A Diſingag'd Survey OF THE Engagement, IN Relation to publike Obligations.

FUlly to ſatisfy Conſcience concerning the preſent Engagement, two Queſtions would be propoun­ded and cleared.

• 1. Whether ex Licito of right we may ſubſcribe when calld to it.
• 2. Whether ex dibito of duty we muſt ſubſcribe when calld to it.

For as we ſinne by way of Commiſſion if we ſub­ſcribe, when of right we ought not: ſo we ſinne by way of Omiſſion if we ſubſcribe not when of duty we ought2 to doe it. The reaſon of the firſt Queſtion is, becauſe it is objected that we are under the obligation of precedent Engagements, which beare a contrariety to the preſent. The reaſon of the ſecond is, becauſe it is aſſerted that the preſent Ingagement comes to us in the name of Au­thority, and as an Act in law. The firſt reaſon ſtands upon〈◊〉, Firſt the Contrariety: Secondly the Ob­ligation. Of theſe neither can ſtand if either faile, but both, with the whole weight of the objection muſt of neceſſity fall to the ground. For if thoſe former En­gagements be either contrary, but not binding; or bind­ding, buy not contrary, nothing can hinder but that we may as lawfully ſubſcribe the preſent Engagement as if they were neither binding nor contrary.

The former Engagements which miniſter matter of ſcru­ple concerning the preſent, are the Oathes of Allegiance and Supremacy, the Proteſtation and Covenant.

The Oathes of Allegiance and Supremacy conſidered.The firſt ſcruple ariſes from the Oaths of Allegiance, and Supremacy; both in effect one. Their parts are two 1. Declaratory. 2, Promiſſory. The Declaratory part conſiſting of an Act meerely tranſient leaves no ground of doubt; the Promiſſory part is onely ſcrupled, and therein the word Heires (or as the Oath of Supremacy) Lawfull beires and Succeſſors, for what concern'd the King is extinct with his perſon.

The doubt may be thus ſtated, Whether a promiſe made and ſworne to beare faith and true Allegiance to, id eſt. (as tis afterwards interpreted) to defend the Kings lawfull heires and Succeſſors, their Crown and dignity, to uttermoſt power, be not contrary to and obliging againſt a promiſe to be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth as it is now eſtabliſhed with­out a King? for the Lords in this place ſignifie nothing.

The parts of the quere are two. 1. the Contrariety, 2, the Obligation. And firſt for ſatisfaction to the point of Contrariety. It may be conſidered that all Oaths being to be taken in their ſence that give them, the intention of3 the firſt giver, muſt certainely be the moſt proper key to open their true meaning. And therefore ſuch ſubſequent emergencies, as at firſt had no place in the intention of the giver, ought not afterwards to be ſcru'd into the meaning of an Oath; ſeeing they doe not properly fall under it, but rather beyond, or beſide it. Now the intenti­on of the giver will appeare from two things. Firſt, from the Occaſion. Secondly, From the equity of the Oath. The one ſhews us what firſt was; the other, what ſtill ſhould be in the intent of the giver. And firſt for the occaſion, 'tis evident concerning the preſent Oathes, that they were at firſt occaſioned by, and by conſequence intended againſt the frequent and pernicious attempts of Papiſts chiefely, and collaterally other Delinquents, by forraigne invaſions and domeſticke Conſpiracies, againſt the then peaceably eſtabliſhed Princes in Conjunction with Par­liaments; And certainely that Parliaments ſhould pro­vide by Oath, for the ſecurity of Princes joyning with Parliaments, againſt Papiſts and other Delinquents, is but reaſon and juſtice: but that the ſame proviſion ſhould alſo intend Princes joyning with Papiſts and other De­linquents, againſt Parliaments, or their Heires and Suc­ceſſors, in courſes of that nature, can no way ſtand with either. Fortis plaine that ſuch caſe neither did, could, nor ought to fall under the intention of the Legiſlators; and therefore muſt fall beyond and beſide the meaning of theſe Oathes. So that when Princes prove untrue, and unfaithfull to their places; 'tis of right that wee may, and of duty, that wee muſt be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth, though eſtabliſhed without them, (yea and bleſs God that we have an eſtabliſhment) notwith­ſtanding any thing really intended; however pretended, in theſe Oathes to the contrary.

