CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING The preſent Engagement.

YOu have obliged me many wayes to ſerve in all that I can for your good; but the matter of your ſpeciall concernment, wherewith you have acquainted me of late, doth lead me of mine own accord, by mine own inclination, beyond all obliga­tions, to endeavour your ſatisfaction. See­ing then your conſcience is ſcrupled about the engagement which by the Parliament is offered to be taken, and you ſay you cannot ſubſcribe thereunto, till three main doubts concer­ning the ſame be cleared; I ſhall take them into ſerious conſi­deration, to ſhew you what I think of the weight thereof, which indeed is of exceeding great moment. For you ſay, 1. That the Oath of Allegiance, and the Nationall Covenant are ſtill binding, and contradictory to this preſent engagement.

2. That the preſent Power by which the engagement is ten­dered, is very doubtfull, as a power unlawfully uſurped; to which uſurpation you think you will be acceſſary if you take the Engagement.

3. That the conſequence of the Engagement, ſeems to tend to an oppoſition againſt the lawfull Heir of the Crowne, and2 the right conſtitution of the Parliaments, whereunto you are pre-engaged, and from which you cannot recede.

To ſatisfie your deſire, I ſhall lay before you, as briefly as may be, my ſence thereof, that you who have been alwaies wel­affected to the common cauſe of Liberty, againſt the deſigns of Tyrany may be helped ſomewhat, to diſcerne how lawfull or unlawfull, how expedient or unexpedient, it will be for you, to take, or not to take this Engagement for the publick good, and the diſcharge of your duty towards the ſame.

Firſt then, concerning the Oath of Allegiance, and the Nati­onall Covenant, repreſent unto your ſelf the true meaning thereof, and ſo order your thoughts to do that which is anſwe­rable thereunto.

The Oath of Allegiance, as you know, did bind all men as Subjects in Law, to be true and faithfull to the Kings Perſon, to his Heirs and Succeſſors, as they were inveſted with the Au­thority which the Law did give them: nor was it ever meant by the Parliament which Enacted the Oath of Allegiance, that any ſhould be abſolutely bound to the King & his Heirs, as they were men, to be true and faithful to their perſonal wils, but on­ly to them & their wils as they had a Legall ſtanding: that is, to the Authority conferred upon them by the conſent of the Peo­ple, which was teſtified in & under a Law; whereunto the King and his Heirs were bound for the Kingdoms good by Oath: So that the obligations of King and ſubjects are mutuall, and muſt needs ſtand and fall together, according as the condition by which they are begotten is kept or broken; which is nothing elſe, but the Law according to which he and his Subjects agree, that he ſhall be their King, and they ſhall be his Subjects. For as you were ſworn to the King, ſo he was ſworne to you: as you were bound to be faithfull to him, ſo he was bound to be faithfull to his truſt: nor is he your Liege further then he is faithfull thereunto. If then he be found unfaithfull to his truſt, you are ipſo facto, abſolved from your Allegiance unto him;3 and if according to Law he receives not his Authority, you are not in Law his Subject at all. Now the juſt and naturall foun­dation of all Lawes, is the reaſon of the Body, of every Nati­on in their Parl. which hath the ſole Right to propoſe & chuſe the Lawes, by which they will be Ruled. Whence it hath been (as I ſuppoſe) a perpetual cuſtome in this Nation, for the Com­mons at all times to aske and propoſe the making of Laws; and for the Lords and King, to give their conſent thereunto: the Lords as the Judges in caſes of tranſgreſſion, and the King as the executer, and publick Truſtee, for the adminiſtration of the common good and wealth thereby; for in a Kingdom there is a Common-wealth, as the intrinſicall ſubſtance of the Being thereof; for which all things are to be done by King and Lords, as the publick ſervants thereof; and Miniſters not Maſters of State therein. If the King then ſhould ſet himſelfe wilfully to be above this Reaſon of the Nation, which is the onely Originall of the Law, and refuſe obſtinatly the Lawes, which they ſhall chuſe to be ſetled: he puts himſelf ipſo facto, out of the capacity of being a King any more unto them, and if this can be made out, to have been the way wherein the late King ſet himſelf, and that it was the deſigne of the Houſe of Lords, to uphold and enable him to follow that way: it is evi­dent, that ſo far as he did by that means actually un-King him­ſelf as to this Nation: ſo far alſo, they that aſſiſted him in that deſign, did un-Lord themſelves in the State thereof, and if this was the guilt of the houſe of Lords by other practiſes and pro­ceedings more than by an indifferency and complyance with the Hamiltonian in vaſion, to help the King to ſuch a Power, I know not what to anſwer for them.

