Englands abſolute Monarchy, or Government of Great Britain.

THere are three kindes of Government amongſt men, Abſolute Monarchy, Ariſtocracie and Democracie, and all of theſe having particular conveni­ences, and inconveniences, the ex­perience and wiſdome of our An­ceſtors hat•ſo moulded this out of a mixture of theſe as to give to this Kingdome (as farre as hu­mane prudence can provide) the conveniences of all three, without the inconveniences of any one, as long as the ballance hangs eeven betweene the three eſtates, and they runne jointly on in their pro­per channell (begetting verdure and fertillity in the medowes of either on both ſides) and the overflow­ing of either on either ſide raiſe no deluge or in­undation.

The ill of abſolute Monarchy is Tyranny.

The ill of Ariſtocracie is Faction and Diviſion.

The ills of Democracie are Tumults, Violence, and Licentiouſneſſe.

The good of Monarchy is the uniting of a Nation under one head to reſiſt invaſion from abroad, and in­ſurrection at home.

The good of Ariſtocracie is the conjunction of Councell in the ableſt perſons of a State, for the publicke benefit.

The good of Democracie is liberty and the cou­rage and induſtry which liberty begets.

In this Kingdome the Lawes are jointly made by a King, by a Houſe of Peeres, and by a Houſe of Commons, choſen by the people, all having free Votes, and particular priviledges.

The government according to the Lawes is tru­ſted to the King, power of treaties of Warre and Peace, of making Peers, of chuſing Officers and Councellors for State. Judges for Law, Comman­ders for Forts and Caſtles, giving Com••ſſions for raiſing men to make warre abroad, or to prevent or provide againſt invaſions, or inſurrections at home, benefit of confiſcations, power of pardoning, and ſome more of the like kinde, are placed in the King. And this kinde of regulated Monarchy having this power to preſerve that authority, which without it would be diſabled to preſerve Laws in their force, and the Subjects in their liberties and proprieties, is intended to draw to him ſuch a reſpect and relation from the great ones, as may hinder the ills of Divi­ſion and Faction, and ſuch a feare and reverence from the people as may hinder Tumults, Violence and licentiouſneſſe.

Againe, that the Prince may not make uſe of this high and perpetuall power to the hurt of thoſe for whoſe good he hath it, and make uſe of publick ne­ceſſity for the gaine of his private favourites and followers, to the detriment of his people, the Houſe of Commons, an excellent conſerver of liberty, but never intended for any ſhare in government, or the chuſing of them that ſhould govern, is ſolely intru­ſted with the firſt propoſitions concerning the le­vies of moneys (which is the ſinewes as wel of peace as warre) and the impeaching of thoſe, who for their owne ends, though countenanced by any ſurrepti­tiouſly gotten command of the King, have violated that Law, which he is bound (when he knowes it) to protect, and to the protection of which they were bound to adviſe him, at leaſt not to ſerve him in the contrary.

And the Lords being tr•ſted with a judicatory power, ate an excellent s••eene and banke betweene the Prince and People, to aſſiſt each againſt any in­croachments of the other, and by juſt judgements to preſerve that Law which ought to be the rule of every one of the three.

This is the exact forme of government eſtabli­ſhed in the Kingdome of England, which I have publiſhed for the ſatisfaction of all thoſe that deſire to be informed of the manner and ground of the go­ver••ent of this State.

It being neceſſary in theſe troubleſome times that all men ſhould know how to obey both King and Parliament, how to maintaine the Kings juſt and royall Prerogative, and likewiſe how to defend the juſt priviledges of Parliament.

For as the three kindes of Government are in a friendly combination united and become one abſo­lute government, ſo the Kings royall Authority, the judicatory power of the Lords, and the juſt pri­viledge of the Commons, are firmely united to make one abſolute power.

Which intimates unto us, that to maintaine one onely, is not our duty, or two, and neglect the third, but to maintaine a firme and inſeparable union: for to make a diviſion is the firſt ſtep to diſſolution: wee ought not to maintaine the Kings regall Preroga­tive, to ſuppreſſe the judicatory power of the Lords, nor the judicatory power of the Lords to make breach of the priviledges of the Commons, but maintaine each in its proper degree, by that meanes to make up an abſolute Monarchy.