An INTRODUCTION TO THE Following Diſcourſe.
WHen the Senators of R•me, in their publike Decrees and Orations, began to comply with and court the People, calling them Lords of the world; how eaſie a matter was it then for Gracchus to perſwade them to un-Lord the Senate? In like manner, when Athens was quitted of Kings, the Power was no ſooper declared to be in the People••t immediately they took it, and made2 ſure of it in their own hands, by the advice of Solon, that excellent Lawgiver: for, as Cicero ſaith, There is a natural deſire of Power and Sovereignty in every man: ſo that if any have once an oportunity to ſeize, they ſeldom neglect it; and if they are told it is their due, they venture life and all to attain it.
If a People once conceive they ought to be free, this conception is immediately put in practice; and they free themſelves. Their firſt care is to ſee, that their Laws; their Rights, their Deputies, their Officers, and all their Dependents, be ſetled in a ſtate of freedom. This becoms like the Apple of the eye; the leaſt grain, atome, or touch, will grieve it: it is an eſpouſed virgin; they are extreme jealous over it.
Thus ſtrangely affected were the Roman people, that if any one among them (though ne'er ſo deſerving) were found to aſpire, they preſently fetch'd him down, as they did the gallant Maelius and Manlius; yea, their jealouſie was ſo great, that they obſerved3 every man's looks, his very nods, his garb, and his gate, whether he walked, converſed, and lived as a friend of Freedom among his neighbours. The ſupercilious eye, the lofty brow, and the grand paw, were accounted Monſters, and no Character of Freedom; ſo that it was the ſpecial care of the wiſer Patriots, to keep themſelves in a demure and humble poſture, for the avoiding of ſuſpicion. Hence it was, that Collatinus, one of their Freedoms Founders, and of the firſt Conſuls, living in ſome more State than ordinary, and keeping at too great a diſtance from the people, ſoon taught them to forget his former merits: inſomuch, that they not onely turned him out of his Conſulſhip, but quite out of the City into Baniſhment. But his Colleague Brutus, and that wiſe Man Valerius Publicola, by taking a contrary courſe, preſerved themſelves and their reputation. For, the one ſacrificed his Children, thoſe living Monuments of his Houſe, to make the vulgar amends for an injury ▪4 the other courted them with the Title of Majeſty, laid the Faſces, the Enſigns of Authority at their Feet, fixt all appeals at their Tribunals, and levelled the lofty Walls of his own ſtately Houſe, for fear they ſhould miſtake it for a Caſtle. Thus alſo did Menenius Agrippa, Camillus, and other eminent Men in that popular State: ſo that by theſe means they made themſelves the Darlings of the people, whilſt many others of a more Grandee-humor, ſoon loſt their Intereſt and Reputation.
Thus you ſee, that when a Peoples Right is once declared to them, it is almoſt impoſſible to keep it, or take it from them.
It is pity, that the people of England, being born as free as any people in the World, ſhould be of ſuch a ſupple humor and inclination, to bow under the ignoble preſſures of an Arbitrary Tyranny, and ſo unapt to learn what true Freedom is. It is an ineſtimable Jewel, of more worth than your Eſtates, or your Lives: it conſiſts not in a Licenſe to do what5 you liſt, but in theſe few particulars: Firſt, in having who eſome Laws ſured to every Man's ſtate and condition. Secondly, in a due and eaſie courſe of adminiſtration, as to Law and Juſtice, that the Remedies of Evil may be cheap and ſpeedy. Thirdly, in a power of altering Government and Governours upon occaſion: Fourthly, in an uninterrupted courſe of ſucceſſive Parliaments, or Aſſemblies of the People. Fifthly, in a free Election of Members to ſit in every Parliament, when Rules of Election are once eſtablished. By enjoying theſe onely, a people are ſaid to enjoy their Rights, and to be truely ſtated in a condition of ſafety and Freedom.
Now if Liberty is the moſt precious Jewel under the Sun, then when it is once in poſſeſſion, it requires more than an ordinary art and induſtry to preſerve it. But the great queſtion is, Which is the ſafeſt way? whether by committing of it into the hands of a ſtanding Power, or by placing the Guardianſhip in the6 hands of the People, in a conſtant ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblys. The beſt way to determine this, is by obſervation out of Romane Stories; whereby it plainly appears, that people never had any real Liberty, till they were poſſeſs'd of the power of calling and diſſolving the Supreme Aſſemblies, changing Governments, enacting and repealing Laws, together with a power of chuſing and depuring whom they pleaſed to this work, as often as they ſhould judge expedient, for their own well-being, and the good of the Publike. This power is ſaid to be the firſt born of that Peoples Freedom: and many a ſhrewd fit, many a pang and throw the Commonwealth had, before it could be brought forth in the world: which (Gracchus told them) was a ſore affliction from the gods, that they ſhould ſuffer ſo much for the ignorance or negligēce of their Anceſtors, who when they drave our Kings, forgat to drive out the Myſteries and inconveniences of Kingly power, which were all reſerved within the7 hands of the Senate. By this means the poor people miſſing the firſt opportunity of ſetling their freedom, ſoon loſt it again: they were told they were a Free-ſtate; and why? becauſe (forſooth) they had no King, they had at length nev•r a Tarquin to trouble them: but what was that to the purpoſe, as long as they had a Caius, and an Appius Claudius, and the reſt of that gant, who infected the Senators with an humour of Kinging it from generation to generation? Alas, when the Romans were at this paſs, they were juſt ſuch another Free-ſtate as was that of Sparta, in the days of yore, where they had a Senate too, to pull down the pride of Kings; but the people were left deſtitute of power and means to pull down the pride of the Senate; by which means indeed they became free to do what they liſt, whilſt the people were confined within ſtraite•bounds than ever. Such another Free-ſtate in theſe daies is that of Venice, where the people are free from the Dominion of their Prince8 or Duke; but little better than ſlaves under the power of their Senate: but now in the Common-wealth of Athens the caſe was far otherwiſe; where it was the care of Solon, that famous Law-giver, to place both the exerciſe & intereſt of Supremacy in the hands of the people, ſo that nothing of a publick intereſt could be impoſed, but what paſſed currant by vertue of their conſent and Authority: he inſtituted that famous Council called the Areopagus, for the managing of State-tranſactions: but left the power of Legiſlation, or lawmaking, in a ſucceſſive courſe of the peoples Aſſemblies; ſo that avoiding Kingly Tyranny on the one ſide, and Senatical incroachments on the other, he is celebrated by all Poſterity, as the man that hath left the onely Patern of a Free-ſtate fit for all the world to follow.
It is alſo to be obſerved, when Kings were driven out of Rome, though they were declared and called a Free-ſtate, et it was a long time ere they could be free indeed, in9 regard Brutus cheated them with a meer ſhadow and pretence of liberty: he had indeed an Ambition high enough, and opportunity fairenough to have ſeized the Crown into his own hands; but there were many conſiderations that deterr'd him from it; for he well perceived how odious the name of King was grown: Beſides, had he ſought to Inthrone himſelf, men would have judged it was not love to his Country made him take up Arms, but deſire of Dominion; nor could he forget, that ſerene privacy is to be preferr'd before Hazardous Royalty: For what hope could he have to keep the Seat long, who by his own example had taught the people both the Theory and practice of oppoſing Tyranny? It was neceſſary therefore that he ſhould think of ſome other courſe more plauſible, whereby to worke his own ends, and yet preſerve the love of the people; who not having been uſed to liberty, did very little underſtand it, and therefore were the more eaſily gul'd out10 of the ſubſtance, and made content with the ſhadow.
For the carrying on this Deſign, all the projecting Grandees joyned pates together; wherein, as one obſerves, Regnum quidem nomen, ſed non Regia poteſtas Româ fuit expulſa: Though the Name of King were exploded with alacrity, yet the Kingly power was retained with all Art and ſubtilty, and ſhared under another notion among themſelves, who were the great ones of the City. For all Authority was confin'd within the walls of a ſtanding Senate, out of which, two Conſuls were choſen yeerly; & ſo by turns they dub'd one another with a new kinde of Regality: the people being no gainers at all by this alteration of Government, ſave onely, that (like Aſſes) they were ſadled with new Paniers of Slavery.
But what followed? The Senate having got all power into their own hands, in a ſhort time degenerated from their firſt Virtue and Inſtitution, to the practice of Avarice,11 Riot, and Luxury; whereby the love of their Country was changed into a Study of Ambition and Faction: ſo that they fell into diviſions among themſelves, as well as oppreſſions over the people; by which diviſions, ſome leading Grandees, more potent than their Fellows, took occaſion to wipe their Noſes, and to aſſume the Power into their own hands, to the number of ten perſons. This Form of Government was known by the Name of the Decemvirate; wherein theſe new Uſurpers, joyning Forces together, made themſelves rich with the ſpoiles of the people, not caring by what unlawful means they purchaſed either Profit or Pleaſure, till that growing every day more inſupportable, they were in the end by force caſhiered of their Tyranny.
But what then? The people being fleſh'd with this Victory, and calling to minde how gallantly their Anceſtors had in like manner baniſhed Kings, began at laſt to know their own ſtrength; and ſtomack'd it exceedingly12 that themſelves, on whoſe ſhoulders the frame of State was ſupported, (and for whoſe ſakes all States are founded) ſhould be ſo much vaſſalized at the will of others, that they who were Lords abroad, ſhould be Slaves at home: ſo that they reſolved to be ridden no longer under fair ſhews of Liberty. They raiſed a Tumult under the conduct of their Tribune Canu•eius; nor could they by any perſwaſion be induced to lay down Arms, till they were put in poſſeſſion of their Rights and Priviledges. They were made capable of Offices of the Government, even to the Dictatorſhip; had Officers of their own, called Tribunes, who were held ſacred and inviolable, as Protectors of the Commons, and retained a power of meeting and acting with all Freedom in their great Aſſemblies. Now, and never till now, could they be called a Free State, and Commonwealth, though long before declared ſo: for the way being open to all without exception, vertue, learning, and good Parts made as ſpeedy13 a Ladder to climbe unto Honours, as Nobility of Birth; and a Good Man as much reſpected as a Great; which was a rare felicity of the Times, not to be expected again, but upon the dawning of another golden Age.
The main Obſervation then ariſing out of this Diſcourſe, is this: That not onely the Name of King, but the Thing King (whether in the hands of one or of many) was pluck'd up root and branch, before ever the Romans could attain to a full Eſtabliſhment in their Rights and Freedoms.
Now when Rome was thus declared A Free State, the next work was to eſtabliſh their Freedom in ſome ſure & certain way: & in order to this, the firſt buſineſs they pitch'd upon, was, not onely to ingage the people by an Oath againſt the return of Tarquin's Family to the Kingdom, but alſo againſt the admiſſion of any ſuch Officer as a King, for ever, becauſe thoſe brave men, who glorified themſelves in laying the foundation of a Commonwealth, well knew, that in14 a ſhort Revolution, others of a leſs publick Spirit would ariſe in their places, and gape again after a Kingdom. And therefore it was the ſpecial care of thoſe worthy Patriots, to imprint ſuch Principles in mens mindes, as might actuate them with an irreconcilable enmity to the former Power: inſomuch, that the very Name of King became odious to the Roman People; yea, and they were ſo zealous herein, that in proceſs of time, when Caeſar took occaſion by Civil Diſcords to aſſume the Soveraignty into his ſingle Hands, he durſt not entertain it under the fatal Name of King, but clothed himſelf with the more plauſible ſtile of Emperor; which nevertheleſs could not ſecure him from the fatal ſtab that was given him by Brutus in revenge, on the behalf of the people. Our Neighbours of Holland traced this example at the heels, when upon recovery of their Freedom from Spain, they binde themſelves by**Oaths in thoſe dayes were not like an old Almanack. an Oath to abjure the Government, not onely of King Philip, but of all Kings for ever.
15Kings being caſhiered out of Rome, then the Right of Liberty, together with the Government, was retained within the hands and bounds of the Patrician or Senatorian Order of Nobility; the people not being admitted into any ſhare, till partly by Mutinies, and partly by Importunities, they compell'd the Senate to grant them an Intereſt in Offices of State, and in the Legiſlative Power, which were circumſcribed before within the bounds of the Senate. Hence aroſe thoſe Officers called Tribunes, and thoſe Conventions called Aſſemblies of the People, which were as Bridles to reſtrain the Power and Ambition of the Senate, or Nobility. Before the erection of thoſe, whilſt all was in the hands of the Senate, the Nation was accounted Free, becauſe not ſubjected to the will of any ſingle perſon: But afterwards they were Free indeed, when no Laws could be impoſed upon them, without a conſent firſt had in the Peoples Aſſemblies: ſo that the Government in the end16 came to be ſetled in an equal mixture of both Intereſts, Patrician and Popular; under which Form, they attained to the height of all their Glory and Greatneſs. In this Form of Free-State, we now ſee the Venetian, where the Patrician is predominant, and the People a little too much kept under. The ſame Form is imbraced alſo by our Neighbours the United Provinces; but the beſt part of their Intereſt lies depoſited in the hands of the people. Rome kept up their Senate as their ſtanding Councel, for the managing of State-affairs, which require Wiſdom and Experience: but as for making of Laws, and the main Acts of Supremacy, they were reſerv'd to the Grand Aſſemblies; ſo that the People gave Rules whereby to govern, and the ſecrets of Government were intruſted in the hands of the Senate. And this Commonwealth ever thriv'd beſt, when the People had moſt Power, and uſed moſt Moderation: and though they made uſe of it now and then to fly out into extravagant17 courſes, yet they were no laſting fits, like thoſe diſtempers that brake out through the Ambition of the Senators. Beſides, we cannot but take notice, as long as the Popular Intereſt continued regular, and more predominant than the other, ſo long the People were ſecure of their Liberties: which enjoyment, was a good Allay and Recompence, for many harſh inconveniences that brake out when they were unruly and irregular: Whereas, when the Senate afterwards worm'd the People out of Power, as that deſign went on by degrees, ſo Rome loſt her Liberty; the Senate domineering over the People, and particular Factions over the Senate, till thoſe Factions tearing one another to pieces, at length he that was head of the paramount ſurviving Faction, by name Caeſar, took occaſion to uſurp over all, ſwallowing up the Rights and Liherties of the Romans, in the Gulph of a ſingle Tyranny.
It was a Noble ſaying, (though Machiavel's). Not he that placeth-a vertuous Government in his own hands, or family; but he that eſtabliſheth a free and la•ting18 Form, for the Peoples conſtant ſecurity, is moſt to be commended. Whoſoever hath this oportunity, may improve his actions to a greater height of glory, than ever followed the fame of any ambitious Idol that hath graſ• 'd a Monarchy: for, as (〈◊〉ſaith in Plutarch, Even the greatest Kings, or Tyrants, refar inferiour to thoſe that are emi•ent in Free-States and Commonwealths: N•r were thoſe mighty Monarchs of old, to be compared with Epimano•das, Pericles, Themiſtocles, Marcus Carius, Amilc•r, Fahius, and Scipio, and other excellent Captains in Free-States, whi•h purchaſ•d themſelves a fame, in defence of their Liberties. And though the very name of Liberty was for a time grown odious, or ridiculous among us, having been long a ſtranger in theſe and other parts; yet in Ancient time, Nations were wont to reckon themſelves ſo much the more Noble, as they were free from the Regal yoke: which was the cauſe why then there were ſo many Free-States in all parts of the world.
Nor is it onely a meer Gallantry of ſpirit that excites men to the love of19 Freedom; but experience aſſures it to be the moſt commodious and profitable way of Government, conducing every way to the enlarging a people in Wealth and Dominion. It is incredible to be ſpoken, (ſaith Salust) how exceedingly the Romane Commonwealth increaſed in a ſhort time, after they had obtained Liberty. And G•icciard•ne affirms, That ▪ Free-States muſt needs be more pleaſing to God than any other Form, becauſe in them more regard is to be had to the common good, more care for the impartial diſtribution of Juſtice, and the mindes of men are more enflamed thereby to the love of Glory and Vertue, and become much more zealous in the love of Religion, than in any other Government whatſoever.
It is wonderful to conſider, how mightily the Athenians were augmented in a few ye•rs, both in Wealth and Power, after they had freed themſelves from the Tyranny of Piſtratus: but the Romans arrived to ſuch a height, as was beyond all imagination after the expulſion of their Kings, and Kingly Go ernment. Nor do theſe things happen without ſpecial reaſon; it being uſual20 in Free-States to be more tender of the Publick in all their Decrees, than of particular Intereſts: whereas the caſe is otherwiſe in a Monarchy, becauſe in this Form the Princes pleaſure weighs down all Conſiderations of the Common good. And hence it is, that a Nation hath no ſooner loſt its Liberty, and ſtoop'd under the yoke of a ſingle Tyrant, but it immediately loſeth its former luſtre, the Body fills with ill humors, and may ſwell in Titles; but cannot thrive either in Power or Riches, according to that proportion which it formerly enjoyed, becauſe all new Acquiſitions are appropriated as the Princes peculiar, and in no wiſe conduce to the eaſe and benefit of the Publick.
It was the pride of Richard Nevil the great Earl of Warwick, and he reckoned it the greateſt of earthly glories, to be called, (as indeed he was) a Kingmaker, in that he made and unmade Kings at his pleaſure: for we read in our Chronicles, how that he firſt pull'd down the Houſe of Lancaſter, and brought King Henry the ſixth from a Crown to a Priſon; ſetting up the Title21 of the Houſe of York, in the perſon of King Edward the fourth: afterwards, he depoſed this Edward, drave him out of England, and reſtored the ſame Henry to the Crown, whom he had before depreſs'd. But the great Query is, Wherefore, and how this was done? One would have thought, there had been no hope of reconciliation betwixt him and the Houſe of Lancaſter, having ſo highly diſobliged them, in caſting down and impriſoming the perſon of Henry. But yet it is very obſervable of this man, Warwick, being on a ſudden diſcontented with the change that he had made, becauſe he miſſed of thoſe ends which he aimed at, in bringing it about; and perceived other perſons (whom he conceived his inferiours, to partake of the intereſt and favour of Edward; therefore, out of an emulous impatience of Spirit, he preſently caſt about to undo all that before he had done; he ſuppreſt the new Government, to advance the old.
From which piece of Story, we may very well conclude, how unſafe it is in a new alteration, to truſt any man with22 too great a ſhare of Government, or place of Truſt; for ſuch perſons ſtand ever ready (like that Warwick) upon any occaſion of diſcontent, or of ſerving their own Intereſts, to betray and alter the Government; eſpecially if they have Warwick's main Guard, that is, if they can (as he did) bring the Prince whom they formerly diſobliged, to come in upon their own terms, and upon ſuch conditions as may bridle him, and ſecure the Power ſo in their own Hands, that whilſt he King it onely in Title, themſelves may be Kings de facto, and leave their old Friends in the lurc•, or yeeld them up at M•rcy, (as Warwick did) to gratifie the Tyrant, and their own Tyrannical ambition.
How much therefore doth it concern every Commonwealth, in ſuch a caſe, to ſee and beware, that Warwick's Ghoſt be not conjur'd up again, to act a Part in ſome new Tragedie!
The Right Conſtitution of a Commonwealth.
THe Romans having juſtly and nobly freed themſelvs from the Tyranny of Kings, and being in time brought to underſtand that the intereſt of Freedom conſiſts in a due and orderly Succeſſion of the Supreme Aſſemblies ▪ they then made it their care, by all good ways and means, to fortifie the Commonwealth, and eſtabliſh it in a free enjoyment of that Intereſt, as the onely bar to the return of Kings, and their main ſecurity againſt the ſubtil mining of Kingly humours and uſurpations. The pu••ike Roſtra, or Pulpits, ſounded out the commendations of Freedom; their24 Augurs, or Prophets, found Freedom written in the entrails of Beaſts, and collected it from the flight of the auſpicious bird, the Sun-daring Eagle, ſpreading her wings aloft over the Capitol: the common people alſo, in their common diſcourſes, breathed nothing but Freedom; and uſed the frequent mention of it, as a Charm againſt the return of Tyranny.
Nor was it without reaſon, that this brave and active people were ſo ſtudiouſly devoted to the preſervation of their Freedom, when they had once attained it, conſidering how eaſie and excellent it is above all other Forms of Government, if it be kept within due bounds and order. It is an undeniable Rule, That the People (that is, ſuch as ſhall be ſucceſſively choſen to repreſent the People) are the beſt Keepers of their own Liberties; and that for theſe following Reaſons.
Firſt, becauſe they never think of uſurping over other mens Rights, but minde which way to preſerve their own. Whereas, the caſe is far otherwiſe among Kings and Grandees, as all Nations25 in the world have felt to ſome purpoſe: for they naturally move within the circle of domination, as in their proper Centre; and count it no leſs Security than Wiſdom and Policy, to brave it over the People. Thus Suetonius tells us, how Caeſar, Craſſus, and another, Societatem iniere, requid ageretur in Repub. quod diſplicuiſſet ulli e tribus: Made a bargain between themſelves, that nothing ſhould be done in the Commonwealth that diſpleaſed either of them three. Such another Triumvirate of Grandees was that of Auguſtus, Lepidus, and Antonie, who agreed to ſhare the world between themſelves; and traced the ſame paths as the other did, to the top of worldly Tyranny, over the ruines of their Countries Liberties: they ſav'd and deſtroy'd, depreſs'd and advanc'd whom they pleaſed, with a wet Finger. But whilſt the Government remained untouch'd in the peoples Hands, every particular man lived ſafe, (except the Ambitious) and no man could be undone, unleſs a true and ſatisfactory reaſon were rendered to the world for his deſtruction.
26Secondly, the People are beſt Keepers of their own Liberty, becauſe it is ever the Peoples care to ſee, that Authority be ſo conſtituted, that it ſhall be rather a burthen than benefit to thoſe that undertake it; and be qualified with ſuch ſlender advantages of profit or pleaſure, that men ſhall reap little by the enjoyment. The happy conſequence whereof is this, that none but honeſt, generous and publick•pirits, will then deſire to be in Authority, and that onely for the Common good. Hence it was, that in the Infan•y of the Romane Liberty, there was no canvaſing of Voices; but ſingle and plain-hearted men were called, intreated, and in a manner forced with importunity to the Helm of Government, in regard of that great trouble and pains that followed the imployment. Thus Cincinnatus was fetch'd out of the Field from his Plow, and placed (much againſt his will) in the ſublime Dignity of Dictator: ſo the noble Camillus, and Fabius, and Curius, were, with much adoe, drawn from the recreation of Gardening, to the trouble of Governing: and the Conſul-yeer27 being over, they returned with much gladneſs again to their private employment.
A third Reaſon why the People in their Supreme Aſſemblies ſucceſſively choſen, are the beſt Keepers of their Liberty, is, becauſe as motion in Bodies natural, ſo ſucceſſion in civil, is the grand preventive of corruption. The Truth of this will appear very clearly, if we weigh the effects of every ſtanding Authority from firſt to laſt in the Romane State: for whilſt they were governed by a continued Power in one and the ſame Hands, the People were ever in danger of loſing their Liberty: ſometimes in danger of being ſwallowed up by Kingly aſpirers, witneſs the deſign of Maelius, Menlius, and others; ſometimes in danger of a ſurpriſe by a Grandee Cabinet or Junta, who by contracting a particular Intereſt, diſtin•t from that which they had in common with the people, ſo ordered the matter in time, that partly by their own ſtrength, and partly by advantage of Power, to gratifie and curb whom they pleaſed, and to wind in other Councils28 and parties to their own, they ſtill brought the leſſer into ſuch ſubjection, that in the end they were forced all either to yeild to the pleaſure of the Grandees, or be broken by them. By theſe practices, they oroduced that upſtart Tyranny of the Decemviri, when ten men made a ſhift to enſlave the Senate, as well as the people. Laſtly, by continuing power too long in the hands of particular perſons, they were ſwallow'd up by two Triumvirates of Emperors by turns, who never left pecking at one another, till Julius and Auguſtus, having beaten all Competitors out of the Field, ſubjected all to the will of a ſingle Emperour. If this were ſo among the Romans, how happy then is any Nation, and how much ought they to joy in the Wiſdom and Juſtice of their Truſtees, where certain Limits and Bounds are fixed to the Powers in being, by a declared ſucceſſion of the ſupreme Authoty in the hands of the People!
A fourth Reaſon is, becauſe a ſucceſſion of ſupreme Powers doth not onely keep them from corruption, but it kills that grand Cankerworm of a Commonwealth,29 to wit, Faction: for, as Faction is an adhering to, and a promoting of an Intereſt, that is diſtinct from the true and declared Intereſt of State: ſo it is a matter of neceſſity, that thoſe that drive it on, muſt have time to improve their ſlights and projects, in diſguiſing their deſigns, drawing in Inſtruments and Parties, and in worming out of their oppoſires. The effecting of all this, requires ſome length of time: therefore the onely prevention is a due ſucceſſion and revolution of Authority in the Hands of the People.
That this is moſt true, appears not onely by Reaſon, but by Example: if we obſerve the ſeveral turns of Faction in the Romane Government. What made their Kings ſo bold, as to incroach and tyrannize over the People, but the very ſame courſe that heightned our Kings heretofore in England, to wit, a continuation of Power in their own Perſons and Families? Then, after the Romans became a Commonwealth, was it not for the ſame Reaſon, that the Senate fell into ſuch heats and fits among30 themſelves? Did not Appius Claudius and his Junta, by the ſame means, Lord it over the Senate? Whence was it, that Sylla and Marius cauſed ſo many proſcriptions, cruelties, and combuſtions in Rome, but by an extraordinary continuation of Power in themſelves? How came it to paſs likewiſe, that Julius Caeſar aſpired, and in the end artained the Empire? and, that the People of Rome quite loſt their Liberty, was it not by the ſame means? For, had not the Sena•e and People ſo long protracted the Power of Pompey and Caeſar; had Pompey had leſs command in Aſia, and Caeſar leſs in Gallia, Rome might have ſtood much longer in the poſſeſſion of her Liberty.
After the death of Caeſar, it was probable enough, they•ight then have recovered their Liberty, but that they ran again into the ſame Error, as before: for by a continuation of Power in the hands of Octavius, Lepidus, and Antonie, the Commonwealth came to be rent and divided into three ſeveral Factions; two of which being worn out by each other, onely Octavius remained;31 who conſidering, that the Title of perpetual Dictator was the ruine of his Father Julius, continued the Government onely for a ſet-time, and procured it to be ſetled upon himſelf but for ten yeers. But what was the effect of this continuation of Power? Even this, That as the former protractings had been the occaſions of Faction, ſo this produced a Tyranny: for, at the end of every ten yeers, he wanted no pretence to renew a leaſe of the Government; and by this means ſo played his Cards, that at length he eaſily and utterly extinguiſhed the ſmall remains of the Roman Freedom.
The Obſervation then ariſing from hence, is this, that the onely way for a people to preſerve themſelves in the enjoyment of their Freedom, and to avoid thoſe fatal inconveniences of Faction and Tyranny, is, to maintain a due and orderly ſucceſſion of Power and Perſons. This was, and is, good Commonwealths Language; and without this Rule, it is impoſſible any Nation ſhould long ſubſiſt in a State of Freedom. So that the Wiſdom, the Piety,32 the Juſtice, and the ſelf-denial of thoſe Governours in Free-States, is worthy of all honour and admiration, who have, or ſhall at any time as willingly reſign their Truſts, as ever they took them up; and have ſo far denied themſelves, as to prefix Limits and Bounds to their own Authority. This was it that made Brutus ſo famous in the beginning of the Romane Commonwealth. For this alſo it was, that Hiſtory hath left ſo reverend a remembrance of Scipio, Camillus, and Virginus; as did Cato likewiſe of Pompey: whilſt the ten Grandee Uſurpers, with Sylla, and Caeſar, and the Names of others that practiſed the contrary, are left as odious upon the Roman Record, as the Name of Richard the third, will be in our modern Chronicle, to all Poſterity.
