Uniformity in Humane Doctrinall Ceremonies un­grounded on 1 Cor. 14.40.

Dr. HAMMOND.

1. SInce the publiſhing that Anſwer to Mr. J. concerning the degrees of ardency in Chriſts Prayer, I am advertiſed of another paſſage in that volume, in which I am concerned, relating to ſome words of mine in the view of the Directory, pag. 19. on the head of Uniformity in Gods Service, and particular­ly reſpecting my rendring of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 14.40. Let all things be done〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

2. Theſe indeed I thus rendred [decently and according to order or appointment] and affirmed the importance of that place to be, that all be done in the Church according to Cuſtome and appointment, rendring this reaſon of the former, becauſe it was implyed in〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, decently (cuſtome being the onely rule of decency, &c.) and of the latter, becauſe the words do literally import this,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. according to order or appointment.

3. To the former of theſe he makes his firſt exception, thus, [he dares not affirme that this is the immediate ſenſe of the place, but onely that it is implyed; it cannot be denyed, but that decency doth imply ſuch customes, the omiſſion of which doth neceſſarily infer indecency; but that the omiſſion of ſuch Ceremonies as ours, doth infer indecency, the Doctor and all his party can never make good: What undecencie can the Doctor prove to be in the administration of Baptiſm without the Croſſe; as alſo in publique Prayers and Preaching without a Surplice? But of this ſee farther in Ames in the places but now quoted: The Doctor may perhaps look upon him as an inconſiderable adverſary. But we ſhall think his Arguments conſiderable; untill the Doctor, or ſome other of his party give a ſatisfactory anſwer unto them. In the mean while let us examine the proof that the Doctor brings for this ſenſe: and it is becauſe cuſtome is the onely rule of decency.

This Propoſition, though very strange, is proofleſſe; and therefore we might as well reject it, as the Doctor dictates it. But I ſhall adde a confutation of it, from theſe follow­ing arguments.

1. If cuſtome be the only rule of decency, then nothing elſe can be a rule thereof4 beſides cuſtomes, but this is falſe; for the light and law of Nature, is alſo a rule there­of,〈◊〉that infallible.

2. Nothing can be undecent, that is agreeable unto the onely rule of decency but divers things are undecent, which yet can plead custome; and this is ſo evident, as that I will not ſo much undervalue the Doctors judgement, as to endeavour any proofs thereof. It is impoſſible that the onely rule of decency ſhould be undecent; but yet it is very poſſible that many cuſtomes ſhould be undecent, and therefore I ſhall conclude, that cuſtome is not the only rule of decency.

3. Laſtly, unto cuſtome, as you may ſee in both Ariſtotle and Aquinas, the frequent uſage of a thing is required. But now there may be decency or handſomneſſe in the firſt uſage of a thing; and of this decency cuſtome is not the rule, and therefore it is not the only rule of decency.

4. The first thing here charged on me, is timidity, that I dare not ſay what I ſaid not, and this attended with a conceſſion (in a limited ſenſe) of the truth of what I did ſay; the ſecond is the impertinence or unſufficiency of that, in that limited ſenſe, to prove what he conceives I would have from it, viz. that the omiſſion of our ceremonies doth inferre indecency: And the proof of this charge twofold, 1. by way of queſtion, founded in two inſtances, the Croſſe in Baptiſm, and the Surplice in publique Prayer, and Preaching: 2. By reference to Ames, and reſolving to think his arguments conſiderable, till a ſatisfactory anſwer be given them. And his third charge, is my uſing an unſufficient proof to prove my interpretation, viz. this, [becauſe cuſtome is the onely rule of decency] which he confutes by three arguments.

Theſe three charges I ſhall now very breifly examine, and, if I miſtake not, clearly evacuate. The firſt by aſsuring him, 1. that I did dare to ſay, and indeed ſaid (as I then thought perspicuouſly) the full of what I meant; but that it was no way incum­bent on me, to ſay either what I did not mean, or what Mr. J. or any other ſhould be juſtly able to charge of want of truth in the leaſt degree. And 2. if what I ſaid cannot, as he confeſſes, be denied, to have truth in it in one ſenſe, I demand why muſt it be a not daring (which is wont to ſignifie timidity or cowardiſe) that I affirmed it not in another ſenſe, wherein he doth not conſent to it.

Jeanes.

