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THE Survey of Policy: OR, A FREE VINDICATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF ENGLAND, AGAINST Salmaſius, and other Royalliſts.

And ye have this day rejected your God, and ye have ſaid unto Him, [Nay] but ſet a King over us

1 Sam. 10.19.

I will call unto the Lord, and he ſhall ſend thunder and rain, that ye may perceive and ſee that your wickedneſs is great, which ye have done in the ſight of the Lord, in asking you a King,

1 Sam. 12.17.

And all the People ſaid unto Samuel, we have added unto all our ſins, this evil, to ask us a King,

Ibid. ver. 19.

But if ye ſhall ſtill do wickedly, ye ſhall be conſumed, both ye and your King,

Ibid. ver. 29.

The Lord of hoſts hath purpoſed it, to ſtain the pride of all glory, and to bring into contempt all the honourable of the earth,

Iſa. 23.9.

By PETER ENGLISH, a friend to Freedom.

LEITH, Printed in the Year, 1653. Feb: 2d

TO THE Very Honourable, and truly Godly, the LORD-GENERAL CROMWELL, Greeting.

WHile I was thinking to whom I might dedicat this Book, in which is aſſerted the Authority and Non-uſurpation of the Commonwealth of England, I judged none more fit then him to whoſe patronage I might commit it, who hath moſt promoted the Liberty lately obtained, under the power and protection of the God of Iſrael. And thus, among many, I made choice of your Lordſhip. Albeit I look upon Kingly Govern­ment, as that which is inconſubſiſtent with juſt Freedom and Liberty; nevertheleſs, under what Power and Authority I am, be what it will, I am willing to give unto Caeſar that which is Caeſar's. And therefore I will humbly offer my judgment to your Lordſhip, in this caſe; which I hope will be uſeful to abate the ſeditiouſneſs of ſpirit, to which many (as is at leaſt pretended upon a conſcientious accompt) are bent.

It will not be amiſs to diſtinguiſh between the caſe of Superiority and Inferiority. Now the Word of God will have the inferiour ſubject to the ſuperiour, without any reſiſtance, not only for wrath, but alſo for conſcience-ſake, Rom. 12.1. The higher can never be without the lower, the one neceſſarily pre-ſuppoſing the other. And therefore, that which is lower and inferiour, ought to be ſubject to the higher and ſuperiour. Hence it is Jeſus Chriſt & his Apoſtles, ſubjected themſelves to the great­eſt of tyrants, even to ſuch whoſe title and right depended meetly from the ſword. So then, put me under the Turk's command, I ſhall not diſpute his power. Shew me where Chriſt, or any of his Apoſtles, diſpute the authority of any power they lived under. It is undeniable, they ſpoke and preached againſt all manner of ſin and vice, bearing faithful witneſs againſt it. And thus they witneſſed againſt the ſins of Princes, aſwel as of the People. Howſoever, there is a great difference between a Magi­ſtrate, as a Magiſtrate, and as a man. As a Magiſtrate he cannot fail, but either in tyranny, or in injuſtice, or elſe in bribery. As a man, he is ſub­ject to perſonal infirmities as others ar. I muſt confeſs, the Goſpel wit­neſſeth abundantly againſt all theſe failings. But as I underſtand, the Goſpel doth not allow the inferiour to ſpeak directly, and by way of ap­plication againſt the Magiſtrate, as he faileth in his office. I do not read where Chriſt, or his Apoſtles charged any Ruler with tyranny, injuſtice, or bribery, in the diſcharge of his truſt. Sure I am, there were many un­juſt Judge in their time. I made, that Chriſt called Herod, a Fox: and Paul called Nero, a Lion But the Law could not conclude from hence, that any thing was ſpoken againſt them as Magiſtrates: Becauſe as men, they were〈◊〉to be〈◊〉as Foxes and cruel as Lion. And thus the Law could make no other, but their ſpeaking againſt perſonal taults in the Magiſtrate. And I judge it not unlawful, upon ſome ſerious ac­compts, (though not by all perſons and at all occaſions) to ſpeak againſt the perſonal ſins of the Magiſtrate in a down-right way, as did the Bap­tiſt to Herod. If this will not ſatisfie, then obſerve that Chriſt was not at that time ſubject to Herod, but to Pilate. And may not I ſpeak againſt any tyrannous Magiſtrate, to whoſe Law & Government I am not ſubjected? Yea, againſt the great Turk, though I might not being under his Au­thority. Ny, but I chooſe rather to ſay, (as the ſcope of Chriſt's words inſinuate in oppoſition to the diſdainful bragging of the Phariſees) that Chriſt oppoſeth his divine and kingly power, to Herod's tyranny; upon which accompt he defieth his deſpiaht, as being impoſſible for him to act any thing to ins prejudice, or alteration of his purpoſe. And as for that of Paul. it is not clear what he meaneth by the Lion. Only this much he is pleaſed to be a little free with his dear friend, Timothy. And truly, I may uſe ſo much freedom with my dear friend, as with mine own heart. But what is all this for the ſubject to call the Magiſtrate to his face, A tyrannous and partial Judge granting he be ſo? Shall I therefore, both in private and publick ſpeak what I will (making an ordinary trade of it) againſt his unfaithfulneſs in managing his office? Scripture doth not allow me to think any thing againſt him in my Bed-chamber, Eccleſ. 0.20. [Is it fit] to ſay to a King. [thou] are wicked, [and] to Princes, ye [are] un­godly? Job 34 18. Surely, It is not good to〈◊〉Princes for equty, Pro. 17.26. We muſt not revile the Judges, nor curſe to Ruler of the People, Exod. 22.28. Acts 23.5. And we ſee how that Paul in all his arraignments, ma­keth his conſtant plea that in his preaching the Goſpel he ſpake nothing whether againſt the Magiſtrate, or the Law of the Nation; whereupon many times he eſcaped. Yea, John the Baptiſt doth not diſpute the quar­rel of the Romon Souldiers, but, waving State-matters, exhorteth them to their duty, as is pertinent to a Goſpel-Preacher. Notwithſtanding, I would have it ſeriouſly minded, that I only ſpeak of the duty of the infe­riour toward the ſuperiour: ſo that whatſoever is really and properly inferiour, ought, without diſputing the matter, give due obedience to the ſuperiour not reſiſting the higher power. Now ſay I, every individual ſubject ſeorſim, or any inconſiderable number thereof, is inferiour to the Magiſtrate. And therefore ought not to reſiſt his power. I admire how any perſon or perſons, who are not in a capacity, yea, not ſo much as in a probability of withſtanding the Maſtiſtrat's power, dare adventure to do ſo, (unleſs miraculouſly and extraordinarily aſſiſted as were the Prophets of old) even though, not only to them but alſo revera his power is tyran­nous, and his commands unjuſt. Will any rational man ſay, I ought to reſiſt an hundred high-way Robbers, and not give them that which they ſeek, though unjuſtly? If I did ſo, whatſoever evill befell me in reſiſting, I ſhould be acceſſory to it my ſelf as none in reaſon can deny.

But if it be asked, Whether or not ought the People to reſiſt the Magiſtrate? Say I, The lawfulneſs, or unlawfulneſs of their reſiſting, only dependeth from the nature of the quarrel. It is clear to me (as is fully evinced in the following Treatiſe) not only the whole Power, but alſo any conſide­rable power of the People may vry juſtly reſiſt the Magiſtrate, in main­taining and promoting their own juſt Liberty and freedom: for as the whole Power of the People is ſuperiour, ſo any conſiderable part thereof is not inferiour to the Magiſtrate's power. And thus my judgment lea­deth me no other wales to reſiſt a tyrannous Magiſtrate, but as I am added by Providence to that Body, whoſe Quarrel is not only juſt, but alſo whoſe Power is either ſuperiour to the Magiſtrate's Power, or at leaſt ſo far equal to it as that it is in a capacity of reſiſting it Now, if I either miſtake the Quarrel, or the conſiderable capacity of reſiſting, 'tis my raſhneſs to engage againſt the Ruler, and juſt with God to puniſh my ſeditiouſneſs, though my engaging be upon zealous and conſcientious ac­compts. Let a very Pter be rebuked, though in zeal he ſmile Malchus, not being able to maintain his act of Reſiſtance. As to example, had I a year or two ſince ſpoken or acted againſt the late Parliament, me thinks I had not only done unwiſely (unleſs, as I ſaid before, I had been raiſed up extraordinarily, as were the Prophets of old, in ſpeaking and acting againſt the tyranny of the Magiſtrate) but alſo ſeditiouſly. But now it is high time for me, or any wel-wiſher of the People's Liberty, to ſpeak and act, in our ſeveral employments and vocations, againſt the late Po­wer. As it is time to ſail when tide and wind make, and no ſooner; ſo it is time to engage, and no ſooner, for Freedom and Liberty, when either the People's willingneſs, or a ſtanding Power call for it. Then let every man, according to his ability, (whoſe ambition is to promote juſt Free­dom and Liberty) improve his time, letting no occaſion ſlip, but ſtrike the iron while it is yet hot. Sooner, it is folly; and latter, it is but a bea­ting of the air. And thus let every cordial wel-wiſher of Freedom, walk wiſely, neither going a ſtep before, nor a ſtep behind the willingneſs and power of the People, in promoting the foreſaid Intereſt. The Quarrel of juſt Freedom not arightly timed, is loſt labour, and an untimely birth. This poſſibly will be called Policy rather then Piety. But it matters not if this Policy be true Divinity, as is already ſhewed to be. He is worthy of all commendation, who neither reſiſteth the Ruler's ſuperiority, nor thwarteth, but promoteth the People's Liberty. Thus is he neither rebel­lious nor malignant, but obedient to his ſuperiour during his Command, and faithful to the Intereſt of the People. Let me obey the Tyrant ſo long as he commandeth, but ſide with the People when they oppoſe him.

Beſide what I have ſpoken, (if I may be called to counſel) I would wil­lingly offer ſome of my earneſt wiſhes unto your Lordſhip. O that con­ſtrained maintenance for upholding Prieſts, Chaplains, and Maſters in Univerſities, were at an end! Oh, that all who are able, and willing, to preach the Goſpel, might be encouraged with all due freedom and pro­tection therein, upon all occaſions, and in all convenient places, without moleſtation, whether in private, or in places of publick meeting! All which ſhall come to paſſe, when that is accompliſhed which is foretold, in Iſa. 26.12, 14, 15.

As for annual Repreſentatives, the levelling of the Law, ſubjecting all to it without exception; the diſpoſing ſo of all Rents, Revenues, Forfei­tures, Sequeſtrations, and ſuch like, as that competences may be provi­ded out of them for all that want, they be things too high for me. I on­ly take liberty to ſpeak in order to ſuch things as immediatly relate to the Freedom of Saints, and the Fall of Babylon. As to Religion's Intereſt, every wel-wiſher of Zion may uſe freedom. Howſoever I judge it need­leſs for me to ſpeak any thing of theſe laſt particulars, ſeeing (as I con­ceive) they are already taken into conſideration by all theſe who mind the true and juſt Intereſt of the People. Nay, but (my Lord) J cannot forget, how that one day after another J hear large diſcourſe of Levelling. But though the moſt part be for it, excepting the Rich, (as it was of old in the dayes of Agis and Gracchus) J cannot well learn what is in­tended thereby. Only J do find in it, theſe two things which be either re­dundant or defective, as to the nature of right Levelling. Firſt, ſome un­derſtand no more, but the levelling of the Law. Secondly, others over­turn propriety ſo much, as that they intend no more uſe of the Creation, but here to day, and yonder to morrow. J ſhall not diſpute this caſe at preſent, but only adde ſome few words to what is ſpoken in this matter. As J underſtand, people ſo much the more cheerfully ought to engage to promote their juſt Civil Freedom and Liberty, how much the more the fall of Babylon, and the intereſt of Zion are concerned therein. 'Tis a de­bate to me, to engage for the one, the other not being linked therewith; though ſelf-defence be lawful upon all accompts. Howſoever the Quar­rel of the Lamb is that which J heed moſt. But if your Lordſhip, and others in power, will allow me in this caſe, to remonſtrate to the world, the practice of the Jewiſh, Athenian, Lacedemonian, Roman, and of other ancient and notable Commonwealths, J ſhall be moſt willing to do ſo at command. And J ſhall endeavour to publiſh nothing, but what is accor­ding to the Scriptures, the practice of the chiefeſt Commonwealths, the judgment, yea and practice of the chiefeſt Stateſ-men, Philoſophers, Ora­tors, and Hiſtorians. O! but all of us will be prevented in theſe things, by the ſudden approach of the Ancient of dayes, who being come, will level ſpirits, powers, and eſtates. Till then there will be no more but the beginnings of Liberty, the earneſt of what ſhall be when the Lord alone ſhall be exalted, ſtaining the pride of all Glory, and bringing into con­tempt all the Honourable of the Earth. Yea, as I conceive, it is impoſſible a ſolid and entire Freedom can be eſtabliſhed, till His approach: for then He ſhal judge among the Nations, becoming our Lord, our King and Law-giver, the Law going out of Zion, and the Word of the Lord from Jeruſalem. I reſt ſatisfied in the expectation thereof, not exerciſing my ſelf in great matters, nor in things too high for me. When he cometh, croo­ked things ſhall be made ſtraight, and mountains ſhall be made valleys. The Lord will haſten it in his time.

