The OATH of ALLEGIANCE AND THE NATIONAL COVENANT PROVED To be NON-OBLIGING: OR, THREE SEVERAL PAPERS ON THAT SUBJECT; VIZ.
A REPLY to the ſaid ANSWER, wherein the Truth of the Poſitions is Vindicated, and the Oath of Allegiance, and the National Covenant are made Non-Obliging.
By SAMUEL EATON, Teacher of the Church of Chriſt at DARKENFIELD in CHESSHIRE.
LONDON: Printed by Peter Cole, at the ſign of the Printing-Preſs in Cornhil, near the Royal Exchange, 1650.
IT is not many daies ſin•I was informed, that ſome Poſitions of mine, reſpecting the Oath of Allegiance, were made publick to the world, and that an Anſwer thereto was annexed, and together with the Poſitions was printed, which at firſt I could hardly receive for truth: but for further ſatisfaction, the book was ſent me, and in the Title Leaf, I read, An Anſwer to ſome Poſitions of Mr. Samuel Eaton (diſperſed by him.) I am neceſſitated for the Vindication of my ſelf, to publiſh the bad dealings that I have met with in this buſineſs from Brethren, I will not call them falſebrethren, though their proceedings do hold forth too much falſeneſs and baſeneſs.
I had occaſion in the latter end of the laſt yeer, to be often times at a Gentlemans houſe of honorable note in Lancaſhire; he declared himſelf unſatisfied how the Oath of Allegiance could be Non-Obliging, which was ſo abſolutely taken by many of the Subjects, and by himſelf: I gave him ſuch Anſwers as were ſuitable to my preſent apprehenſions: his requeſt was, That I would put down in writings what I had preſented in words, or any other conceptions of the like nature, about that ſubject, and ſend them to him: I condeſcended, and in a free friendly way preſented him with my ſudden thoughts, and incloſed them in a letter to him, having had his promiſe not to communicate the ſame to any, ſave to one friend of his, whoſe private conceptions of th•m he would entreat, and would ſhew them to me. But thus it fell out, there waas a piece of diſhoneſtly (I might put a worſe term upon it) acted by ſome, that would be better thought of. The letter ſent to this Gentleman was opened, a Copy was taken of the Poſitions conteined therein, and many Copies written out of that Copy and diſperſed abroad, all•ver two Counties, before ever the Gentleman (to whom I writ, and ſent the ſaid Poſitions) received his Letter. I wondred much at it, knowing that I had not given any Copy to any Creature, and had not ſo much as ſhewed it to any at that time, ſave to three perſons. The Gentleman diſcerning that the Letter had been opened, and hearing that Copies were got abroad, thought himſelf bound to ſearch it out, ſome pains was taken to diſcover it, at laſt it came to light. I could both name the place where, and the perſon by whom it was done, but for ſome ſpecial reaſons I forbear. The Gentleman when he had peruſed the Writing ſent it to his friend, and his friend inſtead of Anſwering it himſelf, (as I expected) procures an elaborate Anſwer unto it; which after the ſpace of ſix weeks or two months was ſent unto me, and therein my two Poſitions were ſpoken to, but nothing elſe that was contained in my Paper was medled with. And the Author of this Anſwer, at that time, thought to have proceeded no further in his Anſwer, but about ſix weeks after the receipt of the other, the ſecond part of his Anſwer was given to me, both which are now printed to the view of the world by means of ſome Brethren about Mancheſter, to whom a Copy of the Anſwer was ſent, without the knowledg, and unto the offence of the Author thereof, as I am credibly informed. I had ſent my Reply to that part of the Anſwer which firſt came to my hands, to be peruſed in a private way, before I knew that any thing was extent in print, but am now forced to expoſe it to Publick view. By all this it may appear that I intended not to engage in this Controverſie, but could not decline the giving of an Anſwer to a Queſtion propounded. If any ſatisfaction ſhall ariſe to any by any thing which I repreſent, I ſhall be thankful to God. However I ſhall not repine, becauſe it was Gods Will, that my private conceptions muſt thus come to light. Notwithſtanding, wrong doers muſt give an account. I remain,
EVERY Oath to make it warran•able, and lawful, ought to be taken in Judgment and Righteouſneſs. Ier. 4. 2.
The Oath then of Allegience, that it may be in Righteouſneſs and Judment muſt be,
1 Conditional, not Abſolute; mutual, not ſingle: taken by both Parties, not by one onlie: by the Ruler or Governor, not alone by the Ruled; by the Prince, as well as by the Subject.
Reaſon.
It is againſt the ground and reaſon of the Primitive Inſtitution of Government, which is the good of the Subject, That there ſhould be any Oath to hind the Subject abſolutelie to Allegiance and Dutie, whether the Prince or Governour rule for the Subjects good or not; therefore ſuch an Oath cannot be taken by the Subject in judgment, or in righteouſneſs; therefore ſuch an Oath is not lawful.
So again it is againſt Equity, and Reaſon, and againſt the good of the Subject, that he ſhould be further or longer bound to the Prince, or Ruler, to ſubmit to him, then the Prince or Ruler is bound to the Subject, to rule well, and adminiſter juſtice rightlie, if therefore the Obligation be not mutual, but ſingle, it is not lawful.
Conſequence.
Then (if the Oath of Allegiance taken to the late King, were in judgment and righteouſneſs, and ſo lawful) the King was, or ought to have been, as ſtrongly bound to all his Subjects by Oath, as any of them to him; then if he break his oath, all the Subjects are abſolved, if they will. Then at what time the King levyed War againſt his Subjects, they were diſcharged by that breach of oath in him, of their Allegiance, elſe the whole Parliament, and Parliamentary party were both perjured perſons (as many of them as ha•e take•that Oath) and are Rebels, that have taken up Arms againſt the King.
2 Not to Heires.
Reaſon.
Becauſe who knoweth (as Solomon ſaith Eccleſ. 2. 19. ) whether the Heir will be a Wiſe man, or a Fool: a juſt and righteous man, or a wicked man, and tyrant. Now if no man know this, then it is not an Oath in judgment, if any man ſwear Allegiance to an Heir, nor is it a righteous Oath, for the Subject may hind himſelf to his own hurt, yea ruin and deſtruction.
2Conſequence.
Then the oath of Allegiance was in that branch of it that reſpected Heirs, an unlawful oath; for who knows what any of the late Kings Poſterity might have proved? Whether they would have upheld Religion, or have changed it? Whether they would have upheld the Liberty and Propriety of the Subject, or ſubverted it? We know what their Education was, Who then could take an oath in righteouſneſs and judgment in reference to them? It is good to know firſt, and to ſwear afterward.
3 Not to any one kind of Government, Monarchical, or any other, to uphold it, and continue it, in a conſtant way, without changing of it.
Reaſon.
Becauſe, though Civil Government in general be an Ordinance of God, tending to mans good, therefore to reject it would be ſinful; yet this or that kind of Government is not an Ordinance of God, but an Ordinance of man, 1 Pet. 2. 13. And if an Ordinance of man, then man may change it, for his own greateſt good, and benefit, and muſt change it, when he hath proved any kind of Government inconvenient, and hurtful. Then to ſwear not to change it, is ſinful, and in righteouſneſs and judgment may not be done, for all kinds of Government is not equallie good, uor are they equallie ſuitable to all people; and experience makes perſons wiſe to diſcern what is better, and what is worſe for themſelves: Therefore an Oath to uphold any one kind of Government, longer then it continues to be moſt ſafe and profitable, is unlawful.
Conſequence.
Then the oath of allegiance ſerving to uphold Kingly. Government againſt all other, was an unlawful oath; for who knows not what a plague this kind of Government hath been to this Nation? and who knows not that the moſt of our Kings have been Tyran•s? and who knows not what a Bleſſing the change of Government hath brought to the United Provinces ▪
Objection.
But ſuppoſe there was ſome unlawfulneſs in the taking of ſuch Oathes, yet is there not a neceſſity of keeping them being taken?
Anſwer.
If that Oath taken againſt the life of one man, by Herod, becauſe unrighteous, and cruel, was not only ſinfully taken, but more ſinfully kept; then ſuch oaths of allegiance which are abſolute, and not conditional, which are ſingle, and not mutual, which are to Heirs, whether wiſe-men or fools, whether juſt men or Tyrants, which are to uphold Monarchy, (the woful fruits whereof having been long taſted, and felt by this Nation) ſeeing they are dangerous, and may pro•e (as often they have done) deſtructive to the lives of many men, they are not only unlawful to be taken, but unlawful to be kept.
SUppoſe the Oath of Allegiance be a lawful Oath, yet the Subject is now abſolved from it, by them that have Power to abſolve from it.
Reaſon.
The Repreſentatives of the People, which in reaſon are the Supream Power of the Nation, impoſed this Oath upon the Subject, by an Act for it, made in Parliament, by which they obliged the Subject to Allegiance to the King, then in being, and to his Heirs. And this Act done by their Repreſentatives was their own voluntarie Act, to which they were not obliged by anie law of God, or Nature; for there is no rule requiring them to accept of ſuch a Perſon to be their Prince, and his Heirs after him, and to ſwear Allegiance to him and them; but this was the Subjects own free Act, in their Repreſentatives: Therefore if the Repreſ•ntatives take away this Act and repeal it, they thereby ſet the Subjects at Libertie from ſuch Allegiance, and from that Oath by which they are bound to it. Abraham that impoſed the Oath upon his Servant, might acquit him of it, becauſe not bound by anie rule from God, but obliged by Abraham onlie.
Conſequence.
This preſent Parliament, having taken away that Oath of Allegiance, which was Enacted to be impoſed; there remains no more Conſcience of it, to ſuch who have taken it.
But then it will come unto this,
Whether the Parliament be the Supream Power?
Whether the Repreſentatives of the People, be the Parliament?
Whether the preſent Repreſentatives that now Sit in Parliament, be the Repreſentatives of the People?
To the Firſt I ſay, 1 It is evident, That the Norman Kings coming in by Conqueſt had never any true Right to the Crown of England, but what the Parliament gave them: Then the Power of the Parliament was greater then theirs; becauſe that Power, that is the Cauſe of Power, is greater then that Power, that is the Effect of Power: 2 The Power of Parliament, is the Power of the People; now in Reaſon the Power of the People is the Supream Power, becauſe thence (as from the Root) all Power firſt ſprang, and proceeded.
To the Second I ſay, I•the Parliaments Power be the Peoples Power, and the Supream Power, then the Repreſentatives of the People, are the Parliament, and none elſe: for the Repreſentatives of the People are the People in them, and there is the Root of Power, therefore they are a Parliament.
4To the Third I ſay, The preſent Repreſentatives that now Sit in Parliament, are, 1 All of them Choſen by the People, therefore of Right they Sit in Parliament. 2 The preſent Repreſentatives are all that are left to Sit in Parliament; for the moſt of the reſt have Deſerted their Truſt, without any Force upon them; for though ſome were Secluded and Secured, yet the reſt were not at all interrupted, but have voluntarily Departed from the Houſe. 3 The Repreſentatives that Remained, and Continued to Sit in Parliament, were alwayes, when feweſt, and ſtill are above the Number allowed of by Law; and therefore they are a Parliament.
There is one Objection, which may be urged againſt the Parliaments Abſolving men from their Allegiance to the Kings Heirs, and againſt their Aboliſhing Kingly Government. It may be ſaid, That
Kings have the ſame Right to their Kingdoms, Crowns, and Revenues, as othersQueſt. have to their Mannors, and Demeſnes?