But as to the meaning of the oath of Allegiance, as by the per­petuall conſent of all ages it never was otherwiſe underſtood; and by the third Article of the Nationall Covenant, (which is another branch of this doubt) may be made manifeſt. It is then undeniable, that the third Article of that Nationall Covenant,4 was never meant by thoſe that made it, or that took it, to be oppoſite to the ſence of the Oath of Allegiance; but altogether agreeable thereunto. What then the meaning of that Article is, muſt needs alſo be the true ſence of the Oath of Allegiance. That Article then doth oblige you, to preſerve the Right and Priviledges of the Parliament, and the Liberties of the King­dom in your Calling, abſolutely and without any limitation; but as for the Kings Perſon and Authority, it doth oblige you onely thereunto, conditionally and with a limitation; Namely in the preſervation and defence of the true Religion and Liberties of this Kingdom: If then the King did not give to the Repreſentatives of the Nation that aſſurance which was ſa­tisfactory and neceſſary, that their Religion and Liberties ſhould be preſerved, none but his Subjects were bound either by their Allegiance or Covenant, to defend his Perſon and the Authority, which was conferred upon him. The Oath of Alle­giance therefore was bottomed upon the Laws, which the Re­preſentatives of the Nation in Parl. had choſen to be obſerved concerning their Religion, and the Liberties of the Kingdom; which he refractorily either caſting off, or ſeeming to yield unto, in ſuch a way that no truſt could be given him, that he would keep what he yeilded unto; the Parliament did actually lay him aſide, and voted, that no more Addreſſes ſhould be made unto him: from which time forward he was no more an object of your Oath of Allegiance, but to be lookt upon as a privat man: and your Oath by which you were engaged, to be true and faithfull to the Law, by which the Religion and Li­berty of the Kingdom was to be preſerved, did ſtill remaine in force: which if it may be the true ſubſtantiall ſence of the pre­ſent Engagement, which you think is contradictory to this Oath and to the Nationall Covenant, then you are to look well to it, that you be not miſtaken. For to an indifferent eye, it may be thought ſo far from being oppoſite to the true ſence of either, that it may be rather a confirmation of the ground; for which5 both the Oath of Allegiance, and the third Article of the Nati­onall Covenant was then binding; For the ground of all theſe Obligations, is nothing elſe, but the welfare of the Common­wealth, which was intrinſicall, to that which was called the Kingdom, to which you are bound by the Law of Nature and Nations, to be true and faithfull for it ſelf, and to the King, to the particular Laws whereof the King is a ſervant to keep them and ſee them kept; and to the Liberties, which by Law were limited (leſt they ſhould be exorbitant) and preſerved, (leſt they ſhould be incroached upon) you were bound for that Common-wealths ſake, which in the boſome of the Kingdome was then, and is now without it exſtant, and in being by it ſelf. So then it may ſeeme that you are ſo far from being put by this Engagement upon any Declaration contradictory to your for­mer Oaths, that you are rather obliged thereby to ſtand firme to the ſame, by the fundamentall Reaſon thereof, as it is wrapt up in the common cauſe of Religion and of the Liberty of the Nation: which notwithſtanding any alterations which are fal­len out, or may fall out hereafter are to be conſtantly and unalterably preſerved: for this or that outward forme of Go­vernment, is wholly accidentall, and no waies eſſentiall to any Nation of the world: and therefore is alterable, in reſpect of formes, as is moſt expedient for their exigent neceſſities; but to be governed by Lawes, and to have the uſe of the true Re­ligion, and of the Nationall Freedom, is abſolutly neceſſary, and eſſentiall to the being of a Commonwealth.

It may bee conceived then that the intent of the Engagement is to this effect; that ſeeing there is ſtill a Nationall tye and Aſſociation remaining amongſt the people of this land; whereof the Common good ought to be procured truly, and faithfully by all that belong thereunto; therefore you are re­quired to declare, that the want of that accidentall forme of Government, which ſtood in the having of a King and Houſe of Lords, ſhall not take you off from being willing to procure6 the ſame: which I thinke you are bound in conſcience, as to in­tend, ſo to declare and really to endeavour.

