An INTRODUCTION TO THE Following Diſcourſe.
WHen the Senators of R•me, in their publike Decrees and Orations, began to comply with and court the People, calling them Lords of the world; how eaſie a matter was it then for Gracchus to perſwade them to un-Lord the Senate? In like manner, when Athens was quitted of Kings, the Power was no ſooper declared to be in the People••t immediately they took it, and made2 ſure of it in their own hands, by the advice of Solon, that excellent Lawgiver: for, as Cicero ſaith, There is a natural deſire of Power and Sovereignty in every man: ſo that if any have once an oportunity to ſeize, they ſeldom neglect it; and if they are told it is their due, they venture life and all to attain it.
If a People once conceive they ought to be free, this conception is immediately put in practice; and they free themſelves. Their firſt care is to ſee, that their Laws; their Rights, their Deputies, their Officers, and all their Dependents, be ſetled in a ſtate of freedom. This becoms like the Apple of the eye; the leaſt grain, atome, or touch, will grieve it: it is an eſpouſed virgin; they are extreme jealous over it.
Thus ſtrangely affected were the Roman people, that if any one among them (though ne'er ſo deſerving) were found to aſpire, they preſently fetch'd him down, as they did the gallant Maelius and Manlius; yea, their jealouſie was ſo great, that they obſerved3 every man's looks, his very nods, his garb, and his gate, whether he walked, converſed, and lived as a friend of Freedom among his neighbours. The ſupercilious eye, the lofty brow, and the grand paw, were accounted Monſters, and no Character of Freedom; ſo that it was the ſpecial care of the wiſer Patriots, to keep themſelves in a demure and humble poſture, for the avoiding of ſuſpicion. Hence it was, that Collatinus, one of their Freedoms Founders, and of the firſt Conſuls, living in ſome more State than ordinary, and keeping at too great a diſtance from the people, ſoon taught them to forget his former merits: inſomuch, that they not onely turned him out of his Conſulſhip, but quite out of the City into Baniſhment. But his Colleague Brutus, and that wiſe Man Valerius Publicola, by taking a contrary courſe, preſerved themſelves and their reputation. For, the one ſacrificed his Children, thoſe living Monuments of his Houſe, to make the vulgar amends for an injury ▪4 the other courted them with the Title of Majeſty, laid the Faſces, the Enſigns of Authority at their Feet, fixt all appeals at their Tribunals, and levelled the lofty Walls of his own ſtately Houſe, for fear they ſhould miſtake it for a Caſtle. Thus alſo did Menenius Agrippa, Camillus, and other eminent Men in that popular State: ſo that by theſe means they made themſelves the Darlings of the people, whilſt many others of a more Grandee-humor, ſoon loſt their Intereſt and Reputation.
Thus you ſee, that when a Peoples Right is once declared to them, it is almoſt impoſſible to keep it, or take it from them.
It is pity, that the people of England, being born as free as any people in the World, ſhould be of ſuch a ſupple humor and inclination, to bow under the ignoble preſſures of an Arbitrary Tyranny, and ſo unapt to learn what true Freedom is. It is an ineſtimable Jewel, of more worth than your Eſtates, or your Lives: it conſiſts not in a Licenſe to do what5 you liſt, but in theſe few particulars: Firſt, in having who eſome Laws ſured to every Man's ſtate and condition. Secondly, in a due and eaſie courſe of adminiſtration, as to Law and Juſtice, that the Remedies of Evil may be cheap and ſpeedy. Thirdly, in a power of altering Government and Governours upon occaſion: Fourthly, in an uninterrupted courſe of ſucceſſive Parliaments, or Aſſemblies of the People. Fifthly, in a free Election of Members to ſit in every Parliament, when Rules of Election are once eſtablished. By enjoying theſe onely, a people are ſaid to enjoy their Rights, and to be truely ſtated in a condition of ſafety and Freedom.
Now if Liberty is the moſt precious Jewel under the Sun, then when it is once in poſſeſſion, it requires more than an ordinary art and induſtry to preſerve it. But the great queſtion is, Which is the ſafeſt way? whether by committing of it into the hands of a ſtanding Power, or by placing the Guardianſhip in the6 hands of the People, in a conſtant ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblys. The beſt way to determine this, is by obſervation out of Romane Stories; whereby it plainly appears, that people never had any real Liberty, till they were poſſeſs'd of the power of calling and diſſolving the Supreme Aſſemblies, changing Governments, enacting and repealing Laws, together with a power of chuſing and depuring whom they pleaſed to this work, as often as they ſhould judge expedient, for their own well-being, and the good of the Publike. This power is ſaid to be the firſt born of that Peoples Freedom: and many a ſhrewd fit, many a pang and throw the Commonwealth had, before it could be brought forth in the world: which (Gracchus told them) was a ſore affliction from the gods, that they ſhould ſuffer ſo much for the ignorance or negligēce of their Anceſtors, who when they drave our Kings, forgat to drive out the Myſteries and inconveniences of Kingly power, which were all reſerved within the7 hands of the Senate. By this means the poor people miſſing the firſt opportunity of ſetling their freedom, ſoon loſt it again: they were told they were a Free-ſtate; and why? becauſe (forſooth) they had no King, they had at length nev•r a Tarquin to trouble them: but what was that to the purpoſe, as long as they had a Caius, and an Appius Claudius, and the reſt of that gant, who infected the Senators with an humour of Kinging it from generation to generation? Alas, when the Romans were at this paſs, they were juſt ſuch another Free-ſtate as was that of Sparta, in the days of yore, where they had a Senate too, to pull down the pride of Kings; but the people were left deſtitute of power and means to pull down the pride of the Senate; by which means indeed they became free to do what they liſt, whilſt the people were confined within ſtraite•bounds than ever. Such another Free-ſtate in theſe daies is that of Venice, where the people are free from the Dominion of their Prince8 or Duke; but little better than ſlaves under the power of their Senate: but now in the Common-wealth of Athens the caſe was far otherwiſe; where it was the care of Solon, that famous Law-giver, to place both the exerciſe & intereſt of Supremacy in the hands of the people, ſo that nothing of a publick intereſt could be impoſed, but what paſſed currant by vertue of their conſent and Authority: he inſtituted that famous Council called the Areopagus, for the managing of State-tranſactions: but left the power of Legiſlation, or lawmaking, in a ſucceſſive courſe of the peoples Aſſemblies; ſo that avoiding Kingly Tyranny on the one ſide, and Senatical incroachments on the other, he is celebrated by all Poſterity, as the man that hath left the onely Patern of a Free-ſtate fit for all the world to follow.
It is alſo to be obſerved, when Kings were driven out of Rome, though they were declared and called a Free-ſtate, et it was a long time ere they could be free indeed, in9 regard Brutus cheated them with a meer ſhadow and pretence of liberty: he had indeed an Ambition high enough, and opportunity fairenough to have ſeized the Crown into his own hands; but there were many conſiderations that deterr'd him from it; for he well perceived how odious the name of King was grown: Beſides, had he ſought to Inthrone himſelf, men would have judged it was not love to his Country made him take up Arms, but deſire of Dominion; nor could he forget, that ſerene privacy is to be preferr'd before Hazardous Royalty: For what hope could he have to keep the Seat long, who by his own example had taught the people both the Theory and practice of oppoſing Tyranny? It was neceſſary therefore that he ſhould think of ſome other courſe more plauſible, whereby to worke his own ends, and yet preſerve the love of the people; who not having been uſed to liberty, did very little underſtand it, and therefore were the more eaſily gul'd out10 of the ſubſtance, and made content with the ſhadow.
For the carrying on this Deſign, all the projecting Grandees joyned pates together; wherein, as one obſerves, Regnum quidem nomen, ſed non Regia poteſtas Româ fuit expulſa: Though the Name of King were exploded with alacrity, yet the Kingly power was retained with all Art and ſubtilty, and ſhared under another notion among themſelves, who were the great ones of the City. For all Authority was confin'd within the walls of a ſtanding Senate, out of which, two Conſuls were choſen yeerly; & ſo by turns they dub'd one another with a new kinde of Regality: the people being no gainers at all by this alteration of Government, ſave onely, that (like Aſſes) they were ſadled with new Paniers of Slavery.
But what followed? The Senate having got all power into their own hands, in a ſhort time degenerated from their firſt Virtue and Inſtitution, to the practice of Avarice,11 Riot, and Luxury; whereby the love of their Country was changed into a Study of Ambition and Faction: ſo that they fell into diviſions among themſelves, as well as oppreſſions over the people; by which diviſions, ſome leading Grandees, more potent than their Fellows, took occaſion to wipe their Noſes, and to aſſume the Power into their own hands, to the number of ten perſons. This Form of Government was known by the Name of the Decemvirate; wherein theſe new Uſurpers, joyning Forces together, made themſelves rich with the ſpoiles of the people, not caring by what unlawful means they purchaſed either Profit or Pleaſure, till that growing every day more inſupportable, they were in the end by force caſhiered of their Tyranny.
But what then? The people being fleſh'd with this Victory, and calling to minde how gallantly their Anceſtors had in like manner baniſhed Kings, began at laſt to know their own ſtrength; and ſtomack'd it exceedingly12 that themſelves, on whoſe ſhoulders the frame of State was ſupported, (and for whoſe ſakes all States are founded) ſhould be ſo much vaſſalized at the will of others, that they who were Lords abroad, ſhould be Slaves at home: ſo that they reſolved to be ridden no longer under fair ſhews of Liberty. They raiſed a Tumult under the conduct of their Tribune Canu•eius; nor could they by any perſwaſion be induced to lay down Arms, till they were put in poſſeſſion of their Rights and Priviledges. They were made capable of Offices of the Government, even to the Dictatorſhip; had Officers of their own, called Tribunes, who were held ſacred and inviolable, as Protectors of the Commons, and retained a power of meeting and acting with all Freedom in their great Aſſemblies. Now, and never till now, could they be called a Free State, and Commonwealth, though long before declared ſo: for the way being open to all without exception, vertue, learning, and good Parts made as ſpeedy13 a Ladder to climbe unto Honours, as Nobility of Birth; and a Good Man as much reſpected as a Great; which was a rare felicity of the Times, not to be expected again, but upon the dawning of another golden Age.
The main Obſervation then ariſing out of this Diſcourſe, is this: That not onely the Name of King, but the Thing King (whether in the hands of one or of many) was pluck'd up root and branch, before ever the Romans could attain to a full Eſtabliſhment in their Rights and Freedoms.
Now when Rome was thus declared A Free State, the next work was to eſtabliſh their Freedom in ſome ſure & certain way: & in order to this, the firſt buſineſs they pitch'd upon, was, not onely to ingage the people by an Oath againſt the return of Tarquin's Family to the Kingdom, but alſo againſt the admiſſion of any ſuch Officer as a King, for ever, becauſe thoſe brave men, who glorified themſelves in laying the foundation of a Commonwealth, well knew, that in14 a ſhort Revolution, others of a leſs publick Spirit would ariſe in their places, and gape again after a Kingdom. And therefore it was the ſpecial care of thoſe worthy Patriots, to imprint ſuch Principles in mens mindes, as might actuate them with an irreconcilable enmity to the former Power: inſomuch, that the very Name of King became odious to the Roman People; yea, and they were ſo zealous herein, that in proceſs of time, when Caeſar took occaſion by Civil Diſcords to aſſume the Soveraignty into his ſingle Hands, he durſt not entertain it under the fatal Name of King, but clothed himſelf with the more plauſible ſtile of Emperor; which nevertheleſs could not ſecure him from the fatal ſtab that was given him by Brutus in revenge, on the behalf of the people. Our Neighbours of Holland traced this example at the heels, when upon recovery of their Freedom from Spain, they binde themſelves by**Oaths in thoſe dayes were not like an old Almanack. an Oath to abjure the Government, not onely of King Philip, but of all Kings for ever.