Secondly, It is to bee conſidered, that where the Letter bindes to a thing that is dubious, and cannot ſtand with reaſon and juſtice, not it, but the equity of a Law is to be4 regarded. In omni dubio praeſumendum eſt pro aquitale legis. And the reaſon is, becauſe the Letter is variable; but the equity is immutable and eternall. Now it's impoſſible that two pretending to the〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉or publike authority, commanding things contrary, ſhould both command things juſt at once in the ſame place; and therefore the equity of the Law (in which both the pre­cedent and preſent engagements agree) requires us (in order of the Salus of that Society, whereof we are Mem­bers) to be true and faithfull to the obtaining〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉or publike authority, commanding things lawfull and juſt, becauſe in the peace thereof, our ſelves ſhall have Peace. And the truth of this will further appeare, if we conſider that the obligation in the Oathes ſcrupled, ſo farre as it concernes the perſons, muſt be taken onely Conjunction with the Crowne and Dignity. i. e. the〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉or publike authority, becauſe the formalis ratio, under which they are capable either of requiring, or receiving the perfor­mance, is, qua inveſted with the〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉or publike authority; for the perſons that act the Authority, give nothing to, but take all from it; and therefore without it, are not the formall object, to whom the obligation ought to be performed. Whereupon it followes, that in caſe the King, his Heires, and Succeſſors ſhall divide, and ſe­parate their perſons from the Crown and Dignity; and proſtitute them to the patronage of the moſt oppoſite in­dignities, they put themſelves into an incapacity of re­ceiving the obligation, in the Oathes in queſtion. Which diviſion & ſeparation; The Parliaments of both Na­tions have long ſince declared to have beene the caſe of the Father, and the Kirke of Scotland have lately de­clared to be the caſe of the Sonne. And indeed upon this account, it was that when the perſon of the King re­moved with Papiſts, and Delinquents to Oxford; the conſcientious of the Nation thought it their duty ▪ (not­withſtanding any obligations in the Oaths now ſcrupled,5 and then pretended by the other ſide, to the contrary) to abide with the Crown & dignity at Weſtm. judging it more agreeable to their Obligation in the Oaths mentioned; thus to keepe it in the intention and equity, by ſeemingly breaking it (if it muſt needes be called ſo) in ſome part of the expreſſion and letter; then otherwiſe really to breake it upon a bare pretence of keeping it. Although now (ſuch is the power of paſſion, or intereſt, or both) ſome of the ſame perſons could almoſt perſwade them­ſelves, that the Crowne and Dignity which remain'd at Westminſter, while the perſon of the late King kept Gar­riſon at Oxford, hath of late (I know not by what winde) taken ſaile for the Ile of Jerſey, which if in any thing it differ from Oxford, it is in this; That as it hath not any more of the thing, ſo it hath much leſſe (if any thing at all) of the appearance of the Crowne and Dignity. For really if men were free to uſe their owne reaſon, they might eaſily diſcerne that as to the Crowne and Dignity in a right acceptation, neither is any thing preſent THERE, nor any thing abſent HERE, but an empty name. Neither certainely can any ſatisfactory reaſon be given, why we may not with as little contrariety to the preſent Oathes,Maſter Pym's ſpeech at a con­ference. promiſe to be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth, as now eſtabliſht without a King, as formerly engage to, and with the Parliament exerciſing the〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉or publike Authority wholly without him;Votes againſt Hamiltons Army yea and in ſome things without the Lords. And which comes up fully to the preſent caſe, avowing the doing the like in all caſes, if they ſhould finde it requiſite for the good and ſafety of the Nation. And if it ſhall be objected, that however they never changed the Government, but left a doore open for the King to enter in at; 'Tis an­ſwered in the firſt place, That makes the matter worſe, ra­ther then better; for to acknowledge a part of the〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉or publike Authority in the King, and to make addreſſes to him accordingly, and yet to exerciſe the whole wholly with­out6 him, however it could not, the cauſe duly conſider­ed, render ſuch Engagements any thing the leſs lawfull, yet it could not (at the firſt appeareance) but render them ſo much the more doubtfull; and the adverſe party conſtantly endeavoured to make advantage of it accor­dingly.

Secondly, As they left a door open, ſo they prepared ſu­ficient locks for that door, and (not without cauſe neither) to ſhut him up faſt enough when entred; ſo as he had as much ſhare in the〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉or publike authority, without doores, as he was like to have had within. But to ſpeake the truth in plaine Engliſh, or rather Scotiſh; hath not the Kirke of Scotland lately told their proclaimed King, that unleſſe he intend to be forever ſhut out, he muſt make his enterance into that Kingdome, by the doore of the Covenant, and an univerſall compliance with the reli­gious Party there. Which when it ſhall be cordially per­formed, with a Demonſtration of the ſincerity thereof, cleare and convincing, then there may be ſome ſhew per­haps of a ground to ſcruple the point in hand, but till then it may well become all peaceably godly men, not to ſcruple, to promiſe to be true and faithfull to the pre­ſent Government, untill they ſee a better; for at preſent, there appeares none other; and if that returne which is by ſome deſired, it is like to prove worſe, (if there can be a worſe) then none?

