A SURVEY of POLICY; OR, A Free VANDICATION of the COMMON-VVEALTH of ENGLAND.
PROEME.
I Beſeech thee judge of me impartially; Do not imagine I ſpeak my mind more freely then is pertinent: Let me tell thee, my freedom is upon a good accompt; I may hold my face toward Heaven, and ſay, what I ſpeak it is from the ſimplicity of my ſpirit: My record is from on high, I do not ſpeak from a by-aſſed principle, and if I do ſo, ſhall not my Lord try it out? Why, I pray thee, wilt thou ſtumble at my freedome in expreſſing my mind againſt Kingly Government, in behalf of that which is popular? Verily, I deſire thee, not to cleave to my judgment implicitly: Yet would I have thee duly examining without prejudice, what I ſpeak, and embrace that which is good: wilt thou learn ſo much of that which the world cals Scepticiſme, as to ſuspend thy judgment a little, and not ſentence againſt me at the firſt. Be not wedded to thine own opinion, but try all things, and hold that which is good. Do thou kindly embrace any thing which is of GOD in this Book. I do ingenuouſly profeſs, I ſhal forthwith be of thy judgment, if thou ſhew me better grounds, inforcing the contrary of what I maintain: Well, the main ſubject in hand reſolveth upon this Queſtion,
2Whether or not is the Commonwealth of ENGLAND an uſurped power?
Theſe Queſtions being put aſide, that follow, it is eaſily anſwered.
- 1. Whether or not, is the power of the King abſolute?
- 2. Whether or not, is Royall Government the choiceſt of Governments?
- 3. Whether or not, is a Commonwealth the beſt of Governments?
- 4. Whether or not, is it lawfull to reſiſt the Royall Perſon, and decline the Royall Authority?
- 5. Whether or not, doth the Covenant tye us, to preſerve Monarchy inviolably?
Of theſe as followeth.
SECT. I. Whether or not, is the power of the King abſolute?
THe Court-Paraſits, and Nation of Royaliſts, do plead much for an arbitrary and illimited power to the Royall Perſon. But in this matter we do freely offer our judgment.
ASSERT. I. The power of the King, as it commandeth juſt and lawful things, is abſolute, and in ſuch a notion cannot be lawfully contraveened.
It is made good, firſtly, from that which Solomon ſaith, — for he doth whatſoever pleaſeth him. Where the word of a King [is, there is] power, and who may ſay unto him, what doſt thou? Eccl. 8. Theſe words by Writers are diverſly expounded. (1.) Some expound them concerning the abſolutenes of the Kings power, whether in things lawfull or unlawfull, good or bad. And in this we find none more willing then Salmaſius the Humaniſt, Defenſ. Reg. cap. 2. (2.) Others again who are no friends to abſolute and unlimited Monarchy, do interpret the words, not de jure, but de facto Regis, i.e. they opinionat, that Solomon doth not ſpeak here of the power of Kings, which according to Law and Reaſon doth belong to them, but concerning the abſolute way of governing, which one way or other, is conferred upon Kings, whether by uſurpation or tyranny, or by a voluntary and free ſubjection of the people to an abſolute3 and arbitrary power in the Kingly Perſon. Yet (3.) I do chooſe a way diſtinct from either of theſe. And I expound the words concerning an abſolute power in the King, in things lawfull and honeſt. This I make good from the Contexts. 1. The Preacher ſaith, I [counſell thee] to keep the Kings commandment, and that in regard of the oath of GOD. Now, what power the Holy Ghoſt here giveth to Kings, is ſuch a power, whoſe ordinances he exhorteth to obey, and that under an obligation, being tyed to obey it by a lawfull oath, the oath of GOD. But we cannot obey the unjuſt Acts and Ordinances of an arbitrary and illimited power. Unleſs you will ſay, that it is lawfull for us to ſin againſt the LORD, and to do the will of man rather then the will of GOD, which is contrary to that which is ſpoken, Act. 4. and 5. Yea, as afterward is ſhewed, arbitrary Monarchy inveſted with a boundleſſe power, to do both good & evill, is ſinful and unlawfull. And therefore we cannot tye our ſelves by the oath of GOD to maintain it. Sure we are, we can not lawfully ſwear, to maintain and obey a ſinfull and unlawfull power. Unleſſe you may alſo ſay, that we may lawfully engage our ſelves by oath and Covenant, to maintain and obey the ordinance of Satan. 