A fifth Reaſon to prove the Life of Liberty lies in ſucceſſion of Powers and Perſons, is, becauſe it is the onely Remedy againſt Self-ſeeking, with all the powerful Temptations and Charms of ſelf-intereſt: for the attaining of particular ends, requires length of time, as well as the creating and promoting33 of a Faction: both theſe deſigns muſt lie long in fermentation, or elſe they can never gain the beloved opportunity to bring matters to perfection. The Truth of this appears likewiſe in the Story of the Romane State: for, as long as all Authority was confined within the Walls of a ſtanding Senate, they being more ſtudious of their own, than the common good, in a ſhort time the Commonwealth was turned altogether into a private; inſomuch, that the people became not onely incapable of any Honour and Authority; but well-nigh reduced to flat beggery. Hence it was, that ſo many Quarrels and Combuſtions aroſe one after another: for, the Great Ones having made uſe of their time, in drawing all to themſelves, the People were forc'd to live upon borrowing; and when they could borrow no longer, they fell into a general Mutiny, and forſook the City: nor could they be pacified till all Accounts were quitted; and then, with much adoe, they were wrought upon with the Eloquence of Menenius Agrippa, with his excellent Fable of a Mutiny in a34 natural Body, among the Members againſt the Belly.
Thus, as the firſt Inſurrection was occaſioned by the Uſury and Exactions of the Great Ones; who by their long continuance in Power, had drawn all unto themſelves: ſo the ſecond was occaſioned by the Lordlineſs of thoſe ten Perſons, who being elected to do Juſtice, according to the Laws, made uſe of their time, onely to confirm their Power, and Greaten themſelves, by repleniſhing their own Coffers, ingroſſing of Offices, and preferring their own Kindred and Alliances: and at length, improved Self-Intereſt ſo high, that they domineered, like abſolute Tyrants, advancing and depreſſing whom they pleaſed, without reſpect of Merit or Inſufficiency, Vice or Vertue; ſo that having ſecured all in their own Hands, they over-ruled their Fellow-Senators at pleaſure, as well as the People.
Many more inſtances of After-times might be given; but theſe are ſufficient whereupon to ground this Obſervation, That as the firſt Founders of the Roman35 Liberty did well in driving out their Kings; ſo on the other ſide, they did very ill in ſetling a ſtanding Authority within themſelves: for, by this means, lying open to the Temptations of Honour and Profit, (which are Sails too big for any humane bulk) they were immediately ſwallowed up of Self; and taking their riſe from the opportunity of a continued Power, made uſe of the Publick onely to advance their Private, whereby they put the Commonwealth into frequent flames of diſcontent and ſedition; which might all have been prevented, could they have denied themſelves at firſt, and ſetled the State Free indeed, (as they ought to have done) by placing an orderly ſucceſſion of ſupreme Authority in the Hands of the People.
A ſixth Reaſon, why a Free-State is much more excellent than a Government by Grandees or Kings; and, that the People are the beſt Keepers of their own Liberties, is, becauſe, as the end of all Government is (or ought to be) the good and eaſe of the People, in a ſecure enjoyment of their Rights, without36 Preſſure and Oppreſſion: ſo queſtionleſs the People, who are moſt ſenſible of their own Burthens, being once put into a capacity and Freedom of Acting, are the moſt likely to provide Remedies for their own Relief; they onely know where the ſhooe wrings, what Grievances are moſt heavy, and what future Fences they ſtand in need of, to ſhelter them from the injurious Aſſaults of thoſe Powers that are above them: and therefore it is but Reaſon, they ſhould ſee that none be intereſted in the ſupreme Authority, but Perſons of their own election, and ſuch as muſt in a ſhort time return again into the ſame condition with themſelves, to reap the ſame Benefit or Burthen, by the Laws enacted, that befalls the reſt of the People. Then the iſſue of ſuch a Conſtitution muſt needs be this, That no Load ſhall be laid upon any, but what is common to all, and that always by common conſent; not to ſerve the Luſts of any, but onely to ſupply the Neceſſities of their Country.
But when it happens, that a ſupreme Power long continues in the Hands of37 any Perſon or Perſons; they, by greatneſs of place, being ſeated above the middle Region of the People, ſit ſecure from all windes and weathers, and from thoſe ſtorms of violence that nip and terrifie the inferiour part of the World: whereas, if by a ſucceſſive Revolution of Authority, they came to be degraded of their Earthly Godheads, and return into the ſame condition with other Mortals, they muſt needs be the more ſenſible and tender of what ſhall be laid upon them. The ſtrongeſt Obligation that can be laid upon any Man in publick Matters, is, To ſee that he ingage in nothing, but what muſt either offenſively or beneficially reflect upon himſelf: for as, if any be never ſo good a Patriot, yet if his power be prolonged, he will finde it hard to keep Self from creeping in upon him, and prompting him to ſome Extravagancies for his own private Benefit; ſo, on the other ſide, if he be ſhortly to return to a condition common with the reſt of his Brethren, ſelf-Intereſt bindes him to do nothing but what is Juſt and Equal; he himſelf being to reap the38 good or evil of what is done, as well as the meaneſt of the people.
This without controverſie muſt needs be the moſt Noble, the moſt Juſt, and the moſt excellent way of Government in Free-States; without which, it is obvious to common ſenſe, no Nation, can long continue in a ſtate of Freedom: as appears likewiſe by Example out of the Romane Story. For what more noble Patriots were there ever in the World, than the Romane Senators were, whilſt they were kept under by their Kings, and felt the ſame Burthens of their fury, as did the reſt of the people? but afterwards being freed from the Kingly yoke, and having ſecured all power within the hands of themſelves and their poſterity, they at length fell into the ſame Abſurdities that had been before committed by their Kings; ſo that this new yoke became more intolerable than the former. Nor could the people finde any Remedy, untill they procured that neceſſary Office of the Tribunes; who being inveſted with a temporary Authority by the peoples Election, remained the more ſenſible39 of their condition, and were as Moderators between the Power of the Great Ones, and the Rights of the People.
What more excellent Patriot could there be than Manlius, till he became corrupted by Time and Power? Who more Noble, and Courteous, and Wellaffected to the common good, than was Appius Claudius at firſt? but afterwards, having obtained a Continuation of the Government in his own hands, he ſoon loſt his primitive Innocency and Integrity, and devoted himſelf to all the Practices of an Abſolute Tyrant. Many others might be reckon'd up. And therefore, hence it was, That when the Senate (for ſome Reaſons) though to continue Lucius Quintius in the Conſulſhip longer than the uſual time; that gallant Man utterly refuſed it, and choſe rather to deny himſelf, than that a Precedent ſo prejudicial to the Romane Freedom ſhould be made for his ſake, by a Prerogative of Authority in his hands, beyond the ordinary Cuſtome.
A ſeventh Reaſon why a people qualified with a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their Supreme Aſſemblies, are the40 beſt keepers of their own Liberties, is, Becauſe, as in other Forms, thoſe perſons onely have acceſs to Government, who are apt to ſerve the luſt and will of the Prince, or elſe are parties or compliers with ſome powerful Faction: ſo in this Form of Government by the People, the door of Dignity ſtands open to all (without exception) that aſcend thither by the ſteps of Worth and Vertue: the conſideration whereof hath this noble effect in Free-States, That it edges mens ſpirits with an active emulation, and raiſeth them to a lofty pitch of deſigne and action.
The truth of this is very obſervable in the Romane State: for, during the Vaſſalage of that People under Kings, we read not of any notable Exploits, but finde them confined within a narrow compaſs, oppreſs'd at home, and ever and anon ready to be ſwallowed up by their enemies. After this Government of Kings was aboliſhed, you know that of Grandees in a ſtanding Senate was next erected; under which Form, they made ſhift to enlarge their bounds a little: but the moſt they could then do,41 was only to ſecure themſelves from the attempts of the baniſhed Tarquins, and thoſe petty neighbours that envied the ſmall increaſe of their Dominion. But at length, when the State was made free indeed, and the People admitted into a ſhare and intereſt in the Government, as well as the Great Ones; then it was, and never till then, that their thoughts and power began to exceed the bounds of Italy, and aſpire towards that prodigious Empire. For, while the road of Preferment lay plain to every man, no publike work was done, nor any Conqueſt made; but every man thought he did and conquered all for himſelf, as long as he remained valiant and vertuous: it was not Alliance, nor Friendſhip, nor Faction, nor Riches, that could advance men; but Knowledge, Valour, and vertuous Poverty, was preferred above them all.
For the confirmation whereof, we finde in the ſame Story, how that many of their brave Patriots and Conquerors were men of the meaneſt Fortune, and of ſo rare a temper of ſpirit, that they little cared to improve them, or enrich42 themſelves by their publike employment: ſo that when they died, they were fain to be buried at the publike charge. We finde Cincinnatus, a man of mean fortune, fetch'd from the Plough, to the dignity of a Dictator: for he had no more than four acres of land, which he tilled with his own hands. Yet ſo it happened, that when the Roman Conful with his whole Army was in great peril, being circumvented and ſtraitned by the Equuns, and the City of Rome it ſelf in a trembling condition; then, with one conſent, they pitch'd upon Cincinnatus, as the fitteſt man for their deliverance: and he behaved himſelf ſo well, with ſo much magnanimity, integrity, and wiſdom, that he relieved the Conſul, routed and utterly ſubdued the Enemy, and gave as it were a new life to his Countries Liberties: which work being over, he with all willingneſs quitted his Authority, and returned to the condition of a painful private life.
This Example might ſeem ſtrange, but that we know it was ordinary in that State, till it grew corrupt again: for, we read alſo, how Lucius Tarquin, (not of43 the Tyrants family) a man of mean fortune, yet of great worth, was choſen General of the Horſe, and drawn to it out of the Country, in which place he ſurpaſſed all the Romane youth for gallant behaviour. Such another plain Country-fellow was Attilius Regulus, the ſcourge of Carthage in his time; of whom many eminent points of Bravery were recorded: as were alſo moſt of thoſe Heroick ſpirits that ſucceeded, down to the times of Lucius Paulus Emilius, by whoſe Conqueſts, the firſt charms and inchantments of Luxury were brought out of Aſia to Rome, and there they ſoon ſwallowed up the remainders of primitive integrity and ſimplicity. And yet it is very obſervable alſo, that ſo much of the ancient ſeverity was remaining ſtill even in the time of this Paulus, the famous General, that a Silver diſh, that was part of the Spoil, being given to a ſon-in-law of his, who had fought ſtoutly in that war, it was thought a great reward; and obſerved by the Hiſtorian, to be the firſt piece of plate that ever was ſeen in the Family.
44This Obſervation then ariſes from this Diſcourſe, That as Rome never thrived till it was ſetled in a Freedom of the People; ſo that Freedom was preſerved, and that Intereſt beſt advanced, when all Places of Honour and Truſt were expoſed to men of Merit, without diſtinction; which happineſs could never be obtained, until the people were inſtated in a capacity of preferring whom they thought worthy, by a Freedom of electing men ſucceſſively into their Supreme Offices and Aſſemblies. So long as this Cuſtome continued, and Merit took place, the people made ſhift to keep and encreaſe their Liberties: but when it lay neglected, and the ſtream of Preferment began to run along with the favour and pleaſure of particular powerful men, then Vice and Compliance making way for Advancement, the people could keep their Liberties no longer; but both their Liberties and themſelves were made the price of every man's Ambition and Luxury.
The eighth Reaſon, why the People in their Aſſemblies are the beſt Keepers45 of their Liberty, is, becauſe it is they onely that are concerned in the point of Liberty: for, whereas in other Forms the main Intereſt and Concernment both of Kings and Grandees, lies either in keeping the People in utter ignorance what Liberty is, or elſe in allowing and pleaſing them onely with the name and ſhadow of Liberty in ſtead of the ſubſtance: ſo in Free-States the People being ſenſible of their paſt condition in former times, under the Power of Great Ones, and comparing it with the poſſibilities and enjoyments of the preſent, become immediately inſtructed, that their main Intereſt and Concernment conſiſts in Liberty; and are taught by common ſenſe, that the onely way to ſecure it from the reach of Great Ones, is, to place it in the Peoples Hands,•adorned with all the Prerogatives and Rights of Supremacy. The Truth of it is, the Intereſt of Freedom is a Virgin that every one ſeeks to deflower; and like a Virgin, it muſt be kept from any other Form, or elſe (ſo great is the Luſt of mankinde after dominion) there follows a rape upon the46 firſt opportunity. This being conſidered, it-will eaſily be granted, That Liberty muſt needs lie more ſecure in the Peoples than in any others hands, becauſe they are moſt concerned in it: and the careful eyeing of this Concernment, is that which makes them both jealous and zealous; ſo that nothing will ſatisfie, but the keeping of a conſtant Guard againſt the Attempts and Inchroachments of any powerful or crafty Underminers.
Hence it is, that the People having once taſted the Sweets of Freedom, are ſo extreamly affected with it, that if they diſcover, or do but ſuſpect the leaſt Deſign to incroach upon it, they count it a Crime never to be forgiven for any conſideration whatſoever. Thus it was in the Romane State, where one gave up his Children, another his Brother to death, to revenge an Attempt againſt common Liberty: divers alſo ſacrificed their Lives, to preſerve it; and ſome their beſt Friends, to vindicate it, upon bare ſuſpicion; as in the Caſes of Maelius, and Manlius, and others, after manifeſt violation47 as in the Caſe of Caeſar.
Nor was it thus onely in Rome; but we finde alſo as notable inſtances of revenge in the Free-People of Greece, upon the ſame occaſion. But the moſt notable of all, is that which happened in the Iſland of Corcyra, during the war of Peloponneſus: where the People having been rook'd of Liberty by the ſlights and power of the Grandees, and afterwards by the aſſiſtance of the Free-ſtates of Athens recovering it again, took occaſion thereupon to clap up all the Grandees, & chop'd off ten of their Heads at one time, in part of ſatisfaction for the Injury: but yet this would not ſerve the turn; for, ſome delay being made in executing of the reſt, the People grew ſo inraged, that they ran, and pull'd down the very Walls, and buried them in the ruines and rubbiſh of the Priſon.
We ſee it alſo in the Free-State of Florence, where Coſmus the firſt Founder of the Tuſcan-Tyranny, having made ſhipwrack of their Liberty, and ſeized all into his own Hands; though he enſlaved their Bodies, yet he could not48 ſubdue their Hearts, nor wear their paſt Liberty our of Memory; for upon the firſt oportunity, they ſought revenge, and a recovery; forcing him to fly for the ſafety of his Life: and though afterwards he made way for his Return and Re-eſtabliſhment by Treachery, yet now after ſo long a time, the old Freedom is freſh in memory, and would ſhew it ſelf again upon a favourable occaſion.
But of all Modern Inſtances, the moſt ſtrange is that of the Land of Holſtein; which being deprived of Liberty, and about ſeventy yeers ſince made a Dutchy, and an Appendix to the Crown of Denmark; though the Inhabitants be but a Booriſh, poor, ſilly Generation, yet ſtill they retain a ſenſe of Indignation at the loſs of their Liberty; and being given to drink, the uſual Complement in the midſt of their Cups, is this, Here is a health to the remembrance of our Liberty.
Thus you ſee what an impreſſion the love of Freedom makes in the mindes of the people: ſo that it will be eaſily concluded, They muſt be the beſt49 Keepers of their own Liberties; being more tender and more concerned in their ſecurity, than any powerful pretenders whatſoever.
The ninth Reaſon to juſtifie a Free-State, is, becauſe in Free-States the People are leſs Luxurious, than Kings or Grandees uſe to be. Now, this is moſt certain, that where Luxury takes place, there is as natural a tendency to Tyranny, as there is from the Cauſe to the Effect: for, you know the Nature of Luxury lies altogether in Exceſs. It is a Univerſal Depravation of Manners, without Reaſon, without Moderation; it is the Canine appetite of a corrupt Will and Phant'ſie, which nothing can ſatisfie; but in every Action, in every Imagination, it flies beyond the Bounds of Honeſty, Juſt, and Good, into all Extremity: ſo that it will eaſily be granted, That Form of Government muſt needs be the moſt excellent, and the Peoples Liberty moſt ſecured, where Governours are leaſt expoſed to the baits and ſnares of Luxury.
The evidence of this may be made out, not onely by Reaſon, but by Examples50 old and new. And firſt, by Reaſon, it is evident, That the People muſt needs be leſs luxurious than Kings or the Great Ones, becauſe they are bounded within a more lowly pitch of Deſire and Imagination: give them but panem & tircenſes; Bread, Sport and Eaſe, and they are abundantly ſatisfied. Beſides, the People have leſs means and opportunities for Luxury, than thoſe pompous ſtanding powers, whether in the hands of one or many: ſo that were they never ſo much inclined to Vice or Vanity, yet they are not able to run on to the ſame meaſure of Exceſs and Riot. Secondly, as it appears they are leſs Luxurious; ſo, for this Cauſe alſo, it is cleer, They (that is, their ſucceſſive Repreſentatives) muſt be the beſt Governours; not onely, becauſe the current of ſucceſſion keeps them the leſs corrupt and preſumptious; but alſo, becauſe, being the more free from luxurious Courſes, they are likewiſe free from thoſe oppreſſive and injurious Practices, which Kings and Grandees are moſt commonly led and forced unto, to hold up the port and ſplendor of their Tyranny51 and to ſatisfie thoſe natural appetites of Covetouſneſs, Pride, Ambition and Oſtentation, which are the perpetual Attendants of Great Ones, and Luxury. Thus much for Reaſon.
Now, for Example, we might produce a Cloud of Inſtances, to ſhew ▪ That Free-States, or the People duely qualified with the Supreme Authority, are leſs devoted to Luxury, than the Grandee or Kingly Powers: but we ſhall give you onely a few,
The firſt that comes in our way is the State of Athens, which, whilſt it remained free in the Peoples Hands, was adorned with ſuch Governours as gave themſelves up to a ſerious, abſtemious, ſevere courſe of Life; ſo that whilſt Temperance and Liberty walked hand in hand, they improved the points of Valour and Prudence ſo high, that in a ſhort time they became the onely Arbitrators of all Affairs in Greece. But being at the height, then (after the common fate of all worldly Powers) they began to decline; for, (contrary to the Rules of a Free-State) permitting ſome men to greaten themſelves, by52 continuing long in Power and Authority, they ſoon loſt their pure Principles of Severity and Libertie: for, upſtarted thoſe thirty Grandees, (commonly called the Tyrants) who having uſurped a ſtanding Authority unto themſelves, preſently quitted the old Diſcipline and Freedom, gave up themſelves firſt to Charms of Luxury, and afterwards to all the practices of an abſolute Tyranny. Such alſo was the condition of that State, when at another time (as in the dayes of Piſtratus) it was uſurp'd in the hands of a ſingle Tyrant.
From Athens let us paſs to Rome, where we finde it in the dayes of Tarquin, diſſolved into Debauchery. Upon the change of Government, their manners were ſomewhat mended, as were the Governours in the Senate: but that being a ſtanding Power, ſoon grew corrupt; and firſt let in Luxury, then Tyranny, till the people being intereſted in the Government, eſtabliſhed a good Diſcipline and Freedom both together; which was upheld with all Severity, till the ten Grandees came in53 play after; whoſe Depoſition, Liberty, and Sobriety began to breath again, till the dayes of Sylla, Marius, and other Grandees that followed down to Caeſar, in whoſe time Luxury and Tyranny grew to ſuch a height, that unleſs it were in the Life and Converſation of Cato, there was not ſo much as one ſpark, that could be raked out of the aſhes, of the old Roman Diſcipline and Freedom; ſo that of all the World, onely Cato remained as a Monument of that Temperance, Virtue and Freedom, which flouriſhed under the Government of the People.
Omitting many other Examples, our Concluſion upon theſe Particulars ſhall be this, That ſince the Grandee or Kingly Powers, are ever more luxurious, than the popular are, or can be: and ſince Luxury ever brings on Tyranny, as the onely bane of Liberty; certainly the Rights and Priviledges of the People, placed and provided for, in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their Supreme Aſſemblies, muſt needs remain more ſecure in their own Hands, than in any others whatſoever.
54A tenth Reaſon, to prove the excellency of a Free-State or Government by the People, above any other Form of Government, is, becauſe under this Government, the People are ever indued with a more magnanimous, active, and noble temper of Spirit, than under the Grandeur of any ſtanding power whatſoever. And this ariſes from that apprehenſion which every particular Man hath of his own immediate ſhare in the publick Intereſt, as well as of that ſecurity which•he poſſeſſes in the enjoyment of his private Fortune, free from the reach of any Arbitrary Power. Hence it is, that whenſoever any good ſucceſs or happineſs betides the Publick, every one counts i•his own: if the Commonwealth conquer, thrive in Dominion, Wealth or Honour, he reckons all done for himſelf; if he ſees Diſtributions of Honour, high Offices, or great Rewards, to Valiant, Vertuous, or Learned Perſons, he eſteems them as his own, as long as he hath a door left open to ſucceed in the ſame Dignities and Enjoyments, if he can attain unto the ſame meaſure of Deſert. 55This it is which makes men aſpire unto great Actions, when the Reward depends not upon the Will and Pleaſure of particular Perſons, as it doth under all ſtanding Powers; but is conferred upon Men (without any conſideration of Birth or Fortune) according to merit, as it ever is, and ought to be in Free-States, that are rightly conſtituted.
The Truth of this will appear much more evident, if ye liſt a little to take a view of the condition of People, under various Forms of Government: for, the Romanes of old, while under Kings, (as you heard before) remained a very inconſiderable People, either in Dominion or Reputation; and could never inlarge their Command very far beyond the Walls of their City. Afterwards, being reduced unto that ſtanding power of the Senate, they began to thrive a little better, &, for a little time: yet all they could do, was only to ſtruggle that for a ſubſiſtence among bad Neighbours. But at length, when the People began to know, claim, and poſſeſs their Liberties in being govern'd56 by a ſuceſſion of their Supreme Officers and Aſſemblies; then it was, and never till then, that they laid the Foundation, and built the Structure of that wondrous Empire that overſhadowed the whole World. And truely the founding of it muſt needs be more wonderful, and a great Argument of an extraordinary Courage and Magnanimity, wherewith the People was indued in Recovery of Liberty; becauſe their firſt Conqueſts were laid in the ruine of mighty Nations, and ſuch as were every jot as free as themſelves: which made the difficulties-ſo much the more, by how much the more free (and conſequently, the more couragious) they were, againſt whom they made oppoſition: for as in thoſe dayes the World abounded with Free-States, more than any other Form, as all over Italy, Gallia, Spain, and Africa, &c. ſo ſpecially in Italy, where the Tuſcans, the Samnites, and other Emulators and Competitors of the Romane Freedom, approved themſelves magnanimous Defenders of their Liberty againſt Rome, that they endured Wars ſo many57 yeers with utmoſt extremity, before ever they could brought to bow under the Romane Yoke. This magnanimous State of Freedom, was the cauſe alſo why Charthage was enabled ſo long, not only to oppoſe, but often to hazard the Romane Fortune, and uſurp the Laurel. It brought Hannibal within view, and the Gauls within the Walls of the City, to a beſieging of the Capitol; to ſhew, that their Freedom had given them the courage to rob her of her Maiden-head, who afterwards became Miſtriſs of the whole World. But what ſerves all this for, but onely to ſhew, That as nothing but a State of Freedom could have enabled thoſe Nations with a Courage ſufficient ſo long to withſtand the Romane Power: ſo Rome her ſelf alſo was beholden to this State of Freedom, for thoſe Sons of Courage which brought the Necks of her Siſter-States and Nations under her Girdle? And it is obſervable alſo in after-times, when Tyranny took place againſt Liberty, the Romans ſoon loſt their ancient Courage and Magnanimity; firſt under uſurping Dictators, then58 under Emperors, and in the end, the Empire it ſelf.
Now, as on the one ſide, we feel a loſs of Courage and Magnanimity, follow the loſs of Freedom: ſo, on the other ſide, the People ever grow magnanimous and couragious upon a Recovery; witneſs at preſent, the valiant Swiſſes, the Hollanders, and not long ſince, our own Nation, when declared a Free-State, and a Re-eſtabliſhment of our Freedom in the hands of the People procured, (though not ſecured) what noble Deſigns were undertaken and proſecuted with ſucceſs? The Conſideration whereof, muſt needs make highly for the Honour of all Governours in Free-States, who have been, or ſhall be inſtrumental in redeeming and ſetting any People in a fulneſs of Freedom, that is, in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies.
The eleventh Reaſon is, becauſe in this Form no Determinations being carried, but by conſent of the People; therefore they muſt needs remain ſecure out of the reach of Tyranny, and59 free from the Arbitrary Diſpoſition of any commanding Power. In this Caſe, as the People know what Laws they are to obey, and what Penalties they are to undergo, in caſe of Tranſgreſſion; ſo having their ſhare and intereſt in the making of Laws, with the Penalties annexed, they become the more inexcuſable if they offend, and the more willingly ſubmit unto puniſhment when they ſuffer for any offence. Now the caſe is uſually far otherwiſe, under all ſtanding Powers: for, when Government is managed in the hands of a particular Perſon, or continued in the hands of a certain number of Great Men, the People then have no Laws but what Kings and Great Men pleaſe to give: Not do they know how to walk by thoſe Laws, or how to underſtand them, becauſe the ſenſe is oftentimes left at uncertainty; and it is reckoned a great Myſtery of State in thoſe Forms of Government, That no Laws ſhall be of any ſenſe or ſorce, but as the Great Ones pleaſe to expound them: ſo as by this means, the People many times are left as it were without60 Law, becauſe they bear no other conſtruction and meaning, but what ſutes with particular mens Intereſts and Phant'ſies; not with Right Reaſon, or the Publike Liberty.
For the proof of this under Kingly Government, we might run all the world over; but our own Nation affords Inſtances enough in the Practices of all our Kings: yet this Evil never came to ſuch a height, as it did in the Raign of Henry the ſeventh, who by uſurping a Prerogative of expounding the Laws after his own pleaſure, made them rather Snares, than Inſtruments of Relief, (like a grand Catch-pole) to pill, poll, and geld the Purſes of the People; as his Son Harry did after him, to deprive many Gallant Men both of their Lives and Fortunes. For, the Judges being reputed the Oracles of the Law, and the power of creating Judges being uſurp'd by Kings, they had a care ever to create ſuch, as would make the Laws ſpeak in Favour of them, upon any occaſion. The Truth whereof hath abundantly appeared in the dayes of the late King, and his Father James, whoſe61 uſual Language was this: As long as I have power of making what Judges and Biſhops I pleaſe, I am ſure to have no Law nor Goſpel but what ſhall pleaſe me.
This very providing for this Inconvenience, was the great Commendation of Lycurgus his Inſtitution in Sparta; who, though he cut out the Lacedemonian Commonwealth after the Grandee faſhion, confirming the Supremacy within the Walls of the Senate, (for their King was but a Cypher) yet he ſo ordered the matter, that he took away the Grandeur; that as their King was of little more value than any one of the Senators; ſo the Senate was reſtrained by Laws, walking in the ſame even pace of ſubjection with the People; having very few Offices of Dignity or Profit allowed, which might make them ſwell with State and Ambition; but were preſcribed alſo the ſame Rules of Frugality, Plainneſs, and Moderation, as were the Common People: by which means immoderate luſts and deſires being prevented in the Great Ones, they were the leſs inclined to Pride and Oppreſſion; and no great profit or pleaſure62 being to be gotten by Authority, very few deſired it; and ſuch as were in it, ſate free from Envie, by which means they avoided that odium and emulation which uſes to rage betwixt the Great Ones and the People in that Form of Government.
