſi quod habet in ſubjecto, ex hoc autem ipſo quod ſubjectum magis participat charitatem vehementius operatur, quia unumquodque operatur in quantum eſt actu. Aquinas thought (you ſee) that a greater vehemency in the operations of love, argued a greater participation in the ſubject of the habits of love. And againe ſecundâ ſecundae qu. 24. art. 4. ad tertium. Similiter26 charitas eſſentialiter eſt virtus ordinata ad actum, unde idem eſt ipſam augeri ſecundum eſſentiam, & ipſam habere efficaciam ad producendum ferventioris dilectionis actum. Unto this I ſhall adde a third place out of Aquinas quoted by Capreolus lib. 3. diſ. 27, 28, 29, 30. pag. 209. Cum actus & habitus ſpeciem habent ex objecto, oportet quod ex eodem ratio perfectionis ipſius ſumatur. Objectum autem charitatis eſt ſummum bonum; igitur perfecta charitas eſt, quae in ſummum bonum fcrtur in tantum in quantum eſt diligibile. The habit of love is then perfect, when tis carried towards God as the cheife, when God is loved ſo farre forth as he may be loved, to wit, by a creature: when God is not loved thus intenſely, the habit of love (as Aquinas thought) was imperfect. With Aquinas alſo Scotus accords l. 3. diſ. 13. q. 3. Poſsibile eſt animā Chriſti habere ſummam gratiam, ergo ſummam fruitionem. Conſequentia probatur, quia actus naturaliter elicitus ab aliquâ formâ, aequatur in perfectione illi formae. Unto theſe two great Schoole-men, I ſhall adde the teſtimony of a Philoſopher of great ſubtilty and repute Pet. Hurt. de Mendoza. De An. diſ. 16. ſect. 8. p. 672. Intenſio actus ſecundi ſupponit aequalem intenſionem in actu primo, cum actus ſecundus ſupponat primum.
A ſecond argument is drawn from the perpetuall and uninterrupted happineſſe of Chriſt: it is reſolved both by Aquinas 3 a.q. 34.. art. 4. Scotus lib. 3. diſp. 18. and their followers, that Chriſt in regard of his Soule was even here in this life, from the very firſt moment of his conception, all his life long unto his death perfectus comprehenſor; and therefore he injoyed in his ſoule all that was neceſſary unto heaven happineſſe: and I find learned Proteſtants herein conſenting with them; now tis the unanimous opinion of the Schoole-men that a moſt intenſe27 actuall love of God, an actuall love of God for degrees as high, as ardent, as fervent, as is according to Gods ordinary power poſſible unto the humane nature, doth neceſſarily belong to the heaven happineſſe of men. The Scotiſts place the very formality of happineſſe ſolely herein, and Suarez with others think it eſſentiall unto happineſſe, though he ſuppoſeth the eſſence of happineſſe not to conſiſt wholly or chiefly in it. And for the reſt of the Thomiſts, who hold that the eſſence of happineſſe ſtands onely in the beatificall viſion of God, why even they make this actuall moſt intenſe love of God a naturall and neceſſary conſequent of the beatifique viſion. By this that hath been ſaid it is evident, that whereas you averre that the inward acts of Chriſts love of God were leſſe intenſe at one time than another, (for ſo you affirme in ſaying they were more intenſe at one time than at another) you deny Chriſt to be happy and bleſſed at thoſe times wherein his inward acts of love were thus leſſe intenſe, and that this is propoſitio malè ſonans, harſhly ſounding in the eares of Chriſtians, that are jealous of their redeemers honour, will I hope be ingeniouſly confeſſed by your ſelfe upon a review of it. Adde hereunto that the Schoolemen generally conſent, as unto a propoſition that is piouſly credible, that the happineſſe of Chriſts ſoule did even during the whole time of his abode here, farre ſurmount that of all the Saints, and Angells in heaven: but if the inward acts of his love of God were leſſe intenſe at one time than another, the bliſſe of his Soule would have come farre ſhort of that of the loweſt Saint in heaven; for the actuall love of the loweſt Saint was not, is not more intenſe at one time than another, but alwaies full and perfect; and therefore28 uncapable of further and higher degrees.