2. He ſpeaketh of ſuch a power which is not for maintaining vice, and allowing that which is evill, but for correcting and puniſhing of evill-doers. Be not haſtie to go out of his ſight, (to do knaves who hate the light) ſtand not in an evil thing: Why? for he doth whatſoever pleaſeth him, &c. Would the Holy Ghoſt ſay, ye muſt not dare to do evill, and with draw your ſelves prepoſterouſly from the Kings preſence; for he hath a power conferred on him, that cannot be contraveened in executing juſtice on malefactors. And therefore if ye tranſgreſſe, be ſure the King will puniſh you. So then this manifeſtly holdeth out to us, that the Holy Ghoſt ſpeaketh in this place, of ſuch a power in Kings, which exerciſeth good, and performeth that which according to the Law of GOD, is incumbent to the Kingly power to do. But ſure I am, illimited Monarchy, whoſe power is alſo to do evill, can ſpare the malefactour, and puniſh the righteous. The Holy Ghoſt ſpeaketh of a Kingly power, that produceth contrary effects. 3. The Holy Ghoſt ſubjoyneth, Whoſe keepeth the commandment, ſhal feel no evil thing. Then, this muſt be a juſt and lawfull commandment; otherwiſe obedience to it would bring forth death, Rom. 6. But ſure we are, this cannot be ſpoken concerning a boundleſſe and arbitrary4 Regall power: for as Solomon here ſpeaketh of the Regall power, ſo he ſpeaketh of the effects thereof, and of our obedience thereto. And as we find, he ſpeaketh onely of good effects; ſo he onely ſpeaketh of an obedience and ſubjection thereto, which according to the oath of GOD, and in conſcience we are tyed to perform. But as we cannot lawfully give up our oath of Allegiance to boundleſs and arbitrary Regall power, ſo there is a vaſt diſ-proportion between it and the effects of that power which Solomon ſpeaketh of here. Solomon ſpeaketh of a power which only produceth good effects. But arbitrary Monarchy is in a capacity of producing both good and bad effects.
Secondly, we eſtabliſh the point from reaſon it ſelf; the Kingly power, as it produceth good effects, not onely in it ſelf is the Ordinance of GOD, but alſo it executeth the purpoſe of GOD both on good and bad. But as the Ordinance of GOD cannot be contraveened; ſo it is laid on us as a neceſſary duty, to ſubject our ſelves for conſcience ſake to him who executeth the purpoſe of GOD, according to the preſcript of GOD'S wil, Rom. 13. So then, in ſuch caſes as GOD can not be contraveened, no more can the Kingly power be withſtood, but what it enacteth according to equity & reaſon, ſhould abſolutely be obeyed. In this ſenſe the Holy Ghoſt commandeth obedience and ſubjection, not onely to Kings, but alſo to all other Rulers, Tit. 3.1. Per. 2. Kings and all Magiſtrats in this ſenſe are called Gods, GOD'S Deputies and Lieutenants upon Earth, Ex. 4. and 22. Pſ. 82. feeders of the LORD'S people, Pſ. 78. the ſhields of the Earth, Pſ. 47. nurſing Fathers of the Church, Iſ. 49, Captains over the LORD'S people, 1. Sam. 9. Their Throne is the Throne of GOD, 1. Chr. 19, their judgment is the judgment of the LORD, 2. Chr. 19. The Land lyeth under great judgment when it wanteth them, Iſ. 3. Who then dare adventure in ſuch reſpects any way to contraveen the Kingly power, and to decline his authority? for ſo, there is a divine ſentence in his lips, his mouth tranſgreſſeth not in judgment, his Throne is eſtabliſhed by righteouſneſſe, righteous lips are his delight, and he loveth him that ſpeaketh right, his wrath is as meſſengers of death, but in the light of his countenance is life, and his favour is as a cloud of the latter rain, Prov. 16. In ſuch caſes his wrath is as the roaring of a Lion, but his favour is as dew upon the graſſe; he ſitteth in the Throne of judgment, ſcattering away all evill with his eyes, ſcattering the5 wicked, and bringing the wheel over them: So mercy and truth preſerve him, and his Throne is upholden by mercy; Yea, his fear is as the roaring of a Lyon, ſo that he who provoketh him to anger, ſineth againſt his own ſoul, Prov. 19, and 20. Upon theſe grounds, and in theſe reſpects Solomon exhorteth us, to honour the King, Proverb. 24. and not to ſtrike: Princes for equity, Prov. 17. Therefore the Kingly power, as it is in it ſelf, and as it executeth the purpoſe of the juſt LORD of Heaven and Earth, according to the LORD'S good will and pleaſure, neither his power, nor the juſt Acts thereof, can be any more contraveened, then the power of GOD, and that which he commandeth to be performed: for ſo the King's power is GOD'S power, and what he doth is according to divine authority. And in theſe notions we hold the Kingly power to be abſolute: for ſo, as his power in ſuch reſpects can not be contraveened, in like manner he may lawfully execute every thing that is good and expedient, with a full and vaſt power, according to Law and reaſon. So the power of the King of kings is vaſt and abſolute, not becauſe he may do both juſtly and unjuſtly, according to his pleaſure, but becauſe he may do every thing that ſeemeth good in his eyes, according to juſtice.