Laſtly, J would offer my judgment to your Lordſhip, concerning the Power of the People, in chooſing Rulers. J ſhall only hint at this in a word. To me it is clear, that as Nature in the ſtate of fallen-man (un­leſſe all ſhould go to ruin) cannot be without Government, even though all men by Nature be free-born; ſo neither are all capable of governing, nor of chooſing to govern. The Scripture is clear in this, that only ſuch ought to govern, who are men fearing God, and hating Covetouſneſs, Exod. 18.21. Deut. 1.13. Job 34.17, 29, 30. Pſa. 12.8. Eccleſ. 20.16, 17. And thus, uppon a Scripture-accompt, according to the primitive pattern of Judges in the choiceſt of Commonwealths, there be theſe four qualifi­cations neceſſarily required in thoſe that govern, 1. ability, 2. fearing of God, 3. truth, 4. hatred of Covetouſneſs. Whence, according to the primitive and Scripture-mould of Judges, all men are uncapable of go­verning, but ſuch who be ſo and ſo qualified. Now the queſtion is, Who ſhall chooſe ſuch who are endowed with theſe qualifications? In an­ſwer to this J premiſe, this diſtinction. As the Legiſlative power radi­cally, is in the People, ſo by Nature they ought to chooſe their own Go­vernours and Rulers. But Nature being contaminated, all men upon that accompt are not fit to make choice of their Rulers. For all men are either godly, or ungodly. Now, the major part of the People, being ungodly, will, and do chooſe men like themſelves, as experience teacheth, unleſſe upon ſome ſelfiſh accompt they happen now and then, here and there, to chooſe ſome godly perſon or perſons. But the Scripture doth not allow any to rule but the Righteous. And therefore, according to the Word of God, and the dictates of pure Nature godly men, (who are known to be ſuch by their fruits) ſhould be ſearched thorowout all the Tribes of Iſ­rael and appointed Rulers. So did Moſes. And our Moſeſes ought to do ſo too; to which the People in reaſon will be forced to condeſcend, and the rather, when they ſee judgment and righteouſneſs abounding, while the righteous govern. And which is more, in all heatheniſh ancient Commonwealths, in which the Rulers were choſen by the People, the whole multitude therein followed the counſel of ſome few wiſe-men a­mong them. Otherwiſe, the whole matter among them ſhould have tur­ned into confuſion. And is it not known by experience, how that ſome one faction or other doth ſway in all elections? though the free choice of the People be pretended? Now the generality of the People are ſwayed, rather by the diſaffected, then wel-affected party, in al free choice til they be conſtrained to do otherwiſe. Which is a clear demonſtration that they cannot improve their own Intereſt, but are apt to give it up into the hands of ſtrange Lords, and cruel Task-maſters. And therefore all our wiſe and godly Moſeſes, whom the Lord hath impower'd, ought to aſſay all means poſſible, to find out among all the Tribes of Iſrael, able men, ſuch as fear God, men of truth, and hating Covetouſneſs, that they may bear burden with them in the management of affairs. And ſuch of them as be poor there is enough in the world to make them rich. But I do not expect the full accompliſhment of ſuch things, till the Ancient of dayes be come: for I ſee under the ſun the place of judgment, [that] wickedneſs is there; and the place of righteouſneſs, [that] iniquity is there. I ſay in mine heart, God ſhall judge the righteous, and the wicked: for [there is] a time there for every purpoſe, and for every work. Eccleſ. 3.16, 17. Till which time, (hoping all theſe things ſhall be acceptable to your Lordſhip) I remain,

My Lord,
Your Lordſhips undoubted wel-wiſher, and unfeigned ſervant, P. ENGLISH.

To the Very Honourable, Major General Lambert, and the reſt of the Honourable Commiſsioners, for ordering and managing affairs in Scotland. AS ALSO, To the Right Honourable, Colonel R. Lilburne, Commander in chief of the Engliſh Forces in SCOTLAND.

May it pleaſe your Honours,

I Do look upon it as incumbent to me at preſent, to expreſs and manifeſt my thankfulneſs toward you: for not only by your Authority, but alſo upon the accompt of your Mecoenatick gratuity, did this Treatiſe iſſue out to publick view. And not only ſo, but likewiſe it was preffered to me, by you the honourable Commiſſioners, That any charge in this Nation, ſuitable to my capacity ſhould be devoted to my truſt. Which, no queſtion, had been accom­pliſhed, had not your Honours from hence on a ſudden been removed. Ʋpon conſideration of which things. I cannot but thus humbly de­mean my ſelf in tendering my respects to your Honours.

The greateſt reward I either deſire or expect, is, That your Honours would be companions of all ſuch who fear the Lord, being willing to live and die, to ſtand and fall with ſuch by joynt-concurrence, espou­ſing the Quarrel of the Lamb againſt the Beaſt, the falſe-Prophet, the Kings of the earth, and their Armies.

I ſhall crave leave of your Honours to offer my ſingle judgment in order to the right regulating of Law-matters, which I ſuppoſe you will not look upon as matters too high for me, unleſs you ſhould ſo judge of all that I have written in the following Treatiſe. Howſo­ever, I ſhall contribute my mite to the treaſury, in proſecuting theſe following Poſitions.

Poſit. 1. The Law in its ſubſtantials needeth no reformation, being grounded upon the principles of pure Nature.

I ſhall glance a little at the diſcovery of the general and ſubſtan­tial principles of the Law. In general it conſiſteth of a direct and indirect part. The direct part of the Law is, ſecundum allegata & probata. The indirect is, ſecundum allegata & improbata. The direct principles thereof reſolve upon Allegation & Probation, or upon Claim and Inſtruction. Claim is either in order to Movables, or Immovables. In order to immovables, the grounds thereof be heirſhip, diſpoſition, donation, and conqueſt. Heirſhip is, either of Line, or of Conqueſt. Of Line, ſecundum deſcenſum proprium. v. g. as is between father and ſon. And ſecundum deſcenſum accidentalem. v. g. as is between the elder, and younger brother. Of conqueſt, ne ultra unum gradum aſcendat. v. g. Conqueſt being disponed to the third ſon, cannot fall to the firſt. In order to which, the Law doth ſay well, Primogenito Primoginitura, & caeteris Proportio: Juſtitia enim fit, ſecundum pro­portionem. Dispoſition is, either mutual by way of contract, or per­ſonal by way of aſſignation. But ſaith the Law, Ne ulla ſit diſpoſitio in fraudem creditorum. Donation is either abſolute, or conditional. In order to which, ſaith the Law, Volenti non fit, injuria. Conqueſt is, that which is purchaſed by the proper induſtry of the Owner, not being derived from any Predeceſſour. But, Quod Propria virtute ac­quiritur, Propria ac libera voluntate diſponitur. As for the Inſtructi­on of Claim, whether in order to Immovables, or Movables, it muſt be by Evidences, either of Writ, Witneſſes, or Confeſſion. Con­feſſion is, either formal, or virtual. Virtual, aut per ſilentium, aut per abſentiam. Qui tacet, conſentire videtur. Non dormientibus, ſed vigilantibus ſunt jura. All which principles be very conſonant to Nature and ſound Reaſon, as is evident from the very tenor of them. To which all Law-principles, in point of ſuit, may be reduced, as is known to all skilful Lawyers.

Poſit. 2. Intail is a corrupt title of Claim.

For it hath no ground, either in Nature, or in Reaſon, but only in the circuit of a prodigal humour, for perpetuating a Name, which is but graſſe, and the glory thereof, as the flower that fadeth. Thus the perpetuating of the Line in the perſon of the eldeſt ſon, by vouch­ſafing the whole ſubſtance on him, is no leſſe unjuſt then prodigal.

Poſit. 3. Jure divino, upon the accompt of Divine Right, all Pleas ought to be compoſed according to Conſcience and Reaſon, without all reſpect to any Platform of humane Law.

So it was in the Primitive Inſtitution of the Jewiſh Common­wealth. (1) Special care was had to eſtabliſh ſuch Judges in it, as were men of Conſcience and Religion, Exod. 18.22, 25. Deut. 1.13, 15. Who were to judge the People, as did Moſes, making them know the Statutes of GOD, and his Laws, in judging Pleas between one and another, Ex. 18.16. (2) Becauſe as they were to judge no other Judgment but what was GOD's, Deut. 1.17. ſo they were to judge only for the Lord, 2 Chron. 19.6.

Poſit. 4. The Rigour of the Law is great injuſtice, although the Proceſs be ſecundum allegata, & probata.

For, Nimium jus nimia injuria. I might inſtance a hundred caſes, in which the peremptorineſs of the Law is either too intenſe, or too re­miſſe.

Poſit. 5. Though the Law were never ſo juſt in it ſelf, it can never be juſtly executed, a Platform being obſerved, men not being left to their own freedom in judging.

Becauſe a Platform can never be pleaded without Interpreters. Who, I pray, ſhall interpret? Not the Judges: for they cannot both judge, and plead. Hoc opus, hic labor eſt. Not the ignorant Purſuers, and Defenders: for ignoti nulla cupido, far leſs intellectio. There­fore it only remaineth, that skilful Lawyers be employed. And then be ſure, of heavie burdens which they themſelves will not touch with one of their fingers. And thus a Platform's abrogation is the Law's reformation. Otherwiſe it is but verberatio aëris.

Poſit. 6. To day, the only beſt way of eaſing the People of their burdens in point of Suit, is, To remit all Pleas to the Arbitration of Neighbours.

The truth of this doth appear thus: All determination of Pleas of neceſſity is either upon a judicial, or (as I may ſo ſay) arbitral accompt. If upon a judicial accompt, then either according to the dictates of Conſcience and pure Reaſon, or the principles of a Plat­form. The former cannot be to day. Oh! how ſelfiſh are the beſt of men at this time? Though there be both godly and able men to day, yet cannot all places of truſt be filled with ſuch as anſwer the Scrip­ture qualifications of Rulers. Not til the time, Our Officers be, peace, and Exactors, righteouſneſs, the Judges being reſtored, as at the firſt, and Counſellours as at the beginning. And as the former is impoſſible, ſo the other is hurtful: for as Judges qualified, as ſaid is, are rare, and many of them to fil al places of truſt cannot be found, ſo, a Plat­form being eſtabliſhed, ſwarms of Lawyers, the main face-grinders, do abound. It therefore remaineth that Pleas be determined by way of Arbitration among friends. And then be ſure (not one of a hun­dred otherwaies) of little expence, great moderation, and great diſ­patch. Becauſe of the untowardneſs of People, I muſt needs adde ſome Cautions.

Caut. 1. The Purſuer refuſing without all reaſon, friendly to com­pound by way of Arbitration, it will do well, if by an Act be forfeited, toties quoties, ſo much of his ſuit as may daunt him; viz. either one half, or a third part thereof, as may be judged convenient.

Caut. 2. The Defender, upon no good grounds, refuſing to com­pound by way of friendly Arbitration, it will do well, if an Act bind him toties quoties, to forfeit an half, or a third part, more and above what is ſued of him.