15Kings being caſhiered out of Rome, then the Right of Liberty, together with the Government, was retained within the hands and bounds of the Patrician or Senatorian Order of Nobility; the people not being admitted into any ſhare, till partly by Mutinies, and partly by Importunities, they compell'd the Senate to grant them an Intereſt in Offices of State, and in the Legiſlative Power, which were circumſcribed before within the bounds of the Senate. Hence aroſe thoſe Officers called Tribunes, and thoſe Conventions called Aſſemblies of the People, which were as Bridles to reſtrain the Power and Ambition of the Senate, or Nobility. Before the erection of thoſe, whilſt all was in the hands of the Senate, the Nation was accounted Free, becauſe not ſubjected to the will of any ſingle perſon: But afterwards they were Free indeed, when no Laws could be impoſed upon them, without a conſent firſt had in the Peoples Aſſemblies: ſo that the Government in the end16 came to be ſetled in an equal mixture of both Intereſts, Patrician and Popular; under which Form, they attained to the height of all their Glory and Greatneſs. In this Form of Free-State, we now ſee the Venetian, where the Patrician is predominant, and the People a little too much kept under. The ſame Form is imbraced alſo by our Neighbours the United Provinces; but the beſt part of their Intereſt lies depoſited in the hands of the people. Rome kept up their Senate as their ſtanding Councel, for the managing of State-affairs, which require Wiſdom and Experience: but as for making of Laws, and the main Acts of Supremacy, they were reſerv'd to the Grand Aſſemblies; ſo that the People gave Rules whereby to govern, and the ſecrets of Government were intruſted in the hands of the Senate. And this Commonwealth ever thriv'd beſt, when the People had moſt Power, and uſed moſt Moderation: and though they made uſe of it now and then to fly out into extravagant17 courſes, yet they were no laſting fits, like thoſe diſtempers that brake out through the Ambition of the Senators. Beſides, we cannot but take notice, as long as the Popular Intereſt continued regular, and more predominant than the other, ſo long the People were ſecure of their Liberties: which enjoyment, was a good Allay and Recompence, for many harſh inconveniences that brake out when they were unruly and irregular: Whereas, when the Senate afterwards worm'd the People out of Power, as that deſign went on by degrees, ſo Rome loſt her Liberty; the Senate domineering over the People, and particular Factions over the Senate, till thoſe Factions tearing one another to pieces, at length he that was head of the paramount ſurviving Faction, by name Caeſar, took occaſion to uſurp over all, ſwallowing up the Rights and Liherties of the Romans, in the Gulph of a ſingle Tyranny.
It was a Noble ſaying, (though Machiavel's). Not he that placeth-a vertuous Government in his own hands, or family; but he that eſtabliſheth a free and la•ting18 Form, for the Peoples conſtant ſecurity, is moſt to be commended. Whoſoever hath this oportunity, may improve his actions to a greater height of glory, than ever followed the fame of any ambitious Idol that hath graſ• 'd a Monarchy: for, as (〈◊〉ſaith in Plutarch, Even the greatest Kings, or Tyrants, refar inferiour to thoſe that are emi•ent in Free-States and Commonwealths: N•r were thoſe mighty Monarchs of old, to be compared with Epimano•das, Pericles, Themiſtocles, Marcus Carius, Amilc•r, Fahius, and Scipio, and other excellent Captains in Free-States, whi•h purchaſ•d themſelves a fame, in defence of their Liberties. And though the very name of Liberty was for a time grown odious, or ridiculous among us, having been long a ſtranger in theſe and other parts; yet in Ancient time, Nations were wont to reckon themſelves ſo much the more Noble, as they were free from the Regal yoke: which was the cauſe why then there were ſo many Free-States in all parts of the world.
Nor is it onely a meer Gallantry of ſpirit that excites men to the love of19 Freedom; but experience aſſures it to be the moſt commodious and profitable way of Government, conducing every way to the enlarging a people in Wealth and Dominion. It is incredible to be ſpoken, (ſaith Salust) how exceedingly the Romane Commonwealth increaſed in a ſhort time, after they had obtained Liberty. And G•icciard•ne affirms, That ▪ Free-States muſt needs be more pleaſing to God than any other Form, becauſe in them more regard is to be had to the common good, more care for the impartial diſtribution of Juſtice, and the mindes of men are more enflamed thereby to the love of Glory and Vertue, and become much more zealous in the love of Religion, than in any other Government whatſoever.
It is wonderful to conſider, how mightily the Athenians were augmented in a few ye•rs, both in Wealth and Power, after they had freed themſelves from the Tyranny of Piſtratus: but the Romans arrived to ſuch a height, as was beyond all imagination after the expulſion of their Kings, and Kingly Go ernment. Nor do theſe things happen without ſpecial reaſon; it being uſual20 in Free-States to be more tender of the Publick in all their Decrees, than of particular Intereſts: whereas the caſe is otherwiſe in a Monarchy, becauſe in this Form the Princes pleaſure weighs down all Conſiderations of the Common good. And hence it is, that a Nation hath no ſooner loſt its Liberty, and ſtoop'd under the yoke of a ſingle Tyrant, but it immediately loſeth its former luſtre, the Body fills with ill humors, and may ſwell in Titles; but cannot thrive either in Power or Riches, according to that proportion which it formerly enjoyed, becauſe all new Acquiſitions are appropriated as the Princes peculiar, and in no wiſe conduce to the eaſe and benefit of the Publick.
It was the pride of Richard Nevil the great Earl of Warwick, and he reckoned it the greateſt of earthly glories, to be called, (as indeed he was) a Kingmaker, in that he made and unmade Kings at his pleaſure: for we read in our Chronicles, how that he firſt pull'd down the Houſe of Lancaſter, and brought King Henry the ſixth from a Crown to a Priſon; ſetting up the Title21 of the Houſe of York, in the perſon of King Edward the fourth: afterwards, he depoſed this Edward, drave him out of England, and reſtored the ſame Henry to the Crown, whom he had before depreſs'd. But the great Query is, Wherefore, and how this was done? One would have thought, there had been no hope of reconciliation betwixt him and the Houſe of Lancaſter, having ſo highly diſobliged them, in caſting down and impriſoming the perſon of Henry. But yet it is very obſervable of this man, Warwick, being on a ſudden diſcontented with the change that he had made, becauſe he miſſed of thoſe ends which he aimed at, in bringing it about; and perceived other perſons (whom he conceived his inferiours, to partake of the intereſt and favour of Edward; therefore, out of an emulous impatience of Spirit, he preſently caſt about to undo all that before he had done; he ſuppreſt the new Government, to advance the old.
From which piece of Story, we may very well conclude, how unſafe it is in a new alteration, to truſt any man with22 too great a ſhare of Government, or place of Truſt; for ſuch perſons ſtand ever ready (like that Warwick) upon any occaſion of diſcontent, or of ſerving their own Intereſts, to betray and alter the Government; eſpecially if they have Warwick's main Guard, that is, if they can (as he did) bring the Prince whom they formerly diſobliged, to come in upon their own terms, and upon ſuch conditions as may bridle him, and ſecure the Power ſo in their own Hands, that whilſt he King it onely in Title, themſelves may be Kings de facto, and leave their old Friends in the lurc•, or yeeld them up at M•rcy, (as Warwick did) to gratifie the Tyrant, and their own Tyrannical ambition.
How much therefore doth it concern every Commonwealth, in ſuch a caſe, to ſee and beware, that Warwick's Ghoſt be not conjur'd up again, to act a Part in ſome new Tragedie!
The Right Conſtitution of a Commonwealth.
THe Romans having juſtly and nobly freed themſelvs from the Tyranny of Kings, and being in time brought to underſtand that the intereſt of Freedom conſiſts in a due and orderly Succeſſion of the Supreme Aſſemblies ▪ they then made it their care, by all good ways and means, to fortifie the Commonwealth, and eſtabliſh it in a free enjoyment of that Intereſt, as the onely bar to the return of Kings, and their main ſecurity againſt the ſubtil mining of Kingly humours and uſurpations. The pu••ike Roſtra, or Pulpits, ſounded out the commendations of Freedom; their24 Augurs, or Prophets, found Freedom written in the entrails of Beaſts, and collected it from the flight of the auſpicious bird, the Sun-daring Eagle, ſpreading her wings aloft over the Capitol: the common people alſo, in their common diſcourſes, breathed nothing but Freedom; and uſed the frequent mention of it, as a Charm againſt the return of Tyranny.
Nor was it without reaſon, that this brave and active people were ſo ſtudiouſly devoted to the preſervation of their Freedom, when they had once attained it, conſidering how eaſie and excellent it is above all other Forms of Government, if it be kept within due bounds and order. It is an undeniable Rule, That the People (that is, ſuch as ſhall be ſucceſſively choſen to repreſent the People) are the beſt Keepers of their own Liberties; and that for theſe following Reaſons.
Firſt, becauſe they never think of uſurping over other mens Rights, but minde which way to preſerve their own. Whereas, the caſe is far otherwiſe among Kings and Grandees, as all Nations25 in the world have felt to ſome purpoſe: for they naturally move within the circle of domination, as in their proper Centre; and count it no leſs Security than Wiſdom and Policy, to brave it over the People. Thus Suetonius tells us, how Caeſar, Craſſus, and another, Societatem iniere, requid ageretur in Repub. quod diſplicuiſſet ulli e tribus: Made a bargain between themſelves, that nothing ſhould be done in the Commonwealth that diſpleaſed either of them three. Such another Triumvirate of Grandees was that of Auguſtus, Lepidus, and Antonie, who agreed to ſhare the world between themſelves; and traced the ſame paths as the other did, to the top of worldly Tyranny, over the ruines of their Countries Liberties: they ſav'd and deſtroy'd, depreſs'd and advanc'd whom they pleaſed, with a wet Finger. But whilſt the Government remained untouch'd in the peoples Hands, every particular man lived ſafe, (except the Ambitious) and no man could be undone, unleſs a true and ſatisfactory reaſon were rendered to the world for his deſtruction.
26Secondly, the People are beſt Keepers of their own Liberty, becauſe it is ever the Peoples care to ſee, that Authority be ſo conſtituted, that it ſhall be rather a burthen than benefit to thoſe that undertake it; and be qualified with ſuch ſlender advantages of profit or pleaſure, that men ſhall reap little by the enjoyment. The happy conſequence whereof is this, that none but honeſt, generous and publick•pirits, will then deſire to be in Authority, and that onely for the Common good. Hence it was, that in the Infan•y of the Romane Liberty, there was no canvaſing of Voices; but ſingle and plain-hearted men were called, intreated, and in a manner forced with importunity to the Helm of Government, in regard of that great trouble and pains that followed the imployment. Thus Cincinnatus was fetch'd out of the Field from his Plow, and placed (much againſt his will) in the ſublime Dignity of Dictator: ſo the noble Camillus, and Fabius, and Curius, were, with much adoe, drawn from the recreation of Gardening, to the trouble of Governing: and the Conſul-yeer27 being over, they returned with much gladneſs again to their private employment.