In this ſenſe, I confeſs, Saluſtius his Author ſaith very well, Impune quidvis facere; id eſt, Regem eſſe. Indeed, the King may do every thing that is juſt and equitable, according to Law and Reaſon, and deſerveth not to be puniſhed therfore. This is the ſame which Solomon ſaith, Eccl. 8. v. 3. and 4. compared with Prov. 17.26. Albeit we may put ſuch a favorable conſtruction upon theſe words, yet do we doubt much if Saluſtius his Author's meaning be ſuch. Indeed, I take him to be of Ariſtotle's opinion, who ſaith concerning the King, —〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉— Pol. 1. 3. c. 12. The Law alſo ſaith concerning the King, — Tanta eſt ejus celſitudo, ut non poſſet ei imponi Lex in Regne ſuo, Curt. in conſol. 65. col. 6. ad F. Petr. Rebuf. notab. 3. repet. L. un. c. Omnia ſunt poſſibilia Regi, Imperator omnia poteſt, Bald. in Sect. F. de no. for. fid. in F. & in 1 Conſtit. C. col. 2. Chaſſ. catal. glor. mun. part 5. conſid. 24. All theſe go no other wayes (ſaith our learned Country-man) but thus, The King can do all things, which by Law he can do, and that holdeth in him, Id poſſumus, quod jure poſſumus. Lex Rex, 9.26. aſſ. 3. This is a6 very quick and noble gloſſe. But for my ſelf, as I judge their meaning to be nothing ſuch, ſo I am indifferent, whether it be ſo, or not. No queſtion, there be many who do plead for abſolute and arbitrary Monarchy, beſide the Nation of Royalliſts. And thoſe, to whoſe temper abſolute Monarchy doth moſt reliſh, we find, to be attended with theſe qualifications. (1) They are meerly heroick and ambitious. So were the Giants before the Flood, Gen. 6. Beroſ. Antiq. l. 1. Nimrod after the Flood, Gen. 10. Bern. Antiq. l. 4. and all the reſt of the great Heroes, Ariſt. pol. 3. c. 10. (2) They are meerly tyrannous and cruel. So we find that Pharaoh had an arbitrary power over the People of Iſrael, Exod. 1 and 5. Nebuchad-nezzar had the like power over his Kingdoms, Dan. 2. and 3. By vertue of Ahaſuerus abſolute power, Haman was licenced to exerciſe tyranny on the People of the Jews, Eſt. 3. We might alledge many examples to this purpoſe: But the point is moſt clear in it ſelf: for thoſe who are of a tyrannous diſpoſition can endure no Law, but their will: Otherwiſe, they could never get their tyranny exerciſed. (3) Thoſe whom we find chief pleaders for abſolute Monarchy, are either concerned therein themſelves, as Alexander M. and M. Aurelius, and ſuch like; or elſe Flatterers and Court-Paraſites, as Lyricus Rom. Virgil, and ſuch like. And of this ſort we find none more violent in this matter, than Dr. Fern, Hugo Grotius, Arniſaeus, Spalato, &c. whoſe foot-ſteps, with his ful-ſpeed Salmaſius doth trace. But although men by way of flattery and by-reſpect, may act and plead for arbitrary Monarchy; yet let me tell you, I do not imagin, but they may act and plead for it through ſimple error and deluſion. And ſo I conclude, that Ariſtotle, Xiphilin, Saluſt, and the foreſaid Lawyers do much run this way, though they be more moderate in the matter then the reſt. And, as afterward is ſhewed, we find the Talmudick and Rabbinick Writers this way ſomewhat inclining to the lawleſs and arbitrary power of abſolute Monarchy.
Aſſert. 2. The King hath not a power above Law, and a Prerogative Royal, to diſpoſe upon things according to his pleaſure, whether with, or againſt Law and Reaſon.