The reſult of all that hath beene ſaid, is, That the r•- Oathes of Allegiance, and Supremacy, ſo farre as they are binding, which is according to the legiſlators inten­tion, and their owne equity, are not contrary to the pre­ſent Engagement; but as in the one reſpect not contra, but praeter, ſo in the other neither, but rather full for it: which may ſatisfie as to the point of contrariety.

The ſecond part of the quaere, was concerning the Ob­ligation of the premiſ'd Oathes; And 'tis whether bind­ging or not binding, ſo farre as it croſſes the preſent En­gagement. 7In which Particular to arrive at the truth; we muſt ſet out at the conſideration of ſuch caſes as have power to null the Obligation of an Oath. Not to ſpeake of any but what are pertinent, and unqueſtionable; When the performance becomes either; Firſt, unlawfull: or Se­condly, Impoſſible. In theſe two caſes the obligation is rendred null. For as to binde to what ought not to bee done, makes ſinne a duty; ſo to binde to what cannot be done, makes duty a ſinne; becauſe tis a duty that the creature aſwell willingly, as of neceſſity, containe him­ſelfe within thoſe liſts, wherewith, in actions of this na­ture, the providence of God, ordering things contingent to us, by a power and wiſedome infinitely above us, con­trary to our expectations, is pleaſed to circumſcribe it.

The unlawfulneſſe may ariſe two waies, either in re­ſpect of the perſons firſt to to whom; or ſecondly, by whom, the Obligation is to be performed. Firſt, to whom, As put caſe a Ship deſigned to publique ſervice, putting forth to Sea, the whole company (other Officers and Marriners) ſweare to be true and faithfull to the Cap­taine, and to defend his perſon, Place and Authority. Afterwards the Captaine with others of the company, forſake their own Veſſel, and ſhipping themſelves with the common Enemy; the Captaine require the reſt of the company, with their Ship to attend his perſon, and ſubmit to his authority, by vertue of the Obligation of the former Oath: Meane while the other Officers joy­ning together in the Government of the Ship, require the reſt of the Marriners to enter into an engagement, to be true and faithfull to the publique ſervice under their Government. Can it be doubted that the obligation of the firſt Oath, in this caſe became null? And need it be ſcrupled, whether it be lawfull to enter into the ſe­cond? And is not the reaſon evident, becauſe if the for­mer Oath ſhould oblige in the letter, againſt the inten­tion and equity; a neceſſity would be laid upon them by8 pretended fidelity to their late Captaine, to be really falſe to their Countrey. Now a Ship being as it were a little Common-Wealth, and a Common-wealth, no o­ther but a great Ship; the application will need no ex­plication, eſpecially the caſe to which the alluſion looks being ſufficienty knowne, and decided both by God and Man.

Secondly, The performance may be unlawfull, and conſequently the obligation null in reſpect of thoſe by whom it is to be performed: And that in two caſes, when way muſt be made to the performance by them; either firſt through the Commiſſion of a greater evill, then the non-performance. Or ſecondly, through the omiſſion of a greater good, then the performance.

For firſt, if no Obligation can binde to that which is evill, much leſs of two evills, can it binde to the greater. And therefore when God hath given a Nation the ſub­ſtantials of Government, Righteouſneſs and Peace, to throw them into bloud and confuſion, for that which is but a circumſtantial (or ſcarce ſo much) the bare Title of a pretender, is that which the world by ſad experience can witneſs to be the continued practice of tyranicall Princes, but never can be proved, to be the duty of true Chriſtians, upon pretence of any obligation whatſoever. Neither can it be deny'd, that in ſuch a caſe, were the cauſe of the pretender never ſo juſt, yet it were not to be proſecuted by a cruelty ſo unjuſt; but rather in reaſon and Religion (if either could be expected from ſuch) a ſtrong obliga­tion would lye upon him, to deſiſt from his claime; but not the leaſt ſhow of any obligation upon that people, by meanes ſo inconſiſtent with humanity, to be aſſiſting (not ſo much to his cauſe, in a condition ſo deſperate) as to their owne miſerable and unavoidable ruine. But then put caſe the pretenders cauſe be unjuſt in it ſelfe, how deſperately wicked will it be rendered by the ac­ceſſion of that guilt which will eternally cleave unto it by9 ſo horrid a proſecution! Were the non-performance of ſuch an Obligation, to ſuch a pretender in regard of the juſtneſſe of his cauſe evill, as was ſaid before, yet it ought to be choſen before an evill, ſo beyond all controverſie greater; But when not the non-performance, but the performance is the evill (as tis in an unjuſt cauſe) then 'tis to endeavour to ſet the Crowne upon the head of wickedneſs, and by a violence no leſſe bloudy then unjuſt to attempt, to place unjuſtice in the throne of righ­teouſneſs. Concerning the cauſe of the preſent Pretender, continuing in thoſe waies wherein he is ſo deeply and deſperately engag'd, there needs no more but this, if it be (as certainely 'tis) the ſame now that was at firſt; it either then was unjuſtly, or now may be as juſtly, as for­merly oppoſ'd.