A third Reaſon why the People in their Supreme Aſſemblies ſucceſſively choſen, are the beſt Keepers of their Liberty, is, becauſe as motion in Bodies natural, ſo ſucceſſion in civil, is the grand preventive of corruption. The Truth of this will appear very clearly, if we weigh the effects of every ſtanding Authority from firſt to laſt in the Romane State: for whilſt they were governed by a continued Power in one and the ſame Hands, the People were ever in danger of loſing their Liberty: ſometimes in danger of being ſwallowed up by Kingly aſpirers, witneſs the deſign of Maelius, Menlius, and others; ſometimes in danger of a ſurpriſe by a Grandee Cabinet or Junta, who by contracting a particular Intereſt, diſtin•t from that which they had in common with the people, ſo ordered the matter in time, that partly by their own ſtrength, and partly by advantage of Power, to gratifie and curb whom they pleaſed, and to wind in other Councils28 and parties to their own, they ſtill brought the leſſer into ſuch ſubjection, that in the end they were forced all either to yeild to the pleaſure of the Grandees, or be broken by them. By theſe practices, they oroduced that upſtart Tyranny of the Decemviri, when ten men made a ſhift to enſlave the Senate, as well as the people. Laſtly, by continuing power too long in the hands of particular perſons, they were ſwallow'd up by two Triumvirates of Emperors by turns, who never left pecking at one another, till Julius and Auguſtus, having beaten all Competitors out of the Field, ſubjected all to the will of a ſingle Emperour. If this were ſo among the Romans, how happy then is any Nation, and how much ought they to joy in the Wiſdom and Juſtice of their Truſtees, where certain Limits and Bounds are fixed to the Powers in being, by a declared ſucceſſion of the ſupreme Authoty in the hands of the People!
A fourth Reaſon is, becauſe a ſucceſſion of ſupreme Powers doth not onely keep them from corruption, but it kills that grand Cankerworm of a Commonwealth,29 to wit, Faction: for, as Faction is an adhering to, and a promoting of an Intereſt, that is diſtinct from the true and declared Intereſt of State: ſo it is a matter of neceſſity, that thoſe that drive it on, muſt have time to improve their ſlights and projects, in diſguiſing their deſigns, drawing in Inſtruments and Parties, and in worming out of their oppoſires. The effecting of all this, requires ſome length of time: therefore the onely prevention is a due ſucceſſion and revolution of Authority in the Hands of the People.
That this is moſt true, appears not onely by Reaſon, but by Example: if we obſerve the ſeveral turns of Faction in the Romane Government. What made their Kings ſo bold, as to incroach and tyrannize over the People, but the very ſame courſe that heightned our Kings heretofore in England, to wit, a continuation of Power in their own Perſons and Families? Then, after the Romans became a Commonwealth, was it not for the ſame Reaſon, that the Senate fell into ſuch heats and fits among30 themſelves? Did not Appius Claudius and his Junta, by the ſame means, Lord it over the Senate? Whence was it, that Sylla and Marius cauſed ſo many proſcriptions, cruelties, and combuſtions in Rome, but by an extraordinary continuation of Power in themſelves? How came it to paſs likewiſe, that Julius Caeſar aſpired, and in the end artained the Empire? and, that the People of Rome quite loſt their Liberty, was it not by the ſame means? For, had not the Sena•e and People ſo long protracted the Power of Pompey and Caeſar; had Pompey had leſs command in Aſia, and Caeſar leſs in Gallia, Rome might have ſtood much longer in the poſſeſſion of her Liberty.
After the death of Caeſar, it was probable enough, they•ight then have recovered their Liberty, but that they ran again into the ſame Error, as before: for by a continuation of Power in the hands of Octavius, Lepidus, and Antonie, the Commonwealth came to be rent and divided into three ſeveral Factions; two of which being worn out by each other, onely Octavius remained;31 who conſidering, that the Title of perpetual Dictator was the ruine of his Father Julius, continued the Government onely for a ſet-time, and procured it to be ſetled upon himſelf but for ten yeers. But what was the effect of this continuation of Power? Even this, That as the former protractings had been the occaſions of Faction, ſo this produced a Tyranny: for, at the end of every ten yeers, he wanted no pretence to renew a leaſe of the Government; and by this means ſo played his Cards, that at length he eaſily and utterly extinguiſhed the ſmall remains of the Roman Freedom.
The Obſervation then ariſing from hence, is this, that the onely way for a people to preſerve themſelves in the enjoyment of their Freedom, and to avoid thoſe fatal inconveniences of Faction and Tyranny, is, to maintain a due and orderly ſucceſſion of Power and Perſons. This was, and is, good Commonwealths Language; and without this Rule, it is impoſſible any Nation ſhould long ſubſiſt in a State of Freedom. So that the Wiſdom, the Piety,32 the Juſtice, and the ſelf-denial of thoſe Governours in Free-States, is worthy of all honour and admiration, who have, or ſhall at any time as willingly reſign their Truſts, as ever they took them up; and have ſo far denied themſelves, as to prefix Limits and Bounds to their own Authority. This was it that made Brutus ſo famous in the beginning of the Romane Commonwealth. For this alſo it was, that Hiſtory hath left ſo reverend a remembrance of Scipio, Camillus, and Virginus; as did Cato likewiſe of Pompey: whilſt the ten Grandee Uſurpers, with Sylla, and Caeſar, and the Names of others that practiſed the contrary, are left as odious upon the Roman Record, as the Name of Richard the third, will be in our modern Chronicle, to all Poſterity.
A fifth Reaſon to prove the Life of Liberty lies in ſucceſſion of Powers and Perſons, is, becauſe it is the onely Remedy againſt Self-ſeeking, with all the powerful Temptations and Charms of ſelf-intereſt: for the attaining of particular ends, requires length of time, as well as the creating and promoting33 of a Faction: both theſe deſigns muſt lie long in fermentation, or elſe they can never gain the beloved opportunity to bring matters to perfection. The Truth of this appears likewiſe in the Story of the Romane State: for, as long as all Authority was confined within the Walls of a ſtanding Senate, they being more ſtudious of their own, than the common good, in a ſhort time the Commonwealth was turned altogether into a private; inſomuch, that the people became not onely incapable of any Honour and Authority; but well-nigh reduced to flat beggery. Hence it was, that ſo many Quarrels and Combuſtions aroſe one after another: for, the Great Ones having made uſe of their time, in drawing all to themſelves, the People were forc'd to live upon borrowing; and when they could borrow no longer, they fell into a general Mutiny, and forſook the City: nor could they be pacified till all Accounts were quitted; and then, with much adoe, they were wrought upon with the Eloquence of Menenius Agrippa, with his excellent Fable of a Mutiny in a34 natural Body, among the Members againſt the Belly.
Thus, as the firſt Inſurrection was occaſioned by the Uſury and Exactions of the Great Ones; who by their long continuance in Power, had drawn all unto themſelves: ſo the ſecond was occaſioned by the Lordlineſs of thoſe ten Perſons, who being elected to do Juſtice, according to the Laws, made uſe of their time, onely to confirm their Power, and Greaten themſelves, by repleniſhing their own Coffers, ingroſſing of Offices, and preferring their own Kindred and Alliances: and at length, improved Self-Intereſt ſo high, that they domineered, like abſolute Tyrants, advancing and depreſſing whom they pleaſed, without reſpect of Merit or Inſufficiency, Vice or Vertue; ſo that having ſecured all in their own Hands, they over-ruled their Fellow-Senators at pleaſure, as well as the People.
Many more inſtances of After-times might be given; but theſe are ſufficient whereupon to ground this Obſervation, That as the firſt Founders of the Roman35 Liberty did well in driving out their Kings; ſo on the other ſide, they did very ill in ſetling a ſtanding Authority within themſelves: for, by this means, lying open to the Temptations of Honour and Profit, (which are Sails too big for any humane bulk) they were immediately ſwallowed up of Self; and taking their riſe from the opportunity of a continued Power, made uſe of the Publick onely to advance their Private, whereby they put the Commonwealth into frequent flames of diſcontent and ſedition; which might all have been prevented, could they have denied themſelves at firſt, and ſetled the State Free indeed, (as they ought to have done) by placing an orderly ſucceſſion of ſupreme Authority in the Hands of the People.
A ſixth Reaſon, why a Free-State is much more excellent than a Government by Grandees or Kings; and, that the People are the beſt Keepers of their own Liberties, is, becauſe, as the end of all Government is (or ought to be) the good and eaſe of the People, in a ſecure enjoyment of their Rights, without36 Preſſure and Oppreſſion: ſo queſtionleſs the People, who are moſt ſenſible of their own Burthens, being once put into a capacity and Freedom of Acting, are the moſt likely to provide Remedies for their own Relief; they onely know where the ſhooe wrings, what Grievances are moſt heavy, and what future Fences they ſtand in need of, to ſhelter them from the injurious Aſſaults of thoſe Powers that are above them: and therefore it is but Reaſon, they ſhould ſee that none be intereſted in the ſupreme Authority, but Perſons of their own election, and ſuch as muſt in a ſhort time return again into the ſame condition with themſelves, to reap the ſame Benefit or Burthen, by the Laws enacted, that befalls the reſt of the People. Then the iſſue of ſuch a Conſtitution muſt needs be this, That no Load ſhall be laid upon any, but what is common to all, and that always by common conſent; not to ſerve the Luſts of any, but onely to ſupply the Neceſſities of their Country.
But when it happens, that a ſupreme Power long continues in the Hands of37 any Perſon or Perſons; they, by greatneſs of place, being ſeated above the middle Region of the People, ſit ſecure from all windes and weathers, and from thoſe ſtorms of violence that nip and terrifie the inferiour part of the World: whereas, if by a ſucceſſive Revolution of Authority, they came to be degraded of their Earthly Godheads, and return into the ſame condition with other Mortals, they muſt needs be the more ſenſible and tender of what ſhall be laid upon them. The ſtrongeſt Obligation that can be laid upon any Man in publick Matters, is, To ſee that he ingage in nothing, but what muſt either offenſively or beneficially reflect upon himſelf: for as, if any be never ſo good a Patriot, yet if his power be prolonged, he will finde it hard to keep Self from creeping in upon him, and prompting him to ſome Extravagancies for his own private Benefit; ſo, on the other ſide, if he be ſhortly to return to a condition common with the reſt of his Brethren, ſelf-Intereſt bindes him to do nothing but what is Juſt and Equal; he himſelf being to reap the38 good or evil of what is done, as well as the meaneſt of the people.