Firſtly, Such an arbitrary and vaſt power is repugnant to the firſt Inſtitution and Scripture-mould of Kings. According to the Holy Ghoſt's way of moulding the King, he is thus qualified. (1) He7 is an Elective King, choſen by the People, in ſubordination to God. Thou ſhalt in any wayes ſet [him] King over thee, whom the LORD thy God ſhall chooſe — Deut. 17. (2) A Brother-King. and not a ſtranger-King. [One] from amongst thy Brethren ſhalt thou ſet King over thee: thou mayeſt not ſet a ſtranger over thee, who is not thy Brother. Ibid. (3) He muſt not tyrannize over the People, by Leavying Forces, and by ſtrength of hand, drawing them into Egyptian ſlavery. — He ſhall not multiply horſes to himſelf, nor cauſe the People to return to Egypt, to the end that he ſhould multiply horſes: foraſmuch as the LORD hath ſaid unto you, Ye ſhall henceforth return no more that way. Ibid. Theſe words properly, and in their emphatick ſenſe, can import nothing elſe, but a diſcharging of the King by Forces and Armies to tyrannize over his People, that bringing them into bondage, and upon their ruines he may not ſtrengthen himſelf, and multiply his Forces. So the King of Egypt did with the People of Iſrael, whileas they were in Egypt, under his tyrannous yoke. (4) Not a Leacherous King, given to women, for drawing him on into temptation. Neither ſhall he multiply wives to himſelf, that his heart turn not away — Ibid. (5) Nor Covetous, given to enrich himſelf, and to build-up his own eſtate upon the ruins of his People. — Nether ſhall he greatly multiply to himſelf Silver and Gold. Ibid. (6) But he muſt be a King, acquiring the Scriptures of GOD, meditating on them his whole life-time, thereby learning to fear the LORD, to obſerve his Commandments, and to practiſe them, that he may be humble and lowly, not turning aſide either to the right-hand or to the left. And it ſhall be, when he ſitteth upon the Throne of his Kingdom, that he ſhall write him a Copy of this Law in a Book, out of [that which is] before the Prieſts the Levits. And it ſhall be with him, and he ſhall reade therein all the dayes of his life, that he may learn to fear the LORD his God, to keep all the words of this Law, and theſe Statutes, to do them: That his heart be not lifted up above his Brethren, and that he turn not aſide from the Commandment, to the right-hand, or to the left, — Ibid. Herefrom we draw this Argument:
The power of him is not Arbitrary, and beyond the bounds of Law; whoſe power according to the Law and Word of GOD is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law.
8But the power of the King according to the Law and Word of God, is Regulated and kept within the bounds of Law:
Ergo, the Power of the King is not Arbitrary, and beyond the bonnds of Law.
The Major cannot be denyed, unleſſe men will be ſo bold, as to deny a Regulating and ſquaring of their Acts and Inſtitutions according to the Word and Law of God. Sure I am none will deny it but ſuch as will contradict Scripture it ſelf, and decline it as the rule and pattern of their Actions: The Minor is manifeſt from the Text above Cited.
Barclay the Royalliſt, diſtinguiſheth between the Office and power of the King; and ſo the man endeavoureth to elude our Argument thus: The Office of the King (quoth he) is ſet down Deut. 17. and the King's power is ſpoken of, 1 Sam. 8 where (ſaith he) an Arbitrary power is conferred upon the King, and laid upon his ſhoulders. But this diſtinction ſerveth not for his purpoſe: For either the power of the King is according to the Word and Law of God, or not. If it be, then as the Office of the King is regulated, in like manner his power alſo is kept within the compaſſe of Law: For his Office ſpoken of, Deut. 17. admitteth bounds, and is kept within marches. That which is ſpoken concerning the King, Dent. 17. in terminis doth ſubject the King to Law, and taketh-away Arbitrarines in his Government: So then that which is ſpoken of the King, 1 Sam. 8. doth either contradict that which is ſpoken, Deut. 17. or elſe it giveth him no power and liberty of governing above Law at random. If it be not, then it is not a Divine but a diabolick power. Moreover, what the King doth according to his power, either he doth it by vertue of his Office, or contrary to it. If by vertue of his Office, Ergo, the Kingly power cannot be abſolute, unleſſe his Office be alſo abſolute: for ſo the exerciſe of his power dependeth from his Office. In ſuch a caſe he can do nothing according to his power, but what he hath Authority for from his Office: But his Office, Deut. 17 is not abſolute, but Regulated according to Law. If contrary to it, Ergo, it is not the Kings Office to exerciſe an abſolute power, and conſequently the Kings Authority is not abſolute. Furthermore, either the King, as King, is abſolute, or not. If he be abſolute as King, Ergo, the Royall Office is abſolute: For the King is formally King by vertue of his Royall9 Office. If not abſolute as King, then we gain the point: For ſo it followeth, that the Kingly Government in it-ſelf is not abſolute and illimited; and if the Kingly Government in it-ſelf be not of a vaſt and abſolute extent, we Demand, in what notion the Authority of the King is Arbitrary and illimited? Either ab intrinſcco, i.e. As it is eſſentially a Kingly Authority, or ab extrinſeco, i.e. according to ſome cadent and accident of the Regall Office. If the former, ergo the Office of the King it-ſelf is abſolute, which is not onely repugnant to that, Deut. 17. but alſo to that which Barclay confeſſeth himſelf. If the latter, ergo the King, as King, and according to his Office is not abſolute: for, quod convenit rei accidentaliter, ei non convenit formaliter. Then we demand, if the King, as King, be not abſolute, whether, or not, he be abſolute as he is a Judge, or as he is a Man? If as he is a Judge, ergo all Judges no leſſe then Kings, are of an abſolute and Arbitrary power, which Royalliſts themſelves do altogether deny; yea, they make the King eſſentially different from other Judges under this notion, becauſe the Kings power is abſolute, and their's is not. And conſequently, ſeing according to the Doctrine of Royalliſts, the King is eſſentially differenced from other Judges as he is abſolute, then nolint velint, the King, as King, is abſolute. Thus the Gentlemen do contradict themſelves. If as he is a Man, ergo all men, let-be Kings, are of an Arbitrary and boundleſie power; but ſure I am, no Royalliſt will ſay ſo.