But ſecondly, An Obligation may be rendered Null, becauſe unlawfull, when the performance cannot be, but by omiſſion of a greater good; that is, Of a duty more immediately neceſſary. Tis of immediate neceſſity that there be a Government; a duty immediately neceſſary, that they that live under it, be true and faithfull to it; otherwiſe neither Governours nor Government can bee ſecured againſt fraud and force, in the diſcharge of their duty; but that this Government muſt be continued; be­cauſe once begun in the name of ſuch a Family, though entering and poſſeſſing the place with approved juſtice, is no way neceſſary; no nor when providence hath other­wiſe determined it, lawfull, for the Kingdomes of the Earth are the Lords, and he gives them to whomſoever he pleaſes; neither can any Obligation binde againſt his determination; which appeares to us onely by ex­ternall providences. For ſecret things belong to God, but to us things revealed. And whereby can providence reveale the minde of God•ore clearely, then by deveſt­ing the former, and inveſting the preſent Governours; with the plenary poſſeſſion of the〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that publique10 Authority, which is the foundation and formall object of all publike Obligations of this nature, which we are there, and there onely to performe where the Almighty, who is the Lord Paramount, ſhall bee pleaſed to fix it. Wherefore to neglect a preſent duty by an over-ruling providence faſtned upon us, upon pretence of ormer ob­ligations to the contrary, when notwithſtanding, God hath raz'd the foundations of thoſe Obligations; what can it be but to rebell againſt the Ordinances, out onely of men, but of God himſelfe, againſt the univerſall good (with the univerſall confuſion, if not ruine) of a Nati­on, againſt our Obligation, to that〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉that publike Authority, under whoſe ſhadow we ſit downe in peace, and may (if our owne frowardneſs hinder not) enjoy all the Ordinances of Righteouſneſſe, both divine and humane; and in a word, againſt that gratitude and obedi­ence which we owe to divine diſpenſations. To con­clude; if the bare Title of a Pretender though juſt, can­not oblige againſt an immediate and neceſſary duty to preſent authority; much leſſe where the cauſe is doubt­full, or apparently unjuſt: Seeing that were to pull down that ruine upon our owne heads, (by our owne breach of duty) from which a divine hand hath in mercy reſ­cu'd us, without leaving our ſelves the excuſe of ſo much at a good intention. Which whether it be the preſent caſe let the impartiall judge.

The ſecond thing which nulls the Obligation of an Oath, is the Impoſſibility of performance. Nemo tenetur ad impoſſibilia. To which beſide what hath been ſaid, as to the unlawfulneſs (for id tantum poſſumus quod jure poſſu­mus) Vpon which ground the limitation in the Oathes ſcrupl'd to uttermoſt power) was inſerted. We may then lawfully conclude, that God hath ſhut men up under an impoſſibility, when he hath not onely deprived them of all naturall meanes and power, but alſo deſtroy'd the foundotion, upon which the Obligation was built, and11 ſubſtituted another in its ſtead. And this alſo is more evi­dent in the preſent caſe, then to need a demonſtration, which yet will be more fully evinc't, when we come to ſpeake of the preſent Authority.

And ſo we have done with the Oathes of Allegiance, and Supremacy, wherein we havee beene the more large, becauſe all that is ſcrupl'd in the other Ingagements, ſave what concernes the Priviledges of Parliament, is built upon the ſame foundation.