Such Right which Kings have had, they never juſtly came by it, butAnſw. by Force and Flattery have obtained it, and have Uſurped upon the Birth-right of the People, to whom it belongs to Chuſe them that muſt Rule over them: and Kingdoms with the Appurtenances thereto, were never intended for particular mens Advancements; to lift up ſuch Families in Glory and Greatneſs; or that the Heraeditary Right of any ſhould be in them; but that Wiſdom, Righteouſneſs, and Vertue was to lift up men unto them; and Crowns and Revenues were to encourage them in acting in ſuch Places; and men that were ſo Qualified, were to be Heirs, and Succeſſors, ſet up by the People, after them. And the People themſelves, nor their Repreſentatives, could neither Give, nor Sell away this Priviledge from their Poſterity, in which the welfare of the People is ſo mainly concerned, and without which a People are given up, and ſold to Ruine. This cannot be ſaid of Mannors and Demeſnes which are things which fall under Commutative Juſtice, and are things vendible, and wherein particular men are concerned, and not the Common-Wealth.
THE drift of the Firſt Poſition, and the proſecution thereof, (with which I begin) is to ſhew the ſaid Oath to have been unlawful and unwarrantable in the taking of it, and ſo void in the fact, or making.
1 I ſhall premiſe for the cleering partly of what follows, That anD. Sand. de Iuram. obl. pr. 2. §. 14 Oath may be unlawful, 1 Either in regard of the matter, or thing ſworn, as if a m•n ſwear to do any impoſſible, or ſinful act. 2 Or in the Manner, or Circumſtances of ſwearing; as if a man ſwear unadviſedly, or with a falſe intention or other-wayes unduly for manner. The former way of unlawfulneſs makes an Oath void in the taking, but not the Latter: So that though a man ſwear an Oath (in ſome ſort) not in Truth, that is, not intending to be tyed to, or to keep it; or not in Judgment,2 that is, not conſideratly enough; yet if the Oath be in Righteouſneſs, that is, of a juſt, and lawful matter, or thing, it is of Force; otherwiſe no Oath could bind in foro externo, or be of any uſe for Confirmation, for who can diſcern with what mind another man Swears? Again, This evidently appears by the validity of that unadviſed Oath of the Princes to the Gibe•nites, Joſhu. 9. 15. 18, 19. 2 Sam. 21. 2. And of that Oath of Z•d•kiah, and his people to Nebuchadnezzar, 2 Cron. 36. 13. Ezek. 17. 13 21. 2•. which they entred into treacherouſly, Hoſ. 104. ‡‡Annotat of•••mes & Diodat. on Hoſ. 10 4.
2 I obſerve what a groſs Imputation the firſt Poſition layeth upon the King, and Parliament that framed and Ordained the Oath of Allegiance, and all other Parliaments ſince that have Continued, and the Succeſſive Houſes of Commons that have Sworn it, with thoſe multitudes of Magiſtrates, Miniſters, and of other Profeſſions in the Kingdom that have taken, and ſtill hold themſelves bound by it (having had all the while ſo much Divine and Goſpel ▪ light ſhining forth to and in them) as if they had publiſhed, preſſed, taken, and juſtified (as againſt the Papiſts by writing) an Oath the matter of it unjuſt and ſinful. This man had need bring cleer Reaſons for what he here thus chargeth upon ſo many Worthyes, for place, piety, and judgment; and declare themA Lye againſt the Title, or the Title a Lye againſt this. more publickly then by a Private Paper, that he may call to Repentance the whole Nation, that is (as he ſuppoſeth) involved in this impiety of an unlawful Oath. But let us firſt by the Tryal of his Reaſons, ſee whether he hath not more need to repent of this his Charge.
His general exception againſt the lawfulneſs of the Oath is, That it is not according to the rule Jer. 4. 2. in Iudgment and in Righteouſneſs. Were it defective [in judgment] that is (in deliberatneſs of taking) that would not be (as I have ſaid) a ground to invalidate its obligation ipſo•acto: ſeeing it were but a failing in the manner, not a corruptneſs in the matter: a fault in the Perſon ſwearing, not in the Oath ſworn: and in the perſon a defect internal, or of the mind, not externally viſible in the act: and to be preſumed to be found only in ſome perſons ſwearing, not in all. That part therefore of the Allegation, were it true, might have been left out, and as often as it is brought in to prove the Oath unlawful ſo as not to bind, it addes no ſtrength to the Concluſion. But to deſcend to his particulars, 1 To manifeſt the Oath's diſagreement with the ſaid rule of Ieremiah. His firſt particular Exception is, That it ought to have been Conditional, not Abſolute; Mutual, not Single. His Argument in effect runs thus, That it may be in Iudgment and Righteouſneſs, it muſt be Conditional not Abſolute; Mutual, or taken both by Ruler, and Rulled; not Single, or taken onlie by one Partie. But this Oath is not ſo Ergo, &c. That the Reader may underſtand us both, and I may more cleerly paſs on in my Anſwer, I muſt interpoſe a diſtinction or two upon the Terms.
1 Saith he, The Oath muſt be Conditional, not Abſolute. 1 I conceive3 the words [Conditional, and Abſolute] may be taken, 1 Either in reference to the thing ſworn, which is Obedience, or Allegiance to the KING; thus the Oath muſt be Conditional, not Abſolute; that is, the obedience which we bind our ſelves to, muſt be with limitation, and c•ndition, reſtraining it (as all obedience to men in any relation is to be, to juſt, honeſt, lawful things, or ſo as to Conſiſt with our obedience to God; not abſolute or illimited in that ſenſe. 2 Or in reference to the tye, or obligation of the oath, as the qualification thereof; and ſo I ſay it may be Abſolute, and muſt not of neceſſity be Conditional, that is, The ſubordinate and limited obedience which is due to the Prince or Magiſtrate, I may ſwear unto abſolutely, or withour any ſpecial Condition annexed to my Engagement. Special Condition I ſay, for I muſt once again diſtinguiſh, to wit, of Conditions. 1 Some are general, and ſuch as no promiſary oath that is lawful can be without, thoſe are (I think) all of them reduced to theſe two heads, namely that the thing ſworn be Honeſt and Poſſible. Theſe Conditions are preſuppoſed, and not wont to be expreſt, and notwithſtanding the including of them an oath may be ſaid to be Abſolute. 2 Others are Special, and Proper Conditions, which are ingredients in ſome oaths, the which are (by reaſon of them) termed Conditional. They are uſually either ſomewhat that is Contingent, as when a Merchant Covenants and Swears to give an hundred pounds to another man, or to a publick Uſe, if his Ship (that is gone to Sea) return home ſafe with her Merchandize; or, that which is Arbitrary, or in the choice of mans Will, his (commonly) to whom the oath is Engaged; as if a Maſter Covenant and Swear to maintain his Servant with Meat, Drink, and ſuch Wages, if he be a true and diligent Servant to him. It is not the Former, but this Latter Conditionality which he requires in the oath of Allegiance, to wit, That the Subject be only bound to his Duty of Allegiance if, and ſo long as the Prince obſerveth his duty of Government inviolate: and this in truth is not in that oath, nor is it neceſſary to make the oath lawful. The Major therefore of this Oath-impugners Syllogiſme I deny in that firſt part of it, viz. It muſt be Conditional, not Abſolute: To make good my Denial, 1 I will Anſwer what he ſaith to prove it. 2 Bring in my Reaſons againſt it: and leave the Reader to judge betwixt us.
1 All that he ſaith for proof of that Aſſertion is this, It is againſt the ground, and reaſon of the Primitive Inſtitution of Government, which is the good of the Subject, that there ſhould be any Oath to bind him Abſolutlie, whether the Prince Rule for the Subjects good, or not. This were ſomething if it were proved, but the Reader is left either to take it upon his word, or to remain unſatisfied both of it, and the concluſion which depends upon it, if he like to do neither, let him try whether I can ſatisfie him to the contrary.
41 The Parliament that Enacted this Oath, and all ſubſequent Parliaments who were intruſted with, and moſt able (in all probability) to judge what would be for the Subjects good, and who (without all controverſie) were more ſufficient and competent Judges thereof then this man, have adjudged it not againſt, but for the Subjects good.
2 It hath conſiſted with the publick good (yea contributed to it, or els the Papiſts would not have ſo oppoſed it) from the time it was firſt ſet forth, until now, in impartial mens judgments, and no complaint hath been at all heard againſt it from the Kingdom, nor ſcarcely, if at all, from particular men, till within theſe few dayes, what the ſuppreſſing of it on the other hand will tend to, a little time may fully enough manifeſt.
3 A thing may be ſaid to be againſt the peoples good in two very far different ſenſes: 1 Either in it ſelf of its own nature, or ſimply conſidered: of this ſort are injuſtice, impunity of offences, ſedition, conſpiracy, hoſtile invaſion, and the like; ſuch things are in their own nature oppoſed to the publick good. 2 Or accidentally and contigently, thus any thing almoſt that fals under a political conſideration, and comes under the dehberation of the Law-givers, though lawful in it ſelf, and for the preſent probably, yea, or neceſſarily good for a Common-wealth, may prove in the event ſomewhat incommodious and hurtful. There is a goodneſs of the end, which is one and the ſame in all States and Governments, viz. The happineſs of the Community, and this is intended, not deliberated on, or choſen by the Law-givers:**Ac deliberamus quidem non de finibus ſed de iis quae referuntur ad fines. Ariſtot. Eth. l. 3. c. 3. And there is a goodneſs of the means tending to that end, and this is variable in relation to times and people; that may be good in the nature of a means for one people, or time, that is not ſo for another. ‡‡Eſt enim genus hominum natura variè comparatum atque affectum, aliud ſervile, aliud colendis regthus accommodatum; aliud Democraticum & Populare; at que horum generum ſuum cuique eſt ac diſtinctum commodum. Ariſtot. Polit. l. 3. c. 12. num. 112. Itaque manifeſtum eſt ejuſdem diſciplinae eſſe conſiderare, non ſolum quae ſit, & qualis optima Reſpublica, cujus ſtatus ſi nulla vis obſtiterit, maximè deſideretur, & optetur; ſed etiam, quae cuique congrua & conſentanea eſt, permulti enim optimam conſequi nequeunt, quare neque Legiſlator, neque is qui verè civilis habeatur, ignorare debet quae reſ•ub tam abſolutè perfecta ſit, tum pro ſtatu rerum preſaentium maximè laudanda, tum denique quae pro conditione aliqua non ſit improbanda. Idem l. 4. c. 1. num. 2. Itaque cognoſcendae erant rerum publicarum ſpecies, ac differentiae, & quot modis u•ter ſe commiſceantur, cumque haec eadem prudentia optimarum legum ſcientia & unicuique Reipub. convenientium conjungenda eſt, ad reſpublicas enim leges ſun•accommodandae non autem ad leges res ipſae publicae. Idem eodem Nu. 6. 27It is the means and its goodneſs which fals under the conſulation of the Legiſlators, and becauſe of the uncertainty thereof, they are occaſioned often to change their adviſements and laws: But by reaſon that in things which approach neer the foundation, or do conſtitute it, changes are very perillous in a State, and in thoſe things it is better to bear an inconvemency, then to run the hazard of an in̄ovation; therefore it hath been the honeſt5 and neceſſary wiſdome of moſt States, to ſettle them by a firmer Sanction then they uſe in other things, and to ordain a kind of immutability in them, and conſequently to ratifie them by Oaths, fore-ſeeing that no inconvenience in the Conſtitution of a Government, in it ſelf lawful and eligible, can match the miſchief of an-alteration; and therefore that the uncertain danger of that is rather to be choſen, then the inevitable miſeries of this: Such things as may by reaſon of their changeable nature prove in the iſſue ſome what diſadvantagious, may yet, if for the preſent good, and probably hopeful ſo to continue, be ſworn to abſolutly, as in voluntary Promiſes, Leagues, and Contracts, both publike and private, among all Nations hath been the practiſe, and by good Scripture-preſidents it is juſtified,‡‡Gen. 47. 31. Exod. 13. 19. Joſh. 9. 15 14 9. Judg. 21. 5. 18. 15. 12. 13. 1 Sam. 14. 24. 19. 6. 20. 12. 17 1 King. 1. 13. 29. 2 Sam. 29. 23. and the reaſon is, Becauſe if any future prejudice do redound, it can be (the Obligation of the Oath remaining) at the worſt, but an outward incommodity, the which is compenſated by the avoiding of a greater evil, which the leaving of the matter free and unſecured would more certainly breed and bring. To apply all this to the caſe in hand: If any impeachment of the Subjects good can be ſuppoſed to reſult out of his ſweating to his Prince abſolutly, whether he Rule well or no, it is but accidental, and ſuch as it is, it is over-ballanced with a greater miſchief which would accrue by leaving the Subjects un-ingaged: for the ſhuning of which, the leſſer evil, to wit, the being bound to a King, though he ſhould prove a bad Governor, is to be choſen; for that, in compariſon of a greater evil, hath the conſideration of good, and is ſo eligible: It is a leſs evil for a people to be bound to a Prince that poſſibly may prove bad, then to be ſo looſe, as to be at liberty to caſt him off when they ſhall judge him to Rule ill, that is, when they pleaſe; the former doth not ſo neerly and probably tend to the ſubjects hurt as doth the latter: For, firſt, The Prince may prove juſt and vertuous. Secondly, If he degenerates, the Subject is bound to obey him actively, but in lawful things. Thirdly, In his lawleſs Acts there may be a remedy (as the puniſhment or reſiſtance of his bad inſtruments by the Parliament, without whom, though he may Will unjuſt things, yet he cannot Execute them) and yet his Government be continued. Fourthly, And ſuppoſe the caſe that there be no remedy, as when he hath got a party ſtronger then can be reſiſted, or ſubjected to puniſhment, then to caſt off his power and depoſe him (ſuppoſe it lawful to do) will be no relief, his6 ſtrength will command ſubjection. Fifthly, The miſcarriages of a Prince ordinarily (unleſſe it come to publick conteſtation, wherein the Subjects ſworn and unſworn, if their cauſe be juſt, and the Parliameot authorize their ſtanding up, are in the ſame capacity of reſiſtence) extend but to the detriment of ſome particular perſons, rarely doth any Nero-like, ſeek the deſtruction of the whole. But on the other hand, ſet the people free to ſhake off the reins of their preſent Government, when they ſhall think it unequal, and, 1 You deſtroy the nature of Government, as will afterwards be ſhewed. 2 You expoſe the people to an immediate loſſe of the very uſe and enjoyment of any Government, the power of mobility and change being ſure to invite al ill-diſpoſed perſons immediatly to put that power in ure, and hurry all (if they may prevail) into conſuſion. In ſhort, a bad Government is better then none; it is more tolerable for a people that one, or few, then that every man do that which is right in his own eyes. To be bound to Allegiance, may lay the people open to the former; to be looſe, will precipitate them into the latter: The former inconvenience cannot be ſo univerſally extenſive, ſpeedily deſtructive, and remedileſs, or unreſiſtible, as the latter.
