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A Copy of a LETTER Written to an OFFICER OF THE ARMY BY A true Commonwealths-man, and no COƲRTIER, Concerning The Right and Settlement of our preſent GOVERNMENT and GOVERNORS.

LONDON, Printed by Tho. Newcomb, over againſt Bainards-Caſtle in Thames-ſtreet. 1656:


IF we look into our Stories from the Con­queror, (from whom the whole race of our Kings ſince have derived their Titles and Claims) we ſhall finde it evident, that thoſe that were originally the great Council of this Land, were originally ſuch as had been Commanders under, and had holpen that firſt William to the Soveraignty of this Kingdom: who, having now through his means obtained ſo great a ſhare in the wealth of the Nation, ſeemed moſt likely to be regardful as well of his, as of the general ſafety and good thereof. To you therefore I ſhall make this my humble Appeal concerning the reaſonableneſs of that Letter which I formerly addreſſed unto thoſe that laſt of all ſate as a Parliament amongſt us; leaving it to you to determine whether they had not preſidents, as well as reaſon, ſufficient to have led them to the eſta­bliſhment of this Government in a more ſetled way then now it is. For we ſhall find that (all along) this great Council or Parliament have ever ſetled the ſucceſſion on him that had the preſent power, although others might in legal appearance have a better title, and that confirmed by their own oaths alſo. Thus we find the ſaid William the Firſt generally obeyed by the Engliſh after the con­queſt of Harold, even as Harold was before; notwithſtanding Edgar Etheling had the indubitable right from both, according to the then eſtabliſhed Laws. And ſo again were the poſſeſſion and hereditary right of his ſucceeding ſons, William and Henry the Firſt, ſworn to and maintained by the Peers and others; notwith­ſtanding alſo that theſe two, beſides the claim of the ſaid Edgar, might be alſo juſtly reputed Ʋſurpers againſt the right of their elder Brother Robert yet living. The Soveraignty being next2 ſeiſed on by Stephen againſt the direct lineal right of the Iſſue of Maud the Empreſs, unto whom the ſaid Peers had alſo ſworne faith and allegiance; yet ſhall we again find them ſwearing to be faithful to him and his iſſue, and both they and others of the Na­tion generally taking his part againſt the ſaid Maud and her children.

To inſtance in all, would be too tedious: But it is apparent through the whole Story, that all Parliaments both before and after the addition of the Houſe of Commons, have ever confirmed and ſetled the ſucceſſion in him whoſe Writs they obeyed in their Sum­mons, however a more apparent Title might ſeem to reſt in ſome other perſon yet living. In which doing it could not yet be expected, but ſome mutterings and inſurrections muſt ariſe from ſome par­ticular perſons, as well ſuch as had been of the ſame party with the preſent Prince, who (like ſons of Zerviah) out of diſcontent at their own ſmaller ſhare of preferment, or the greater favor caſt to­wards others then they thought fit, will thereupon be keeping the terms of War in time of Peace, and ſo diſlike of their Princes enter­tainment of any that have (like Abner) been of a contrary party, although their uſefulneſs and fidelity be now apparent: As alſo of ſome again, who (like Shimei) out of ſome more particular love and relation to the depoſed Family,2 Sam. 6.5, 6, 7, 8. 1 Sam. 20 14, 15, 42. 1 Sam. 2.2, 22. 2 Sam. 3.1. will be prone to caſt the odium of blood and uſurpation upon the perſon poſſeſſed; especially if from a mean degree he have come to the Throne, and had alſo taken an oath of fidelity to the former Prince and his family, as in the caſe of David to Jonathan and Saul; when as yet it was plain enough that Saul was not ſlain by David, but by the Philiſtines: And for that war between their houſes, in which it is ſaid, The houſe of David waxed daily ſtronger and ſtronger, and the houſe of Saul weaker and weaker; it is to be looked upon as the joint aſſo­ciation of theſe of Judah alſo; who, having now ſubmitted to an­other Head, oppoſed the other as a common enemy.

And if we look into the latter times for the care taken by the then good Commonwealths-men in ſetling this great affair, even to the time of Queen Elizabeth, we ſhall find the firſt Parliament humbly to ſollicite her to marry betimes. Annal. Eliz. fol. 25. The Parliament (ſays Mr. Cambden) being to be diſſolved, they all thought good that the Third Eſtate or Lower Houſe ſhould adviſe the Queen to marry3 betimes: yet would not the Temporal Lords join with them, leſt any of them might ſeem to propound it in hope to prefer himſelf.And it's like, both they and all former Peers were alſo willing to have the Crown hereditary, leſt they might alſo ſeem to be ambitious of ſuc­ceſſion themſelves; as though they had been rather Pares as to the Soveraignty, then as a true Senate of Patres or Peres as to the Nation. Some words then uſed by the Speaker I ſhall particularly ſet down, that we may ſee how antient Parliaments differed from ſome of late, they having as great a care to build and to eſtabliſh, as theſe to pull down. There is nothing which with more ardent affection we beg of God in our daily prayers, then that our happi­neſs hitherto received by your moſt gracious Government, may be perpetuated to the Engliſh Nation to all eternity. Whileſt in our minds and cogitations we caſt many ways how this may be effect­ed, we can find none at all, unleſs your Majeſty ſhould either reign for ever, (which to hope for is not lawful) or elſe by marriage bring forth Children, heirs both of their Mothers vertue and Empire (which God Almighty grant.)

And in the Parliamnt held in the ninth year of her Reign, when, through difference of Religions which then were, men began to propound to themſelves ſometimes one, and ſometimes another to get the Soveraignty, in caſe ſhe ſhould die without a certain Suc­ceſſor:fol. 84.Therefore (ſays my Author) the Higher Houſe beſought the Queen with all earneſtneſs, by the mouth of Bacon L. Keeper, their Speaker; according to the duty which they owe to God, the allegeance to their Prince, and love to their Country; that foraſmuch as by her they now quietly enjoyed all the benefits of Peace, Juſtice and Clemencie, both they and their poſterity might ſecurely and always enjoy the ſame by her. But (ſay they) they cannot enjoy the ſame, unleſs ſhe marry, and withall deſign a Suc­ceſſor. Above all things therefore they do wiſh and pray her, that ſhe will join herſelf in the ſacred bond of marriage, to whomſoever, whereſoever, and howſoever it may pleaſe her, to the end ſhe may have Children to be pillars of the Realm; conſtitute and appoint a Succeſſor if ſhe or her children (which God forbid) ſhould die without iſſue. That they ſhould ſo earneſtly beg this, which is ſo mainly neceſſary, there are (ſay they) many cauſes; to wit, the freſh fear which invaded all men, when very lately her health4 was indangered; the opportunity of the times, when the Eſtates of the Realm were now aſſembled, who would maturely delibe­rate of ſo weighty matters; the terror which ſhe ſhould ſtrike in­to her adverſaries, and the immortal joy wherewith ſhe would repleniſh all her Subjects. They commend the Examples of her Anceſtors, which in ſuch caſes have prudently provided for the ſecurity of their Poſterity; condemning that ſpeech of Pyrrhus, who ſaid, He would leave the Kingdom to him which had the ſharpeſt ſword. Moreover they propound, how great a ſtorm of calamities would hang over England, if ſhe ſhould put off her mortality, deſigning no certain Succeſſor; That ſeditious and Civil Wars would break forth, wherein the Victory it ſelf were moſt miſerable: That Religion would be aboliſhed, Juſtice ſmo­thered, the Laws trodden under feet, When there ſhould be no certain Prince, which is the ſoul of the Law; and that the King­dom would fall as a prey to Foreiners. And other calamities of that ſort they reckon up and exaggerate, wherein all men would be included, if ſhe ſhould die without iſſue. Out of the ſacred Scriptures alſo they modeſtly join hereunto precepts, counſels, and examples.At which time alſo the Lower Houſe were more vehement in their expreſſions to the ſame purpoſe.