But now the caſe is far otherwiſe in the Commonwealth of Venice, where the People being excluded from all intereſt in Government, the power of making and executing of Laws, and bearing of Offices, with all other Immunities, lies onely in the hands of a ſtanding Senate, and their Kindred, which they call the Patrocian, or Noble Order. Their Duke, or Prince, is indeed reſtrained, and made juſt ſuch another Officer as were the Lacedemonian Kings; differing from the reſt of the Senate, onely in a Corner of his Cap, beſides a little outward Ceremony and Splendor: but the Senators themſelves have Liberty at random, Arbitrarily to ramble, and do what they pleaſe with the people: who excepting the City it ſelf, are ſo extreamly oppreſs'd in all their Territories, living by no63 Law, but the Arbitrary Dictates of the Senate, that it ſeems rather a Junta, than a Commonwealth; and the Subjects take ſo little content in it, that ſeeing more to be enjoyed under the Turk, they that are his Borderers take all opportunities to revolt, and ſubmit rather to the mercy of a Pagan-Tyranny. Which diſpoſition if you conſider, together with the little Courage in their Subjects, by reaſon they preſs them ſo hard; and how that they are forced, for this cauſe, to relie upon Forrain Mercenaries in all warlike Expeditions, you might wonder how this State hath held up ſo long; but that we know the Intereſt of Chriſtendom, being concerned in her Security, ſhe hath been chiefly ſupported by the Supplies and Arms of others.
Therefore our Concluſion ſhall be this, That ſince Kings, and all ſtanding Powers, are ſo inclinable to act according to their own Wills and in Intereſts, in making, expounding, and executing of Laws to the prejudice of the Peoples Liberty and Security: and ſeeing the onely way to prevent Arbitrariness64 is, That no Laws or Dominations whatſoever ſhould be made, but by the Peoples Conſent and Election: therefore it muſt of neceſſity be granted, that the People are the beſt Keepers of their own Liberties, being ſetled in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies.
A twelfth Reaſon is, becauſe this Form is moſt ſutable to the Nature and Reaſon of Mankinde: for, as Cicero ſaith, Man is a noble Creature, born with Affections to rule, rather than obey; there being in every man a natural appetite or deſire of Principality. And therefore the Reaſon why one man is content to ſubmit to the Government of another, is, not becauſe he conceives himſelf to have leſs right than another to govern; but either becauſe he findes himſelf leſs able, or elſe becauſe he judgeth it will be more convenient for himſelf, and that community whereof he is a Member, if he ſubmits unto another's Government. Nemini purere vult animús a naturâ bene informatus, niſi, &c. ſaith the ſame Cicero: that is to ſay, in honeſt Engliſh, A minde well inſtructed65 by the light of Nature, will pay obedience unto none, but ſuch as command, direct, or govern, for its good and benefit. From both which paſſages and expreſſions of that Oracle of Humane wiſdom, theſe three inferences do naturally ariſe: Firſt, that by the light of Nature people are taught to be their own Carvers and Contrivers, in the framing of that Government under which they mean to live. Secondly, that none are to preſide in Government, or ſit at the Helm, but ſuch as ſhall be judged fit, and choſen by the People. Thirdly, that the People are the onely proper Judges of the convenience or inconvenience of a Government when it is erected, and of the behaviour of Governours after they are choſen: which three Deductions appear to be no more, but an Explanation of this moſt excellent Maxime, That the Original and Fountain of all juſt Power and Government is in the People.
This being ſo, that a Free-State-Government by the People, that is, by their ſucceſſive Repreſentatives, or ſupreme Aſſemblies, duely choſen, is moſt natural66 and onely ſutable to the Reaſon of mankinde: then it follows, that the other forms, whether it be of a ſtanding Power in the Hands of a particular perſon, as a King; or of a ſet number of Great Ones, as in a Senate, are beſides the Dictates of Nature, being meer artificial devices of Great Men, ſquared out onely to ſerve the Ends and Intereſts of Avarice, Pride and Ambition of a few, to a vaſſalizing of the Community. The Truth whereof appears ſo much the more, if we conſider, That a Conſent and free Election of the People, which is the moſt natural Way and Form of governing, hath no real effect in the other Forms; but is either ſupplanted by Craft and Cuſtome, or ſwallowed up by a pernicious pretence of Right (in one or many) to govern, onely by vertue of an Hereditary ſucceſſion. Now certainly, were there no other Argument to prove the excellency of Government by the People, &c. beyond the other Forms; yet this one might ſuffice, That in the Peoples Form, men have Liberty to make uſe of that Reaſon and Underſtanding God hath given67 them, in chuſing of Governours, and providing for their own ſafety in Government: but in the other Forms of a ſtanding Power, all Authority being entailed to certain Perſons and Families, in a courſe of inheritance, men are alwayes deprived of the uſe of their Reaſon about choice of Governours, and forced to receive them blindely, and at all adventure: which courſe being ſo deſtructive to the Reaſon, common Intereſt, and Majeſty of that Noble Creature, called Man, that he ſhould not in a matter of ſo high conſequence as Government, (wherein the good and ſafety of all is concerned) have a Freedom of Choice and Judgement, muſt needs be the moſt irrational and brutiſh Principle in the World, and fit onely to be hiſſed out of the World, together with all Forms of ſtanding Power (whether in Kings, or others) which have ſerved for no other end, but transform Men into Beaſts, and mortified mankinde with miſery through all Generations.
The Truth of this is evident all the World over; firſt, by ſad Examples of68 Monarchy: for, the Kingly form having been retained in a courſe of Inheritance, men being forced to take what comes next for a Governour, whether it be Male or Female, a wiſe Man or a Fool, Good or Bad; ſo that the major part of Hereditary Princes, have been Tyrannous and Wicked by Nature, or made ſo by Education and Opportunity: the People have been for the moſt part banded to and fro, with their Lives and Fortunes, at the Will and Pleaſure of ſome one ſingle unworthy Fellow, who uſually aſſumes the greater confidence in his unrighteous dealing, becauſe he knows the People are tied in that Form to him and his, though he practice all the Injuſtice in the World. This was it that brought on Tyranny in Rome, firſt under their Kings, afterwards under Emperors: for it is to be obſerved out of the Story, that all thoſe Emperors which ruled by right of Inheritance, proved moſt of them no better than ſavage Beaſts, and all of them Wicked except Titus. 'Tis true indeed, That a Nation may have ſome reſpite and recruit now and then, by the Vertue69 and Valour of a ſingle Prince; yet this is very rare; and when it doth happen, it uſually laſts no longer than for his Life, becauſe his Son or Succeſſor (for the moſt part) proves more weak or vitious, than himſelf was Virtuous, as you may ſee in the ſeveral Liſts of Kings throughout Great Britain, France, Spain, and all the World. But this is not all the Inconvenience, that Hereditary Princes have been and are for the moſt part Wicked in their own Perſons: for, as great Inconveniences happen by their being litigious in their Titles; witneſs the bloody diſputes between the Princes of the Blood in France, as alſo in England, between the two Houſes of Yorke and Lancaſter; to which many more might be reckoned out of all other Kingdoms; which miſeries, the people might have avoided, had they not been tied to one particular Line of Succeſſion. Therefore if any Kingly Form be tolerable, it muſt be that which is by Election, choſen by the Peoples Repreſentatives, and made an Officer of Truſt by them, to whom they are to be accountable. And70 herein, as Kings are onely tolerable upon this account, as Elective; ſo theſe Elective Kings are as intolerable upon another account, becauſe their preſent Greatneſs gives them opportunity ever to practiſe ſuch flights, that in a ſhort time, the Government that they received onely for their own Lives, will become entailed upon their Families, whereby the Peoples Election will be made of no effect further, than for Faſhion, to mock the poor People, and adorn the Triumphs of an aſpiring Tyranny; as it hath been ſeen in the Elective Kingdoms of Bohemia, Poland, Hungaria, and Sweden; where the Forms of Election were, and are ſtill retained; but the Power ſwallowed up, and the Kingdoms made Hereditary; not onely in Sweden, by the Artifice of Gustavus Ericus; but alſo in Poland, and the Empire, where the peoples right of election was ſoon eaten out by the cunning of the two Families of Caſimira and Austria.
Let this ſerve to manifeſt, that a Government by a free Election and Conſent of the People, ſetled in a due and71 orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies, is more conſonant to the light of Nature and Reaſon, and conſequently much more excellent than any Hereditary ſtanding Power whatſoever. To take off all mis-conſtructions; when we mention the People, obſerve all along, that we do not mean the confuſed promiſcuous Body of the People, nor any part of the people who have forfeited their Rights by Delinquency, Neutrality, or Apoſtacy, &c. in relation to the divided ſtate of any Nation; for they are not to be reckon'd within the Liſts of the People.
The thirteenth Reaſon, to prove the excellency of a Free-State above any other Form, is, becauſe in Free-States there are fewer opportunities of Oppreſſion and Tyranny, than in the other Forms. And this appears, in that it is ever the care of Free-Commonwealths, for the moſt part, to preſerve, not an Equality, (which were irrational and odious) but an Equability of Condition among all the Members; ſo that no particular Man or Men ſhall be permitted to grow over-great in Power; nor any Rank of Men be allowed72 above the ordinary Standard, to aſſume unto themſelves the State and Title of Nobility.
The Obſervation of the former, ſetures the Peoples Liberty from the reach of their own Officers, ſuch as being entruſted with the Affairs of high Truſt and Imployment, either in Campe and Council, might perhaps take occaſion thereby to aſpire beyond Reaſon, if not reſtrained and prevented.
The Obſervation of the later, ſecures the People from the preſſures and Ambition of ſuch perty Tyrants, as would uſurp and claim a Prerogative, Power, and Greatneſs above others, by Birth and Inheritance. Theſe are a ſort of Men not to be endured in any well-ordered Commonwealth; for they alwayes bear a Natural and Implacable Hate towards the People, making it their Intereſt to deprive them of their Liberty; ſo that if at any time it happen, that any great Man or Men whatſoever, arrive to ſo much Power and Confidence, as to think of uſurping, or to be in a Condition73 to be tempted thereunto; theſe are the firſt that will ſet them on, mingle Intereſts with them, and become the prime Inſtruments in heaving them up into the Seat of Tyranny.
For the clearing of theſe Truths; and firſt, to manifeſt the Inconvenience of permitting any perſons to be overgreat in any State; and that Free-States that have not avoided it, have ſoon loſt their Liberty, we ſhall produce a File of Examples. In Greece we finde, that the Free-State of Athens loſt its Liberty upon that account once, when they ſuffered certain of the Senators to over-top the reſt in power; which occaſioned that multiplied Tyranny, made famous by the name of the thirty Tyrants: at another time, when by the ſame Error they were conſtrained, through the power of Pistr•tus, to ſtoop unto his ſingle Tyranny.
Upon this ſcore alſo, the people of Syracuſa had the ſame misfortune under the Tyrant Hiero, as had they of Sicily under Dyonlſius and Agathocles.
74In Rome alſo the caſe is the ſame too: for during the time that Liberty was included within the Senate, they gave both Malius & Manlius an opportunity to aſpire, by permitting them a growth of too much Greatneſs: but by good fortune eſcaping their clutches, they afterwards fell as fooliſhly into the hands of ten of their Fellow-Senators, called the Decemviri, in giving them ſo much power as tempted them unto Tyranny. Afterwards, when the people ſcuffled, and made a ſhift to recover their Liberty out of the hands of the Senate, they committed the ſame Error too, by permitting of their Servants to grow overgreat; ſuch as Sylla, who by power tyrannized and made himſelf Dictator for five yeers, as Caeſar afterwards ſecled the Dictatorſhip upon himſelf for ever: and after Caeſar's death, they might have recovered their Liberty again, if they had taken care (as they might eaſily have done) to prevent the growing Greatneſs of Auguſtus, who gaining power firſt, by the courteſie & good will of the Senate and People, made uſe of it to eſtabliſh himſelf in a Tyranny, which75 could never after be extinguiſhed, but in the ruine of the Roman Empire it ſelf.
Thus alſo the Free-State of Florence fooliſhly ruined it ſelf by the greatning of Coſmus; firſt, permitting him to ingroſs the Power, which gave him opportunity to be a tyrant; & then as fooliſhly forcing him to declare himſelf a Tyrant, by an unſeaſonable demand of the power back out of his hands. Many more inſtances might be fetch'd out of Milan, Switzerland, and other places: but we have one neerer home, and of a later date, in Holland; whereby, permitting the Family of Orange to greaten a little more than beſeemed a Member of a Free-State, they were inſenſibly reduced to the laſt caſt, to run the hazzard of the loſs of their Liberty.
Therefore one prime Principle of State, is, To keep any man, though he have deſerved never ſo well by good ſucceſs or ſervice, from being too great or popular: it is a notable means (and ſo eſteemed by all Free-States) to keep and preſerve a Commonwealth from the Rapes of Uſurpation.
A fourteenth Reaſon, (and though76 the laſt, yet not the leaſt) to prove a Free-State or Government by the People, ſetled in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies, is much more excellent than any other Form, is, becauſe in this Form, all Powers are accountable for miſdemeanors in Government, in regard of the nimble Returns and Periods of the Peoples Election: by which means, he that ere-while was a Governour, being reduced to the condition of a Subject, lies open to the force of the Laws, and may with eaſe be brought to puniſhment for his offence; ſo that after the obſervation of ſuch a courſe, others which ſucceed, will become the leſs daring to offend, or to abuſe their Truſt in Authority, to an oppreſſion of the People. Such a courſe as this, cuts the very throat of all Tyranny; and doth not onely root it up when at full growth, but cruſheth the Cockatrice in the Egg, deſtroys it in the Seed, in the principal, and in the very poſſiblities of its being for ever after. And as the ſafety of the People, is the Soveraign and Supreme Law; ſo an eſtabliſhment77 of this Nature, is an impregnable Bulwark of the Peoples ſafety, becauſe without it, no certain Benefit can be obtained by the ordinary Laws; which if they ſhould be diſpenſed by uncontrolable, unaccountable Perſons in Power, ſhall never be interpreted, but in their own ſenſe; nor executed, but after their own Wills and Pleaſure.
Now, this is moſt certain, That as in the Government of the People, the ſucceſſive Revolution of Authority by their conſent, hath ever been the onely Bank againſt Inundations of Arbitrary Power and Tyranny; ſo on the other ſide, it is as ſure, That all ſtanding Powers have and ever do aſſume unto themſelves an Arbitrary Exerciſe of their own dictates at pleaſure, and make it their onely Intereſt to ſettle themſelves in an unaccountable ſtate of Dominion: ſo that, though they commit all the injuſtice in the World, their cuſtome hath been ſtill to perſwade men, partly by ſtrong pretence of Argument, and partly by force, that they may do what they liſt, and that78 they are not bound to give an account of their Actions to any, but to God himſelf. This Doctrine of Tyranny hath taken the deeper Root in mens mindes, becauſe the greateſt part was ever inclined to adore the Golden Idol of Tyranny in every Form: by which means the rabble of mankinde being prejudicated in this particular, and having plac'd their corrupt humour or intereſt in baſe fawning, and the favour of preſent Great Ones; Therefore if any reſolute Spirit happen to broach and maintain true Principles of Freedom, or do at any time ariſe to ſo much courage, as to perform a noble Act of Juſtice, in calling Tyrants to an account, preſently he draws all the enmity and fury of the World about him. But in Commonwealths it is and ought to be otherwiſe; for, in the Monuments of the Grecian and Romane Freedom, we finde, thoſe Nations were wont to heap all the Honours they could invent, by publick Rewards, Conſecration of Statues, and Crowns of Laurel, upon ſuch worthy Patriots: and as if on earth all were too little, they inroll'd them79 in heaven among the Deities. And all this they did out of a Noble ſenſe of Commonweal-intereſt; knowing that the life of Liberty conſiſts in a ſtrict hand, and zeal againſt Tyrants and Tyranny, and by keeping perſons in power from all the occaſions of it: which cannot be better done, than (according to the cuſtom of all States that are really free) by leaving them liable to account: which happineſs was never ſeen yet under the ſun, by any Law or Cuſtom eſtabliſhed, ſave onely in thoſe States, where all men are brought to taſte of Subjection as well as Rule, and the Government ſetled by a due ſucceſſion of Authority, by conſent of the People.
In Switzerland the people are free indeed, becauſe all Officers and Governours in the Cantons, are queſtionable by the People in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies.
The Inference from the fore-going particulars, is eaſie, That ſince Freedom is to be preſerved no other way in a Commonwealth, but by keeping Officers and Governours in an accountable ſtate; and ſince it appears no ſtanding80 Powers can never be called to an account without much difficulty, or involving a Nation in Blood or Miſery. And ſince a revolution of Government in the Peoples hands, hath ever been the onely means to make Governours accountable, and prevent the inconveniences of Tyranny, Diſtraction, and Miſery; therefore for this, and thoſe other reaſons fore-going, we may conclude, That a Free-State, or Government by the People, ſetled in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies, is far more excellent every way, than any other Form whatſoever.
ALL OBJECTIONS Againſt the Government of the People, ANSWERED.
COnſidering, That in times paſt, the People of this Nation were bred up and inſtructed in the brutiſh Principles of Monarchy, by which means they have been the more averſe from entertaining Notions of a more noble Form: and remembring, that not long ſince we were put into a better courſe, upon the declared Intereſt of a Free-State, or Commonwealth; I conceived nothing could more highly tend to the propagation of that good Intereſt, and the Honour82 of its Founders, than to manifeſt the Inconveniences and ill Conſequences of the other Forms; and ſo to root up their Principles, that the good People, who but the other day were inveſted in the poſſeſſion of a more excellent way, may (in order to their re-eſtabliſhment) underſtand what Commonwealth-Principles are, and thereby become the more reſolute to defend them againſt the common Enemy; learn to be true Commonwealths men, and zealous againſt Monarchick-Intereſt, in all its appearances and incroachments whatſoever. To this end we have ▪ ſet down our Poſition ▪ That a Free-State, or Government by the People, ſetled in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies, is the moſt excellent Form of Government; which (I humbly conceive) hath been ſufficiently proved, both by Reaſon and Example: but becauſe many pretences of Objection are in being, and ſuch as by many are taken for granted; therefore it falls in of courſe, that we may refute them: which being done with the ſame evidence of Reaſon and83 Example, I doubt not but it will ſtop all the Mouths, not onely of Ignorance, but even of ▪ Malice and Flattery, which have preſumed to prophane that pure way of a Free-State, or Government by the People.
That Objection of Royaliſts, and others, which we ſhall firſt take notice of, is this, That the erecting of ſuch a Government would be to ſet on Levelling an•Confuſion.
For anſwer, If we take Levelling in the common uſage and application of the term in theſe days, it is of an odions ſignification, as if it levell'd all men in point of Eſtates, made all things common to all, deſtroyed propriety, introduced a community of enjoyments among men; which is a Scandal faſtned by the cunning of the common Enemy upon this kinde of Government, which they hate above all others; becauſe, were the People once put in poſſeſſion of their Liberty, and made ſenſible of the great Benefits they may reap by its injoyment, the hopes of all the Royal Stickler would be utterly extinct, in regard it would be the likelieſt means84 to prevent a return of the Intereſt of Monarchy: for no Perſon or Parties ſeeking or ſetting up a private Intereſt of their own, diſtinct from the Publick, it will ſtop the Mouths of all Gain-ſayers. But the Truth is, This way of Free-State, or Government by the People in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, is ſo far from introducing a community, that it is the onely preſervative of Propriety in every particular: the Reaſons whereof are plain: for, as on the one ſide, it is not in Reaſon to be imagined, that ſo choice a Body, as the Repreſentative of a Nation, ſhould agree to deſtroy one another in their ſeveral Rights and Intereſts: on the other ſide, all Determinations being carried in this Form by common Conſent, every Man's particular Intereſt muſt needs be fairly provided for, againſt the Arbitrary diſpoſition of others; therefore, whatever is contrary to this, is levelling indeed; becauſe it placeth every Man's Right under the Will of another, and is no leſs than Tyranny; which ſeating it ſelf in an unlimited uncontrollable Prerogative over others without their85 Conſent, becomes the very bane of propriety; and however diſquieted, or in what Form ſoever it appears, is indeed the very Intereſt of Monarchy.
Now that a Free-State, or ſucceſſive Government of the People, &c. is the onely preſervative of Propriety, appears by Inſtances all the World over; yet we ſhall cite but a few.
Under Monarchs, we ſhall finde ever, That the Subjects had nothing that they could call their own; neither Lives, nor Fortunes, nor Wives, nor any thing elſe that the Monarch pleaſed to command, becauſe the poor people knew no remedy againſt the levelling Will of an unbounded Soveraignity; as may be ſeen in the Records of all Nations that have ſtoop'd under that wretched Form: whereof we have alſo very ſad Examples in France, and other Kingdoms, at this very day, where the People have nothing of Propriety; but all depends upon the Royal Pleaſure, as it did of late•ere in England. Moreover, it is very obſervable, That in Kingdoms where the People have enjoyed any thing of Liberty and Propriety, they have been86 ſuch Kingdoms onely, where the frame of Government hath been ſo well tempered, as that the beſt ſhare of it hath been retained in the Peoples Hands; and by how much the greater influence the People have had therein, ſo much the more ſure and certain they have been, in the enjoyment of their Propriety.
To paſs by many other Inſtances, conſider how firm the Aragonians were in their Liberties and Properties, ſo long as they held their hold over their Kings in their ſupreme Aſſemblies; and no ſooner had Philip the ſecond deprived them of their ſhare in the Government, but themſelves and their properties became a prey (and have been ever ſince) to the Will and Pleaſure of their Kings.
The like alſo may be ſaid of Erance, where, as long as the Peoples Intereſt bore ſway in their ſupreme Aſſemblies, they could call their Lives and Fortunes their own, and no longer: for, all that have ſucceeded ſince Lewis the eleventh, followed his levelling pattern ſo far, that in ſhort time they deſtroyed the Peoples Property, and became the87 greateſt Levellers in Chriſtendom. We were almoſt at the ſame paſs here in England: for, as long as the Peoples Intereſt was preſerved by frequent and ſucceſſive Parliaments; ſo long we were in ſome meaſure ſecure of our Properties: but as Kings began to worm the People out of their ſhare in Government, by diſcontinuing of Parliaments; So they carried on their levelling deſign, to the deſtroying of our Properties; and had by this means brought it ſo high, that the Oracles of the Law and Goſpel ſpake it out with a good levelling Grace, That all was the King's and that we had nothing we might call our own.
Thus you ſee how much Levelling, and little of Propriety, the people h••e had certain under Monarchs; and if any at all, by what means, and upon what terms they have had it. Nor hath it been thus onely under Kings; but we finde, the People have ever had as little of Property ſecure, under all other Forms of ſtanding Powers; which have produced as errant Levellers in this particular, as any of the Monarchies. In the88 Free-State of Athens, as long as the People kept free indeed, in an enjoyment of their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, ſo long they were ſecure in their Properties, and no longer. For, to ſay nothing of their Kings, whoſe Hiſtory is very obſcure, we finde, after they were laid ſide, they erected another Form of ſtanding Power, in a ſingle Perſon, called, a Governour, for Life; who was alſo accountable for miſdemeanours: but yet a Tryal being made of nine of them, the People ſaw ſo little ſecurity by them, that they pitch'd upon another ſtanding Form of Decimal Government; and being oppreſs'd by them too, they were caſhier'd. The like miſeries they taſted under the ſtanding power of Thirty, which were a ſort of Levellers more rank than all the reſt; who put to death, baniſh•d, pill'd, and poll'd whom they pleaſed, without Cauſe or Exception; ſo that the poor people having been tormented under all the Forms of ſtanding Power, were in the end forced (as their laſt remedy) to take Sanctuary under the Form of a89 Free - State, in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies.
And though it may be objected, That afterwards they fell into many diviſions and miſeries, even in that Form: yet whoever obſerves the Story, ſhall finde, it was not the fault of the Government, but of themſelves, in ſwerving from the Rules of a Free-State, by permitting the continuance of Power in particular hands; who having an opportunity thereby to create Parties of their own among the People, did for their own ends, inveigle, ingage, and intangle them in popular Tumults and Diviſions. This was the true Reaſon of their Miſcarriages. And if ever any Government of the People did miſcarry, it was upon that account.
Thus alſo the Lacedemonians, after they had for ſome yeers tryed the Government of one King, then of two Kings at once of two diſtinct Families; afterwards came in the Ephori, as Superviſers of their Kings: after (I ſay) they had tryed themſelves through all the Forms of a ſtanding Power, and found them all to be Levellers of the Peoples90 Intereſt and Property, then neceſſity taught them to ſeek ſhelter in a Free-State, under which they lived happily, till by a forementioned Error of the Athenians, they were drawn into Parties by powerful Perſons, and ſo made the Inſtruments of Diviſion among themſelves, for the bringing of new Levellers into play; ſuch as were Manchanidas and Nabis, who ſucceeded each other in a Tyranny.
In old Rome, after the ſtanding Form of Kings was extinct, and a new one eſtabliſhed, the people found as little of ſafety and property as ever: for, the ſtanding Senate, and the Decemviri, proved as great Levellers, as Kings: ſo that they were forced to ſettle the Government of the People by a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies. Then they began again to recover their propertie, in having ſomewhat they might call their own; and they happily enjoyed it, till, as by the ſame Error of the Lacedemonians and Athenians, ſwerving from the Rules of a Free-State, lengthning of power in particular hands, they were drawn and divided91 into Parties, to ſerve the luſts of ſuch powerful men as by craft became their Leaders: ſo that by this means (through their own default) they were deprived of their Liberty long before the dayes of Imperial Tytanny. Thus Cinna, Sylla, Marins, and the reſt of that ſucceeding Gang, down to Caeſar, uſed the Peoples favour, to obtain a continuation of power in their own hands; and then having ſadled the people with a new ſtanding Form of their own, they immediately rooted up the Peoples Liberty and Property, by Arbitrary Sentences of death, Proſcriptions, Fines, and Confiſcations: which ſtrain of levelling, (more intolerable than the former) was maintained by the ſame Arts of Devilliſh Policy down to Caeſar; who ſtriking in a Favourite of the People, and making uſe of their Affections to lengthen power in his own hands: at length, by this Errour of the people, gained opportunity to introduce a new levelling Form of ſtanding power in himſelf, to an utter and irrecoverable ruine of the Romane Liberty and property.
92In Florence they have been in the ſame caſe there, under every Form of ſtanding power. It was ſo, when the Great Ones ruled: it was ſo under Goderino, it was ſo under Savanarola the Monk. When they once began to lengthen power by the peoples Favour, they preſently fell to levelling and domineering, as did Coſmus afterwards, that crafty Founder of the preſent Dukedom.
Upon the ſame terms, the Republick of Piſa loſt themſelves, and became the prey of ſeveral Uſurpations.
Mantua was once a Free-City of the Empire; but neglecting their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, and permitting the Great Ones, and moſt Wealthy, to form a ſtanding power in themſelves: the people were ſo vexed with them, that one Pafferimo getting power in his own hands, and then lengthening it by Artifice, turn'd Leveller too, ſubjecting all to his own will; ſo that the poor people, to rid their hands of him, were forced to pitch upon another, as bad, and tranſlate their power into a petty Dukedom, in the hands of the Family of Gonzaga.