But you will preſs this further and ſay, that in the third Ar­ticle of the Covenant you are ſworne to preſerve the Rights & Priviledges of the Parl. now (ſay you) amongſt the Rights & Priviledges of the Parl. this is one; that therin ſhould be a houſe of Lords diſtinct from the Commons, and this another, that all the Members of the Commons ſhould ſit and Vote freely; for when you ſwore, you meant a parliament ſo conſtituted, and none other: but now (ſay you) I am put upon a Declaration contrary to the intent of that part of my Oath: becauſe I am oblieged to be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth, as it is without ſuch a Houſe, and ſuch Members of the Commons.

To examine this Scruple I ſhall grant materially all that you ſay; Firſt concerning your ſenſe of the Rights and Privi­ledge of Parliament. Secondly the preſent Parliament that it is not ſuch as the former was without any alteration. Thirdly concerning the intention, which you ſay you had in that Part of your Oath: that it cannot now be proſecuted to that effect, whereunto you ſay you tooke it; for if you tooke it, to pre­ſerve thoſe Rights of Parliament which you have mentioned; it muſt be granted that ſuch an intention cannot now be proſe­cuted by you in your privat calling: But yet for all this which I have granted, I muſt ſay that the taking of the preſent Engage­ment, will not make you more guilty of the breach of this part of your Covenant than you are already: for if you did when time and place was, according to your calling, what in you lay, to prevent the breach of thoſe priviledges; you did obſerve your Covenant, & cannot be accuſed of the infringement there­of; forwhen a fatall neceſſity of State; in the courſe of Divine Juſtice, with a power irreſiſtable, not only to men of privat, but to all that were in publick vocations, did bring about that Change upon the Parliament, no particular mens engagements were conſiderable. Therefore of that charge, whether you at­tempted, or attempted not to hinder it, you cannot be counted7 guilty; what ever the intent of your promiſe was in the Cove­nant, becauſe it was neither morally poſſible nor lawful to you in the way of your calling, to hinder the cauſe or effect of that change; and therefore to you it cannot be imputed as a breach of Covenant. But you will here ſay, true indeed I am not guilty; but others in my opinion are: But if I promiſe now to be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth, as upon this breach of priviledge they have ſetled it, then I confirme what they have done, and ſo make my ſelf acceſſary to their guilt and breach of Covenant. Here I perceive is that which doth pinch you in the buſines: you thinke, they that made the change broke the Covenant, & if you engage under this change, as is deſired, you thinke you breake your Covenant alſo. To this I ſhall ſay; Firſt, that they who made the change will plead for themſelves, that they are not guilty of any breach of Cove­nant notwithſtanding that change; but this I ſhall leave to them to juſtifie, as not being needfull for the reſolving of your doubt at this time; therefore in the ſecond place as to your ſelf, I ſee not how it will appear, that the conſequence which you draw from the act of the Engagement to the breach of Cove­nant, doth at all follow, although thoſe that made the change ſhould be guilty, as you think they are. And then alſo this I am confident of, to be able to let you ſee further, that although you may think that the effect of this Engagement is materially contrary to ſome intention which you had in the third Article of the Covenant; yet that by the act of the Engagement, you are ſo far from breaking your Covenant, that except you take it, and obſerve it faithfully, you will not onely materially, but formally break that very Article of the Covenant, for which you ſcruple the taking of the Engagement.