Theſe things have been the more largely collected and ſet down, that we might ſee the difference between Parliaments then, and ſince: For they were ſo far from uſurping authority to themſelves to alter the ſucceſſion of the Prince in poſſeſſion which had Heirs, under colour of their power of Election during the life of the Prince, that they claimed not a right to conſtitute an Heir or Succeſſor unto him that had Children of his own. Even as in the time of Henry the Eight, they had (at his motion) ſetled the Crown ſome­times upon the iſſue by one wife, and ſometimes upon another; and at last left it to ſuch as he ſhould give it by his laſt Will and Teſtament. Theſe Parliaments of Q Elizabeth conſiſting then of Papiſts chiefly, might more juſtly then now have ſuſpected an averſneſs from the Religion profeſſed or eſtabliſhed,fol. 16. eſpecially in Fundamentals. But on the other hand (ſays my Author) ſhe was much troubled at the impatience of ſome Miniſters of the Word, who choſe rather to forerun then expect Laws, and began to ſow abroad the Doctrine of the Gospel more freely, firſt in private5 houſes, then in Churches; and the people greedy of novelty, began to flock unto them in great numbers:It might have been objected, that ſhe was a Woman, and ſo unfit to be acknowledged Head of the Church; which authority had been in the time of her Father ſetled upon the Imperial Crown of this Realm; A thing ſcoffed at as well by them which ſeemed more ſtrictly zealous, as by the Pa­piſts themſelves: And they might alſo, and with more right have inſiſted upon an Act of Parliament, whereby ſhe ſtood diſabled from the Government, and that as one declared illegitimate, and whoſe Mother had been condemned and executed for Adultery, Even by an Act of a Parliament conſiſting of King, Lords and Commons, and not made by a piece of a piece of a Parliament only. Camb. Annal. fol. 18. Where­upon (ſays my Author) ſome ſeditious perſons afterward took occaſion thereby to attempt dangerous matters againſt her, as being not lawful Queen, albeit the Engliſh Laws have long ſince pronounced, that the Crown once worne quite taketh away all defects whatſoever. And as this unrepealing of that Act, and this Maxim of the Law, was then imputed to Bacons wiſdome, (on whom as an Oracle of the Law the Queen wholly relied in ſuch matters) ſo (for further ſatisfaction of mens mindes concerning the undoubted obedience which is due to the Poſſeſſor, in queſtions of like kinde) I ſhall ſet down the determination of him, who by Lawyers themſelves is accompted an Oracle of the Law ſince, namely my Lord Cook, who in the 3. part of his Inſtitutes, f. 6, 7. in the Title of Treaſon, expounding the words of Nre Seignior le Roy, ſays, that by le Roy is to be underſtood a King regnant, and not of one that hath but the name of a King. And then alſo he alleadges the inſtance of Q. Mary, on whom, as having indeed the ſoveraign power, the word le Roy was appropriate, although ſhe were a woman, and her Husband at the ſame time ſtiled King of England. After­wards he quotes in the margent the Statute of 11 Henry 7. enact­ing, That none ſhall be condemned for any thing done in obedience to the preſent King or Soveraign, (for ſo the words of the Statute are, King or Soveraign;) He further ſaith,This Act is to be underſtood of a King in poſſeſſion of the Crown and Kingdom: For if there be a King regnant in poſſeſſion, although he be Rex de facto, & non de jure, yet is he Seignior le Roy within the purview of this Statute; and the other that hath right, and is out6 of poſſeſſion, is not within this Act. Nay, if Treaſon be committed againſt a King de facto, & non de jure, & after the King de jure cometh to the Crown, he ſhall puniſh the Treaſon done to the King de facto and a Pardon granted by a King de jure, that is not alſo de facto, is void.By all which it will appear, that the Law directs our fidelity to Nre Seignior, our Soveraign Lord; not confining it to the ſtile and title of le Roy or King, to whom it is only due, as being actually Nre Roy, our Soveraign Lord the King. And indeed it would have ſeemed ſtrange, if what by the Law is due to inferior powers, (as Lords of Manors, or the like) ſhould have been denied to the chief: For in that caſe, the exception of a Diſſeiſor againſt the right Heir, is not available to abate any Ser­vice or Acknowledgment which ought to come from a Tenant or Homager.

Having thus (Sir) as ſhortly as I could, cleered my way of ſome moſt material doubts, I ſhall now crave your patience to peruſe the following Letter; beſeeching God to direct and bleſs you in the ſet­ling of the peace and good of theſe Nations. Which is the daily prayer of

Your moſt affectionate Friend and Servant.

YOu may pleaſe to remember, that upon ſome late diſcourſes which paſſed between us concerning ſome things relating to the preſent eſta­bliſhment in our Government, and of that queſtion of Hereditary or Elective ſucceſſion; I did then trou­ble you with the relation of my o­pinion therein, and give you ſuch reaſons and arguments as did then occur, for the eſtabliſh­ment of both: And which might ſerve by way of anſwer to thoſe ordinary objections made to the contrary, which in malicious Pamphlets or otherwiſe were vulgarly ſpread a­broad, both to diſaffect the people, and to breed a diſtaſte and jealouſie both in Parliament and Army againſt the Pro­tector and his ſettlement and proceedings. But having now ſince had time more ſeriouſly to conſider of the nature and conſequences of the thing, both as it is in it ſelf, and as it doth relate to the conſtitution of theſe Nations, and the preſent ſtate of publique affairs therein ſetled, I found my ſelf on all hands ſo throughly ſatisfied with the inconveni­encies that would accompany Election, and with the falla­cies of all thoſe ſpecious arguments uſually given for it, that I conceived it lay upon me as a duty, as well for your own farther ſatisfaction, as for that ſatisfaction you might here­in give to others, both in the Houſe and Army, to give un­to you a more full and regular accompt of my conceptions herein: To the end that the prejudices of all unbiaſſed peo­ple may be herewith ſo far ſatisfied, that through murmure and ingratitude we do not again provoke God to deſiſt in that courſe of eſtabliſhment he hath now put us, and ſuffer us again to relapſe into our former way of diviſion and diſ­order; whilſt, at once, we ſhould ſhew our ſelves as well unjuſt and ingrateful towards him, as towards that his Mi­niſter whom he hath made ſo highly inſtrumental in ſo great a mercy.


So far as this deſign of Election ſavours of injuſtice and ingratitude towards our preſent Superior, I ſhall deſire you (Sir) firſt to conſider, that as ambition and covetouſneſs are vices to all men more or leſs incident, ſo in thoſe or ſuch like alterations of State as have happened to us, it cannot be ex­pected that the acquiſitions of the prevailing party, either for honour or riches, can be ſo equally or in ſuch ſort ſhared as to find general ſatisfaction. For as each one is then ready to ſet the higheſt rate he can on his own deſerts and endea­vours in the Common cauſe, even ſo muſt he conſequently as much repine at the portions of others above him, and which are greater then his own, as to be thereby prompted to find out and promote all the ways he can both for abating from them, and for reducing them to an equality with himſelf: And if this cannot be effected, then at leaſt to abridge them of continuance herein, that he alſo, as in right of election, may have his turn in thoſe honours and eſtates which are higheſt. And this is alſo to be expected from ſuch as have for a long time together made to them­ſelves a way of trade and gain by means of that ſupreme and uncontrollable power and truſt they then executed: when now being debarred of the perpetuity of their miſuſed power, they are buſie to vent abroad their angry and re­vengeful declamations as well againſt his power that hath done it, as his continuance therein; and to make it take the better, to palliate it with the ſhew of publike good.

They ſay, that ſince all in the late engagement have run equal hazard, and have jointly adventured their lives and fortunes, why ſhould any one perſon or family be ſuffered to ingroſs all the prize to themſelves? That the Cauſe they undertook was that which was common, and for the good of the whole people, and to render them happy, not the ſingle advantage and preferment of any one man or his po­ſterity. And if any one man ſhould claim advantage or pre­ferment above the reſt, as having been (for his part) moſt eminent and active in the proſecution and danger thereof, yet why his ſon or poſterity, who (perhaps) were not all,5 or very little meritorious therein? Will not the ſame juſtice and reaſon of eminent deſert that preferred the Father to others of leſs deſert then him, claim precedence for other perſons of more preſent deſerts and hopes before theſe alſo? Mark the diſpenſations of Providence and Nature; ſince they entail not Vertue and Wiſdom to a Family, what is it but on purpoſe to adviſe us to a diſcreet liberty of chooſing him that is beſt out of all, and not ſervilely to ſubject our ſelves to ſuch hazards and inconveniences as may accom­pany any one? In ſuch ſort as ſometimes a perſon notori­ouſly wicked, and ſometimes (to the heightening of our woe) a Child ſhall be left to rule over us. That it is the ſtrongeſt allurement to undertake acts of Tyrannie and In­juſtice; ſince now they know they cannot be amoved, be they what they will: Nor will they at all ſtudy the content and ſatisfaction of the people, ſince they know they came in, and can continue therein without them. Whereas he that conſiders that his election comes from, and is made by the people, will probably, as in gratitude and kindneſs to them, ſtudy all ways to pleaſe and oblige them

With theſe and ſuch like diſcourſes and arguments I find the ambitious heads of ſome perſons (diſaffected to the preſent Government, or indeed to any Government ar all) have of late ſought, not only to eſtrange the minde of both Parliament and Army one towards another, but to ſpread an univerſall jealouſie and diſguſt againſt him that is now our higher Power: That ſo as under the odium and ſuſpition of that arbitrary Government which may be acted by one perſon, themſelves may, more certainly, and in grea­ter numbers, both at Committees and elſwhere, by vetue of the glorious title and countenance of a Parlament, ſtil retain to themſelves an unlimited power to ſettle and diſpoſe of the Liberties and fortunes of others as they ſhall ſee good. And although, for the preſent there may not be ſo much fear of impreſſion upon a juſt conſideration of the appro­ved moderation and diſcipline of the whole Army (the like whereunto I may confidently ſay no ſtory can make in­ſtance6 in) yet, conſidering them as mortal in their particu­lar members, and how that hereafter the hope of ſucceſſion (a contrivance purpoſely brought in to engage and diſaffect ſome of them) may work upon more ambitious and cove­tous heads, I have thought good to offer theſe Conſidera­tions following, as highly conſiderable, both in reſpect of Juſtice and gratitude to the perſon now in poſſeſſion, and alſo in reference to the future good and tranquility of the three Nations.