2 The latter thing I premiſed, is to give my Reaſons for the contradictory to his Major Propoſition in that firſt part, It muſt be Conditional, not Abſolute: Againſt which I ſay, The oath of allegiance may be abſolute, or unconditional, in the ſenſe before given; and for this Aſſertion, I render theſe Reaſons:
1 Were there no Oath, the limited obedience which is due to Princes and Magiſtrates, is due to them abſolutly; that is, Whether they Ru•e well or no; and that which is abſolutly due, may be obſolutly ſworn; The former Propoſition I ground thus;
1 The Precept of Obedience to Civil Governors, is without any condition or reſerve of a diſingagement of the Subject in caſe of the Governors miſcarriage; reade the Fifth Commandement, and thoſe other Injunctions, Rom. 13. 1, 2, &c. Tit. 3. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13, &c.
2 God commands his people to be ſubject to Heathen Princes, and the moſt abſolute and oppreſſive Tyrants that likely ever have ben, Jer. 27. 12. Mat. 22. 21. 1 Pet. 2. 13. I ſpeak not here of Tyrants, in regard of Title, or Right; that is, Uſurpers: but of Tyrants whoſe Title is juſt, but their Government unjuſt, and oppreſſive.
3 Servants are to be ſubject to their Maſters, not only that are good and gentle, but thoſe that are froward, and do them wrong, and from whom they ſuffer for wel-doing, 1 Pet. 2. 18, 19, 20. and by Analogy. Subjects are tyed in the ſame terms to their Governors.
4 David would not ſtretch out his hand againſt Saul upon this ground, for that he was his Maſter the King of Iſrael, and the Lords Anointed, though he was then in actual, violent, and unjuſt purſuit of his life, 1 Sam. 24. 5. &c. 26. 9. &c.
75 Otherwiſe you leave no place for paſſive obedience to pray for, and patience towards Magiſtrates in caſe of their wrong doing, and your innocency, which yet is generally acknowledged to be a duty‡‡Ameſ. Medula Theol. l. 1. c. 17. p. 57. Vrſin. Cat. p. 3. q. 104
6 Els you diſſolve all Magiſtracy, it will be impoſſible in mans corrupt eſtate to retain or continue any, in as much as no man, or men, can in the vaſt multitude, and difficulty of Magiſtratical affairs avoid offending every day, 2 Sam. 23. 3, 5.
7 The Doctrin of orthodox Proteſtant Divines generally is, That obedience is due (in lawful things) to the moſt degenerate, oppreſſing, and tyrannical Princes‡‡Calvin. Inſt. l 4 c. 20. §. 24, 25, &c. Pet. Mart. loc. C cl. 4. C. 2. §. 12. 18, 19. Alſ. Theol. C. 17. Reg. 8. Perk C. of Conſ. l. 3 c. 6. §. 1•Buc. Inſti. Theol. loc. 49. q. 21. Synop. pu•. Theol. diſ. 50. Theſ. 18. 27. Sharp. ſim. Epoch. 5. Q. 44. 45.
2 We find oaths of Allegiance in Scripture, ſworn to Princes without any Conditions inſerted, Judg. 11. 9, 10. 2 King. 11. 4. 2 Chron. 36. 13. Ezek. 17. 13. & Nehem. 10. 29. Their oath was to obſerve all the Commandements of the Lord, whereof the fifth Commandement, with application to their preſent and future Magiſtrates, was one.
3 It is a thing within our power to ſettle our Allegiance abſolutly, as well as it is within a mans power to diſpoſe of himſelf to ſervice ſo, whether his Maſter prove good, or evil, or as it is in a man or womans power to beſtow themſelves in Marriage, whether the mate be obſervant of duty, or no?
4 A Conditional oath is not conſiſtent with a neceſſary duty; obedience to Magiſtrates is no leſs arbitrary, but commanded, and that though they be bad; but now the duty being neceſſary, if you would have it ſworn with a proviſo of the Rulers performing his duty, you nulliſie the end of an Oath, which is to confirm, put out of doubt, and give ſecurity of what is due. A thing ſworn may become due, either by the rule of Equity, or by a voluntary Covenant: That which is due the latter way, if the Covenant be conditional; the Oath that is to ratifie it, may be alſo ſo far conditional, but what is due in the former kind, to wit, by abſolute and unalterable rule, or precept of Juſtice, cannot be ſworn to conditionally; for that would be no ratification to it, nay it would be a debilitating, and rendering more inſecure of that which was ſimply due without an oath, a condition being put into your oath, being a very probable medium to perſwade the ſwearer that he is no otherwayes bound to the things ſworn, then upon that Condition; which being broken by that party ſworn to, he will eaſily conceive himſelf altogether free: Thus the abſolute Rule will receive impeachment, and not ſtrength in its obligation by the conditional oath: ſuch an oath therefore is in its end inconſiſtent with it.
2 I come to the latter part of his Major which exacteth, That the Oath be mutual, or taken both by Ruler, and Ruled; not ſingle, or taken only by the ruled. Some explanation of his terms, more then is here he might have uſed; for lack whereof I ſhall as I go obſerve ſome difference of ſenſe8 appliable to his words, and ſo expreſſe how I deny this branch of his Poſition, and why.
1 His words ſound, as if he would have the ſame oath to be taken mutually both by Prince and Subject, which (if he remember that the oath ſpoken of, is the oath of a Subjects Allegiance, obedience, or ſubjection to be yeelded to his Sovereign, and that the King is the perſon ſworn to) he will no•, cannot I ſuppoſe, own to be his ſenſe.
2 But the apter ſenſe, and that which I ſuppoſe was in his intention, is, That the Ruler and Subject ſhould each ſwear to his reſpective duty; the Prince, That he will Command and Govern lawfully: the Subject, That he will perform all lawful homage, and obedience: And to this I ſay, Although it be true, it in fact, in our caſe, that the King hath ſworn his duty on his part, as well as the Subject doth in this oath ſwear his, yet the Propoſition is falſe in this, and it cannot be ſaid, That thus it univerſally ought of neceſſity to be betwixt every Prince & his Subjects, much leſſe can it hold that, unleſſe it be thus mutual, the Subjects oath is not in righteouſneſſe according to Jer. 4. 2. but that for want of this mutuality it is null. For,
1 We read of many undoubtedly righteous Oaths in Scripture, undertaken in Covenant betwix•s man and man, wherein one party only ſweareth, and not both mutually, Gen 24. 2. 47. 31. Exod. 13. 19. Joſh. 2. 12. 9. 15. 14. 9 Judg. 15. 12. 1 Sam. 19. 6. 1 King. 1. 13. 29. 51. 2 Sam. 19. 23. Neh. 5. 12. Jer. 38. 16.
2 We find in Scripture, Oaths of Allegiance taken by Subjects to their Rulers, without the reciprocal ſwearing of the Rulers to them‡‡2 King. 11. 4. Judg. 11. 10. Ch. 36. 13 Ez. 17. 3.; ſuch was that engagement, Joſh. 1. 16, 17, 18.
3 Oaths are never to be taken but neceſſarily, that is, When not only the matter is of great weight, but it cannot otherwiſe be ſufficiently confirmed or aſſured then by Oath‡‡Doctor Sanderſ. de Juram. ob. prael. 7. §. 12. Thol. ſynt. jur. l. 50. c. 3. , but in ſolemn humane Covenants it comes to paſſe that ſometimes the performance lies only on one party, the other is to receive advantage, but not to do any thing: Sometimes the danger of breach lies only, or more on one part then on another: Sometimes th•re is other ſatisfactory aſſurance given beſides ſwearing: and ſometimes there is other remedy, if there ſhould be a breach, then the forfeiture of an Oath: In ſuch, and other caſes, an Oath on the one party may no•need, and conſequently is not to be exacted.
4 But ſuppoſe the caſe, that it be as neceſſary for ſecurity that the King ſwear to the people, as that they take an oath to him, yet if through overmuch credulity, or otherwiſe it be that the people do ſwear, and not the Prince, this cannot be the leaſt colour for the nullifying of the peoples Oath: For whether the King Swear or no, that which makes the Oath obliging, is, That in a juſt and poſſible matter promiſed, God is invocated as a witneſſe of the promiſe.
93 There is another ſenſe of mutual ſwearing more ſtrict then the former, and that is, when not only two parties ſwear to each other their reſpective parts, but they both ſwear with a mutual reſpect; that is, The obligation of the one party, hath a reſpct to, and a dependance on the performance of the other party: as when one man ſwears to another to give him ſo much Money for his Land; that other ſwears to convey to him his Land for ſo much Money; in this kind, the breach of the one is a releaſment to the other. And here that Adage holds good,
Frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem;And alſo that Rule of the Law,Fruſtra qu•fidem poſtulat ſibi ſervari ab eo, cui fidem à ſe praeſtitam ſervare recuſat.