The Proteſt. conſidered.The next Scandall at which Conſcience ſtickes, and untill it be removed, cannot finde its way cleare to enter into the preſent Ingagement, is taken from the Proteſta­tion and Covenant. And firſt for the Proteſtation; It promiſes the preſervation and defence of five particulars: The Doctrine of the Church of England, The Kings Perſon, Honour and Eſtate, The Power and Priviledges of Parliament, The Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and laſtly, The Union and Peace of the three Kingdoms; But with this limitation, To the power of the party proteſting, and as farre as lawfully he may. The firſt, the laſt, and the ſecond Branch (ſo farre as it concernes the Perſon of the King) are not here at all concern'd. What concernes the Kings Honour and Eſtate, if it be to be underſtood of the Heires of his Perſon, hath alrea­dy been conſidered in the Oaths of Allegiance and Su­premacy. Neither may we, by the expreſſe Limits of the preſent Proteſtation, lawfully defend them in wayes long ſince and ſtill condemned for unlawfull; or not lawfully be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth without them, when their owne poſture will not admit us to be true and faithfull (in a right ſenſe) to them with it. But if it be (as in reaſon it may be) underſtood of the Pub­lique Authority, reſulting from, and exerciſed by the Lawes of the Nation, 'tis involv'd in the Common-wealth, and ſo this Branch in effect ſpeakes the ſame Language with the Ingagement. And for the thied and12 fourth: Firſt, in a generall conſideration (if the ſubſtance of things, not circumſtance of perſons, be, as they muſt be, principally minded) why the Power and Priviledges of Parliament ſhould not be capable of the firmeſt preſer­vation and fulleſt improvement, without a King or Houſe of Lords (eſpecially proving oppoſite) cannot eaſily ſinke into the head of any impartiall man, that ſhall without prejudice conſult the free vote of his owne reaſon, toge­ther with the conſtant experience of former times. For 'tis reaſon to believe, That the Lords Temporall (in this perſonall conſideration) are no more eſſentiall to the Po­wer of Parliaments, then the Lords Spirituall, nor the King, then either. And what can be more plaine, if we conſider that in the Coronation Oath, the Office of the King (and the Lords his Creatures have for the moſt part the ſame) is neither to enact nor repeale Lawes, ſave onely by giving (pro forma, for he is bound by Oath to do it) his conſent to both; both which (things thus ſtand­ing) neceſſarily muſt, and poſſibly may be done without them, with more expedition and advantage, and leſſe delay and difficulty. For 'tis well knowne, though by ill experience, that both King and Lords, partly by aſſu­ming to themſelves in the Houſe of Peeres, an Arbitrary Juriſdiction over the Perſons and Eſtates of the free Peo­ple of this Nation; and partly by the perverſe Engine of a Negative Voyce, have exerciſed a power of their owne, to enervate at their pleaſure the power of Parliaments, both obſtructing the progreſſe of the beſt Lawes, and meaſu­ring out the Rights and Liberties of the People, by the Line of their owne Wils and Intereſts. It remaines that to a reall and ſubſtantiall obſervation of theſe two Bran­ches (eſpecially when the circumſtantiall is not in our po­wer) no better way appeares then cordially to enter into the preſent Engagement. For from what hath laſt been ſaid, thus much doubtleſſe may with ſufficient evidence of truth be affirmed, That the Power of Parliaments ab­ſtractly13 conſidered, and the Rights and Liberties of the People, may be preſerved and defended by being true and faithfull to the Common-wealth without (at leaſt) AS WELL as with a King or Houſe of Lords; and if the preſent Juncture of affaires will not admit it to be done with them, it not onely may, but muſt be done without them; elſe it were to throw away the ſubſtance, becauſe the circumſtance cannot be preſerved. But ſecondly, the onely queſtion therefore being concerning the Priviledges as veſting ſome part of the exerciſe of the Power in the King and Houſe of Lords, for there is nothing in the preſent Ingagement, but what makes rather for then againſt the Preſervation and Defence of other Privi­ledges. And firſt for that part which concernes the King, it referres to what hath formerly been conſi­dered in the preceding Diſcourſe, and ſhall be fur­ther in the ſucceeding, when wee come to the Co­venant, as being more expreſſe in that particular. The true ſtate of the queſtion therefore will onely be: Whether having proteſted to preſerve the Priviledges of Parlia­ment, and by conſequence incluſively the Houſe of Lords, to our power, and ſo far as lawfully we may; whether, I ſay, we may without breach of Proteſtation, promiſe to be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth without them? Now to come to a cleare reſolution in the queſtion; firſt let it be obſerved, that the preſent Proteſtation ſuppoſes the Houſe of Lords actually in BEING, and accordingly the promiſe is to preſerve and defend it. Neither is it poſſible to per­forme ſuch a promiſe to that which IS NOT. And this is generally obſervable concerning the Engagements ſcrupl'd, that they all promiſe a preſervation and de­fence of things as in BEING, not as ſurceaſing to BE. Wherefore to conclude, either the Houſe of Lords is not now actually in BEING, and then it muſt be a ſtrong obligation indeed, that ſhall binde to preſerve and defend that which is not: Or if it have yet a being,14 why doth it not appeare? why is it not operative? for Non apparere & non operari ſunt nec eſſe. To us, what ap­peares not, acts not, IS NOT. Now to be true and faithfull to that which is not, and not to be true and faithfull to that which is; but by being untrue and un­faithfull to that which is, to be true and faithfull to that which is not; is ſuch a riddle of abſurdities, as I know no ſolution fitter to be given it then this: That the onely way to be true and faithfull in preſerving that which is not, is not to do any thing in its preſervation; and ſo there may be a freedome left to be true and faithfull to that which is.