This without controverſie muſt needs be the moſt Noble, the moſt Juſt, and the moſt excellent way of Government in Free-States; without which, it is obvious to common ſenſe, no Nation, can long continue in a ſtate of Freedom: as appears likewiſe by Example out of the Romane Story. For what more noble Patriots were there ever in the World, than the Romane Senators were, whilſt they were kept under by their Kings, and felt the ſame Burthens of their fury, as did the reſt of the people? but afterwards being freed from the Kingly yoke, and having ſecured all power within the hands of themſelves and their poſterity, they at length fell into the ſame Abſurdities that had been before committed by their Kings; ſo that this new yoke became more intolerable than the former. Nor could the people finde any Remedy, untill they procured that neceſſary Office of the Tribunes; who being inveſted with a temporary Authority by the peoples Election, remained the more ſenſible39 of their condition, and were as Moderators between the Power of the Great Ones, and the Rights of the People.
What more excellent Patriot could there be than Manlius, till he became corrupted by Time and Power? Who more Noble, and Courteous, and Wellaffected to the common good, than was Appius Claudius at firſt? but afterwards, having obtained a Continuation of the Government in his own hands, he ſoon loſt his primitive Innocency and Integrity, and devoted himſelf to all the Practices of an Abſolute Tyrant. Many others might be reckon'd up. And therefore, hence it was, That when the Senate (for ſome Reaſons) though to continue Lucius Quintius in the Conſulſhip longer than the uſual time; that gallant Man utterly refuſed it, and choſe rather to deny himſelf, than that a Precedent ſo prejudicial to the Romane Freedom ſhould be made for his ſake, by a Prerogative of Authority in his hands, beyond the ordinary Cuſtome.
A ſeventh Reaſon why a people qualified with a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their Supreme Aſſemblies, are the40 beſt keepers of their own Liberties, is, Becauſe, as in other Forms, thoſe perſons onely have acceſs to Government, who are apt to ſerve the luſt and will of the Prince, or elſe are parties or compliers with ſome powerful Faction: ſo in this Form of Government by the People, the door of Dignity ſtands open to all (without exception) that aſcend thither by the ſteps of Worth and Vertue: the conſideration whereof hath this noble effect in Free-States, That it edges mens ſpirits with an active emulation, and raiſeth them to a lofty pitch of deſigne and action.
The truth of this is very obſervable in the Romane State: for, during the Vaſſalage of that People under Kings, we read not of any notable Exploits, but finde them confined within a narrow compaſs, oppreſs'd at home, and ever and anon ready to be ſwallowed up by their enemies. After this Government of Kings was aboliſhed, you know that of Grandees in a ſtanding Senate was next erected; under which Form, they made ſhift to enlarge their bounds a little: but the moſt they could then do,41 was only to ſecure themſelves from the attempts of the baniſhed Tarquins, and thoſe petty neighbours that envied the ſmall increaſe of their Dominion. But at length, when the State was made free indeed, and the People admitted into a ſhare and intereſt in the Government, as well as the Great Ones; then it was, and never till then, that their thoughts and power began to exceed the bounds of Italy, and aſpire towards that prodigious Empire. For, while the road of Preferment lay plain to every man, no publike work was done, nor any Conqueſt made; but every man thought he did and conquered all for himſelf, as long as he remained valiant and vertuous: it was not Alliance, nor Friendſhip, nor Faction, nor Riches, that could advance men; but Knowledge, Valour, and vertuous Poverty, was preferred above them all.
For the confirmation whereof, we finde in the ſame Story, how that many of their brave Patriots and Conquerors were men of the meaneſt Fortune, and of ſo rare a temper of ſpirit, that they little cared to improve them, or enrich42 themſelves by their publike employment: ſo that when they died, they were fain to be buried at the publike charge. We finde Cincinnatus, a man of mean fortune, fetch'd from the Plough, to the dignity of a Dictator: for he had no more than four acres of land, which he tilled with his own hands. Yet ſo it happened, that when the Roman Conful with his whole Army was in great peril, being circumvented and ſtraitned by the Equuns, and the City of Rome it ſelf in a trembling condition; then, with one conſent, they pitch'd upon Cincinnatus, as the fitteſt man for their deliverance: and he behaved himſelf ſo well, with ſo much magnanimity, integrity, and wiſdom, that he relieved the Conſul, routed and utterly ſubdued the Enemy, and gave as it were a new life to his Countries Liberties: which work being over, he with all willingneſs quitted his Authority, and returned to the condition of a painful private life.
This Example might ſeem ſtrange, but that we know it was ordinary in that State, till it grew corrupt again: for, we read alſo, how Lucius Tarquin, (not of43 the Tyrants family) a man of mean fortune, yet of great worth, was choſen General of the Horſe, and drawn to it out of the Country, in which place he ſurpaſſed all the Romane youth for gallant behaviour. Such another plain Country-fellow was Attilius Regulus, the ſcourge of Carthage in his time; of whom many eminent points of Bravery were recorded: as were alſo moſt of thoſe Heroick ſpirits that ſucceeded, down to the times of Lucius Paulus Emilius, by whoſe Conqueſts, the firſt charms and inchantments of Luxury were brought out of Aſia to Rome, and there they ſoon ſwallowed up the remainders of primitive integrity and ſimplicity. And yet it is very obſervable alſo, that ſo much of the ancient ſeverity was remaining ſtill even in the time of this Paulus, the famous General, that a Silver diſh, that was part of the Spoil, being given to a ſon-in-law of his, who had fought ſtoutly in that war, it was thought a great reward; and obſerved by the Hiſtorian, to be the firſt piece of plate that ever was ſeen in the Family.
44This Obſervation then ariſes from this Diſcourſe, That as Rome never thrived till it was ſetled in a Freedom of the People; ſo that Freedom was preſerved, and that Intereſt beſt advanced, when all Places of Honour and Truſt were expoſed to men of Merit, without diſtinction; which happineſs could never be obtained, until the people were inſtated in a capacity of preferring whom they thought worthy, by a Freedom of electing men ſucceſſively into their Supreme Offices and Aſſemblies. So long as this Cuſtome continued, and Merit took place, the people made ſhift to keep and encreaſe their Liberties: but when it lay neglected, and the ſtream of Preferment began to run along with the favour and pleaſure of particular powerful men, then Vice and Compliance making way for Advancement, the people could keep their Liberties no longer; but both their Liberties and themſelves were made the price of every man's Ambition and Luxury.
The eighth Reaſon, why the People in their Aſſemblies are the beſt Keepers45 of their Liberty, is, becauſe it is they onely that are concerned in the point of Liberty: for, whereas in other Forms the main Intereſt and Concernment both of Kings and Grandees, lies either in keeping the People in utter ignorance what Liberty is, or elſe in allowing and pleaſing them onely with the name and ſhadow of Liberty in ſtead of the ſubſtance: ſo in Free-States the People being ſenſible of their paſt condition in former times, under the Power of Great Ones, and comparing it with the poſſibilities and enjoyments of the preſent, become immediately inſtructed, that their main Intereſt and Concernment conſiſts in Liberty; and are taught by common ſenſe, that the onely way to ſecure it from the reach of Great Ones, is, to place it in the Peoples Hands,•adorned with all the Prerogatives and Rights of Supremacy. The Truth of it is, the Intereſt of Freedom is a Virgin that every one ſeeks to deflower; and like a Virgin, it muſt be kept from any other Form, or elſe (ſo great is the Luſt of mankinde after dominion) there follows a rape upon the46 firſt opportunity. This being conſidered, it-will eaſily be granted, That Liberty muſt needs lie more ſecure in the Peoples than in any others hands, becauſe they are moſt concerned in it: and the careful eyeing of this Concernment, is that which makes them both jealous and zealous; ſo that nothing will ſatisfie, but the keeping of a conſtant Guard againſt the Attempts and Inchroachments of any powerful or crafty Underminers.
Hence it is, that the People having once taſted the Sweets of Freedom, are ſo extreamly affected with it, that if they diſcover, or do but ſuſpect the leaſt Deſign to incroach upon it, they count it a Crime never to be forgiven for any conſideration whatſoever. Thus it was in the Romane State, where one gave up his Children, another his Brother to death, to revenge an Attempt againſt common Liberty: divers alſo ſacrificed their Lives, to preſerve it; and ſome their beſt Friends, to vindicate it, upon bare ſuſpicion; as in the Caſes of Maelius, and Manlius, and others, after manifeſt violation47 as in the Caſe of Caeſar.
Nor was it thus onely in Rome; but we finde alſo as notable inſtances of revenge in the Free-People of Greece, upon the ſame occaſion. But the moſt notable of all, is that which happened in the Iſland of Corcyra, during the war of Peloponneſus: where the People having been rook'd of Liberty by the ſlights and power of the Grandees, and afterwards by the aſſiſtance of the Free-ſtates of Athens recovering it again, took occaſion thereupon to clap up all the Grandees, & chop'd off ten of their Heads at one time, in part of ſatisfaction for the Injury: but yet this would not ſerve the turn; for, ſome delay being made in executing of the reſt, the People grew ſo inraged, that they ran, and pull'd down the very Walls, and buried them in the ruines and rubbiſh of the Priſon.
We ſee it alſo in the Free-State of Florence, where Coſmus the firſt Founder of the Tuſcan-Tyranny, having made ſhipwrack of their Liberty, and ſeized all into his own Hands; though he enſlaved their Bodies, yet he could not48 ſubdue their Hearts, nor wear their paſt Liberty our of Memory; for upon the firſt oportunity, they ſought revenge, and a recovery; forcing him to fly for the ſafety of his Life: and though afterwards he made way for his Return and Re-eſtabliſhment by Treachery, yet now after ſo long a time, the old Freedom is freſh in memory, and would ſhew it ſelf again upon a favourable occaſion.
But of all Modern Inſtances, the moſt ſtrange is that of the Land of Holſtein; which being deprived of Liberty, and about ſeventy yeers ſince made a Dutchy, and an Appendix to the Crown of Denmark; though the Inhabitants be but a Booriſh, poor, ſilly Generation, yet ſtill they retain a ſenſe of Indignation at the loſs of their Liberty; and being given to drink, the uſual Complement in the midſt of their Cups, is this, Here is a health to the remembrance of our Liberty.
Thus you ſee what an impreſſion the love of Freedom makes in the mindes of the people: ſo that it will be eaſily concluded, They muſt be the beſt49 Keepers of their own Liberties; being more tender and more concerned in their ſecurity, than any powerful pretenders whatſoever.
The ninth Reaſon to juſtifie a Free-State, is, becauſe in Free-States the People are leſs Luxurious, than Kings or Grandees uſe to be. Now, this is moſt certain, that where Luxury takes place, there is as natural a tendency to Tyranny, as there is from the Cauſe to the Effect: for, you know the Nature of Luxury lies altogether in Exceſs. It is a Univerſal Depravation of Manners, without Reaſon, without Moderation; it is the Canine appetite of a corrupt Will and Phant'ſie, which nothing can ſatisfie; but in every Action, in every Imagination, it flies beyond the Bounds of Honeſty, Juſt, and Good, into all Extremity: ſo that it will eaſily be granted, That Form of Government muſt needs be the moſt excellent, and the Peoples Liberty moſt ſecured, where Governours are leaſt expoſed to the baits and ſnares of Luxury.