93We may from hence ſafely conclude againſt all objecting Monarchs and Royaliſts, of what name and Title ſoever, that a Free-State or Commonwealth by the people in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies is ſo far from levelling or deſtroying propertie, that in all ages it hath been the onely preſervative of Liberty and property, and the onely remedy againſt the Levellings and Uſurpations of ſtanding powers: for, it is cleer, That Kings and all ſtanding powers are the Levellers.
A ſecond Objection in the Mouths of many, is this, That the erecting of ſuch a Form in the Peoples hands, were the ready way to cauſe confuſion in Government; when all perſons (without diſtinction) are allowed a right to chuſe and be choſen members of the ſupreme Aſſemblies.
For anſwer to this, know, we muſt conſider a Commonwealth in a twofold condition: either in its ſetled ſtate, when fully ſtabliſhed and founded, and when all men were ſuppoſed Friends to its eſtabliſhment; or elſe when it is newly founding or founded, and that in the cloſe of a civil War, upon the ruine of94 a former Government, and thoſe that ſtood for it; in which caſe it even hath a great party within it ſelf, that are enemies to its eſtabliſhment.
As to the firſt, to wit, a Commonwealth in its ſetled and compoſed ſtate, when all men within it are preſumed to be its Friends, queſtionleſs, a right to chuſe and to be choſen, is then to be allowed the people, (without diſtinction) in as great a latitude, as may ſtand with right Reaſon and Convenience, for managing a matter of ſo high Conſequence as their Supreme Aſſemblies; wherein ſomewhat muſt be left to humane Prudence; and therefore that latitude being to be admitted more or leſs, according to the Nature, Circumſtance, and Neceſſities of any Nation, is not here to be determined.
But as to a Commonwealth under the ſecond conſideration, when it is founding, or newly founded, in the cloſe of a Civil War, upon the mine of a former Government; In this caſe, (I ſay) to make no diſtinction betwixt men; but to allow the conquered part of the people an equal right to chuſe and to95 be choſen, &c. were not onely to take away all proportion in policy, but the ready way to deſtroy the Commonwealth, and by a promiſcuous mixture of oppoſite Intereſts, to turn all into confuſion.
Now, that the Enemies of Liberty, being ſubdued upon the cloſe of a Civil War, are not to be allowed ſharers in the Rights of the people, is evident, for divers Reaſons: not onely becauſe ſuch an allowance would be a means to give them opportunity to ſow the ſeeds of new Broyls and Diviſions, and bring a new hazard upon the Liberties of the People, (which are Reaſons derived from Convenience: but there is a more ſpecial Argument from the equity of the thing, according to the Law and Cuſtom of Nations, That ſuch as have commenced War, to ſerve the Luſts of Tyrants againſt the Peoples Intereſt, ſhould not be received any longer a part of the people, but may be handled as ſlaves when ſubdued, if their Subduers pleaſe ſo to uſe them; becauſe by their Treaſons againſt the Majeſty of the people, (which they ought to have96 maintained) they have made forfeiture of all their Rights and Priviledges, as Members of the People; and therefore if it happens in this caſe at any time, That any Immunities, Properties or Enjoyments be indulged unto them, they muſt not take them as their own by Right, but as Boons beſtowed upon them by the peoples courteſie.
The old Commonwealth of Greece was very ſevere in this particular: for, as they were wont to heap up all Honours they could vent, upon ſuch as did or ſuffered any thing for the maintenance of their Liberty; ſo, on the other ſide, they puniſhed the Underminers of it, or thoſe that any wayes appeared againſt it, with utmoſt extremity; perſecuting them with For Feitures, both of Life and Fortune; and if they eſcaped with Life, they uſually became ſlaves: and many times they perſecuted them, being dead, branding their Memories with an Eternal Mark of Infamy.
In old Rome they dealt more mildly with the greateſt part of thoſe that had ſided with the Tarquins after their Expulſion: but yet they were not reſtored97 to all their former Priviledges. In proceſs of time, as oft as any conſpired againſt the Peoples Intereſt, in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies; after they had once gotten them, themſelves were baniſhed, and their Eſtates confiſcated, not excepting many of the Senators, as well as others; and made for ever incapable of any Truſt in the Commonwealth.
Afterwards, they took the ſame courſe with as many of Catiline's Fellow-Traytors and Conſpirators, as were worthy any thing; and had no doubt ſufficiently paid Caeſar's Abettors in the ſame Coin, but that he wore out all oppoſites with his proſperous Treaſon. Thus Millain, and the reſt of thoſe States, when they were free, as alſo the Swiſſes and Hollanders, in the Infancy of the Helvetian and Belgick Freedoms, who took the ſame courſe with all thoſe uunatural Paricides and Apoſtates, that offered firſt to ſtrangle their Liberty in the Birth, or afterwards in the Cradle, by ſecret Conſpiracy, or open violence. Nor ought this to ſeem ſtrange, ſince if a right of Conqueſt may be uſed over a Forain, who onely is to be accounted98 a fair enemy: much more againſt ſuch, as againſt the light of Nature, ſhall engage themſelves in ſo foul practices, as tend to ruine the Liberty of their Native Country.
Seeing therefore that the people in their Government, upon all occaſions of Civil War againſt their Liberties, have been moſt zealous in vindicating thoſe Attempts upon the heads of the Conſpirators: ſeeing alſo, that upon the cloſe of a Civil War, they have a Right; and not onely a Right, but uſually a very great Reſolution to keep out thoſe Enemies of Liberty, whom they conquer, from a participation of any Right in Government: therefore in this caſe alſo, as well as the former, we may conclude, That they in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, are ſo far from levelling the Intereſt of Government into all hands, without diſtinction, that their principal care is ever to preſerve it in their own, to prevent the return of new Wars, old Intereſts, and Confuſion.
But there is a third Objection againſt it, drawn from a pretending inconvenience of ſuch a ſucceſſion; alledging,99 That the management of State-Affairs requires Judgement and Experience; which is not to be expected from new Members comming into thoſe Aſſemblies upon every•lection.
Now, becauſe the very Life of Liberty lies in a ſucceſſion of Powers and Perſons; therefore it is meet I ſhould be ſomewhat preciſe & punctual by way of anſwer to this particular. Obſerve then, that in Government two things are to be conſidered: Act a Imperi, and Arcan a Imperii ▪ that is, Acts of State, and Secrets of State. By Acts of State, we mean the Laws and Ordinances of the Legiſlative Power: theſe are the things that have moſt influence upon a Commenwealth, to its ill or well-being; and are the onely Remedies for ſuch bad Cuſtomes, Inconveniences, and Incroachments as afflict and grieve it. Wherefor•, matters of grievance being matters of common ſenſe, and ſuch are obvious to the people, who beſt know where the ſhooe pinches them; certainly, there is no need of any great skill or judgement in paſſing or applying a Law for Remedy, which is the100 proper work of the people in their ſupreme Aſſemblies; and ſuch, as every ordinary ▪ Underſtanding is inſtructed in by the Light of Nature: ſo that, as to this, there can be no danger by inſtituting an orderly ſucceſſion of the people.
But as for thoſe things called Ar•ana Imperii, Secrets of State, or the executive part of Government, during the Intervals of their Supreme Aſſemblies; theſe things being of a Nature remote from ordinary apprehenſions, and ſuch as neceſſarily require prudence, time, and experience, to fit men for management: Mu•h in Reaſon may be ſaid, and muſt be granted, for the continuation of ſuch Truſts in the ſame hands, as relate to matter of Counſel, or Adminiſtration of•uſtice, more•r leſs, according to their good or ill-behaviour. A prudential continuation of theſe, may (wi•hout queſtion) and ought to be all•wed upon diſcretion; becauſe, if the•do amiſs, they are eaſily accountable to the peoples Aſſemblies. But now the caſe is otherwiſe, as to theſe Supreme Aſſemblies, where a few, eaſie,101 neceſſary things, ſuch as common ſenſe and reaſon inſtruct men in, are the fitteſt things for them to apply themſelves unto: and there the Peoples Truſtees are to continue, of right, no longer than meer Neceſſity requires, for their own redreſs and ſafety; which being provided for, they are to return into a condition of Subjection and Obedience, with the reſt of the people, to ſuch Laws and Government as themſelves have erected: by which means alone, they will be able to know whether they have done well or ill, when they feel the effects of what they have done. Otherwiſe, if any thing happen to be done amiſs, what way can there be for remedy? ſince no Appeal is to be had from the Supreme Body of the People, except a due courſe of Succeſſion be preſerved from hand to hand, by the Peoples choice; and other perſons thereupon admitted (upon the ſame terms) into the ſame Autho•ity.
This is the truth, as we have made manifeſt both by Reaſon and Example: therefore we ſhall adde a little to our former Diſcourſe, by way of Illuſtration.
102In Athens, when govern'd by the People, we finde, it was their courſe to uph•ld conſtant returns and periods of Succeſſion in their Supreme Aſſemblies, for remedy of Grievances; and they had a ſtanding Council, called the Areop•g••, to whom all their Secrets of State were committed, together with the adminiſtration of Government during the Intervals of thoſe Aſſemblies, at whoſe return they were accountable; and warily continued, or excluded, as the People found cauſe ▪
In Sparta they had the like; as alſo in Rome, after the People had once got their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, wherein they paſſed Laws for Government: and not knowing how to be rid of their hereditary Senate, they permitted them and their ſami•ies to continue a ſtanding Council; but yet controllable by, and accountable to their Aſſemblies, who ſecluded and baniſhed many of them for their miſdemeanours: ſo that by this means ▪ the people had an oportunity to make uſe of thei•Wiſdom, and curb their Ambi•ion.
In Florence (when free) the Government103 was after the ſame Mode.
In Holland alſo, and Switzerland, they have their Supreme Aſſemblies frequent by Election, with exceeding benefit, but no prejudice to Affairs: for the frequencie of thoſe ſucceſſive Meetings, preſerves their Liberty, and provides Laws; the Execution whereof is committed to others, and affairs of State to a Council of their own choice, accountable to themſelves: where their State-concernments very ſeldom miſcarry, becauſe they place and diſplace their Counſellors with extraordinary care and caution.
By theſe particulars, you may perceive the vanity of the aforeſaid Objection, and how ſlender a pretence it is againſt that excellent courſe of Succeſſive Aſſemblies; ſince affairs of State are as well diſpoſed (or rather better) under this Form, than any other.
A fourth Objection commonly uſed againſt the Conſtitution of a Free-State, or Government by the People in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, is this: That ſuch a Government brings great Damage to the104 Publike, by their frequent Diſcontents, Diviſions, and Tumults, that ariſe within it.
For anſwer to this, it is requiſite that we take notice of thoſe Occaſions which are the common cauſes of ſuch humours in this Form: which being once known, it will eaſily appear whence thoſe Inconveniences do ariſe, and not from any default in the nature of the Government: they are commonly theſe three.
Firſt, when any of their fellow-Citizens, or Members of the Commonweal, ſhall arrogate any thing of Power and Priviledge unto themſelves, or their Families, whereby to Grandize or greaten themſelves, beyond the ordinary ſize and ſtandard of the People. We finde thi•to be moſt true, by the courſe of affairs in the Romane State, as they are recorded by Livy; who plainly ſhews, that upon the expulſion of the Tarquins, though the Senate introduced a new Government, yet their retaining the power of the old within the hands of themſelves and their Families, was the occaſion of all thoſe after-Diſcontents105 and Tumults that aroſe among the People. For, had Brutus made them free, when he declared them ſo; or had the Senate a little after, followed the advice and example of Publicola, and ſome others as honeſt as he; all occaſion of Diſcontent had been taken away: but when the People ſaw the Senators ſeated in a lofty poſture over them; when they felt the weight of that State and Dignity preſſing upon ſhoulders that were promiſed to be at eaſe, and free; when they found themſelves exempted from the enjoyment of the ſame common Priviledges, excluded from all Offices, or Alliance with the Senators; their purſes emptied of Money, their bellies of Meat, and their hearts of Hope: then it was, that they began to grumble and mutiny; and never until they got a power to bridle the Great ones, by an happie ſucceſſion of their Supreme Aſſemblies.
A ſecond Occaſion of the peoples being inclined to Diſcontent and Tumult, under their Free Form of Government, appears in Story to be this: When they106 felt themſelves not fairly dealt withal, by ſuch as became their Leaders and Generals. Thus in Syracuſa, Dionyſius cloathing himſelf with a pretence of the peoples Liberties; and being by that means made their General, and then making uſe of that power to other ends than was pretended, became the Fire-Brand of that State, and put the people all into Flames, for the expulſion of him, who had made a Forfeiture of all his glorious pretences.
Thus in Sparta the people were peaceable enough under their own Government, till they found themſelves overreached, and their credulity abuſed by ſuch as they truſted, whoſe deſigns were laid in the dark, for the converting of Liberty into Tyranny, under Manchanidas and Nabis. In old Rome, under the peoples Government, it is true, it was a ſad ſight oftentimes to ſee the people ſwarming in tumults, their ſhops ſhut up, and all trading given over throughout the City, and ſomtimes the City forſaken and left empty.
But here, as alſo in Ath•ns, the Occaſion was the ſame: for, as the people107 naturally love Peace and Eaſe; ſo finding themſelves often out-witted and abuſed by the ſlights and fears of the Senate, they preſently (as it is their Nature upon ſuch Occaſions) grew out of all patience. The caſe was the ſame alſo, when any one of their Senators, or of themſelves, arrived to any height of power by inſinuating into the peoples favour, upon ſpecious and popular pretences, and then made a forfeiture of thoſe pretences, by taking a contrary courſe. Thus Sylla of the Senatorian order, and Marius of the Plebeian, both got power into their hands, upon pretence of the peoples good, (as many others did before and after, not onely in Rome, but in other Free-States alſo) but forfeiting their pretences by taking Arbitrary courſes, they were the ſole Cauſes of all thoſe Tumults and Slaughters among the Romanes, the infamy whereof hath moſt injuriouſly been caſt upon the peoples Government, by the profane pens of ſuch as have been bold in Penſion or Relation in the Courts of Princes.
Thus Caeſar alſo himſelf, ſtriking as a108 Favorite of the people upon fair pretences, and forfeiting them, when in power, was the onely cauſe of all thoſe ſucceeding Civil Broyles and Tragedies among the people.
A third Occaſion of the Peoples being inclined to Diſcontent and Tumult in a Free-State, is this, when they are ſenſible of Oppreſſion. For, I ſay again, The people are naturally of a peaceable temper, minding nothing, but a free Enjoyment: but if once they finde themſelves circumvented, miſled, or ſqueezed by ſuch as they have intruſted, then they ſwell like the Sea, and over-run the Bounds of Juſt and Honeſt, ruining all before them.
In a word, there is not one precedent of Tumults or Sedition can be cited out of all Stories, by the Enemies of Freedom, againſt the peoples Government; but it will appear likewiſe thereby, that the people were not in fault, but either drawn in, or provoked thereto, by the Craft or Injuſtice of ſuch fair Pretenders as have had byends of their own, and by-deſigns upon the publick Liberty.
109Nevertheleſs, admit that the people were tumultuous in their own Nature; yet thoſe Tumults (when they happen) are more eaſily to be borne, than theſe Inconveniences that ariſe from the Tyranny of Monarchs and Great Ones: for popular Tumults have theſe three Qualities:
Firſt, The Injury of them never extends further than ſome few Perſons; and thoſe (for the moſt part) guilty enough; as were the thirty Grandees in Athens, the Ten in Rome, and thoſe other State-Mountebanks, that ſuffered for their Practices by the Peoples Fury.
Secondly, Thoſe Tumults are not laſting, but (like fits) quickly over: for, an Eloquent Oration, or Perſwaſion, (as we ſee in the Example of Menenius Agrippa) or the Reputation of ſome grave or honeſt Man, (as in the Example of Virginus, and afterwards of Cato) doth very eaſily reduce and pacifie them.
Thirdly, The ending of thoſe Tumults, though they have ruined ſome particulars, yet it appears they have110 uſually turned to the good of the Publick: for we ſ••, that both in Athens and Rome, the Great Ones were by this means kept in awe from Injuſtice; the Spirits of the people were kept warm with high thoughts of themſelves and their Liberty (which turned much to the inlargement of their Empire.)
And laſtly, By this means they came off alwayes with good Laws for their profit, (as in the caſe of the Law of twelve Tables, brought from Athens to Rome) or elſe with an Augmentation of their Immunities, and Priviledges (as in the caſe of procuring the Tribunes, and their Supreme Aſſemblies) and afterwards in the frequent confirmation of them againſt the Incroachments of the Nobles.
Now the caſe is far otherwiſe under the ſtanding power of the Great Ones; they, in their Counſels, Projects, and Deſigns, are faſt and tenacious; ſo that the Evils under thoſe Forms are more remedileſs. Beſides, they reach to the whole Body of a Commonweal: and ſo the Evils are more Univerſal. And laſtly, thoſe Tumults, Quarrels, and Inconveniences111 that ariſe from among them, never tend nor end, but to the farther oppreſſion and ſuppreſſion of the people in their Intereſt and Propriety.
For concluſion then: by theſe particulars you may plainly ſee the vanity of this Objection about Tumults, how far they are from being natural effects of the Peoples Government; inſomuch, as by the Records of Hiſtory, it appears rather that they have been the neceſſary conſequences of ſuch Tricks and Cheats of Great Men, as in the dayes of yore have been put upon the people.
A fifth Objection againſt the Form of a Free-State, or Government by the people in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, and which we finde moſt in the Mouths of Royaliſts and Paraſites, is this, That little ſecurity is to be had therein for the more wealthy and powerful ſort of men, in regard of that Liberty which the people aſſume unto themſelves, to accuſe or calumniate whom they pleaſe upon any occaſion.
For anſwer to this, know, That calumniation (which ſignifies ambitious112 ſlandering of men, by whiſperings, reports, or falſe accuſations) was never allowed or approved in this Form of Government. 'Tis true indeed, that ſuch Extravagancies there have been (more or leſs) in all Forms whatſoever; but in this, leſs than any: it being moſt in uſe under ſtanding Powers of Great ones, who make it their grand Engine to remove or ruine all perſons that ſtand in the way of them and their deſignes: And for this purpoſe, it hath ever been their common cuſtom to have Inſtruments ready at hand; as we ſee in all the Stories of Kings and Grandees from time to time; yea, and by Ariſtotle himſelf, together with the whole train of Commentators, it is particularly mark'd out inter flagitia Dominationis, to be one of the peculiar enormities that attend the Lordly intereſt of Dominion.
The Romane State, after it grew corrupt, is a ſufficient Inſtance; where we finde, that not onely the ten Grandees, but all that ſucceeded them in that domineering humour over the People, ever kept a Retinue well ſtock'd with113 Calumniators and Informers, (ſuch as we call Knights of the Poſt) to ſnap thoſe that in any wiſe appeared for the Peoples Liberties. This was their conſtant trade, as it was afterwards alſo of their Emperours. But all the while that the People kept their power entire in the Supreme Aſſemblies, we read not of its being brought into any conſtant practice. Sometimes indeed, thoſe great Commanders that had done them many eminent Services, were, by reaſon of ſome after-actions, called to an account; and having, by an ingro•ment of Power, render'd themſelves ſuſpected, and burthenſome to the Commonwealth, were commanded to retire, (as were both the Scipio's.)
And in the Stories of the Athenian Commonwealth, we finde, that by their lofty and unwary carriage, they ſtirr'd up the Peoples fear and jealouſie ſo far, as to queſtion and ſend divers of them into B••iſhment, notwithſtanding all their former merits; as we read of Alcibtades, Themiſtocles, and others: whereas, if the Rules of a Free-State had been punctually obſerved, by preſerving114 a diſcreet revolution of Powers, and an equability, or moderate ſtate of particular perſons, there had been no occaſion of Incroachment on the one part, or of Fear on the other; not could the prying Royaliſt have had the leaſt pretence or ſhadow of Invective againſt the Peoples Government in this particular.
Thus much of Calumniation, which is leſs frequent under the Peoples Form, than any other.
Now as to the point of Accuſing, or liberty of Accuſation by the People, before their Supreme Aſſemblies; it is a thing ſo eſſentially neceſſary for the preſervation of a Commonwealth, that there is no poſſibility of having perſons kept accountable without it; and, by conſequence, no ſecurity of Life and Eſtate, Liberty and Property. And of what excellent uſe this is, for the publike benefit of any State, appears in theſe two particulars.
Firſt, it is apparent, that the reaſon wherefore Kings, and all other ſtanding Powers, have preſumed to abuſe the People, is, becauſe their continuation115 of Authority having been a means to ſtate them in a condition of Impunity, the People either durſt not, or could not aſſume a liberty of Accuſation; and ſo have linger'd without remedy, whilſt Great Men have proceeded without control to an Augmentation of their miſery: whereas if a juſt Liberty of Accuſation be kept in ure, and Great Perſons by this means lie liable to queſtioning, the Commonwealth muſt needs be the more ſecure; becauſe none then will dare to intrench, or attempt ought, againſt their Liberty; and in caſe any do, they may with much eaſe be ſuppreſs'd. All which amounts, in effect, to a full confirmation of this moſt excellent Maxime, recorded in Policie: Maximè intereſt Repub. Libertatis, ut liberè poſſis•vem aliquem accuſare: It moſt highly concerns the Freedom of a Commonwealth, that the People have liberty of accuſing any perſons whatſoever.
Secondly, it appears, this Liberty is moſt neceſſary, becauſe, as it hath been the onely Remedy againſt the Injuſtice of great and powerful perſons; ſo it116 hath been the onely means to extinguiſh thoſe Emulations, Jealouſies, and Suſpicions, which uſually abound with fury in mens mindes, when they ſee ſuch perſons ſeated ſo far above, that they are not able to reach them, or bring them (as it becomes all earthly Powers) to an account of their actions: of which Liberty when the People have ſeen themſelves deprived in time paſt, it is ſad to conſider how they have flown out into ſuch abſurd and extraordinary courſes, in hope of Remedy, as have cauſed not onely Diſtraction, but many times utter Ruine, to the Publike. Moſt of thoſe Tumults in old Rome, were occaſioned for want of this liberty in ordinary; as thoſe that happened under the Decemviri: ſo that the People, not having freedom to accuſe and queſtion their Juſtice, were enflamed to commit ſudden Outrages, to be revenged upon them. But when they had once obtained power to accuſe or queſtion any man, by aſſiſtance of their Tribunes; then we meet with none of thoſe heats and fits among them; but they referr'd themſelves over, with much content, to117 the ordinary courſe of proceeding. A pregnant Inſtance whereof, we have in the Caſe of Coriolanus; who having done ſome injury to the people, they finding him befriended and upheld by the Great ones, reſolved to be revenged upon him with their own hands; and had torn him in pieces as he came out of the Senate, but that the Tribunes immediately ſtep'd in, and not onely promis'd, but appointed them a day of Hearing againſt him; and ſo all was calm again, and quiet: whereas, if this ordinary courſe of Remedy, in calling him to account, had not been allow'd, and he been deſtroy'd in a Mutiny, a world of ſad Conſequences muſt have befallen the Commonwealth, by reaſon of thoſe Enormities and Revenges that would have riſen, upon the ruine of ſo conſiderable a perſon.
In the Stories of Florence alſo, we read of one Valeſius, who greatning himſelf into little leſs than the poſture of a Prince in that Republike, he ſo confirm'd himſelf, that the people not being able to regulate his extravagancies by any ordinary proceedings, they118 betook themſelves to that unhappie remedy of Arms; and it coſt the beſt blood and lives in that State, before they could bring him down: involving them in a world of Miſeries, which might have been avoided, had they taken care to preſerve their old Liberty of Accuſation and Que••ion, and being able to take a courſe with him in an ordinary way of progreſs.
Thus alſo in the ſame State, Soderino, a man of the ſame ſize, intereſt, and humour; when the People ſaw that they had loſt their Liberty, in being unable to queſtion him, ran like madmen upon a Remedy as bad as the Diſeaſe, and called in the Spaniard to ſuppreſs him: ſo that turned almoſt to the ruine of the State, which might have been prevented, could they have repreſs'd him by the ordinary way of Accuſation and Queſtion.
From theſe Premiſes, then, let us conclude, That ſeeing the crooked way of Calumniation is leſs uſed under the Peoples Form of Government, than any other: and ſince the retaining of a Regular courſe, for admitting and deciding119 of all Complaints and Controverſies by way of Accuſation, is of abſolute neceſſity to the ſafety and wellbeing of a Commonwealth; Therefore this Objection is of as little weight as the reſt, ſo as in any wiſe to diminiſh the Dignity and Reputation of a Free-State, or Government by the People in their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies.
A ſixth Objection againſt the Form of a Free-State, or Government by the People; is alleadged by many, to this effect: That People by nature are factious, inconſtant, and ungrateful.
For anſwer, firſt, as to the point of being Factious, we have already ſhewn, that this Government, ſtated in a ſucceſſion of its Supreme Aſſemblies, is the onely preventive of Faction; becauſe, in creating a Faction, there is a neceſſity, that thoſe which endeavour it, muſt have oportunity to improve their ſlights and projects, in diſgniſing their Deſignes; drawing in Inſtruments and Parties, and in worming out Oppoſites: the effecting of all which, requires ſome length of time; which120 cannot be had, and conſequently, no Faction form'd, when Government is not fixed in particular perſons, but managed by due ſucceſſion and revolution of Authority in the hands of the People.
Beſides, it is to be conſidered, that the People are never the firſt or principal in Faction: they are never the authors and contrivers of it, but ever the parties that are drawn into Sidings by the influence of ſtanding Powers, to ſerve their intereſts and deſignes.
Thus Sylla and Marius, Pompey and Caeſar, continuing power in their own hands, cleft the Romane Empire at ſeveral times into ſeveral Parties: as afterwards it was cleft into three by the Triumvirate; wherein the people had no hand, being (as they are alwayes) purely paſſive, and paſſionately divided, according as they were wrought upon by the ſub•il Inſinuations of the prime Engineers of each Faction.
Thus Italy was divided into Guelph and Gib•ll•ne; and France torn in two by the two Families of Orleance and Burgundi: alſo, by the Guiſians and their121 Confederates; wherein the people had no further hand, than as they were acted by the perſwaſions and pretences of two powerful parties.
The caſe alſo was the ſame in England, in times paſt, when the Grandee-Game was in action between the two Families of Yorke and Lancaſter. So that it is clear enough, The people in their own nature are not inclined to be Factious, nor are they ever ingaged that way, farther than as their Nature is abuſed, and drawn in by powerful perſons.
The ſecond particular of this Objection, is Inconſtancy; which holds true indeed in them that are debauched, and in the corrupted State of a Commonwealth, when degenerated from its pure Principles; as we finde in that of Athens, Rome, Florence, and others: but yet in Rome you may ſee as pregnant inſtances of that peoples conſtancy, as of any other ſort of men whatſoever: for, they continued conſtant irreconcilable Enemies to all Tyranny in general, and Kingly power in particular.
In like manner, when they had once122 gotten their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, they remained ſo firm & ſtiff to uphold them, that the ſucceeding Tyrants could not in a long time, nor without extraordinary cunning and caution deprive them of that onely Evidence of their Liberty.