But ſecondly, put caſe the Houſe of Lords were in a capacity of receiving, it muſt further be ſhowne that the obliged alſo are in a capacity of giving their aſſiſtance in order to their preſervation and defence. Now where is that power Naturall or Morall, that warrant from Au­thority Divine or Humane, by which they may be arm'd both with might and right ſufficient for ſuch a worke? If there be any, why is it not us'd? if there be none, why is the Obligation of this and other Engagements urg'd, which binde the obliged but to their power, and ſo far as lawfully they may? And laſtly, if they be free in this re­ſpect from others, why not free to the preſent Engage­ment?

Thirdly, ſuppoſing there were both might and right ſufficient; it would ſtill remaine a queſtion, Whether we might (or rather it would be out of queſtion, that we might not) enter into blood to contend againſt the ſubſtance, the Authority, and peace of the Nation, for a circumſtance (the exerciſe of ſome part of that Au­thority by ſome peculiary perſons in ſuch a peculiar manner) a circumſtance I ſay ſo much out of our po­wer, as tis not a little doubtfull whether it will ever be within, or (if ſo) any way worth our recovery at ſo deare a rate. Beſide in ſuch a wretched, if not wicked purſuit of a circumſtance, we runne the preſent loſſe of15 the ſubſtance, the Government and peace, under which Providence hath plac't us, and with ſo gracious a hand, that we feele not any want of the Circumſtance loſt, but rather enjoy the benefit of our loſſe, a freedome from the ſuperfluous and unneceſſary burdens of an Arbitrary Juriſdi­ction, and the obstructions of a Negative Voyce.

Laſtly, if there may be a Delinquency deſerving a diſ­ſolution, what might be thought of theirs, who have in the face of the Nation refus'd to diſ-owne and declare againſt an Army of Forraigners in the bowells thereof, diſ-own'd and declar'd againſt not onely by the Kirke of Scotland, and all the well-affected there, but alſo by the Commons in Parliament here, and own'd them by Votes, &c. made publike to the view of the whole world? And thus farre ſhall ſuffice to have conſidered the Proteſtation.

The Covenant conſidered.In the laſt place, among former Engagements, though not leaſt urg'd againſt the preſent, comes the Solemne League and Covenant, and the Scruples therein. The occaſion ſeemes to be taken from ſome expreſſions in the Preamble and the third Article: For the Covenanters having in the Preamble profeſt an intention to advance the Honour and Happineſſe of the King & his Poſterity; and in the third Article, no intention to diminiſh his juſt Power and Greatneſſe; and covenanted to preſerve and defend his Perſon and Authority; apprehend that they cannot with truth and faithfulneſſe to the Covenant in theſe particulars, promiſe to be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth without a King. This is the firſt ſcru­ple. Now that we may come to a right underſtanding in the Premiſſes, it would be ſoberly conſidered, that from preſent intentions to poſitive execution, in things de futu­ro, and of a contingent nature, we may not draw con­cluſions abſolute and peremptory; but with ſubordina­tion to the Divine Majeſty, many times contrary to our expectations, by an over-ruling power, Wiſdome and goodneſſe interpoſing. Man purpoſes but God diſpoſes, and frequently things fall out between the intention and16 execution, which may juſtly alter the one, and hinder the other, by rendring the performance either unlawfull or impoſſible: Neither is an intention ſimply as ſuch an Obligation. Wherefore that in this caſe we may come to a cleare iſſue, two things would be remembred: Firſt, That there is a tacite condition neceſſarily imply'd in all intentionall Promiſes. Secondly, That there is an ex­preſſe limitation annext with this. Was it not upon the ac­count of a tacite condition, that Solomon when he had promis'd his Mother not to refuſe her requeſt, not onely refus'd to performe his promiſe, but vow'd the capitall puniſhment of the party for whom the requeſt was made, 1 Kin. 2.20, 24. And certainly if (in a caſe of the like nature) Herod had deni'd the Baptiſts head, he had been true to his duty, without being falſe to his Oath. Tis true therefore, the intent of the Covenanters was, to advance the honour and happineſſe of the King and his Poſterity; but with this condition, That in their reſpe­ctive capacities they ſhould cooperate and aſſiſt, at leaſt, not obſtinately perſiſt to reſiſt the effectuall meanes there­unto conducing. For what were it but to put our ſelves upon a contradictory impoſſibility, if we ſhould intend the honour and happineſſe of perſons in wayes directly oppoſite to, and inconſiſtent with either. Tis ſaid, Luke 7.30. That the Phariſees and Lawyers rejected the Coun­cell of God againſt themſelves: And may not the Coun­cels of men concerning the honour and happineſſe of others, though never ſo really intended, be much more rejected by them againſt themſelves? Shall the reall intention of the Phiſician, for the recovery of his Patient be queſtioned; if the Patient obſtinately joyne with the diſtemper of his diſeaſe, againſt the advice of the Phiſi­cian to his owne ruine? But ſecondly, What if the King and his poſterity will not be ſo true and faithfull, as could be wiſht, to their owne honour and happineſs; muſt that hinder us from being true and faithfull to the honour and happineſs of the Common-Wealth without17 them? Muſt the Common-Wealth be miſerable, be­cauſe they will not be happy? What if nothing will con­tent others, but an unjuſt power and greatneſs; muſt the Common-Wealth looſe any part of its greatneſs, for want of the exerciſe of a juſt power, which may be a terrour to evill doers, and apraiſe to them that do well? And can any thing be more equall and reaſonable, then that they that are careful to ſee this juſt power executed, ſhould be ſecured againſt turbulent ſpirits, and practiſes in the execution of this power, not onely juſt but ne­ceſſary? The truth is, this is ſo farre from being a queſti­on in the true intent and meaning of the Covenant, That the Covenant it ſelfe puts it clearely out of queſti­on, as will evidently appeare, if in the ſecond place we conſider the limitation annext. For when the Covenan­ters profeſſe in the preamble, that they enter into this Covenant, having before their eyes, the honour and happineſſe of the King, and his poſterity, it followes conjunctim, and the true publike liberty, ſafety, and peace of the Kingdomes. And accordingly in the third Article (which mutually interprets, and is interpreted by the preamble) they ingage to preſerve and defend the Kings perſon and authority, but how? In the preſervation and defence of the liberties of the Kingdome.