The evidence of this may be made out, not onely by Reaſon, but by Examples50 old and new. And firſt, by Reaſon, it is evident, That the People muſt needs be leſs luxurious than Kings or the Great Ones, becauſe they are bounded within a more lowly pitch of Deſire and Imagination: give them but panem & tircenſes; Bread, Sport and Eaſe, and they are abundantly ſatisfied. Beſides, the People have leſs means and opportunities for Luxury, than thoſe pompous ſtanding powers, whether in the hands of one or many: ſo that were they never ſo much inclined to Vice or Vanity, yet they are not able to run on to the ſame meaſure of Exceſs and Riot. Secondly, as it appears they are leſs Luxurious; ſo, for this Cauſe alſo, it is cleer, They (that is, their ſucceſſive Repreſentatives) muſt be the beſt Governours; not onely, becauſe the current of ſucceſſion keeps them the leſs corrupt and preſumptious; but alſo, becauſe, being the more free from luxurious Courſes, they are likewiſe free from thoſe oppreſſive and injurious Practices, which Kings and Grandees are moſt commonly led and forced unto, to hold up the port and ſplendor of their Tyranny51 and to ſatisfie thoſe natural appetites of Covetouſneſs, Pride, Ambition and Oſtentation, which are the perpetual Attendants of Great Ones, and Luxury. Thus much for Reaſon.
Now, for Example, we might produce a Cloud of Inſtances, to ſhew ▪ That Free-States, or the People duely qualified with the Supreme Authority, are leſs devoted to Luxury, than the Grandee or Kingly Powers: but we ſhall give you onely a few,
The firſt that comes in our way is the State of Athens, which, whilſt it remained free in the Peoples Hands, was adorned with ſuch Governours as gave themſelves up to a ſerious, abſtemious, ſevere courſe of Life; ſo that whilſt Temperance and Liberty walked hand in hand, they improved the points of Valour and Prudence ſo high, that in a ſhort time they became the onely Arbitrators of all Affairs in Greece. But being at the height, then (after the common fate of all worldly Powers) they began to decline; for, (contrary to the Rules of a Free-State) permitting ſome men to greaten themſelves, by52 continuing long in Power and Authority, they ſoon loſt their pure Principles of Severity and Libertie: for, upſtarted thoſe thirty Grandees, (commonly called the Tyrants) who having uſurped a ſtanding Authority unto themſelves, preſently quitted the old Diſcipline and Freedom, gave up themſelves firſt to Charms of Luxury, and afterwards to all the practices of an abſolute Tyranny. Such alſo was the condition of that State, when at another time (as in the dayes of Piſtratus) it was uſurp'd in the hands of a ſingle Tyrant.
From Athens let us paſs to Rome, where we finde it in the dayes of Tarquin, diſſolved into Debauchery. Upon the change of Government, their manners were ſomewhat mended, as were the Governours in the Senate: but that being a ſtanding Power, ſoon grew corrupt; and firſt let in Luxury, then Tyranny, till the people being intereſted in the Government, eſtabliſhed a good Diſcipline and Freedom both together; which was upheld with all Severity, till the ten Grandees came in53 play after; whoſe Depoſition, Liberty, and Sobriety began to breath again, till the dayes of Sylla, Marius, and other Grandees that followed down to Caeſar, in whoſe time Luxury and Tyranny grew to ſuch a height, that unleſs it were in the Life and Converſation of Cato, there was not ſo much as one ſpark, that could be raked out of the aſhes, of the old Roman Diſcipline and Freedom; ſo that of all the World, onely Cato remained as a Monument of that Temperance, Virtue and Freedom, which flouriſhed under the Government of the People.
Omitting many other Examples, our Concluſion upon theſe Particulars ſhall be this, That ſince the Grandee or Kingly Powers, are ever more luxurious, than the popular are, or can be: and ſince Luxury ever brings on Tyranny, as the onely bane of Liberty; certainly the Rights and Priviledges of the People, placed and provided for, in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their Supreme Aſſemblies, muſt needs remain more ſecure in their own Hands, than in any others whatſoever.
54A tenth Reaſon, to prove the excellency of a Free-State or Government by the People, above any other Form of Government, is, becauſe under this Government, the People are ever indued with a more magnanimous, active, and noble temper of Spirit, than under the Grandeur of any ſtanding power whatſoever. And this ariſes from that apprehenſion which every particular Man hath of his own immediate ſhare in the publick Intereſt, as well as of that ſecurity which•he poſſeſſes in the enjoyment of his private Fortune, free from the reach of any Arbitrary Power. Hence it is, that whenſoever any good ſucceſs or happineſs betides the Publick, every one counts i•his own: if the Commonwealth conquer, thrive in Dominion, Wealth or Honour, he reckons all done for himſelf; if he ſees Diſtributions of Honour, high Offices, or great Rewards, to Valiant, Vertuous, or Learned Perſons, he eſteems them as his own, as long as he hath a door left open to ſucceed in the ſame Dignities and Enjoyments, if he can attain unto the ſame meaſure of Deſert. 55This it is which makes men aſpire unto great Actions, when the Reward depends not upon the Will and Pleaſure of particular Perſons, as it doth under all ſtanding Powers; but is conferred upon Men (without any conſideration of Birth or Fortune) according to merit, as it ever is, and ought to be in Free-States, that are rightly conſtituted.
The Truth of this will appear much more evident, if ye liſt a little to take a view of the condition of People, under various Forms of Government: for, the Romanes of old, while under Kings, (as you heard before) remained a very inconſiderable People, either in Dominion or Reputation; and could never inlarge their Command very far beyond the Walls of their City. Afterwards, being reduced unto that ſtanding power of the Senate, they began to thrive a little better, &, for a little time: yet all they could do, was only to ſtruggle that for a ſubſiſtence among bad Neighbours. But at length, when the People began to know, claim, and poſſeſs their Liberties in being govern'd56 by a ſuceſſion of their Supreme Officers and Aſſemblies; then it was, and never till then, that they laid the Foundation, and built the Structure of that wondrous Empire that overſhadowed the whole World. And truely the founding of it muſt needs be more wonderful, and a great Argument of an extraordinary Courage and Magnanimity, wherewith the People was indued in Recovery of Liberty; becauſe their firſt Conqueſts were laid in the ruine of mighty Nations, and ſuch as were every jot as free as themſelves: which made the difficulties-ſo much the more, by how much the more free (and conſequently, the more couragious) they were, againſt whom they made oppoſition: for as in thoſe dayes the World abounded with Free-States, more than any other Form, as all over Italy, Gallia, Spain, and Africa, &c. ſo ſpecially in Italy, where the Tuſcans, the Samnites, and other Emulators and Competitors of the Romane Freedom, approved themſelves magnanimous Defenders of their Liberty againſt Rome, that they endured Wars ſo many57 yeers with utmoſt extremity, before ever they could brought to bow under the Romane Yoke. This magnanimous State of Freedom, was the cauſe alſo why Charthage was enabled ſo long, not only to oppoſe, but often to hazard the Romane Fortune, and uſurp the Laurel. It brought Hannibal within view, and the Gauls within the Walls of the City, to a beſieging of the Capitol; to ſhew, that their Freedom had given them the courage to rob her of her Maiden-head, who afterwards became Miſtriſs of the whole World. But what ſerves all this for, but onely to ſhew, That as nothing but a State of Freedom could have enabled thoſe Nations with a Courage ſufficient ſo long to withſtand the Romane Power: ſo Rome her ſelf alſo was beholden to this State of Freedom, for thoſe Sons of Courage which brought the Necks of her Siſter-States and Nations under her Girdle? And it is obſervable alſo in after-times, when Tyranny took place againſt Liberty, the Romans ſoon loſt their ancient Courage and Magnanimity; firſt under uſurping Dictators, then58 under Emperors, and in the end, the Empire it ſelf.
Now, as on the one ſide, we feel a loſs of Courage and Magnanimity, follow the loſs of Freedom: ſo, on the other ſide, the People ever grow magnanimous and couragious upon a Recovery; witneſs at preſent, the valiant Swiſſes, the Hollanders, and not long ſince, our own Nation, when declared a Free-State, and a Re-eſtabliſhment of our Freedom in the hands of the People procured, (though not ſecured) what noble Deſigns were undertaken and proſecuted with ſucceſs? The Conſideration whereof, muſt needs make highly for the Honour of all Governours in Free-States, who have been, or ſhall be inſtrumental in redeeming and ſetting any People in a fulneſs of Freedom, that is, in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies.
The eleventh Reaſon is, becauſe in this Form no Determinations being carried, but by conſent of the People; therefore they muſt needs remain ſecure out of the reach of Tyranny, and59 free from the Arbitrary Diſpoſition of any commanding Power. In this Caſe, as the People know what Laws they are to obey, and what Penalties they are to undergo, in caſe of Tranſgreſſion; ſo having their ſhare and intereſt in the making of Laws, with the Penalties annexed, they become the more inexcuſable if they offend, and the more willingly ſubmit unto puniſhment when they ſuffer for any offence. Now the caſe is uſually far otherwiſe, under all ſtanding Powers: for, when Government is managed in the hands of a particular Perſon, or continued in the hands of a certain number of Great Men, the People then have no Laws but what Kings and Great Men pleaſe to give: Not do they know how to walk by thoſe Laws, or how to underſtand them, becauſe the ſenſe is oftentimes left at uncertainty; and it is reckoned a great Myſtery of State in thoſe Forms of Government, That no Laws ſhall be of any ſenſe or ſorce, but as the Great Ones pleaſe to expound them: ſo as by this means, the People many times are left as it were without60 Law, becauſe they bear no other conſtruction and meaning, but what ſutes with particular mens Intereſts and Phant'ſies; not with Right Reaſon, or the Publike Liberty.
For the proof of this under Kingly Government, we might run all the world over; but our own Nation affords Inſtances enough in the Practices of all our Kings: yet this Evil never came to ſuch a height, as it did in the Raign of Henry the ſeventh, who by uſurping a Prerogative of expounding the Laws after his own pleaſure, made them rather Snares, than Inſtruments of Relief, (like a grand Catch-pole) to pill, poll, and geld the Purſes of the People; as his Son Harry did after him, to deprive many Gallant Men both of their Lives and Fortunes. For, the Judges being reputed the Oracles of the Law, and the power of creating Judges being uſurp'd by Kings, they had a care ever to create ſuch, as would make the Laws ſpeak in Favour of them, upon any occaſion. The Truth whereof hath abundantly appeared in the dayes of the late King, and his Father James, whoſe61 uſual Language was this: As long as I have power of making what Judges and Biſhops I pleaſe, I am ſure to have no Law nor Goſpel but what ſhall pleaſe me.
This very providing for this Inconvenience, was the great Commendation of Lycurgus his Inſtitution in Sparta; who, though he cut out the Lacedemonian Commonwealth after the Grandee faſhion, confirming the Supremacy within the Walls of the Senate, (for their King was but a Cypher) yet he ſo ordered the matter, that he took away the Grandeur; that as their King was of little more value than any one of the Senators; ſo the Senate was reſtrained by Laws, walking in the ſame even pace of ſubjection with the People; having very few Offices of Dignity or Profit allowed, which might make them ſwell with State and Ambition; but were preſcribed alſo the ſame Rules of Frugality, Plainneſs, and Moderation, as were the Common People: by which means immoderate luſts and deſires being prevented in the Great Ones, they were the leſs inclined to Pride and Oppreſſion; and no great profit or pleaſure62 being to be gotten by Authority, very few deſired it; and ſuch as were in it, ſate free from Envie, by which means they avoided that odium and emulation which uſes to rage betwixt the Great Ones and the People in that Form of Government.