The not daring of a thing proceeds from, not only timidity, but alſo from conſcience and ſhame: When we ſay of men in controverſal writings, that they dare not affirm ſuch and ſuch errours, we do not reproach them with cowar­diſe, unleſſe he be a coward that is afraid, or aſhamed to deliver an untruth. That according unto cuſtome is the immediate ſenſe of〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is a very groſs & evident falſhood; & when I ſaid that you dared not to affirm it, my mean­ing plainly was, that your conſcience or ſhame kept you from ſuch an affirma­tion, and what wrong I have herein done you I am yet to ſeek.

If you demand why I ſay that, you dare not ſay what you ſaid not?

I anſwer, I have two reaſons for it:

1. In entrance into this diſpute, I did, as is uſual in Controverſies, premiſe what I took for uncontroverted on both ſides. 1. for your part, I thought you would not deny, but that the immediate ſenſe of〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉was not accor­ding unto cuſtome; and then, I propounded for my owne part what I granted.

2. Though in Charity I judge, that you dare not ſay, that according unto cu­ſtome,5 is the immediate ſenſe of〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, yet I muſt needs tell you, that by your opinion it is incumbent upon you to ſay as much, and that I thus prove: You ſay that according to cuſtome is the importance of〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, the a­dequate and full importance of it, for that you ſhould ſo trifle, as to ſay, that you meant, it is onely the partiall, and inadequate importance of it, I will not ſo much as imagine: But now, if it be not the expreſſe, and immediate ſenſe of the word, but onely implyed therein, as drawn there-from, as a ſequele or inference; by way of deduction or conſequence, it may onely be a part or peice of the importance ther­of: to prove then, that 'tis the full and adequate importance of the word, you muſt make good, that it is the immediate ſenſe of it.

Dr. Hammond. ſect. 6.

To make ſhort, and prevent all poſſibilitie of his, or any mans farther miſtaking my words, I ſhall hasten to tell him the full of my meaning in that paſſage, that (〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉decently) implies (according to cuſtome) viz. that in ſuch things as theſe, of which then I ſpake, geſtures, habits, and the like circumſtances of Gods publique ſer­vice, wherein the Apoſtle preſcribes care of decency, 'tis neceſſary to obſerve the cuſtom, of the place wherein we live.

Jeanes.

1. The cuſtomes of ſome places in geſtures, habits, and the like circum­ſtances of Gods worſhip are very undecent, and it is not neceſſary to obſerve ſuch cuſtomes: But you will perhaps ſay, that you except undecent cuſtoms, and then you are to be underſtood onely of decent cuſtomes; for every cu­ſtome is decent or undecent: becauſe decency and undecency are privatively oppoſed, and interprivativè oppoſita non datur medium in ſubjecto capaci, between privative oppoſites there is no middle either of abnegation or participation in a ca­pable ſubject: The reſult and upſhot then of your meaning is, that, decently implyes, according unto decent cuſtomes; and then

1. The full of your meaning is but a trifling ſpeech, that proves nothing in the Controverſie, unleſſe you alſo prove the Ceremonies controverted, to be ſo decent, as that the omiſſion of them will be undecent in the ſervice of God.

2. I would fain know, how you will ſuit unto it the proof of it: Cuſtome is the onely rule of decency, for there too, by cuſtome you underſtand that which is decent, ſo that your argument runs thus: decent cuſtome is the onely rule of decency; therefore〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉decently, implyeth decent cuſtoms. And this argument moſt of your learned Readers will (to borrow your words concerning a ſaying of mine) deſpiſe under the appearance of a tautologie.

2. If the full of your meaning in that paſſage, that〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉decently, im­plyes according to cuſtome, be, that in ſuch things as theſe, of which then you ſpake, geſtures, habits and the like circumſtances of Gods publique ſervice, &c. it is neceſſary to obſerve the cuſtomes of the place wherein wee live, why then I muſt be bold to tel you, that the full of your meaning is very ſhort of the meaning of the Apoſtle; for theſe words of the Apoſtle, let all things be done decently〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. 〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, prohibits al undecency, not only that undecency againſt the cuſtom of the place wherin we live, but alſo that undecency which is againſt the dictates of the Law of Nature. By this the Reader may ſee, how defective your expoſition is: the Apoſtle ſaith, let all things be done decently, and your gloſſe is, let ſome things in Gods worſhip be6 done according unto ſome cuſtomes, to wit, ſuch as are decent.