But this ſenſe of mutual ſwearing cannot come in to be meant in our caſe: For, 1 Such an oath is plainly conditional; The one party ſwears not to give the other abſolutly, and cleerly ſo much Money, but to give him ſo much for his Land; the having of the Land then is an expreſſe condition of his oath: but the oath of the Subjects Allegiance is granted to be abſolute, and is as ſuch diſputed againſt by him here; and I have abo•e proved an oath of Allegiance cannot be Conditional. 2 The Kings cath is alſo abſolute, and binds without dependence on the Subjects loyalty; no man wil ſay (I think) that the King is diſcharged from ruling juſtly, and may become an abſolute Tyrant, if his Subjects exceed the bounds, or fail of the bonds of their oath, or duty: nay, if the Subject tranſgreſſe his duty, the King is bound by his oath to cauſe Juſtice according to the Law and Tenor of his Oath, to be done; and cannot otherwiſe eſcape violation of his Oath. 3 Such mutual oathes are entred into by both parties at the ſame time, and have their mutual reſpects expreſſed, but neither doth the King and Subjects ſwear to each other at the ſame time; neither is there any ſuch mutual reſpect mentioned, or ſo much as implyed in either of their Oathes. 4 Such mutually reſpective oathes have only place in matters arbitrary, or that are in mens choice to do, or not to do until they bind themſelves by Covenant, but ſuch are not the relative duties of Kings and Subjects, there being a divine Law obliging each to the Duties of their Offices before they ſwear.
We ſee no ſenſe imaginable of Mutual not Single wil fit this mans turn, but it wil make his Propoſition falſe, either if predicated of the oath of Allegiance at al; So doth the Firſt, and Third acception afore mentioned; or if predicated with that modus of a neceſſe eſt, ſo doth the Second. But let us hear his Reaſon for this clauſe of his Major whatever be the ſenſe of it.
It is (ſaith he) againſt Equitie and Reaſon, and the good of the Subject, that he ſhould be further, or longer bound to the Prince to ſubmit to him, then the10 Prince is bound to the Subject to Rule wel, and adminiſter juſtice rightlie. Grant al this, and it wil no way follow; Therefore the Oath of Allegiance to make it righteous muſt be mutual, in any ſenſe: for the Prince may be bound, and that as long to his part, as the Subject is to his, (and ſo he is, and it is impoſſible to be otherwiſe for Prince and Subject; his tye to Rule in Juſtice, and his to Obey in juſt things are relatives, and do infer neceſſarily each other) to wit, by the tye of Scripture, Conſcience, and poſitive Laws, and yet not be ſworn at al.
His Major being thus (I hope) fully Refuted, I need not to take notice of his Conſequences, as he cals them, but in a word I ſhal touch on them.
The Firſt is nothing but a Hypothetical Repetition of ſome part of the Major Propoſition, which I have been ſo long in diſproving: If the Oath of Allegiance were in judgement and righteouſneſſe, the King was as ſtronglie bound to the Subjects, as any of them to him: This therefore I paſſe by, as the ſame that was ſaid before, and no Conſequence from it.
The Second is, Then if he break his Oath, al the Subjects are abſolved if they wil. This Conſequence I deny: I have I think, fully made it cleer before, That the Oath of Allegiance taken by the Subject is abſolute, not depending upon any thing to be performed by the King, whether ſworn, or not ſworn; and that it could not have been otherwiſe. And though the King and People have each ſworn their duties mutually, yet not withSee Doct. Sanderſ. de Juram. ob. prael. 4. §. 8. a mutual reſpect, by vertue whereof a breach on one ſide might be a diſcharge on the other, and that neither the tenor of their Oaths hold forth any ſuch thing, neither is the matter of them capable thereof, being neceſſary, not arbitrary.
The Third is, Then at what time the King Levied War againſt his Subjects, they were diſcharged by that breach of Oath in him of their Allegiance. This is a Conſequence of the former Conſequence, and ſtands or fals with it: That therefore being Anſwered and Diſproved, this vaniſheth.
The Fourth thing is no Conſequence, but a Reaſon of the two laſt Conſequences, and in method of arguing is therefore an antecedent to prove them, it is thus, Elſe the whole Parliament and their partie were perjured perſons, ſo manie of them as have taken this Oath, and are Rebels in taking up Armes againſt the King.
Firſt, If their taking up of Arms againſt the King (as he terms it) were Rebellion, their abſolution from their Oathes (were it ſo indeed) by the Kings breach of his, could not unmake, or make it no Rebellion; for the debt of Obedience is exiſtent in the Subject before any Oath taking, and it is not founded on ſwearing, but only confirmed by it, and therefore ſurvives after the pretended diſſolution of it; and conſequently makes that taking up of Armes which would have been (if the Oath11 had not been (as he ſuppoſeth) nullified) Rebellion nevertheleſſe.
Secondly, We muſt therefore ſay, as the Parliamentarian party hath beleeved, declared, and in many Treatiſes in Print, maintained al along the late Wars, That the Armes of the Parliament were not againſt any brance of the Subjects Allegiance, or the Oath for it (which they profeſſed ſtil to perſiſt in, yea, and in the act of their Armes bearing, Covenanted to yeeld and maintain) but concordant with the ſame. In as much as they enterprized not againſt the Kings Perſon, his State, or Government, they went not againſt his Majeſty, his Heirs, or Succeſſors, they joyned not againſt his Crown and Dignity, the Rights whereof, and the Bounds of the Subjects Obedience, are prefixed by the Lawes of the Realm, the ultimate interpretation whereof, is in the Parliament which declared their Arms to be for, and agreeable to the Laws. The King, as King, acts only by his Courts and Laws, what he doth beſides, or againſt theſe, is the mans, not the Kings acting. What is done by Order of the Courts of Juſtice, and by vertue of the Laws, is done (though againſt his perſonal preſence or command, yet) for the King, his Crown, and Dignity.
2 His next Exception againſt the Oath of Allegiance is, That it is an unlawful Oath, in that it is ſworn to the Kings Heirs: His Reaſon for this Exception proceeds thus,
Who knoweth (as Eccleſ. 2. 19. ) whether he will be a wiſe man, or a fool; a juſt, or a•ricked man, and Tyrant? Now if no man know this, then to ſwear to an Heir, is not an Oath in judgment, nor is it righteous: for the Subject may bind himſelf to his own hurt, yea ruine.
Conſequence. Then the Oath of Allegiance was in that branch, that reſpected Heirs, an unlawful Oath, &c.
1 For the whole Conſequence, I Anſwer;
1 This inference is directly contrary to that which Solomon in the place cited, Eccleſ. 2. 19. makes from the words. Solomons is, Yet ſhall he have Rule over all my labours wherein I have laboured, and wherein I have ſhewed my ſelf wiſe under the Sun. This mans inference is (in effect) becauſe no man knows whether he wil be a wiſe man, or a fool; therefore he ſhal not have Rule, &c. that is, We muſt not Engage beforehand that he ſhal Rule, while it is uncertain what he wil prove: though Solomon ſaith, Notwithſtanding that is uncertain, yet he ſhal have Rule.
2 The ſame Reaſon (if it held) would lie againſt any Oath, or Engagement to any Rulers in being whatſoever they are; for ſay they be come to maturity, and for the paſt and preſent time have given proof;12 yet who knows what they that are now wiſe, and juſt (morally) may hereafter come to be? The Scripture ſuppoſeth, That not only a juſt Father may have a wicked Son, but a righteous man (in profeſſion and external carriage) may turn from his righteouſneſſe, and commit iniquity, Ezek. 18. 24. Neroes Quinqu•nnium of Reigning wel is generally known, the good beginnings of•eaſh, and Vzziah, 2 Chron. 23, 24, and 26. and therefore degeneracies are ſufficient inſtances of the lubricity of men in authority. Yea it is wel known how fearfully Solomon himſelf with Aſa, 1 King. 11. 2 Chron 16. and others, fel in divers particulars of a groſſe nature; if we muſt firſt know, and ſwear afterwards, we muſt never ſwear to any promiſſorily.
3 This Conſequence (were it of force) would equally condemn in general al promiſſory Oathes, and other Covenants, and Engagements, betwixt man, and man; for it cannot be fore-ſeen in any, what the perſons contracted with wil prove; or whether the Covenant wil be beneficial, ot hurtful; and in particular, the Laws and Sanctions of thoſe Nations in al ages, which have ſettled ſucceſſive Regality, or any other Government,•or longer then the preſent poſſeſſors of the power endure, which yet is a way, not only more generally approved, and practiſed, then any other of viciſſitudinary Election, but warranted by the word of God. Iſrael offered a ſucceſſive power to Gideon, Judg. 8. 22. and God himſelf inſtituted, and bound the People to a lineal Government in David and his ſeed, 2 Sam. 12. 15. 2 Chron. 13. 5. The Patriarchal power (which was political) was ſucceſſive, and could not have been caſt off at pleaſure: ſo was the Government of the Jewiſh Nation, f•r about an hundred yeers in the lineage of the Macca•ees.
4 We have Scripture examples (of an uncontroverted integrity) of Oathes, and Engagements to Princes and their Heirs; and to Princes in their yong, unripe, and untryed yeers: Take for inſtance that of Abrahams ſwearing to Abimelech King of Gerar, his Son, and Sons Son, 1 Chr. 23. 29. 22. 29. 1. 22 5. & that of Davids making Solomon King in his own life time, and engaging the people to him when he was yet yong and tender; and that of JEHOJADAHS, and the Peoples making Ioaſh King, and ſwearing to him when he was but ſeven yeers old, 2 King. 11. 4. 22.
2 For the two parts of the CONSEQUENCE in ſeveral.
1 The Oath is not in judgment, becauſe no man knows what the Heir will prove.
I ſay, 1 It may be in Judgment ſo far as a future contigency can be deliberated on: and this may be concluded on adviſedly (as morally certain) that it's better to have the Crown ſettled in a line, whereby ſometimes a vicious perſon may be advanced, then to have it under Election13 at every perſonal change. This hath been the experimented maxime of the wiſeſt States‡‡Minore diſcrimine ſumi princip. m quā quaeri. Tacit. H. lib. 2. . 2 If it were not in Judgment, this defect makes not an oath Unlawful, as to the nullifying of it. A raſh oath, if of a lawful thing binds (Judg. 21. 7. 15. 1 Sam. 14. 24. 37. Joſh. 9. 14. 15. as before was proved.
2 Nor is it a righteous Oath, for the Subject may bind himſelf to his own hurt, yea ruine.
1 Though the Subject may not bind himſelf to what is neceſſarily, or at the time of his ſwearing may appear probably to tend to his hurt, or ruine, yet he may ſwear (intending the publick good) to that which is of a mutual nature, and may in the event turn to his own hurt, and ruine; and might he not ſo ſwear, yet having ſo ſworn, he is bound to ſtand to his Oath, Pſal. 15. 4. Ioſh. 9. 15. Ezek. 17. 13. 1 Sam. 14. 26. 28. 37. Judg. 21. 5. 15. 18. which is contradictory to what this man here ſaith.
2 If the Heir ſhould miſprove, his power is bounded by the Law, and commixed with the Parliaments: If he vary, the power of Parliament, the Laws and Liberties of the Subject are the ſame. The late King confeſſed and declared a remedy againſt Tyranny to reſide in the Parliament; there may be a prevention then of the Subjects ruine (whatever the Heir prove) if the KINGDOME be faithful to it ſelf.
3 His Third Exception againſt the Oath as unlawful, and void, is, That it is to uphold one kind of Government for continuance, and in a conſtant way without changing. His Argument to make good this Exception, proceeds thus,
If of the ſeveral kinds of Government, all are not equally good, nor ſutable to all People: And man may change the Government he is under for his own greateſt good and benefit, and muſt change it when he hath proved any kind of Government inconvenient and hurtful, and muſt not uphold any one kind of Government longer then it continues to be moſt ſafe and profitable; then to ſwear to uphold any one Government continually and conſtantly, and not to change it, is ſinful; and in Righteouſneſs and Judgment may not be done. But of the ſeveral kinds of Government, all are not equally good, nor ſutable to all people, and man may change the Government he is under for his own greateſt good and benefit, and muſt change it, when he hath proved any kind of Government inconvenient and hurtful; and muſt not uphold any one kind of Government longer then it continues to be moſt ſafe and profitable. Ergo,
14For Anſwer hereunto,
Firſt, I obſerve there is a fault to be found with the whole Argument, as ſomewhat tranſgreſſing the rules of arguing.