The third and laſt argument, is fetched from Chriſts impeccability; it was impoſſible for Chriſt to ſinne: but if the inward acts of his love of God had been leſſe intenſe at one time than at another, he had ſinned; for he had broken that firſt and great commandment, thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, with all thy Soule, with all thy mind, with all thy might, and ſtrength. Deut. 6.5. Matth. 22.37. Mark. 12.30. Luk. 10.27. For this commandment enjoyneth the moſt intenſe actuall love of God, that is poſſible; an actuall love of him tanto nixu & conatu quanto fieri poteſt (i. e. ) as much as may be; what better and more probable gloſſe can we put on that clauſe, thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy ſtrength or might,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, then thou ſhalt love him with thy uttermoſt force and endeavour: ſutable hereunto is that interpretation which Aquinas giveth of thoſe words thou ſhalt love the Lord with all thy heart (i. e. ) ſaith he ex toto poſſe tuo, with as high a degree of actuall love as thou art able to reach unto. Deus eſt totaliter diligendus, poteſt intelligi ita quod totalitas referatur ad diligentem: & ſic etiam Deus totaliter diligi debet; quia ex toto poſſe ſuo homo debet diligere deum, & quicquid habet, ad dei amorem ordinare; ſecundum illud Deuter. 6. Diliges dominum deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, 2 da 2 dae, q. 27. art. 5. But now Chriſt man had in him as great abilities for the actuall love of God as Adam in Paradiſe, as the Saints and Angels in heaven; for an all-fulneſſe of the grace and virtue of love dwelled in him, and therefore if the inward acts of his love were leſſe intenſe at one time, than another; then ſomtimes when he actually loved God, he did not love29 him as intenſly, as ardently, as fervently as he could, he did not love him with all his might, and ſtrength, ex toto poſſe ſuo, and ſo conſequently he fulfilled not all righteouſneſſe; for his obedience unto this commandment would have been by this your opinion imperfect and ſinfull, which, but to imagine were blaſphemy. But you will be ready to tell me, that you have prevented this charge, by that expoſition of thoſe large incluſive words, thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy Soule &c. which you have given in your treatiſe of will-worſhip, which I ſhall tranſcribe and briefly examine.
Once more, if it be objected that what ever is thus performed, is commanded by thoſe large incluſive words, [thou ſhalt love thy God, with all thy heart, with all thy Soule &c.] nothing being of ſuch latitude, as that the (with all) ſhould not contain it. I anſwer, that that phraſe denoteth two things only.
1. Sincerity of this love of God, as oppoſed to partiall divided love, or ſervice.
2. The loving him above all other things, and not admitting any thing into Competition with him; not loving any thing elſe in ſuch a degree. Treat: wil-worſh. p. 24.
Here you barely dictate, that that phraſe, [Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy Soule &c.] denoteth onely thoſe two things, you mention, whereas your reader hath juſt reaſon to expect a confirmation of what you ſay.
1. Becauſe this very anſwer is the ſhift of Papiſts in ſeverall controverſies between them and us, Bellarm. Tom. 2. De monachis. lib. 2. cap. 13. Tom. 4. de30 amiſsione gratiae, & Statu peccati lib: 1. cap. 12. &c. And was it not fit that you ſhould acquaint us, what thoſe cogent reaſons were, that neceſſitated you unto this compliance with Papiſts?