Firſt, I ſay, that in this great change in the face of pub­lick affairs which hath hapned and been brought about, all that have been active have not run equal hazards. For, as it is apparent that the Souldier hath run more hazard then others; ſo, amongſt them again, although it be true, that as to the ſhock of a battail, the common Souldier is in equal or greater peril of his life, then his Captain or Colonell, yet ſince in the defeat of an Army, it is much the leſſer patt that periſh in the field; but the reſt coming to be made pri­ſoners, and ſo left to the uſage of the Conqueror, it is not then to be thought but that the leader and Commander is more in danger of ſevere and exemplary puniſhment then the other. Beſides which, in all Proclamations of pardon, which are the uſuall fore-runners of open warr or ſett battailes, an offer of indemnity and grace uſeth to be made as to the body and ordinary ſort of the adverſe party and army, and onely ſome few, and it may be but the Generall himſelf to ſtand excepted. And therefore I would deſire thoſe that be now Commanders in this preſent army to lay theſe things to heart, and to meaſure the caſe of their preſent Generall by that Goſpel rule of doe as thou wouldeſt be done unto. Doe they not really believe that in caſe the King had prevailed, themſelves ſhould have undergone higher Cenſure and Puniſhment then thoſe of inferior ranke that ſerved under them? and that, not onely as having greater fortunes then them to loſe, but alſo as having been more eminent and active againſt him then they. And doe they not farther believe that their preſent Generall, as7 having moſt of all been eminent and forward in this whole enterpriſe, was not thereupon, proportionably in greateſt danger of all? Therefore if they think it reaſonable that thoſe ſtates and honours which by means, and as in reward of their publique imployment are come into their hands, ſhould now remain as hereditary to their poſterity, in like manner as they did to others before, they muſt, upon the ſame rule of equity determine that the like is moſt juſtly due to the Protector & his family alſo. If any of them by means of his own military and publick imployment, have encreaſed his eſtate or degree ſo far as to be brought up to the ranke and title of Eſquire, will he be content that nothing of this ſhall deſcend to his ſonne? Or if he have gotten the propriety of ſome Mannor, and through that the juriſdiction and Honour which belongs to a Lord thereof, will they be content to exerciſe and enjoy al this but during life onely, and then ſuffer both the acquired eſtate and Lordſhip to reſt at the diſpoſe of the Tenants, or thoſe that have ſerved under him? whereby theſe, as renouncing that their own former and proper relations and conditions of Tenancy and Obedience, ſhould now take upon them to diſpoſe, as they think good of the heir; and to ſhare and diſtribute, as they pleaſe, all that belonged to the Father? And all this upon allegation it was a joynt and publike cauſe which they all undertooke, and that theſe honours and Revenews being parcels of, and belonging unto that Com­monwealth, for which they ſerved, there was no reaſon that one ſhould engroſs and appropriate that for which all had run like hazard and ſervice: If they think this Levelling plea fit in this caſe to take place, there will then indeed be ſome equality though little diſcretion. But if they on their parts, like not to be reduced to this condition, but do rather judge it reaſonable that ſince that Commonwealth, for whoſe ſake and ſafety they have undertaken all this pains and hazard, hath belonging unto it, and to the neceſſary ſupport and management thereof divers hereditary Offi­cers, preferments, and Revenues, it is but juſt that thoſe8 perſons that have been moſt eminently faithful and active above others in the ſupport of it and them, ſhould by good equity be eſtated in thoſe places and powers which are of greateſt truſt and benefit. For if this plea be not good, there are examples and preſidents enow to be fetched out of for­reign parts both for levelling of Gentry and Nobility, and alſo to make them mortal with the parent, and to depend on the arbitrary diſpoſal of others. But if they would not, for their parts, have it well taken to have alterations pur­poſely deviſed and ſet on foot to take from them and theirs what they had ſo highly deſerved, ſo can they not but judge it as hard and unequal uſage towards others. For, did any of them ever hear or read that the Soveraignty of this place was ever elective? If not, doe they indeed think that this man that now hath it, is, for his part, ſo much the worſt and moſt undeſerving of any that ever yet ruled, that, for his exemplary infamy and diſgrace, a particular law muſt be brought in to the prejudice of his poſterity? I would fain demand of any of them that are fathers of children; Was not the honor & advancement of their houſe one great mo­tive to this undertaking? Did they not beforehand know, that if they had been overcome, the infamy and loſs accom­panying Traitors and Treaſon (ever imputed to the weaker ſide) would have light on their poſterity as much or more then themſelves? And therefore ſince theſe their children (eſpecially of ſuch as have been eminent) have run their ſhares in the hazard of that ſhame and loſs which did attend the ſucceſs, and the greateſt ſhare too in the perpetuity thereof; they cannot therefore but conclude, that not only their own, but the race of thoſe alſo that are above them, muſt, by good right, claim to be eſtated and ſetled in all ſuch hereditary Offices as their father ſtood ſeiſed of, in reward or acknowledgment of their paſt ſervice. There can be no man ſo weak of judgment or experience, but may eaſily conceive there would have been a more high meaſure of contempt and puniſhment inflicted on the poſterity of the Protector then of any other, in caſe he had been overcome:9 Nor ſurely can any be ſo devoid of reaſon or conſcience, as not to determine that by good conſequence they doe there­upon deſerve alſo to be continued in the higheſt preferment that doth belong to that Commonwealth whoſe cauſe they maintained, and for whoſe ſafety they were put into ſuch hazard.

But to come yet nearer to them in their Propoſals for Equality: Do they think ſit indeed, that every perſon and every family engaged in this Cauſe, ſhould enjoy an arith­metical proportion of power and advantage with that of their ſuperiors, both in electing and being elected? Why, then muſt the pooreſt Cottager and Mechanick of all come in with their equal voice to chooſe, and alſo with his equal turn for being choſen, without any put-off for want of birth or breeding, or other perſonal endowment or fitting quali­fication which was not at his hand to be expected But if they cannot think it poſſible that this way could afford turns e­now for the hundreth family in a Kingdom that have en­gaged; nor do think it farther neceſſary to erect an Heralds Office to regiſter all that firſt ventured and acted in that Cauſe, with their ſeveral diſcents and pedigrees; then do they proceed partially according to their own rule, making an unequal choice amongſt thoſe that have equally en­gaged: Becauſe equality of honor and preferment being due to that firſt equality of deſert, and engagement in the Father only, how can it be forfeited by any accidentall in­feriority or impediment in the Son hapning ſince? Will they wave this ſuppoſition of equall engagement and claim due unto all Families, and confine both the Electors and E­lected unto ſome rank or order of men, and ſo by an exact pair of Sizers cut a Nation into two equalities; one that ſhall be equally and altogether uncapable of having voice or ſhare in the Government, and the other of being con­ſtantly and equally capable of both (as in all elective Mo­narchies is practiſed) then by the ſame rule of juſtice that they obſerve a diſtance, and exclude thoſe below from ha­ving an equality with them in ſome places of command or10 profit; he that is uppermoſt of all, may, as I ſaid, exclude them again in that which is higheſt. For it may well be preſumed, that he is as much above them of the higheſt rank of equality, as they again are above thoſe that are below. If we look to the examples of Germany and Poland (the two onely places where there is a ſoveraign Magiſtrate ele­cted with any competent power) we ſhall find that Germany hath ſcarcely made any choice but out of their four great Families of Franconia, Swevia, Bavaria, and Auſtria, ſtill making choice of one of thoſe Dukes for Emperor; which they did not neither, till there was a failer in the family of Charls the Great, which was above them all. And as for Poland, their Stories tell us, That they have had Forty per­ſons ſucceſſively Raigning of one and the ſame Family: the like whereunto cannot be ſaid of any hereditary Monarchy that I know of.

And, Sir, if you would be ſatisfied with preſidents as well as Reaſon, for this hereditary ſucceſſion amongſt our ſelves, you ſhall finde it adjuſted even from the Founders and Ori­ginals of our Engliſh Nation. For did not thoſe Armies of the Saxons that had holpen the people of this Land againſt their Enemies, think it afterwards reaſonable, that ſince themſelves had ſhared in moſt of the great places of Truſt and Command, and that alſo in the ſame way of approbation and hereditary right they found them poſſeſt by others before, ſo alſo to ſettle their Generals and their Heires in that place and degree of power which was higheſt of all? and this they did, although in their own Nation that Office did then paſs by Election. And it will be alſo found that both Dane and Norman coming with their Ar­mies afterwards, did, upon their ſucceſs, ſettle themſelves and their Chieftains in like manner.

If we look abroad we ſhall finde, Sir, that as theſe Saxons did in England, ſo the Francks (another people of Germany) did alſo ſettle their Leaders in the Kingdom of France; and although they had called themſelves Francks, as impatient of the ſubjection of any other, yet did they moſt willingly11 ſubmit to the Head of their own party. And mark thoſe ſeverall lines of Kings that have therein ſwayed, and you will finde that the ſeverall Families of Meroveus, Charles the Great, and of Capet, were ſuch as by their own policy and proweſs, and by the help of a powerfull party had bin advanced from the degree of Subjects to become abſolute Kings, upon the expulſion of thoſe that were their former Maſters, and had the Title. Nay, look to Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Poland, Hungary, and all the world over, and you ſhall ſtill finde, that in all thoſe State-alterations that have been made by a prevailing party, either domeſtick or foraign, the Head and Leader of that party hath ſtill had the Diademe, or chief place of Authority ſetled on him and his Family. Neither Goths, Vandals, Lombards, Huns, or any people whatever but acted accordingly: and how­ever they were Nations moſt fond of the name of Liberty, as it is obſerved that all Northern people are, and might al­ſo be otherwiſe governed at home; yet, in this caſe, they ſtill held it equitable, that ſince themſelves had every one, by the conduct of their Chieftain, bettered his Fortunes, in poſſeſſion of the Inheritances of perſons of inferior Ranks, ſo proportionally ſhould their Generall be ſetled in that which was higheſt. And as the examples of Republicks, or of elective Monarchies have been few, and alſo inconſide­rable, either for eminence or durance, in compariſon of Mo­narchies, and thoſe hereditary (which in moſt places hath always ſo continued without alteration, whereas no one place that hath been Republick or Elective, but what hath been longer and more eminent otherways) ſo is it farther obſervable, That when Greeks, Romans, Germans, Poles, or any other have erected Commonwealths, or made their Princes elective, it hath never been done after a Civill con­teſt, and where one party hath gotten the better of the other by way of conqueſt, but was ſtill done in peace, and by an unanimous conſent of the whole Nation, and when there was no alteration of private mens Fortunes and con­ditions; and where alſo there was a failer in the Line of12 their laſt conquering Prince: at which time it is not to be ſuppoſed, that the Nobles or Senators would in their parity one to another, be content to ſubmit to the conſtant Regi­ment of any third perſon and family amongſt themſelves. For ſo in Greece they ſet up their Commonwealths, when the Heraclidae, (that race of Kings amongſt them that de­ſcended from their famous Warrior and defender Hercules) became extinct. And ſo they did in Germany and Poland, upon failer of the Lines of Charlemain and Lechus. Or elſe (as in Rome) where the whole people did joyn in that diſcontent, and in ſecluſion of their Kings, and had no pre­cedent Civill war thereabouts, or about the exerciſe of the Civill power. For had it ſo been, that ſide that had under a Ceſar been victorious, and thereupon ſeated themſelves and families in the honors and poſſeſſions of the adverſe party, would certainly, in honor and gratitude, have made him and his iſſue Imperatores in the Civill State, who had all that while been Imperatores in the Field. And if we look to our Neighbors of the Low-Countries (a People that our Nation hath no reaſon to reckon as gratefull to their Protectors) yet we ſhall finde that they having in their U­nion againſt their King the King of Spain, been victorious through the conduct and aſſiſtance of the Prince of Orange, have thereupon confirmed unto the ſame Family the chief Office of Honor and Command heretofore executed among them: Under which, as they have hithetto thriven, ſo is it highly probable that the ſecluſion thereof, may prove the ſecluſion of all farther peace and happineſs from that people,

And now, Sir, after all this travail in foraign Stories, to return home, and home to your ſelf too, let me appeal to you as a Member of a Parlament of England; Did you ever read of any Parlament that did not ſettle the Govern­ment on the poſterity of him that was poſſeſſed, and whoſe Writs they obeyed in their Summons? And therefore, Sir, ſince there is no competent example to be fetched herein out of any foraign Story, and ſince no one ſort of people at13 any time inhabiting or poſſeſſing this Land, did ever in any age attempt to make this Government elective; ſuch a thing to be at this time attempted, and towards ſuch an one that hath in particular ſo well deſerved, will ſeem a thing moſt of all unreaſonable, as well as ungrateful.