3. I ſuppoſe that by geſtures, habits, and the like circumſtances in the ſer­vice of God, you mean ſuch of them as are Symbolical ceremonies; for other­wiſe your full meaning is nothing unto the purpoſe, becauſe it will be no ground for that uniformity you plead for. Now that the Apoſtles words, let all things be done decently implyeth, that in humane Symbolical ceremonies it is neceſſary that we obſerve the cuſtomes of the place wherein we live, is a thing which I utterly deny, and ſhall be conſtant in ſuch denyal, untill you drive me from it by ſome convincing argument; and that I do not do this out of ſtomack, will appear by the reaſon that I ſhall alledge: The words of the Apoſtle, let all things be done decently, are not diſobeyed, unleſſe there be ſome undecency committed in the worſhip and ſervice of God; for decency and unde­cency are privatively oppoſite, and therefore there is decency in thoſe actions where there is no undecency; but now by the omiſſion of Symbolical ceremonies of humane inſtitution, ſuch as the Croſſe in Baptiſm, Surplice in Prayer and Preaching, which can plead cuſtome of the preſent place we live in, there is committed no undecency in the worſhip and ſervice of God, viz. in Baptiſm, in Preaching and Praying, as will be apparent unto any man that will attempt to prove ſyllogiſtically the contrary; therefore the Apoſtles precept is not diſobeyed by the omiſſion of ſuch Symbolical ceremonies, and conſequently the Apoſtles precept doth not in any way imply ſuch Cere­monies.

Dr. Hammond. ſect. 6.

This I then thought ſufficiently explicated by exemplifying in mens wearing long hair, which the Apoſtle proved indecent by its being againſt〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. ſaith Suidas,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a cuſtome of ſome continuance in that place (which yet in women there, and men in other places, where that cuſtome prevailed not, had nothing indecent in it.)

Jeanes.

1. This conceit that you have out of Suidas, Salmaſius de C•ma diſputes a­gainſt; but his argument ſatisfyeth me not, and therefore I ſhall wave all that he ſaies, and confine my ſelf unto the very words of the Apoſtle for diſproof of your ſenſe of them, and my reaſon is taken from the joyning of〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉with〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; for ſuppoſe that〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Nature, may ſometimes ſignifie cuſtome, yet that〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, nature it ſelf ſhould ſignifie cuſtome, is very improper.

2. Womens wearing of long hair is no religious myſtical ceremony, but uſed out of Gods worſhip and ſervice, as well as in, and therefore a moſt imperti­nent exemplification of that which you plead for, Ʋniformity in religious myſti­cal Ceremonies, that are proper and peculiar unto the ſpecial and ſolemn worſhip of God.

I readily grant, that in ſome places, cuſtome hath made the long hair of wo­men one badge of diſtinction between them and men; but being by cuſtome made ſuch a badge, nature it ſelf dictates the obſervation of it; and if a man wear ſuch long hair as women; he ſins againſt the law of nature, if not im­mediately and proximè, yet mediately ex interventu rationabilis conſuetudinis.

As impertinent is your ſecond exemplification, if Chryſoſtomes and others ex­poſition7 may have place; for they refer [we have no ſuch cuſtome] unto the words immediately foregoing (and why we ſhould goe farther for a coherence, I can ſee no reaſon) if any man ſeem to be contentious: So that the meaning of the Apoſtle is, we have no cuſtome to be contentious: Now to be contentious, is a ſin againſt the Moral Law, the Law of Nature, and therefore belongs not un­to your diſcourſe of Ceremonies.

Dr. Hammond. ſect 7.

But this exemplification of my meaning he thought fit to conceale from the Reader, and ſupply that vacuity onely with an &c. yet reciting at length, to a word, what was immediately before, and after it. His deſign in ſo doing, I judge not, but ſhall endeavour to undeceive the Reader for the future, by farther enlarging on it.

Jeanes.

1. Womens wearing of long hair is no Symbolical ceremony, and therefore what you ſaid of it was an impertinency, and no exemplification of your mean­ing, and therefore I had no reaſon to take notice of it.

But 2. ſuppoſe it were an exemplification, yet unleſſe it were alſo for confirmation of your concluſion; that cuſtome is the onely rule of decency, I was no wiſe obliged to recite what you ſaid herein; for I expreſly told the Rea­der, I would tranſcribe what was argumentative in your words; now what I left out was not argumentative; for from it, neither you, nor any man elſe can ever infer your now mentioned concluſion.

Dr. Hammond. ſect. 8.