Vpon the foundation of which expreſſions, we may fairely and firmely raiſe a two-fold concluſion. Firſt, That according to the ſence of the Covenant, the liberties of the Kingdome are the greater, and more worthy part of this branch: and ſecondly, That thererefore they ought to have the precedence, in point of preſervation and defence; For that which comprehends, is greater then that which is comprehended; and that which limits is greater, and more excellent then that which is limitted; and by conſequence in caſe of competition to be prefer­red before it. When therefore perſons ingage for the diſ­charge of duties different in their worths, but yet con­ſiſtent in their performance, at the time of Ingagements;18 if in proceſſe of time they ſhall prove wholly inconſiſtent; both reaſon and Religion, and the Covenant accordingly obliges to prefer the more excellent and neceſſary, with the rejection of the leſſer. And ſo wee are come home to the preſent Caſe. For the Conſcientious of the Nation after, yea and by the taking of the Covenant, accounted themſelves obliged to preſerve and defend the liberties of the Kingdome, without the Conjunction of, and againſt the oppoſition made by the King, and his perſonall authority, and acted accordingly. In ſhort then, 'tis true, that at the entering into Covenant, ſuch was the modeſty and charity of the Covenanters, that they hop'd and deſir'd, and with a faithfulneſs anſwer­able, a long time endeavour'd, a compliance betweene the King and the peoples concernments. But now, after much patience, being clearely convinc't of their abſo­lute inconſiſtencie, (if the pertinacious oppoſition of the Father deceaſ'd; and the pernitious proceedings of the living Son may be beleev'd) no wonder if at laſt they think it time, to neglect what hath ſo long, but in vaine beene expected; and provide for what muſt no longer, if it might be ſo long neglected, the true publike liberty, ſafety, and peace of the Nation, though (with as much juſtice as neceſſiity) without the concurrence of the active con­ſtant and implacable oppoſers thereof; which accor­ding to the Covenant is the chiefe; and according to the preſent juncture of affaires, the onely duty in their power. And why all that follow peace with holineſſe, ſhould not contribute their parts, to the preſervation and defence of that true publike liberty, ſafety, and peace of the Nation, mentioned in the preamble of this Cove­nant, by promiſing to be true and faithfull to the Com­mon-Wealth, wherein (if any where) it is now involv'd, though without a King or Houſe of Lords; Why, I ſay, they would not thus far contribute their parts to the pub­like Peace at leaſt, notwithſtanding any ſcruple that may juſtly be grounded upon this, or any of the Oaths prece­ding in this diſcourſe is difficult, if not impoſſible to diſ­cern, upon a ſober & diſingag'd ſurvey.

What concernes the Rights and Priviledges of Parlia­ment, hath been ſpoken to in the Proteſtation.