But now the caſe is far otherwiſe in the Commonwealth of Venice, where the People being excluded from all intereſt in Government, the power of making and executing of Laws, and bearing of Offices, with all other Immunities, lies onely in the hands of a ſtanding Senate, and their Kindred, which they call the Patrocian, or Noble Order. Their Duke, or Prince, is indeed reſtrained, and made juſt ſuch another Officer as were the Lacedemonian Kings; differing from the reſt of the Senate, onely in a Corner of his Cap, beſides a little outward Ceremony and Splendor: but the Senators themſelves have Liberty at random, Arbitrarily to ramble, and do what they pleaſe with the people: who excepting the City it ſelf, are ſo extreamly oppreſs'd in all their Territories, living by no63 Law, but the Arbitrary Dictates of the Senate, that it ſeems rather a Junta, than a Commonwealth; and the Subjects take ſo little content in it, that ſeeing more to be enjoyed under the Turk, they that are his Borderers take all opportunities to revolt, and ſubmit rather to the mercy of a Pagan-Tyranny. Which diſpoſition if you conſider, together with the little Courage in their Subjects, by reaſon they preſs them ſo hard; and how that they are forced, for this cauſe, to relie upon Forrain Mercenaries in all warlike Expeditions, you might wonder how this State hath held up ſo long; but that we know the Intereſt of Chriſtendom, being concerned in her Security, ſhe hath been chiefly ſupported by the Supplies and Arms of others.
Therefore our Concluſion ſhall be this, That ſince Kings, and all ſtanding Powers, are ſo inclinable to act according to their own Wills and in Intereſts, in making, expounding, and executing of Laws to the prejudice of the Peoples Liberty and Security: and ſeeing the onely way to prevent Arbitrariness64 is, That no Laws or Dominations whatſoever ſhould be made, but by the Peoples Conſent and Election: therefore it muſt of neceſſity be granted, that the People are the beſt Keepers of their own Liberties, being ſetled in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies.
A twelfth Reaſon is, becauſe this Form is moſt ſutable to the Nature and Reaſon of Mankinde: for, as Cicero ſaith, Man is a noble Creature, born with Affections to rule, rather than obey; there being in every man a natural appetite or deſire of Principality. And therefore the Reaſon why one man is content to ſubmit to the Government of another, is, not becauſe he conceives himſelf to have leſs right than another to govern; but either becauſe he findes himſelf leſs able, or elſe becauſe he judgeth it will be more convenient for himſelf, and that community whereof he is a Member, if he ſubmits unto another's Government. Nemini purere vult animús a naturâ bene informatus, niſi, &c. ſaith the ſame Cicero: that is to ſay, in honeſt Engliſh, A minde well inſtructed65 by the light of Nature, will pay obedience unto none, but ſuch as command, direct, or govern, for its good and benefit. From both which paſſages and expreſſions of that Oracle of Humane wiſdom, theſe three inferences do naturally ariſe: Firſt, that by the light of Nature people are taught to be their own Carvers and Contrivers, in the framing of that Government under which they mean to live. Secondly, that none are to preſide in Government, or ſit at the Helm, but ſuch as ſhall be judged fit, and choſen by the People. Thirdly, that the People are the onely proper Judges of the convenience or inconvenience of a Government when it is erected, and of the behaviour of Governours after they are choſen: which three Deductions appear to be no more, but an Explanation of this moſt excellent Maxime, That the Original and Fountain of all juſt Power and Government is in the People.
This being ſo, that a Free-State-Government by the People, that is, by their ſucceſſive Repreſentatives, or ſupreme Aſſemblies, duely choſen, is moſt natural66 and onely ſutable to the Reaſon of mankinde: then it follows, that the other forms, whether it be of a ſtanding Power in the Hands of a particular perſon, as a King; or of a ſet number of Great Ones, as in a Senate, are beſides the Dictates of Nature, being meer artificial devices of Great Men, ſquared out onely to ſerve the Ends and Intereſts of Avarice, Pride and Ambition of a few, to a vaſſalizing of the Community. The Truth whereof appears ſo much the more, if we conſider, That a Conſent and free Election of the People, which is the moſt natural Way and Form of governing, hath no real effect in the other Forms; but is either ſupplanted by Craft and Cuſtome, or ſwallowed up by a pernicious pretence of Right (in one or many) to govern, onely by vertue of an Hereditary ſucceſſion. Now certainly, were there no other Argument to prove the excellency of Government by the People, &c. beyond the other Forms; yet this one might ſuffice, That in the Peoples Form, men have Liberty to make uſe of that Reaſon and Underſtanding God hath given67 them, in chuſing of Governours, and providing for their own ſafety in Government: but in the other Forms of a ſtanding Power, all Authority being entailed to certain Perſons and Families, in a courſe of inheritance, men are alwayes deprived of the uſe of their Reaſon about choice of Governours, and forced to receive them blindely, and at all adventure: which courſe being ſo deſtructive to the Reaſon, common Intereſt, and Majeſty of that Noble Creature, called Man, that he ſhould not in a matter of ſo high conſequence as Government, (wherein the good and ſafety of all is concerned) have a Freedom of Choice and Judgement, muſt needs be the moſt irrational and brutiſh Principle in the World, and fit onely to be hiſſed out of the World, together with all Forms of ſtanding Power (whether in Kings, or others) which have ſerved for no other end, but transform Men into Beaſts, and mortified mankinde with miſery through all Generations.
The Truth of this is evident all the World over; firſt, by ſad Examples of68 Monarchy: for, the Kingly form having been retained in a courſe of Inheritance, men being forced to take what comes next for a Governour, whether it be Male or Female, a wiſe Man or a Fool, Good or Bad; ſo that the major part of Hereditary Princes, have been Tyrannous and Wicked by Nature, or made ſo by Education and Opportunity: the People have been for the moſt part banded to and fro, with their Lives and Fortunes, at the Will and Pleaſure of ſome one ſingle unworthy Fellow, who uſually aſſumes the greater confidence in his unrighteous dealing, becauſe he knows the People are tied in that Form to him and his, though he practice all the Injuſtice in the World. This was it that brought on Tyranny in Rome, firſt under their Kings, afterwards under Emperors: for it is to be obſerved out of the Story, that all thoſe Emperors which ruled by right of Inheritance, proved moſt of them no better than ſavage Beaſts, and all of them Wicked except Titus. 'Tis true indeed, That a Nation may have ſome reſpite and recruit now and then, by the Vertue69 and Valour of a ſingle Prince; yet this is very rare; and when it doth happen, it uſually laſts no longer than for his Life, becauſe his Son or Succeſſor (for the moſt part) proves more weak or vitious, than himſelf was Virtuous, as you may ſee in the ſeveral Liſts of Kings throughout Great Britain, France, Spain, and all the World. But this is not all the Inconvenience, that Hereditary Princes have been and are for the moſt part Wicked in their own Perſons: for, as great Inconveniences happen by their being litigious in their Titles; witneſs the bloody diſputes between the Princes of the Blood in France, as alſo in England, between the two Houſes of Yorke and Lancaſter; to which many more might be reckoned out of all other Kingdoms; which miſeries, the people might have avoided, had they not been tied to one particular Line of Succeſſion. Therefore if any Kingly Form be tolerable, it muſt be that which is by Election, choſen by the Peoples Repreſentatives, and made an Officer of Truſt by them, to whom they are to be accountable. And70 herein, as Kings are onely tolerable upon this account, as Elective; ſo theſe Elective Kings are as intolerable upon another account, becauſe their preſent Greatneſs gives them opportunity ever to practiſe ſuch flights, that in a ſhort time, the Government that they received onely for their own Lives, will become entailed upon their Families, whereby the Peoples Election will be made of no effect further, than for Faſhion, to mock the poor People, and adorn the Triumphs of an aſpiring Tyranny; as it hath been ſeen in the Elective Kingdoms of Bohemia, Poland, Hungaria, and Sweden; where the Forms of Election were, and are ſtill retained; but the Power ſwallowed up, and the Kingdoms made Hereditary; not onely in Sweden, by the Artifice of Gustavus Ericus; but alſo in Poland, and the Empire, where the peoples right of election was ſoon eaten out by the cunning of the two Families of Caſimira and Austria.
Let this ſerve to manifeſt, that a Government by a free Election and Conſent of the People, ſetled in a due and71 orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies, is more conſonant to the light of Nature and Reaſon, and conſequently much more excellent than any Hereditary ſtanding Power whatſoever. To take off all mis-conſtructions; when we mention the People, obſerve all along, that we do not mean the confuſed promiſcuous Body of the People, nor any part of the people who have forfeited their Rights by Delinquency, Neutrality, or Apoſtacy, &c. in relation to the divided ſtate of any Nation; for they are not to be reckon'd within the Liſts of the People.
The thirteenth Reaſon, to prove the excellency of a Free-State above any other Form, is, becauſe in Free-States there are fewer opportunities of Oppreſſion and Tyranny, than in the other Forms. And this appears, in that it is ever the care of Free-Commonwealths, for the moſt part, to preſerve, not an Equality, (which were irrational and odious) but an Equability of Condition among all the Members; ſo that no particular Man or Men ſhall be permitted to grow over-great in Power; nor any Rank of Men be allowed72 above the ordinary Standard, to aſſume unto themſelves the State and Title of Nobility.
The Obſervation of the former, ſetures the Peoples Liberty from the reach of their own Officers, ſuch as being entruſted with the Affairs of high Truſt and Imployment, either in Campe and Council, might perhaps take occaſion thereby to aſpire beyond Reaſon, if not reſtrained and prevented.
The Obſervation of the later, ſecures the People from the preſſures and Ambition of ſuch perty Tyrants, as would uſurp and claim a Prerogative, Power, and Greatneſs above others, by Birth and Inheritance. Theſe are a ſort of Men not to be endured in any well-ordered Commonwealth; for they alwayes bear a Natural and Implacable Hate towards the People, making it their Intereſt to deprive them of their Liberty; ſo that if at any time it happen, that any great Man or Men whatſoever, arrive to ſo much Power and Confidence, as to think of uſurping, or to be in a Condition73 to be tempted thereunto; theſe are the firſt that will ſet them on, mingle Intereſts with them, and become the prime Inſtruments in heaving them up into the Seat of Tyranny.
For the clearing of theſe Truths; and firſt, to manifeſt the Inconvenience of permitting any perſons to be overgreat in any State; and that Free-States that have not avoided it, have ſoon loſt their Liberty, we ſhall produce a File of Examples. In Greece we finde, that the Free-State of Athens loſt its Liberty upon that account once, when they ſuffered certain of the Senators to over-top the reſt in power; which occaſioned that multiplied Tyranny, made famous by the name of the thirty Tyrants: at another time, when by the ſame Error they were conſtrained, through the power of Pistr•tus, to ſtoop unto his ſingle Tyranny.