When I have ſaid ſo much to you (Sir) on the behalf of the General, to ſerve as an Anti-Memento againſt the in­ſinuations of ſuch as would have the Army believe that the power and ſettlement of him and his family would prove an unſetling of them: I ſhall now on the contrary deſire you to conſider how the eſtabliſhment of this one perſon and his family will be, under God, the moſt neceſſary and likely way to draw on their ſecurities alſo; and that, even from the aforeſaid arguments of moſt prime and principal en­gagement of the ſame cauſe. For ſince he and his have herein already ſo far adventured, as to be moſt of all un­capable of reconcilement and forgiveneſs, they may then be moſt ſure that both he and his in order to their own de­fence and ſecurity, (which is no way elſe to be had but by the ſteady aſſiſtance of the Army) will be moſt intent and ſtudious of all and every one of their ſeveral preferments and good wills, in ſuch ſort as not to make any the leaſt alteration amongſt them without neceſſary and juſt cauſe. Whereas another perſon or family that may hereafter be elected, and it may be contrary to their intereſt and liking, cannot be preſumed to carry ſo ready and great a reſpect towards them and theirs, as experience doth warrant this man to have done. For if the power of election ſhall reſt in ſuch men as are not members of the Army, it is then likely, out of that enmity which uſually paſſeth towards martial men, from ſuch as are not of like quality or deſcent, all their former ſervices may come to be forgotten, and themſelves put off with contempt, as being now of no further uſe. And farther, it may be ſuch an one ſhall be choſen as hath not been at all, or very little active in the ſame Cauſe with them; in which caſe their danger will alſo increaſe through that greater likelihood of his compliance14 with the adverſe party: For how eaſie a matter may it be for ſuch an one to be taken into favor there, and for ſome eminent breach of truſt have ſuch high dignity and reward promiſed and ſetled upon him and his, as may by far coun­tervail that momentany title which he now holdeth? The which can never be feared from him that is of the ſame qua­lity and engagement with themſelves, and that is hereditari­ly fixed in this place; who being at the height already, and ſo ſetled, nothing can be offered him valuable to his reſignati­on. And having ſo far ſpoken of theſe things as they carry a more particular concern to the Army, in anſwer to thoſe that would diſaffect them from their own General; I ſhall now anſwer thoſe arguments whereby they endeavour to diſaffect the whole Nation againſt the preſent Settlement, under the pretence of the good of the Common­wealth.

You are hereupon, Sir, deſired to conſider, That when you diſcover in any men more then ordinary pretenſions of zeal to the publique good, and for advancement of the Li­berties of the people; and, on the contrary, as ſtrong inve­ctives againſt Tyranny and Arbitrary government; and do withall finde them offering and giving in ſtrange propoſals for the eſtabliſhment of the one, and the prevention of the other, you may then, I ſay, be ſure that that party from whom all this proceeds is ſuch an one as miſlikes his preſent condition; and, for the amendment of his fortune, doth either expect to be bribed by preferment from making any diſturbance; or elſe he hopes, that, from the new ſhuffling of affairs in the alteration of State, he may have a better game dealt him then before. In the mean time all modeſt and judicious men doe look upon mankinde under Govern­ment, as in all other his worldly conditions, ſtill ſubject and liable to many miſchiefs and inconveniences. And there­fore although each ſort of ſetled Government carry with it ſelf a certain benefit, even as Government; and that Monarchy and hereditary Monarchy, as the moſt ſetled form, is moſt preferrible to the reſt, in reſpect of Divine15 appointment and inſtitution, and of politicall practiſe and accommodation; yet, to ſuppoſe that any thing, ſubmitted to the managery and accidents of humane frailty, can be thereupon found otherwiſe then liable to adverſe accidents, beyond the cure of any mortall contrivance, will (as I ſaid) argue an ambitious arrogance in the propoſer, and alſo a credulous folly in the receiver. Beſides, when I finde God both puniſhing and threatning to puniſh people by ſending ſuch Princes as they deſerve, what doth this invention of Election but look like a contrivance to defeat the decrees of Heaven in either of thoſe ways of puniſhment, by a Childe or an evil Prince? and what doe they deſerve, that take this courſe either in diſtruſt of Gods providence, or in prevention of their own puniſhment, but to finde a remedy worſe then the diſeaſe, and to be liable to certain evils, to avoid contingent ones? For, let us ſuppoſe our ſelves even in the worſt of theſe chances, either faln under an evill or a childiſh heir, and yet we ſhall herein finde it equall with that which is Elective. For, firſt, if a Childe be left to ſucceed, then is it perfectly in the ſame condition; becauſe of that perſon who is elected to rule in his ſtead, as his Pro­tector and guardian. And this apparent advantage is then alſo uſually found, that being done by the Father, who had more intereſt in the good of the publique then any other, is not only done without danger of Civill war, but with due and unbyaſſed reſpect to the ſufficiency of the perſon. In which caſe alſo the higheſt perſon and neareſt of blood, is commonly choſen. Whereupon, by reaſon of his native high quality, the Subjects pay their obedience more readily then they would to a new raiſed perſon: And then, he and his Family having greater and more certain intereſt in the Commonwealth then any other, will, in that reſpect, be more careful to advance the good thereof then any other alſo.

