YOu may pleaſe to remember, that upon ſome late diſcourſes which paſſed between us concerning ſome things relating to the preſent eſta­bliſhment in our Government, and of that queſtion of Hereditary or Elective ſucceſſion; I did then trou­ble you with the relation of my o­pinion therein, and give you ſuch reaſons and arguments as did then occur, for the eſtabliſh­ment of both: And which might ſerve by way of anſwer to thoſe ordinary objections made to the contrary, which in malicious Pamphlets or otherwiſe were vulgarly ſpread a­broad, both to diſaffect the people, and to breed a diſtaſte and jealouſie both in Parliament and Army againſt the Pro­tector and his ſettlement and proceedings. But having now ſince had time more ſeriouſly to conſider of the nature and conſequences of the thing, both as it is in it ſelf, and as it doth relate to the conſtitution of theſe Nations, and the preſent ſtate of publique affairs therein ſetled, I found my ſelf on all hands ſo throughly ſatisfied with the inconveni­encies that would accompany Election, and with the falla­cies of all thoſe ſpecious arguments uſually given for it, that I conceived it lay upon me as a duty, as well for your own farther ſatisfaction, as for that ſatisfaction you might here­in give to others, both in the Houſe and Army, to give un­to you a more full and regular accompt of my conceptions herein: To the end that the prejudices of all unbiaſſed peo­ple may be herewith ſo far ſatisfied, that through murmure and ingratitude we do not again provoke God to deſiſt in that courſe of eſtabliſhment he hath now put us, and ſuffer us again to relapſe into our former way of diviſion and diſ­order; whilſt, at once, we ſhould ſhew our ſelves as well unjuſt and ingrateful towards him, as towards that his Mi­niſter whom he hath made ſo highly inſtrumental in ſo great a mercy.

So far as this deſign of Election ſavours of injuſtice and ingratitude towards our preſent Superior, I ſhall deſire you (Sir) firſt to conſider, that as ambition and covetouſneſs are vices to all men more or leſs incident, ſo in thoſe or ſuch like alterations of State as have happened to us, it cannot be ex­pected that the acquiſitions of the prevailing party, either for honour or riches, can be ſo equally or in ſuch ſort ſhared as to find general ſatisfaction. For as each one is then ready to ſet the higheſt rate he can on his own deſerts and endea­vours in the Common cauſe, even ſo muſt he conſequently as much repine at the portions of others above him, and which are greater then his own, as to be thereby prompted to find out and promote all the ways he can both for abating from them, and for reducing them to an equality with himſelf: And if this cannot be effected, then at leaſt to abridge them of continuance herein, that he alſo, as in right of election, may have his turn in thoſe honours and eſtates which are higheſt. And this is alſo to be expected from ſuch as have for a long time together made to them­ſelves a way of trade and gain by means of that ſupreme and uncontrollable power and truſt they then executed: when now being debarred of the perpetuity of their miſuſed power, they are buſie to vent abroad their angry and re­vengeful declamations as well againſt his power that hath done it, as his continuance therein; and to make it take the better, to palliate it with the ſhew of publike good.