All people, I think, in the world, have ſome outward ſignifications, and expreſſions of Reverence; but all have not the ſame, but according to Topical cuſtomes, ſome different, ſome contrary to others: We of this and all our neighbour nations expreſse reverence by uncovering the head, the Turks doe the contrary. Again, among Chriſti­ans, 'tis cuſtomary for men ſo to expreſſe their reverence, but for women, ſaith the Apo­ſtle, it is not, but the contrary; and ſo it is ſtill among us. Nay it was once among ſome Heathens (that worſhipt Mercury) an act of the higheſt reverence, even of ado­ration, to throw ſtones at their God; among others, to cut themſelves with Lances, when they were a praying to him. And it can be no news to Mr. J. that theſe customes were not obſerved by other Countries; the Jews that threw ſtones at Christ, and the Daemoniack that cut himſelf with them, were neither of them interpretable to wor­ſhip him.

Jeanes.

1. Unleſſe you can prove, that there cannot be outward ſignifications and expreſſions of reverence in Gods ſervice, without humane Symbolical ceremo­nies, all this your enlargement about the expreſſions of reverence will be to no purpoſe. We require reverence in all parts of Gods worſhip as well as you; but then we hold, that Gods worſhip may be performed reverently, and in a ſeemly manner, without myſtical ceremonies of humane invention.

2. Kneeling in Prayer is an expreſſion of the higheſt degree of Reverence, Adoration; and it hath a higher rule than Cuſtome, viz. Scripture and the light of Nature: No Cuſtome can render this Kneeling undecent; unleſſe you will ſay thoſe words of the Pſalmiſt, Pſal. 95.6, doe not oblige Chriſtians: O come,8 let us worſhip and bow down, let us kneel before the Lord our maker.

3. There be ſome cuſtomary expreſſions of reverence, that are undeniably unjuſtifiable, and you cannot ſay that they are implyed in the Apoſtles〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thus for expreſſion of reverence, 'tis a cuſtome with Papiſts not to touch the bread with their hands, but to have it put into their mouths; and upon the like pretence of reverence, it is cuſtomary amongſt them, for Lay-men to abſtain from the Cup altogether.

Laſtly, why you bring in the Heathens throwing of ſtones at Mercury in a way of worſhip, I cannot divine; for I cannot imagine, that you think it to be a decent way of worſhip, and if it be undecent, then it ſerveth nothing unto the exemplification of your meaning.

Dr. Hammond. ſect. 9.

This therefore was no dark, but viſible foundation of what I ſaid; In aſſigning any rite or ceremony for the ſervice of God, decency, ſaith the Apoſtle, was to be obſerved, the onely rule to judge of that, is, ſay I, to conſider the Cuſtomes of that particular place, of which we conſult. Where bewing the knee, or kneeling on the ground is cuſtomarily uſed as a token of reverence, where putting off, or keeping off the hat, there the choice of Ceremonies muſt be made with respect to thoſe particular customes: Here 'tis evident, that I mean not the frequent uſage of that ceremony, in oppoſition to a firſt uſage of it, as Mr. J. is willing to miſtake me, and found one of his arguments upon that miſtake, but the ſtanding-cuſtome of the place, by which, as by an argument or evidence, ſuch a ceremony is demonstrated to be a reverential reſpect, and ſo (for the ſervice of God, to whom all reverence is due) decent in that place, though in nature or in the estimation of all other men, it be not ſo.

Jeanes.

1. If the Apoſtle had ſaid, as you ſay, he ſaith, there ought to be no farther controverſie about the lawfulneſſe of humane ceremonies; but that clauſe [in aſſigning any rite or ceremony for the ſervice of God, &c. •is an Apocryphal ad­dition of yours, without any colour from the Text it ſelf, or from the cohe­rence; and therefore all you build upon it is but fancy and fiction: That the A­poſtles decency cannot be obſerved without aſſigning ſuch Rites and Ceremonies as you diſpute for, you may dictate and boldly affirm, but can never with all your learning ſolidly prove; and unleſſe you can make proof hereof, you and your party have juſt reaſon to be aſhamed of urging this place for ceremo­nies, with ſuch an unſhaken confidence as you do.

2. Whereas you tell us, 'tis evident that you mean not〈◊〉the frequent uſage of that ceremony in oppoſition to the firſt uſage of it: This evidence of your meaning you have not ſo much as attempted to prove; and if you ſhall for the future make ſuch an attempt, it would, I am afraid, prove ſucceſleſs. The cu­ſtome of a thing (unleſſe you can faſten upon it a ſenſe or meaning never yet heard of) is oppoſed unto the firſt uſage of that thing; for cuſtome implyeth the frequent uſage of a thing, and to ſay that the frequent uſage of a thing is the firſt uſage of it, is an evident repugnancy and an apparent contradiction, contradictio in adjecto oppoſitum in oppoſito, as they ſay. I am therefore much to ſeek for the ſenſe and reaſon of that Antitheſis you make in theſe words, I mean, not the frequent uſage of that ceremony in oppoſition to a firſt uſage of it, but the ſtanding cuſtome of the place, &c. for 'tis impoſſible that the ſtanding cuſtome9 of the place in a ceremony, ſhould be the firſt uſage of that ceremony; where the miſtake is let the Reader judge.