Moreover, it is obſervable of this people, That in making their Elections they could never be perſwaded to chuſe a known Infamous, Vitious, or unworthy Fellow; ſo that they ſeldom or never erred in the choice of their Tribunes and other Officers. And as in the framing of Laws, their aim was ever at the general Good, it being their own Intereſt, quatenus the people; ſo their conſtancy in the conſervation of thoſe Laws was moſt remarkable: for, notwithſtanding all the crafty Devices and Fetches of the Nobles, the people could never be woo'd to a conſent of abrogating any one Law, till by the alteration of Time, Affairs, and other Circumſtances, it did plainly appear inconvenient.
But the caſe hath ever been otherwiſe under Kings and all ſtanding Powers,123 who uſually ran into all the extreams of Inconſtancy, upon every new Project, petty Humour, and Occaſion, that ſeemed favourable for effecting of their by-deſigns. And in order hereunto, Stories will inform you, That it hath been their Cuſtome, to ſhift Principles every Moon, and caſhier all Oaths, Proteſtations, Promiſes, and Engagements, and blot out the Memory of them with a wet Finger.
This was very remarkable in the late King, whoſe inconſtancy in this kinde, was beyond compare; who no ſooner had paſſed any Promiſes, made Vows and Proteſtations, fix'd Appeals in the High Court of Heaven, in the behalf of Himſelf and his Family; but preſently he forfeited all, and cancell'd them by his Actions.
As to the third point, of Ingratitude, it is much charged upon this Form of Government; becauſe we read both in Athens and Rome, of divers unhandſome Returns made to ſome worthy Perſons that had done high ſervices for thoſe Commonwealths; as Alcibiades, The•iſtocles, Phocion, Milt•ades, Furius,124 Camillus, Coriolanus, and both the Scipio's; the cauſe of whoſe misfortunes is deſcribed by Plutarch and Livy, to be their own lofty and unwary carriage; Having (ſay they) by an ingroſsment of power, rendred themſelves ſuſpected and buthenſome to the Commonwealth, and thereby ſtirred up the peoples fear & jealouſie: where as if they had kept themſelves within the Rules of a Free-State, by permitting a diſceet Revolution of power in particular hands; there had been no occaſion of incroachment on the one part, nor of fear on the other. Of all, the Scipio's indeed were moſt to be pitied, becauſe their only fault ſeems to be too much power and grearneſs, (which indeed is the greateſt fault that Members of a Commonwealth can be guilty of, if ſeriouſly conſidered;) inſomuch, that being grown formidable to their Fellow-Senators, they were by them removed: and ſo it appears to have been the act of the Nobles, (upon their own ſcore and Intereſt) and not of the people. But as for Camillus and Coriolanus, they ſufficiently deſerved whatſoever befel125 them, becauſe they made uſe of the power and reputation they had gotten by their former merits, onely to maligne and exerciſe an implacable hate towards the peoples Intereſt. Nevertheleſs, the people reſtored Camillus again to his Eſtate and Honour, after ſome little time of Baniſhment.
And though this accident in a Free-State hath been objected by many, as a great deffect; yet others again do highly commend the humour: For (ſay they) it is not onely a good ſign of a Commonwealths being in pure and perfect health, when the people are thus active, zealous, and jealous in the behalf of their Liberties, that will permit no ſuch growth of power as may endanger it; but it is alſo a convenient means to curb the Ambition of its Citizens, and make them contain within due bounds, when they ſee there is no preſuming after Inlargements, and Acceſſions of Powers and Greatneſs, without incurring the danger and indignation of the people.
Thus much of the Reaſon why the126 people many times caſt off perſons that have done them eminent ſervices: yet on the other ſide, they were ſo far from Ingratitude, that they have alwayes been exceſſive in their Rewards and Honours, to ſuch men as deſerved any way of the Publike, whilſt they conformed themſelves to Rules, and kept in a poſture ſuiting to Liberty. Witneſs their Conſecration of Statues, Incenſe, Sacrifices, and Crowns of Laurel, inrolling ſuch men in the number of their Deities.
Therefore the crime of Ingratitude cannot in any peculiar manner be faſtned upon the People: but if we conſult the Stories of all ſtanding Powers, we may produce innumerable teſtimonies of their Ingratitude toward ſuch as have done them the greateſt ſervice; ill recompence being a Myſtery of State practiſed by all Kings and Grandees, who (as Tacitus tells us) ever count themſelves diſobliged, by the braveſt actions of their ſubjects.
Upon this account, Alexander hated Antipater and Parmenio, and put the later to death. Thus the Emperour Veſpaſian127 caſhiered and ruined the meritorious Antonies. Thus alſo was Alphonſus Atbuquerque ſerved by his Maſter the King of Portugal; and Conſalvus the Great, by Ferdinand of Aragon: as was alſo that Stanley of the Houſe of Derby, who ſet the Crown upon King H•nry the ſeventh's head. Thus Sylla the Romane Grandee deſtroyed his choiceſt Inſtruments that help'd him into the Saddle; as Auguſtus ſerved his friend Cicero, and expoſed him to the malice and murther of Anthonie.
Innumerable are the Examples of this kinde, which evidence, that ſuch unworthy dealings are the effect of all ſtanding Powers; and therefore more properly to be objected againſt them, than againſt the Government of the People.
Thus having anſwered all, or the main Objections, brought by the adverſaries of a Free-State; before we proceed to the Errours of Government, and Rules of Policie, it will not be amiſs, but very convenient, to ſay ſomething128 of that which indeed is the very Foundation of all the reſt; to wit, That the Original of all Juſt Power and Government is in the PEOPLE.
The Original of all Juſt Power is in the People.
THoſe Men that deny this Poſition, are fain to run up as high as Noah and Adam, to gain a pretence for their Opinion: alledging, That the primitive or firſt Governments of the World were not inſtituted by the conſent and election of thoſe that were governed, but by an abſolute Authority inveſted in the perſons governing. Thus th••ſay our firſt Parent ruled, by a〈◊〉Power and Authority in himſelf onely, as did alſo the Patriarchs before and after the Flood too, for ſome time, becoming Princes by vertue of a paternal right over all the Families of their own Generation and Extraction: ſo that the Fathers, by reaſon of their extraordinary long Lives, and the multiplicity of Wives, happened to130 be Lords of Kingdoms or Principalities of their own begetting.
And ſo ſome deriving the Pedigree or Government of this Paternal Right of Soveraignty, would by all means conclude, That the Original of Government, neither was nor ought to be in the People.
For anſwer to this, conſider, That Magiſtracy or Government is to be conſidered, as Natural, or as Political: Naturally he was a true publick Magiſtrate or Father of his Country, who in thoſe Patriarchal times ruled over his own Children and their Deſcendants. This Form of Government was only temporary, and took an end not long after the Flood, when Nimrod changed it, and by force combining〈◊〉of diſtinct Families into one Bod•〈◊〉ſubjecting them to his own Regiment, did, by an Arbitrary Power, ſeated in his own Will and Sword, conſtrain them to ſubmit unto what Laws and Conditions himſelf pleaſed to impoſe on them.
Thus the Paternal Form became changed into a Tyrannical. Neither of theſe had (I confeſs) their Original131 in or from the People, nor hath either of them any relation to that Government which we intend in our Poſition.
But ſecondly, There is a Government Political, not grounded in Nature, nor upon Paternal Right by Natural Generation; but founded upon the free Election, Conſent or mutual Compact of men entring into a form of civil ſociety. This is the Government we now ſpeak of, it having been in requeſt in moſt ages, and ſtill is: whereas the other was long ſince out of date, being uſed onely in the firſt age of the World, as proper onely for that time.
So that to prevent all Objections of this nature, when we ſpeak here of Government, we mean onely the Political, which is by Conſent or Compact; whoſe original we ſhall prove to be in the people. As for the Government of the Iſraelites, firſt under Moſes, then Joſhua and the Judges; The Scripture plainly ſhews, that they were extraordi•nary Governours, being of God's immediate inſtitution, who raiſed them up by his Spirit, and impoſed them upon that people; whoſe peculiar happineſs it was in132 caſes of this nature, to have ſo infallible and ſure a direction; ſo that their Government was a Theocracie, (as ſome have called it) having God himſelf for its onely Original: and therefore no wonder we have in that time & Nation, ſo few viſible foot-ſteps of the peoples Election, or of an inſtitution by Compact. But yet we finde after the Judges, when this people rejected this more immediate way of Government by God, (as the Lord told Samuel, They have not rejected thee, but me) and dedeſired a Government after the manner of other Nations; then God ſeems to forbear the uſe of his Prerogative, and leave them to an exerciſe of their own natural Rights and Liberties, to make choice of a new Government and Governour by ſuffrage and compact.
The Government they aimed at, was Kingly: God himſelf was diſpleaſed at it, and ſo was Samuel too; who, in hope to continue the old Form, and to fright them from the new, tells them, what Monſters in Government Kings would prove, by aſſuming unto themſelves an Arbitrary Power, (not that a King might133 lawfully and by right do what Samuel deſcribes, but onely to ſhew how far Kings would preſume to abuſe their power; which no doubt Samuel foreſaw, not onely by Reaſon, but by the Spirit of Prophecie.) Nevertheleſs the people would have a King; ſay they, Nay, but there ſhall be a King over us: whereupon, ſaith God to Samuel, Hearken to their voice. Where we plainly ſee; firſt, God gives them leave to uſe their own natural Rights, in making choice of their own Form of Government; but then indeed, for the choice of their Governor, there was one thing extraordinary, in that God appointed them one, he vouchſafing ſtill in an extraordinary and immediate manner to be their Director and Protector: but yet, though God was pleaſed to nominate the perſon, he left the confirmation and ratification of the Kingſhip unto the people; to ſhew, that naturally the right of all was in them, however the exerciſe of it were ſuperſeded at that time, by his Divine pleaſure, as to the point of nomination: for, that the people might underſtand it was their Right, Samuel calls them134 all to Mizpeh, as if the matter were all to be done anew on their part; and there by lot, they at length made choice of Saul, and ſo immediately by proclaiming him with ſhouts and acclamations: and then having had proof of his valour againſt the Amorites, they meet at Gilgal, and proclaim him King once again, to ſhew that (naturally) the validity of the Kingſhip depended wholly upon the peoples conſent and confirmation. And ſo you ſee the firſt and moſt eminent evidence of the inſtitution of Political Government in Scripture doth notoriouſly demonſtrate, that its original is in or from the people; and therefore I ſhall wave any further inſtances in caſes of the like nature out of Scripture, which are not a few. Onely let it be remembred, that Peter in his firſt Epiſtle, calls all Government the Ordinance of man, (in the Original, the creation of man, a Creature of a mans making) to ſhew, that in all its forms it depends onely upon the will & pleaſure of the people.
We might inſiſt farther to evince the Truth of this by ſtrength of Reaſon; but let this ſerve to aſſert the right of the135 thing; and as for the reſt, every man will eaſily believe it very conſonant to reaſon, if he reflect upon the matter of fact, and conſider, that it hath been the unanimous practice of all the Nations of the World, to aſſert their own Rights of Election and Conſent (as often as they had opportunity) in the various turns of inſtitution and alteration of Government. In Italy of old they had moſt Free-States, and few Princes; now all Princes, and no Free-States. Naples, after many Revolutions, is under Spain, Rome under a Pope, and under him one Senator, in ſtead of thoſe many that were wont to be; Venice and Genoa have Senators and Dukes, but the Dukes are of ſmall power; Florence, Ferrara, Mantua, Parma, and Savoy, have no Senators, but Dukes only, and they abſolute; Burgundy, Lorain, Gaſcoin, and Britany, had once Kings, then Dukes, but now are incorporated into France: ſo all the Principalities of Germany that now are, were once imbodied in one entire Regiment: Caſtile, Aragon, Portugal, & Barcelona, were once diſtinct Kingdoms, but now united all to Spain, ſave Portugal, which fell off the other136 day: France was firſt one Kingdom under Pharamond, afterwards parted into four Kingdoms, and at laſt become one again: England conſiſted of Free-States till the Romans yoked it, afterwards it was divided into ſeven Kingdoms, and in the end it became one again. Thus you ſee how the world is ſubject to ſhiftings of Government: and though it be moſt true, that the power of the Sword hath been moſt prevalent in many of theſe changes, yet ſome of them have been chiefly managed (as they ought) by the peoples Conſent; and even in thoſe where the Sword hath made way, the peoples conſent hath ever been drawn and taken in afterwards, for corroboration of Title; it having been the cuſtom of all Uſurpers, to make their inveſtitures appear as juſt as they could, by getting the Communities Conſent ex poſt ſacto, and entring into ſome compact with them, for the better eſtabliſhing themſelves with a ſhew of legality: which act of all Tyrants and Uſurpers, is a manifeſt (though tacite) confeſſion of theirs, That de jure the original of all Power and Government, is and ought to be in the people.
Errours of Government; And Rules of Policie.
HAving proved that the Originall of all juſt Power and Government is in the People; and that the Government of the People, in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of their ſupream Aſſemblies, is much more excellent than any other Form, I ſuppoſe it falls in of courſe, in the next place, to note, and obſerve thoſe common Errors in Policie, wherein moſt Countties of the World, (eſpecially that part of it called Chriſtendome) have been long intangled; that when the myſtery of Tyrannie is undreſs't, and ſtript of all its gaudy Robes, and gay Appearances,146 it may be hiſs't out of the Civill part of Mankind into the company of the more barbarous and brutiſh Nations.
The firſt Errour that we ſhall obſerve in antient Chriſtian Policie, and which hath indeed been a main foundation of Tyranny, is that corrupt Di•iſion of a State, into Eccleſiaſtical and Civil; A fault, whereof our lateſt Refiners of Political Diſcourſe, are as guilty in their Writings, as any others: But that there is the leaſt footſtep, in the Scripture, for Chriſtians to follow ſuch a Diviſion of〈◊〉o•to allow of a National way••Ch••••ing, which is the Root of••at D•••ſion could never yet be proved by any; and the contrary is very clear from the drift and ſcope of the Goſpel. We read, indeed, of the Common-wealth of Iſrael being thus divided, and that it was done according to Rules and Conſtitutions of Gods own appointment; it being Gods way then, when he was pleaſed, to make choice of that peop•e onely, out of all the World, to be his own peculiar, and ſo fixed his Church there in a Nationall Form: Then it was conſined and reſtrained to147 that particular Nation, excluding all others. But if any man will argue from hence, that it is lawfull for any Nation now under the Goſpel to follow this pattern; then it behoves him, 1. to prove, that God intended the Jewiſh Government as a pattern for us to follow under the Goſpel. And if any man will pretend to this, then in the ſecond place, it will concern him to prove, that we are to follow it in every particular, or onely in ſome particulars. That we are to follow it in every one, no ſober man did ever yet affirm: And if they will have us to follow it in ſome particulars, relinquiſhing the•eſt, then it concerns him to produce ſome Rule or Command out of Scripture, plainly pointing out what parts of it we are to imbrace, and what not; or elſe he will never be able to make it appear, that the Form of the Commonwealth of Iſrael was ever intended, either in the whole, or in part, as a Pattern for Chriſtians to follow under the Goſpel. But never was any ſuch Rule alleadged yet out of Scripture by thoſe that pretend to a Nationall Church.
And therefore, if we ſeriouſly reflect148 upon the Deſign of God, in ſending Chriſt into the World, we ſhall find it was to ſet an end to that Pompous Adminiſtration of the Jewiſh Form; that as his Church and People were formerly confined within the Narrow Pale of a particular Nation, ſo now the Pale ſhould be broken down, and all Nations taken into the Church: Not all Nations in a lump; nor any whole Nations, or National Bodies to be formed into Churches; for his Church or People, now under the Goſpel, are not to be a Body Political, but Spiritual, and Myſtical: Not a promiſcuous confuſion of perſons, taken in at adventure; but an orderly collection, a picking and chuſing of ſuch as are called and ſanctified; and not a company of men forced in, by Commands and Conſtitutions, of Worldly Powers and Prudence; but of ſuch as are brought in by the Power and Efficacy of Chriſts Word and Spirit: for he himſelf hath ſaid, My Kingdome is not of this World; it is not from hence, &c. And therefore, that hand which hitherto hath preſumed, in moſt Nations, to erect a Power, called Eccleſiaſtick, in equipage with the Civil, to bear•way, and bind149 mens Conſciences to retain Notions, ordained for Orthodox, upon civill penalties, under colour of prudence, good order, diſcipline, preventing of Hereſie, advancing of Chriſts Kingdome; and to this end; hath twiſted the Spiritual Power (as they call it) with the Worldly and ſecular intereſt of State: This (I ſay) hath been the very right hand of Antichriſt, oppoſing Chriſt in his way: Whoſe Kingdom, Government, Governours, Officers, and Rulers; Laws, Ordinances, and Statutes, being not of this World, (I mean, jure humano,) depend not upon the helps and devices of Worldly wiſdome.
Upon this ſcore and pretence, the Infant Myſtery of Iniquity began to work in the very Cradle of Chriſtianity.
Afterwards it grew up by the indulgence of Conſtantine, and other Chriſtian Emperours, whom though God uſed in many good things for the ſuppreſſion of groſs Heathen Idolatry, yet (by Gods permiſſion) they were carryed away, and their eyes ſo far dazled, through the glorious pretences of the Prelates and Biſhops, that they could150 not ſee the old Serpent in a new Form wrapt up in a Myſtery; for, Satan had a new Game now to play, which he managed thus: Firſt, he led a great part of the World away with dangerous Errours, thereby to find an occaſion for the Prelates, to carry on the myſtery of their Profeſſion; and ſo, under pretence of ſuppreſſing thoſe dangerous errors they eaſily ſcrued themſelves into the Civil Power: and for continuing of it the ſurer in their own hands, they made bold to baptize whole Nations with the name of Chriſtian, that they might (under the ſame pretence) gain a ſhare of Power and Authority with the Magiſtrate in every Nation; which they ſoon effected.
The Infant-being thus nurſt, grew up in a ſhort time to a perfect man, the man of ſin (if the Pope be the man, which is yet controverted by ſome:) for, the Prelates having gotten the power in their hands, began then to quarrel, who ſhould be the greateſt among them. At length, he of Rome bore away the Bell; and ſo the next ſtep was, that, from National Churches they proceed to〈◊〉a Mother-Church161 of all Nations. A fair progreſs and pitch; indeed, from a ſmall beginning: and now being up, they defied all with Bell, Book, and Candle, excommunicating and depoſing Kings and Emperours, and binding mens Conſciences ſtill, under the firſt ſpecious pretence of ſuppreſſing Hereſie, to believe onely in their Arbitrary Dictates, Traditions, and Errours, which are the greateſt Blaſphemies, Errours, and Hereſies, that ever were in the World. Now they were up ſee what a do there was to get any part of them down again. What a Quarter and Commotion there was in Germany, when Luther firſt brake the Ice? And the like here in England, when our firſt Reformers began their Work: Theſe men, in part, did well, but having baniſhed the Popes actual Tyranny, they left the Seed, and Principle of it, ſtill behind, which was, a State Eccleſiaſtical united with the Civil; for, the Biſhops twiſted their own intereſt again with that of the Crown, upon a Proteſtant Accompt; and by vertue of that, perſecuted thoſe they called Puritans, for not being as Orthodox (they ſaid) as themſelves.
152To conclude, if it be conſidered, that moſt of the Civil Wars, and Broiles, throughout Europe, have been occaſioned, by permitting the ſettlement of Clergy-Intereſt, with the Secular, in National Formes, and Churches, it will doubt els be underſtood, that the Diviſion of a State into Eccleſiaſticall and Civil, muſt needs be one of the main Errors in Chriſtian Policy.
A ſecond Error which we ſhall note, and which is very frequent under all Formes of Government, is this; that care hath not been taken at all times, and upon all occaſions of Alteration, to prevent the paſſage of Tyranny out of one Form into another, in all the Nations of the World: for, it is moſt clear, by obſerving the Affairs and Actions of paſt-Ages, and Nations, that the intereſt of abſolute Monarchy, and its Inconveniencies, have been viſible and fatal under the other Forms (where they have not been prevented) and given us an undeniable proof of this Maxime ▪ by Experience in all Times; That the Intereſt of Monarchy may reſide in the hands of many, as well as of a ſingle perſon.
The Intereſt of abſolute Monarchy,153 we conceive to be an unlimited, uncontrolable, unaccountable ſtation of Power and Authority in the hands of a particular perſon, who governs onely according to the Dictates of his own Will and Pleaſure. And though it hath often bin diſguiſed by Sophiſters in Policy, ſo as it hath loſt its own name, by ſhifting Formes; yet really, and effectually, the thing in it ſelf hath bin diſcovered under the artificial covers of every Form, in the various Revolutions of Government: So that nothing more concerns a People eſtabliſhed in a ſtate of Freedom, than to be inſtructed in things of this Nature, that the means of its preſervation being underſtood, and the ſubtil ſleight of old Projectors brought into open view, they may become the more zealous to promote the one, and prevent the other, if any old game ſhould happen to be plaid over anew, by any ſucceeding Generation.
It is very obſervable in Athens, that when they had laid aſide their King, the Kingly power was retained ſtill in all the after-turns of Government: for their Decimal Governours, and their Thirty (commonly called the154 Tyrants) were but a multiplied Monarchy, the Monarchal Intereſt being held up as high as ever, in keeping the exerciſe of the Supremacy out of the peoples hands, and ſeating themſelves in an unaccountable ſtate of Power and Authority, which was ſomewhat a worſe condition, than the people were in before; for their Kings had Superviſors, and there were alſo Senatick Aſſemblies, that did reſtrain and correct them: but the new Governors having none, ran into all the heats and fits, and wild extravagancies, of an unbounded Prerogative: by which means, Neceſſity and Extremity opening the peoples Eyes, they, at length, ſaw all the Inconveniencies of Kingſhip wrapt up in new Forms, and rather increaſed, than diminiſhed; ſo that (as the onely Remedy) they diſlodged the Power out of thoſe hands, putting it into their own, and placing it in a conſtant orderly Revolution of perſons Elective by the Community. And now being at this fair paſs, one would have thought there was no ſhelter for a Monarchal Intereſt, under a popular Form too. But alaſs, they found the contrary; for, the people not keeping a ſtrict Watch over themſelves, according to the Rules of a Free State; but being won by ſpecious pretences, and deluded by created Neceſſities, to intruſt the management of Affairs into ſome particular hands, ſuch an occaſion was given thereby to thoſe men to frame parties of their own, that by this means, they in a ſhort time became able to ſtand upon their own legs, and do what they liſt without the peoples conſent: and in the end, not onely diſcontinued, but utterly extirpated their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies.
In Rome alſo, the Caſe was the ſame under every Alteration; and all occaſioned, by the crafty contrivances of Grandiſing Parties, and the peoples own facility and negligence, in ſuffering themſelves to be deluded: for, with the Tarquin's, (as it is obſerved by Livy, and others) onely the name King was expelled, but not the thing; the Power & Intereſt of Kingſhip was ſtill retained in the Senate, and ingroſſed by the Conſuls: For, beſides the Rape of Lucrece, among the other faults objected againſt Tarquin, this was moſt conſiderable, That he had154 acted all things after his own head; and diſcontinued Conſultations with the Senate, which was the very height of Arbitrary Power. But yet as ſoon as the Senate was in the ſaddle, they forgat what was charged by themſelves upon Tarquin, and ran into the ſame Errour, by eſtabliſhing an Arbitrary, Hereditary, unaccountable Power in themſelves, and their Poſterity, not admitting the people (whoſe intereſt and liberty they had pleaded, into any ſhare in Conſultation, or Government, as they ought to have done, by a preſent erecting of their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies: ſo that you ſeethe ſame Kingly Intereſt, which was in one before, reſided then in the hands of many. Nor is it my Obſervation onely, but pointed out by Livy, in his ſecond Book, as in many other places; Cum à Patribus, non Conſules, ſed Carnifices, &c. When (ſaith he) the Senators ſtrove to create, not Conſuls, but Executioners, and Tormentors, to vex & tear the people, &c. And in another place of the ſame Book, Conſules, immoderat â infinitaquepoteſtate, omnes metus legum, &c. The Conſuls having an immoderate and unlimited Power, turned157 the terror of Laws and puniſhments onely upon the people, themſelves (in the mean while) being accountable to none but to themſelves, and their Confederates in the Senate.
Then the Conſular Government being caſhiered, came on the Decemviri. Cum Conſulari Imperio ac Regio, ſine provocatione, (ſaith my Author) being inveſted with a Conſular and Kingly Power, without appeal to any other.
And in his third Book, he ſaith, Decem Regum ſpecies erat, it was a Form of ten Kings, the miſeries of the people being increaſed ten times more then they were under Kings, and Conſuls: For remedy therefore, the ten were caſhiered alſo; and Conſuls being reſtored, it was thought fit for the bridling of their Power, to revive alſo the Dictatorſhip (which was a Temporary Kingſhip, uſed onely now and then upon occaſion of Neceſſity) and alſo thoſe Deputies of the people called Tribunes, which one would have thought had bin ſufficient Bars againſt Monarchick Intereſt, eſpecially being aſſiſted by the peoples ſucceſſive158 Aſſemblies. But yet for all this, the people were cheated through their own neglect, and beſtowing too much confidence and truſt upon ſuch as they thought their friends: For when they ſwerved from the Rules of a Free-State, by lengthning the Dictatorſhip in any hand, then Monarchick-Intereſt ſtept in there, as it did under Sylla, Caeſar, and others, long before it returned to a declared Monarchal Form; and when they lengthned Commands in their Armies, then it crept in there; as it did under the afore-named perſons, as well as Marius, Cinna, and others alſo; and even Pompey himſelf, not forgetting alſo the pranks of the two Triumvirales, who all made a ſhift: under every Form, being ſometimes called Conſuls, ſometimes Dictators, and ſometimes Tribunes of the people, to out-act all the Flagitions Enormities of an abſolute Monarchy.
It is alſo evident in the Story of Florence, that that Common-wealth, even when it ſeemed moſt free, could never quite ſhake off the Intereſt of Monarchy: for, it was ever the buſineſs of one Upſtart, or other; either in the Senate, or among the People, to make159 way to their own ambitious Ends, and hoiſt themſelves into a Kingly poſture through the Peoples favour, as we may ſee in the Actions of Savanarola the Monk, Soderino, and the Medices, whoſe Family did (as we ſee at this day) fix it ſelf at length in the State of an abſolute Monarchy, under the Title of a Dukedome. Nor can it be forgotten, how much of Monarchy (of late) crept into the United Provinces.
Now the uſe that is to be made of this Diſcourſe, is this, that ſince it is clear, the Intereſt of Monarchy may reſide in a Conſul; as well as in a King; in a Dictator, as well as in a Conſul; in the hands of many, as well as of a ſingle perſon; and that its Cuſtom hath bin to lurk under every Form, in the various turnes of Government, therefore as it concerns every people in a State of Freedome to keep cloſe to the Rules of a Free-State, for the turning out of Monarchy (whether ſimple, or compound, both name and thing, in one or many) by which means onely they will be inabled to avoid this ſecond Error in Policy; ſo they ought ever to have a Reverent and Noble reſpect160 of ſuch Founders of Free-States, and Common-wealths, as ſhall block up the way againſt Monarchick Tyranny, by declaring for the Liberty of the People, as it conſiſts in a due and orderly ſucceſſion of Authority, in their ſupream Aſſemblies.
A third Errour in Policy, which ought eſpecially notice to be taken of, and prevented in a Free-State, hath bin a keeping of the people ignorant•of thoſe ways and means that are eſſentially neceſſary ▪ for the preſervation of their Liberty; for, implicite Faith, and blind Obedience, hath hitherto paſſed currant, and been equally preſſed and practiſed by Grandees ▪ both Spirituall and Temporal, upon the People; ſo that they have in all Nations ſhared the Authority between them. And though many quarrels have•i•en in times paſt between Kings, and their Clergy, touching their ſeveral Juriſdictions, yet the myſteries ▪ of Domination have been ſtill kept under lock and key: ſo that their Prerogative remained entire ever above the reach and knowledge of the People: by which means, Monarchs and other ſtanding Powers, have ſeen their own Intereſt provided161 for, as well as in the Popes, in this myſterious ▪ Maxime, Ignorance is the Mother of Devotion.