1 In the Conſequence there is ſomething of the error called Ignoratio Elenchi; for we ſwear not in the Oath of Allegiance, indefinitly or indeterminatly as his words import, to uphold one Government continually, and not to change.
Firſt, We ſwear only to His Majeſty, his Heirs, and Succeſſors: ſo that when ever they are al extinct, (which may be ſooner or later, as divine Providence diſpoſeth) the Oath of it ſelf ceaſeth and determines.
Secondly, Notwithſtanding the Allegiance ſworn to the ſaid perſons, their Crown and Dignity, there is power of change in the Government left to the mutual conſent of both parties; to wit, Thoſe ſworn to, and them ſwearing, as it is in al humane Contracts and OathsAlſ. Theol. Caſ. C. 15. Reg. 2. of this nature ‡.
2 In the Minor there is ſomewhat of the fallacy called petitio principii, namely, That any kind of Government, granted to be lawful, can prove inconvenient and hurtful to the Subjects. The Governors indeed may prove bad and noxious, and ſo the Government comes to be abuſed; but a perniciouſneſſe cannot therefore be charged upon the Government it ſelf, nor can that be a neceſſary ground for the change of Government: if ſo, you wil bring in a ground for endleſſe Mutations; a change in the perſons, or a regulating of them, is the apt remedy for that hurt: but the Government, the abſtract or eſſence of the thing, never can prove hurtful, becauſe it is an Ordinance of God for mans good, Rom. 13. 12. 4. and that in ſpecie, as afterwards wil be ſhewed, and as a Go•ernment it hath a political goodneſſe ſeated in its being, by the unchangable Law of Nature.
Secondly, But admit the Argument were not peccant in form, yet the Aſſumption in the main of it, which is, That man may change the Government he is under for his own greateſt good, and muſt change it when he hath proved anie Government inconvenient and hurtful, and muſt not uphold anie one Government longer then it continues moſt ſafe and profitable; I muſt flatly deny. What Poſition more Anarchical could be delivered? For the diſproof, I offer thus,
1 He ſaith, Man may change the Government, &c. but the holy Ghoſt ſaith, Prov. 24. 21. My Son, fear thou the Lord and the King, and meddle not with them that are given to change: He alloweth a change to be for greater good; but the holy Ghoſt tels us in the next words, Verſ. 22. For their Calamitie ſhall riſe ſuddenlie, and who knoweth the Ruine of them•oth?
2 If men may change for the better, and muſt change upon a ſuppoſed15 hurt, then all Oathes, Engagements, or Promiſes of Obedience, Allegiance, or Fidelity to Magiſtrates, are unlawful to be undertaken; for al ſuch Bonds, are in relation to a preſent, and particular Government, the Engagers are under: And they are not for the time preſent, or for an inſtant, but for a future Continuance. And there is in al ſuch Engagements, a making over of the Right which the Engagers have in the matter Covenanted, to the perſons Engaged to; according to that known Rule, Omne promiſſum cadit in debitum: either then ſuch a change to be made by the perſons under Authority may not, muſt not be; or ſuch Engagements may not, muſt not be by them undertaken: The former imports a power and duty inherent in the Subjects to reſerve in themſelves a liberty to alter, and to practiſe it when they judge it convenient: The latter ſpeaks a binding out from any ſuch deed, and an abandoning of any ſuch Right; but the Scripture is cleer enough for ſuch Engagements, Eccleſ. 8. 2. 2 King. 11. 4. Joſh. 1. 16, 17, 18 Judg. 8. 9, 10. 2 Chron. 36. 13.
Thirdly, This Poſition not only diſalows all ſuch Engagements, but diſſolves the natural, or moral bond it ſelf of duty, and ſubjection to Magiſtrates, for to be free to change when a man judgeth it beſt, is to be free when he wil, and that is not to be tyed at al; by this means any man is diſingaged from ſubjection, both in foro interno, & externo, when he wil ſay, He thinks the preſent Government not ſafe or profitable, or another to be better; and having ſo reſolved, he is abſolved: He may now diſobey the Commands, ſtand our againſt the Judgements, take up Arms againſt the Perſon and Authority, and be exempt from the Sword of the Magiſtrate: yea, although he have ſworn, or ſubſcribed Allegiance: becauſe ſuch an Oath, or Promiſe (ſaith this Doctor) was ſinful, not in righteouſneſſe: But I would fain have him declare, What thing Magiſtracy, and what Subjection is.
Fourthly, This Doctrine wil acquit, and juſtifie al the Conſpiracies, and Treaſons, that ever were enterprized againſt the power of the Magiſtrate ſince the World was. Was not the Conſpiracy of Abſolem,2 Sam. 1•1 Kin. 11 2•. 12. 1. &c. Act. 5. 36. and that of Sheba againſt David? Was not the Rebellion of Ieroboam againſt Solomon, and Rehoboam? Were not the Seditions of Thendas and Iudas the Gaulonite againſt Caeſar? Were not al the Treaſons againſt MAGISTRACY that ever have been, attempted for the p•rties (yea for the Publique) greater good, as the Conſpirators judged?
If it be ſaid, That not particular men or a leſſe party are to judge the expediency, and take in hand the change, but the whole people. Beſides that, the people under Authority collectively taken have no ſuch power (as I intend preſently to ſhew) it may be ſaid.
1 Seldome or never doth a whole Nation under a lawful Government16 of themſelves affect or move to a change, it is the flatterers, and deceivers of the people ‡ ordinarily that deſire and miſlead the people to〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Ariſt. poli. lib. 5. c. 5. it.
2 How the Judgement and Will of the whole Body of a People ſhould be known and declared unto Execution before particular men act to a change of their own private judgement, to me is a thing unimaginable.
Fifthly, This neceſſity of retaining a power in Subjects to change, and of uſing it for a greater good, or removal of a temporal hurt, in oppoſition to an Oath ſworn againſt that change, is directly againſt the Scriptures, tying men, that ſwear to their own hurt, not to change, Pſal. 15. 4. Joſh. 9. 18, 19. and condemning thoſe that for ſuch ends have receded from their Oathes, Ezek. 17. 13, &c. Joſh. 9. 15. compared with 2 Sam. 21. 2.
Sixthly, That Poſition ſo much now adayes inſiſted on of the Peoples Power to depoſe, aboliſh, and alter the power of their Governors at pleaſure, which is actually ſetled, and both in it ſelf lawful, and lawfully ſet over them, I hold is a groſſe error.
Some of my Reaſons in ſhort are,
Firſt, Such a courſe (ſuppoſing the Governors Diſſent to it al along) is no other then that reſiſtance of the Ordinance of God, condemned, Rom. 13. 2.
Secondly, It is directly oppoſite to that Subjection commanded every Soul that is in the relation of a Subject, Rom. 13. 1. and that 2 Pet. 2. 13.
Thirdly, If the People may do it, then it muſt needs be that they have a Civil power and authority over their Magiſtrates; which is contrary to thoſe Scriptures which make the King Supream, and cal the power which the people are ſubject to, The higher Powers; higher in relation to them, who are below, and put in ſubjection to them, 1 Pet. 2. 13. Rom. 13. 1. And indeed, if the People have a power over their Magiſtrates to judge, or diſplace them, How are the Magiſtrates their Superiors, and Rulers? The ſame perſons cannot be under, and over others in the ſame kind of order or power. If the Magiſtrates be under the People, whom are they over? If the People be above the Magiſtrates, whom are they under?
Fourthly, The holy Ghoſt commands the People to render Tribute, Cuſtome, Fear, Honor ▪ (not at random to a Magiſtracy leaving them at liberty to what they pleaſe, but) to whom they are due; they are a debt then, which reſpecteth a determinate object, the preſent Magiſtrate. No Debtor can pay a Debt by transfering it from one to another, or giving what he oweth to another beſides the proprietor.
17Fifthly, Magiſtrares are of God, his Ordinance and Miniſters, and they are Judges for him as his Vicegerents, Rom. 13. 1, 2. 4. 2 Chr. 19. 6. and therefore cannot ſtand at the meer wil of the People. God muſt have a hand in their removal, as he hath in their admiſſion; or elſe it is injurious: he removes, and admits now, but not by immediate revelation (as ſometimes in Iſrael) but by the rule of his Word, executed by man, He hath given a Rule for the ſetting up of Magiſtrates, but where hath he given any for their depoſing?
Sixthly. If it were in the Peoples power to change at pleaſure their Magiſtracy, then how could it be ſuch a heinous ſin as it is challenged to be for the people to reject Samuels Government, and deſire and mo•e for a King, 1 Sam. •. 6, 7, 8. 12. 17 ?
But let us next•ear what he alledgeth for this his Aſſertion of Mutability.
He ſaith, Though Civil Government in general be an Ordin•nce of God tending to mans good, therefore to reject it would be ſinful, yet this or that kind of Government is not an Ordinance of God, but an Ordinance of man, 1 Pet. 2. 13. and if an Ordinance of man, then man may change it, &c.
1 Civil Government in the general cannot be ſaid to be Gods Ordinance, and therefore unrejectable; but this, or that kind of Government, that is a legitimate & true ſpecies of it, muſt neceſſarily be yeelded to be alſo Gods Ordinance, and unrejectable; for it is a ſure rule, whatſoever is directly and per ſe ſaid of the genus, or general nature, muſt be alſo ſaid of the ſpecies, or particular kind: And again, the whole nature of the genus, or general, is conteined in every Species, or kind‡‡Quicquid predicatur de praedicato praedicetur de ſubjecto, Reg. 1. 〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Tota natura generis continetur in una quaque ſpecie.
2 The Apoſtle cannot be taken to ſpeak of power in general only, and abſtractly, but muſt be underſto•d diſtributively of al lawful powers in their ſpecial kinds: When he ſaith, There is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God: whoſoever therefore reſiſteth the power, reſiſteth the Ordinance of God, Rom. 13. 1, 2. He that ſhal ſay of this or that kind of lawful Government, as of Monarchy, it is not of God, it is not the Ordinance of God; ſpeaks direct contradictories to the holy Ghoſt here. No Subjects obedience, to this or that Government he is under, could be urged upon him by vertue of this reaſon, There is no power but of God, &c, if this, or that kind of Government were not of God, and were not his Ordinances.
3 And for his diſcretive, but an Ordinance of man, it is no inference of the former, therefore not the Ordinance of God. For this, or that Government, is both an ordinance of God in Pauls ſtile, and an ordinance18 of man in Peters; and you cannot ſay theſe two Apoſtles ſpeak of Government in two different wayes; the former in general, the latter in particular: for as I have proved, Paul muſt be taken of particular kinds. So it is cleer, Peter ſpeaks firſt in general, Submit your ſelves to everie Ordinance of man, &c. and then in particular, Whether it be to the King as Supream, or unto Governors, &c. this, or that Government, Paul cals an Ordinance of God.
1 In that it is inſtituted in its ſpecial nature by God, and warranted for any people, but not commanded or impoſed (as Government in the general is) upon every Nation. For it is with Governments in relation to Nations, as with Callings, in relation to Perſons: every man muſt have a Calling, but it is diſtribu•ively this, or that, or the other; al are not neceſſarily to have this one, 1 Cor. 7. 7. 17.
2 In that it is inveſted in the particular perſons by God, when they are called to the Government according to his Rule, though he doth not point them out immediatly by his own finger, but immediatly by men. In like manner as they are the Miniſters of Chriſt in the Church that are Called according to his appointment, though men in the ſame office ordain them And in this regard, the Magiſtrates (not the Government abſtractly) are called Gods Ordinance, Rom. 13. 2. compared with 3, and 4. Peter terms it mans ordinance, either becauſe both the ſpecial form of Government, and the perſons holding it are choſen, and ſo immediatly Conſtituted by men. Or rather becauſe it is converſant about humane affairs, and mans benefit. Not as if it were invented by, and had its original from men, for ſo it is of God. As Expoſitors interpret and compare that place of Peter with the other of Paul‡‡Beza. Marlor. Divin•s Annotat. D•odat. And that Peter excludes not, but taketh in the divine authoriration to that Government he treats of, is evident; in that he willeth ſubmiſſion to it, for the Lords ſake. How for his ſake, if it be not his Ordinance?