They ſay, that ſince all in the late engagement have run equal hazard, and have jointly adventured their lives and fortunes, why ſhould any one perſon or family be ſuffered to ingroſs all the prize to themſelves? That the Cauſe they undertook was that which was common, and for the good of the whole people, and to render them happy, not the ſingle advantage and preferment of any one man or his po­ſterity. And if any one man ſhould claim advantage or pre­ferment above the reſt, as having been (for his part) moſt eminent and active in the proſecution and danger thereof, yet why his ſon or poſterity, who (perhaps) were not all,5 or very little meritorious therein? Will not the ſame juſtice and reaſon of eminent deſert that preferred the Father to others of leſs deſert then him, claim precedence for other perſons of more preſent deſerts and hopes before theſe alſo? Mark the diſpenſations of Providence and Nature; ſince they entail not Vertue and Wiſdom to a Family, what is it but on purpoſe to adviſe us to a diſcreet liberty of chooſing him that is beſt out of all, and not ſervilely to ſubject our ſelves to ſuch hazards and inconveniences as may accom­pany any one? In ſuch ſort as ſometimes a perſon notori­ouſly wicked, and ſometimes (to the heightening of our woe) a Child ſhall be left to rule over us. That it is the ſtrongeſt allurement to undertake acts of Tyrannie and In­juſtice; ſince now they know they cannot be amoved, be they what they will: Nor will they at all ſtudy the content and ſatisfaction of the people, ſince they know they came in, and can continue therein without them. Whereas he that conſiders that his election comes from, and is made by the people, will probably, as in gratitude and kindneſs to them, ſtudy all ways to pleaſe and oblige them

With theſe and ſuch like diſcourſes and arguments I find the ambitious heads of ſome perſons (diſaffected to the preſent Government, or indeed to any Government ar all) have of late ſought, not only to eſtrange the minde of both Parliament and Army one towards another, but to ſpread an univerſall jealouſie and diſguſt againſt him that is now our higher Power: That ſo as under the odium and ſuſpition of that arbitrary Government which may be acted by one perſon, themſelves may, more certainly, and in grea­ter numbers, both at Committees and elſwhere, by ve•tue of the glorious title and countenance of a Parlament, ſtil retain to themſelves an unlimited power to ſettle and diſpoſe of the Liberties and fortunes of others as they ſhall ſee good. And although, for the preſent there may not be ſo much fear of impreſſion upon a juſt conſideration of the appro­ved moderation and diſcipline of the whole Army (the like whereunto I may confidently ſay no ſtory can make in­ſtance6 in) yet, conſidering them as mortal in their particu­lar members, and how that hereafter the hope of ſucceſſion (a contrivance purpoſely brought in to engage and diſaffect ſome of them) may work upon more ambitious and cove­tous heads, I have thought good to offer theſe Conſidera­tions following, as highly conſiderable, both in reſpect of Juſtice and gratitude to the perſon now in poſſeſſion, and alſo in reference to the future good and tranquility of the three Nations.

Firſt, I ſay, that in this great change in the face of pub­lick affairs which hath hapned and been brought about, all that have been active have not run equal hazards. For, as it is apparent that the Souldier hath run more hazard then others; ſo, amongſt them again, although it be true, that as to the ſhock of a battail, the common Souldier is in equal or greater peril of his life, then his Captain or Colonell, yet ſince in the defeat of an Army, it is much the leſſer patt that periſh in the field; but the reſt coming to be made pri­ſoners, and ſo left to the uſage of the Conqueror, it is not then to be thought but that the leader and Commander is more in danger of ſevere and exemplary puniſhment then the other. Beſides which, in all Proclamations of pardon, which are the uſuall fore-runners of open warr or ſett battailes, an offer of indemnity and grace uſeth to be made as to the body and ordinary ſort of the adverſe party and army, and onely ſome few, and it may be but the Generall himſelf to ſtand excepted. And therefore I would deſire thoſe that be now Commanders in this preſent army to lay theſe things to heart, and to meaſure the caſe of their preſent Generall by that Goſpel rule of doe as thou wouldeſt be done unto. Doe they not really believe that in caſe the King had prevailed, themſelves ſhould have undergone higher Cenſure and Puniſhment then thoſe of inferior ranke that ſerved under them? and that, not onely as having greater fortunes then them to loſe, but