Caut. 3. It will do well, if ſome of the godlieſt and ableſt men be appointed and authorized to that end, to attend aPleas, which either cannot, or ſtubborn perſons refuſe to, be compoſed by way of Arbitra­tion, all due execution paſſing upon their Determination, whether as to the deciding of the Plea, or fining of the ſtubborn and refractory perſon.

All which, as I conceive, do ſtand with Reaſon: for as the end of War is Peace, ſo the end of Law is Arbitration. Were all men beaten with the Law abroad, be ſure they would friendly agree at home. And many are forced to do ſo, when they have ſpent their time, wits, and eſtates upon it. So old Clients can, though wantons be ig­norant thereof.

I ſhall not multiply words on this ſubject at preſent, but willingly reſt ſatisfied with what is spoken already, though I might enlarge my ſelf theron, (to which I ſhall be moſt ready, whenſoever called thereto) being nothing but the abridgment of my thoughts in the matter; and hoping the poor man's counſel may deliver the City, ſuppoſing theſe words to be spoken in ſeaſon, the exigent of time calling for the like. I have no more to adde at preſent, but that I am

Your Honours obedient, and humble ſervant, PET. ENGLISH.

To the READER.

THough my broken speech can adde nothing to the worth of this Trea­tiſe; yet I judge it my duty to utter ſome few words concerning it. I know, Truth in all ages hath had many enemies ſome men asking what it is, and ſome contradicting and appoſing. And ſurely that truth which croſſeth most the vanity, glory, and pride of this world, is moſt oppoſed by the men of this world, in whom the Prince of the power of the aworketh. Yea, and any truth which in former ages hath not appeared unto the ſons of light, but hath been under a cloud, (the Sun of Righteouſneſs, in whoſe ſight Saints ſee light, being pleaſed not to make the cloud flee away) is ſeen, and ſcarce clearly ſeen, but by few, who are of the day, and not of the night. Hence is it that many who are light even oppoſe ſuch a truth. No wonder then though the truth ſpoken of here be ſo much oppoſed, ſeing it not only croſſeth the vanity of a vain-glorious age, but alſo hath been ſo long over-clouded. Howſoever it is very neceſſary to be known. Doubteſt thou whether it be lawful for thee to ſubmit to the preſent Government, the Power of the King being in thy apprehenſion abſolute without the bounds of Law; or the Kingly Government being the choiceſt and best. (and ſo not be altered) far better then a Commonwealth; or it being unlawful to re­ſist the King and decline his Authority? Thou ſhalt find theſe things fully and largely cleared from arguments of all ſorts. To the Law, and to the Teſtimony of the Spirit of Truth, that compleat rule, they are brought. In the balance of Reaſon they are weighed. But if that ſhall not ſuffice thee who eyeſt much the examples of Politick Governments, and ſayings of men. Theſe arguments alſo are to be found here. You ſhall find that even certain of your Poets, Kings, Law­makers, Hiſtorians, Orators, Philoſophers have ſaid ſo, as ſaith this Treatiſe. And that this Government is neither new-found out, nor uſurped, nor bad and dangerous; but by example of the firſt and beſt, the oldeſt, ſweeteſt, and moſt to be deſired, and by lawful practiſes of old, far from uſurpation. But if thou ima­gineſt that thou art engaged by the League and Covenant to ſtand for Monarchy; and ſo canſt not take a contrary Engagement. That caſe alſo is anſwered and cleared here. I counſel thee who doubtest, to ſearch whether the things which are laid down in the Treatiſe as truths, be ſo or not. That is Nobility indeed. O! if the ſons of men could learn to be Berean-like, more noble then thoſe of Theſſa­lonica. Shut not thine eyes, ſtop not thine ears at the ſeeing and hearing of things of ſuch uſe and concernment.

But poſſibly (courteous Reader) thou art fully perſwaded in thy mind of the truths ſpoken-of in this Book; and therefore apprehendeſt it to be uſeleſs, or born out of due time. Well, but art thoſo full of knowledge, and ſo clear in the thing, that thou canſt not receive any more. Be not deceived. It may be, thou ſhalt receive greater information therein, if it pleaſeth thee diligently to weigh and conſider Dſt thou engage thy life, eſtate, name, or pains one way or other in defence of that truth which here by arguments is defended, thou ſhalt do well to inform thy ſelf well, and to ſtrengthen thy ſelf with good and ſound grounds, that with the better and cleaner conſcience, or greater courage thou mayeſt go on thy way? Moreover, if the Book had come forth when firſt it was written, thou couldſt not but have ſaid, it had been born in the due time. But hitherto it hath been hindered. Yet I ſuppoſe it is born in a due time, if we look upon the greateſt part of men. And if the ſpirits of men, chiefly of ſuch as know not this truth, were ſo framed as in moderation, impartiality, and ſimplicity to read the Treatiſe, they ſhould rejoyce at the birth thereof, and ſay it is very ſeaſonable: Yea, and find more perhaps in it then in ethers of that ſame nature. They would ſee the adver­ſaries of theſe truths diſcomfited and overthrown by their own weapons in which they ſo much glory; even by Reaſon, the teſtimonies of men, and that of all ſtations and conditions; and example of the moſt refined Policies and Govern­ments. And what obſcurity or obſtruſneſs is in the Book, it is becauſe of ſuch boaſters; whoſe mouthes the Author judged expedient to ſtop with arguments of that kind; and ſo to beat them from that place in which they thought their ſtrength did lie.

I have no more to adde, but do again wiſh that without prejudice, malice, en­vie, hatred, ſelfiſhneſs, in moderation and ſobriety, thou wouldſt peruſe the Treatiſe: and I dare ſay thou ſhouldſt receive more good thereby then poſſibly thou in the leaſt expecteſt. And for thine eaſe I have written the heads of it, as ſo many Aſſertions, or Concluſions. I leave thee, and it, to the diſpoſal of Him who ruleth all things in the Army of Heaven, and among the Inhabitants of the Earth, whoſe Kingdom and Dominion are everlasting, in whoſe hand the hearts of the moſt mighty are, as the rivers of water; and He turneth them whither­ſoever he will. And do remain,

Thy ingenuous wel-wiſher, DAVID PIERSON.

ANAGRAM.MONARCHIE, and DEMOCRACIE, deſcribed under the names of Μοναρχικοσ & Δημοκρατικοσ.

deſirous of reigning;
an Aſſe, and the upper part of an Aſſe-mill;
moſt ſtrong;
κριμα, or κρισισ,
He MilſtONe. like weighs-down and grinds the ſtate,
The people poor Aſſe-like enſlaveth, and
He Reigns alone, and Hath an AnCIEnt date.
People Do rule, Electing who command.
MOſt ſtrong and beſt he's, and from Clear debate
Makes Right Appear, and Cauſeth IudgmEnt ſtand.
And if αριστοσ beſt Doth ſignifie,
This is, me thinks, Pure ARISTOCRACIE,


  • SECT. I.
    • THe Power of the King, as it commandeth juſt and lawful things, is abſolute, and in ſuch a notion cannot belaw fully contraveened. pag. 2
    • The King hath not a Power above Law, and a Prerogative Royal to dispoſe upon things ac­cording to his pleaſure, whether with, or againſt Law and Reaſon. p. 6
      • SUBSECT. 1.
        • The Jewiſh Sanhedrin had power over the Kings of Iſrael, and Judah. p. 11
        • Becauſe of extraordinary Heroiciſm and gallantry of old, ſome were of a ſimply vaſt and abſolute power, and in nothing ſubject to Law. 29
        • The firſt erecters of Kingdoms, and planters of Colonies were of an abſolute power, altogether unſubject to Law. 34
        • Perſonal endowments and extraordinary gifts have drawn-on People to devolve an abſolute and full power, without all re­ſervation, upon ſome men. 40
        • Conquering Kings in old were of an abſolute power. 47
        • Ʋſurping and tyrannous Kings in old had an abſolute power. 47
        • Except for ſome of theſe cauſes, there was never any King ſo abſolute, but his power one way or other, according to Law, was reſtricted. Ibid.
      • SUBSECT. 2.
        • The wicked Kings of the Jews had an arbitrary power both over Religion, and the People of GOD. 120
        • The tyrannous and uſurping Kings of the Jews, in all proba­bility had an arbitrary power over the Republick. Ibid.
        • The good Kings of the Jews, becauſe of perſonal endowments, had exemption and immunity from Law. 121
        • The Kings of the Jews, de jure, had no arbitrary and uncir­cumſcribed power. 125
  • SECT. II.
    • Royal Power, ectypically, is the choiceſt of Governments. 135
    • Monarchy,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is the beſt Government. 136
    • Monarchy, demotically, in respect of the dispoſition of people, is the choiceſt Government. Ibid.
    • Kingly Government, conſecutively, in respect of its fruits and conſequences, may be hic & nunc, the beſt of all Governments. 138
    • Regulated and mixed Monarchy, per ſe and in it ſelf, is the ſweeteſt Government. 140
    • Monarchy, conſecutively, in respect of the fruits and effects it may and doth produce, ſimply & abſolutely, is of all Governments moſt dangerous, and leaſt to be deſired. 41
  • SECT. III.
    • Democracy arightly conſtituted, ſimply & abſolutely, is the ſweeteſt Government, and moſt for the good of the People. 152
    • Moſes before the counſel of Jethro, had a Kingly power. 155
    • After the accompliſhment of Jethro's counſel, and the inſtitution of the ſeventy Elders, neither Moſes, nor any of the Judges had a Kingly power. 157
    • No man by Nature, in a formal and antecedent way, is born ſub­ject to Government. 165
    • Nature per accidens and in a ſecondary way, intendeth Govern­ment. 169
  • SECT. IV.
    • It is not lawful to reſiſt the King, as King, nor the Kingly power, as the Kingly power. 171
    • It is lawful and commendable to reſiſt the tyranny of the King, and the abuſe of his power. Ibid.
    • Kingly Government may very lawfully be declined, that one better may be ſet-up. 180
  • SECT. V.
    • We are tied by League and Covenant, to maintain and espouſe Chriſt's intereſt, abſolutely, notwithſtanding any thing may enſue thereupon. Ibid.
    • By no Oath, or Covenant can we be abſolutely tied to espouſe the King's intereſt, and preſerve Monarchy involably. Ibid.




I Beſeech thee judge of me impartially; Do not imagine I ſpeak my mind more freely then is pertinent: Let me tell thee, my freedom is upon a good accompt; I may hold my face toward Heaven, and ſay, what I ſpeak it is from the ſimplicity of my ſpirit: My record is from on high, I do not ſpeak from a by-aſſed prin­ciple, and if I do ſo, ſhall not my Lord try it out? Why, I pray thee, wilt thou ſtumble at my freedome in expreſſing my mind againſt Kingly Government, in behalf of that which is popular? Verily, I deſire thee, not to cleave to my judgment implicitly: Yet would I have thee duly examining without prejudice, what I ſpeak, and embrace that which is good: wilt thou learn ſo much of that which the world cals Scepticiſme, as to ſuspend thy judgment a little, and not ſentence againſt me at the firſt. Be not wedded to thine own opi­nion, but try all things, and hold that which is good. Do thou kind­ly embrace any thing which is of GOD in this Book. I do ingenu­ouſly profeſs, I ſhal forthwith be of thy judgment, if thou ſhew me better grounds, inforcing the contrary of what I maintain: Well, the main ſubject in hand reſolveth upon this Queſtion,

2Whether or not is the Commonwealth of ENGLAND an uſur­ped power?

Theſe Queſtions being put aſide, that follow, it is eaſily anſwered.

  • 1. Whether or not, is the power of the King abſolute?
  • 2. Whether or not, is Royall Government the choiceſt of Go­vernments?
  • 3. Whether or not, is a Commonwealth the beſt of Govern­ments?
  • 4. Whether or not, is it lawfull to reſiſt the Royall Perſon, and decline the Royall Authority?
  • 5. Whether or not, doth the Covenant tye us, to preſerve Mo­narchy inviolably?

Of theſe as followeth.

SECT. I. Whether or not, is the power of the King abſolute?