But theſe things ought not to be ſo, among a people that have declared themſelves a Free-State: For, they ſhould not onely know what Freedome is, and have it repre•ented in all its lively and lovely Features, that they may grow zealous and jealous over it; but, that it may be a Zeal according to knowledge and good purpoſe: it is without all queſtion, moſt neceſſary, that they be made acquainted, and throughly inſtructed in the Meanes and Rules of its preſervation, againſt the Adulterous Wiles and Rapes of any projecting Sophiſters that may ariſe hereafter.
And doubtleſs, this endeavour of mine, in laying down the Rules of preſerving a Free-State, will appear ſo much the more neceſſary, if we conſider, that all the Inconveniencies that in Times have happened under this Form, to imbroyl, or ruine it, have proceeded (as we have formerly proved) either from the peoples neglect, or rather ignorance of thoſe Meanes and Rules that ſhould be committed162 unto them, both for Practice, and Obſervation: having therefore made brief Collections out of the Monuments of this kind of Learning, I ſhall here inſert them, that the People of every Common-wealth, which mean to preſerve their Freedom, may be informed how to ſteer their courſe ▪ according to ſuch Rules as have bin put in practice heretofore by, divers Nations.
Firſt, it hath bin a Cuſtom, not only to breed up all the young Fry in Principles of Diſlike and Enmity againſt Kingly Government; but alſo to cauſe all that were capable of ſwearing, to enter into an Oath of Abjuration, to abjure a toleration of Kings, and Kingly Power, in time to come.
Thus Brutus ▪ bound the Romans by an Oath againſt Kings, That they ſhould never ſuffer any man again to reign at Rome ▪
Thus the Hollanders preſerved themſelves alſo, entering into an Oath of Abjuration ▪ not onely againſt King Philip•▪ and his Family, but all Kings for ever.
And Brutus ▪ to make ſure work, did not onely do this, but divided ▪ the163 Royal Revenues among the People; which was a good way to make them reſolute to Extremity, knowing, That if ever any King came in play again, He would take all away again by vertue of his Prerogative and Crown: He brake alſo all the Images and Statues of the T•rquint ▪ and he levell'd their houſes with the ground, that they might not remain as Temptations to any ambitious Spirits ▪ Suitable to this Policy, was that of Henry the 8th, who when he diſpoſed of the Revenues of Abbies, demoliſhed alſo the Building ▪ oſaying, Deſtroy the Neſts, and the Rockes will ne're return again. Which ▪ queſtionleſs, was a moſt ſure way, both in him, and Brutus, to be imitated, or neglected ▪ as there may be occaſion. But they thought, in a eaſe of this Nature, that the convenience in keeping them, could not counter•ail the danger.
Secondly, It hath bin uſual not to ſuffer particular perſons to Grandiſe ▪ or great•n themſelves more than ordinary ▪ for that, by the Romans, was called, affectatio Regnt, an aſpiring to Kingſhip: Which being obſerved in M•lius and Manlius, two noble Romans,164 that had deſerved highly of the State, yet their paſt-merits & ſervices, could not exempt them from the juſt anger of the People, who made them Examples to Poſterity: Yea, the Name of the latter, (though Livy cals him an incomparable man, had he not lived in a Free-State,) was ever after diſowned by his whole Family, that famous Family of the Manlii; and both the Name and Memory of Him, and of his Conſulſhip, was raſed out of all publike Records, by Decree of the Senate.
The not keeping cloſe to this Rule, had of late like to have coſt the Lowcountries, the loſs of their Liberty; for the Wealth of the Houſe of Orange, grown up to exceſs, and permitting the laſt man to match into a Kingly Family, put other thoughts and deſigns into his head, than beſeemed a member of a Free-State; which had he not been prevented, by the Providence of God ▪ and a dark night, might in all probability, have reduced them under the Yoak ▪ of Kingly Power.
Thirdly, Eſpecial care hath been taken, non Diurnare Imperia, not to permit a Continuation of Command165 and Authority, in the hands of particular perſons, or families. This point we have been very large in: The Romans had a notable care herein, till they grew corrupt. Livy, in his fourth Book, ſaith, Libertatis magna cuſtod•a eſt,•ſi magna Imperia eſſe non ſinas, & temporis modus imponatu•: It is a grand preſervative of Liberty, if you do not permit great Powers and Commands to continue long ▪ and if ſo be you limit, in point of time. To this purpoſe, they had a Law, called, the Emilian Law, to reſtrain them; as we find in the Ninth Book, where he brings in a Noble Roman, ſaying thus: Hoc quidem Regno ſimile eſt; And this, indeed, is like a Kingſhip ▪ That I alone ſhould bear this great Office of the Cenſorſhip, Triennium & ſex menſes, three years and ſix moneths, contrary to the Emiliam Law. In his third Book alſo, he ſpeaks of it, as of a monſtrous buſineſs, That the Ides of May were come (which was the time of their years choice) and yet no new Election appointed: Id-verò Regnum haud dubiè videre, deploratur in perſpetuum libertas. It with doubt ſeems no other than a Kingdom, and Liberty is utterly166 loſt for ever. It was Treaſon for any man to hold that high Office of the Dictatorſhip in his own hand, beyond ſix moneths. He that would ſee notable ſtuff to this purpoſe, let him read Ciceroes Epiſtles to Atticus, concerning Caeſar. The care of that people ▪ in this particular, appeared alſo, that they would not permit any man to bear the ſame Office twice together.
This was obſerved likewiſe (as Ariſtotle tells us) in all the Free-States of Greece.
And in Rome we find Cincinnatus, one of the brave Romane Generals, making a Speech unto the People, to perſwade them, to let him lay down his Command. Now the time was come, though the Enemy was almoſt at their Gates, and never more need, than at that time, of his valour and prudence, as the people told him: but no perſwaſion would ſerve the turn; reſign he would, telling them, There would be more danger to the State, in prolonging his Power, than from the Enemy, ſince it might prove a Preſident moſt pernicious to the Romane Freedome. Such another Speech was made by M. Rutilius167 Cenſorinus, to the People, when they forced him to undergo the Office of Cenſor twice together, contrary to the intent and practice of their Anceſtors; yet he accepted it: but (as Plutarch tell us) upon this condition; That a Law might paſs againſt the Title in that, and other Officers, leaſt it ſhould be drawn into Preſident in time to come. Thus the People dealt alſo with their own Tribunes, the Law being, That none of them ſhould be continued two years together. So tender were the Romans, in this particular, as one principal Rule and Means, for the preſervation of their Liberty.
A fourth Rule ▪ not to let two of one Family to bear Offices of High Truſt at one time, nor to permit a Continuation of great Powers in any own Family. The former, uſually brings on the latter: And if the latter be prevented, there is the leſs danger in the former: but however, both are to be avoided: The reaſon is evident, becauſe a permiſſion of them, gives a particular. Family an opportunity, to bring their own private Intereſt into competition, with that of the Publique ▪ from whence preſently enſues168 this grand inconvenience in State, the Affairs of the Commonwealth will be made ſubſervient to the ends of a few perſons; no Corn ſhall be meaſured. but in their buſhel; nor any Materials be allowed for the Publick Work, unleſs they ſquare well with the building of a private Intereſt, or Family. This therefore, was a principal point of State among the Romans, Ne duo vel plures ex una familia magnos Magiſtratus gerant eodem tempore; Let not two ▪ or more ▪ of one Family, bear great Offices at the ſame time. And a little after it follows, Ne magna Imperia ab unâ familiâ praeſcribantur, Let not great Commands be preſcribed, or continued, by one Family.
That little liberty which was left to the Romans, after that fatal ſtab given to Caeſar in the Senate-houſe, might have been preſerved, had they prevented his Kinſman Octavius from ſucceeding him in the poſſeſſion of an extraordinary Power. The effecting whereof was Ciceroes work, and, indeed, his principal errour: as he often afterwards acknowledged; which may ſerve to ſhew, That the wiſeſt man may be ſometimes miſtaken: For he brought169 the other into play; whertas had he quitted his ſpleen, and conſulted his brain, he muſt queſtionleſs have ſeen, that a ſiding with Anthony had been more convenient, then with the other; who being once admitted into Power, ſoon drew the Parties, and Intereſts of his Uncle Julius, to become his own; and with a wet finger, not onely caſt off his friend Cicero, but contrived the ruine of the Republick, and Him, both together.
The Florentine Family of the Medices, who hold an abſolute Command at this day, made themſelves, by continuing Power in their hands, in a ſhort time ſo conſiderable, that they durſt openly bid defiance to Publick Liberty, which might have continued much longer, had not Caſinus been ſo eaſily admitted to ſucceed his Couſin Alexander.
It is obſervable alſo, of the ſame Family, that one of them being Pope, they then hatched Deſigns upon ſeveral parts of Italy, not doubting but to carry them by favour of the Pope their Kinſman: but he dying before their Ends were effected, they then made a Party in the Conclave, for the170 creating of Julian de Medicis, who was Brother to the former Pope, and had like to have carried it, till Pompeius Columba ſtood up, and ſhewed them how dangerous and prejudicial it muſt of neceſſity prove, to the Liberties of Italy ▪ that the Popedom ſhould be continued in one houſe, in the hands of two brothers one after another.
What Effects the continuation of Power, in the Family of Orange, hath had in the Ʋnited Provinces, is every mans obſervation; and that Nation ſufficiently felt, long before the Project came to maturity, in this laſt mans dayes; and had he left a ſon of ſufficient years behind him, to have ſlept immediatly into his place, perhaps the Deſign might have gone on: but certainly that People have wiſely improved their opportunity, (the Cockatrice being not flech'd) in reducing that Family into a temper more ſuitable to a State and Intereſt of Liberty.
What made the antient Roman Senate, in a ſhort time, ſo intollerable to that People, but becauſe they carryed all by Families; as the Senate of171 Venice doth now at this day: where, if the Conſtitution were otherwiſe, the people would then (perhaps) be much more ſenſible what it is to be in a State of Freedom.
Fifthly, It hath bin uſual in Free-States, to hold up the Majeſty and Authority of their Suffrages, or Votes intire ▪ in their Senators, or ſupream Aſſemblies: for if this were not look'd to, and ſecured from controle, or influence of any other Power, then Actum erat de libertate, Liberty and Authority became loſt for ever. So long as the Roman people kept up their credit and Authority, as ſacred, in their Tribunes, and Supream Aſſemblies, ſo long they continued really free: but when by their own neglect, they gave Sylla, and his Party, in the Senate, an opportunity of power to curb them, then their Suffrages (once eſteemed as ſacred) were troden under foot; for immediatly after, they came to debate and act but by courteſie, the Authority left being by Sylla, after the expiration of his Dictatorſhip, in the hands of the ſtanding Senate, ſo that it could never after be regained by the People, Nor did the Senate themſelves keep it172 long in their own hands: for when Caeſar marched to Rome, he deprived them alſo of the Authority of their Suffrages; onely in a formal way made uſe of them, and ſo under a ſhadow of legality, he aſſumed that power unto himſelf, which they durſt not deny him.
Juſt in the ſame manner dealt Coſmus with the Flerentine Senate: he made uſe of their Suffrages, but he had ſo plaid his Cards before-hand, that they durſt not but yield to his Ambition. So alſo Tiberius, when he endeavored to ſettle himſelf, firſt brought the Suffrages of the Senate at his own Devotion, that they durſt not but conſent to his Eſtabliſhment; and then ſo ordered the matter, that he might ſeem to do nothing, not only without their conſent; but to be forced to accept the Empire by their intreaty: ſo that you ſee, there was an Empire, in Effect, long before it was declared in Formality.
From hence, therefore, we may clearly deduce the neceſſity of this Rule in a Free-State, from the practice of times paſt, that no State can preferits Freedom, but by maintaining the free173 Suffrage of the People in full vigour, untainted with the influence, or mixture, of any Commanding Power.
A ſixth Rule in Practice hath been this; to ſee, that the people be continually trained up in the Exerciſe of Arms, and the Militia lodged onely in the Peoples hands; or that part of them, which are moſt firm to the Intereſt o•Liberty, that ſo the Power may reſt fully in the Diſpoſition of their Supream Aſſemblies. The happy conſcquence whereof, was ever to this purpoſe:
That nothing could at any time be impoſed upon the people, but by their conſent; that is, by the conſent of themſelves; or of ſuch as were by them intruſted: this was a Rule moſt ſtrictly practiſed in all the Free-States of Greece: For, as Aristotle tells us, in his fourth Book of Politicks, they ever had ſpecial care to place the Uſe and Exerciſe of Arms in the people: becauſe (ſay they) the Common-wealth is theirs who held the Arms.
The Sword, and Soveraignty, ever walk hand in hand together. The Romans were very curious in this particular, after they had gained a plenary174 poſſeſſion of Liberty in their Tribunes, and ſucceſſive Aſſemblies, Rome it ſelf, and the Territories about it, was trained up perpetually in Arms, and the whole Common-weal, by this means became one formal Militia, a generall Exerciſe of the beſt part of the people in the uſe of Arms, was the onely Bulwark of their Liberty: This was reckoned the ſureſt way to preſerve it both at home, and abroad: the Majeſty of the People being ſecured thereby, as well againſt Domeſtick Affronts from any of their own Citizens, as againſt the forraign Invaſions of bad Neighbors.
Their Arms were never lodged in the hands of any, but ſuch as had an Intereſt in the Publick; ſuch as were acted by that Intereſt not drawn only by Pay; ſuch as thought themſelves well paid, in repelling Invaders that they might with Freedome return to their Affairs: For, the truth is, ſo long as Rome acted by the pure Principles of a Free-State, it uſed no Arms to defend itſelf, but, ſuch as we call, ſufficient men; ſuch, as for the moſt part were men of Eſtate, Maſters of Families, that took Arms (only upon occaſion) pro175 Aris & Focis, for their Wives, their Children, and their Countrey. In thoſe days there was no difference, in order, between the Citizen, the Huſbandman, and the Souldier: for, he that was a Citizen, or Villager yeſterday, became a Souldier the next, if the Publick Liberty required it; and that being ſecured, by repelling of Invaders, both Forreign and Domeſtick, immediatly the Souldier became Citizen again: ſo that the firſt and beſt brave Roman Generals, and Souldiers, came from the Plough, and returned thither when the Work was over.
This was the uſual courſe even before they had gained their Tribunes and Aſſemblies; that is, in the Infancy of the Senate, immediatly after the Expulſion of their Kings: for, then even in the Senatick Aſſembly, there were ſome Sparks of Liberty in being, and they took this courſe to maintain it.
The Tarquins being driven out, but having a Party left ſtill within, that attempted to make ſeveral Invaſions, with confidence to carry all before them: and yet in the Intervalls, we find not any form of ſouldiery; only176 the Militia was lodged and exerciſed in the hands of that Party, which was firm to the Intereſt of Freedom, who upon all occaſions, drew forth at a Nod of the Senate, with little charge to the Publick, and ſo reſcued themſelves out of the Clawes of Kingly Tyranny.
Nor do we find in after ▪ times, that they p•rmitted a Depoſition, of the Arms of the Common-wealth in any other way, till that their Empire increaſing neceſſity conſtrained them to erect a continued ſtipendary Souldiery (abroad in forreign parts) either for the holding, or winning of Provinces. Then Luxury increaſing with Dominion, the ſtrict Rule and Diſcipline of Freedome was ſoon quitted ▪ Forces were kept up at home, (but what the conſequences were, ſtories will tell you) as well as in the Provinces abroad.
The Ambition of Cinna, the horid Tyranny of Sylla, the inſolence of Marius, and the ſelf-ends of divers other Leaders, both before, and after them, filled all Italy with Tragdeies, and the World with wonder: ſo that in the end, the People ſeeing what miſery177 they had brought on themſelves, by keeping their Armies within the bowels of Italy, paſſed a Law to prevent it, and to employ them abroad, or at a convenient diſtance: the Law was, That if any General marched over the River of Rubicon, he ſhould be declared a publike Enemy.
And in the paſſage of that River, this following Inſcription was erected, to put the men of Arms in mind of their duty: Imperator, ſive miles, ſive Tyrannus armatus quiſquis, ſiſtito vexillum armaquedeponito, nec citra hunc Amnem trajicitio: General, or Souldier, or Tyrant in Arms, whoſoever thou be, ſtand, quit thy Standard, and lay aſide thy Arms, or elſe croſs not this River.
For this cauſe it was, that when Caeſar had preſumed once to march over this River, he conceived himſelf ſo far ingaged, that there was no Retreat; no Game next, but have at all, advanceth to Rome it ſelf, into a poſſeſſion of the Empire.
By this means it was, the Commonwealth having loſt its Arms, loſt it ſelf too, the Power being reduced both effectually and formally into the178 hands of a ſingle Perſon, and his Dependants, who, ever after, kept the Armes out of the hands of the People.
Then followed the erecting of a Praetorian Band, inſtead of a Publick Militia, he being followed here in by Auguſtus, and the reſt of his Succeſſors, imitated of latter-times by the Grand Seignor; by Coſmus the firſt great Duke of Tuſcany; by the Muſcovi•e, the Ruſſian, the Tartar, and the French, who by that means are all Abſolute; and it was ſtrongly endeavored here too in England by the late King, who firſt attempted it by a Deſign of introducing Forreigners, viz. the German Horſe ▪ and afterwards by corrupting of the Natives; as when he laboured the Army in the North, in their return to rifle the Parliament, neglected Train-Bands; and at length, flew out him•elf into open Arms againſt the Nation.
So that you ſee, the way of Freedome hath bin to lodge the Arms of a Common-Weal•, in the hands of that part of the People, which are firm to its Eſtabliſhment.
Seve••hly that Children ſhould be179 educated and inſtructed in the Principles of Freedom ▪ Ariſtotle ſpeaks plainly to this purpoſe, ſaying; That the inſtitution of Youth, ſhould be accommodated to that Form of Government, under which they live, foraſmuch, as it makes exceedingly for preſervation of the preſent Government, whatſoever it be. The Reaſon of it appe••s in this; becauſe all the Tinctures and Impreſſion that men receive in their Youth, they retain in the full Age, though never ſo bad, unleſs they happen (which is very rare) to quell the corrupt Principles of Education by an Excellency of Reaſon, and ſound Judgment.
And for confirmation of this, we might cite the various Teſtimonies of Plutarch, Iſocrates, with many more, both Philoſophers, Orators, and others, that have treated of this particular, touching the Education of Children, as it relates either to Domeſtick, or Civil Government: But we ſhall take it for granted, without more ado, ſuppoſing none will deny, of what effect it is, in all the Concernments of Mankind, either in Converſation, or in Action.
The neceſſity of this Point, appears180 from hence, as well as the Reaſon; That if care be nor taken to temper the Youth of a Common-Wealth, with Princip•es and Humours ſuitable to that Form, no ſure ſettlement or peace, can ever be expected: for Schools, Academies with al•other Seed-plots, and Seminaries of Youth, will otherwiſe be but ſo many Nurſeries of Rebellion, publike Enemies, and unnatural Monſters that will tear the bowels of their Mother-Countrey: And this Neglect, if it follow an alteration of Government, after a Civil War, is ſo much the more dangerous; becauſe, as long as Youngſters are nuzled up in the old Ways and Rudiments, by the old ill-affected Paedagogues, there will ever be a hankering after the Old Government, which muſt ever be in a fair probability of return, when new Generations ſhall be catechiſed into old Tenets and Affections, contrary to the Eſtabliſhment of a Free-State: That being taken for the declared Intereſt of this Nation. Therefore, the conſequence of ſuch Neglect is clearly this ▪ That the Enmity will be immortal, a Sett•ement impoſſible: there muſt be a perpetual Diſpoſition to Civil-War,181 in ſtead of Civil Society.
Upon this account it was, that in Plutarch and Iſocrates, we find ſo many good Teſtimonies of the great care that was had amongſt all the Free-States of Greece in this particular, which tyed up their Paedagogues and Teachers, to certain Rules; and ſelected certain Authors to be read onely, as Claſſical, for the Inſtitution of their Youth: And, that it was ſo in the days of Julius Caeſar, even in that barbarous Country of Gallia, appeares by Caeſars own Commentaries, who tells, how that it was the main Office of thoſe famous men amongſt them called Druides, to breed up their Youth not onely in Religion, but alſo to inſtruct them in the Nature of a Common-wealth, and mould them with Principles, anſwerable to the Government.
If we reflect upon the two Grand Turns of State in Rome, the firſt, from a Monarchy to a Free-State; and then from a Free-State to a Monarchy again, they miniſter matter of notable Obſervation in this particular.
In the firſt, we find how difficult it was for the Romans to preſerve their182 Freedom when they had gotten it, becauſe moſt of the Youth had bin educated in Monarchical Principles, and ſuch Tutors were ever inclining that way upon the leaſt opportunity: ſo that the ſons even of Brutus himſelf, (who was the Founder of their Liberty) quitted that natural affection which they owed unto their Father, and Councrey; and being ſway'd by the Monarchick Principles of corrupt Education, drew in a great part of the Roman Youth, (like themſelves,) to joyn with them in a Deſign for the bringing back of the Tarquins to the Kingdom.
It is very obſervable alſo, what a do that Common-wealth had to ſettle, ſo long as any of the old ſtock of Education were living, becauſe thoſe corrupt points of Diſcipline and Government, wherewith they were ſeaſoned when young, could not be worn out with Age; but hurried many of them along with the ſtorm of every Inſurrection and Invaſion of the publike Enemy.
On the other ſide, in the Turn of a Free-State, to a Monarchy again, we ſee with what difficulty Caeſar met, in ſetling his own Domination over a People183 that had been educated in a Free-State, and in Principles of Freedom: inſomuch, that in the end it coſt him his life being ſtab'd for his Uſurpation by a combination of ſome of the Senators, and the Fact applauded not onely by the People, but by Cicero, and all the Roman Writers, and others that had been bred up under the Form of Freedom.
And afterwards, when Auguſtus took upon him the Inheritance and Title of his Uncle Caeſar, he did it, lentopede, very ſlowly and warily, for fear of conjuring up the ſame ſpirit in the people, that had flown into revenge againſt his Uncle, for his Rape upon their Liberty.
And it is Noted by Tacitus, that among the other advantages that Auguſtus had for his Eſtabliſhment, there was this: That he never declared himſelf, till, after many delayes and ſhifts, for the continuation of Power in his own hands, he got inſenſibly into the Throne, when the old men were moſt of them dead, and the young Generation grown up, having been pretty well educated and inured to his Lordly Domination. The words of184 Tacitus are theſe: All (ſaith he) was quiet in the City, the old names of the Magiſtrates remained unchanged; the young men were all born after Auguſtus his Victory at Actium: and the greateſt part of the old men, during the Civil Wars; when the Free-State was imbroiled and uſurpt (in effect, though retained ſtil in name by powerful and ambitious perſons) ſo that when he aſſumed and owned the Empire, there was not one man Living, that had ſo much as ſeen the ancient Form of Government of a Free-State; which indeed facilitated his Deſign very much, the Generation then Living, being by his Artifice and Power, bred up to his own Monarchy-Intereſt and Devotion.
We might be larger, but this is enough, to ſhew of what conſequence the careful Education of Youth, is, in the Conſtitution of Government: and therefore, without doubt, it is one eſſential point to be obſerved in the Eſtabliſhment of a Free-State, that all wayes and meanes be uſed for their ſeaſoning and inſtruction in the principles of Freedom.
The Eighth Rule, is that which more185 eſpecially relates unto the People themſelves in point of behaviour, viz. That being once poſſeſſed of Liberty; they ought to uſe it with moderation, leſt it turn to licentiouſneſs; which, as it is a Tyranny it ſelf, ſo in the end it uſually occaſions the corruption and converſion of a Free State, into Monarchical Tyranny: And therefore (by way of prevention) it is neceſſary to ſet down a few Cautions.
Firſt, That in a Free State, it is above all things neceſſary to avoid Civil Diſſention; and to remember this, That the uttermoſt Remedy is not to be uſed upon every Diſtemper or Default of thoſe that ſhall be intruſted with the Peoples Power and Authority: for, if one Inconvenience happen in Government, the correction, or curing of it by violence, introduceth a thouſand: And for a man to think Civil War, or the Sword, is a way to be ordinarily uſed for the recovery of a ſick-State, it were as great a madneſs, as to give ſtrong Waters in a high Feaver: or as if he ſhould let himſelf blood in the Heart, to cure the aking of his Head.
And therefore, ſeeing that Enormity of Tumult, Diſſention, and Sedition,186 is the main that hath bin objected by Tyrants, & their Creatures, againſt the Peoples Government, the onely Expedient to confute it is, That thoſe People, that are, or ſhall be ſetled, in a State of Freedom, do (upon all occaſions) give them the Lie, by a diſer•e•and moderate behaviour in all their proceedings, and a due reverence of ſuch as they have once elected, and made their Superiors.
And as this is moſt requiſite on the one ſide; ſo on the other ſide, if there be juſt (but they muſt be ſure it be juſt) cauſe to uſe ſharp and quick Remedies, for the Cure of a Commonwealth, then (ſeeing all Majeſty and Authority is really and fundamentally in the people, and but Miniſterially in their Truſtees, or Repreſentatives) it concerns the people by all means to ſee to the Cure.
And that is in a word, in ſuch caſes onely, as appear to be manifeſt intrenchments (either in deſign, or in being) by men of Power, upon the Fundamentals, or Eſſentials, of their Liberty, without which, Liberty cannot conſiſt.
What thoſe Eſſentials are, may be187 collected out of the paſt-diſcourſe; the ſence of all ſhall be illuſtrated by one inſtance.
It is that famous Contention which laſted for three hundred years in Rome betwixt the Senate and the People, about the dividing of ſuch Lands as were conquered and taken from the Enemy.
The Senators; they ſharing the lands amongſt themſelves, allowed little, or none, unto the people; which gave ſuch Diſcontents, that the people made a Law to curb them; enacting, That no Senator ſhould poſſeſs above 500 Acres of Land.
The Senators cryed, it was againſt their Liberty, thus to be abridged by the people: And the people cryed, it was inconſiſtent with Liberty, that the Senators ſhould thus greaten themſelvs by an ingroſment of wealth and power into their own hands. Livy ſaith, The people in this, ſaid right, and the Senators did wrong: but that they both did ill, in making it a ground of Civil Diſſention; for, in proceſs of time, when the Gracchi, who were ſuppoſed great Patrons of Liberty, took upon them to ſide with the people,188 they did, inſtead of finding out ſome moderate wayes and Expedients to reduce the Senators to Reaſon, proceed with ſuch heat and violence, that the Senate being jealous of their own ſafety, were forced to chuſe Sylla for their General: which being obſerved by the people, they alſo raiſed an Army, and made Marius their General: ſo that here you ſee in came to a down-right Civil-War.