As for the conſequence you make from taking the Engage­ment to a breach of the Covenant, it doth not at al follow to my underſtanding; for the direct & plain matter of the Engage­ment binds you onely to procure the good of the Common­wealth, as now it ſtands: and becauſe at all times & in all con­ſtitutions8 thereof, you are bound to do this; no leſſe by the Co­venant it ſelf than by this Engagement; therefore your taking of this, to this effect, can be no breach of that, For the Nega­tive words, without a King and Houſe of Lords, (whereat you ſtumble) in the Engagement, may be properly and moſt obvi­ouſly taken, as an explication of the words Now eſtabliſhed, im­mediatly going before; and not an abſolute abnegation of the things lookt upon truly as in themſelves: ſo that the obvious meaning of the words, is to me as if they had been utterly thus aſſertorily. This Common-wealth at preſent doth ſtand with­out a King and houſe of Lords, and although it doth ſtand thus; yet I promiſe to be true and faithfull thereunto. Now it doth not at all follow, if I promiſe, to do my duty to the Common-wealth, although it is at this time thus ſetled; therefore I am acceſſary to all that hath been done to have it thus ſetled; Nor doth it follow, if I ſeek the good of the Common-wealth, al­though it wants a Houſe of Lords; therefore I am acceſſary to the abolition thereof, or approve of the putting out of the Lords wholly from all ſhare of Government in the Common-wealth. Theſe things are altogether incoherent: for what ground is there for me to abſtaine from doing my duty to the publick; becauſe others have done (I think) more then theirs? Or becauſe they do it not ſo as I can allow of it? Can their faultines one way, excuſe my neglect of duty another way? To think ſo is very abſurd, and therefore the conſequence which you make, doth not at all follow,

But let us now go a ſtep further, and ſuppoſe that in your apprehenſion of matters, this Engagement doth materially ſet­tle ſomething in the Common-wealth, which is contrary to the intention which you had in taking the Covenant; yet I ſay, that by giuing your aſſent thereunto, as matters now ſtand, you break not at all your Covenant, becauſe your Obligation to thoſe matters by vertue of the Covenant, was extinguiſhed, before you were called upon to take this Engagement: now that which is extinct and made void, cannot be ſaid to oblige a­ny9 more: and all promiſes are ipſo facto made void and extinct, in reſpect of their tye upon the Conſcience; when the thing promiſed, is become in it ſelf impoſſible to be done, or in refe­rence to our calling unlawfull to be proſecuted. It is impoſſi­ble in nature to preſerve the Kings life which is cut off, and the Houſe of Lords which is already put down; And it is not lawfull for any in a private Calling to attempt the reſtoring of that which by publick power hath been aboliſhed. Nor did the Covenant ever intend, to engage any to ſuch an attempt: nor could any be lawfully obliged to intend ſuch an undertaking: not is there any word of reſtoring, but onely of preſerving, in the Article of the Covenant. But if in your meaning, the pro­miſe of preſerving ſhould extend it ſelf alſo to a reſtoring endeavour; yet ſtill the limitation of this endeavour muſt be in and according to your Calling, not out of it, or beyond it: Now your Calling I ſuppoſe, at preſent, is only to acquieſce at the abolition of that which is made void, and not to declare any abrogation (as ſome would extend it) of the Right which the Lords have to ſit in Parliament. They may have a Title to this Right, and yet be obliged, even for the preſerving of that Right, which without an inevitable ruin to the publick wellfare can­not be obtained. Suppoſe that in order to the publick good, you were obliged by Oath to proſecute ſome buſines, and that in following it, you ſhould evidently perceive, that by the change of circumſtances the proſecution of your buſineſs, in­tended for the good would prove the ruin of the publick; I ſay, that notwithſtanding your Oath, by which you are engaged to follow ſuch a buſines, you are nevertheleſſe obliged to deſiſt from it; becauſe your Oath binds no further then it is evident that the publick good is advanced thereby; and if the change of circumſtances alter the whole caſe of your buſineſſe (as often in State-affairs it falleth out) I ſay your Oath is made ipſo facto void; And thus the clauſe of the Covenant which relates unto the King & the Houſe of Lords, as ſworn in order to common welfare; if any ſhould now proſecute by force, it is evident10 that he would by a new war hazard the ruining of al; which by all humane means poſſible in nature lawfull & not contradict­ory to the wil of God, we are al bound to the utmoſt to prevent; for to preſerve the publick in peace & ſafety, is the main end of all the promiſes of the Covenant, whereunto all particular matters are ſubordinate; and if I ſhould not ſuſpend my particular pretentions to Right in order to publick ſafety, I tranſgreſſe the Covenant, which above all doth bind me unto this, which alſo is nothing elſe but the expreſſe ſence of the En­gagement which is now offered: ſo that the iment thereof, is no way contradictory, but altogether coordinate and conſiſtent both with the Oath of Allegiance and the Nationall Covenant, ſo far as they are obligatory.