THe Court-Paraſits, and Nation of Royaliſts, do plead much for an arbitrary and illimited power to the Royall Perſon. But in this matter we do freely offer our judgment.

ASSERT. I. The power of the King, as it commandeth juſt and lawful things, is abſolute, and in ſuch a notion cannot be law­fully contraveened.

It is made good, firſtly, from that which Solomon ſaith, for he doth whatſoever pleaſeth him. Where the word of a King [is, there is] power, and who may ſay unto him, what doſt thou? Eccl. 8. Theſe words by Writers are diverſly expounded. (1.) Some ex­pound them concerning the abſolutenes of the Kings power, whe­ther in things lawfull or unlawfull, good or bad. And in this we find none more willing then Salmaſius the Humaniſt, Defenſ. Reg. cap. 2. (2.) Others again who are no friends to abſolute and un­limited Monarchy, do interpret the words, not de jure, but de facto Regis, i.e. they opinionat, that Solomon doth not ſpeak here of the power of Kings, which according to Law and Reaſon doth belong to them, but concerning the abſolute way of governing, which one way or other, is conferred upon Kings, whether by uſurpation or ty­ranny, or by a voluntary and free ſubjection of the people to an ab­ſolute3 and arbitrary power in the Kingly Perſon. Yet (3.) I do chooſe a way diſtinct from either of theſe. And I expound the words concerning an abſolute power in the King, in things lawfull and honeſt. This I make good from the Contexts. 1. The Preacher ſaith, I [counſell thee] to keep the Kings commandment, and that in regard of the oath of GOD. Now, what power the Holy Ghoſt here giveth to Kings, is ſuch a power, whoſe ordinances he exhort­eth to obey, and that under an obligation, being tyed to obey it by a lawfull oath, the oath of GOD. But we cannot obey the unjuſt Acts and Ordinances of an arbitrary and illimited power. Unleſs you will ſay, that it is lawfull for us to ſin againſt the LORD, and to do the will of man rather then the will of GOD, which is con­trary to that which is ſpoken, Act. 4. and 5. Yea, as afterward is ſhewed, arbitrary Monarchy inveſted with a boundleſſe power, to do both good & evill, is ſinful and unlawfull. And therefore we can­not tye our ſelves by the oath of GOD to maintain it. Sure we are, we can not lawfully ſwear, to maintain and obey a ſinfull and un­lawfull power. Unleſſe you may alſo ſay, that we may lawfully en­gage our ſelves by oath and Covenant, to maintain and obey the ordinance of Satan. 2. He ſpeaketh of ſuch a power which is not for maintaining vice, and allowing that which is evill, but for corre­cting and puniſhing of evill-doers. Be not haſtie to go out of his ſight, (to do knaves who hate the light) ſtand not in an evil thing: Why? for he doth whatſoever pleaſeth him, &c. Would the Holy Ghoſt ſay, ye muſt not dare to do evill, and with draw your ſelves prepoſterouſly from the Kings preſence; for he hath a power con­ferred on him, that cannot be contraveened in executing juſtice on malefactors. And therefore if ye tranſgreſſe, be ſure the King will puniſh you. So then this manifeſtly holdeth out to us, that the Holy Ghoſt ſpeaketh in this place, of ſuch a power in Kings, which exerciſeth good, and performeth that which according to the Law of GOD, is incumbent to the Kingly power to do. But ſure I am, illimited Monarchy, whoſe power is alſo to do evill, can ſpare the malefactour, and puniſh the righteous. The Holy Ghoſt ſpeaketh of a Kingly power, that produceth contrary effects. 3. The Holy Ghoſt ſubjoyneth, Whoſe keepeth the commandment, ſhal feel no evil thing. Then, this muſt be a juſt and lawfull commandment; otherwiſe obedience to it would bring forth death, Rom. 6. But ſure we are, this cannot be ſpoken concerning a boundleſſe and arbitra­ry4 Regall power: for as Solomon here ſpeaketh of the Regall power, ſo he ſpeaketh of the effects thereof, and of our obedience thereto. And as we find, he ſpeaketh onely of good effects; ſo he onely ſpeaketh of an obedience and ſubjection thereto, which ac­cording to the oath of GOD, and in conſcience we are tyed to per­form. But as we cannot lawfully give up our oath of Allegiance to boundleſs and arbitrary Regall power, ſo there is a vaſt diſ-pro­portion between it and the effects of that power which Solomon ſpeaketh of here. Solomon ſpeaketh of a power which only produ­ceth good effects. But arbitrary Monarchy is in a capacity of produ­cing both good and bad effects.

Secondly, we eſtabliſh the point from reaſon it ſelf; the Kingly pow­er, as it produceth good effects, not onely in it ſelf is the Ordinance of GOD, but alſo it executeth the purpoſe of GOD both on good and bad. But as the Ordinance of GOD cannot be contraveened; ſo it is laid on us as a neceſſary duty, to ſubject our ſelves for conſcience ſake to him who executeth the purpoſe of GOD, according to the preſcript of GOD'S wil, Rom. 13. So then, in ſuch caſes as GOD can not be contraveened, no more can the Kingly power be withſtood, but what it enacteth according to equity & reaſon, ſhould abſolute­ly be obeyed. In this ſenſe the Holy Ghoſt commandeth obedience and ſubjection, not onely to Kings, but alſo to all other Rulers, Tit. 3.1. Per. 2. Kings and all Magiſtrats in this ſenſe are called Gods, GOD'S Deputies and Lieutenants upon Earth, Ex. 4. and 22. Pſ. 82. feeders of the LORD'S people, Pſ. 78. the ſhields of the Earth, Pſ. 47. nurſing Fathers of the Church, Iſ. 49, Captains over the LORD'S people, 1. Sam. 9. Their Throne is the Throne of GOD, 1. Chr. 19, their judgment is the judgment of the LORD, 2. Chr. 19. The Land lyeth under great judgment when it wanteth them, Iſ. 3. Who then dare adventure in ſuch reſpects any way to contraveen the Kingly power, and to decline his au­thority? for ſo, there is a divine ſentence in his lips, his mouth tranſgreſſeth not in judgment, his Throne is eſtabliſhed by righte­ouſneſſe, righteous lips are his delight, and he loveth him that ſpeak­eth right, his wrath is as meſſengers of death, but in the light of his countenance is life, and his favour is as a cloud of the latter rain, Prov. 16. In ſuch caſes his wrath is as the roaring of a Lion, but his favour is as dew upon the graſſe; he ſitteth in the Throne of judgment, ſcattering away all evill with his eyes, ſcattering the5 wicked, and bringing the wheel over them: So mercy and truth pre­ſerve him, and his Throne is upholden by mercy; Yea, his fear is as the roaring of a Lyon, ſo that he who provoketh him to anger, ſin­eth againſt his own ſoul, Prov. 19, and 20. Upon theſe grounds, and in theſe reſpects Solomon exhorteth us, to honour the King, Proverb. 24. and not to ſtrike: Princes for equity, Prov. 17. Therefore the Kingly power, as it is in it ſelf, and as it executeth the purpoſe of the juſt LORD of Heaven and Earth, ac­cording to the LORD'S good will and pleaſure, neither his power, nor the juſt Acts thereof, can be any more contraveened, then the power of GOD, and that which he commandeth to be performed: for ſo the King's power is GOD'S power, and what he doth is ac­cording to divine authority. And in theſe notions we hold the King­ly power to be abſolute: for ſo, as his power in ſuch reſpects can not be contraveened, in like manner he may lawfully execute every thing that is good and expedient, with a full and vaſt power, accor­ding to Law and reaſon. So the power of the King of kings is vaſt and abſolute, not becauſe he may do both juſtly and unjuſtly, accor­ding to his pleaſure, but becauſe he may do every thing that ſeem­eth good in his eyes, according to juſtice.

In this ſenſe, I confeſs, Saluſtius his Author ſaith very well, Im­pune quidvis facere; id eſt, Regem eſſe. Indeed, the King may do every thing that is juſt and equitable, according to Law and Reaſon, and deſerveth not to be puniſhed therfore. This is the ſame which Solomon ſaith, Eccl. 8. v. 3. and 4. compared with Prov. 17.26. Albeit we may put ſuch a favorable conſtruction upon theſe words, yet do we doubt much if Saluſtius his Author's meaning be ſuch. Indeed, I take him to be of Ariſtotle's opinion, who ſaith concern­ing the King, 〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Pol. 1. 3. c. 12. The Law alſo ſaith concerning the King, Tanta eſt ejus celſitudo, ut non poſſet ei imponi Lex in Regne ſuo, Curt. in conſol. 65. col. 6. ad F. Petr. Rebuf. notab. 3. repet. L. un. c. Omnia ſunt poſſibilia Regi, Imperator omnia poteſt, Bald. in Sect. F. de no. for. fid. in F. & in 1 Conſtit. C. col. 2. Chaſſ. catal. glor. mun. part 5. conſid. 24. All theſe go no other wayes (ſaith our learned Country-man) but thus, The King can do all things, which by Law he can do, and that holdeth in him, Id poſſumus, quod jure poſſumus. Lex Rex, 9.26. aſſ. 3. This is a6 very quick and noble gloſſe. But for my ſelf, as I judge their mea­ning to be nothing ſuch, ſo I am indifferent, whether it be ſo, or not. No queſtion, there be many who do plead for abſolute and ar­bitrary Monarchy, beſide the Nation of Royalliſts. And thoſe, to whoſe temper abſolute Monarchy doth moſt reliſh, we find, to be attended with theſe qualifications. (1) They are meerly heroick and ambitious. So were the Giants before the Flood, Gen. 6. Be­roſ. Antiq. l. 1. Nimrod after the Flood, Gen. 10. Bern. Antiq. l. 4. and all the reſt of the great Heroes, Ariſt. pol. 3. c. 10. (2) They are meerly tyrannous and cruel. So we find that Pharaoh had an arbitrary power over the People of Iſrael, Exod. 1 and 5. Nebu­chad-nezzar had the like power over his Kingdoms, Dan. 2. and 3. By vertue of Ahaſuerus abſolute power, Haman was licenced to exerciſe tyranny on the People of the Jews, Eſt. 3. We might al­ledge many examples to this purpoſe: But the point is moſt clear in it ſelf: for thoſe who are of a tyrannous diſpoſition can endure no Law, but their will: Otherwiſe, they could never get their ty­ranny exerciſed. (3) Thoſe whom we find chief pleaders for abſo­lute Monarchy, are either concerned therein themſelves, as Alex­ander M. and M. Aurelius, and ſuch like; or elſe Flatterers and Court-Paraſites, as Lyricus Rom. Virgil, and ſuch like. And of this ſort we find none more violent in this matter, than Dr. Fern, Hugo Grotius, Arniſaeus, Spalato, &c. whoſe foot-ſteps, with his ful-ſpeed Salmaſius doth trace. But although men by way of flattery and by-reſpect, may act and plead for arbitrary Monarchy; yet let me tell you, I do not imagin, but they may act and plead for it through ſimple error and deluſion. And ſo I conclude, that Ari­ſtotle, Xiphilin, Saluſt, and the foreſaid Lawyers do much run this way, though they be more moderate in the matter then the reſt. And, as afterward is ſhewed, we find the Talmudick and Rab­binick Writers this way ſomewhat inclining to the lawleſs and arbitrary power of abſolute Monarchy.

Aſſert. 2. The King hath not a power above Law, and a Pre­rogative Royal, to diſpoſe upon things according to his pleaſure, whether with, or againſt Law and Reaſon.