2. Thoſe proteſtants, that have dealt in the controverſies betwixt us and the Papiſts, have proved this your ſenſe to be too narrow, and with-all have given another expoſitionaaNimirùm huc tandem res redit, ut ſciamus ita imperari nobis amorem Dei, ut nullus ſit amoris gradus, intra ſummum, cui quiſquam debeat acquieſcere. ſummum autem dico non tantum comparatè ad res alias, quae ſub amorem cadunt: ſed etiam, & quidem praecipuè comparatè ad nos ipſos, ut nè ultrà poſſimus amare: Ita enim verè totum cor erit tota anima: mens tota vires omnes, &c. Chamier. Tom. 3. lib. 11. cap. 16. ſect. 22. of the words which they have confirmed and vindicated from the exceptions of the Papiſts. Now of all this, it had been equitable for you to have taken notice, and not to have troubled your reader with that which hath been ſo abundantly refuted by Proteſtant pens. But to take a ſunder this anſwer into its parts.
The phraſe denoteth 1. ſincerity of this love of God, as oppoſed to partiall divided love, or ſervice; Unto this I ſhall reply. 1. In the words of Ames unto Bellarmine: Bellar: Enervat: Tom. 2. p. 154. Hoc aliquid eſt, ſed non totum quod his verbis praecipitur, tum enim illi etiam qui minimum gradum verae charitatis, quamvis tepidi fuerint, hoc preceptum perfectè implerent. This is ſomething, but it is not all that is commanded in theſe words, for then thoſe that have the leaſt degree of true charity, although they were lukewarme ſhould perfectly fulfill this command.
2. To Ames his words, I ſhall adde thoſe of the Dr. Francis White (one that was farre from Puritaniſme) in31 his reply to the Jeſuite Fiſhers anſwer: If the precept, Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart &c. bind men no further than to an unfained or ſincere love of God, and the obſervance of his commandements without breach of friendſhip, then it bindeth them not to the ſhunning of veniall ſins. But according to Auſtin and Bernard, it bindeth man to the avoiding of all ſin, both veniall and mortall. But proceed we on to the ſecond part of your anſwer. That phraſe denoteth Secondly, the loving him above all other things, and not admitting any thing into competition with him: not loving any thing elſe in ſuch a degree. The Schoole-men tell us that God may be loved above all things three manner of waies, objectivè, appretiativè, and intenſivè: now which of theſe waies it is that you imbrace, or whether you imbrace all of them I cannot determine, and therefore I ſhall waite untill you declare your ſelfe, and accordingly ſhall ſhape mine anſwer. But in the meane while, that this commandement enjoineth a moſt intenſe actuall love of God, a love of God with as high a degree as is poſſible unto the humane nature, I ſhall evince by theſe following reaſons.
1. It cannot be denied but that the intenſion, and dedegrees of love fall all under the commandement of love it ſelfe: for as Aquinas noteth ſecundâ ſecundae queſt. 44. art. 8. Modus, qui pertinet ad rationem virtuoſi actûs, cadit ſub precepto, quod datur de actu virtutis. This premiſed I thus argue: Either the loweſt degree, or ſome middle degree, or the higheſt degree32 of actuall love, is here commanded; if the loweſt, then that is a perfect fulfilling of this law, and the lukewarmneſſe of love can be no ſin; if you ſay ſome one of the middle degrees betwixt the loweſtand the higheſt, it concerneth you to determine, and ſpecify what degree this is, below which all degrees of love are ſin full, and beyond which all degrees of love are a voluntary oblation and uncommanded worſhip; and if you cannot do this (as I know you cannot) I ſhall conclude, that the higheſt degree is commanded in our love of God.
2. A moſt intenſe love of God, a love of him with the utmoſt of our forces and endeavors is due unto God debito connaturalitatis, & debito gratitudinis, 1. debito connaturalitatis, by an obligation of congruence, for it is very fitting that we love him as much as we can, who is infinitely good in himſelfe, and therefore the cheife good, and ſupreame end of man. The Proteſtants are brought in by Bellarmine de Mon. Lib. 2. cap. 13. thus objecting againſt their popiſh evangelicall counſells of perfection, that he that is unwilling to love God as much as he can, doth hereby deny, to wit virtually and interpretatively, that God is the cheife good of man; and whereas he is ſo bold in his anſwer to affirme, that non requiritur ut quis ſummum bonumtam ardenter amet, quam fortè poſs et: Ames hath hereunto a very round and acute reply, tum non requiritur (ſaith he) ut in bonum omni ratione ſummum feramur, affectu omni etiamratione ſummo.