Having thus anſwered the Premiſes of his Sylogiſm, and what he brings to back the Aſſumption withal. His Conſequence or Concluſion following goes to the ground, and the lawfulneſſe of the oath of Allegiance remains unſhaken. But he, as his manner is, amplifies his Conſequence with matters altogether inconſequential, and independant on the Premiſes.
1 He ſaith, Who knoweth not what a plague this kind of Government (viz. Kinglie) hath been to this Nation? And that the moſt of our Kings have been Tyrants? I am one that knows not theſe things, but judge the contrary, and wil be tryed by the Experience, and Voice of this Nation. And in the mean while, I requeſt him to try theſe his words by the Scriptures following, 2 Pet. 2. 10, 11, 12. Jude 8, 9, 10. And to take heed of the Verdict, and Ju•gement therein given upon Governmentblaſphemers.
192 Who knows not what a Bleſſing the Change of Government hath brought to the Vnited Provinces? I am ſure this man knows not, neither can ſay, If thoſe Provinces excel in Bleſſings, that they are brought by a Change of their lawful Government, conſidering what Solomon obſerved of old, Eccleſ. 8. 14. 9. 1, 2. concerning the diſproportion of Wordly ſucceſs to mens wayes; and the inevidence of the goodneſſe, or badneſſe of perſons, and actions if eſtimated by events. Which every mans experience can ſecond.
Whether thoſe Provinees have changed or recovered their Government; or whether they yet ſtand but as our Parliament did with the late King in the firſt War, defending, and demanding the Security of their juſt Priviledges with the Sword in their hand, I leave him further to conſider: and I aſſure him this, There have been obſervations great ſtore of Gods Judgements upon thoſe that have rebelled againſt, caſt off, or murdered their lawful Governors gathered by worthy men‡‡Theatre of Gods judgments by D. Beard and Doct. Taylor, lib. 2. chap. 2, 3, 4, 5.. But I never before met with any, that made obſervations of divine bleſſings upon any of thoſe acts.
Thus far his EXCEPTIONS by way of proof of his firſt Poſition goes.
He in the cloſe makes one Objection againſt himſelf, and gi•es his Anſwer to it thus;
Objection. Suppoſe there was ſome unlawfulneſs in the taking ſuch Oathes, yet is there not a neceſſitie of keeping them being taken?
Anſwer. If Herods Oath againſt the life of one man, being unrighteous and cruel, was ſinfullie taken, and more ſinfullie kept, then theſe of Allegiance which are abſolute, not Conditional, &c. and which are to uphold Monarchie, the woful fruits whereof ſeeing they are dangerous, and may prove, as often they have done, deſtructive to the lives of manie men; they are not onlie unlawful to be taken, but to be kept.
Not granting any unlawfulneſſe in the taking of this Oath, having (I hope) made good its innocency againſt al that hath been ſaid; yet ſuppoſe I had made this Objection, I would not take this Anſwer. My Reaſon is,
He cannot paralel Herods Oath and ours in the matter wherein Herods was unlawful both in the taking and keeping. What was that? to ſhed innocent bloud, to maſſacre a guiltleſſe and holy Perſon. What was ours? To yeeld obedience in lawful things, to a lawful power. Is it any more? and are not the matters of theſe two Oathes as far unlike as light and darkneſſe? That which he heaps np to aggra•a•e our O•••to the height of the unrighteouſneſſe of Herods, is nothing but the three exceptions which al this while I ha•e been Anſwering, and therefore ſhal20 content myſelf with what hath been ſaid to them; only in the cloſe, he tels us,
Monarchy is dangerous, and may, as often it hath, prove deſtructive to the lives of many men, and therefore its unlawful to ſwear, or keep the upholding of it.
This is nothing but what may be as truly ſaid of any kind of Government, how lawful ſoever: none that hath been as much practiſed as it, can be affirmed to have been leſſe deſtructive ▪ or to be leſſe dangerous then it. But the poſſiblity of being, or experience of having been abuſed, is no valid Reaſon why a Government may not be upheld; (if it be, down muſt al Governments fal) and if yet it may be upheld, to ſwear to uphold it, may be an Oath lawful for the matter; and if it cannot in that reſpect be made a Crime, it deſerves not to be paraleld with Herods ▪ Oath. What paralel in point of unrighteouſnes Herods keeping his oath, and others violating theirs; his execution, and theirs, may have; it is not to my pu•poſe in hand to ſhew.
I have done with his Firſt Poſition, and pr•ceed to his Second, which is this,
Suppoſe the Oath of Allegiance to be Lawful, yet the Subject is now abſolved from it by th•m that have power to abſolve from it.
This Poſition of a power in any to abſolve from a lawful Oath is new (as far as I have read, or heard) among Proteſtants, and hath until now been accounted by Papiſts, the Popes and Prelates Prerogative; by us, their Anti-chriſtian preſumption.
But let us ſee where, and upon what ground he builds ſuch a power:
Reaſon. Becauſe Repreſentatives of the People, which in reaſon are the Supream power, impoſed this Oath by an Act of Parliament, this was the Subjects free Act in their Repreſentatives, no Law of God or Nature obliging them to accept of ſuch a Perſon, and his Heirs, and to ſwear Allegiance to them. If therfore the Repreſentatives take away, and repeal this Act (as this Parliament hath done) they thereby ſet the Subjects at libertie from ſuch Allegiance, and from their Oath binding to it, there remains no more Conſcience of it to ſuch as have taken it: Abraham that impoſed the Oath upon his Servant, might acquit him of it, &c.
Firſt, For the Antecedent, I ſhal only note;
1 He ſets up a Supream power over us by Reaſon, not by Law, or the Peoples Conſtitution: and this Reaſon is not the Nations, but, 1 Either his own private judgement, and if that may create a Supre•m power to him, then every ot•er private mans Reaſon is to ſet up one to him ▪ even where there is one already, over the people he is of. 2 Or it is the Common Reaſon that is in all men naturally: and if ſo, how comes it to paſſe, That there is ſo much variety of Kinds of Supream21 Government, and that Repreſentatives have it not in all times and Nations; yea that ſcarce they ever had it?
2 That in citing the power that Enacted this Oath, he omits the King, and Houſe or Lords, who in the then Parliament concu•ed in this Enacting, and Impoſition.
3 That although the King then was rightſully and actually Enthroned in the Regal power and Dignity, and both the Law, and the Oath of Supremacy obliged the people to him and his Heirs; yet he dares to ſay, No Law of God, or Nature, obliged them to accept of ſuch a Perſon and his Heirs. Is not the Fifth Commandement the Law of God, and Nature? and thoſe Precepts, Rom. 13. 1. Tit. 3. 1. 1 Pet. 2. 13. Repe••ions, and divine Ratifications thereof? And doth not that Law command every people and perſon Allegiance to their particular lawful Governors ▪ and was not the King in Being, his Heirs in Capacity, and deſignaton ſuch ▪
Secondly, But for the Conſequent there is no Truth in it, nor colour of Reaſon; or inference from the Anteceden•for it. Beſides, That the act cannot (for ought appears to me) be Repealed, but by the ſame power that made it: and the Allegiance ſworn was not founded upon the Act or Oath, but due, and paid before them both. The Oath in its own words terms it ſelf a Recognition and Acknowledgement; and the firſt words of it are,
I A. B. Do trulie and ſincerelie acknowledge, profeſs, teſtifie, and declare in my Conſcience before God and the World, That King James is lawful King of this Realm, &c.
Suppoſe the Repreſentatives to be the Supream power, that the Impoſing of this Oath was their Sole Act, and the Subjects in them, and that they did it voluntarily or unobliged to it: doth it thence follow. The Repreſentatives repealing that Act, the Subjects that upon their Enacting ſwore it, are now abſolved from their Allegiance, and from the Oath ▪
1 They that have power to impoſe an Oath were never ſaid (many Divintty extant) to have power eo ipſo to abſolve from it, when the impoſers are alſo the party ſworn to, there it is granted (both by Proteſtant‡ Doct. Sanderſ. de juram. oblig. prael. 7. §. 8. Theoloſ Syntag. juris, l. 50. c. 12. and Papiſts ‡) they have power to releaſe from the Oath, not becauſe they are the impoſers, but becauſe they are the party ſworn to, for omnis qui promittit ſacit jus alteri, cui eſt facta promiſſio, the right of the thing ſworn is theirs to whom the Oath is made, and therefore they may releaſe from it; and this is••e true ground of that power he ſuppoſeth in Abraham to acquit his Servant, not his being the impoſer of his Oath: but where the impoſers are a Third party from the perſons ſwearing,22 and ſworn to, there they have no claim of power of Relaxation. And thus the caſe is here, The Repreſentatives (as he faith) impoſe the Oath, which is ſworn to the King, and bind in Allegiance to him. If they that impoſe an Oath, may Releaſe from it, then may any Court or Magiſtrate Releaſe a Juror or Examinate from the Oath they have gi•en him; then it a man impoſe an Oath upon himſelf (as in ſome caſes he may) he may abſolve himſelf when he wil from it, though he therein obliged himſelf to God, or another man. And this is truly the caſe here, as he himſelf ſtates it; The Subjects by their own act in their Repreſentatives impoſe this Oath, and by their own perſonal act ſwear i•, and after by their own•ctin their Repreſentatives abſolve themſelves i•.
2 The Repeal of the act, is no Repeal or diſſolution of the Oath; the Parliament that framed, and by their act impoſed the Oath, did not thereby make it an Oath, but it was the Subjects ſwearing which made it an Oath, and an Obligation or Religion to him ▪ as the Miniſters rehearſing and dictating the words of Marriage to the Couple Marrying each other, makes not the Marriage, but the parties themſelves declaring in thoſe words. And as the Clerk in a Court reciting the words of a Jurors Oath to him makes not the Oath, but the Jurors aſſent to it. The Parliament can conjoyn, or puniſh the refuſal, or manifeſt breach of an Oath. But a promiſſory Oath being the act and Covenant of him that ſwears, and a part of divine Worſhip, the bond of Conſcience upon the ſwearer, and the validity of Gods Ordinance, and the Obligation that is therein entred into unto God, as the invocated witneſſe, and judge, cannot be within the Parliaments authority to nullifie in al Subjects Oathes which may be made with, or without their impoſition. There are caſes indeed, wherein a ſuperior, as a Husband, Maſter, Father, Magiſtrate, may make void the Oath of their reſpective inferior by ANALOGY, or equity of that Rule, Numb. 30. but thoſe are, 1 In matters that are belonging to the Right, or Power of the Superior to diſpoſe of; as the Repreſentatives may acquit from an Oath in point of their owne Right‡‡Animadvertendum tamen eſt penes•os non eſſe facultatem reſcindendi quod libet jus jurandum ſubditorum ſed illud duntaxat cujus materia eſt eorum ▪ poteſtati ſubjecta. Alſted. Theol. Caſ. Cap. 15. Reg. 2. But the Allegiance in this Oath ſworn is none of theirs, but the Kings, and therefore ſworn to him by the Subjects, and in particular by them. 2 By that Law Numb. 30. the Superior may interpoſe to nullifie his Inferiors Oath made without his knowledge and conſent, and that muſt be done in the day that he hears of it; but there is no further power given by that Law in the matter of Oathes. Now in this our Caſe, the Repreſentatives have been ſo far from being ignorant of23 the making of this Oath, and diſalowing it as ſoon as it was know to them, that they were the Compoſers and Commanders of it; yea, and have taken it themſelves. Let any the leaſt Warrant, yea or Preſident be brought for Releaſing an Oath in this Caſe, and I ſhal ſit down.