Firſtly, Such an arbitrary and vaſt power is repugnant to the firſt Inſtitution and Scripture-mould of Kings. According to the Holy Ghoſt's way of moulding the King, he is thus qualified. (1) He7 is an Elective King, choſen by the People, in ſubordination to God. Thou ſhalt in any wayes ſet [him] King over thee, whom the LORD thy God ſhall chooſe Deut. 17. (2) A Brother-King. and not a ſtranger-King. [One] from amongst thy Brethren ſhalt thou ſet King over thee: thou mayeſt not ſet a ſtranger over thee, who is not thy Brother. Ibid. (3) He muſt not tyrannize over the People, by Leavying Forces, and by ſtrength of hand, drawing them into Egyptian ſlavery. He ſhall not multiply horſes to himſelf, nor cauſe the People to return to Egypt, to the end that he ſhould multiply horſes: foraſmuch as the LORD hath ſaid unto you, Ye ſhall henceforth return no more that way. Ibid. Theſe words pro­perly, and in their emphatick ſenſe, can import nothing elſe, but a diſcharging of the King by Forces and Armies to tyrannize over his People, that bringing them into bondage, and upon their ruines he may not ſtrengthen himſelf, and multiply his Forces. So the King of Egypt did with the People of Iſrael, whileas they were in Egypt, under his tyrannous yoke. (4) Not a Leacherous King, given to women, for drawing him on into temptation. Neither ſhall he mul­tiply wives to himſelf, that his heart turn not away Ibid. (5) Nor Covetous, given to enrich himſelf, and to build-up his own eſtate upon the ruins of his People. Nether ſhall he greatly multiply to himſelf Silver and Gold. Ibid. (6) But he muſt be a King, acquiring the Scriptures of GOD, meditating on them his whole life-time, thereby learning to fear the LORD, to obſerve his Commandments, and to practiſe them, that he may be hum­ble and lowly, not turning aſide either to the right-hand or to the left. And it ſhall be, when he ſitteth upon the Throne of his King­dom, that he ſhall write him a Copy of this Law in a Book, out of [that which is] before the Prieſts the Levits. And it ſhall be with him, and he ſhall reade therein all the dayes of his life, that he may learn to fear the LORD his God, to keep all the words of this Law, and theſe Statutes, to do them: That his heart be not lifted up above his Brethren, and that he turn not aſide from the Commandment, to the right-hand, or to the left, Ibid. Here­from we draw this Argument:

The power of him is not Arbitrary, and beyond the bounds of Law; whoſe power according to the Law and Word of GOD is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law.

8But the power of the King according to the Law and Word of God, is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law:

Ergo, the Power of the King is not Arbitrary, and beyond the bonnds of Law.

The Major cannot be denyed, unleſſe men will be ſo bold, as to deny a Regulating and ſquaring of their Acts and Inſtitutions ac­cording to the Word and Law of God. Sure I am none will deny it but ſuch as will contradict Scripture it ſelf, and decline it as the rule and pattern of their Actions: The Minor is manifeſt from the Text above Cited.

Barclay the Royalliſt, diſtinguiſheth between the Office and power of the King; and ſo the man endeavoureth to elude our Ar­gument thus: The Office of the King (quoth he) is ſet down Deut. 17. and the King's power is ſpoken of, 1 Sam. 8 where (ſaith he) an Arbitrary power is conferred upon the King, and laid upon his ſhoulders. But this diſtinction ſerveth not for his purpoſe: For either the power of the King is according to the Word and Law of God, or not. If it be, then as the Office of the King is regulated, in like manner his power alſo is kept within the compaſſe of Law: For his Office ſpoken of, Deut. 17. admitteth bounds, and is kept within marches. That which is ſpoken concerning the King, Dent. 17. in terminis doth ſubject the King to Law, and taketh-away Arbitrarines in his Government: So then that which is ſpoken of the King, 1 Sam. 8. doth either contradict that which is ſpoken, Deut. 17. or elſe it giveth him no power and liberty of governing a­bove Law at random. If it be not, then it is not a Divine but a dia­bolick power. Moreover, what the King doth according to his power, either he doth it by vertue of his Office, or contrary to it. If by vertue of his Office, Ergo, the Kingly power cannot be ab­ſolute, unleſſe his Office be alſo abſolute: for ſo the exerciſe of his power dependeth from his Office. In ſuch a caſe he can do nothing according to his power, but what he hath Authority for from his Office: But his Office, Deut. 17 is not abſolute, but Regulated ac­cording to Law. If contrary to it, Ergo, it is not the Kings Office to exerciſe an abſolute power, and conſequently the Kings Autho­rity is not abſolute. Furthermore, either the King, as King, is ab­ſolute, or not. If he be abſolute as King, Ergo, the Royall Office is abſolute: For the King is formally King by vertue of his Royall9 Office. If not abſolute as King, then we gain the point: For ſo it followeth, that the Kingly Government in it-ſelf is not abſolute and illimited; and if the Kingly Government in it-ſelf be not of a vaſt and abſolute extent, we Demand, in what notion the Autho­rity of the King is Arbitrary and illimited? Either ab intrinſcco, i.e. As it is eſſentially a Kingly Authority, or ab extrinſeco, i.e. according to ſome cadent and accident of the Regall Office. If the former, ergo the Office of the King it-ſelf is abſolute, which is not onely repugnant to that, Deut. 17. but alſo to that which Barclay confeſſeth himſelf. If the latter, ergo the King, as King, and accor­ding to his Office is not abſolute: for, quod convenit rei acciden­taliter, ei non convenit formaliter. Then we demand, if the King, as King, be not abſolute, whether, or not, he be abſolute as he is a Judge, or as he is a Man? If as he is a Judge, ergo all Judges no leſſe then Kings, are of an abſolute and Arbitrary power, which Royalliſts themſelves do altogether deny; yea, they make the King eſſentially different from other Judges under this notion, becauſe the Kings power is abſolute, and their's is not. And conſe­quently, ſeing according to the Doctrine of Royalliſts, the King is eſſentially differenced from other Judges as he is abſolute, then no­lint velint, the King, as King, is abſolute. Thus the Gentlemen do contradict themſelves. If as he is a Man, ergo all men, let-be Kings, are of an Arbitrary and boundleſie power; but ſure I am, no Royalliſt will ſay ſo.

Next to Barclay in-ſteppeth Salmaſius on the floor, as one min­ding to cut the knot, if he cannot looſe it: This Gentleman labour­reth (though in vain) to reconcile that of Deut. 17. with that which is ſpoken of the King, 1 Sam. 8. The Iſraelites (ſaith he) did not ſeek from God one King onely, but a change of the government by Judges, and in ſtead of that, they re­quired a Regall Government: But (quoth he) the Prophet to diſſwade them therefrom, propounded to them theſe incommodi­ties which enſue upon the Kingly government; this the Prophet cal­leth jus Regum, which I (quoth he) call the Arbitrary licence, which is granted as a lawfull power to theſe who govern after a Kingly manner. This jus Regum (ſaith he) the Grecians tran­ſlate it〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Whereby is understood a juſt and reaſona­ble way of carry-on matters. And the Jews in this place,10 call it〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉which ſignifieth〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: for the Septuagints tranſlate this Hebrew word ſometimes〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Now this pertaineth to the office of ſome man; and albeit〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉doth differ from〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, yet ſome ſmal difference being between them, the one is taken for the other, Defenſ. Reg. cap. 2.

Anſ. This Gentleman is ſo far from looſing the knot of the dif­ficulty, as that he tieth it a great deal faſter then it was before: And he muſt give me leave to ſay, that he miſtaketh the ſtate of the que­ſtion in hand. The Queſtion is, whether or not that which is ſpo­ken 1 Sam. 8. is repugnant to that which is ſpoken concerning the King, Deut. 17. This Royalliſt denyeth the one place to contradict the other; and he rendereth no other reaſon for it, but becauſe the Prophet 1 Sam. 8. calleth abſoluteneſſe and Arbitrary licence in the Royall Perſon, jus Regum. Now the man eſpyeth not the light­neſſe of his own inference which is this:

The Prophet 1 Sam. 8. calleth Arbitrary power jus Regum:

Ergo that which is ſpoken of the King 1 Sam. 8. is not repug­nant to that which is ſpoken of him, Deut. 17.

Whereas this man ſhould prove the conſequence, he doth nothing but playeth upon the word〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Well, I deſire him to learn this much, in his probation of the Ante­cedent he ſtandeth by that, which maketh the contradiction between theſe places the more apparent. We have ſhewed alrea­dy, and he himſelf doth not deny it, That the holy Ghoſt, Deut. 17. ſubjecteth the King to Law, and diſclaimeth Arbitrary Power in him. And yet this Gentleman will have the holy Ghoſt, to allow and cry-up (1 Sam. 8.) abſolute power in the King. This he not only ſaith, but he alſo endeavoureth to prove from the word〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉as it is tranſlated and taken by ſome, both in Greek and Latine. But I pray you, Friend, what is this, but to prove a con­tradiction upon your ſelf? let it be ſo, that the word〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉is ſo taken, as you will have it, (the contrary whereof we ſhal demon­ſtrate) yet ſhall you never reconcile theſe two places together, but thereby you enforce the more a contradiction between them. and conſequently, according to your way, the conſequence is ſo far from being deducible from the Antecedent, that contrariwiſe it is directly repugnant to it. So then, my Friend, albeit I ſhould grant you all that you would have, yet you have this to prove, That though the11 holy Ghoſt, Deut. 17. crieth down Arbitrary Government in the King, and 1 Sam. 8. proclaimeth it, and alloweth the ſame in the King, yet notwithſtanding the holy Ghoſt doth not contradict Himſelf, and neither of the places is repugnant one to another. Prove this, Et eris mihi magnus Apollo. And whereas you only prove the Antecedent, you do nothing but beat the air, and proceed ab ignorantia elenchi.

Secondly, It is repugnant to the power, which the holy Ghoſt in Scripture hath confered upon inferiour Judges. It is clear from the Book of God, that the Lord inveſteth inferiour Judges with power to execute judgment on all, without reſpect of perſons, and com­mandeth them to do ſo. And conſequently they are inveſted with power, to execute judgment on Kings themſelves. But if the power of the King were abſolute and above Law, then that power which the holy Ghoſt in Scripture conferreth on inferiour Judges, is al­together unlawful, and in vain.

Royalliſts ſtart much at this Argument. They talk much againſt it, and I wot not what. Becauſe Salmaſius ſpeaketh moſt againſt it, we ſhall firſtly begin with him. This man plainly denieth, in­feriour Judges to have any Authoritative power over Kings. But becauſe he is very large upon this matter, and for preventing te­diouſneſs to the Reader, we ſhall therefore handle the whole ſubſtance of that, which he replieth and objecteth againſt this Ar­gument, in a following Sub-ſection.

SUBSECT. 1. Salmaſius his Opinion concerning the Power of Inferiour Judges, examined, and refuted.

THat we may in a methodick and ſquare way, handle his opinion, and conveniently meet with theſe things which he replieth againſt our ſecond Argument, we ſhall lay down his mind in theſe Propoſitions.

Propoſ. 1. The Jewiſh Sanhedrin had no power over the Kings of Iſrael, and Judah.

That he may eſtabliſh this Propoſition, he taketh this way to prove it: Firſtly, The people of Iſrael (ſaith he) did ſeek a King to reign over them, after the manner of the Nations. But all the12 Kings of the Nations in theſe times were abſolute, and not ſub­ject to Law: Ergo. The Propoſition he proveth from 1. Sam. 8. The Aſſumption he taketh for granted, ſaying, that the Aſſyrians, whoſe Monarchy was at that time, when the Iſraelites ſought a King to reign over them, did not reſtrict their Kings within the bounds of Law. Therefore Artabanus Perſa much commendeth that Law, whereby the Perſians enacted, that the King ſhould be honoured as the image of GOD. Plutn vit. Themiſt. And Claudianus ſaith, that they gave alike obedience to cruell and tyrannous Kings. Yea, O­tades calleth Monarchy, that to which every thing is lawful, un­puniſhably. Herodot. lib. 3. Then ſeing the Perſians ſucceeded to the Medes, and the Medes to the Aſſyrians, who reigned at that time when the Iſraelites did ſeek a King to reign over them, it appeareth that as the Perſian Monarchy, ſo likewiſe the Aſſyrian and Median Monarchies, were of an abſolute and arbitrary power. And Homer (who lived, as ſome imagine, about that time when the Iſraelites ſought a King from Samuel to reign over them,) ſaith, that Kings are from Jupiter, and thoſe do reign who get authority from the ſon of Saturn. Whom he alſo calleth〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, divine Kings,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉trained up by Jupiter. Therefore Kings in Homer's time, were not ſubject to Law. Defenſ. Reg. cap. 2. and 5.