As for that inconvenience, That a wicked Son may be heir to the Crown, and ſo leave a Kingdom neceſſarily ſubjected to ſuch a Ruler; whereas in elective Monarchies16 there is a liberty to chooſe the moſt vertuous and fit per­ſon out of any family: It might be hereunto firſt anſwered, that in caſe of apparent unfitneſs in the elder, the Father (who can better judge thereof then others) will doubtleſs leave the Kingdom to ſome other ſon more fit, or elſe ap­point ſuch as Tutors and Guides over him, that his Kingdom and Family (things to be ſuppoſed of more concern to him then any elſe) ſhall not be hazarded by any of his vices or indiſcretion: and there are not wanting preſidents of this kind. But, to affirm that this courſe of Election is hereby made a conſtant way of prevention of all thoſe miſchiefs that may come from the hands of evil Governors, is a beg­ing of the queſtion, upon theſe and like ſuppoſitions. As firſt, That each perſon hath his abilities, inclinations, and moral habits ſo apparent, as not to endanger thoſe that are to make uſe of him, through diſſimulation. The next is, that all and each one of the Electors (to make it a free and diſcreet choice) are not only endued with an infallibility for the diſcovery of good and bad in the general, but alſo can diſtinguiſh and chooſe according to ſuch particular ver­tuous habits as are moſt fit for him that is to execute the place of Governor in chief; and this as knowingly as the Carpenter can by ſight tell the nature and kind of that wood he is to make uſe of. Next, and beyond this again, it muſt be preſumed that, beſides this knowledge, there muſt be in all and each of the Electors ſo much conſcience and integrity adjoined, as to cauſe them conſtantly to chooſe each perſon for publike regard ſake only, and not according to any particular relation, or private liking or intereſt. Now ſince upon the failing of any one of theſe ſurmiſes, it is apparent that the conſtancie of their promiſed benefit muſt fail alſo, ſo much more upon the failing and uncertainty of all of them, (as is moſt evident they doe) there can nothing of certainty be expected from this their promiſed benefit, as every man in his own judgment may preſently conclude. For firſt, there is nothing that fals out more common within our notice, then the daily practice of17 the art of diſſimulation; even ſo, that thoſe that have high­eſt deſign and intention to gain to themſelves any advan­tage by the over-reaching of others, are thereby alſo ren­dred the moſt ſtudious and able proficients therein, and this moſt eſpecially where ambition bears ſway; for as then the aim is higher, ſo is this humor uſually incident to perſons of more then ordinary abilities: The which cannot again but tell them, that as all men do ſubmit to Government but as out of neceſſity, and that ſince we cannot abſolutely avoid the being under the government of ſome, and ſo conſe­quently of being ſometimes and in ſome things reſtrained of our wils, (to the end that others that would elſe in this time of general liberty injure us, may thereupon be reſtrain­ed alſo) it comes therefore to paſs that thoſe that are moſt deſirous and like to prevail in the obtaining of places of ſu­preme power and command, do, for acceptance and general approbation ſake, frame their outward behaviour in com­pliance to this humour: They not only put on a face of ſobriety, meekneſs and clemencie, whereby vulgarly to pleaſe, but more particularly to ingratiate with the Electors themſelves, (who they know would have been abſolutely governing ſtill, had it not been for the fear of others) They make ſemblance to each party and perſon amongſt them of a great ſympathie and liking they have to them in their ſeveral wayes and opinions, in ſuch ſort as in effect to perſwade them, that to chooſe him to be their chief Ruler, is but the ſame as to rule in chief themſelves by his means. Even as Marius and Silla, as they ſeverally thought them moſt powerful to ſet them up in ſupreme authority, ſo did they ſeverally court and comply with the humors of the people or Nobility; and during the time that the more popular part did bear ſway, ſome in that ſtate, the better to ingratiate themſelves and obtain their election, have re­nounced their noble birth and quality, and cauſed them­ſelves to be adopted by ſome inferior perſon. So that, in a word, as every man is to the world a diſſembler in reſpect of his inward inclinations and faults, ſo from men of the18 higheſt aims are practiſes of this kind to be moſt expected. Whereupon it muſt fall out that he that can (Tiberius-like) moſt diſſemble, ſhall be moſt ſure of this honour: From whence it comes to paſs, that it is ordinarily a peoples hap­pineſs to be deceived in the qualities of the party. For the vulgar ſort chooſing according to meekneſs and ſoftneſs of ſpirit only, are ready to conclude, that he governs all beſt, that governs all leaſt: whereas the Electors again, being di­vided by factions amongſt themſelvs, would have their oppo­ſites to be by him governed too much, and themſelves not at all. Whereupon it will appear, that this fancied benefit leaves us but at as great or greater uncertainty then we were be­fore; until they can prove that the art of diſſimulation and the art of Regiment proceed from the ſame ability, and do always accompany one another in the ſame perſon. And if we look to our own Story, it was certainly a happineſs to thoſe that then lived, that by the right of deſcent they ſtood obliged to accept of Henry the fifth; one that neither for his vertuous life, or any other apparent behaviour, was ſo likely elſe to have been elected, as was Henry the ſixth his ſon, being a Prince of more meek and pious behaviour. So hard a thing it is to diſcover and diſtinguiſh between thoſe endowments and vertues, which are moſt proper to com­pleat a good man and a good Prince. For he that is moſt accompliſhed in his Ethicks, may be as far to ſeek in his Politicks. Of which we have yet a more freſh inſtance in the perſons and reigns of Richard the 3. and that of our late King Charls. When were the people in greater fear of ſe­vere uſage, then at the entrance of the one; or did expreſs greater joy and expectation, then at the entrance of the other? inſomuch as I believe that there is ſcarce any one even of thoſe that have moſt oppoſed him, but had he been then free to chooſe, would have given his voice for him. And yet it hath pleaſed God ſo far to deceive humane judg­ment and expectation, as to cauſe theſe Nations to undergo the greateſt ſhare of Civil calamities and changes in the time of this laſt: whereas in the time of the other the peo­ple19 enjoyed a continual ſecurity and quiet; and during that ſhorter time he did reign, there were yet more good laws made then in the reign of any Prince beſides. Nay, I think I may boldly ſay, that upon the examination of our own Chronicles, or any elſe, it will be found that thoſe perſons that people have received or elected as their greateſt dar­lings, have in their governments proved to them moſt fatal; and, on the contrary, ſuch as they have been moſt afraid of, and have ſubmitted unto only as out of ſenſe of duty, have proved moſt fortunate: As it were on purpoſe to inſtruct and adviſe us, that the moſt high God and diſpoſer of Kings and Kingdoms, will, as he ſees good, make them inſtrumen­tal for infliction of his wrath, or of his bleſſing to any peo­ple; and, by that uſual deception of ours, in the judging of ſuch as be either good or bad, doth thereby teach us, neither to truſt in theſe things to the arm of fleſh and our own judgment and contrivances, nor to caſt ſo much diſtruſt to­wards him and his care of us, as to refuſe thoſe perſons he hath by his providence, and uſual way of diſpenſation in that kind, ſet over us. For as he did never ſet up any government but Monarchy, nor did ever give that, or any ſetled office to any perſon, but he did withall give it to his poſterity; ſo is it to be left to him alone to find out the means to change the ſame from family to family, as he ſhall really know the deſerts both of the one and the other; and not leave it to us to contrive and ſet up elective Monarchies upon any ſuch fond ſuppoſitions. For if ſuch a conſideration had been valuable to have made places of ſupreme truſt and power elective, then certainly the High-Prieſthood, re­quiring far more perſonal execution, and that in more divine affairs then that of King, (who was the firſt eſtabliſhed Officer in Civil affairs) ſhould not alſo have been entailed to a ſingle family. In which kind notwithſtanding it was ſtill ſetled, and ſo to continue, till God by himſelf or by his Vicegerent ſaw juſt cauſe for alteration thereof. In which caſe as there were others ready ſtill to ſupply thoſe defects which childhood or other inſufficiencie might occaſionally20 make in the highe Prieſt hood, ſo may there be in the Civil Magiſtracie alſo, without running into danger of civil war through the abdication of a family of known deſert, and ſtill be but at the ſame hazard for goodneſs or ſufficiencie in the choice of another.

If we appeal from diſcourſe and argument to matter of experience and practice, in this queſtion of the benefit of Election, we ſhall alſo find things to fall out quite contrary to their imagination and promiſes; and that, upon exami­nation of foreign ſtories, and comparing the vertues and good government of ſuch as have ruled in places elective, with the vertues and good rule of ſuch as reigned in places hereditry; we ſhall truly find the people in a much happier condition under the laſt then under the firſt. For where ſhall we pick out any inſtance for a ſucceſſion of Princes, ſo notoriouſly wicked, and in ſo great a number, as was in the Roman Empire after the Souldiery and Senate would there take upon them to make that Government elective, and neglect that more direct line of ſucceſſion and that he­reditary right which belonged to the iſſue of their brave and victorious Chieftain Caeſar? What think we of Cali­gula, Nero, Otho, Vitellius, Caracalla, Heliogabalus, and other unmatchable examples both for ill life and ill go­vernment? And when we have pitcht upon the beſt of them, it will not be any encouraging example for Chriſtians to ſet up their Governor by election, ſince on their ſcore we may juſtly lay the greateſt part of thoſe moſt bloody perſecuti­ons made againſt them: which until the time of Conſtantine the Great, who, with his Chriſtianity, did again eſtabliſh an hereditary ſucceſſion, and ſo ſomewhat more increaſe and ſettle the glory of that Empire, the poor Chriſtians found little joy or intermiſſion. So eaſie and uſual a thing it is for diſſimulation, force or bribery to prevail in this kind.

And if you will imploy your thoughts upon the collecti­on of ſuch Princes as have been highly illuſtrious and emi­nent either in ſacred or prophane ſtory, I do not think you will find any one that came in by election only, (in ſacred21 ſtory I am ſure you will not) that deſerves to be put either in the firſt or ſecond rate. No, thoſe Princes that were ſo glorious in conqueſts as to eſtabliſh the three firſt Monar­chies of the world, were all of them ſuch as were heredi­tary: Nay, that which we call the fourth Monarchy, (be­cauſe it was longeſt a Monarchy, and under that govern­ment it was longeſt, and had under it both riſe and perfe­ction, being from the Creation but 480 years a Common­wealth) doth owe unto hereditary Monarchy its chief and fundamental laws, and alſo that warlike diſcipline by means whereof it became ſo great and victorious afterwards. For all which, Sir, there is a reaſon at hand: Even becauſe the foundation and atchievement of greatneſs and empire, re­quiring a foregoing deſign and councel, and that which is made upon experience alſo; and requiring a foregoing ſtock of Treaſure, Navy, and other warlike ammunition and preparations together with a well diſciplined and obe­dient Amry & laſtly, requiring a good proportion of time for the proſecution and finiſhing thereof, it is not to be ſup­poſed that the life of any one perſon can be ſufficient both to continue and perfect things of ſuch length and difficulty: but rather, upon theſe conſiderations, it is to be conceived that every elective Prince will be diſcouraged from ſuch attempts; not only becauſe of danger and hardſhip, but alſo becauſe he ſhall venture and labour for what ſhall not accrue to his family, and it may be that the glory and profit of all his works may come to be enjoyed by ſuch a ſucceſſor as is his enemy. And ſo again, in caſe any ſuch enterpriſe ſhould have been ſet on foot, it is as vain a thing to ſuppoſe that the emulation that doth uſually attend Princes of this condition (and thoſe that are beſt of them too) will let the ſucceſſor contribute towards the accompliſhment of any work begun by another, but rather to contrive one of his own, and that contrary alſo, to the increaſe of his own glory by the others diſgrace. So that it being probable that his predeceſſor was not allied to him, but of another party or faction, thoſe that were Enemies to the other are but ſo22 much the more likely to expect favour and protection, in ſtead of war and conqueſt from him. And it is farther con­ſiderable, that it will alſo require a good ſpace of time for every new elected Prince to underſtand the ſtate of his own affairs; and both to ſettle them, and ſecure himſelf againſt thoſe of other parties and factions which he miſtruſts, and have oppoſed him at home, before he can have time and opportunity to think of, and make proviſion for conqueſts abroad, (which then alſo muſt be ſuppoſed the more ſhort, for that Princes are not elected young.) So that we are then only to expect ſuch glorious and great acts to be at­chieved by any one ſuch perſon as a Solomon or an Alexan­der, when they have ſucceeded as heirs to a David or a Philip; who, as well in love and care to their Kingdoms, as to their poſterity that ſhall enjoy them, have been ſo provident and induſtrious in laying up all ſort of proviſi­ons, and making ſuch preparations and beginnings as are unto the accompliſhment of ſo great works neceſſary. And it is very obſervable, that when God hath any great and glorious act or change to make in the world, or in any one Nation, he doth then alſo not only raiſe up a new fa­mily, like thoſe of Caeſar and Pepin, (for the greater mani­feſtation of his power and appearance) but doth alſo bleſs the ſame with an Augustus or a Charlemain; ſuch a fa­mous heir and ſucceſſor, as may ſerve for compleating and finiſhing the work: To the end that all the glory might not be appropriate to one neither. In which conſideration, Sir, why may we not preſume that as our preſent Protector hath been by his power and preſence ſet up and made pro­ſperous for ſome great and glorious end (of which we have been prudent foundations already laid,) ſo alſo that the full perfection and ſettlement of the work is to be ex­pected from his heir. And more apparent hope may we have hereof alſo, then could at firſt be conceived of Henry the 5. lately mentioned; who yet ſucceeding a father, the firſt of his family, and raiſed by the ſword, did make ſo good uſe of that eſtabliſhment and thoſe preparations he had23 made at home, that, to the great honor of this Nation, he became the moſt renowned Prince of any before or ſince.