Upon this ſcore alſo, the people of Syracuſa had the ſame misfortune under the Tyrant Hiero, as had they of Sicily under Dyonlſius and Agathocles.
74In Rome alſo the caſe is the ſame too: for during the time that Liberty was included within the Senate, they gave both Malius & Manlius an opportunity to aſpire, by permitting them a growth of too much Greatneſs: but by good fortune eſcaping their clutches, they afterwards fell as fooliſhly into the hands of ten of their Fellow-Senators, called the Decemviri, in giving them ſo much power as tempted them unto Tyranny. Afterwards, when the people ſcuffled, and made a ſhift to recover their Liberty out of the hands of the Senate, they committed the ſame Error too, by permitting of their Servants to grow overgreat; ſuch as Sylla, who by power tyrannized and made himſelf Dictator for five yeers, as Caeſar afterwards ſecled the Dictatorſhip upon himſelf for ever: and after Caeſar's death, they might have recovered their Liberty again, if they had taken care (as they might eaſily have done) to prevent the growing Greatneſs of Auguſtus, who gaining power firſt, by the courteſie & good will of the Senate and People, made uſe of it to eſtabliſh himſelf in a Tyranny, which75 could never after be extinguiſhed, but in the ruine of the Roman Empire it ſelf.
Thus alſo the Free-State of Florence fooliſhly ruined it ſelf by the greatning of Coſmus; firſt, permitting him to ingroſs the Power, which gave him opportunity to be a tyrant; & then as fooliſhly forcing him to declare himſelf a Tyrant, by an unſeaſonable demand of the power back out of his hands. Many more inſtances might be fetch'd out of Milan, Switzerland, and other places: but we have one neerer home, and of a later date, in Holland; whereby, permitting the Family of Orange to greaten a little more than beſeemed a Member of a Free-State, they were inſenſibly reduced to the laſt caſt, to run the hazzard of the loſs of their Liberty.
Therefore one prime Principle of State, is, To keep any man, though he have deſerved never ſo well by good ſucceſs or ſervice, from being too great or popular: it is a notable means (and ſo eſteemed by all Free-States) to keep and preſerve a Commonwealth from the Rapes of Uſurpation.
A fourteenth Reaſon, (and though76 the laſt, yet not the leaſt) to prove a Free-State or Government by the People, ſetled in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies, is much more excellent than any other Form, is, becauſe in this Form, all Powers are accountable for miſdemeanors in Government, in regard of the nimble Returns and Periods of the Peoples Election: by which means, he that ere-while was a Governour, being reduced to the condition of a Subject, lies open to the force of the Laws, and may with eaſe be brought to puniſhment for his offence; ſo that after the obſervation of ſuch a courſe, others which ſucceed, will become the leſs daring to offend, or to abuſe their Truſt in Authority, to an oppreſſion of the People. Such a courſe as this, cuts the very throat of all Tyranny; and doth not onely root it up when at full growth, but cruſheth the Cockatrice in the Egg, deſtroys it in the Seed, in the principal, and in the very poſſiblities of its being for ever after. And as the ſafety of the People, is the Soveraign and Supreme Law; ſo an eſtabliſhment77 of this Nature, is an impregnable Bulwark of the Peoples ſafety, becauſe without it, no certain Benefit can be obtained by the ordinary Laws; which if they ſhould be diſpenſed by uncontrolable, unaccountable Perſons in Power, ſhall never be interpreted, but in their own ſenſe; nor executed, but after their own Wills and Pleaſure.
Now, this is moſt certain, That as in the Government of the People, the ſucceſſive Revolution of Authority by their conſent, hath ever been the onely Bank againſt Inundations of Arbitrary Power and Tyranny; ſo on the other ſide, it is as ſure, That all ſtanding Powers have and ever do aſſume unto themſelves an Arbitrary Exerciſe of their own dictates at pleaſure, and make it their onely Intereſt to ſettle themſelves in an unaccountable ſtate of Dominion: ſo that, though they commit all the injuſtice in the World, their cuſtome hath been ſtill to perſwade men, partly by ſtrong pretence of Argument, and partly by force, that they may do what they liſt, and that78 they are not bound to give an account of their Actions to any, but to God himſelf. This Doctrine of Tyranny hath taken the deeper Root in mens mindes, becauſe the greateſt part was ever inclined to adore the Golden Idol of Tyranny in every Form: by which means the rabble of mankinde being prejudicated in this particular, and having plac'd their corrupt humour or intereſt in baſe fawning, and the favour of preſent Great Ones; Therefore if any reſolute Spirit happen to broach and maintain true Principles of Freedom, or do at any time ariſe to ſo much courage, as to perform a noble Act of Juſtice, in calling Tyrants to an account, preſently he draws all the enmity and fury of the World about him. But in Commonwealths it is and ought to be otherwiſe; for, in the Monuments of the Grecian and Romane Freedom, we finde, thoſe Nations were wont to heap all the Honours they could invent, by publick Rewards, Conſecration of Statues, and Crowns of Laurel, upon ſuch worthy Patriots: and as if on earth all were too little, they inroll'd them79 in heaven among the Deities. And all this they did out of a Noble ſenſe of Commonweal-intereſt; knowing that the life of Liberty conſiſts in a ſtrict hand, and zeal againſt Tyrants and Tyranny, and by keeping perſons in power from all the occaſions of it: which cannot be better done, than (according to the cuſtom of all States that are really free) by leaving them liable to account: which happineſs was never ſeen yet under the ſun, by any Law or Cuſtom eſtabliſhed, ſave onely in thoſe States, where all men are brought to taſte of Subjection as well as Rule, and the Government ſetled by a due ſucceſſion of Authority, by conſent of the People.
In Switzerland the people are free indeed, becauſe all Officers and Governours in the Cantons, are queſtionable by the People in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies.
The Inference from the fore-going particulars, is eaſie, That ſince Freedom is to be preſerved no other way in a Commonwealth, but by keeping Officers and Governours in an accountable ſtate; and ſince it appears no ſtanding80 Powers can never be called to an account without much difficulty, or involving a Nation in Blood or Miſery. And ſince a revolution of Government in the Peoples hands, hath ever been the onely means to make Governours accountable, and prevent the inconveniences of Tyranny, Diſtraction, and Miſery; therefore for this, and thoſe other reaſons fore-going, we may conclude, That a Free-State, or Government by the People, ſetled in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies, is far more excellent every way, than any other Form whatſoever.
ALL OBJECTIONS Againſt the Government of the People, ANSWERED.
COnſidering, That in times paſt, the People of this Nation were bred up and inſtructed in the brutiſh Principles of Monarchy, by which means they have been the more averſe from entertaining Notions of a more noble Form: and remembring, that not long ſince we were put into a better courſe, upon the declared Intereſt of a Free-State, or Commonwealth; I conceived nothing could more highly tend to the propagation of that good Intereſt, and the Honour82 of its Founders, than to manifeſt the Inconveniences and ill Conſequences of the other Forms; and ſo to root up their Principles, that the good People, who but the other day were inveſted in the poſſeſſion of a more excellent way, may (in order to their re-eſtabliſhment) underſtand what Commonwealth-Principles are, and thereby become the more reſolute to defend them againſt the common Enemy; learn to be true Commonwealths men, and zealous againſt Monarchick-Intereſt, in all its appearances and incroachments whatſoever. To this end we have ▪ ſet down our Poſition ▪ That a Free-State, or Government by the People, ſetled in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies, is the moſt excellent Form of Government; which (I humbly conceive) hath been ſufficiently proved, both by Reaſon and Example: but becauſe many pretences of Objection are in being, and ſuch as by many are taken for granted; therefore it falls in of courſe, that we may refute them: which being done with the ſame evidence of Reaſon and83 Example, I doubt not but it will ſtop all the Mouths, not onely of Ignorance, but even of ▪ Malice and Flattery, which have preſumed to prophane that pure way of a Free-State, or Government by the People.
That Objection of Royaliſts, and others, which we ſhall firſt take notice of, is this, That the erecting of ſuch a Government would be to ſet on Levelling an•Confuſion.
For anſwer, If we take Levelling in the common uſage and application of the term in theſe days, it is of an odions ſignification, as if it levell'd all men in point of Eſtates, made all things common to all, deſtroyed propriety, introduced a community of enjoyments among men; which is a Scandal faſtned by the cunning of the common Enemy upon this kinde of Government, which they hate above all others; becauſe, were the People once put in poſſeſſion of their Liberty, and made ſenſible of the great Benefits they may reap by its injoyment, the hopes of all the Royal Stickler would be utterly extinct, in regard it would be the likelieſt means84 to prevent a return of the Intereſt of Monarchy: for no Perſon or Parties ſeeking or ſetting up a private Intereſt of their own, diſtinct from the Publick, it will ſtop the Mouths of all Gain-ſayers. But the Truth is, This way of Free-State, or Government by the People in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, is ſo far from introducing a community, that it is the onely preſervative of Propriety in every particular: the Reaſons whereof are plain: for, as on the one ſide, it is not in Reaſon to be imagined, that ſo choice a Body, as the Repreſentative of a Nation, ſhould agree to deſtroy one another in their ſeveral Rights and Intereſts: on the other ſide, all Determinations being carried in this Form by common Conſent, every Man's particular Intereſt muſt needs be fairly provided for, againſt the Arbitrary diſpoſition of others; therefore, whatever is contrary to this, is levelling indeed; becauſe it placeth every Man's Right under the Will of another, and is no leſs than Tyranny; which ſeating it ſelf in an unlimited uncontrollable Prerogative over others without their85 Conſent, becomes the very bane of propriety; and however diſquieted, or in what Form ſoever it appears, is indeed the very Intereſt of Monarchy.
Now that a Free-State, or ſucceſſive Government of the People, &c. is the onely preſervative of Propriety, appears by Inſtances all the World over; yet we ſhall cite but a few.
Under Monarchs, we ſhall finde ever, That the Subjects had nothing that they could call their own; neither Lives, nor Fortunes, nor Wives, nor any thing elſe that the Monarch pleaſed to command, becauſe the poor people knew no remedy againſt the levelling Will of an unbounded Soveraignity; as may be ſeen in the Records of all Nations that have ſtoop'd under that wretched Form: whereof we have alſo very ſad Examples in France, and other Kingdoms, at this very day, where the People have nothing of Propriety; but all depends upon the Royal Pleaſure, as it did of late•ere in England. Moreover, it is very obſervable, That in Kingdoms where the People have enjoyed any thing of Liberty and Propriety, they have been86 ſuch Kingdoms onely, where the frame of Government hath been ſo well tempered, as that the beſt ſhare of it hath been retained in the Peoples Hands; and by how much the greater influence the People have had therein, ſo much the more ſure and certain they have been, in the enjoyment of their Propriety.
To paſs by many other Inſtances, conſider how firm the Aragonians were in their Liberties and Properties, ſo long as they held their hold over their Kings in their ſupreme Aſſemblies; and no ſooner had Philip the ſecond deprived them of their ſhare in the Government, but themſelves and their properties became a prey (and have been ever ſince) to the Will and Pleaſure of their Kings.