Anſ. Both the Propoſitions of this Gentlemans Argument ſeem very ſtrange to us. As for the firſt Propoſition we do not deny it: for the people of Iſrael ſaid to Samuel, Now make us a King to judge us like all the Nations, 1. Sam. 8. But it doth not follow, Ergo, make us an abſolute King, as the Nations about us have. 1. Becauſe Moſes, Deut. 17. by the Spirit of prophecie foretelleth their ſeeking of a King after the manner of the Nations. But it is e­vident, that Moſes there doth onely propheſie of their ſeeking a King after the manner of the Nations, i.e. that as the Nations about had Kings over them, ſo they might have a King over them in like manner: for both Deut. 17. and 1. Sam. 8. the words are general. In neither of theſe it is ſaid, Make us an abſolute king after the maner of the Nations. The words admit a two-fold ſenſe; and ſo they may either ſignifie, As other Nations have Kings, ſo make us a King. This ſenſe we allow; or, as other Nations have abſolute Kings, ſo make us an abſolute King. This ſenſe we deny; And ſo, this is a fallacy, either ab Homonymia, or à figura dictionis. (2.) We may as well13 conclude from theſe words, after the manner of the Nations, that the people of Iſrael did ſeek a non-abſolute and regulated King: for at that time there were King of the Nations, who were regula­ted according to Law. We read, that Priamus was not only with­ſtood by his own ſubjects who did ſteal Helena, but alſo what he did in the matter of Helena's away-taking, was according to the advice and counſell of Senators, whom Paris with his Complices did over-awe, Dict. Cret. de bello Tro. lib. 1. And it is obſervable, that Agamemnon and Palamedes, though the Kings of Kings were ſubjected to Law. So ſtorie Dictys Cretenſis, Dares Phry­gius, Homer and Ariſtotle. Which was at that time, when the Jewes did ſeek a King to reign over them. Yea then the Egyptian Kings were ſubjected to Law. Diod. Sic. Rer. Ant. l. 2. c. 3. And it is alſo evident, that at this time the Athenian Monarchy was not abſolute. So Heraclid. de polit. ΑΘΗΝ. Diod. Sic. lib. 5. c. 5. Moreover, we do not imagine, but there were many other Monar­chies at that time, which were not arbitrary and of an illimited power. We might prove this at length; if it were not both tedious and needleſſe. But Salmaſius himſelf acknowledgeth, that then all the Kingdoms of the Orient were of a limited power, regu­lated κατὰ νόμον. And for proof of this he citeth Ariſtotle, pol. lib. 3. c. 10. and 11. (3.) The people of Iſrael did ſeek a King under very fair pretences. They not only alleaged, that Samuel was unfit becauſe of his years, to govern them, according to Law and reaſon, but alſo they pleaded for a King from the tyrannie of Sa­muel's ſons, and their non-governing according to juſtice and equi­ty. Then tell me, would they ever have ſought a King, that he might govern them according to his pleaſure, whether to tyrannize over them, or not? Thus they ſhould not onely have palpably con­tradicted themſelves, but alſo they ſhould have cut off from themſelves theſe pretences, whereby they urged their pur­poſe in ſeeking a King. (4.) To ſay, that the people of Iſrael did ſeek an abſolute King, is to miltat directly againſt theſe ends which they propounded to Samuel, and ſet before their eyes in ſeeking a King. The ends are three. 1. To judge them. 2. To conduct them. 3. To fight for them, and defend them from their enemies. Theſe three particular ends do abundantly evidence, that they did not ſeek a King to govern them, after the manner of the Nations,12〈1 page duplicate〉13〈1 page duplicate〉14whether according to Law, or contrary to it, but that they ſought a King to govern them, only according to Law and reaſon. I am ſure, the ſecond and third end imply no leſſe. And if you ſay, that the firſt end may take along with it a judging, whether according or contrary to Law, we do eaſily obviat this difficultie. (1.) Becauſe you ſhall not finde in Scripture, where judging is taken for an act of injuſtice and tyrannie. And the Holy Ghoſt in Scripture expound­eth judgment, calling it juſtice, 2. Sam. 8. (2.) Had the people of Iſ­rael ſought a King to judge them, whether according to juſtice or injuſtice, then their arguments whereby they enforced their pur­poſe in ſeeking a King, had been altogether uſeleſſe. Samuel haply might have ſaid to them, I ſee now ye do praevaricate in this mat­ter, your profeſſion is altogether vain, in declaring your ſelves ſen­ſible of my weakneſſe and inability for judging you according to juſtice and equity, and of the corruption and iniquitie of my ſons, in perverting righteous judgment. Away (might Samuel have ſaid) this is nothing but words. Whereas ye ſeek a King to judge you, whether according to Law or not, ye contradict your own pro­feſſion, and give your ſelves the lie to your face. Yea, Salmaſius himſelf doth acknowledge, that they did not ſeek a King to tyran­nize over them, and to rule contrary to Law and reaſon, Def. Reg. c. 2. But mark how the man ſtraight-wayes giveth himſelf the lie: For (ſaith he) they did not deprecat nor abominat an unjuſt King, wicked, violent, ravenous, and ſuch-like as uſe to be among the Nations, though moſt wicked, Ibid. We demand at this Gentle­man, whether or not they did poſitively ſeek ſuch a King as that, to reign over them? If he affirm it, then they ſought a tyrannous King to reign over them. And ſo he belieth himſelf. If he deny it, then it followeth, that in even-down terms they ſought no King but one who would judge them in righteouſneſſe. But this Roy­alliſt will have them poſitively to ſeek an abſolute King to reign o­ver them. Then tell me, how can this agree with theſe preten­ces whereupon they ſought a King, to wit, to reform their Commonwealth, and to baniſh corruption out of Judgment-ſeats? and becauſe Samuel was not able to perform this (as they alled­ged) therefore they ſought a King. But Samuel might have ſaid to them in ſeeking an abſolute King, ye ſeek a remedy worſe then the diſeaſe. Such a King whom ye ſeek, having power to govern15 at randome, according to his pleaſure, will not be a ſit man to re­dreſſe the enormities of your Eſtate. He may well aggravat the burdens under which ye now groan, but he will not leſſen them, and eaſe you of your burden. Be ſure, ye will get few or no good Kings, but ye will have many bad, who having a vaſt power, will make you groan under their yoke. So then (might Samuel have ſaid) ye can no wayes pretend a ſenſe in you of the want of the exerciſe of righteous judgment, and of corruption and enormity in the Judges. Ye ſcorn your ſelves to enforce your purpoſe there­from in ſeeking a King, whenas in ſeeking an abſolute King, ye forthwith give your ſelves the lie, and undermine your own grounds. Again, if poſitively (as is manifeſt from theſe ends above-written) they ſought no King to reign over them, but ſuch who would govern them according to Law and reaſon; then is it more then apparent, that poſitively they ſought a regulated and non-abſolute King to reign over them: for, as governing according to judgment and righteouſneſſe, is done according to Law and rea­ſon, ſo it can never abſolutely be performed, unleſſe the governing power be abſolutely hemmed in by Law, and regulated thereby. Now, the abſolute ends which the Iſraelites did ſet before their eyes in ſeeking a King, do reſolve upon governing according to judgment and righteouſneſſe. And I would fain know of this man, how he can conclude this conſequence,

The people of Iſrael did ſeek a King, to govern them according to judgment and righteouſneſſe:

Ergo, they did ſeek an abſolute King, and did not deprecat the greateſt of tyrants.

Verily the conſequence, at leaſt virtually, is repugnant to the An­tecedent: for, in ſo far as they ſeek a juſt and righteous King, fit to govern them according to Law and reaſon, in as far they abominat an abſolute King, one in a capacity of tyrannizing over them. Thus you ſee, that the people of Iſrael do neither poſitively nor nega­tively, ſeek an unjuſt and tyrannous King to reign over them.

We haſten now to the Aſſumption. And we obſerve, that the man contradicteth himſelf in it: for he ſaith not onely, cap. 5. but alſo cap. 2. that there were many Kings of the Nations at that time ſubject to Law. And for proof of this, he citeth Ariſtotle, Pol. l. 3. c. 10. and II. Diod. Sic. l. 2. But as a man awaking out of16 his wine he recalleth to his memory, what hath eſcaped him, and laboureth to correct it. And ſo he addeth, that though Diodore ſtoricth, that the Kings of Egypt were ſubjected to Law, yet do we never read (ſaith he) that ever any of them was cut-off and beheaded by the inferiour judges. And though Ariſtotle (quoth he) ſaith that all the Oriental Kings did govern〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, yet not withſtanding they did rule with an abſolute power, though more remiſly then did other Kings. Def. reg. c. 5. & 8. Albeit this man doth not admit a plenary and full ſubjection of Kings to Law, yet nevertheleſs he is conſtrained by force of example, to acknow­ledge, that Kings were ſome way or other kept under the power and reverence of Law. And he cannot deny but Diodore ſtorieth of a moſt wonderful ſubjection of the ancient Aegyptian Kings to Law. He telleth us, that they were ſubjected to Law in their eat­ing and drinking, lying and riſing: yea, in preſerving their health they were reſtricted to Law. And which (ſaith he) is more admi­rable, they had not power, to judge, to gather Money together, nor to puniſh anythrough pride or anger, or any other unjuſt cauſe. And yet (ſaith Diodore) they took not this in an evil part, but thought themſelves happy to be ſubjected to Law. I trow, this is far from Salmaſius his cui quod libet licet. He will have the King above Law, not ſubject to any Law. But the Egyptians will have their Kings under the Law, and ſubject to it. And though this immodeſt man doth ſay, That the Egyptians notwithſtanding did not cut-off any of their Kings, yet catcheth he nothing thereby. (1) Becauſe the Egyptian Kings, as Diodore telleth us, were moſt obſervant of the Laws. Therefore he ſaith, Plurimi regum, the greateſt part of their ancient Kings lived blameleſly, and died honou­rably. Rer ant. l. 2. c. 3. But I beleeve that Law cannot ſtrike againſt the innocent. 'Tis iniquity to kill a man, who deſerveth not death. Diodore telleth us of three things, which made the ancient Egypti­an Kings to walk cloſely, and keep themſelves within bounds. Firſtly, their wayes were narrowly hedged-in by Law. Secondly, they were alwaies attended with the Sons of the Noble and Chief-Prieſts, whoſe eyes were alwayes fixed on them. Thirdly, Kings that walked not ſtraightly, as nothing was proclaimed in their life­time to their praiſe, but to their diſcredit; ſo in their death they wanted the honor of ſolemn and ſumptuous burials, which were17 given to good Kings, after their death. The fear of this, hedged-in their wayes, and made them ſtand in awe. (2) We deny not, but Diadore in that ſame place inſinuates, there were many evil ancient Egyptian Kings. Yet we ſay not, tyrannous, as Salmaſius would have it: for we do not think, that though many of their Kings were wicked in themſelves, they got liberty to tyrannize over the People. The Egyptian Laws were more ſtrict then that they would diſpence ſuch a liberty to any of their Kings. Diodore ſaith, they were tied to the Law no leſs then private men. And withal he ſaith, their Judges were moſt impartial, and could not be bought-by, ei­ther by favour or gain. Which maketh us imagine, that they hem­med-in the wayes of the moſt diſſolute King amongſt them, and did not give him liberty to tyrannize over the People. Therefore it is very obſervable that Amaſis getting power in his hands, did ty­rannize over the Egyptians: Whoſe tyranny the Egyptians did tolerate, ſo long (as Diodore ſaith) as they wanted the opportunity of puniſhing him, till Actiſanes King of Ethiopia came down into Egypt. And then (ſaith the ſtory) the Egyptians called to mind old quarrels againſt Amaſis, and falling from him to Actiſanes, they unkinged him, and ſet-up Actiſanes in his room, who governed them moſt gently and amicably. Rer. ant. l. 2. c. 1. (3) Let it be ſo, many of the Egyptian Kings in old did tyrannize over them, and they, notwithſtanding, were not puniſhed, and cut-off by the People and inferiour Judges. What then? That will never conclude their unwillingneſs and unreadineſs to execute judgment on their tyrannous Kings, but that they wanted opportunity and power to do ſuch a thing. So it went (as is ſaid already) with the People and inferiour Judges under Amaſis tyrannous yoke. But ſo ſoon as they got the opportunity, they verified the old Maxim,Quod differtur, non aufertur.Yea, Diadore telleth us. That the People did withſtand the Prieſts and thoſe, who with-held honourable and ſolemn burials from the bad Egyptian Kings in old. Which affordeth us matter to aver, That if the inferiour Judges in Egypt did not execute judgment on their wicked and tyrannous Kings, it was not becauſe they were unready to do ſo, but becauſe the People were refractory thereto. No queſtion, they would much more have withſtood the off-cut­ting of their Kings, then the want of ſolemnities at their death: for18 what is it, I pray you, that draweth People on to act and engage for their Princes, but becauſe they take them up in the notion of half-gods, and far above the reach of ordinary men? Whereupon they conclude, that both their Perſons and Authority are altoge­ther inviolable. They dote ſo much upon them, that they think they ſhould in no terms be reſiſted, far leſs cut-off and puniſhed according to their deſerts. This, daily experience teacheth. There­fore the People of Egypt would far more have withſtood the inſe­riour Judges in cutting-off their Kings, then in denying them ſump­tuous and ſtately burials for their offences. (4) It is eaſie to belearn­ed from Diadore, that the Egyptians eſteemed the want of honou­rable burials to their Kings more then any puniſhment could have been inflicted upon them. Know this, they were a moſt ſuperſtitious People, tainted with a world of blind zeal. And withall (as Dia­dort ſtor eth) the fear of the want of honourable and ſolemn burials provoked their Kings to live circumſpectly, and keep themſelves within bounds. Whereupon we conclude, That both King and People, thought no puniſhment more capitall, and more hurtfull to the King, then the want of an honourable buriall. And ſo the infe­riour Judges imagined, that in with-holding from tyrannous Kings ſumptuous and ſtately burials, they executed more judgment upon them, then if they ſhould have brought them to the Scaffold, and cauſe ſtrike the heads from them. Therefore if Salmaſius ſhall not admit the third Reaſon, (which though it be true in general, yet not in this particular caſe, as is moſt probable, though not demon­ſtrative) he muſt needs confeſs, that the Prators of Egypt, not only in their apprehenſion, but alſo in the up taking both of the King and People, acted more againſt ſome tyrannous King or other, in depriving him of an honourable and ſumptuous buriall after his death, then the Repreſentative of England did in bringing King Charle: to the Scaffold, and cauſing his head to be cut-off.