The endeavour of the foregoing diſcourſe, hitherto hath beene by a thorow diſquſition, manag'd as in a matter of Conſcience, with the greateſt ſtricktnes and impartiality, to examine the true ſtate of former En­gagements, whether contrary to, and obliging againſt the preſent. And the reſult upon the whole matter, ſeemes to afford a three-fold concluſion. Firſt, That as to the ſubſtantiall part, their true intention and equity, there is no contrariety, there is an abſolute harmony between both: both according to equity joyning in this intenti­on, by a promiſſory caution to oblige the engaged not to diſtru••by any unlawfull practices, but by all law­full waies againſt ſuch diſturbances, to endeavour to pre­ſerve the obtaining〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉or publike authority, becauſe tis ever the PRESENT Authority, that gives life to thoſe lawes of the Nation, which by the publike ad­miniſtration of juſtice, propagate peace; and by peace the proſperity of the publike, the proper and ultimate end, in to which all Governors and Government ought to be reſolv'd. Secondly, That as to the Circumſtantiall part, the perſons ſometime veſted with ſome part of the Authority; No Obligation doth or can lye againſt the preſent Engagement, becauſe neither are they now veſt­ed with that Authority; the poſſeſſion and exerciſe whereof is the ſole thing that muſt both render them the formall object, and furniſh them with a capacity of per­forming thoſe reciprocall acts of publike juſtice and pro­tection, which are the fundamentall reaſon, of all ſuch relative Obligations, on which alone they do, and with­out which they cannot ſtand: neither ſecondly, ought they to be ſo inveſted, becauſe engaged in waies incon­ſiſtent and deſtructive. And thirdly, That therefore no contrariety or obligation of former Engagements hin­ders; but that lawfully wee may ſubſcribe the preſent. And ſo anſwer is given to the firſt generall queſtion, and way made for the ſecond. viz.

Whether of duty wee must ſubſcribe the preſent En­gagement (already prov'd lawfull) when call'd there­unto by the preſent Authority.

For orders ſake, that we may proceed with the more clearneſs, we ſhal caſt the anſwer into two poſitions. Firſt, That the authority in queſtion is, de facto, an Authority. 2ly. that an Authority de facto, is to be obey'd, ex debito in things lawfull, and conſequently in the matter of the preſent Engagement. Were it not that daily experience tels us, that men forſake their reaſon, to follow their affecti­on; it could not with any reaſon be imagin'd, that any man ſhould be ſo without all reaſon in the preſent con­troverſie, as not to grant that the preſent Authority is, de facto an Authority. For to deny that, is to contradict, not onely our own, but the ſence and experience of the whole Nation, who in all matters of commutative and diſtribu­tive〈◊〉derive all the benefit of the laws of the Land, only by mediation of ſuch publike miniſters of State, as de­rive the Commiſſions by which they act from them,〈◊〉only from them, and their authority. And the truth is to deny the exiſtence de facto, of a publike Authority in a Nation, is the worſt kinde of that which men call Level­ling. For if there be no Authority, there can be no Law, (for the Lawes of the Land out of the hand of Authori­ty, ſignifie no more then the Lawes of Solon or Lycurgus, in a Library or Study) and if there be no Law; neither firſt can there be any propriety, becauſe tis onely the Law in the hand of Authority, that determines propriety, unleſs every man may be his own judge; and then he will quickly make his owne law, ſo farre as his power can reach: neither ſecondly, if there be no Law, is there any trangreſſion; and ſo the Judges and Jury &c. that con­demne men for Capitall offences, are all concluded un­der the guilt of murder, which is enough to ſhew the wicked abſurdity of this wretched Doctrine. I ſhall there­fore leave ſuch erroneous judgements, to be rectified by the pious, and (I hope) peaceable miniſters, the Authors21 of the Propoſals, who ingenuouſly acknowledge a neceſsity of the exiſtence of a Government de facto in a Nation. (Now a Government without Authority is ſuch an Idoll that as St. Paul ſpeakes, we may ſay it is nothing.) And therefore I cannot but wonder at thoſe godly and learn­ed Miniſters, that when they had gone ſo farre, as to ac­knowledg the neceſsity of an authority in a Nation, and an obedience in all things lawfull unto that authority; that (I ſay) they could not proceed one ſtep further up­on the ſame ground, to acknowledge the lawfulneſs and duty of promiſing to be true and faithfull to the autho­rity in Being, which as it is agreeable to preſent, ſo it cannot be contrary to former publike obligations, ſee­ing nothing can binde to that which is not in Being; un­leſs they would have thoſe that labour not in, but rather againſt the proper worke of magiſtracy, to have the wages of faithfulnes, for being unfaithfull; & thoſe that are tru­ly faithful, the reward of unfaithfulnes; which I am ſure they would not. For that were, as if the dumb and ſcan­dalous Clergi•, juſtly ſequeſtred by Parliament, ſhould ſtil have the double honour of their pariſhes and places, be­cauſe of a former title in Law, and thoſe godly miniſters that are placed in their ſtead, and conſcienciouſly labour in the word and doctrine, ſhould be rewarded with dou­ble diſhonour. 'Tis therefore a truth, both in reaſon and religion, that will never want ground ſufficient to cleare it, that they that poſſeſſe the places and peforme the duty de facto, muſt de jure and ex debito, receive the dignity an­next to the publike authority. And ſo we are come to the ſecond poſition. viz.