3. In that which followeth, there is nothing of argument, unleſſe you can prove every ceremony, which can plead the ſtanding cuſtome of a place, to be a fitting and decent expreſſion of that reverential reſpect, which is due unto God. Biſhop Morton in his Book of the Inſtitution of the Sacrament of the bleſſed Body and Blood of Chriſt, p. 80, 81. ſheweth that the opinion of reverence, hath been the damme and nurſe of manyfold ſuperſtitions; and after ſuch demonſtration he quotes a ſaying of Chryſoſtome upon Joh. 13.8. Let us therefore learne to honour and reverence Christ as he would, and not as we think fit.

Dr. Hammond. ſect. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.

10. Certainly this is ſo evident in it ſelf, and ſo undeniably the importance of my words, that there can be no need farther to inlarge on it, much leſse to examine the weight, or meaning of his conceſſion, that it cannot be dented but that decency doth imply ſuch cuſtomes, the omiſſion of which neceſſarily inferres indecency]

11. This ſaying of his ſome Readers may look on with Reverence, as not readily comprehending the importance of it, others may chance to despiſe it under the appearance of a tautologie. But upon pondering, it will appear that the Author had a meaning in it; which he deſigned ſhould bring in ſome advantage to his cauſe, and without which he was not likely to advance far, or ſucceed in it.

12. Some cuſtomes ▪ we know there are, which are ſo highly decent, as that the omiſſion of them neceſsarily infers indecency: But what are they? why ſuch as the law of (at least lapſt) nature preſcribes, covering of nakedneſſe, and the like; of which 'tis evident a­mong all that have not learnt of Carneades industriouſly to raſe out all naturall meaſures of honeſt and diſhoneſt, that the omiſſion of them infers indecency, yea and neceſſarily in­fers it, this ſort of decency being naturall to all men that ever were, or ſhall be in the world, born and educated in what nation, or inured to what cuſtome ſoever, and this the very firſt hour after our firſt Parents fall, before any cuſtome had been contracted which might recommend it to them.

13. And as of theſe his rule is true, that the omiſſion of theſe neceſsarily inferrs undecency, ſo it is in a manner proper to theſe, and belongs not to any other ſort of things ▪ whoſe decencie flowes but from ſome poſitive command though it be of God, or cuſtome, or command of men. To ſuch things whoſe decency flowes from any com­mand either of God or man, this rule cannot be fully applyed; for that command might have been not given, or there might be a ſpace before it was given, or a peo­ple to whom it was not given, and then in any of thoſe caſes the omiſſion would not be indecent, to whom the law was not given; and ſo it doth not neceſſarily and abſo­lutely, but onely dependently on the law, and conditionally, inferre indecency; ſo in like manner the rule holds not in thoſe things, whoſe decency is introduced onely by cuſtome, for that Mr. J. truly ſaith, ariſing from frequency of actions, it must againe bee granted, that there was a time when that which now is cuſtome, was new, and ſo not custome; and againe, there are, or may bee Nations, with whom that cuſtome (whatſoever can be instanced in) hath not prevailed, which prejudges ſtill the neceſſity spoken of, that ſuch omiſſion ſhould inferre inde­cencie.

And ſo we ſee the Jumme of Mr. J. his liberal conceſſion, viz. that decency implyes10 naturall decency, or ſuch cuſtomes, which are naturally decent, and ſo the omiſſion of them naturally indecent; and if the Doctor or his party do not prove, or make good, that the adminiſtration of Baptiſm without the Croſſe is againſt the law of nature, that the Preaching without the Surplice beares analogie to the diſcloſing of nakedneſſe, he is utterly refuted by Mr. J. in his interpretation of〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or notion of de­cency.

Jeanes.