As for that which Salmeſius ſaith, alledging that Ariſtotle ſaith, that the Oriental Kings in old did not ſimply govern〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ac­cording to Law. Well, let it be ſo. If they were any wayes ſub­jected to Law, as Ariſtotle in even-down terms confeſſeth they were, it is far from Salmaſius his cui quod libet licet. Qui legi­bus ſolutus ect. Yea, and (which is more) Ariſtotle ſaith, That the very government of the Heroes was〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, according to Law,19 and in ſome things their power was determinat, and not abſolute. This is far from Salmaſius his mind, who will have the King to be of an infinit and illimited power. The man would have a care, that he do not ſpeak blaſphemy and knoweth not of it. I take infinacy in power to be only proper to GOD. And 'tis not good to abuſe it, in applying it to the creature. Howſoever, I heartily ſubſcribe to what Ariſtotle ſaith concerning the Orientall Kings. I do not think but in old, as namely, in, and about the dayes of the Heroës, Kings, as Gods, were adored by men. But Salmaſius muſt give me leave to ſay, that even then Kings were puniſhed by the People. We read how the heroick Theſeus was baniſhed by the Athenians. Val. Max. l. 5. c. 3. Diod. Sic. rer. ant. l. 5. c. 5. Plut. in Theſ. I do not deny, but as theſe Hiſtoriographers report, as likewiſe Hera­clid de Pol. Ath. Theſeus before that time had reſtored liberty to the Subject, and had put Power in the People's hand. It is alſo reported, that Agamemnon the King of Kings, was thruſt from his Charge, becauſe he would not ſuffer his eldeſt Daughter to be fa­crificed to ſatisfie the fury of Diana, for the Roe which he killed feeding about her grove. Dict. Cret. l. 1. That of Theſeus, and of Agamemnon were done about the time the Children of Iſrael did ſeek a king to reign over them. We might alſo here alledge exam­ples of other ancient kings, who were brought into ſubjection to the ſentence of inferiour Judges. But we paſs them as not beſeeming the purpoſe in hand: for they are relative to after ages, of latter years then what Ariſtotle ſpeaketh of. Yet we find one example or two more then what we have alledged already, anſwering to this purpoſe. It is reported that Sardanapalus, becauſe of his beaſtlineſs and ſenſuality, was dethroned by his Subjects. Ariſt. Pol. l. 5. c. 10, Metaſth. an. Perſ. lib. Juſt. l. 1. Diod. Sic. l. 3. c. 7. Miltiades was incarcerated by the Athenians, and died in priſon. Val. Max. l. 5. c. 3. Aemil. Prob. in vit. Milt. Plut. in vit. Cim. Albeit he was not the Athenian king, yet was he their great Generall, and crow­ned king of Cherſoneſus. Herod. l. 6. Aem. Prob. in vit. Mil. It is needleſs to exampliſie this any more; for afterward it ſhall be ſhewed by multiplied examples, how that kings in all ages have been brought to the Stage, and puniſhed by the People.

Therefore Salmaſius ſhall do well, not to imagine, that in old times all Kings were abſolute, and the inferiour Judge did not ſit20 upon the Bench againſt any of them. And for my ſelf, I do not de­ny, but in old, Kings were of a vaſt and abſolute power, though I cannot be moved to think that either all of them were abſolute, or any of them ſo abſolute as Salmaſius dreameth of. But more of this afterward. And, I do alſo think, that the Aſſyrian Mo­narchy, coeteris paribus, was in it-ſelf rather more, then leſſe ab­ſolute, then either the Median, or the Perſian; though by ſome accidental occurrents, as afterward ſhall appear, it was not. In­deed it had the firſt ſtart of them, and was in the time wherein Royal Power was more in requeſt then either before or after. This makes Aeſchylus to call the king of the Argives,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉a governour that may not be judged. at this time the Inachides did reign: whoſe kingdom began about the reign of Baleus, the eight king of the Aſſyrians. Herod. lib. 1. Diod. Sic. rer. ant. lib. 6. cap. 14. compared with Beroſ. ant. lib. 5. ARAL VII. BAL. VIII. MAM XVI. SPAR. XVII, and Xenoph. de aquiv. PHOR. And as for Homer, I do not doubt but the man idolized Kings. But in the interim you will be pleaſed to give me leave to ſay, that it follows not: Homer calleth kings, Divine, and ſuch who are edu­cated and brought-up by Jupiter: Ergo Homer opinionateth, that they were abſolute and ſubjected to none but to GOD. He tel­leth us, that Agamemnon, in a convention of the general Perſons of the Army, was greatly upbraided. Iliad. 9. And yet he calleth him, a king begotten of Jupiter, and trained-up by him. And, it is very well known, that Agamemnon was not an abſolute King over the Grecian Princes: for both Dict. Cret. lib. 1. and Dar. Phr. de exc. Tro. lib. report, that Agamemnon was put from his Office, and Palamedes choſen in his room. See alſo Ariſt. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10. I ſtand not here to diſpute at what time Homer lived, but leave it arbitrary to the Reader, either to follow Archil. lib. de temp. who ſaith, that he lived in his time, an. D. after the deſtruction of Troy. Or Herod. de vit. Hom. who ſaith, that he lived, CLXVIII after the Trojan battel. Yet one thing I may determine on, that Homer calieth thoſe kings of the nations, who lived about the time where­in the People of Iſrael did ſeek a king to reign over them,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And whatever be Homer's meaning in theſe words, yet I am not of another opinion, but do think that he was much, if not all the way for abſolute Monarchy. The temper of his21 times did lead him that far on. But though I ſubſcribe to this, yet wil it never therefrom follow, that all the Kings of the Nations at that time, when the People of Iſrael did ſeek a King to reign over them, were abſolute & not ſubject to law. This we have made good already.

Secondly: Whileas Samuel taught the Jews, of what temper kingly-government is, leſt afterward they ſhould pretend ignorance of the power and right of the king, he plainly declareth unto them, That he might do any thing, without fear of puniſhment, not ſubject to any but to GOD. Salmaſ. def. reg. cap. 5. Friend, this is rather ſaid, then proved. But afterward, nolis, velis, we ſhall evidence, That Samuel thought no ſuch thing.

Thirdly: If Kings had been ſubjected to the Sanhedrin, and ought to have been arraigned before it, either to have been accuſed or condemned, then had there been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of the Jewes. But the latter is falſe: Ergo. This is Salmaſius his great gun. And for proof of the Major he faith, The Judges of the people of Iſrael did judge, led forth their Armies, made Lawes, executed judgement, and did exerciſe all o­ther ſuch-like functions which are exerciſed by Kings. Therefore unleſſe the Kings of the Jewes had been unliable to the Sanhedrin, there had been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of Iſrael. The Aſſumption he maketh it good thus. It had been altogether in vain (ſaith he) to have changed the government of the Judges into the government of Kings, if they had been both one. Thus the difference had onely been in name, and not in reality, Def. Reg. cap. 5. But the man cap. 2. proveth the Aſſumption more largely and moſt pertinently. There (ſaith he) the Judges amongſt the people of the Jews were ſubject to the Sanhedrin. And ſo he ſaith, the Judges amongſt the Jews were called in the Hebrew〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉sophetim. Whence the Paenans derive the word Sufetes. Now, the Judges in the Senat of Carthage were called Sufetes. And Feſtus ob­ſerveth, that Sufetes in the Punick language ſignifieth and denotat­eth a Conſul. And out of Caelidus he citeth theſe words: Senatus cen­ſuit referentibus Sufetis. So the Roman Conſuls referred to the Senat, and the Senat judged of their refer. Therefore ſeing the Judges of Iſrael were but like Conſuls who were ſubject to the Senat (as the caſe was amongſt the Carthaginians and Romans,)22 they were not of a kingly power, but ſubject to the Sanhedrin, though they retained the government ſo long as they lived, whereas the Roman Conſuls, and Carthaginian Sufetes, were only but yearly Magiſtrates. And this is further cleared from the Holy Ghoſt's contradiſtinguiſhing, Judg. 9. the government of Abimelech, (who took upon him a kingly government) from the government of the reſt of the Judges. Yea, the Iſraelites, Judg. 8. offered to Gideon that ſame power over them, which his ſon Abimelech uſurped. This was a kingly government that they offered to him. Which Gideon refuſed. And yet nevertheleſſe he was a Judge. And conſequently if both Judges and Kings amongſt the people of Iſrael had one and the ſame power, not onely the people of Iſrael had offered to Gideon, no new power, but what he had before, but alſo Gideon had refuſed to enjoy that power which actually he did enjoy.

Anſ. We heartily ſubſcribe to the Minor, and do much cry-up Salmaſius in the probation thereof. I wiſh the man were as ſo­lid and pertinent in all the reſt, as in that. Yet I crave his leave to deny the Major. And I think, I have good reaſon to do ſo: for he only differenceth abſolute Kings from Judges, imagining that none properly can be a King eſſenitally diſtinct from a judge, but he who is abſolute and unlyable to the Law. He far miſtaketh the point. It is one thing to be an abſolute King, not ſubject to the Sanhedrin and Senat, and another thing to be a non-abſolute King and ſubject to Law. And yet both are properly and univocally Kinge. The non­abſolute King is eſſentially differenced from the Sophet or Sufet, the Judge, becauſe he is major ſingulis, but minor univerſis in ſyuedrie. But the Judge is but of equal authority with the reſt of his collegues in the Senat, though becauſe of his eminencie and perſonall endow­ments, he may praeſide and be as a leading man amongſt the reſt. Such was the caſe of the kings and Judges amongſt the Jewes, as after ward ſhall be ſhewed. There are ſome accidentall differences alſo between the Judges amongſt the people of the Jewes and their kings, as namely, 1. The Judges were in a moſt ſpeciall, immediat, and extraordinary manner, deſigned and appointed by GOD himſelf, to govern his people. Kings were not ſo, if we look to them in an ordinary way, and for the moſt part. 2. The Judges of Iſrael had no hereditary power and government over them. Such had their kings. 3. The kings of Iſrael both in their ordination and after­ward,23 were attended with prodigall, ſumptuous and Royall Digni­ties, which were denied to their Judges. And whereas Salmaſi­us eſſentially diſtinguiſheth Melech a king, from Sophet a Judge, becauſe the one is of an abſolute power, and the other is not, he ſhal do well to advert, that he loſe not more this way then he gaineth: for ſo he putteth the eſſentiall frame of the king in an abſolute and uncircumſcribed power. But in our firſt argument againſt this, we have ſhewed the incongruity and abſurdity thereof. Which after­ward ſhall more appear from what is ſpoken, as followeth.