Next to Barclay in-ſteppeth Salmaſius on the floor, as one minding to cut the knot, if he cannot looſe it: This Gentleman labourreth (though in vain) to reconcile that of Deut. 17. with that which is ſpoken of the King, 1 Sam. 8. The Iſraelites (ſaith he) did not ſeek from God one King onely, but a change of the government by Judges, and in ſtead of that, they required a Regall Government: But (quoth he) the Prophet to diſſwade them therefrom, propounded to them theſe incommodities which enſue upon the Kingly government; this the Prophet calleth jus Regum, which I (quoth he) call the Arbitrary licence, which is granted as a lawfull power to theſe who govern after a Kingly manner. This jus Regum (ſaith he) the Grecians tranſlate it〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Whereby is understood a juſt and reaſonable way of carry-on matters. And the Jews in this place,10 call it〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉which ſignifieth〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: for the Septuagints tranſlate this Hebrew word ſometimes〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Now this pertaineth to the office of ſome man; and albeit〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉doth differ from〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, yet ſome ſmal difference being between them, the one is taken for the other, Defenſ. Reg. cap. 2.
Anſ. This Gentleman is ſo far from looſing the knot of the difficulty, as that he tieth it a great deal faſter then it was before: And he muſt give me leave to ſay, that he miſtaketh the ſtate of the queſtion in hand. The Queſtion is, whether or not that which is ſpoken 1 Sam. 8. is repugnant to that which is ſpoken concerning the King, Deut. 17. This Royalliſt denyeth the one place to contradict the other; and he rendereth no other reaſon for it, but becauſe the Prophet 1 Sam. 8. calleth abſoluteneſſe and Arbitrary licence in the Royall Perſon, jus Regum. Now the man eſpyeth not the lightneſſe of his own inference which is this:
The Prophet 1 Sam. 8. calleth Arbitrary power jus Regum:
Ergo that which is ſpoken of the King 1 Sam. 8. is not repugnant to that which is ſpoken of him, Deut. 17.
Whereas this man ſhould prove the conſequence, he doth nothing but playeth upon the word〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Well, I deſire him to learn this much, in his probation of the Antecedent he ſtandeth by that, which maketh the contradiction between theſe places the more apparent. We have ſhewed already, and he himſelf doth not deny it, That the holy Ghoſt, Deut. 17. ſubjecteth the King to Law, and diſclaimeth Arbitrary Power in him. And yet this Gentleman will have the holy Ghoſt, to allow and cry-up (1 Sam. 8.) abſolute power in the King. This he not only ſaith, but he alſo endeavoureth to prove from the word〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉as it is tranſlated and taken by ſome, both in Greek and Latine. But I pray you, Friend, what is this, but to prove a contradiction upon your ſelf? let it be ſo, that the word〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉is ſo taken, as you will have it, (the contrary whereof we ſhal demonſtrate) yet ſhall you never reconcile theſe two places together, but thereby you enforce the more a contradiction between them. and conſequently, according to your way, the conſequence is ſo far from being deducible from the Antecedent, that contrariwiſe it is directly repugnant to it. So then, my Friend, albeit I ſhould grant you all that you would have, yet you have this to prove, That though the11 holy Ghoſt, Deut. 17. crieth down Arbitrary Government in the King, and 1 Sam. 8. proclaimeth it, and alloweth the ſame in the King, yet notwithſtanding the holy Ghoſt doth not contradict Himſelf, and neither of the places is repugnant one to another. Prove this, Et eris mihi magnus Apollo. And whereas you only prove the Antecedent, you do nothing but beat the air, and proceed ab ignorantia elenchi.