Where it is objected, Sir, that hereditary ſoveraignty renders men more inclined to acts of tyranny and oppreſſi­on, becauſe he is not in fear to be called to accompt: It may be anſwered, that he that fears to be called to accompt, will be by ſo much the more provoked to deſtroy and op­preſs thoſe that he thinks will be moſt inſtrumental therin. For, Tyrannie being nothing elſe but Soveraign revenge upon ſuch as may or have oppoſed and croſſed them; and Subjects being to be preſumed more ready and daring in that kind againſt him that was but lately their fellow, and whoſe anger they fear not (becauſe of that accompt he is to make) then againſt him that is their Prince born, who there­upon is not ſo likely to conceive cauſe of hatred, and ſo to proceed to acts of tyrannie. Beſides, from the very act of Election it ſelf, there muſt be cauſe of diſcontent and re­venge adminiſtred to ſuch like Princes; and that, from all ſuch as have not been of his party, or have oppoſed, or not ſo ſtrongly abetted his claim as he ſaw fit. Which provo­cations can never happen to the other; who, as in heredi­tary right, comes in without any ſuch oppoſition. And it is alſo to be conſidered, that a Prince elected for term of life is as little in fear of being called to accompt as the other, if he be a Soveraign Prince: if not, he is (as I ſaid) for that reaſon moſt like to tyranniſe and oppreſs. And we ſhall therefore find Tyrannie to be moſt cryed out upon by the people under Elective governments, and Inſurrection and Civil war ofteneſt raiſed upon that ſcore.

And laſtly, whereas it is affirmed, that Princes elected, will, as in requital of that courteſie, be more kind and lo­ving to the people then ſuch as are hereditary; for that theſe, on the other ſide, may ſeem more neglectful of them, as claiming their admittance of right, and not of favour: It may be anſwered, that this very thing (if well conſidered) is alſo an inconvenience which follows Election. For, unleſs24 they can ſuppoſe that any Kingdom hath but one perſon fit or ambitious enough to ſtand for this choice, they muſt then next ſuppoſe, that the party choſen will be ſo far from being kind or grateful to ſuch as were not of his party and did not joyn in his election, as he will be their enemy. Again it may be asked where they find theſe elections ever referred to the people in general, ſo as to induce him to kindneſs and acknowledgment towards them, and not ſtill referred to ſome few certain Electors, as in Germany to ſix, nor but to a few in Poland, the Commons in both places being wholly excluded? Whereupon when the number of diſſenting E­lectors ſhall be taken out of the roll of kindneſs, it may well on the other ſide be concluded, that Election doth prompt Princes to be careleſs of the good of their people in general, and to carry ſo partial a reſpect towards ſome few friends and favorites that have holpen him to his ſoveraignty, and can continue him ſtill in power, as to neglect and deſpiſe all the reſt. So that equal juſtice being not to be expected from him in his publique adminiſtrations, it were much better for a Prince to think he holds his power from and under God, and is to him alone accomptable, then by ſuch like deviſes to bribe or terrifie him that is to execute the place of a Judge, and ſo lay a ſtumbling block for him that reproveth in the gate.

By this time, Sir, I hope I have made good what I affirm­ed in the beginning, That all their arguments were but the inſinuations of ambitious and factious heads, clouded under the ſpecious ſhews of publique good and equal juſtice. For it plainly appears, that inſtead of avoidance (as they pre­tend) their Propoſals would neceſſarily bring us into ſla­very and oppreſſion, by making our Princes (as of courſe) partial, unjuſt, and tyrannical. If they be then to ſeek in what they moſt rely upon, what will they anſwer to thoſe more great and more certain miſeries which are ſo conſtant­ly attendant on the other form? all of which are ſo neceſ­ſarily leading to faction and ſiding, and to the unſetling of all eſtates and conditions, that no man regardful of publique25 peace and content, and careful to avoid the danger of Civil war, Anarchy and confuſion, can deliberately carry a wiſh that way. For ſince there cannot be any Political Govern­ment longer then there is an apparent Soveraignty ſome­where abiding; from whoſe reſidence in one, few, or more perſons, it comes to be called of this or that form; what ſhall we ſay of this Government, upon the death of the laſt elected Prince? If the ſupreme power be in the Electors, then is it now an Ariſtocracie: And why is it not to be feared that they may not proceed to election at all; but, by a kind of complot, keep it in their own hands? To think of ſetting up ſome other perſon or order to ſee them ob­ſerve due time and method herein, is again to ſuppoſe the ſoveraignty not in them neither: for if they may be hindred from doing ill, ſo alſo from doing well, or not doing at all. And then how could the deceaſed Prince have ſoveraign power derived from his election, (ſuppoſing they gave it to him during life) if not they, but ſome others then had it? If, according to the fancied way of Coordination, the So­veraignty were partly in the Electors, and partly in the Third Order, then muſt both agree in the election, or elſe it will come to nothing. And this they will doubtleſs do in caſe they be friends and of one intereſt and opinion, or elſe are afraid of each others power. In which caſe, as Coordi­nation will at beſt prove fruitleſs, becauſe they are as like to comply in an ill choice as a good, ſo again, if they be ene­mies, that Commonwealth muſt run theſe two moſt certain perils; not only, through their contention, to be deprived of a good choice, when it is made; but be drawn into the moſt dangerous condition of Civil war, as being wholly engaged in two contraty parties. For, do greatneſs & ſoveraign power uſe to be ſlighted and unregarded, as that thoſe that have it ſhould be more ready to reſign then increaſe it? Do men rather choſe ſubjection, then principality; to be in the con­dition of beggers for favors, then be able to do them? Have we not ſeen a Parliament deſigning to make themſelvs ever­laſting? and may we not hereafter fear that a Councel may26 doe ſo too? And therefore it muſt needs be, that upon the death of every Elected Prince, the whole State and Go­vernment, and every mans fortune therein, muſt be left in tottering condition; whilſt (during that inter-regnun) Eve­ry man may doe what ſeems good in his own eyes; and ſo be as in a ſtate of Anarchy. The which unhappy condition we finde attributed to the Iſraelites before they had the Scepter hereditarily ſetled (as was promiſed) in the Tribe of Judah, but were ſubject to the like Chaſmes in government. And if any would know how it can be imagined that every man could be permitted to doe what was right in his own eyes, or be in a ſtate of Anarchy, where there is a ſtanding Law for direction what to doe, and ſtanding Judges and Officers to ſee it done; and where, laſtly, there is a ſtand­ing high Court or Councell above all. So that the Iſrae­lites having at that time all theſe, that is, the Law of Mo­ſes, the Prieſts and Levites, and other ordinary Judges; and having alſo their Sanhedrim or great Councell of Elders, and prime men of their Tribes, we muſt therefore conceive that by every mans doing what ſeemed good in his own eyes, is not meant that every individuall perſon did ſo to every man elſe; but the heads and leaders in theſe ſeverall Tribes whereof the Sanhedrim conſiſted, being divided a­mongſt themſelves by faction, and conſequently drawing all thoſe of their Tribe and party ſeverally after them, it there­upon came to paſs that every man being thus divided from every man, as under theſe ſeparate aſſociations, they did every man unto every man, what ſeemed good in their own eyes. And this befell them becauſe there was no King or Judge in thoſe dayes to judge between blood and blood, and plea and plea; that is, ſuch matters as happened to fall out between the Elders and great ones; and ſo too hard in judgment to be determined in the ordinary Courts, or re­conciled in that higher Court either: ſince theſe Elders were both judges and parties therein.

And therefore, Sir, if there be ſo muce danger of diviſion and Civill war dependant on Elective principalities (even27 becauſe they are Elective) what may we more juſtly fear to be the event of ſuch things in this Nation; where now, more then ever, every man ſtands from every man ſo much divided in Civill intereſt, but much more in matters of Reli­gion? If there were one man Micha found amongſt them, ſetting up a Teraphim and a Prieſt to himſelf, while there was no King there; what think we of our ſelves, that have lately had ſo many Micha's ſetting up their ſeverall Tera­phims in every corner, and that with ſuch extravagant affe­ctation of diſſent from what is eſtabliſhed, that they per­ſwade themſelves, that to be heterodox is to be orthodox? Will it not in this caſe highly concern us as we love our peace and quiet, to keep conſtant to one perſon and family of moſt moderate principles, and which is well known to carry a tender and univerſall regard to all, and ſo moſt likely in good time to bring us to a happy union again; then, after his deceaſe, to caſt the Commonwealth into the danger of a new ſtorm and ſhipwrack, by awaking the hopes of all that be heads and leaders in thoſe ſeverall ſects and fa­ctions that be among us, to be putting in for themſelves, or ſome great favorer of their party? for if we finde ſuch pack­ing and ſiding for election of Parlament men, or the like, what ſtirs may we look for at the choice of a Protector? Out of which conteſt and diſpute, ſuppoſe we ſhould be ſo happy as to winde our ſelves without open War, and have one perſon at laſt choſen and agreed upon by the Major part of the appointed Electors; and ſuppoſe yet farther, that the preſent Army ſhall therein conſent too, or elſe reſt quiet; why yet ſince that perſon choſen muſt himſelf be of ſome party or another, and could not therefore come in by a joynt or univerſall conſent, will it not hence come to paſs (as beforeſaid) that he being now in power, ſhall be natu­rally provoked to acts of puniſhment and revenge towards ſuch as have oppoſed, or have not, to his content and expe­ctation, taken part with him? Whereupon, all that are of different parties from him muſt expect to live as in a ſtate of perſecution, or endanger a new civill War by joyning28 in oppoſition. So that, if we be not actually broken one againſt another, yet advantage will be hereby ſtill offered and encreaſed; and the whole Nation continually eſpouſed into ſeverall feuds and factions, to the overthrow of all charity and brotherly love. And if, to avoid this miſchief, ſome way of reſtraint ſhould be thought upon, by having a third Eſtate (like that in Poland) to bear a controule over their Kings actions; this, although it might, at ſome times, and for a while keep the ſore from breaking out, yet would it but encreaſe the ſwelling and diſtemper againſt a fit op­portunity, by that encreaſe of Opinions which ſhould fol­low this generall freedom and toleration; as he experience of thoſe many more Religions and Opinions in the ſame Poland, then elſwhere, doe witneſs to be the fruits of Ele­ctive and much limited Princes. Which is a courſe that cannot at all allay the diſcontents of thoſe that live under his Government, and ſtand divided in intereſt or opinion. For ſince he muſt yet have ſome power left him to Rule with, he will ſtill be as ſubject to be accuſed, by thoſe that finde themſelves croſſed for having tranſcended his limits in that little Truſt, as if he had had more. The which jealouſie will be alſo increaſed, as well from that inſolence which doth uſually accompany perſons newly preferred, as alſo, from that degree of impatience which uſeth again to be caſt towards ſuch as were lately but of equal condition with us, and are by our ſelves ſet up. Whenas, in Princes born, theſe things are not only patiently undergone, as out of ſenſe of duty, but are alſo more tolerable and milde; as coming from ſuch as were from their Cradles bred to ſway Scep­ters, and had been accuſtomed to ſuch like honors and ad­dreſſes.