The occaſion indeed, was given by the Senators; (for, there was no reaſon they ſhould Grandiſe themſelves in ſo groſs a manner as they did) but yet the occaſion ought not to have bin ſo taken, and proſecuted with ſuch violence as it was by the People: for ſeeing more temperate-wayes had been practiſed by their Anceſtors, and might have been found out again, to curb the Ambition of their Nobility in the Senate: Therefore, the People ought, firſt, to have tryed thoſe wayes again, and have uſed all other means to have brought things about, rather than by a milguided heat and violence to ruſh into Arms; which as it is the moſt deſperate Remedy, ſo it ought never to be uſed, but when all189 other courſes have been tried in vain, and when the Publick Liberty is really concerned by an imminent Danger, or invincible Neceſſity: For, this Quarrel, which queſtionleſs might have been compoſed was, through indiſcretion, made the ground of ſo bloudy a Civil-war, that what through Fines, Baniſhment, inhumane Cruelties, acted on both ſides, Defeats in the open Field, and Maſſacres within the City, it coſt the beſt Bloud and Eſtates of the Nobility and Commons; and in the end, it coſt them alſo their Liberty.
For it is worthy obſervation, that out of the Root of this Civil war, ſprang that Noble one, which was managed between Pompey and Caeſar, and which will ſerve to illuſtrate the other part of our diſcourſe, in ſhewing, When it is that the people may make uſe of the utmoſt, remedy; that is, in caſe of an intrenchment, manifeſtly deſigned, & acted upon the Publick Liberty. For Caeſar having given manifeſt cauſeſo Suſpition to the Senat & people, by his acting amongſt his Soldiers; and then by a down-right march with them over Rubicon towards Rome, (which was190 treaſon by the Law) this was a plain uſurpation, and drew an invincible neceſſity, upon the people, and Senate, to arm form their Liberty and commence a Civil war under the conduct of Pompey; ſo that this laſt war was neceſſary as the other was needleſſe, if they could have kept within the bounds of prudence, and moderation.
We have a very notable inſtance alſo in our own Nation, which may ſerue for a Juſt example to all the world in point of behaviour. If we run over the Catalogue of the late Kings defaults in government, we find extraordinary patience in the people, notwithſtanding his extraordinary incroachments from time to time. It were needleſs to reckon up the ſeveral Monopolies, Impoſitions, and other oppreſſions of the People, both in ſoul and body, which are made publick and known to all the World; together with that higheſt of all Practices, not onely in diſſolving Parliaments abruptly, but profeſſedly deſigning the ruine of Parliaments, in depriving the People of their due Succeſſion. Yet notwithſtanding all this, that deſperate Remedy of the Sword was forborn,192 untill invincible Neceſſity did put it into their hands, for the preſervation of themſelves, with their Rights and Liberties.
And ſo by theſe Examples, any people in a State of Freedom, may be ſufficiently inſtructed how to demean themſelves, for the avoiding of Licentiouſneſs, Tumult, and Civil Diſſention, which are the principal Inconveniences charged by Royaliſts, upon Free-States and Common-wealths: from hence, alſo, may be obſerved all the neceſſary points of prudence, and forbearance, which ought to take place in reſpect of Superiors, till it ſhall evidently appear unto a people, that there is a Deſign on foot to ſurprize and ſeize their Liberties.
A ſecond Caution, is, in relation to their Elective Power, that in all Elections of Magiſtrates, they have an eſpeciall Eye upon the Publick, in making choice of ſuch perſons onely, as have appeared moſt eminent, and active, in the Eſtabliſhment and Love of Freedom.
In ſuch hands the Guardianſhip of Liberty may be ſafely placed, becauſe ſuch men have made the Publick Intereſt,192 and their own, all one; and therefore will neither betray, nor deſert it, in proſperity or adverſity; whereas men of another qualification and temper, if they get into Authority, care not to ſerve the Publick any further, than the publike ſerves them, and will draw off and on as they find their Opportunity: Yea, and take this for a certain Rule, that if any perſon be admitted into Power, that loves not the Common-wealth, above all other conſiderations, ſuch a man is (as we ſay) every mans money; any State-Marchant may have him for a Factor: and for good conſideration, he will often make Returns upon the Publike Intereſt, have a ſtock going in every Party, and with men of every Opinion, and (if occaſion ſerve) truck with the Common-Enemy, and Commonwealth, both together.
But that you may ſee, I do not ſpeak without book, it is Ariſtotles opinion, as well as mine; who ſaith, in the firſt of his Politicks, being thus tranſlated, Per negligentiam mutatu•ſtatus Reipublicae, cum ad Poteſtates aſſumuntur illi qu•praeſentem ſtatum non amant: The Form of a Common-wealth is then193 altered by negligence, when thoſe men are taken into Power, which do not love the preſent Eſtabliſhment, it is not onely a way to preſerve a Common-wealth, to avoid thoſe that hate it, but thoſe alſo are as much to be avoided, that do not love it; that is, who are not earneſtly wedded to it by an inward active principle of Affection: And the reaſon is very evident, becauſe their Affections being of an indifferent Nature, remain ready to run out into any Form, Intereſt, or Party, that offers it ſelf upon the leaſt alteration or temptation whatſoever. For this, we might give you inſtance enough, and too much; but waving them, it may ſuffice, that moſt of the Broils, Tumults, and Civil Diſſentions, that ever hapned in Free-States, have been occaſioned by the Ambitious, Treacherous, and Indirect Practices of ſuch perſons admitted into Power, as have not been firm in their hearts to the Intereſt of Liberty.
The truth of this is (omitting many others) to be ſeen in the Romane State, after its Liberty was fully ſetled in a Succeſſion of the Peoples ſupream Aſſemblies.
194For the Nobility in the Senate, being men of another Intereſt (however they pretended) and, ſometimes by cunning, ſometimes by corrupting, getting Truſt from the People, did by combination and complyance with their Fellow-Senators, to garble, perplex, and turmoil the Peoples Affairs, Concernments, and Underſtandings, that at length, what they could never have done by force, as Oppoſites, they effected by fraud, as Friends, to deprive the People of a quiet and comfortable enjoyment of their Freedome.
A third Caution is, That in all their Elections of any into the Supream Court, or Councels, they be not led by any bent of Faction, Alliance, or Affection, and that none be taken in, but purely upon the account of merit.
The former courſe hath ever bin the occaſion of diſcontents, ſidings, and Parties.
The latter, ſtops the mouths of men, that perhaps are contrary minded, and draws the conſent and approbation of all the World, when they ſee men put in Authority, that have a clear reputation195 of tranſcendent Honeſty and Wiſdom.
A fourth Caution, is, That as it is the ſecret of Liberty, that all Magiſtrates, and publike Officers, be kept in an accountable ſtate, liable to render an account of their Behaviour and Actions; and alſo, that the people have freedom to accuſe whom they pleaſe: ſo on the other ſide, it concerns them, above all things, to avoid falſe Charges, Accuſations, Calumniations againſt Perſons in Authority, which are the greateſt abuſes and blemiſhes of Liberty, and have been the moſt frequent Cauſes of Tumult and Diſſention.
The Baniſhment, called Oſtraoiſm, among the Athenians, was inſtituted (at firſt) upon a juſt and noble ground: ſo was that called Petatiſm, among the Lacedemonians, to turn ſuch out of the Common-wealth, who had rendered themſelves ſuſpected againſt the common Liberty: but yet the abuſe of it afterwards proved moſt pernicious, to the imbroyling of thoſe States with Civil Diſſention, whenit was perverted by ſome petulant ſpirits, to an oppoſition of ſome few (and but few) of196 their beſt deſerving Citizens.
The Romans alſo, in their ſtate of Liberty, retained this freedom alſo, of keeping all perſons accountable, and accuſing whom they pleaſed, but then they were very cautious alſo, to retain that Decree of the Senate, called, Turpilianum, in full forde and vertue, whereby a ſevere-Fine was ſet on the Heads of all Calumniators, and falſe Accuſers.
The due Obſervation of this Rule preſerved that State a long time from Uſurpation by men in power on the one ſide, and from popular clamour and Tumults on the other ſide.
A fifth Caution is, That, as by all means they ſhould beware of Ingratitude, and unhandſome Returns, to ſuch as have done eminent ſervices for the Common-wealth; So it concerns them, for the publike peace and ſecurity, not to impoſe a Truſt in the hands of any perſon or perſons further, than as they may take it back again at pleaſure.
The Reaſon is, becauſe, (as the Proverb ſaith) Honores mutant mores, Honours change mens manners; Acceſſions, and Continuations of Power and197 Greatneſs, expoſe the mind to temptations: They are Sailes too big for any Bulk of Mortality to ſteer an even courſe courſe by.
The Kingdoms of the World, and the Glories of them, are Baites that ſeldome failes when the Tempter goes a fiſhing: and none but he, that was more than man, could have refuſed them. How many Free-States & Common-wealths have paid dear for their Experience in this particular? who by truſting their own ſervants too far, have been forced, in the end to receive them for their Maſters. Nor is it to be wondred at by any, conſidering that immoderate Power ſoon lets in high and ambitious thoughts; and where they are once admitted, no Deſign ſo abſur'd, or contrary to a mans principles, but he ruſheth into it, without the leaſt remorſe or conſideration: for the Spirit of Ambition, is a Spirit of Giddineſs, ir foxes men that receive it, and makes them more drunk than the ſpirit of Wine.
So that were they never ſo wiſe, juſt, and honeſt before, they afterwards become the contrary, meer ſots, non compos mentis, being hurried on without198 fear or wit, in all their undertakings, And therefore, without queſtion, it highly concerns a People that have redeemed and reſcued their Liberties out of the hands of Tyranny, and are declared a Free-State, ſo to regulate their Affairs, that all Temptations, and Opportunities of Ambition, may be removed out of the way: or elſe there follows a neceſſity of Tumult and Civil Diſſention, the common conſequence whereof hath ever been a Ruine of the publike Freedome.
This Caeſar, who firſt took Arms upon the Publick Score, and became the Peoples Leader, letting in Ambitious Thoughts to his unbounded Power, ſoon ſhook hands with his firſt Friends and Principles, and became another man: ſo that upon the firſt fair Opportuniry, he turn'd his Armes on the Publick Liberty.
Thus did Sylla ſerve the Senate, and Marius alſo the People, being the ſame Tyrant, in effect, though not in name, nor in an open manner.
Thus did Piſiſtratus at Athens, Agathocles in Sicily, Coſmos, Soderino, and Savaranola in Florence, Caſtrucio in199 Luca, and others, in many other places: Nor muſt it be forgotten what the Family of Orange would have done in Holland; for upon the very ſame account have Uſurpations bin commenced in all Free-States throughout the World.
The Ninth, and laſt Rule, for preſervation of the Publick Freedome, is this, That it be made an unpardonable Crime, to incur the guilt of Treaſon againſt the Intereſtand Majeſty of the People.
And for the clearing of this, it will be requiſite to muſter up thoſe various Particulars that come within the compaſs of Treaſon, according to the Practice, and Opinion of other Nations. The 1. remarkable Treaſon in old Rome, after its Eſtabliſhment in a State of Freedome, was that of Brutus his ſons, who entered into a formal Conſpiracy for the bringing back of the Tarquins to the Kingdom by force of Arms.
This Brutus was the Founder of the Roman Liberty; and therefore one would have thought the young men might have obtained an eaſie pardon: But ſuch was the zeal of the Romans,200 for the preſervation of their Freedom, that they were all put to death without mercy; and, that all others in time to come, might be deprived of the leaſt hope of being ſpared upon the like occaſion, their own Father was the man moſt forward to bring them to Execution.
This was Treaſon in groſs: but in after-time, there ſtarted up more refined pieces of Treaſon; as may be collected out of the Actions of Maelius and Manlius, two perſons that had deſerved highly of the Common wealth; but eſpecially the latter, who ſaved it from ruine, when the Gauls had beſieged the Capitol.
Nevertheleſs, preſuming afterwards upon the People, becauſe of his extraordinary Merits, He, by greating himſelf beyond the ſize of a good Citizen; and entertaining Thoughts and Counſels of ſurpriſing the Peoples Liberties, was condemned to death; but yet not without the Peoples pitty (as indeed it was an unhappy Neceſſity, that they ſhould be forced to deſtroy him that had ſaved them from deſtruction)201 To the ſame end came Maelius alſo, upon the like occaſion.
Another ſort of Treaſon there was contrived likewiſe againſt that People;
And that was by thoſe Magiſtrates, called the Decemviri, touching whoſe Actions, and the Ground of their Condemnation, I onely let you know,
That you may be ſufficiently informed by other Pens then mine; ſuch as the Hiſtorian Livy, Pomponius, Dionyſius, and others, that have written of the Roman Affaires and Antiquities.
A fourth ſort of Treaſon againſt that People, was manifeſt Uſurpation, acted over and over, long before the time of Caeſar.
Some other Particulars alſo, there were, of leſs conſideration, that came within the compaſs of Treaſon; And in all, they were very ſtrict to vindicate the Intereſt of the Common-Wealth, without reſpect of Perſons.
202To thoſe paſſages out of the old Common-wealth of Rome, let us add the reſt we have to ſay about this point, out of the practices of the preſent State of Venice, the moſt exact for Punctillo's of that Nature that ever was in the World; and therefore, queſtionleſs, it is the moſt principal cauſe of her ſo long continuance: It is, there, Death without mercy, for any man to have the leaſt attempt, or thought, of conſpiring againſt the Common-weal, and in ſeveral other Caſes, as followeth.
Secondly, it is Treaſon in caſe any Senator betray Counſels: there it is an unpardonable Crime, and ſuch a mortal ſin, that draws on Death without mercy.
This ſeverity alſo, was retained in the Roman State, where ſuch as became guilty of this Crime, were either burnt alive, or hanged upon a Gibber: Hereupon, (ſaith Valerius Max. lib. 2.) when any matter was delivered, or debated, it was, as if no man had heard a ſyllable of what had been ſaid among ſo many: From whence it came to paſs, that the Decrees of their Senate were called Tacita, that is to ſay;203 things concealed; becauſe never diſcovered, untill they came to Execution.
Thirdly, it is Treaſon, without mercy, for any Senators, or other Officers of Venice, to receive Gifts, or Penſions, from any forreign Prince, or State, upon any pretence whatſoever. It was an old Proverb among the Heathens, That the gods themſelves might be taken with gifts: and therefore the conſequences muſt needs be dangerous, in the inferiour Courts of States and Princes; ſince nothing can be carryed in this Caſe, according to Native Intereſt, and Sound Reaſon; but onely by Pluralities of Forreign Dictates, and Compliances: But in Venice they are ſo free from this treacherous Impiety, that all States which tranſact with them, muſt do it above-board, conſult before-hand with their brains, and not their purſes: ſo that (as Thuanus ſaith) the King of France needs not uſe much labour to purchaſe an Intereſt with any Prince, or State in Italy, unleſs it be the Venetian Republick, where all Forreign Compliances, and Penſioners, are puniſhed with utmoſt ſeverity; but eſcape well enough, in other places.
204Fourthly, It is Treaſon for any of her Senators to have any private Conference with Forreign Ambaſſadors and Agents. It is very obſervable alſo, among our Neighbours of the Low-Countries, that one Article of the Charge, whereby they took off Barnevelts head, was, for that he held familiarity and converſe with the Spaniſh Ambaſſador, at the ſame time when Spain was an Enemy.
Thus you have a brief Deſcription of Treaſon, in the moſt notable kinds of it, according to the Cuſtomes and Opinions of two of the moſt eminent Free-States, (which may ſerve inſtead of all the reſt) that hath been in the World; who, as a principal Rule and Means for the preſervation of Freedom, made it a Crime unpardonable, to incur the guilt of Treaſon, in any of theſe kinds, againſt the Intereſt and Majeſty of the People in a Free-State,
We now return to the former main Point of this Diſcourſe, in tracing out the Remainders of thoſe Errours that have been received in the Practice of Policy.
205A fourth error in Policy & which is indeed Epidemical, hath been the Regulation of affaires by Reaſon of State, not by the ſtrict Rule of Honeſt. But for fear be miſtaken, you are to underſtand, that by Reaſon of State here, we do not condemn the equitable Reſults of prudence & right Reaſon: for upon determinations of this nature depends the ſafety of all ſtates, and princes; but that reaſon of ſtate that flowes from a corrupt principle to an indirect end; that reaſon of ſtate, which is the ſtates mans reaſon, or rather his will and luſt, when he admits Ambition to be a reaſon, Perferment, Power, Profit, Revenge, and Opportunity, to be reaſon, ſufficient to put him upon any deſigne of Action that may tend to the preſent advantage; though contrary to the Law of God, or the law of common honeſty & of Nations.
A more lively deſcription of this ſtrange Pocus called Reaſon of State, take as followeth. It is the moſt ſoveraign Commudaer, & the moſt important Counſellor. Reaſon of State is the Care and compaſs of the ſhip, the life of a State. That which anſwers all objections, and quarrels, about Mall206 government. That's it, which makes War, impoſes Taxes, cuts off Offenders, pardons Offenders, ſends and treats Ambaſſadors.
It can ſay and unſay, do and undo, baulk the Common Road, make High-wayes to become By-wayes, and the furtheſt about, to become the neareſt Cut. If a difficult Knot come to be untied, which neither the Divine by Scripture, nor Lawyer by Caſe or precedent can untie, then Reaſon of State, or a hundred wayes more, which Idiots knows not, diſſolves it. This is that great Empreſs which the Italians call Raggione diſtat•. It can rant as a Souldier, complement as a Monfieur, trick it as a Juggler, ſtrut it as a States man and is as changable as the Moon, in the variety of her appearances.
But we may take notice of a more excellent way in oppſition to this ſandy Foundation of Policy, called Reaſon of State, viz. a ſimple reliance upon God in the vigorous and preſent actings of all Righteouſneſs, expreſt by honeſt men, in plain language, to this effect; Fiat juſtitia, & fractus illabatur Orbis; Deal uprightly, walke cloſe207 and real to your promiſes, and principles, though the Fabrick of Heaven and earth ſhould fall, yet God is able to ſupport, he expects but ſo much faith as will counterpoiſe a grain of muſtard-ſeed. Beſides, in following ſingly, a juſt and righteous principle, a man gains this aduantage, that we may go on boldly, with a mind free from that torturing ſollicitude of ſucceſs, (he is ſubject to none of thoſe heats and colds, thoſe fits and frights, wherewith men are perpetually vexed, for fear of diſcovery or miſcarriage, when they have once intangled themſelves in any by-acting of Engagements) he either proſpers, to the great good of his Nation, or elſe dies with honour and triumph.
But thoſe that follow the other principle of Humane Invention, and ſerve that Italian Goddeſs, Raggione di Stato, they may live a while as gods, but ſhall die like men, and periſh like one of the Princes.
But becauſe words will not ſerve the turn, take a few Examples of thoſe many, that might be fetcht from all Ages, and Nations. It was Reaſon of State, made Pharoah hold the Iſraelites208 in bondage, and afterwards, when they were freed, to endeavour to bring them back again to their old ſlavery: but you know what he came to; It was Reaſon of State, that made Saul to ſpare Agag, and plot the ruine of David.
It was Reaſon of State, that made Jeroboam to ſet up Calves in Dan and Bethel.
It was Reaſon of State, (and a ſhrew'd one too) when Achitophel cauſed Abſalom, to defile his Fathers Concubines in the ſight of all Iſrael. You know what end they both came to. It was the ſame, that cauſed Abner, firſt, to take part with the houſe of Saul, and that cauſed Joab to kil him after he came to be his Rival in Fame, and the Favour of David: their Ends were both bloudy.
Hence it was, that Solomon having pardoned Adonijah, thought fit afterwards to put him to death, upon a very ſlender occaſion.
And Jehu, though he had Warrant from God to deſtroy all the houſe of Ahab his Maſter; yet, becauſe in the Execution of it, he mingled Reaſon of State, in relation to his own Intereſt,209 and minded the Eſtabliſhment of himſelf thereby, more than the Command and Honour of God, in the Execution of Juſtice: therefore God curſed him for his pains, threatning by the mouth of the Prophet Hoſea, to avenge the bloud of Ahabs family upon the houſe of Jehu.
It was Reaſon of State, that moved Herod to endeavour the deſtruction of Chriſt, as ſoon as he was born.
It was Reaſon of State in the Jewes, (leſt the Romans ſhould come and take away their Place and Nation) and in Pilate, (leſt he ſhould be thought no friend to Caeſar) that made them both joyn in crucifying the Lord of Glory, and incur that heavy Curſe, which at length fell upon the Jewiſh Place and Nation.
It is Reaſon of State, that makes the Pope and the Cardinals ſtick ſo cloſe one to another, and binds them and the Monarchs of Chriſtendom in one common Intereſt, for the greatning of themſelves, and the inſlaving of the People; for which, a ſad deſtruction doth attend them.
It was Reaſon of State, that deſtroyed ſo many millions of men (forboth) in210 the Holy War; that ſo Princes might not have time to take notice of the Popes Uſurpation, nor the People leiſure and opportunity to call their Princes to an account for their unbounded Tyranny.
It was Reaſon of State, that was pleaded in behalf of Borgia, to juſtifie all his Villanies, in wading through ſo much bloud and miſchief to a Principality in Italy; but he eſcaped not, to enjoy the fruit of all his labour.
It was the ſame Devil, that made Henry the 4 of France, to renounce his Religion, and turn Papiſt, to ſecure himſelf from Popiſh Reveng; but God pur•ſht him, and ſent a Popiſh Dagger through his heart.
It made Richard the Third in England, to butcher his own Nephew; for which vengeance purſued him, being at laſt tied a thwart a horſe back naked and bloudy, like a Calf of the Shambles.
It made Henry the 7 ▪ to extinguiſh the Line of Plantag•n•t, and his Son after him, not onely to dabble his hands in the bloud of many, but to perſecute the Proteſtants, not withſtanding that he fell heavy alſo upon the Papiſts.
211It made his Daughter Mary to fill up the meaſure of her Fathers iniquities, as they could not be expiated by the vertues of her ſiſter, and Succeſſor, whoſe onely fa•••was, in following Reaſon of State ſo far, as to ſerve the Intereſt of Monarchy, above that of Religion, by upholding an Order of Prelacy; ſo that in her the direct Line of that Family ended.
After this, it was wicked Reaſon of State, that continued Monarchy, and brought in a Scotch-man upon us. This was James, who was ſo great an Admirer of Reaſon of State, that he adopted it for its own Darling, by the name of King-craft: and his Motto, No Biſhop no King, ſhewed, that he prefer'd Reaſon of State, before the Intereſt of Religion; as in other things, before honeſty: witneſs, among many other, his quitting the Cauſe of God, and the Patatinate, to keep fair with the houſe of Auſtria: for which, and for the ſame Reaſon of State, put in practice by his Son Charles, for the ruine of Religion and Liberty, by a bloudly war, the whole Family hath been brought to•ad deſtruction.
Theſe Examples are ſufficient to212 ſhew that Reaſon of State, prefer'd before the Rule of Honeſty, is an Errour in Policy with a vengeance; as they that will not believe, ſhall be ſure to feel i•, ſince it brings unavoidable Ruine, not onely to particular perſons, but upon whole Families, and Nations.
A fifth Errour in Policy hath been this, viz. a permitting of the Legiſlative and Executive Powers of a State, to reſt in one and the ſame hands and perſons. By the Legiſlative Power, we underſtand the Power of making, altering, or repealing Laws, which in all well-ordered Governments, hath ever been lodged in a ſucceſſion of the ſupream Councels of Aſſemblies of a Nation.
By the Executive Power, we mean that Power which is derived from the other, and by their Authority tranſfer'd into the hand or hands of one Perſon, (called a Prince) or into the hands of many (called States) for the adminiſtration of Government, in the Execution of thoſe Laws. In the keeping of theſe two Powers diſtinct, flowing in diſtinct Channels, ſo that they may never meet in one, ſave upon213 ſome ſhort extraordinary occaſion conſiſts the ſafety of a State.
The Reaſon is evident; becauſe if the Law-makers, (who ever have the Supream Power) ſhould be alſo the conſtant Adminiſtrators and Diſpencers of Law and Juſtice, then (by confequence) the People would be left without Remedy, in caſe of Injuſtice, ſince no Appeal can lie under Heaven againſt ſuch as have the Supremacy; which, if once admitted, were inconſiſtent with the very intent and natural import of true Policy: which ever ſuppoſeth, that men in Power may be unrighteous; and therefore (preſuming the worſt) points alwayes, in all determinations, at the Enormities and Remedies of Government, on the behalf of the People.
For the clearing of this, it is worthy your obſervation; that in all Kingdomes and States whatſoever, where they have had any thing of Freedom among them, the Legiſlative and Executive Powers have been managed in diſtinct hands: That is to ſay, the Lawmakers have ſet down Laws, as Rules of Government; and then put Power into the hands of others (not their own) to govern by thoſe Rules; by214 which means the people were happy, having no Governours, but ſuch as were liable to give an account of Government to the ſupream Councel of Law-Makers. And on the other ſide, it is no leſs worthy of a very ſerious obſervation; That Kings and ſtanding States never became abſolute over the People, till they brought both the making and execution of Lawes into their own hands: and as this Uſurpation of theirs took place by degrees, ſo unlimited Arbitrary Power crept up into the Throne, there to domineet o're the World, and defie the Liberties of the People.
Cicero, in his ſecond Book de Offic., and his third, de Legibus, ſpeaking of the firſt inſtitution of Kings, tells us, how they were at firſt left to govern at their own diſcretion without Laws. Then their Wills, and their Words, were Law, the ma••ing and execution of Lawes was in one and the ſame hands.
But what was the conſequence? Nothing but Injuſtice, and Injuſtice without Remedy, till the People were taught by Neceſſity to ordain Lawes, as Rules whereby they ought to govern. 215Then began the meeting of the People ſucceſſively in their ſupream Aſſemblies, to make Laws; whereby Kings (in ſuch places as continued under the Kingly Form) were limited and reſtrained, ſo that they could do nothing in Government, but what was agreeable to Law; for which they were accountable, as well as other Officers were in other Forms of Government, to thoſe ſupream Councels and Aſſemblies: Witneſs all the old ſtories of Athens, Sparta, and other Countries of Greece, where you ſhall find, that the Law-making, and the Law-executing Powers, were placed in diſtinct hands under every Form of Government: For, ſo much of Freedom they retained ſtill under every Form, till they were both ſwallowed up (as they were ſeveral times) by an abſolute Domination.
In old Rome, we find Romulus their firſt King cut in pieces by the Senate, for taking upon him to make and execute Laws at his own pleaſure. And Livy tells us, that the reaſon why they expel'd Tarquin their laſt King, was, becauſe he took the Executive and Legiſlative Powers both into his own216 hands, making: himſelf both Legiſlator, and Officer, inconſulto〈◊〉without advice, and in defiance of the Senate.
Kings being caſhier'd, then their Standing-Sonates came in play, who making and executing Laws, by Decrees of their own ▪ ſoongrew intolerable, and put the people upon divers deſperate Adventures, to get the Legiſlative Power out of their hands, and place it in their own; that is, in a ſucceſſion of their Supream Aſſemblies: But the Executive Power they left, part in the hands of Officers of their own, and part in the Senate; in which State it continued ſome hundreds of years, to the great happineſs and content of all, till the Senate by ſleights and ſubtilties got both Powers into their own poſſeſſion again, and turned all into confuſion,
Afterwards, their Emperors (though Uſurpers) durſt not at firſt turn both theſe Powers into the Channel of their own unbounded Will; but did it by degrees, that they might the more infenſibly deprive the people of their Liberty, till at length they openly made and executed Laws at their own217 pleaſures, being both Legiſlators and Officers, without giving〈…〉and ſo there was an end of the Roman Liberty.
To come nearer home, let us look into the old Conſtitution of the Common-wealths, and Kingdomes of Europe. We find in the I••lian States; Venice, which having the Legiſlative and Executive Power, confined within the narrow Pale of its Nobility in the Senate, is not ſo free as once Florence was with Siena, Millan, and the reſt; before their Dukes, by arrogating both thoſe Powers to themſelves, worm'd them out of their Liberty.