alſo as having been more eminent and active againſt him then they. And doe they not farther believe that their preſent Generall, as7 having moſt of all been eminent and forward in this whole enterpriſe, was not thereupon, proportionably in greateſt danger of all? Therefore if they think it reaſonable that thoſe ſtates and honours which by means, and as in reward of their publique imployment are come into their hands, ſhould now remain as hereditary to their poſterity, in like manner as they did to others before, they muſt, upon the ſame rule of equity determine that the like is moſt juſtly due to the Protector & his family alſo. If any of them by means of his own military and publick imployment, have encreaſed his eſtate or degree ſo far as to be brought up to the ranke and title of Eſquire, will he be content that nothing of this ſhall deſcend to his ſonne? Or if he have gotten the propriety of ſome Mannor, and through that the juriſdiction and Honour which belongs to a Lord thereof, will they be content to exerciſe and enjoy al this but during life onely, and then ſuffer both the acquired eſtate and Lordſhip to reſt at the diſpoſe of the Tenants, or thoſe that have ſerved under him? whereby theſe, as renouncing that their own former and proper relations and conditions of Tenancy and Obedience, ſhould now take upon them to diſpoſe, as they think good of the heir; and to ſhare and diſtribute, as they pleaſe, all that belonged to the Father? And all this upon allegation it was a joynt and publike cauſe which they all undertooke, and that theſe honours and Revenews being parcels of, and belonging unto that Com­monwealth, for which they ſerved, there was no reaſon that one ſhould engroſs and appropriate that for which all had run like hazard and ſervice: If they think this Levelling plea fit in this caſe to take place, there will then indeed be ſome equality though little diſcretion. But if they on their parts, like not to be reduced to this condition, but do rather judge it reaſonable that ſince that Commonwealth, for whoſe ſake and ſafety they have undertaken all this pains and hazard, hath belonging unto it, and to the neceſſary ſupport and management thereof divers hereditary Offi­cers, preferments, and Revenues, it is but juſt that thoſe8 perſons that have been moſt eminently faithful and active above others in the ſupport of it and them, ſhould by good equity be eſtated in thoſe places and powers which are of greateſt truſt and benefit. For if this plea be not good, there are examples and preſidents enow to be fetched out of for­reign parts both for levelling of Gentry and Nobility, and alſo to make them mortal with the parent, and to depend on the arbitrary diſpoſal of others. But if they would not, for their parts, have it well taken to have alterations pur­poſely deviſed and ſet on foot to take from them and theirs what they had ſo highly deſerved, ſo can they not but judge it as hard and unequal uſage towards others. For, did any of them ever hear or read that the Soveraignty of this place was ever elective? If not, doe they indeed think that this man that now hath it, is, for his part, ſo much the worſt and moſt undeſerving of any that ever yet ruled, that, for his exemplary infamy and diſgrace, a particular law muſt be brought in to the prejudice of his poſterity? I would fain demand of any of them that are fathers of children; Was not the honor & advancement of their houſe one great mo­tive to this undertaking? Did they not beforehand know, that if they had been overcome, the infamy and loſs accom­panying Traitors and Treaſon (ever imputed to the weaker ſide) would have light on their poſterity as much or more then themſelves? And therefore ſince theſe their children (eſpecially of ſuch as have been eminent) have run their ſhares in the hazard of that ſhame and loſs which did attend the ſucceſs, and the greateſt ſhare too in the perpetuity thereof; they cannot therefore but conclude, that not only their own, but the race of thoſe alſo that are above them, muſt, by good right, claim to be eſtated and ſetled in all ſuch hereditary Offices as their father ſtood ſeiſed of, in reward or acknowledgment of their paſt ſervice. There can be no man ſo weak of judgment or experience, but may eaſily conceive there would have been a more high meaſure of contempt and puniſhment inflicted on the poſterity of the Protector then of any other, in caſe he had been overcome:9 Nor ſurely can any be ſo devoid of reaſon or conſcience, as not to determine that by good conſequence they doe there­upon deſerve alſo to be continued in the higheſt preferment that doth belong to that Commonwealth whoſe cauſe they maintained, and for whoſe ſafety they were put into ſuch hazard.