And to go yet a ſtep beyond this conſideration, I ſhall adde this, that if the third Article of the National Covenant concern­ing the Priviledges of Parl. be yet in force in any degree, as you ſuppoſe it is, then it binds you to preſerve the priviledges of Parliament that now are, as well as thoſe that then were. For if there hath not been a totall diſſolution of all Government amongſt us, but a Parl. notwithſtanding all changes ſtill kept up, and therein a right to rule and to order matters for the pub­lick good preſerved: then the Oath of preſerving theſe Parl. Rights is ſtill binding, ſo far as the Parl. is in being: nor can it be agreeable to the intent of that article, or to the rule of con­ſcience, and of ſound reaſon, that becauſe it is ſuppoſed ſome have made a breach upon ſome of the Rights of Parliament; that therefore it ſhould be free for any to break & diſſolve all the reſt. For if you count them guilty, who made void the Au­thority that then was in any degree, how can you be guiltleſſe your ſelf, if you intend to make void all that which remaines? Therefore ſo far as there is yet any ground of order & ſettle­ment in the Common-wealth by the Authority of Parliament, and by the Counſelf of State and Courts of Juſtice depending thereon; you are by that very Covenant in Conſcience ſtill11 bound to preſerve it: & to this very thing alſo the Engagement which is now offered doth clearly bind you, & (as I conceive) to nothing elſe directly; for the obvious ſenſe of the expreſs words can be none other but this: That ſo far as the Aſſociation of this people is ſetled, in a courſe of Government and in the admini­ſtration of Juſtice, you ſhall not overthrow but preſerve the ſame, although the adminiſtration of this Government and ju­ſtice, is not now carried on by a King and Houſe of Lords; but onely by the Parl. that now is, which certainly is your duty at this time; And if this is cleerly your duty for the publick good then you cannot underſtand the words of the Covenant to be binding in any other ſenſe but in this; for the words muſt be ta­ken in the ſenſe which they can directly bear, and which do im­part the main end for which the Covenant was taken; for the maine end of this very Article whereof you make a ſcru­ple, was evidently to preſerve the Parliament and Com­mon-wealth for it ſelf, and (if need ſo required) alſo without the King.

Now this is that which the Engagement doth direct­ly alſo require, for which cauſe I ſay, that by vertue of this very promiſe, you are bound to take the preſent En­gagement; and if you take it not, that you make your ſelf a tranſgreſſor of that very Article which you pretend to keepe; for if you refuſe to be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth as it is now Eſtabliſhed, you do what in you lyeth to make the remaining Rights of Parliament, and the beginnings of our ſettlement void; which though at firſt it was not intended to be without a King; yet it was clearly preſuppoſed in the Article it ſelfe, as poſſible to be without him; and conſequently, that although he ſhould not be, yet that the Common-Wealth by the Rights of Parliament, and the Liberties of the Nation ſhould be preſerved; which is all that now is ſought for by the En­gagement.

I hope then that you ſhall find no cauſe to ſcruple any fur­ther at this; but that ſuch as under the pretence of ſuch ſcruples take a courſe to overthrow this Parliament, will be made con­ſcionably awake to ſee their error; and that they Diametri­cally by ſuch a purpoſe croſſe the main intention of their Co­venant, and become guilty of diſſolving the whole tye of this Common-wealth. And this ſhall ſuffice concerning your firſt ſcruple at this time.

As concerning the preſent power by which the Engagement is tendered, your Doubt is, what you ought to think of it: whe­ther you ſhould count it a lawfull, or an unlawfull and uſurped Power? and if ſuch, whether you will not be acceſſary to their uſurpation, by taking the Engagement?

To theſe Queſtions I ſhall anſwer diſtinctly, and let you ſee the Rules by which I order my converſation, in theſe caſes, that if you have nothing to except againſt them, you may take them up, and walk in the righteouſnes thereof.

For mine own part then, I have taken this to be a Rule, where­by all privat men (ſuch as I am) as Chriſtians ought to walk unblameably under the ſuperiour powers of this world. Name­ly; That it doth not be long to us, to judge definitively of the rights which the Supreame powers over us in the world, pretend to have unto their places. And the Reaſon is this, becauſe I finde it no part of the profeſſion of Chriſtianity to meddle with this mat­ter, nor can I ſee that God doth allow privat men to take ſo much upon them over their Superiors, nor ought Superiors to ſuffer it in their Subjects, nor will ſound reaſon, or a good Conſcience allow it in any.