Secondly, It is repugnant to the power, which the holy Ghoſt in Scripture hath confer•ed upon inferiour Judges. It is clear from the Book of God, that the Lord inveſteth inferiour Judges with power to execute judgment on all, without reſpect of perſons, and commandeth them to do ſo. And conſequently they are inveſted with power, to execute judgment on Kings themſelves. But if the power of the King were abſolute and above Law, then that power which the holy Ghoſt in Scripture conferreth on inferiour Judges, is altogether unlawful, and in vain.
Royalliſts ſtart much at this Argument. They talk much againſt it, and I wot not what. Becauſe Salmaſius ſpeaketh moſt againſt it, we ſhall firſtly begin with him. This man plainly denieth, inferiour Judges to have any Authoritative power over Kings. But becauſe he is very large upon this matter, and for preventing tediouſneſs to the Reader, we ſhall therefore handle the whole ſubſtance of that, which he replieth and objecteth againſt this Argument, in a following Sub-ſection.
SUBSECT. 1. Salmaſius his Opinion concerning the Power of Inferiour Judges, examined, and refuted.
THat we may in a methodick and ſquare way, handle his opinion, and conveniently meet with theſe things which he replieth againſt our ſecond Argument, we ſhall lay down his mind in theſe Propoſitions.
Propoſ. 1. The Jewiſh Sanhedrin had no power over the Kings of Iſrael, and Judah.
That he may eſtabliſh this Propoſition, he taketh this way to prove it: Firſtly, The people of Iſrael (ſaith he) did ſeek a King to reign over them, after the manner of the Nations. But all the12 Kings of the Nations in theſe times were abſolute, and not ſubject to Law: Ergo. The Propoſition he proveth from 1. Sam. 8. The Aſſumption he taketh for granted, ſaying, that the Aſſyrians, whoſe Monarchy was at that time, when the Iſraelites ſought a King to reign over them, did not reſtrict their Kings within the bounds of Law. Therefore Artabanus Perſa much commendeth that Law, whereby the Perſians enacted, that the King ſhould be honoured as the image of GOD. Plut•n vit. Themiſt. And Claudianus ſaith, that they gave alike obedience to cruell and tyrannous Kings. Yea, Otades calleth Monarchy, that to which every thing is lawful, unpuniſhably. Herodot. lib. 3. Then ſeing the Perſians ſucceeded to the Medes, and the Medes to the Aſſyrians, who reigned at that time when the Iſraelites did ſeek a King to reign over them, it appeareth that as the Perſian Monarchy, ſo likewiſe the Aſſyrian and Median Monarchies, were of an abſolute and arbitrary power. And Homer (who lived, as ſome imagine, about that time when the Iſraelites ſought a King from Samuel to reign over them,) ſaith, that Kings are from Jupiter, and thoſe do reign who get authority from the ſon of Saturn. Whom he alſo calleth〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, divine Kings,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉trained up by Jupiter. Therefore Kings in Homer's time, were not ſubject to Law. Defenſ. Reg. cap. 2. and 5.