But to come yet nearer to them in their Propoſals for Equality: Do they think ſit indeed, that every perſon and every family engaged in this Cauſe, ſhould enjoy an arith­metical proportion of power and advantage with that of their ſuperiors, both in electing and being elected? Why, then muſt the pooreſt Cottager and Mechanick of all come in with their equal voice to chooſe, and alſo with his equal turn for being choſen, without any put-off for want of birth or breeding, or other perſonal endowment or fitting quali­fication which was not at his hand to be expected But if they cannot think it poſſible that this way could afford turns e­now for the hundreth family in a Kingdom that have en­gaged; nor do think it farther neceſſary to erect an Heralds Office to regiſter all that firſt ventured and acted in that Cauſe, with their ſeveral diſcents and pedigrees; then do they proceed partially according to their own rule, making an unequal choice amongſt thoſe that have equally en­gaged: Becauſe equality of honor and preferment being due to that firſt equality of deſert, and engagement in the Father only, how can it be forfeited by any accidentall in­feriority or impediment in the Son hapning ſince? Will they wave this ſuppoſition of equall engagement and claim due unto all Families, and confine both the Electors and E­lected unto ſome rank or order of men, and ſo by an exact pair of Sizers cut a Nation into two equalities; one that ſhall be equally and altogether uncapable of having voice or ſhare in the Government, and the other of being con­ſtantly and equally capable of both (as in all elective Mo­narchies is practiſed) then by the ſame rule of juſtice that they obſerve a diſtance, and exclude thoſe below from ha­ving an equality with them in ſome places of command or10 profit; he that is uppermoſt of all, may, as I ſaid, exclude them again in that which is higheſt. For it may well be preſumed, that he is as much above them of the higheſt rank of equality, as they again are above thoſe that are below. If we look to the examples of Germany and Poland (the two onely places where there is a ſoveraign Magiſtrate ele­cted with any competent power) we ſhall find that Germany hath ſcarcely made any choice but out of their four great Families of Franconia, Swevia, Bavaria, and Auſtria, ſtill making choice of one of thoſe Dukes for Emperor; which they did not neither, till there was a failer in the family of Charls the Great, which was above them all. And as for Poland, their Stories tell us, That they have had Forty per­ſons ſucceſſively Raigning of one and the ſame Family: the like whereunto cannot be ſaid of any hereditary Monarchy that I know of.

And, Sir, if you would be ſatisfied with preſidents as well as Reaſon, for this hereditary ſucceſſion amongſt our ſelves, you ſhall finde it adjuſted even from the Founders and Ori­ginals of our Engliſh Nation. For did not thoſe Armies of the Saxons that had holpen the people of this Land againſt their Enemies, think it afterwards reaſonable, that ſince themſelves had ſhared in moſt of the great places of Truſt and Command, and that alſo in the ſame way of approbation and hereditary right they found them poſſeſt by others before, ſo alſo to ſettle their Generals and their Heires in that place and degree of power which was higheſt of all? and this they did, although in their own Nation that Office did then paſs by Election. And it will be alſo found that both Dane and Norman coming with their Ar­mies afterwards, did, upon their ſucceſs, ſettle themſelves and their Chieftains in like manner.