Laſtly, For a Cloſe of my Anſwer unto this Poſition, I ſhal obſerve what the Tenor of this Oath hath in it:
I do beleeve, and in Conſcience am reſolved, That neither the Pope, nor any Perſon whatſoever hath power to abſolve me of this Oath, or any part thereof. And do renounce all Pardons and Diſpenſations to the contrary.
This is not the Swearers Declaration only, but the Parliaments in Compiling, and Impoſing this Oath, and al Repreſentatives have perſonally thus declared in taking it. Shal we beleeve them concerning their power in this matter, or this man?
That which follows is no proof of the Poſition, nor any thing to the validity of the Oath.
THE Anſwerer begins with the Drift of the Firſt Poſition, which he ſaith is, To ſhew the Oath to be unlawful in the taking of it.
Reply. The Drift of the Firſt Poſition is to ſhew the unlawfulneſs of the Oath upon a Suppoſition, that the Oath was Abſolute and not Conditional, that it was Single and not Mutual, &c. and not otherwiſe.
He falls upon Premiſing ſomething in theſe words: An Oath may be unlawful, 1 Either in regard of the matter or thing ſworn, as when it is ſome ſinful act: Or, 2 In regard of the manner, as when the thing is unadviſedly2 ſworn: The former way of unlawfulneſs makes the Oath Void in the taking of it, but not the latter: which appears by the validity of that unadviſed Oath of the Princes to the Gibeonites, Joſh. 9. 15. 18, 19. 2 Sam. 21. 2.
He erreth at the firſt daſh; That Oath of the Princes was a ſinful OathReply. in the matter of it, becauſe expreſly againſt the command of God, Deut. 7. 2. Exod. 23. 32. yet it was not void, but was kept by them.
He falls upon Obſerving, and ſpeaks of A groſs imputation that is laid upon very many Worthies of all ſorts and kinds of men, as if they had preſſed, taken, and juſtified an Oath in the matter of it unjuſt and ſin•ul.
If there be any Charge at all upon any, it is upon thoſe that make theReply. Oath to be Abſolute and not Conditional, &c. But if any perſon hold otherwiſe, that it was a Mutual Conditional Oath that was taken when Allegiance was ſworn, then there is no imputation at all upon one or other, which the Author of the Poſition rather conceives then the contrary.
He mentioneth the general Exception againſt the lawfulneſſe of the Oath, and Objects againſt it in that branch of it that reſpects Judgment, and ſaith, That Defectiveneſſe in that will not invalidate the Oath, It is but a fault (ſaith he) in the manner, not in the matter; in the Perſon, not in the Oath.
If it be ſo, Whence is it that the Law provides, That no Vows, Oaths,Reply. Deeds, or Acts that are done by perſons in their Nonage (becauſe it is ſuppoſed they are not done in Judgment) ſhall ſtand, but be all invalid, unleſſe ratified afterwards when they come to age. This man (whoever he be) ſpeaks againſt the Law herein, which is more groſſe then to ſpeak againſt perſons. Notwithſtanding it muſt not be conceived, That the Author of the Poſitions doth intend, That every oath that is defective in judgement, is ipſo facto void; but he connects Judgement and Righteouſneſſe together, as adding ſtrength to each other, and making ſuch an oath ſo unlawful, as not to be obligatory.
He deſcends to particulars, and objects againſt that Conditionality which in the Poſition is made neceſſary unto an oath, that it may agree with Jer. 4. 2. And he diſtinguiſheth in theſe words: I conceive the words (Conditional and Abſolute) may be taken, 1 Either in reference to the thing ſworn, which is Obedience or Allegiance to the King; and ſo the Condition is, it muſt be Honeſt; Or, 2 In reference to the Tye or Obligation of the Oath: And of this latter, he makes another diſtinction concerning Conditions, in theſe words: Some Conditions are general, and ſuch as no promiſory Oath that is lawful can be without: And he makes (Honeſt) this general Condition. 2ly. Others are ſpecial and proper Conditions.
He makes, Honeſt and Iuſt, to fall under the oppoſite members of hisReply. own diſtinction, and ſo confounds that which he would diſtinguiſh.
He comes to oppugn the Reaſon, that is brought in the Poſition, that3 the Oath muſt not be Abſolute, but Conditional, viz. That it is againſt the Ground and Reaſon of the Primitive Inſtitution of Government, which is the good of the Subject, that there ſhould be any Oath to bind him abſolutly whether the Prince Rule for the Subjects good or not. And his firſt Exception is,
That this Reaſon wants proof.
There was ſuch cleerneſſe in the Reaſon, that it needed not proof. ForReply. if an abſolute Vaſſalage (with firſt or laſt will infallibly be the Conſequence of an abſolute Oath) be not for the good of the Subject, and ſo not ſutable to the Primitive Inſtitution of Government, then an abſolute oath cannot be for the good of the Subject, and ſo not ſutable to the Primitive Inſtitution of Government.
His Second Exception is, The Reflection that this Argument in the Poſition would have upon the Parliament (ſhould it be granted to be true) who Enacted the Oath of Allegiance, and all ſubſequent Parliaments confirmed it, which if it were not for the good of the Subject, would call their wiſdom and goodneſſe into queſtion.
There is ſomething inſerted in this, that is not granted, viz That theReply. Parliament intended this Oath to be Abſolute, without implying in it ſo much as this Condition, While the Prince ſhould rule according to the Laws of the Kingdom. For, 1 They never declared ſo much, That they intended the oath to be abſolute. 2 The Oaths that Kings in this Nation have alwayes taken, ſhew the contrary, and their Oaths to him muſt be interpreted by his Oath to them: Now his Oath to them is, To Rule according to the Laws of the Kingdom, therefore their Oath to him muſt have the ſame reſtriction, and ſo cannot be abſolute. 3 The Parliament is ſharer (at leaſt) by this mans own confeſſion, pag 5. with the Prince in Government. For, he ſaith, It is a mixed Government that is amongſt us in this Nation; and in a mixed Government, the Prince hath his ſhare; and the People, in their Repreſentatives, have their ſhare; therefore the Parliament would never make the Oath abſolute, leaſt thereby they ſhould give away to the Prince that part in Government which is theirs. 4 It was to recover this ſhare in Government, and the Peoples Liberties thereby out of the hand of the Prince, that this WAR was undertaken againſt him. Which if they had never Conditioned with the Prince for, in their Oath to him, (neither expreſly, nor implicitly) had not been juſtifiable upon this mans Aſſertion, That an abſolute Oath is lawful.
His third Exception is ſetcht from Experience, His words are, It hath conſiſted with the publick good (yea contributed to it, or elſe the Papiſts would not have ſo oppoſed it) from the time it was firſt ſet forth, until now, and no complaint at all hath been heard againſt it•ill now.
1 It had been neceſſary that he ſhould have ſhewed what good itReply. 4hath contributed to it, and how it hath been conſiſtent with it, conſidered as abſolu•e, as now he and many more do underſtand it, and hold themſelves ſtill obliged by it.
2 The Papiſts•ad reaſon to oppoſe it, becauſe it was given out to be intended principally (if not ſolely) againſt them. And their Allegiance in reference to their Religion (which ſubjected them to a forreign power) tell juſtly under ſuſpition, to engage them therefore more firmly to the Prinee, this oath was contrived and Enacted.
3 Many precions conſcientious men were long ſince (much more then Papiſts) offended at it, foreſeeing that there would be a great ſnare in it, as it was urged without an explication, Yea, It was preſſed more upon them ▪ then upon the Papiſts; and the Papiſts (moſt of them) knew how to get off from it, and to avoid it, but not they. When the Perſecution was ſo ho•againſt Inconformiſts that many thouſands were forced to fly the Land; then was there a command, That all Ports and Havens ſhould be narrowly looked unto, that none might be ſuffered to paſſe out of the Nation, till they had firſt taken this Oath; and my ſelf hardly eſcaped at that time.
4 It might•ave proved fatal to this Nation, had this Parliament underſtood it as this man doth in an abſolute ſenſe, and not according to the Laws of the Land ▪ For then had the Deſign of the late King and his Father (to make themſelves abſolute Mona•chs, and to bring the peointo an abſolute ſubjection to their arbitrary Government) been accompliſhed, and there had been no place ſo much as for a Defenſive War, but abſolute ſlaves the Kingdom muſt have been, as they were ſeveral yeers before this Parliament ſate.
He comes to diſtinguiſh of things that are againſt the peoples good; and, ſaith he,
That ſome things are againſt the peoples good in their own nature, and other things accidentally ▪ and ſaith, That any thing almoſt that falls under a Political conſideration may be againſt the peoples good in the latter Conſideration though unlawful, and for the preſent, probably (yea neceſſarily) for the peoples good: and of this ſort (I ſuppoſe) he makes this abſolute oath of Allegiance to be. It is but by accident that it proves hurtful, but it is good in it ſelf.
He might and muſt diſtinguiſh of things accidentall; ſome things areReply. accidental in reference to the time when, and yet ce••ain that they will be, in reference to the Cauſes whence they come, and the Courſe of Gods Providence: other things are ſo accidental, as that it is contingent, whether they will be at all. Chriſt ſpeaks of offences, That it is neceſſary that they ſhould come: and the Apoſtle of Hereſies, That there muſt be Hereſies, and yet both the one and the other are accidental, in reference to the perſons by whom, and the time in which they5 ſhould come: So it is in Common-wealths, there are many things that are againſt the good of the people, which though accidental in reference to the perſons and time, yet certain and in•allible, in reference to the Cauſes, and the courſe of Gods Providence; and when there is not proviſion againſt ſuch evils, but rather a door ſet open for them, by either perſons or things done, 'tis againſt the good of the people, becauſe all knowing men may eaſily foreſee ſuch things, though they cannot ſo punctually diſcern the times and ſeaſons of them.
I ſhall give ſome inſtances: Wars, are things accidental, yet certain, at one time or another; and that Government that provides not againſt it, but rather invites it by ſecurity and negligence, is againſt the good of the people, and ought to be either redreſ•ed, or removed: Murthers, Rapes, Fellonies in a Common-wealth are accidental, yet they will certainly be, and thoſe States-men, and L•giſla•ors that provide not againſt them, are againſt the good of the people.
There may be Inſtances of other kinds: Wolves amongſt the Flock are accidental, yet they will be, and thoſe Shepherds that provide not againſt them, by feeding the Church of God with wholſome ſound Doctrine, are againſt the good of the Flock. Storms and Tempeſts at Sea are accidental, yet they will certainly come; and thoſe Ship-maſters and Marriners that go to Sea without good Tacking, they are againſt the good of their Principals, and thoſe that fraught them, and againſt their own lives alſo. And ſo it is with Tyrants in Government, they are accidental in a Common-wealth, yet it is certain ſuch there will be, ſince ſo great corruption ſell upon mankind, and thoſe Oath-impoſers, and Oathes that are impoſed, that provide not againſt ſuch, but rather invite and ſet open a door to Governors to be ſuch, are againſt the good of the Common-wealth, and people; and ſuch is that Oath of Allegiance, if it be abſolu•e and not conditional, as this man would have it.
2 He diſtinguiſheth again of the goodneſſe of the End, and of the means tending to that End; and he makes the happineſſe of the Community to be the goodneſſe of the End; and this to be intended and not deliberated on, or choſen by the Law-gi•ers. The means he makes variable, in relation to times and people, and ſaith. That that may be good in the nature of a means, for one people or time, that is not good for another.
Reply. I allow of the Diſtinction in the former branch of it fully, and ſay with him, That the happineſſe of the Community is the goodneſſe of the End. And I ad this, That the juſt freedom o•the Subject is the happineſſe of the Communitie, which an abſolute Oath of ALLEGIANCE fights againſt.