Of all thoſe States there, onely Genoa remains in a free poſture, by keeping the Power of Legiſlation onely in their ſupream Aſſemblies, and leaving the Execution of Law in a titular Duke, and a Councel, the keeping of theſe Powers aſunder within their proper Sphere, is one principal Reaſon why they have been able to exclude Tyranny out of their own State, while it hath run the Round in Italy.
What made the Grand Seignior abſolute of old, but his ingroſſing both theſe Powers? and of late218 the Kings of Spain and France? In ancient time the caſe ſtood far otherwiſe; for in Ambroſio Morales his Chronicle you will finde, that in Spain the Legiſlative power was lodged onely in their ſupreme Councel, and their King was no more but an elective Officer, to execute ſuch Laws as they made, and in caſe of failing, to give them an accompt, and ſubmit to their judgements, which was the common practice; as you may ſee alſo in Mariana: It was ſo alſo in Aragon, till it was united to Castile, by the Mariage of Ferdimand, and Iſabel; and then both States ſoon loſt their liberty, by the projects of Ferdimand and his ſucceſſors, who drew the powers of Legiſlation and Execution of Law, within the verge and influence of the Prerogative Royall: whileſt theſe two powers were kept diſtinct, then theſe States were free; but the ingroſſing of them in one and the ſame hands, was the loſſe of their Freedom.
France likewiſe was once as free as any Nation under Heaven, though the King of late hath done all, and been all in all, till the time of Lewis219 the eleventh: he was no more but an Officer of State; regulated by Law, to ſee the Laws put in execution; and the Legiſlative Power (that) reſted in the Aſſembly of the 3. Eſtates; but Lewis, by ſnatching both theſe Powers into the ſingle hands of himſelfe, and his ſucceſſors, rookt them of their Liberty; which they may now recover again, if they have but ſo much manhood, as to reduce the two Powers into their ancient, or into better Channels.
This pattern of Lewis was followed cloſe by the late King of England, who by our ancient Laws, was the ſame here, that Lewis ought to have been in France, an Officer in truſt, to ſee to the execution of the Lawes: but by aiming at the ſame ends which Lewis attained, and ſtraining, by the ruine of Parliaments, to reduce the Legiſlative Power, as well as the Executive into his own hands, he inſtead of an abſolute Tyranny, which might have followed his project, brought a ſwift deſtruction upon himſelf and Family.
Thus you ſee it appears, that the keeping of theſe two Powers diſtinct,220 hath been a ground preſervative of the peoples Intereſt, whereas their uniting hath been its ruine all along in ſo many Ages and Nations.
A ſixth errour in Policy, obſervable in the practices of other times and Nations, hath been a reducing tranſactions, and in Inetreſt of the Publick, into the diſpoſition and power of a few particuler perſons. The ill conſequences where of have ever bin theſe; that matters were not wont to be carried by fair, freindly, and legal debates, but by Deſign and Surpriſal; not by freedom, and conſent of the people, in their open Aſſemblies; but according to the premeditated Reſolutions, and foreſtalments of Crafty prijectors in private Cabinets, and Junto's; not according to the true Intereſt of State, but in order to the ſerving of mens ends; not for the benefit, and improvement of the people, but to keep them under as ignorant of true Liberty, as the Horſe and Mule; that they might be Bridled and Sadled, & Ridden under the wiſe pretences of being Governed and kept in Order. But the Grand and worſe conſequences of all, hath been this;221 that ſuch Collegues, Partners, and Ingroſſers of Power having once brought about their ends by lying practies upon the people; have ever•a•n into fits of Emulation againſt themſelves, and the next deſign hath ever bin to rook their fellows, and rid themſelves of competitors, ſo that at length they have been their own executioners, and ruined one another. And had it been only the deſtruction of themſelves, the matter were not conſiderable; but the people having by this means been torn with Civill diſſentions, and the miſeries of War, by being drawn into Parties, according to their ſeverall humors and affections; the uſuall event ever was, that in the end they have been ſeized as the prey of ſome ſingle Tyrant.
An example of this there was in the State of Athens, under the Government of thoſe thirty men, who uſurped the power into their own hands, and were afterwards called the thirty Tyrants, for their odious behaviour; for Xenophon tells us, that they drew the determinations of all things into their own Cloſets, but ſeemed to manage them calculis & ſuffragiis Plebis,222 by the Votes of the people, which they had brought to their own devotion in the Aſſembly, to countenance their proceedings. And their cuſtom was, if any ſort of men complained, and murmured at their doings; or appeared for the Publique, immediately to ſnap them off by the loſſe of life or fortune, under a pretence of being ſeditions, and turbulent fellows againſt the peace of their Tyranny. Theſe Juncto-men had not been many moneths in poſſeſſion; but they began to quarrel with one another; and the reaſon why the game went not on, againſt one another, was becauſe the people took it out of their hands, and diverted the courſe of their ſpleen againſt each other, into a care of mutuall defence, they being aſſaulted on every ſide, by popular arme and clamors, for the recovery of liberty. So you ſee the event of theſe thirty mens combination, was no leſſe then a civill War; and it ended in their baniſhment. But as great a miſchief followed, for a new Junto of ten men got into their places, whoſe Government proving little leſſe odious than the〈◊〉, gave an occaſion to new223 changes, which never left ſhifting, till at laſt they fell into a ſingle Tyranny. And the wilder ſort of people, having by a ſad experience, felt the fruits of their own error, in following the luſts and parties of particular powerful perſons, grew wiſe; and combining with the honeſter ſort, they all as one man, ſet their ſhoulders to the work, and reſtored the primitive Majeſty, and Authority of their ſupreme Aſſemblies.
Herodotus in his ſecond Book, tells us, that Monarchy being aboliſhed in Egypt, after the death of King Setho, and a Declaration publiſhed for the freedom of the people, immediately the Adminiſtration of all Affaires, was ingroſſ't in the hands of twelve Grandees, who having made themſelves ſecure againſt the people in a few years, fell to quarrelling with one another (as the manner is) about their ſhare in the Government. This drew the people into ſeverall parties, and ſo a civill Warre enſued; wherein Pſummeticus (one of the twelve) having ſlain all his Partners, left the people in the lurch, and inſtead of a free State, ſeated himſelf in the poſſeſſion224 of a ſingle Tyranny.
But of all old inſtances, the moſt famous are the two Triumvirates that were in Rome. The firſt was that of Pomp•y, Caeſar, and Craſſus, who having drawn the affairs of the Empire, and the whole World into their own particular hands, acting and determining all in a private•unto of their own, without the advice or conſent of the Senate and people, unleſs it were now and then to make ſtalking horſes of them, for the more clearly conveyance of ſome unpleaſing deſign: Theſe men, having made an agreement among themſelves, that nothing ſhould be done in the Commonwealth, but what pleaſed their own humor, it was not long ere the ſpirit of Ambition ſet them flying at the faces of one another, and drew the whole World upon the Stage, to act that bloody Tragedy, whoſe Ca•aſtrophe was the death of Pompey, and the Dominion of Caeſar. The ſecond Trimuvirate was erected after the fatall ſtab given to Caeſar in the Senate, between Octavius (afterwards Emperor by the name of Auguſtus,) Lopidus, and Antony: theſe having drawn all225 Affairs into their own hands, and ſhared the World between them, preſently fell abandying againſt one another. Auguſtus picking a quarrell with Lepidus, gave him a lift out of his Authority, and confined him to a cloſe impriſonment in the City. This being done firſt, he had the more hope and opportunity next for the outing of Anthony: he picks a quarrel with him too, begins a new civill Warre, wherein Rome and a great part of the World was engaged to ſerve his ambition; and things being brought to the deciſion of a Battell, and the ruine of Anthony, he afterwards ſeated, and ſecured himſelf in the injoyment of a ſingle Tyranny.
Omitting many other inſtances here in England, it is worthy obſervation, that in the great conteſt between Henry the third, and the Barons, about the liberties of themſelves and the people, the King being forced at length to yield, the Lords inſtead of freeing the Nation indeed, ingroſſed all power into their own hands, under the name of the Twenty-foure Conſervators of the Kingdom, and behaved themſelves like totidem. 226Tyranny, ſo many Tyrants acting all in their own Names, and in〈◊〉of their own, wholly neglecting, or elſe over-ruling Parliaments. But then not agreeing among themſelves, there were three or four of them defeated the other twenty, and drew the intire management of Affairs into their own hands, viz. the Earles of Leiceſter, Glouceſter, Hereford, and Spencer; yet it continued ſo not long; for, Leiceſter getting all into his own power, fell at enmity with Glouceſter, and was defeated by him.
At length, Leiceſter putting his Fortune to a Battel, was ſlain; and the King thereupon, getting all power back again took advantage of that opportunity for the greatning of himſelf, and Prerogative.
And ſo you ſee, All that the people got by the effuſion of their bloud, and loſs of their peace, was, That inſtead of one Tyrant, they had Twenty Four, and then Four; and after them, a ſingle Uſurper, (which was Monfort, Earl of Leiceſter) and he being gone, they were forced to ſerve their old Tyrant Henry the Third again, who by this means, became the more ſecure and227 firm in his Tyranny: wherein if they had dealt like men of honour, and made the Nation as free as they pretended, not ingroſſing all into their own private hands, but inſtating the liberty of England, Paramount above the regall prerogative, in a due and conſtant courſe of ſucceſſive Parliaments, (without which, liberty is but a meere name and ſhadow) then all the ſucceeding inconveniences had been ſurely prevented: the bloody bickering afterwards might have been avoided, their own perſons and honors preſerved, Kings either caſhiered or regulated; as they ought to have been, and the whole Nation freed from thoſe after-gripes and pa•gs; inflicted by that Henry and his corrupt Line of ſucceſſors.
The World affords many inſtances of this kinde, but theſe are ſufficient to manifeſt the fatall conſequences that have happened, in permitting publick〈◊〉and intereſts to be ingroſſed, and reſt in the power of a few particuler perſons; and that it deſerves to be markt (as one faith) with a black Cole, as a moſt permitions error••Policy.
226228A ſeventh error in Policy, is the driving of Factions and Parties. Now that you may know what Factiou is, and which is the factious Party in any State or Kingdom, afflicted with that infirmity ▪ the onely way is firſt to finde out the true and declared Intereſt of State; and then if you obſerve any Deſignes, Counſels, Actings, or Perſons, moving in oppoſition to that which is the true publick Intereſt, it may be infallibly concluded, that there lies the Faction; and the factious Party, which is ſo much the more dangerous, in regard it not only afflicts and tears Common-wealths with diviſions and diſcords ▪ at home, but in the end expoſes them to the mercy (or rather) the malice of ſome publick enemy, either at home, or from abroad, and brings a ſad deſolation, and ruine upon the Eſtates, lives, and liberties of the people.
There is a notable faction we read of in this Roman ſtory, which was that of the Decemviri, who being intruſted with the Government, and the time of their truſt expired, they inſtead of making a Reſignation, combined together for the Perpetuation of229 the power in their own hands, contrary to the intent of their firſt Election, and in defiance of that which twelve moneths before had been declared the intereſt of the Commonwealth. The grand Engineer among them was Appius Clandius, who managed his deſigne by promiſing the Nobility, that if they would ſtick to the Decemviri, then the Decemviri would ſtick to them, and joyn with them, in keeping under the people and their Tribunes, and to defeat them of their ſucceſſive Aſſemblies. By this means he ſowed the ſeeds of an immortall enmity between the Senate and the people; though himſelf and his Collegues were notwithſtanding deceived of their own eſtabliſhment, and ſoon caſheired from their imperious Domination.
If we conſider alſo what befell Carthage, and how it came to ruine: the ſtory tells us, it was occaſioned by their Factions, the whole Senate being divided betwixt two potent Families of Hannibal and Hanno; by which means they were diſinabled, from carrying on their Warre with Unanimity and alacrity, as was requiſite230 againſt ſuch wary Gameſters, as the Romans, who made ſuch uſe of their Civil Diſſentions, that they ſoon laid the glory of that famous Republick in the duſt.
It was Faction and Civil Diſſention that deſtroyed Rome it ſelf; that is to ſay, her Liberty, and made her ſtoop under the Yoak of Caeſar.
And it muſt not be omitted, that when her Liberty was firſt eſtabliſhed, and Tarquin expelled, he had like to have made his way back again, by reaſon of their Diviſions. And though he miſt his aym there, yet Piſiſtratus, another Tyrant, being driven out of Athens, made a ſhift to get in again, by reaſon of their mutual Diviſions.
It was the ſame Devil of Faction, and Civil Diſſention, (as Philip de Comines tells us) that made way for the Turk into Hungaria, as it let him in before into Conſtantinople, that admitted the Goths and Vandals into Spain and Italy; the Romans into Jeruſalem, firſt under Pompey; and afterwards under Veſpatian and Titus.
It was the cauſe why Genoa, for a time was content to ſubmit to the Family of Sforza, Dukes of Millan. It231 brought the Spaniard into Sicily and Naples; and the French once into Millain, where they outed the aforenamed Family of Sferza.
From hence, therefore, let us conclude, that no Errour is more dangerous, no Treaſon more pernicious to a Common-wealth, than the driving of Faction.
An Eighth and laſt Errour obſervable in practice of Times, and Nations, hath been a violation of Faith, Principles, Promiſes, and Engagements, upon every Turn of Time, and advantage. An Impiety that ought to be exploded out of all Nations, that bear the Name of Chriſtians: And yet we find it often paſs, among the leſs diſcerning ſort of men, for admirable Policy: and thoſe Impoſtors that uſed it, have had the luck to be eſteemed the onely Politicians. But yet, leſt ſo many wiſe men of the World, as have been given up to this monſtrous vanity, ſhould be thought to have no reaſon for it, I remember, I find it uſually expreſt in Machiavel, to be this, becauſ the greateſt part of the world being wicked, unjuſt, deceitful, full of treachery and circumvention, there is a Neceſſity232 that thoſe which are down-right, and confine themſelves to the ſtrict Rule of Honeſty, muſt ever look to be overreached by the Knavery of others. And take this for certain, (ſaith he) Quiſe virum bonum omnibus partibus profiteri ſtudet, eum certe inter tot non bonos periclituri neceſſe eſt.) He which endeavours to approve himſelf an honeſt man to all parties, muſt of neceſſity miſcarry among ſo many that are not honeſt: Becauſe ſome men are wicked and perſidious, I muſt be ſo too. This is a ſad inference, and fit onely for the practice of Italy, where he wrote it.
The antient Heathen would have loathed this; and the Romans (who were the nobleſt of them all) did in all their actions deteſt it, reckoning plain honeſty to have been the onely Policy, and the foundation of their Greatneſs, (•avendo pietati fideique, populus Romanus ad tantum faſtigii pervenerit) The people of Rome attained to ſo great a height, by obſerving Faith and Piety: whereof you ſhall ſee an Inſtance or two.
In the War between them, and Porſena King of the Tuſcans, it ſo happened233 that their City was beſieged by Porſena: but peace being made, upon ſome advantagious Conditions for the Tuſcans, the Romanes, for the performance of their Conditions, were forced to yield up divers Noble Virgins.
Theſe Virgins, after ſome time, made an eſcape from the Tuſcans, and came back to Rome, but were demanded again.
Hereupon the Senate, though they were then recovered, and in a poſture, able to have defied the Tuſcans, and denied the performance of thoſe harſh Conditions, choſe rather to preſerve their Faith inviolable, then to take the preſent advantage; and ſo delivered up the Virgins.
The behaviour alſo of Attilius Regulus, is very memorable, who being priſoner at Carthage, and condemned to a cruel Death, was, notwithſtanding, permitted to go to Rome, upon his bare Paroll, to propound certain Terms to the Senate; which if they yielded, then he was to have his liberty: if not, he was to return again to Carthage, and to ſuffer.
The Senate not yielding, He, rather234 then violate his Faith, did return, and ſuffer, being put into a Barrel ſpiked with Nails, and tumbled down a Hill by the Carthag•nians. No•was i•the temper onely of a few perſons; but general throughout the whole Nation, as might be ſhown by innumerable Examples; eſpecially in their Leagues and Treaties with other Nations.
But that you may the better know, and avoid the impious Impoſtors, I ſhall repreſent them in Machiavels own language; who in that unworthy book of his, entituled, The Prince, hath made a moſt unhappy Deſcription of the Wiles that have been uſed by thoſe Jugglers; and thereby left a Leſſon upon Record, which hath been practiſed ever ſince by all the State-Rooks in Chriſtendom. And therefore, ſince they have made ſo ill uſe of it, I ſuppoſe the beſt way to prevent the further operation of the poyſon, is, to ſet it down here before you, (as I ſhall do verbati•, without adding or diminiſhing a ſyllable) and then make two or three Inferences thereupon, for the practice of the people.
In what manner Princes ought to keep their Words. How commendable235 in a Prince it is to keep his Word, and live with Integrity, not making uſe of Cunning and Subtilty, every one knows well: yet we ſee by Experience, in theſe our dayes, that thoſe Princes have effected great matters, who have made ſmall reckoning of keeping their words, and have known by their Craft, how to turn and wind men about, and in the end overcome thoſe who have grounded upon the Truth.
You muſt then know, there are two kinds of Combating or Fighting: the one, by Right of the Laws: the other, meerly by Force. That firſt way is proper to Men: The other is alſo common to Beaſts. But becauſe the firſt many times ſuffices not, there is a neceſſity to make recourſe to the ſecond: wherefore, it behoves a Prince to know how to make good uſe of that part which belongs to a Beaſt, as well as that which is proper to a Man.
This part hath been covertly ſhew'd to Princes by antient Writers; who ſay, that Achilles, and many others of thoſe antient Princes, were intruſted to Chiron the Centaure, to be brought up under his Diſcipline: The morall236 of this, having for their Teacher, one that was half a Beaſt, and half a Man, was nothing elſe, but that it was needful for a Prince to underſtand how to make his advantage of the one, and other Nature, becauſe neither could ſubſiſt without the other.
A Prince then being neceſſitated to know how to make uſe of that part belonging to a Beaſt, ought to ſerve himſelf of the Conditions of the Fox, and the Lyon; for the Lyon cannot keep himſelf from Snares, nor the Fox defend himſelf againſt the Wolves. He had need then be a Fox, that he may beware of the Snares; and a Lyon, that he may ſcare the Wolves. Thoſe that ſtand wholly upon the Lyon, underſtand not themſelves.
And therefore a wiſe Prince cannot, nor ought not to keep his Faith given, when the obſervance thereof turnes to diſadvantage, and the occaſions that made him promiſe, are paſt: for if men were all good, this Rule would not be allowable; but being they are full of miſchief, and will not make it good to thee, neither art thou tied to keep it with them: nor ſhall a Prince ever want lawfull occaſions to237 give colour to this breach. Very many modern Examples hereof might be alleadged, wherein might be ſhewed how many Peaces concluded, and how many Promiſes made, have been••olated and broken by Infidelity of Princes: and ordinarily things have beſt ſucceeded with him that hath bin neareſt the Fox in condition.
But it is neceſſary to underſtand, how to ſet a good colour upon this Diſpoſition, and be able to feign and diſſemble throughly; and men are ſo ſimple, and yield ſo much to the preſent Neceſſities, that he who hath a mind to deceive, ſhall alwayes find another that will be deceived. I will not conceal any of the Examples that have been of late; Alexander the ſixth never did any thing elſe, than deceive men, and never meant otherwiſe, and always found whom to work upon; yet never was there man that would proteſt more effectually, nor aver any thing with more ſolemn Oaths, and obſerve them leſs then he: nevertheleſs, his Couzenage thrived well with him, for he knew how to play his part cunningly.
238Therefore is there no neceſſitie for a Prince to be endued with all thoſe above written qualities, but it behoves well that he ſeeme to be ſo: or rather I will boldly ſay this, that having thoſe qualities, and alwaies regulating himſelf by them, they are hurtfull; but ſeeming to have them, they are advantageous, as to ſeeme pittyfull, faithfull, milde, religious, and indeed to be ſo (provided with all thou beeſt of ſuch a compoſition, that if need require thee to uſe the contrary, thou canſt, and know'ſt how to apply thy ſelfe thereto.) And it ſuffices to conceive this, that a Prince, and eſpecially a new Prince, cannot obſerve all theſe things, for which men are held good, he being often forced, for the maintenance of his State, to do contrary to his faith, charity, humanity, and religion. And therefore it behoves him to have a mind ſo diſpoſed as to turn and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes; and as formerly I ſaid, not forſake the good while he can; but to know to make uſe of the evil upon neceſſity. A prince then ought to have a ſpeciall care, that he never let fall any words, but what239 are all ſeaſoned with the five above written qualities: and let him ſeem to him that ſees and knows him, all pitty, all faith, all integrity, all humanity, all religion; not is there any thing more neceſſarie for him to ſeem to have, than the laſt quality: for all men in generall judge thereof, rather by the ſight than by the touch; for every man, may come to the ſight of him, few come to the touch and feeling of him; every man may come to ſee what thou ſeemeſt; few come to underſtand and perceive what thou art: and thoſe few dare not oppoſe the opinion of many, who have the Majeſty of ſtate to protect them. And in all mens actions, eſpecially thoſe of Princes, wherein there is no judgment to appeal unto, men forbear to give their cenſures till the events, and ends of thing. Let a Prince therefore take the ſureſt courſes he can to maintaine his life and ſtate, the meanes ſhall alwaies be thought honorable, and commended by every one: for the vulgar is ever taken with the appearance and event of a thing, and for the moſt part of the people, they are but the vulgar, the others that are240 but few, take place where the vulgar have no ſubſſiſtance. A Prince there is in theſe daies, whom I ſhall not do well to name, that preaches nothing but peace and faith, but had he kept the one and the other, ſeverall times had they taken from him his State and reputation.
This is the old Court Goſpel, which hath gained many thouſand of Proſelytes, among the great ones, from time to time, and the inferences ariſing thence in behalfe of the people, in breife are theſe: That ſince the great ones of the world, have been very few that have avoyded this doctrine, therefore it concerns the people to keep a ſtrict hand and eie upon them all, and impoſe not overmuch or long confidence in any.
If the Right of laws be the way of men, and force of beaſts and great ones, not onely adviſed, but inclined to the latter, then it concernes any Nation or people to ſecure themſelves, and keep Great men from degenerating into beaſts, by holding up of law, liberty, priviledge, birthright, elective power, againſt the241 ignoble beaſtly way of powerfull domination.
If of all beaſts, a Prince ſhould ſome times reſemble the Lyon, and ſomtimes the Fox, then people ought to obſerve great ones in both the diſguiſes, and be ſure to cage the Lyon, and unkennel the Fox, and never leave till they have ſtript the one, and unrais'd the other.
If a Prince cannot, and ought not to keep his faith given, when the obſervance thereof turnes to diſadvantage, and the occaſions that made him promiſe, are paſt; then it is the Intereſt of the people, never to truſt any Princes, nor ingagements and promiſes of men in power, but ever to preſerve a power within themſelves, either to reject them, or to hold them to the performance whether they will or no. And if Princes ſhall never want occaſions to give colour to this breach, then alſo it concernes the people, ever to make ſure of the Inſtance, and not ſuffer themſelves to be deluded with colours, ſhadows, and meere pretences.
Laſtly, if it be neceſſarie for great ones to fain and diſſemble throughly;242 becauſe men are ſo ſimple and yield ſo much to the preſent neceſſity (as Machivel ſaith;) and in regard he that hath a mind to deceive, ſhall alwayes finde another that will be deceived: then it concerns any people or Nation, to make a narrow ſearch ever into the men, and their pretences and neceſſities, whether they be fained or not; and if they diſcover any deceipt hath been uſed, then they deſerve to be ſlaves, that will be deceived any longer. Thus I have noted the prime Errors of Government, and Rules of Policy. I ſhall now conclude with a word of Advice, in order to the chuſing of the Supreme Aſſemblies.
Since it appears, that the right, liberty, welfare, and ſafety of a people, conſiſts in a due ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies: ſurely then, the right conſtitution and orderly motion of them, is of the greateſt conſequence that can be, there being ſo much imbarqued in this Veſſel, that if it ſhould miſcarry, all is irreparably loſt, unleſs it can be recovered again out of the Sea of confuſion. Therefore, as at all times there ought to be an243 eſpeciall care had to the Compoſure and Complexion of thoſe great Aſſemblies, ſo much more after the confuſion of a Civil Warre, where it is ever to be ſuppoſed, there will be many diſcontented humours a working, and labouring to inſinuate themſelves into the body of the people, to undermine the ſettlement and ſecurity of the Common-wealth, that by gaining an intereſt and ſhare with the better ſort, in the ſupreme Authority, they may attain thoſe corrupt ends of Policy, which were loſt by Power.
In this caſe without queſtion, there are ſeverall men that ought to be taken into a ſtrict conſideration ▪ There is the old Malignant and the new; againſt whom, not only the doores are to be ſhut, but every hole and cranny ought to be ſtopt, for fear they creep into Authority. There is likewiſe a came Beaſt, more dangerous than the other two, which is that Amphibious animal, the neutrall of Laodicea, that can live in either Element, ſail with any winde on every point of the compaſſe, and ſtrike in with Malignants of every ſort, upon any occaſion ▪
244This is he that will undoe all, if he be not avoided; for in the form of an Angel of Light, he moſt ſlightly carries on the works of darkneſs. Let not him then, as to our preſent caſe, be ſo much as named upon an Election. Thus much for the Conſtitution of the ſupreme Aſſembly, or the manner of ſetling Authority upon the cloſe of a Civil Warre, for the recovery of Liberty. What remains then, but that upon due caution for excluding the wilde Geeſe and the came, the Malignant and the Neutrall, ſuch a people may reaſonably be put into poſſeſſion of their right and intereſt in the Legiſlative power, and of all injoyment of it, in a ſucceſſion of their ſupreme Aſſemblies?
The onely way to preſerve liberty in the hands of a people, that have gained it by the Sword, is to put it in the peoples hands, that is, into the hands of ſuch, as by a contribution of their purſes, ſtrength, and counſells, have all along aſſerted it, without the leaſt ſtain of corruption, ſtaggering•▪ apoſtaſie; for in this caſe, theſe only are to be reckoned the people: the reſt having either by a trayterous Engagement245 Compliance, Neutrality, or Apoſtaſie, as much as in them lies, deſtroyed the people, and by conſequence made a forteiture of all their Rights and immunities, as Members of a people. In this caſe therefore men ought to have a courage; and to have a care of the courſe of Election, and truſt God with the ſucceſs of a righteous Action; for nothing can be more righteous and neceſſary, than that a people ſhould be put into poſſeſſion of their native right and freedom: However, they may abuſe it, it is their right to have it, and the want of it is a greater inconvenience, and drawes greater inconveniencies after it, than any can be pretended to ariſe from the injoyment, though they were preſented in a multiplying glaſſe, to the eyes of diſcerning men. But now, as this holds true at all times, in all Nations, upon the like occaſions of Liberty newly purchaſed, ſo much more in any Nation, where freedom in a ſucceſſive courſe of the peoples Aſſemblies, hath once bee•ſolemnly acknowledged and declared to be the intereſt of the Commonwealth; for, then a depriving246 the people of their due, is a foundation for broils and diviſions; and as Cicero defines faction to be a deviation from the declared intereſt of State: ſo in this caſe, if it happen that any ſhall deſert a Common-wealth in its declared Intereſt, they immediately loſe the name and honour of Patriots, and become Parties in a Faction.