Anſ. Both the Propoſitions of this Gentlemans Argument ſeem very ſtrange to us. As for the firſt Propoſition we do not deny it: for the people of Iſrael ſaid to Samuel, — Now make us a King to judge us like all the Nations, 1. Sam. 8. But it doth not follow, Ergo, make us an abſolute King, as the Nations about us have. 1. Becauſe Moſes, Deut. 17. by the Spirit of prophecie foretelleth their ſeeking of a King after the manner of the Nations. But it is evident, that Moſes there doth onely propheſie of their ſeeking a King after the manner of the Nations, i.e. that as the Nations about had Kings over them, ſo they might have a King over them in like manner: for both Deut. 17. and 1. Sam. 8. the words are general. In neither of theſe it is ſaid, Make us an abſolute king after the maner of the Nations. The words admit a two-fold ſenſe; and ſo they may either ſignifie, As other Nations have Kings, ſo make us a King. This ſenſe we allow; or, as other Nations have abſolute Kings, ſo make us an abſolute King. This ſenſe we deny; And ſo, this is a fallacy, either ab Homonymia, or à figura dictionis. (2.) We may as well13 conclude from theſe words, after the manner of the Nations, that the people of Iſrael did ſeek a non-abſolute and regulated King: for at that time there were King of the Nations, who were regulated according to Law. We read, that Priamus was not only withſtood by his own ſubjects who did ſteal Helena, but alſo what he did in the matter of Helena's away-taking, was according to the advice and counſell of Senators, whom Paris with his Complices did over-awe, Dict. Cret. de bello Tro. lib. 1. And it is obſervable, that Agamemnon and Palamedes, though the Kings of Kings were ſubjected to Law. So ſtorie Dictys Cretenſis, Dares Phrygius, Homer and Ariſtotle. Which was at that time, when the Jewes did ſeek a King to reign over them. Yea then the Egyptian Kings were ſubjected to Law. Diod. Sic. Rer. Ant. l. 2. c. 3. And it is alſo evident, that at this time the Athenian Monarchy was not abſolute. So Heraclid. de polit. ΑΘΗΝ. Diod. Sic. lib. 5. c. 5. Moreover, we do not imagine, but there were many other Monarchies at that time, which were not arbitrary and of an illimited power. We might prove this at length; if it were not both tedious and needleſſe. But Salmaſius himſelf acknowledgeth, that then all the Kingdoms of the Orient were of a limited power, regulated κατὰ νόμον. And for proof of this he citeth Ariſtotle, pol. lib. 3. c. 10. and 11. (3.) The people of Iſrael did ſeek a King under very fair pretences. They not only alleaged, that Samuel was unfit becauſe of his years, to govern them, according to Law and reaſon, but alſo they pleaded for a King from the tyrannie of Samuel's ſons, and their non-governing according to juſtice and equity. Then tell me, would they ever have ſought a King, that he might govern them according to his pleaſure, whether to tyrannize over them, or not? Thus they ſhould not onely have palpably contradicted themſelves, but alſo they ſhould have cut off from themſelves theſe pretences, whereby they urged their purpoſe in ſeeking a King. (4.) To ſay, that the people of Iſrael did ſeek an abſolute King, is to mil•tat directly againſt theſe ends which they propounded to Samuel, and ſet before their eyes in ſeeking a King. The ends are three. 1. To judge them. 2. To conduct them. 3. To fight for them, and defend them from their enemies. Theſe three particular ends do abundantly evidence, that they did not ſeek a King to govern them, after the manner of the Nations,12〈1 page duplicate〉13〈1 page duplicate〉14whether according to Law, or contrary to it, but that they ſought a King to govern them, only according to Law and reaſon. I am ſure, the ſecond and third end imply no leſſe. And if you ſay, that the firſt end may take along with it a judging, whether according or contrary to Law, we do eaſily obviat this difficultie. (1.) Becauſe you ſhall not finde in Scripture, where judging is taken for an act of injuſtice and tyrannie. And the Holy Ghoſt in Scripture expoundeth judgment, calling it juſtice, 2. Sam. 8. (2.) Had the people of Iſrael ſought a King to judge them, whether according to juſtice or injuſtice, then their arguments whereby they enforced their purpoſe in ſeeking a King, had been altogether uſeleſſe. Samuel haply might have ſaid to them, I ſee now ye do praevaricate in this matter, your profeſſion is altogether vain, in declaring your ſelves ſenſible of my weakneſſe and inability for judging you according to juſtice and equity, and of the corruption and iniquitie of my ſons, in perverting righteous judgment. Away (might Samuel have ſaid) this is nothing but words. Whereas ye ſeek a King to judge you, whether according to Law or not, ye contradict your own profeſſion, and give your ſelves the lie to your face. Yea, Salmaſius himſelf doth acknowledge, that they did not ſeek a King to tyrannize over them, and to rule contrary to Law and reaſon, Def. Reg. c. 2. But mark how the man ſtraight-wayes giveth himſelf the lie: For (ſaith he) they did not deprecat nor abominat an unjuſt King, wicked, violent, ravenous, and ſuch-like as uſe to be among the Nations, though moſt wicked, Ibid. We demand at this Gentleman, whether or not they did poſitively ſeek ſuch a King as that, to reign over them? If he affirm it, then they ſought a tyrannous