As thus, Sir, Elective and limited Monarchies doe nou­riſh qarties and factions, for want of a common center of Union amongſt themſelves, ſo the generality of the ſubjects and people doe in them live in the higheſt degree of ſervi­tude. Becauſe thoſe that call themſelves the Free Princes and Nobility (as in Germany, Poland, Denmarke, &c.)29 making it part of their freedom to debarr their Emperors and Kings from intermedling in their Juriſdictions, or from hearing the appeals or addreſſes of their Subjects (which they arbitrarily govern according to their own privat laws, and not after the common law of the Empire and King­dom) they muſt thereupon be by ſo much the more enſla­ved, as their Emperor or King is leſs powerfull. And that which yet makes their caſe more hard, is, that ſince they are alſo liable to more Taxes then others, paying not onely to the ſupport of their own Lords what they ſhal think fit, but alſo to the ſupport of the Empire and Kingdom upon all publique Levies, they are thereby unreaſonably put to maintain a power that cannot protect them.

And from the foregoing grounds it is, found that, as Elective governments may be obſerved more ſhort-lived then Hereditary; ſo alſo, of thoſe that have or doe conti­nue, there may be a daily leſſening and dclenſion obſerved in them; by ſuffering ſeverall parcels to be taken away by their Neighbours, or elſe to ſtand upon terms of abſolute independency; as may be ſeen by thoſe ſeverall petit States of Italy and elſwhere, canton'd off from the German Em­pire. For why ſhould thoſe abſolute Princes and Lords, that have their peculiar Seignories and power, be ſo much concerned herein as to undergoe the charge and hazard of recovering thoſe Territories and Dominions to a common Soveraignty only, whereof themſelves have ſo little honor or benefit? and why ſhould the Emperor or Prince (who holds but for life) endanger or impoveriſh himſelf herein, ſince he ſhall ſtill keep on the ſame rank and title; and have, it may be, a good ſum for his connivance.

And ſo again, for that very time they doe continue, they come to owe their preſervation more to outward occur­rences and good luck, then their inward prudence or policy. As for example, the German Empire is beholding to the Turk, and to the Chriſtian Princes its Neighbors for their agreement; who, by their continuall fears from abroad, keep them united and in peace at home. And by the like30 accident is the Kingdom of Poland often kept from Civill War alſo: and alſo by keeping cloſe to one family; which cannot afford many perſons at once, whereby to make civil diſturbance about Election. Beſides, the German Empire is alſo kept in ſome agreement by that reſpect therein given to the Papall Sea. For the Pope having, by much ſtrugling and policie, pulled down the power of thoſe Emperors, and by his golden Bull ſetled it as now it is (having half the Electors Biſhops) hath ſtill kept up ſuch a power and reve­rentiall reſpect amongſt them, as to awe any one there, from making himſelf ſo great and abſolute, as to be again in competition with him for maſtery: or, (on the other ſide) to ſuffer the Electors or other Eſtates to invade or diminiſh that greatneſs and glory left him; leaſt alſo that honour of his own ſhould abate in the loſs of ſo honourable a ſervant. And ſince the time of Luther it hath been preſerved by the policie of the Auſtrian family; who ever ſince getting their ſons ſetled in their life times, have kept it from thoſe diſtractions which might accompany new choice.

Another inconvenience attending elective Soveraignties, is decay of publique Revenue, and proviſions of all kinds both for war and peace. For how ſhall it be thought that thoſe that hold but for his life, ſhould either repair what was done by another, or attempt the erection of ſuch mag­nificent works and foundations, which could not likely be in that time accompliſhed; and which, in the doing alſo, muſt rob his family of ſo much in propriety, as that coſt would have come to? So that theſe things having their reaſons apparent, I ſhall forbear examples therein, as I have done in many things foregoing, and ſhall do in moſt that follow; fearing alſo, Sir, that I have already made too great an aſſault on your patience, and tranſcended the allowable bulk of a Letter. But, Sir, ſince all mens reading and expe­rience do inform them that money hath been and will be the uſual purchaſer of preferment, it muſt be preſumed that the perſon aiming at this greatneſs, doth intend that the publick ſtock ſhall again make good his disburſment. 31But, may ſome think, the Princes and Nobles, or thoſe in power, will look to all exorbitance in this kind. No, Sir, they will rather encourage it: for they were the perſons that were firſt bribed for his entrance, and ſo cannot in ju­ſtice but ſee him (at leaſt) repay himſelf again. Beſides, they being but few, and bearing no great proportion in their own particulars, towards publick levies, may be ſu­ſpected leſs careful of what is done therein, and may alſo have their good will purchaſed by part thereof. As the ne­ceſſity of compliance with the great ones that holp him in and do ſupport him, muſt thus exhauſt the publick ſtock, ſo alſo the care and thought for preſervation and main­tenance of his own family and other dependents, muſt cauſe him to imploy that ſtudy and endeavour which ſhould be intent to advance the publick ſtock as his own, to ſeek to take from it all he can, that it may be ſo indeed. So that if we ſhould ſtill make change of families for our Governor, and pick out of any according as one happened to have a fitter perſon then another, it muſt be ſuppoſed that the ſame ſum that would ſuffice for the maintenance of one fa­mily, would not, by much, be ſufficient to afford proportions to advance and ennoble a great many, in ſuch ſort that they may carry a continual ſhew and rank anſwerable to that place which was once executed by their anceſtor. And if we think of putting the election and power of comptroll in more perſons (as in the people, in Parliaments, or the like) as thinking a multitude of ſuffrages and conſents are not ſo eaſily purchaſed; we might yet be herein miſtaken alſo, ſince we are informed that Caeſar and others could tell how to bribe whole Commonwealths (or thoſe that bore the name thereof) both to be elected and kept Dicta­tors, or the like offices: And that Senators or Parliament-men may be drawn by money, preferment, or other relation or intereſt, is but too truly known. If, Sir, you ſhould think fit to chooſe but out of ſome few more Noble families, to avoid the impoveriſhing of the common ſtock by enriching ſo many little ones, as they do in Germany; then how will32 you do to pick out ſuch in England, as now it is, without diſcontent and danger too, to ariſe from thoſe that are ſe­cluded? Will you keep to one family, as they in Poland have done? why, this is yet better. But the beſt courſe of all is to do as they do now in Germany, and as hath been ever practiſed in theſe Nations, to keep not only to one fa­mily, but to obſerve the ſame order of deſcent in this chief place of authority, as is by the law of God and the Land obſerved in other families in the inheritance of all things elſe. Sir, when you have thus done, you and the reſt of the Houſe may then, and not till then, reſt aſſured that you have anſwered that great truſt repoſed in you, The peace and ſettlement of theſe Nations. For to ſettle us otherwiſe, were but to unſettle us by that ſettlement.

And this, Sir, I may alſo preſs upon you as a duty you owe to thoſe you repreſent, even the ſatisfaction of the deſires of the people in generall, which I may con­fidently affirm is ſtrongly enclined to that only form of Go­vernment they have heretofore ſo long and ſo happily lived under, And which upon a juſt conference with that diſpa­rity which is between us and thoſe other places where Ele­ction is practiſed, cannot with ſafety be altered.