The like alſo may be ſaid of Erance, where, as long as the Peoples Intereſt bore ſway in their ſupreme Aſſemblies, they could call their Lives and Fortunes their own, and no longer: for, all that have ſucceeded ſince Lewis the eleventh, followed his levelling pattern ſo far, that in ſhort time they deſtroyed the Peoples Property, and became the87 greateſt Levellers in Chriſtendom. We were almoſt at the ſame paſs here in England: for, as long as the Peoples Intereſt was preſerved by frequent and ſucceſſive Parliaments; ſo long we were in ſome meaſure ſecure of our Properties: but as Kings began to worm the People out of their ſhare in Government, by diſcontinuing of Parliaments; So they carried on their levelling deſign, to the deſtroying of our Properties; and had by this means brought it ſo high, that the Oracles of the Law and Goſpel ſpake it out with a good levelling Grace, That all was the King's and that we had nothing we might call our own.
Thus you ſee how much Levelling, and little of Propriety, the people h••e had certain under Monarchs; and if any at all, by what means, and upon what terms they have had it. Nor hath it been thus onely under Kings; but we finde, the People have ever had as little of Property ſecure, under all other Forms of ſtanding Powers; which have produced as errant Levellers in this particular, as any of the Monarchies. In the88 Free-State of Athens, as long as the People kept free indeed, in an enjoyment of their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, ſo long they were ſecure in their Properties, and no longer. For, to ſay nothing of their Kings, whoſe Hiſtory is very obſcure, we finde, after they were laid ſide, they erected another Form of ſtanding Power, in a ſingle Perſon, called, a Governour, for Life; who was alſo accountable for miſdemeanours: but yet a Tryal being made of nine of them, the People ſaw ſo little ſecurity by them, that they pitch'd upon another ſtanding Form of Decimal Government; and being oppreſs'd by them too, they were caſhier'd. The like miſeries they taſted under the ſtanding power of Thirty, which were a ſort of Levellers more rank than all the reſt; who put to death, baniſh•d, pill'd, and poll'd whom they pleaſed, without Cauſe or Exception; ſo that the poor people having been tormented under all the Forms of ſtanding Power, were in the end forced (as their laſt remedy) to take Sanctuary under the Form of a89 Free - State, in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies.
And though it may be objected, That afterwards they fell into many diviſions and miſeries, even in that Form: yet whoever obſerves the Story, ſhall finde, it was not the fault of the Government, but of themſelves, in ſwerving from the Rules of a Free-State, by permitting the continuance of Power in particular hands; who having an opportunity thereby to create Parties of their own among the People, did for their own ends, inveigle, ingage, and intangle them in popular Tumults and Diviſions. This was the true Reaſon of their Miſcarriages. And if ever any Government of the People did miſcarry, it was upon that account.
Thus alſo the Lacedemonians, after they had for ſome yeers tryed the Government of one King, then of two Kings at once of two diſtinct Families; afterwards came in the Ephori, as Superviſers of their Kings: after (I ſay) they had tryed themſelves through all the Forms of a ſtanding Power, and found them all to be Levellers of the Peoples90 Intereſt and Property, then neceſſity taught them to ſeek ſhelter in a Free-State, under which they lived happily, till by a forementioned Error of the Athenians, they were drawn into Parties by powerful Perſons, and ſo made the Inſtruments of Diviſion among themſelves, for the bringing of new Levellers into play; ſuch as were Manchanidas and Nabis, who ſucceeded each other in a Tyranny.
In old Rome, after the ſtanding Form of Kings was extinct, and a new one eſtabliſhed, the people found as little of ſafety and property as ever: for, the ſtanding Senate, and the Decemviri, proved as great Levellers, as Kings: ſo that they were forced to ſettle the Government of the People by a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies. Then they began again to recover their propertie, in having ſomewhat they might call their own; and they happily enjoyed it, till, as by the ſame Error of the Lacedemonians and Athenians, ſwerving from the Rules of a Free-State, lengthning of power in particular hands, they were drawn and divided91 into Parties, to ſerve the luſts of ſuch powerful men as by craft became their Leaders: ſo that by this means (through their own default) they were deprived of their Liberty long before the dayes of Imperial Tytanny. Thus Cinna, Sylla, Marins, and the reſt of that ſucceeding Gang, down to Caeſar, uſed the Peoples favour, to obtain a continuation of power in their own hands; and then having ſadled the people with a new ſtanding Form of their own, they immediately rooted up the Peoples Liberty and Property, by Arbitrary Sentences of death, Proſcriptions, Fines, and Confiſcations: which ſtrain of levelling, (more intolerable than the former) was maintained by the ſame Arts of Devilliſh Policy down to Caeſar; who ſtriking in a Favourite of the People, and making uſe of their Affections to lengthen power in his own hands: at length, by this Errour of the people, gained opportunity to introduce a new levelling Form of ſtanding power in himſelf, to an utter and irrecoverable ruine of the Romane Liberty and property.
92In Florence they have been in the ſame caſe there, under every Form of ſtanding power. It was ſo, when the Great Ones ruled: it was ſo under Goderino, it was ſo under Savanarola the Monk. When they once began to lengthen power by the peoples Favour, they preſently fell to levelling and domineering, as did Coſmus afterwards, that crafty Founder of the preſent Dukedom.
Upon the ſame terms, the Republick of Piſa loſt themſelves, and became the prey of ſeveral Uſurpations.
Mantua was once a Free-City of the Empire; but neglecting their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, and permitting the Great Ones, and moſt Wealthy, to form a ſtanding power in themſelves: the people were ſo vexed with them, that one Pafferimo getting power in his own hands, and then lengthening it by Artifice, turn'd Leveller too, ſubjecting all to his own will; ſo that the poor people, to rid their hands of him, were forced to pitch upon another, as bad, and tranſlate their power into a petty Dukedom, in the hands of the Family of Gonzaga.
93We may from hence ſafely conclude againſt all objecting Monarchs and Royaliſts, of what name and Title ſoever, that a Free-State or Commonwealth by the people in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies is ſo far from levelling or deſtroying propertie, that in all ages it hath been the onely preſervative of Liberty and property, and the onely remedy againſt the Levellings and Uſurpations of ſtanding powers: for, it is cleer, That Kings and all ſtanding powers are the Levellers.
A ſecond Objection in the Mouths of many, is this, That the erecting of ſuch a Form in the Peoples hands, were the ready way to cauſe confuſion in Government; when all perſons (without diſtinction) are allowed a right to chuſe and be choſen members of the ſupreme Aſſemblies.
For anſwer to this, know, we muſt conſider a Commonwealth in a twofold condition: either in its ſetled ſtate, when fully ſtabliſhed and founded, and when all men were ſuppoſed Friends to its eſtabliſhment; or elſe when it is newly founding or founded, and that in the cloſe of a civil War, upon the ruine of94 a former Government, and thoſe that ſtood for it; in which caſe it even hath a great party within it ſelf, that are enemies to its eſtabliſhment.
As to the firſt, to wit, a Commonwealth in its ſetled and compoſed ſtate, when all men within it are preſumed to be its Friends, queſtionleſs, a right to chuſe and to be choſen, is then to be allowed the people, (without diſtinction) in as great a latitude, as may ſtand with right Reaſon and Convenience, for managing a matter of ſo high Conſequence as their Supreme Aſſemblies; wherein ſomewhat muſt be left to humane Prudence; and therefore that latitude being to be admitted more or leſs, according to the Nature, Circumſtance, and Neceſſities of any Nation, is not here to be determined.
But as to a Commonwealth under the ſecond conſideration, when it is founding, or newly founded, in the cloſe of a Civil War, upon the mine of a former Government; In this caſe, (I ſay) to make no diſtinction betwixt men; but to allow the conquered part of the people an equal right to chuſe and to95 be choſen, &c. were not onely to take away all proportion in policy, but the ready way to deſtroy the Commonwealth, and by a promiſcuous mixture of oppoſite Intereſts, to turn all into confuſion.
Now, that the Enemies of Liberty, being ſubdued upon the cloſe of a Civil War, are not to be allowed ſharers in the Rights of the people, is evident, for divers Reaſons: not onely becauſe ſuch an allowance would be a means to give them opportunity to ſow the ſeeds of new Broyls and Diviſions, and bring a new hazard upon the Liberties of the People, (which are Reaſons derived from Convenience: but there is a more ſpecial Argument from the equity of the thing, according to the Law and Cuſtom of Nations, That ſuch as have commenced War, to ſerve the Luſts of Tyrants againſt the Peoples Intereſt, ſhould not be received any longer a part of the people, but may be handled as ſlaves when ſubdued, if their Subduers pleaſe ſo to uſe them; becauſe by their Treaſons againſt the Majeſty of the people, (which they ought to have96 maintained) they have made forfeiture of all their Rights and Priviledges, as Members of the People; and therefore if it happens in this caſe at any time, That any Immunities, Properties or Enjoyments be indulged unto them, they muſt not take them as their own by Right, but as Boons beſtowed upon them by the peoples courteſie.
The old Commonwealth of Greece was very ſevere in this particular: for, as they were wont to heap up all Honours they could vent, upon ſuch as did or ſuffered any thing for the maintenance of their Liberty; ſo, on the other ſide, they puniſhed the Underminers of it, or thoſe that any wayes appeared againſt it, with utmoſt extremity; perſecuting them with For Feitures, both of Life and Fortune; and if they eſcaped with Life, they uſually became ſlaves: and many times they perſecuted them, being dead, branding their Memories with an Eternal Mark of Infamy.
In old Rome they dealt more mildly with the greateſt part of thoſe that had ſided with the Tarquins after their Expulſion: but yet they were not reſtored97 to all their former Priviledges. In proceſs of time, as oft as any conſpired againſt the Peoples Intereſt, in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies; after they had once gotten them, themſelves were baniſhed, and their Eſtates confiſcated, not excepting many of the Senators, as well as others; and made for ever incapable of any Truſt in the Commonwealth.
Afterwards, they took the ſame courſe with as many of Catiline's Fellow-Traytors and Conſpirators, as were worthy any thing; and had no doubt ſufficiently paid Caeſar's Abettors in the ſame Coin, but that he wore out all oppoſites with his proſperous Treaſon. Thus Millain, and the reſt of thoſe States, when they were free, as alſo the Swiſſes and Hollanders, in the Infancy of the Helvetian and Belgick Freedoms, who took the ſame courſe with all thoſe uunatural Paricides and Apoſtates, that offered firſt to ſtrangle their Liberty in the Birth, or afterwards in the Cradle, by ſecret Conſpiracy, or open violence. Nor ought this to ſeem ſtrange, ſince if a right of Conqueſt may be uſed over a Forain, who onely is to be accounted98 a fair enemy: much more againſt ſuch, as againſt the light of Nature, ſhall engage themſelves in ſo foul practices, as tend to ruine the Liberty of their Native Country.
Seeing therefore that the people in their Government, upon all occaſions of Civil War againſt their Liberties, have been moſt zealous in vindicating thoſe Attempts upon the heads of the Conſpirators: ſeeing alſo, that upon the cloſe of a Civil War, they have a Right; and not onely a Right, but uſually a very great Reſolution to keep out thoſe Enemies of Liberty, whom they conquer, from a participation of any Right in Government: therefore in this caſe alſo, as well as the former, we may conclude, That they in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, are ſo far from levelling the Intereſt of Government into all hands, without diſtinction