1. That I had no deſign in putting in the word neceſſarily, is evident by my leaving it out in the next words; but that the omiſſion of ſuch ceremonies as ours doth inferre undecency, the Doctor and all his party can never make good. You ſhall have my good leave inſtead of neceſſarily to place truly, or convincingly. Vo­ciferations I have heard many againſt the undecency of Gods worſhip and ſer­vice amongſt Presbyterians, and when I have called for proof, I have been told, amongſt o•her things, that they Baptiſed without the Croſſe, that they put up prayers unto God without a Surplice; but that God is undecently worſhipped, where ſuch toyes as theſe are omitted, you may ſtoutly affirme, but can never prove, by ſo much as one convictive argument: the word neceſſarily may then very well be inſerted, in oppoſition to the groundleſſe ſurmiſes of the ignorant, and proofleſſe dictates of ſome learned men. Ignorant men may ſurmiſe, and lear­ned men may dictate, that the omiſſion of our ceremonies doth infer indecency, but this ſurmiſe and dictate can never be made good by argument.

2. In Logick, a neceſſary inference is oppoſed unto that which is fallacious, as alſo that which is but probable and contingent; and therefore I wonder why you ſhould quarrell at the word neceſſarily? for doe you think in earneſt, that decency implyes ſuch cuſtomes, the omiſſion of which doth ſophiſtically, or at the beſt, onely probably inferre undecency, you cannot, I know, harbour ſo ſenſleſſe and irrational a thought, and therefore you muſt ſay as I doe, that decency here implyeth onely ſuch cuſtomes, the omiſſion of which, neceſſarily inferre undecency.

3. When you ſay that my rule is in a manner proper to thoſe cuſtoms, which the Law, of at leaſt, laps'd Nature preſcribes, that limitation in a manner is a back­door, out of which how farre you may run, I know not, and therefore untill you ſomewhere make a ſtand, I ſhall not run after you.

4. Whereas you faſten upon me this aſſertion, that decency here implyeth onely ſuch cuſtomes which are naturally decent, viz. preſcribed immediately by the Law of Nature, and ſo the omiſſion of them naturally indecent, you have for this no colour, but that which you take from the word neceſſarily, and how weak a ground this is for ſuch an imputation, you muſt needs confeſſe, when you remember what I now told you, that neceſſarily here is oppoſed unto fallaciouſly and probably. Dr. Ames himſelf in the diſpute about humane cere­monies, pag. 58. confeſſeth, that comelineſſe, in the very place of the Apoſtle, containeth all naturall and civill handſomneſs; and in his Reply to Mortons ge­neral Defence, &c. cap. 3. ſect. 28. he acknowledgeth the womens vailes, 1 Cor. 11. to be an inſtance of this decency; for by the example of it, he concludes that other Churches may be directed ſo farre, juſt as the Apoſtles rule ſtretch­eth, 1 Cor. 14.40. Let all things be done comely: when Biſhop Morton deſired to know whether this matter were not a thing indifferent? his anſwer is, it is indifferent in the general nature of it; yet at that time, and in that place, they ſinned11 that did otherwiſe, even before Paul, or any of their overſeers gave them charge about it. By this his anſwer it is apparent, that he did not think it dictated by Nature unto the Corinthians, before any cuſtome had recommended it unto them. As for my own part you ſhall have here my frank conceſſion, that decency here implyeth even that decency which is introduced by civill cuſtome, pro­vided,

1. That it be, conſuetudo rationabilis;Suarez de legib. for no other cuſtome can have the force and authority of a law, and if you, or any other can bring any arguments, that it was confuetudo rationabilis which introduced our ceremonies, they ſhall have, God willing, an anſwer.

2. That the omiſſion of it renders Gods worſhip undecent: the equity of this li­mitation appeareth from this reaſon, becauſe the Apoſtles command of decency is not violated but by undecency: This is at large ſet down in Ames his diſpute about humane ceremonies, pag. 77, 78.

Laſtly, your, and my learned friend Mr. Barlow, reſolveth and proveth, Ex­ercit. Metaph. p. 29. every morall evill, every evill of ſin, to be againſt the law of Nature, if not proximè and immediatè, yet mediatè ex interventu legis poſitivae, now the undecency here prohibited by the Apoſtle is a morall evill, a ſin, malum culpae, therefore 'tis at leaſt mediately againſt the Law of Nature. Your great and learned Hooker, pag. 95. of his Eccleſiaſtical Politie ſaith, that this rule of the A­postle is an edict of Nature, a Canon of that Law which is written in all mens hearts; the Church had for ever, no leſſe then now, ſtood bound to obſerve it, whether the Apo­ſtle had mentioned it or no. And hereupon I ſhall infer, that if you or your party doe not prove or make good, that the adminiſtration of Baptiſme without the Croſſe, that Preaching, Praying, without the Surplice, is againſt the Law of na­ture, in ſome ſenſe at leaſt, mediately, he is utterly refuted by Mr. Hooker his inter­pretation of〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or notion of decency; and I doe not deſire to live ſo long, as to ſee ſuch a proof as this made.