Fourthly: There can be no example alledged in the Book of God, whereby is pointed-out the ſubjection of Kings to Law. We read not, that ever the Sanhedrin, or the people of the Jews did puniſh Kings for their faults. And yet many of their Kings were moſt guilty of many great and criminall faults, as namely David and Solomon. Def. Reg. cap. 5.

Anſ. This argument is like the firſt. Both of them ſpeak much de facto, but nothing de jure. This is a very bad conſequence: The people of Iſrael ſought an abſolute King to reign over them, and did ſet-up ſuch a King over them: Ergo the power of an abſolute King is lawfull, and Kings de jure are not ſubject to Law. Friend, you break-off too ſoon. Though I ſhould grant you the Antece­dent, yet before I can approve the validity of the conſequence, you muſt prove the validity of their practice. You count your reckoning too ſoon, whileas you thus conclude: There is no practice in Scrip­ture holding-out to us that the Jewiſh Sanhedrin did ever execute judgement, on any of their Kings, who tranſgreſſed the Law, and did violate it: Ergo Kings are not ſubject to Law. What if I ſhould grant the Antecedent? You have notwithſtanding to prove the lawfulneſſe of their non-executing judgement on their kings who tranſgreſſed, before I can at any time ſubſcribe to the conſequence. Philoſophs know (though many Humaniſts do not) that à facto adjus non ſtatim valet conſequentia, Aye, they can tell you, that argumentum negativum nihil concludit. Well, as I deny your con­ſequence, ſo I do not admit your Antecedent. I illuſtrate the vani­ty of it from examples in Scripture, both ordinary and extraordina­ry. Ordinary] Jehojadah in the face of the Aſſembly commanded to fall upon Athaliah, and kill her, 2 Kings 11.2 Chron. 23. And though you ſhall deny this practice as concluding any thing againſt24 your purpoſe, yet I pray you, what can you ſay of that practice in killing Amaſiah? We have ſhewed elſewhere, that ſuch a thing was done in a Publick and legall way. Extraordinary] The Pro­phets rebuked the Kings of Iſrael and Judah for their faults and tranſgreſſions. And what is rebuke but a degree of puniſhment? And ſo Kings not having immunity from the leſſer degree of puniſh­ment, why are they not alſo lyable to the greater, according to their delinquency? Magis & minus non variant ſpeciem. Yea, Jehu executing the purpoſe of the Lord on the houſe of Ahab, ſlew both the King of Iſrael and the King of Judah, 2 King. 9. and withall he cauſed cut-off all the ſons of Ahab, 2 King. 10. O, but you will ſay, Theſe practiſes of the Prophets and of Jehu were extraordina­ry. And then; It is a very bad Argument: The Apoſtles preached by the extraordinary inſtinct of the Spirit: Ergo Miniſters, who have nothing but an ordinary ſpirit, ſhould not preach. So, it doth not follow: The Prophets and Jehu acted againſt delinquent kings through an extraordinary call thereto: Ergo thoſe, who have nothing but an ordinary call thereto, ſhould not do ſo. It may be you will ſay, The People can have no ordinary call, to act againſt their kings. Be not miſtaken. (1) Extraordinary things ſupply the room of ordinary things, whileas they are wanting. So Sa­muel killed Agag, becauſe Saul, the ordinary Judge, was want­ing in his duty. 1 Sam. 15. (2) At leaſt it followeth, that the ſame thing, which is done extraordinarily, may alſo be done lawfully in an ordinary way. Otherwiſe many abſurdities and blaſphemies ſhould follow. (3) Datounoppoſitorum datur & alterum. And conſequently ſeing there is an extraordinary call for puniſhing Kings, there is alſo an ordinary call for doing it. The reaſon of this is, becauſe eſſe extraordinarioe vocationis is ſo called, and is ſo in it-ſelf, becauſe it ſtandeth in oppoſition to eſſe ordina­ria vocationis, as we have ſhewed at length, curſ. Philoſophico­theolog. diſp. 4. Sect. 6. And therefore there can be no extraordinary call for puniſhing Delinquent Kings, unleſſe there be alſo an ordi­nary call for doing ſo. (4) Puniſhing of delinquent Kings either in it-ſelf is ſinfull and unlawfull, or not. If ſinfull and unlawfull, then neither ordinarily, nor extraordinarily may Kings lawfully be pu­niſhed: for no ſin can be committed by an extraordinary Divine pro­vidence. Otherwiſe God ſhould extraordinarily ſin. But we have25 ſhewed already, that Kings may be puniſhed by vertue of an extra­ordinary call. And conſequently, it is not a ſin in it-ſelf, to puniſh delinquent Kings. If lawfull and unſinfull, I ſee no reaſon why a thing which is in it-ſelf lawfull and honeſt, may not lawfully be done, by ordinary as well as by extraordinary midſes: for either the exerciſe of ordinary midſes is in it ſelf lawfull, or not. None, I am ſure, will ſay, that the exerciſe of ordinary midſes is unlawfull, Otherwiſe every thing that is done ordinarily, is done ſinfully. Which to ſay, is abſurd. And if you ſay that the exerciſe of them in it ſelf is lawfull, then it is lawfull in it ſelf by vertue of an ordina­ry call, to puniſh delinquent Kings. But if there be any fault and eſ­cape in the way and manner of imploying that cal that no whit hin­dereth, but the call in it ſelf is lawfull and commendable: for ſuch things are meerly extrinſecall to the nature of the call it-ſelf. And ab extrinſeco, ad intrinſecum, non eſt ſequela. (5) Jehu and the Prophets, had no other reaſons for them in ſpeaking and acting by vertue of an extraordinary call againſt delinquent Kings, but what thoſe may have in proceeding againſt them, by vertue of an ordina­ry call. They no otherwiſe proceeded againſt them by vertue of their extraordinary call, but as it was for the good of the LORD's People, and for executing Juſtice on their delinquency, that others might learn not to offend. But ſure we are, ſuch grounds are com­petent to an ordinary call, foproceeding againſt delinquent Kings. And 'tis an undoubted maxim, Idem eſt jus, ubi eadem eſt ratio juris.

Iſt. That example concerning Athaliah (ſaith Salmaſius) de­ſerveth not an anſwer: for (ſaith he) ſhe uſurped the kingdom, and killed the whole Royall Family. And ſo there was leſſe exe­cuted againſt her, then ſhe deſerved. And with all according to the Jewiſh Lawes, it was not permitted to women to ſway the Scepter, and ſit on the Throne: for it is not ſaid Deut. 17. Thou ſhalt ſet a Queen over thee, but a King over thee. Def. Reg. cap. 4.

Anſ. That the example concerning Athaliah very much conclu­deth our purpoſe, we argue thus: Either Athaliah had the right and authority of a King, or not. If the had the right and authority of a King, ergo if the King be of an abſolute power, and not ſubject to Law, then Athaliah was no more ſubject to Law then any o­ther King: for as Salmaſius, and all Royalliſts will have it, the26 King is of an abſolute power, and not ſubject to Law. And conſe­quently, Athaliah being inveſted with the right of a Kingly power and authority, ſhe was no more ſubject to Law, then any other of the Kings of Judah. Therefore if you ſay that Athaliah was in­veſted with the right and authority of a King, you muſt either com­mend the practice of Jehojadah and the people in killing her, or elſe you muſt charge your opinion, and not imagine Kings to be abſo­lute, and not ſubject to Law. If ſhe had not the right and authority of a King then either becauſe ſhe uſurped the Kingdom, and in­truded her-ſelf upon it, contrary to the conſent of the People, or becauſe ſhe did cut-off the righteous heirs of the Kingdom, and ſet up her-ſelf in the Kingdom, or elſe becauſe according to the Law women ought not to govern. Not the firſt, because according to the Doctrine of Royalliſts, conqueſt is a lawfull title to the Crown. But Athaliah conquered the Crown of Judah to her-ſelf. What more I pray you, did ſhe in intruding her-ſelf upon the Kingdom of Judah, then unjuſt Conquerers do, in thruſting themſelves in upon the kingdoms which they ſubdue? As ſhe intruded her-ſelf, without the free conſent and election of the People, ſo do they. And yet Salmaſius, with the reſt of his Brethren, will have ſuch Conquerers lawful heirs, and abſolute kings over theſe kingdoms, which they ſubdue. Nor can you ſay the ſecond, becauſe conque­rers, who ſubdue other men's kingdoms, cut-off all thoſe who by pretended blood-right, claim a title to the Crown. And yet Roy­alliſts will have ſuch lawfull heirs, and abſolute kings over theſe kingdoms, to which they have no title but the ſword. Nor can you ſay the third, becauſe all Royalliſts admit Royal birth, a juſt and abſolute title to the Crown. But women no leſs then men may be and are of the Royall Off-ſpring. And conſequently, if the do­ctrine of Royalliſts be true, and unleſs Salmaſius will contradict himſelf, women may as lawfully govern as men: Therefore it doth not follow, that becauſe Athaliah was a woman, ſhe had not right to govern the People of the Jews, and reign over them. I confeſſe, by Royall birth ſhe had no title to the Crown. But ſhe conquered the Crown to her-ſelf, and did reign ſix years with the conſent of the People. But ſure I am, Salmaſius and all the Royalliſts, as they hold the conſent of the People, as a neceſſary ingredient to make­up the lawfulneſs of the title to the Crown, ſo they maintain con­queſt27 without all exception, to be a juſt and lawful title thereto. But what need I thus to ſtand? do not I know that Salmaſius and the whole nation of Royaliſts will have the formall and eſſentiall being of the King to conſiſt in an abſolute and illimited power? But any perſon, whether man or woman, uſurper or non-uſurper, is capable of ſuch a power, and may be inveſted therewith. And conſequently, though Athaliah was but a woman, and an uſurper, it doth not follow, that becauſe ſhe was ſuch, therefore ſhe was not of an abſolute and arbitrary power. The greateſt of Tyrants, and the worſt of women, is capable of ſuch a power. And the power is not changed, becauſe of the change of the perſon, and of ſuch and ſuch qualifications in him. Such things are meerly extrinſecal to the nature of the power it-ſelf. So then, if the King be formally a King, becauſe he is of an illimited and arbitrary power; I ſee no reaſon why Athaliah did not reign as a King: for ſhe was capable of ſuch a power, wherein, according to the doctrine of Royalliſts, the eſſentiall frame of a King doth conſiſt. And conſequently, ſeing ſhe did reign in ſtead of the King of Judah, and exerciſed his authority, there is no reaſon why ſhe was not abſolute and unſub­ject to Law, as well as he. Therefore Salmaſius muſt either leave­off his opinion, and not imagine that the Kings of Judah were ab­ſolute and not ſubject to Law, or elſe he muſt cry-down the lauda­ble practice of Jehojadah, and of the People, in killing Athaliah. For ſhame he will not do this.

Propoſ. 2. Except the Lacoedemonian kingdom, there was no kingdom in old, wherein abſolute and uncircumſcribed Monarchy was not erected, though in ſome more remiſs, and in others more intenſe.

For proof of this Salmaſius ſheweth, what was the condition of Monarchy in the Aſſyrian, Egyptian, Jewiſh, Median, Per­ſian, Grecian, and Roman kingdoms. Of the Jewiſh kingdom we have ſpoken already, and more of it afterward in a more con­venient place. As for the Aſſyrian kingdom,