It is no part of our Chriſtian profeſſion, to become Judges of the great ones of this world, in reſpect of their rights and pre­tentions to power. For we are to behave our ſelves as ſpiritu­all men in this world, by the Rule of our profeſſion; and as ſtrangers and pilgrims therein. taking it as our paſſage to a Kingdome that cannot be ſhaken; and uſing it as the ſubject wherein our Faith & Patience, our mortification to things pre­ſent and our hope for things to come are to be exerciſed. A ſtranger, paſ­ſenger13 & pilgrim, takes things as he finds them on his way, makes the beſt of them that he can, and meddles only with his own matters, how to advance proſperouſly, and eaſily towards his journeys end; that is, how to behave himſelf without blame and offence towards God and men, in all things, with a good Conſcience: holding forth the Word of life, which is the Rule by which he doth walke in the feare of God towards others This is all that a Chriſtian as a Chriſtian, that is, by vertue of his Profeſsi­on, is to meddle withall about the affairs of this world, which in ſo doing he doth judge in the ſpirit of righteouſnes; but if he doth make himſelf a judge in another kind of particular rights & pretentions of the great ones in this world, he takes upon him that which doth not belong unto him in his Profeſſion of Chriſtianity, for he doth more then Chriſt would do on earth; for Chriſt our Maſter in this profeſſion would not become a Iudge of the leaſt matters between man & man in the world; and how ſhall we that ought to be his followers and Diſciples, take upon us, to judge of the greateſt of all? How ſhall we Anſwer this to him? Is not this one of the great Characters of the ſpirit of Antichriſt, that he exalts himſelf above all that is called God? and wherein hath he done this more remarkably towards Magiſtrates who are called Gods amongſt men, then by exalting himſelf over them to become a Judge of all their Rights and pretentions to power in this world? We muſt therefore beware of entertaining the motions and practiſes of his Spirit, whereof this is a very eminent one, to judge of the Right of power to Rule in the world.

Nor doth God allow in the Word, thoſe whom he hath made Sub­jects to Superior Powers, to take upon them to judge of the Rights & ti­tles of thoſe that are over them. The Rule of Subjects behaviour as Sub­jects is clearly determined in Rom. 13.1, till 8. & 1 Pet, 2.13, 14. & Tit. 3.1. Where we find nothing but a command of ſubmiſſion & ſubjection, of not reſiſting and of paying taxes & dues, and of giving honour, fear and re­ſpect for Conſcience ſake unto Superiour powers, becauſe they are Gods Ordinance over privat men, and they bear not the ſword which God hath put in their hand, in vain. Now the Commandements thus delivered, with­out any limitation or reſtriction of their Rights to rule, or of our obedi­ence (further then that we are bound to obey God rather than man) I ſup­poſe do oblige all Subjects that are under them either to obey, or to ſuffer patiently if they find cauſe to refuſe obedience: but that privat men in our­ward and humane concernments; and for worldly conſiderations of their own taking up, ſhould not find any cauſe to refuſe obedience, I conceive is the meaning of thoſe abſolute and unlimited injunctions which the Scrip­ture layes upon Subjects, in reſpect of their Superior powers: ſo then the duty which God hath appointed Subjects to obſerve towards thoſe that14 are over them, in the places of power, is clearly inconſiſtent with the ſcru­puloſitie of this queſtion, concerning their Right and Title to Rule. Nor ſhould thoſe that are in places of power ſuffer their titles by meer private Subjects to be queſtioned; for either they ſhould actually ſuppreſſe the diſ­putes & diſquiries of that nature in privat men, as not at all belonging to their cognizance, or they ſhould prevent it in others who are to be accoun­ted their equals, & to whom in reaſon they are accountable of their procee­dings (for God hath made no men ſo Supreme, as not to be accountable un­to others in a reaſonable way) by ſome ſatisfactory declarations or demon­ſtrations of the grounds of their Right to their places & of the equity of their proceedings therein. Nor laſtly, can it ſtand with ſound Reaſon or a good conſcience in any privat man, to take upon him to be a Judge of that matter, & to ſuſpend his acts of obedience in things otherwiſe good & law­full in themſelves, till his ſcruples in that kinde be ſatisfied. For firſt, no ſound reaſon will allow any man to take upon him the judicature of rights, whereof it is not obvious to him, to know the true grounds circumſtantial­ly; & ſeeing al claims to places amongſt men depend upon the concurrences of many circumſtances, which in the way of juſtice give to one & take a­way from another a right to the ſame; & it is in Gods hand alone, to order the incidency of thoſe circumſtances between thoſe that have power, and the competitors for the ſame places: & privat men cannot poſsibly in their ordinary way (wherein they are bound to ſtand and walk) know aſſured­ly the incidencies of theſe circumſtances, which change the nature of rights and claimes to places; therefore no juſtice nor reaſon can allow privat men to be Iudges of things whereof it is not morally poſsible for them to have a true inſight, and whereinto they have no calling by God or men to make a ſpeciall inquiry, without which they become unreaſonably and unconſcionably preſumptuous, if they ſettle within themſelvs, or utter to­wards others any judgement definitively. Then in the ſecond place, it is a moſt unconſcionable practice in any whom God hath put in the place of ſubjection, and of living in a private ſtation, to reſiſt the powers that are over him, requiring good and lawfull things, onely becauſe he is not ſa­tisfied in their right to require thoſe things of him, and in their Title to their places, as if Superiour Powers that are actually in the poſeſſion of places, which God hath put in their hands to rule others by, and ſerve the publick with, were accountable to every private man, concerning their right, by which they ſtand under God in their Charges, and as if it were lawfull for men profeſſing Chriſtianity, to diſpenſe with matters of duty in themſelves commendable and profitable to common edification, onely becauſe they will appear oppoſite for ſome worldly reſpects unto thoſe that are over them, to whom they owe due reſpect and ſubmiſſion.