If we look abroad we ſhall finde, Sir, that as theſe Saxons did in England, ſo the Francks (another people of Germany) did alſo ſettle their Leaders in the Kingdom of France; and although they had called themſelves Francks, as impatient of the ſubjection of any other, yet did they moſt willingly11 ſubmit to the Head of their own party. And mark thoſe ſeverall lines of Kings that have therein ſwayed, and you will finde that the ſeverall Families of Meroveus, Charles the Great, and of Capet, were ſuch as by their own policy and proweſs, and by the help of a powerfull party had bin advanced from the degree of Subjects to become abſolute Kings, upon the expulſion of thoſe that were their former Maſters, and had the Title. Nay, look to Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Poland, Hungary, and all the world over, and you ſhall ſtill finde, that in all thoſe State-alterations that have been made by a prevailing party, either domeſtick or foraign, the Head and Leader of that party hath ſtill had the Diademe, or chief place of Authority ſetled on him and his Family. Neither Goths, Vandals, Lombards, Huns, or any people whatever but acted accordingly: and how­ever they were Nations moſt fond of the name of Liberty, as it is obſerved that all Northern people are, and might al­ſo be otherwiſe governed at home; yet, in this caſe, they ſtill held it equitable, that ſince themſelves had every one, by the conduct of their Chieftain, bettered his Fortunes, in poſſeſſion of the Inheritances of perſons of inferior Ranks, ſo proportionally ſhould their Generall be ſetled in that which was higheſt. And as the examples of Republicks, or of elective Monarchies have been few, and alſo inconſide­rable, either for eminence or durance, in compariſon of Mo­narchies, and thoſe hereditary (which in moſt places hath always ſo continued without alteration, whereas no one place that hath been Republick or Elective, but what hath been longer and more eminent otherways) ſo is it farther obſervable, That when Greeks, Romans, Germans, Poles, or any other have erected Commonwealths, or made their Princes elective, it hath never been done after a Civill con­teſt, and where one party hath gotten the better of the other by way of conqueſt, but was ſtill done in peace, and by an unanimous conſent of the whole Nation, and when there was no alteration of private mens Fortunes and con­ditions; and where alſo there was a failer in the Line of12 their laſt conquering Prince: at which time it is not to be ſuppoſed, that the Nobles or Senators would in their parity one to another, be content to ſubmit to the conſtant Regi­ment of any third perſon and family amongſt themſelves. For ſo in Greece they ſet up their Commonwealths, when the Heraclidae, (that race of Kings amongſt them that de­ſcended from their famous Warrior and defender Hercules) became extinct. And ſo they did in Germany and Poland, upon failer of the Lines of Charlemain and Lechus. Or elſe (as in Rome) where the whole people did joyn in that diſcontent, and in ſecluſion of their Kings, and had no pre­cedent Civill war thereabouts, or about the exerciſe of the Civill power. For had it ſo been, that ſide that had under a Ceſar been victorious, and thereupon ſeated themſelves and families in the honors and poſſeſſions of the adverſe party, would certainly, in honor and gratitude, have made him and his iſſue Imperatores in the Civill State, who had all that while been Imperatores in the Field. And if we look to our Neighbors of the Low-Countries (a People that our Nation hath no reaſon to reckon as gratefull to their Protectors) yet we ſhall finde that they having in their U­nion againſt their King the King of Spain, been victorious through the conduct and aſſiſtance of the Prince of Orange, have thereupon confirmed unto the ſame Family the chief Office of Honor and Command heretofore executed among them: Under which, as they have hithetto thriven, ſo is it highly probable that the ſecluſion thereof, may prove the ſecluſion of all farther peace and happineſs from that people,

And now, Sir, after all this travail in foraign Stories, to return home, and home to your ſelf too, let me appeal to you as a Member of a Parlament of England; Did you ever read of any Parlament that did not ſettle the Govern­ment on the poſterity of him that was poſſeſſed, and whoſe Writs they obeyed in their Summons? And therefore, Sir, ſince there is no competent example to be fetched herein out of any foraign Story, and ſince no one ſort of people at13 any time inhabiting or poſſeſſing this Land, did ever in any age attempt to make this Government elective; ſuch a thing to be at this time attempted, and towards ſuch an one that hath in particular ſo well deſerved, will ſeem a thing moſt of all unreaſonable, as well as ungrateful.