2. This moſt intenſe actuall love of God is due unto God by an obligation of gratitude, for hereby (as Dr33 Francis White againſt Fiſher out of Bernard) we are indebted and owe to the almighty, omne quod ſumus, & omne quod poſſumus, whatſoever we are, & whatſoever we are able to do.
For the further confirmation of this point, Proteſtants alleadge the teſtimonies of divers of the Fathers, particularly Auſtin and Bernard, as alſo of the ancient Schoole men, who ſay that this command cannot be fulfilled in this life; becauſe it commands ſuch a perfection of love, as is impoſſible to be attained in this life. I ſhall not clog the readers patience with tranſcribing the ſeverall quotations, becauſe I beleive he may have them almoſt in every writer of controverſies betwixt us and the Papiſts: onely I ſhall trouble him with what I conceive to be moſt remarkeable in Aquinas and Scotus concerning this mater. 1. Aquinas ſecunda ſecundae qu. 44. art. 6. intendit deus per hoc praeceptum Deut. 6. ut homo deo totaliter uniatur; quod fiet in patriâ, quando deus erit omnia in omnibus, 1 Cor. 15. & ideo plenè & perfectè in patriâ implebitur hoc praeceptum. And againe. qu. 184. art. 3. Non autem dilectio dei & proximi cadit ſub praecepto ſecundum aliquam menſuram, it a quòd id quod eſt plus, ſub conſilio remane at; ut patet ex ipſâ formâ praecepti, quae perfectionem demonſtrat; ut cum dicitur, diliges dominum deum ex toto corde tuo: totum enim & perfectum idem ſunt ſec. Phil. 3. phyſ. & cum dicitur, diliges proximum tuum ſicut teipſum: unuſquiſque enim ſe ipſum maximè diligit. Et hoc ideo eſt, quia finis praecepti charitas eſt, ut Apoſtolus 1 Tim. 1. in fine autem non adhibetur aliqua menſura, ſed ſolum in his quae ſunt34 ad finem, ut philoſophus dicit 1. polit. Sicut medicus non adhibet menſuram quantum ſanet, ſed quanta medicina vel diaeta utatur ad ſanandum. Thus alſo Scotus lib. 3. diſt. 27. dico igitur quod illud praeceptum, Deut. 6. non poteſt impleri in viâ, quantum ad omnes conditiones, quae exponuntur perillas additiones ex toto corde, & ex totâ anima, &c. quià non poteſt eſſe in viâ iſtâ tanta recollectio virium, ut amotis impedimentis poſsit voluntas tanto conatu ferri, quanto poſſit, ſi vires eſſent unitae, & non impeditae, & quod ad talem intenſionem actus expulſis impedimentis, & recollectis viribus debet intelligi dictum Aug. et magiſtri, quod praeceptum illud non impletur in viâ; nam pronitas virium inferiorum pro ſtatu iſto impedit ſuperiores ab actibus perfectis. The firſt that Bellarmine hath to evade theſe teſtimonies is not unknowne unto me, viz. that they are to be underſtood of the command quatenus indicant finem, non quatenus praecipit medium; if you think fit to adventure hereupon, I muſt needs intreat you to remove firſt out of your way the replies of Chamier and Ames unto it.