Now after all this; if you ſay: what? ſhall private Chriſtians then make them­ſelves ſlaves to any that will rule over them; without judging rationally, who are their lawfull Superiours to whom they owe obedience, I ſay to this, no: for Chriſtians are the only free men of the world: all the reſt are ſlaves to their pro­per paſſions, luſts, oppoſite intereſts; but he that is ſubject to the law of liberty, doing all by a Rule; is truly free and none but he. But you will ſay; by what rule then ſhall he diſcern, who is his ſuperior? I anſwer by a rule agreeable to ſenſe, to reaſon, and to conſcience. Senſe will ſhew him who is actually in profeſſion of all power and places of Government over him, and by this he will perceive under whom he doth ſtand. Reaſon will ſhew what he who is over him pre­tends unto; whether yea or no, his pretences are backed with power to maintain his right againſt all adverſaries therein? and whether yea or no, the uſe of that power be limited by law; or let wholly to his own will without any law? And Conſcience will ſhew that he to whom God hath committed the plenary ad­miniſtration, of publick affairs with unconfrontable power, is Gods vicegerent over the ſociety of thoſe to whom his adminiſtration doth extend it ſelf, either by vertue of a contract, which makes a law, or by vertue of a conqueſt, which is bound to no law but the will of the Conqueror; for if the Apoſtle doth teach us that [all ſoules ought to be ſubject to the higher powers] becauſe [there is no power but of God] and becauſe [the powers that be] in place [are ordained of God] then it will follow, that thoſe who are actually ſupreme, and in a plenary poſſeſſion of power, ought to be obeyed as Gods Ordinance; for it is not poſſi­ble that any can attain to the height of power without Gods diſpoſall of it into his hands. Here then a Chriſtian reſts, and freely performs his duty toward him in all things good and lawfull and makes no further inquiry, after the rights to titles according to lawes of men; becauſe he doth conſider that the moſt high gi­veth the Kingdomes of men to whomſoever he pleaſeth. Thus keeping my Spirit from flying out beyond his bounds one way, and following the directions of a clear rule another way; I prevent this example wherewith you trouble your ſelf without cauſe, and intangle your Conſcience againſt your duty.