For Sir, ſince we have no ſuch ſtanding rank of Gentry, Nobility, and free Princes, as in Venice, Poland, Germany, &c. which ſhould hereditarily make up the body of a ſtanding ſupreme Councell; nor doe not now ſo much as allow of that ancient right of Peerage in our Parlaments, but have levelled all to the order of Commons: and ſince we do not, like other places, caſt any ſuch reverentiall fear towards Pope or any Foraign prince, from whom, as from an Um­pire our differences might receive ready reconciliation; and we being alſo an Iſland, are not like other places, ſo much in danger of Foraign ſurprize and invaſion, whereby to be frighted to agreement, in caſe we ſhould fall out about the perſon or the power of the Prince to be elected. It is there­fore much more, on our parts, to be feared, that upon the death of every Protector, a general jealouſie and fear of33 what ſhall next happen will amuſe and diſturb every one, as not knowing whether they ſhall continue under the ſame laws and form of government they were before. For firſt, ſuppoſe it to be in the interval of Parliament, and ſo the chief power and command being in the Councel, may they not by the ſame power they command them in all other things, forbid the Keepers of the Great Seal for making out Writs, or the Sheriffs for making Elections? What likeli­hood that either will oppoſe a power in being, and able to reward as well as protect them; upon fear that a power may ariſe to puniſh them, but cannot do it till they be called, nor be called till themſelves ſhall think fit? In which caſe to ſuppoſe the Army, ſuch an one as may be then in being, ſhall lay aſide all conſideration of advantages to themſelves, likely to be offered from ſuch a Councel as may be alſo, and on the contrary, to be ready to compel thoſe that are their legal Superiors to proceed to election, or calling of a Par­liament, is as far unlikely. Or ſuppoſe the Protector ſhould die, the Parliament fitting; why then this being the ſupreme power, is it not to be preſumed they will take to themſelves as much power in matters of government as other Parlia­ments have done, and ſo reſcind what was before eſtabliſh­ed as an impeachment to their perpetuity, even the power of a Protector and his Councel? Now as theſe confuſions and alterations of the Government as now eſtabliſhed, are more to be feared from us then in other places, both for want of practice in the ſteering and dividing of our duties amongſt ſuch like Coordinate powers, and for want of one only ſtanding ſupreme Council to direct, without fear of a dormant higher power to ſucceed; ſo is it much more on our parts to be feared, that through that ſiding and inter­medling which an Army may hereafter make between theſe juriſdictions, both the government may be changed, and the publique peace hazarded. For it being evident, that in all thoſe places where the Soveraign Magiſtrate and the perſon of the higheſt rank is elective, and ſo the Govern­ment ſubject to intervals, there thoſe of the next Order are hereditarily ſeiſed of the Soveraignty as in fee, until they34 ſhall again leaſe the ſame out to another for life; and ſo again, where the Soveraignty is hereditary in one family, there on the other ſide thoſe next ſubordinate Officers to be imployed in the Government are elective and dependent on him: It muſt therefore come to paſs, that if this Council or Order of men that is to have power in the interregnum ſhould be elective alſo, then muſt that Government depend upon contingencies; becauſe there may not be enow of them, or enow rightly choſen to compleat ſuch an aſſembly. Now ſince with us there is not (as I ſaid) ſuch a ſtanding Order or Council claiming power by birth, but it is in ſome ſort neceſſary and convenient that the Officers of the Army ſhould be taken in as members both of Council and Parlia­ment, it will follow, that in caſe the Council ſhould conſiſt moſtly of ſuch, there were no likelihood that a Parliament ſhould be called. But if the Parliament ſhould have more or other then thoſe that made up the Council, then is it again to be feared, that in order to the continuance of their own power, they would cauſe both the power of Council and future Protectors to be voted down alſo. For how can it be imagined, that in this viciſſitude and ſliding from one Maſter to another, they ſhall be ſo equally favoured and uſed by Protector, Parliament and Council, in their ſeveral turns of power, as to ſtand on all hands ſo indifferently en­gaged to all and each of them, that they ſhall not cleave to the one, and hate and deſpiſe the other; but ſhall, to a man, be one day for the Council againſt all other, and on the morrow when the Parliament ſhall ſit, do the like for them? If things do not happen juſt ſo, then will one Coordinate overthrow the other, by their partial and unequal ſiding; Or that which is yet worſe, by their diviſion hereabout they will involve us into a ſtate of Civil war. And truly, Sir, although from ſuch an Army, ſuch a Council, and ſuch a Parliament as we now have, encroachments and juſtlings on one another are not to be much feared; yet, Sir, that there may be juſt ground given to ſuſpect ſuch events for the future, will be very apparent to him that ſhall reflect on thoſe ſad conſequences which might have been the iſſue of35 ſuch high and turbulent agitations and endeavours as were by ſome fiery ſpirits ſet on foot in the begining of this very Parliament. You are not ſure, Sir, that the Protector and the General ſhall always be the ſame man, or that he ſhall be of equal prudence and reputation with this; ſo as by his diſcretion & authority, all ſuch miſchief may be pre•••ted. And therefore, Sir, ſince our future peace and eſtab••••ent ought chiefly to be provided for, I pray think in h••un­certaine a condition you leave us, if you leave all to depend on election; and that election to be or not be, to be wel and orderly done or ill done, as the parties therein entruſted ſhall be faithful and able, or biaſſed and ignorant. For it is not enough in ſuch a caſe to propound things fit to be done by any, unleſs there be withall ſome others appointed to ſee them do it: the which alſo may faile in their truſt, and ſo need others again to ſee them doe their duties: and then it will come to paſs that thoſe that are laſt truſted will be chiefly or firſt truſted, whereas that high tituled officer that was firſt truſted wil be leaſt truſted, and ſo come to be loweſt of all. And by this ſettling of watchmen upon watchmen, you will bring all buſineſs to a ſtand, whilſt thoſe officers that are to act ſhall have no power to act, and thoſe that are not to act ſhall have all.

But ſince experience doth make it manifeſt, that at laſt ſome perſons muſt be truſted, and that for ſome time alſo; in order to reconcile publick differences, how madly doth it look to take ſuch a middle courſe herein, as ſhall neither attain the good, nor avoid the evil intended? They that will truſt a man for his life, doe run the utmoſt minute of hazard he hath to do it in; and do then ſet the gap open again, for Civil combuſtion about the next Election, when as his heir may prove as good as another. And they that will not afford their Prince ſo much power as to be in all cauſes, and over all perſons ſupreme, doe not only ſtill want a decider of quarrels amongſt themſelves, but do alſo therby add ſuch new occaſion of quarrels about power as they may afterwards have with him. And therefore ſince Election cannot aſſure us of goodneſs; nay, ſince good Princes may36 change to ill (as Nero that for 5 years was the beſt, & after­wards the worſt of any) 'tis beſt to make ſure of that certain benefit of publick peace, by keeping cloſe to one family, and by allowing ſufficiency of power, then increaſe the diſeaſe by thoſe remedies of election of perſons, and limitation of his power.

Sir, there was a time indeed when Monarchy and Ty­rannie, Parlaments and Liberty were thought to be the ſame, but the experience of our condition under that long, long, long, Parliament, a and that little once ſince; hath rectifyed our judgements, and brought us to look on that Text as Canonical, and on him as a wiſe man that ſaid, For the wic­kedneſs of a Land many are the Princes thereof, but by a man of underſtanding the ſtate thereof is preſerved, Prov. 28.2. We do acknowledge that in the multitude of Councellors there is ſafety, Prov. 11.14. but we look for no ſuch matter from a multitude of Controlers. So that Vox populi being now Vox Dei, we hope you will, in your debates of Go­vernment, Ask for the old paths, where is the good way, and walk therein, that we may finde reſt for our ſouls, Jer. 6.16. In this Sir, we ſhall not contend with you for names, but things. If you will have our Soveraign Magiſtrate to be called Protector, we like it well: it is an Office we want, and do therefore deſire he may have that power left him as will enable him to perform it: ſuffer him to wear a ſword Sir, or elſe he can neither protect us nor himſelf. And if again, you will have our former great Councel called by the An­cient name of Parliament, we pray you alſo, that the thing may be again reduced: and made agreeable to the name; let them have freedom to ſpeak their minds, but not to do them. No more of that Sir. For it is a yoak which our Fathers never knew of, nor are we able to bear. And there­fore as you and the reſt do now repreſent us, and are to make known our grievances, we do deſire that you would take notice of this as a great one. For you may reſt aſſured that, were this Nation poled, not one in twenty but would deſire their old Government again.


But it is now time, Sir, to deſire ſomething for my ſelf; namely, your pardon for the tediouſneſs and extravagancie of the paſſed diſcourſes, and alſo your favorable conſtruction of my meaning in them, which was not to find fault with any thing already done, or to inſtruct you what to doe. No, Sir, as you have always known me a quiet man un­der Government, and reſpectful to my preſent Su­periors therein; ſo I beſeech you to believe that I am ſo far from intending a Cenſure of any thing this way eſtabliſhed, that my drift hath been to de­fend it againſt all others; eſpecially that part which is moſt malign'd, as having moſt tendencie towards Monarchy. For, finding (as I ſaid) many Pam­phlets of late thrown abroad to render that Form odious and diſadvantagious to the people, that thereby you might be prejudiced and affrighted from making any farther ſettlement that way, I have thereupon preſumed it expedient, even for your own and publick ſatisfaction, that ſomething ſhould be alſo ſaid on the other ſide; that ſo you might be again brought to ſome even poize in your judgments, before you come to determination in this great affair. And therefore, as they would have had the World believe that you had not re­ſpected the peoples welfare, if you had ſetled the Protector and his Iſſue; ſo have I endeavoured to make it appear, that you cannot doe the Nation a better courteſie then by ſo doing. The which coming from one ſo diſintereſſed as I am to him and his family by any relation, will the ſooner, I hope, find acceptance as a word ſpoken in ſeaſon:38 Nay farther, Sir, He is one that I never received courteſie and encouragement from in the leaſt kind; and as for his Children, I know not the face of one of them. What I have ſaid, Sir, hath been that which in my judgment is moſt for the general be­nefit: And hath been the ſudden iſſue of mine own brain, as by the indigeſtion both of method and matter will be but too apparent. The Author having nothing to boaſt of, but that he is

Your most affectionate Servant.

About this transcription

TextA copy of a letter written to an officer of the Army by a true Commonwealths-man, and no courtier, concerning the right and settlement of our present government and governors.
AuthorTrue Commonwealths-man..
Extent Approx. 94 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 23 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images.
SeriesEarly English books online.
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(EEBO-TCP ; phase 2, no. A80505)

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Bibliographic informationA copy of a letter written to an officer of the Army by a true Commonwealths-man, and no courtier, concerning the right and settlement of our present government and governors. True Commonwealths-man.. [2], 38 p. Printed by Tho. Newcomb, over against Bainards-Castle in Thames-street.,London, :1656.. (Annotation on Thomason copy: "March 19".) (Reproduction of the original in the British Library.)
  • Republics -- Early works to 1800.
  • Monarchy -- Early works to 1800.
  • Great Britain -- Politics and government -- 1649-1660 -- Early works to 1800.

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  • DLPS A80505
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  • EEBO-CITATION 99863041
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