Dr. Hammond. ſect. 15.

This is indeed his meaning, which (though ſomewhat darkned in that his expreſſion) will appear but conſequent to the two things which he hath premiſed in this matter from Ameſius his notion of decency. p. 64. in marg. 1. that decency requires not that any ſacred things be inſtituted de novo, but onely that thoſe things which are inſtituted by God, be uſed in that manner which is agreeable to the dignity of them. 2. That as order, ſo decency belongs to civil offices, as well as ſacred things, in which indecorum eſt vitium oppoſitum debito illi modo, qui requiritur ad eorum juſtum finem, & uſum conſequendum, indecency is a vice oppoſed to that due manner which is required to the obtaining the just end, and uſe of thoſe things. Now if in the former of theſe, the mode he ſpeaks of, as agreeable to the dignity of thoſe things which are inſtituted, be it ſelf-ſuppoſed by him to be inſtituted by men, then muſt he acknowledge humane power of inſtituting ceremonies, which being ſo contrary to his deſign, I muſt reſolve not to be intended by him; but rather, that as the ſacred things are inſtituted by God, ſo the mode which is conſentaneous to their dignity is inſtituted by God alſo, and that no­thing is decent in ſacris, which is not ſo inſtituted. And ſo likewiſe on the ſecond head, that of civill offices. For that indecency, which is a vice or ſin, must be contrary to ſome Law of Gods, and ſo alſo that which is oppoſed to the due manner which is required; and ſo is neceſſary either neceſſitate medii, or praecepti alſo to obtaining a just end, this ſure is more than the omiſſion of an indifferent cuſtome, which may, or may not be conti­nued12 without any offence againſt nature, even the omiſſion of ſtrict univerſal duty, either natural decency, or ſomewhat that bears proportion with it.

Jeanes.

Both Ames and my poor ſelf confeſs, that God hath by the Canon of the A­poſtle, and by the light of Nature, appointed and commanded, that decency in his worſhip and ſervice, the neglect whereof would be undecent; but that hee holds that there is need of a special divine inſtitution to render a thing decent, is diſ­claimed by Ames in ſeveral places of his writings: Medul. Theol. lib. 2. c. 14. ſect. 24, 25, 26. Hujuſmodi igitur circumſtantiae, quae ſuâ naturâ ſunt civiles, aut com­munes ▪ non ſunt particulariter in ſcripturis praeceptae, partim, quia in communem hominum ſenſum incurrunt; & partim, quia infra dignitatem & majeſtatem legis divinae eſſ•t, ut talia figilla•im in illa praeſcribantur, hâc etenim ratione ridieula multa fuiſſent ſingu­lari lege cavenda: Exempli gratiâ, ne in eccleſiaſtico coetu unus in alterius ſinu ſeſe colocaret, in alterius faciem cenſpueret, aut ne popijmos faccret in ſacris actionibus. Habendae tamen ſunt tanquam ex voluntate Dei praeceptae. 1. Quia in genere praecipiun­tur, ſub lege ordinis, decori, & aedificationis. 2 Quia pleraeque earum neceſſario ſe­quuntur ex iis quae à Deo ſunt expreſſè conſtituta. Cum enim Deus constituit, ut fide­les omnis generis convenirent, ad ipſius nomen & cultum celebrandum, conſequentèr e­tiam inſtituit, ut idoneum & commodum aliquem locum habeant, in quo poſſint conve­nire. & horam etiam aſſignatam, qua ſimul p•ſſint adeſſe; c•m etiam miniſter à Deo ſit conſtitutus ad alios publice inſtituendos, ſimul etiam conſtituitur, ut ſedem & ſitum cor­poris illum habeat, qui tali actioni congruit.

25. Illa igitur quae pertinent ad ordinem & decorum, non ita relinquuntur hominum arbitrio; ut poſsint, quod ipſis libet, ſub illo nomine Eccleſ•is obtrudere; ſed partim de­terminantur generali•us De•praeceptis, partim natura ipſarum rerum, & partim circum­ſtantiis illis, quae ex occaſione ſeſe offerunt.

26. Variae enim ord•is & decori circumſtantiae tales ſunt, ut nulla inſtitutione pub­lica accedente, debeant tamen à ſingulis obſervari, neque poſſunt ab hominibus prohiberi ſine peccato.