Thirdly you ſeeme in the latter end of ſection the 39. to intimate, that in the time of Chriſts agony there was more occaſion for the heightning of his love of God than there was at other times. What you meane by theſe ocaſiōs of heightning Chriſts love of God that you intimate, I will not undertake to gueſſe; but this I am ſure of, that at all other times he had ſufficient cauſes, grounds, and motives to induce him to love God with as heightned degrees of Actuall love as the humane nature could reach unto; he injoied the beatificall viſion,35 a cleare, evident, and intuitive knowledg of the divine eſſence, that had in it all the fulneſſe of goodneſs, and ſo was an object infinitely lovely and amiable: Now ſuch an Object thus known, thus ſeen, challengeth ſuch a meaſure of actuall love, as that it leaveth no place for a farther and higher degree. The Thomiſts generally maintaine that this moſt intenſe love of God is a naturall, and neceſſary ſequele of the beatificall viſion, neceſſary quo ad exercitium, as well as quoad ſpecificationem actûs; now that which works naturally and neceſſarily, works as vehemently and forcibly as it can. Omne agens de neceſsitate, neceſſariò agit uſque ad ultimum potentiae ſuae; therefore the inward acts of Chriſts love of God were alwaies as ardent, and fervent as he could performe them, and therefore ſome were not more intenſe than others; for if we ſpeak of a liberty of indifferency, and indetermination, he had no more liberty towards the intenſion of the inward acts of his love, than he had towards the acts themſelves.
40. Of this I ſhall hope it is poſſible to finde ſome inſtances among men (of whoſe graces it can be no blaſphemy to affirme, that they are capable of degrees) ſuppoſe we a ſincerely pious man, a true lover of God, and no deſpiſer of his poore perſecuted Church, and ſuppoſe we, as it is very ſuppoſeable, that at ſome time the ſeas roar, the tempeſt be at its height, and the waves beat violently upon this frail brittle veſſell, may it not be a ſeaſon for that pious mans ardency to receive ſome growth? for his zeal to be emulous of thoſe36 waves, and poure it ſelfe out more profuſely at ſuch, than at a calmer ſeaſon? I hope there be ſome at this time among us, in whom this point is really exemplified; if it be not, it is an effect of want, not fulneſſe of love. But I need not thus to inlarge, It is not by this Refuter denied of the perſon of Chriſt, and that is my intire〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉in reference either to Mr. C. or to him, the utmoſt that I undertook to demonſtrate then, or to juſtify now.
This Section your poore refuter had paſſed over as a digreſſion, had he not found himſelfe named in the cloſe of it; it is not by this refuter denyed of the perſon of Chriſt. I ſuppoſe the antecedent to the relative is in theſe words, may it not be a ſeaſon for that pious mans ardency to receive ſome growth? for his zeale to be emulous of thoſe waves, and poure it ſelfe out more profuſely at ſuch than at a calmer ſeaſon? And then there be two things that you affirme, that I deny not of the perſon of Chriſt.
1. That a tempeſtuous time (a time of affliction) was a ſeaſon for Chriſts ardency to receive ſome growth.
2. That twas a ſeaſon for his zeale to poure it ſelfe out more profuſely at ſuch, than at a calmer ſeaſon.
As for the firſt ſentence, a time of affliction was a ſeaſon for Chriſts ardency to receive ſome growth, if by ardency you underſtand the ardency of his love of God, I deny that it did receive any growth; for to aſcribe growth unto it is to charge it with imperfection. 37Charitas, quamdiu augeri poteſt (ſaith Auſtin) profectò illud quod minus eſt quàm debet, ex vitio eſt. And I am very confident that beſides this replyer, no learned man either proteſtant; or papiſt hath aſcribed any ſuch growth unto the ardency of Chriſts actuall love of God.
As for the ſecond ſentence, that a tempeſtuous time, a time of Chriſts affliction was a ſeaſon for his zeale to poure it's ſelfe out more profuſely than at a calmer ſeaſon, this is not (I grant) denied by me, if by this more profuſe pouring out of his zeale you only underſtand the outward expreſſions of his zeale; but I cannot but extreamly wonder that you affirme this to be the utmoſt, that you undertook to demonſtrate to Mr. Cawdrey, or to juſtify now againſt me &c.