When I have ſaid ſo much to you (Sir) on the behalf of the General, to ſerve as an Anti-Memento againſt the in­ſinuations of ſuch as would have the Army believe that the power and ſettlement of him and his family would prove an unſetling of them: I ſhall now on the contrary deſire you to conſider how the eſtabliſhment of this one perſon and his family will be, under God, the moſt neceſſary and likely way to draw on their ſecurities alſo; and that, even from the aforeſaid arguments of moſt prime and principal en­gagement of the ſame cauſe. For ſince he and his have herein already ſo far adventured, as to be moſt of all un­capable of reconcilement and forgiveneſs, they may then be moſt ſure that both he and his in order to their own de­fence and ſecurity, (which is no way elſe to be had but by the ſteady aſſiſtance of the Army) will be moſt intent and ſtudious of all and every one of their ſeveral preferments and good wills, in ſuch ſort as not to make any the leaſt alteration amongſt them without neceſſary and juſt cauſe. Whereas another perſon or family that may hereafter be elected, and it may be contrary to their intereſt and liking, cannot be preſumed to carry ſo ready and great a reſpect towards them and theirs, as experience doth warrant this man to have done. For if the power of election ſhall reſt in ſuch men as are not members of the Army, it is then likely, out of that enmity which uſually paſſeth towards martial men, from ſuch as are not of like quality or deſcent, all their former ſervices may come to be forgotten, and themſelves put off with contempt, as being now of no further uſe. And farther, it may be ſuch an one ſhall be choſen as hath not been at all, or very little active in the ſame Cauſe with them; in which caſe their danger will alſo increaſe through that greater likelihood of his compliance14 with the adverſe party: For how eaſie a matter may it be for ſuch an one to be taken into favor there, and for ſome eminent breach of truſt have ſuch high dignity and reward promiſed and ſetled upon him and his, as may by far coun­tervail that momentany title which he now holdeth? The which can never be feared from him that is of the ſame qua­lity and engagement with themſelves, and that is hereditari­ly fixed in this place; who being at the height already, and ſo ſetled, nothing can be offered him valuable to his reſignati­on. And having ſo far ſpoken of theſe things as they carry a more particular concern to the Army, in anſwer to thoſe that would diſaffect them from their own General; I ſhall now anſwer thoſe arguments whereby they endeavour to diſaffect the whole Nation againſt the preſent Settlement, under the pretence of the good of the Common­wealth.

You are hereupon, Sir, deſired to conſider, That when you diſcover in any men more then ordinary pretenſions of zeal to the publique good, and for advancement of the Li­berties of the people; and, on the contrary, as ſtrong inve­ctives againſt Tyranny and Arbitrary government; and do withall finde them offering and giving in ſtrange propoſals for the eſtabliſhment of the one, and the prevention of the other, you may then, I ſay, be ſure that that party from whom all this proceeds is ſuch an one as miſlikes his preſent condition; and, for the amendment of his fortune, doth either expect to be bribed by preferment from making any diſturbance; or elſe he hopes, that, from the new ſhuffling of affairs in the alteration of State, he may have a better game dealt him then before. In the mean time all modeſt and judicious men doe look upon mankinde under Govern­ment, as in all other his worldly conditions, ſtill ſubject and liable to many miſchiefs and inconveniences. And there­fore although each ſort of ſetled Government carry with it ſelf a certain benefit, even as Government; and that Monarchy and hereditary Monarchy, as the moſt ſetled form, is moſt preferrible to the reſt, in reſpect of Divine15 appointment and inſtitution, and of politicall practiſe and accommodation; yet, to ſuppoſe that any thing, ſubmitted to the managery and accidents of humane frailty, can be thereupon found otherwiſe then liable to adverſe accidents, beyond the cure of any mortall contrivance, will (as I ſaid) argue an ambitious arrogance in the propoſer, and alſo a credulous folly in the receiver. Beſides, when I finde God both puniſhing and threatning to puniſh people by ſending ſuch Princes as they deſerve, what doth this invention of Election but look like a contrivance to defeat the decrees of Heaven in either of thoſe ways of puniſhment, by a Childe or an evil Prince? and what doe they deſerve, that take this courſe either in diſtruſt of Gods providence, or in prevention of their own puniſhment, but to finde a remedy worſe then the diſeaſe, and to be liable to certain evils, to avoid contingent ones? For, let us ſuppoſe our ſelves even in the worſt of theſe chances, either faln under an evill or a childiſh heir, and yet we ſhall herein finde it equall with that which is Elective. For, firſt, if a Childe be left to ſucceed, then is it perfectly in the ſame condition; becauſe of that perſon who is elected to rule in his ſtead, as his Pro­tector and guardian. And this apparent advantage is then alſo uſually found, that being done by the Father, who had more intereſt in the good of the publique then any other, is not only done without danger of Civill war, but with due and unbyaſſed reſpect to the ſufficiency of the perſon. In which caſe alſo the higheſt perſon and neareſt of blood, is commonly choſen. Whereupon, by reaſon of his native high quality, the Subjects pay their obedience more readily then they would to a new raiſed perſon: And then, he and his Family having greater and more certain intereſt in the Commonwealth then any other, will, in that reſpect, be more careful to advance the good thereof then any other alſo.