I alſo concur with him in the ſecond branch of the Diſtinction of the goodneſſe of the means, that it is that which falls under Deliberation and6 Counſel: but that all means is variable and changable after Counſel hath found it out, I deny: For the goodneſſe of the means may be conſidered Generally, or Specifically. Conſider it in its general nature, and it admits not of any ſuch variation according to times and places: but conſider it in its ſpecial nature, and then it may admit of variation. For Example, Government in general, is a good of the means, reſpecting the happineſſe of the Community, and yet is neceſſary for all Communities, that they may be happy: but this, or that ſpecial kind of Governmentis not necſſary for all Communities, in all places and at all times, but there may be ſome change and variation. So to Govern according to Laws, and to obey according to Laws, is neceſſary, and admitts of no variation, becauſe it conduceth abſolutly to the good of the Community: but to govern and obey according to the ſame Laws, is not neceſſary, but variable, according to places and times.
Unto this head of the goodneſſe of means conducing to ſuch an End, viz. The happineſſe of the Community, he makes a firm Sanction by an abſolute Oath (that there may be a kind of immutability in States and Governments thereby) to appertain. And ſaith, It is the wiſdom of moſt States ſo to ſetle them, to prevent the danger of Innovation and changes. And•e makes this to be a better means of the Communities happineſſe, then the other of Conditional parts and Covenants with the Prince. For he ſpeaks of the evil of ſwearing to a Prince abſolutly, to be but inconvenience, diſadvantagiouſneſſe, prejudice, outward incommodity, impeachment of the Subjects good: but the evils of a Conditional, or unabſolute Engagement, he ſpeaks of them, as Miſchief and Miſery: and when the other is in his accompt but uncertain danger, he makes this inevitable hurt.
Reply. If all this be true, then the Conſtitution of our State, was not ſo prudently conſidered by our fore-Fathers, when they Eſtabliſhed a mixt Government, as might have been; and ſo much expence of Bloud to recover the Subjects Liberty and Propriety, was a great ſin. For it had been better for the Subject (if he have ſaid truth) to have yeelded themſelves up to the Will of their Prince, to have ſubmitted quietly to an arbritrary power, and to have borne an Iron yoke for ever, then to have contended with him: and our Brethren of Scotland did ill to give us ſuch an Example as firſt to appear in Arms againſt him: But rational men muſt firſt put out their eyes ▪ before they can beleeve ſuch a Paradox. For can there be a greater Miſchief and Miſery, then thraldom and ſlavery? then loſſe of Religion, Liberty, Propriety, Life it ſelf? For all theſe will lie at ſtake, and be hazarded, by an abſolute Oath firmly kept and obſerved. War with all the effects of it that can follow ſuch conditional Engagements, is but a ſhort Miſery, and not ſo ignominious as the other, for perſons live and die like men in it; but in the other,7 they live and die like beaſts, and all their life is but a long-lived death. But many in theſe dayes, are like the Iſraelites, who when in bondage and under Pharoahs yoke, cryed to God, and ſighed and groaned, and then it was a condition intollerable; but when they were delivered and ſaw War, and found ſome evils they expected not, then they judged it better to be in Egyptagain: and then the ſtate of cruel Servitude was but an inconvenience in compariſon of the other Miſchief. But let the miſchief of a Conditional Engagement be what it will, it muſt be choſen, and the abſolute muſt be avoided, becauſe Liberty, and Propriety, &c. are the happineſſe of a Community, and the end of Government, and the birth-right of all the Subjects which have not forfeited it, and ought not to be given away to the will of the Governor, and a Conditional Engagement is the means to preſerve it.
He ſaith, Such things as may by reaſon of their changeable nature prove in the iſſue ſomewhat diſadvantagious, may yet, if for the preſent good, and probably hopeful ſo to continue, be ſworn to abſolutly, as in voluntary Promiſes, Leagues, and Contracts, both publike and private, among all Nations hath been the practiſe, and by good Scripture-preſident it is juſtified,‡‡Gen. 47. 31. Exod. 13. 19. Joſh. 9. 15 14 9 Judg. 21. 5. 18. 15. 12. 13. 1 Sam. 14. 24. 19. 6. 20. 12. 17 1 King. 1. 13. 29. 2 Sam. 19 ▪ 23..
Reply. 1 Allegiance (which is the thing that he would have abſolutly ſworn unto) may not only prove through the changable nature diſadvantagious, but alſo hath, and doth often, and will certainly at one time or other prove pernicious, not to perſons only, but to Commonwealths.
2 An abſolute Contract of Allegiance, ſets up the Prince too high, and puts down the Subject too low: The one is made by ſuch a Contract more then a man, the other is rendered leſſe then a man, and more like unto a Beaſt. And it is neither for the preſent good, nor hopeful to continue ſo ▪ to put ſuch a diſtance betwixt them. For abſolute Sovereignty is Gods Prerogative, whoſe Will is perfectly holy, and juſt, and good, and not to be attributed to the Creature, ſo full of imperfection and corruption; and it layes a temptation before him to miſcarry in his Office.
3 Some voluntary Promiſes and Contracts are diſſimilia, things unlike, holding no proportion to the thing in Controverſie, viz. To the Oath of Allegiance, the abſolutneſſe whereof is by him Aſſerted, and the Inſtances or Examples in Scripture carry not any kind of Analogy. Let them be pe•uſed, and rational men will wonder, that ever they were produced. 1 Some of them, are not Oaths made to men at all, but to God, as that in Judg. 21. 5. 18. and ſome others. 2 Others of them are Oathes, the performanee whereof lies only on one Party; the other is to receive advantage, but to do nothing, as that in Gen. 47, 31. Exod. 13. 19. Joſh. 9. 15. & 14. 9 ▪ 3 Others of them were Oathes of things, that8 were in their nature pernicious and ſinful to be ſworn to, as that in 1 Sam. 14. 24. Ionathan ſpeaks of it, That his Father had troubled Iſrael and hindred the Lords Work by that Oath of not touching any food till evening. And when Saul would have had Ionathan put to death in reference to his violation of that Oath, the people reſcued him, and did well in it. And there is none that comes ſo neer the caſe, as Ionathans and Davids Oath, which was not abſolute, but conditional, ſo as that if the one had broken it, the other would have been abſolv'd upon it. But this Oath of Allegiance is an Oath betwixt perſons, that owe reſpective duties to each other, and the Obligation of the one, hath a reſpect unto, and a dependance on the performance of the other; and ſo is an Oath of another kind, then thoſe mentioned in his Scriptures, and cannot be abſolute, as he from theſe patterns would prove.
1, He ſaith, The Prince may prove juſt and vertuous.
Reply. 1 The Conditional Engagement is the beſt way to make him prove ſuch, when he Rules upon his good Behaviour, he is more likely to Rule well. 2 Moſt Princes prove not ſuch but unjuſt and vitious. 3 To be left to his own arbitrary Will in Governing, is like to prove a temptation and ſnare to him. A lawleſſe Liberty to do what he liſteth many times corrupteth the Prince.
2, He ſaith, If he degenerates, the Subjects are bound to obey him actively, but in lawful things.
Reply. What then? If the Oath be abſolute, they are bound to obey him paſſively in all other things, wherein they cannot obey him actively, even to the loſſe of Life, Limb, Liberty, and Eſtate, which will certainly bring calamity enough upon them. Nor were the Children of Iſrael bound to obey Pharaoh actively, ſave only in lawful things; and yet they were miſerable enough for all that. And the Condition of the Subject may be no better then the Condition of Gally-ſlaves, if this be all the comfort that the Subject hath, that he is bound to obey actively but in lawful things,
3, Heſaith, In his lawleſs Acts there may be a remedy (as the puniſhment or reſiſtance of his bad inſtruments by the Parliament, without whom, though he may Will unjuſt things, yet he cannot Execute them) and yet his Government be continued.
Reply. 1 What Juſtice is in this, To reſiſt, and puniſh his bad Inſtruments, and not him who is the principal efficient? For if they be in fault, he that ſets them on work much rather. And uſually it hath been ſaid, The Meſſenger bears no blame, but if there be a fault, his it is that ſent him, and certainly the Servant is in leſſe fault. 2 This reſiſting of his9 bad Inſtruments, is a reſiſting of him, as Chriſt ſpeaks to his Apoſtles whom he ſent forth, He that receiveth you, receiveth me; and he that deſpiſeth you, deſp•ſeth me: So it may be ſaid of Reſiſting, in reference to the Inſtruments of the Prince, He that puniſheth, or reſiſteth them, puniſheth and reſiſteth him in them; and this is abſolutly againſt the Oath of abſolute Allegiance. 3 This reſiſting and puniſhing of the Princes Inſtruments, is as unſafe and dangerous, as the not continuing of his Government when it is degenerated to Tyranny; for it will inevitably bring on a War betwixt the Prince and People: For the Prinee, if he be able, will maintain his Inſtruments in what he ſetteth them about, and vindicate their Cauſe, while they do nothing but what they have his authority for; and this is the evil that this man declines ſo much, that to prevent it, he pleads for an abſolute Engagement, whatever the miſchief be to the Subject; and yet in this place he brings this in as a Remedy to prevent the danger of the other. 4 This Remedy begins at the wrong end, goes not the next way, but far about to work redreſſe, and reacheth not the end, nor effects any cure; for a corrupt Prince will never want bad Inſtruments, his greatneſſe will have a corrupting influence upon thoſe about him; and like Prince, like Officers and Servants under him. But let the Prince be fettered by wholſome Laws, tending to his own juſt Honor, and the Subjects juſt Freedom, and the Miſchief will not only be redreſſed, but might be pre•ented, and with leſſe•azard alſo. 5 The Parliament are Subjects, in this mans account, as well as other men; and therefore by his Aſſertion, muſt be abſolutly engaged to the Prince; and wherein they cannot obey actively, they are bound to obey paſſively, and therefore may not actively appear againſt his authority in his Inſtruments, for where is then Allegiance, which an abſolute Oath will alwayes bind too?
4, He ſaith, And ſuppoſe the caſe that there be no remedy, as when he hath got a party ſtronger then can be reſiſted, or ſubjected to puniſhment, then to caſt off his power and depoſe him (ſuppoſe it lawful to do) will be no relief, his ſtrength will command ſubjection.
Reply. 1 The way to prevent the getting of this ſtrong Party, is to keep the Subject from the ſnare of abſolute Oathes, and to let them know their Liberty, and that their Allegiance is but Conditional. 2 Concerning depoſing (if an abſolute Oath be once taken, and be lawful both to be taken, and kept when taken) it cannot be lawful; no nor yet the putting of his Perſon into hazard by War, pretended to be undertaken againſt his Miniſters and Servants under him. 3 When the Subject hath a juſt Cauſe to contend for; viz. For Covenanted Rights, they may caſt themſelves upon God; for God hath made it to appear, not by Might, nor by Arms, but by his Spirit, great things have been accompliſhed.
105, He ſaith, The miſcarriages of a Prince ordinarily extend but to the detriment of ſome particular perſons, rarely doth any Nero-like, ſeek the deſtruction of the whole.
Reply. 1 Let the Declarations which have been ſet forth by the Parliament (when both Houſes ſate, and were moſt full) be viewed, and it will appear, That the Miſchiefs and Miſeries that came by the corrupt Mind and Will of the Prince, were general, and reached the whole Nation: What can be ſaid of Ship-money, and multiplicity of Monopolies? Did they not, one way or other, reach all? Were ſome particuperſons only annoyed by them? 2 If at firſt few be like Nero, to ſeek the deſtruction of the whole; yet being croſſed, and thereby incenſed and vexed, if it come to a publick Conteſtation, almoſt every one will chuſe to deſtroy all, rather then to miſſe of their Will, and fall ſhort of their Deſign.
6, He ſaith, In that caſe Subjects ſworn, and unſworn, (if their Cauſe be good, and the Parliament authorize their ſtanding up) are in the ſame capacity of Reſiſtance.
Reply. 1 Not ſo, if their Oath be abſolute and obligatory, (as this man will have it) for an