26. For divers circumſtances of order and decency are ſuch, as though there be no publique inſtitution of them, yet they ought to be obſerved of every one, neither can men forbid them without ſin. Unto this adde another place in his f•eſh ſuit againſt Ceremonies, diſput. pag. 29. We never ſaid, or thought, that all particular rites pertaining to order and decency are punctually deter­mined in the Scripture. We never dreamed, that all ſuch rites being beſide the particular determination of the Scripture, are againſt it, we ſpeak of double, or treble rites as the Rejoinder ſtileth them, which no meer order and decency doth neceſſarily require, but onely the meer will of man injoyne.That which is inſtituted by God in his worſhip, Ames knew very well to be a part of Gods worſhip; but that decency is no part of Gods worſhip, Ames in his diſput. pag. 176. proves by a Reaſon quoted out of Dr. Abbot, Def of Mr. Perk. pag 844Order and comelineſs (ſaith the Popiſh Biſhop) is ſome part of Gods worſhip. But (ſaith Dr. Abbot) who taught him this deep point of Philoſophy, that an accident is a part of the ſubject, that the beauty or comelineſſe of the body is a part of the body, order and comelineſſe pro­perly and immediately reſpect men, and therefore can be no parts of the worſhip of God.To be inſtituted by God, if we ſpeake ſtrictly & properly, is to be injoyned by a divine poſitive Law ſuperadded unto the law of nature; and in conformity hereunto it is that our Author Ames divides Gods worſhip, Med. lib. 2. cap. 5. into natural and inſtituted: Now if this be your meaning, when you impute unto Ames and me, that our opinion is, that nothing is decent in ſacris, which is not instituted by God, as the charge is falſe in it ſelf, ſo it proveth not that which you bring it for, viz. that in our ſenſe decency in the Apoſtle, is only that decency which the law of nature preſcribes; but confirmeth the clean con­trary, becauſe that which is inſtituted by a poſitive law ſuperadded to the law of nature, is not preſcribed proximè and immediatè by the law of nature.

You are by this time, I hope, conſcious of the great injury you have done unto poor Dr. Ames, in affixing unto him ſo irrational an opinion, and hereupon I ſhall be bold to give you this advertiſement, that however you may deſpiſe him as a mean Author, unworthy of your peruſal, yet, if you undertake to cenſure and refute him, you muſt read him, or elſe you will be very lyable unto the breach of the ninth Commandement, Thou ſhalt not bear falſe witneſſe againſt thy neighbbour.

But you will perhaps ſay in defence of your ſelf, that if it were not the opi­nion of Ames, it is the ſequele of his words; and for this you have two reaſons.

The 1. becauſe the mode or manner agreeable unto the dignity of ſacred things is inſtituted by God, as the ſacred things are inſtituted by God: But this propoſition, if it be particular, proves nothing, and if it be univerſal, is falſe, as you might have ſeen in the next reaſon of Ames, but that you cannot ſee wood for trees, as the Proverb is; There is a mode or manner in the uſe of ſa­cred things agreeable unto their dignitie, that is not adequate, proper, and peculiar to them, but common unto civill matters of a grave nature together with them; and this is a matter inculcated by Dr. Ames in many places,14 which if you had weighed, you would never have troubled the Reader with this objection, Medul. Theol. lib. cap. 14. th: 23. Quamvis igitur hujuſmodi cir­cumſtantiae vocari ſoleant à nonnullis ritus & ceremoniae ▪ religioſae, aut eccleſiaſticae, nihil tamen habent in ſua natura, quod proprium eſt religionis, atque adeo in iis non propriè conſiſtit cultus religioſus, quamvis ex eorum neglectu, & contemptu violatur a­liquo modo ſancti•as cultus religioſi; quia communis illa ratio ordinis & decori quae ae­què convenit religioſis actibus, atque civilibus, à religioſo cultu non poteſt ſeparari, quin aliquo modo laedatur ipſius dignitas & majeſtas. Although theſe circumſtances of time, place, and other lïke, are wont by ſome to be called rites, or religious Eccleſiaſtical ceremonies, yet in their nature they have nothing that is proper to Religion, and therefore religious worſhip doth not properly conſiſt in them, however by neglect and contempt of ſuch circumſtances, the ſanctity of ſuch re­ligious worſhip is in ſome ſort violated, becauſe the common reſpect of order and decency, which do equally agree to religious and civil actions cannot bee ſevered from religious worſhip, without diminiſhing of the ſanctity and digni­ty of it.