For 1. in your anſwer to Mr. Cawdrey, you affirme by conſequent, that Chriſts love of God was capable of farther and higher degrees, but love is predicated of the outward expreſſions thereof only analogically, analogiâ attributionis extrinſecae, ſicut ſanitas dicitur de urina.
2. In this your reply unto me you expreſly averre, that the inward acts of Chriſts love of God were more intenſe at one time, than another Sect. 21. and I hope you have more philoſophy, then to confound the inward acts, and the outward expreſſions of love.
That which hath herein occaſioned your miſtake is, I beleeve, a ſuppoſall that the inward acts of love, and the outward expreſſions thereof are, if they be38 ſincere, alwaies exactly proportioned in point of degree; but this propoſition hath no truth in it, as you will ſoone find, if you attempt the proofe of it, who almoſt but may eaſily conceive how 'tis very ordinary for the outward expreſſions of love to be gradually beneath the inward acts thereof? he is no hypocrite in expreſſing his love, that loveth inwardly more than he expreſſeth outwardly; the degrees then of the inward acts of love may not only equall, but alſo tranſcend the moſt ſincere expreſſions of love. It may be ſo in all men, and I ſhall alleadge two reaſons, why in Chriſt the inward acts of his love were alwaies equally intenſe, though the outward expreſſions thereof were gradually different.
The firſt reaſon agreeth unto Chriſt in common with other men. Chriſt as man was alwaies obliged unto the moſt intenſe, ardent, and fervent inward acts of love of God, but he was not alwaies obliged unto the moſt intenſe expreſſions of theſe inward acts; the reaſon of the difference betweene his obligation unto the intenſion of the inward acts of his love, and his obligation unto the intenſion of the outward expreſſions thereof, you may fetch from what is ſaid by Aquinas 2 da 2 dae, q. 27. art. 6. ad tertiam. Nec eſt ſimile de interiori actu charitatis & exterioribus actibus. Nam interior actus charitatis habet rationem finis, quià ultimum bonum hominis conſiſtit in hoc, quod anima Deo inhaereat, ſecundum illud Pſalmi, mihi adhaerere deo bonum eſt. Exteriores autem actus ſunt ſicut ad finem, & ideo ſunt39 commenſurandi, & ſecundum charitatem, & ſecundum rationem.
The ſecond reaſon is peculiar unto Chriſt above all other men: Whil'ſt he lived here upon earth, he injoyed the beatificall viſion; and the naturall, and neceſſary conſequent thereof is a moſt intenſe actuall love of God, and therefore the inward acts of his love of God were equally intenſe at all times: but as for the outward expreſſions of theſe acts, Chriſt had to them a proper freedome, taking the word [freedome] for an active indifferency, in ſenſu diviſo, and therefore they might be more intenſe at one time than another; but of this you may, if you pleaſe, ſee further in Suarez in tertiam partem Thom: diſ. 37. ſect. 4. where the queſtion debated is quomodo voluntas Chriſti ex neceſsitate diligens deum, in reliquis actibus potuerit eſſe libera.
41. And ſo I ſhut up this haſty paper, hoping that he which invited and promiſed it a welcome, in caſe it were given in a fair and Scholaſticall way, having nothing to accuſe in it 'as to the firſt Epithet, will abate ſomewhat in reference to the ſecond, and allow it a friendly, though being unqualified, it pretend not to a more hoſpitable reception.
Unto this your haſty paper (as you call it) I have given a deliberate anſwer; and I hope it may contend with your reply for civility, and faireneſſe in carriage of the controverſy between us. As for the Scholaſticallneſſe40 of either paper, it were a vaine thing for me to ſay any thing of it; for we muſt be tried by the learned readers, unto whom we both have, by thus appearing in publique, appealed; and unto their judgment I ſhall contentedly ſubmit my ſelfe. And thus your refuter, for the preſent, takes his leave of you, hoping, when your more pleaſing and profitable imployments ſhall permit, to heare further from you; in the meane time he ſhall reſt: Your moſt humble ſervant
(EEBO-TCP ; phase 2, no. A87508)
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