But here again it may be ſaid, if this bee the condition of ſubjects, and if their duty toward Superiors is thus circumſcribed; what way is there left for them to be freed from the unnaturall uſurpation of tyrannicall powers? I anſwer there be three ways which God hath left to the reaſon of men to make uſe of partly to prevent, partly to redreſſe the tyrannicall uſurpations of an over ruling Roman. The firſt is to ſettle ſubordinate Officers under him with out whom he cannot act. The ſecond is, to ſettle lawes whereby to circumſcribe him, and their actings, and a law making power to whom both he and they are to be accountable. And the third is, the great and invincible law of neceſſity, whereof every one is ſo far the judge in his own cauſe and in his own place as he is mo­ved16 thereby to venture his life and welfare to obſerve the dictates thereof: by theſe means ſubjects without judging of the titles of Superiours, may repreſse the undue uſurpation of power in tyrannicall ſpirits: where you may take notice that although you and I, as private men ought not to make our ſelves judges of the rights which ſuperiors pretend to have in & to their places; yet that they are not without a judicature over them in thoſe places: for the ſubordinate Officers belonging to a ſtate are bound to judge of the rights of thoſe that are over them; both by which they ſtand in their places of ſupremacy, and by which they pro­ceed in their actings toward ſubjects, leaſt they be made the inſtruments of Ar­bitrary power and Tyranny, and then alſo the law-making power, which in all Nations reſides by the law of Nature. in the convention of the Repreſentatives of the whole body of the people (whether it be made up of the heads of familes, or of choſen Deputies who are intruſted with a delegated power from all the reſt) doth make or unmake rights in all places and persons within it ſelf, as it from time to time doth ſee cauſe. As for the Law of neceſſity which begetteth war, whereby God is immediately appealed unto by thoſe that pretend to have no Superiors on earth, that he may judge of their rights; whatſoever his hand doth determine in the event, is to be counted the right of thoſe in favour of whom the determination is made by his judgement.

By theſe rules then quiet your mind according to your place, concerning the right, which the preſent powers have to Rule, do not take upon you to define matters whereof you are no competent judge: you are made a competent judge only of your own actions which belong to a ſubject, as you are under a viſible and uncontroulable power which God hath ſet over you, and your duty is to ſubmit thereunto, in all things agreeable to the will of God, judging your ſelf that you put no ſtumbling block, or an occaſion of offence in any mans way, Rom. 14: 13: yet I will not ſay but in the judgement of diſcretion as you are a member of this Common-wealth, and concerned in the publick welfare thereof, you may look upon your ſuperiours to ſee how they pretend to ſtand: that is, by what apparent right, and with what viſible power they poſseſs their places, but this you ought not to do ſo peremptorily, as to oblige your conſcience as to be ſuſpended upon the obſervations which you ſhall happen to make of them, and their proceedings; as if your private iudgement in ſuch caſes ſhould be the Rule by which you ought to walk in point of obedience: I ſay you ought not to ſet up this judgement of yours ſo high within your ſelf and over others as to drown the thoughts of all other rules: but you ought to limit it as I have ſaid before, within the bounds of Chriſtianity, and diſcreet rationallity: wherein that I may help you yet a little further: Conſider ſoberly with your ſelf what can be anſwered to this plea, which they will alleadge for themſelves.

1. Whether yea or no, the Nationall tye and aſſociation, by which we were a Common-wealth while we were yet called a Kingdome, hath ever been diſſol­ved.

2. If it hath not been diſſolved, what hath kept it entire in the middest of all theſe ſhakings? was is not a Parliament? and the ſubordination of all Of­ficers throughout the nation under it?

3. And if a Parliament is ſtill remaining, and all ſubordinate Officers in places of judicature and execution, ſtand under it throughout the whole nation, ſo that all men may have a legal protection from injuries; what is there wan­ting to a lawfull power and government?

4. If nothing be wanting to a legall protection, for thoſe that acknowledge the juriſdiction, then ſuch as acknowledge it not, do put themſelves out of that protection: and if they reſiſt the power which God hath ſet over them for the publick good, and which is actually & fully poſſeſt with al the places of publick administration, they reſiſt the Ordinance of God; and they that reſiſt this Or­dinance (ſaith the Apoſtle) ſhall receive to themſelves damnation, Rom. 12.2.

As for the point of enquiry, how theſe particular men in whoſe hands the power and government is are come to their preſent places, whether in a legall way, or that which you call uſurpation, it doth not belong to the Conſcience of any man, who is in a private ſtation, to determine peremptorily, far leſſe upon his determination to ſuſpend his actings towards the publique good. Yet if in this alſo you deſire to reflect upon the paſſages of Right, without oblieging your Conſcience to ſtand engaged either way by that which you ſhall obſerve, I ſhall further ſuggeſt theſe heads of matters appliable unto the caſe of thoſe whom you ſuſpect to be uſurpers, unto your impartiall meditation, as a Plea which they do alledge for themſelves.