King to reign over them. And ſo he belieth himſelf. If he deny it, then it followeth, that in even-down terms they ſought no King but one who would judge them in righteouſneſſe. But this Royalliſt will have them poſitively to ſeek an abſolute King to reign over them. Then tell me, how can this agree with theſe pretences whereupon they ſought a King, to wit, to reform their Commonwealth, and to baniſh corruption out of Judgment-ſeats? and becauſe Samuel was not able to perform this (as they alledged) therefore they ſought a King. But Samuel might have ſaid to them in ſeeking an abſolute King, ye ſeek a remedy worſe then the diſeaſe. Such a King whom ye ſeek, having power to govern15 at randome, according to his pleaſure, will not be a ſit man to redreſſe the enormities of your Eſtate. He may well aggravat the burdens under which ye now groan, but he will not leſſen them, and eaſe you of your burden. Be ſure, ye will get few or no good Kings, but ye will have many bad, who having a vaſt power, will make you groan under their yoke. So then (might Samuel have ſaid) ye can no wayes pretend a ſenſe in you of the want of the exerciſe of righteous judgment, and of corruption and enormity in the Judges. Ye ſcorn your ſelves to enforce your purpoſe therefrom in ſeeking a King, whenas in ſeeking an abſolute King, ye forthwith give your ſelves the lie, and undermine your own grounds. Again, if poſitively (as is manifeſt from theſe ends above-written) they ſought no King to reign over them, but ſuch who would govern them according to Law and reaſon; then is it more then apparent, that poſitively they ſought a regulated and non-abſolute King to reign over them: for, as governing according to judgment and righteouſneſſe, is done according to Law and reaſon, ſo it can never abſolutely be performed, unleſſe the governing power be abſolutely hemmed in by Law, and regulated thereby. Now, the abſolute ends which the Iſraelites did ſet before their eyes in ſeeking a King, do reſolve upon governing according to judgment and righteouſneſſe. And I would fain know of this man, how he can conclude this conſequence,
The people of Iſrael did ſeek a King, to govern them according to judgment and righteouſneſſe:
Ergo, they did ſeek an abſolute King, and did not deprecat the greateſt of tyrants.
Verily the conſequence, at leaſt virtually, is repugnant to the Antecedent: for, in ſo far as they ſeek a juſt and righteous King, fit to govern them according to Law and reaſon, in as far they abominat an abſolute King, one in a capacity of tyrannizing over them. Thus you ſee, that the people of Iſrael do neither poſitively nor negatively, ſeek an unjuſt and tyrannous King to reign over them.
We haſten now to the Aſſumption. And we obſerve, that the man contradicteth himſelf in it: for he ſaith not onely, cap. 5. but alſo cap. 2. that there were many Kings of the Nations at that time ſubject to Law. And for proof of this, he citeth Ariſtotle, Pol. l. 3. c. 10. and II. Diod. Sic. l. 2. But as a man awaking out of16 his wine he recalleth to his memory, what hath eſcaped him, and laboureth to correct it. And ſo he addeth, that though Diodore ſtoricth, that the Kings of Egypt were ſubjected to Law, yet do we never read (ſaith he) that ever any of them was cut-off and beheaded by the inferiour judges. And though Ariſtotle (quoth he) ſaith that all the Oriental Kings did govern〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, yet not withſtanding they did rule with an abſolute power, though more remiſly then did other Kings. Def. reg. c. 5. & 8. Albeit this man doth not admit a plenary and full ſubjection of Kings to Law, yet nevertheleſs he is conſtrained by force of example, to acknowledge, that Kings were ſome way or other kept under the power and reverence of Law. And he cannot deny but Diodore ſtorieth of a moſt wonderful ſubjection of the ancient Aegyptian Kings to Law. He telleth us, that they were ſubjected to Law in their eating and drinking, lying and riſing: yea, in preſerving their health they were reſtricted to Law. And which (ſaith he) is more admirable, they had not power, to judge, to gather Money together, nor to puniſh anythrough pride or anger, or any other unjuſt cauſe. And yet (ſaith Diodore) they took not this in an evil part, but thought themſelves happy to be ſubjected to Law. I trow, this is far from Salmaſius his cui quod libet licet. He will have the King above Law, not ſubject to any Law. But the Egyptians will have their Kings under the Law, and ſubject to it. And though this immodeſt man doth ſay, That the Egyptians notwithſtanding did not cut-off any of their Kings, yet catcheth he nothing thereby. (1) Becauſe the Egyptian Kings, as Diodore telleth us, were moſt obſervant of the Laws. Therefore he ſaith, Plurimi regum, the greateſt part of their ancient Kings lived blameleſly, and died honourably. Rer ant. l. 2. c. 3. But I beleeve that Law cannot ſtrike againſt the innocent. 'Tis iniquity to kill a man, who deſerveth not death. Diodore telleth us of three things, which made the ancient Egyptian Kings to walk cloſely, and keep themſelves within bounds. Firſtly, their wayes were narrowly hedged-in by Law. Secondly, they were alwaies attended with the Sons of the Noble and Chief-Prieſts, whoſe eyes were alwayes fixed on them. Thirdly, Kings that walked not ſtraightly, as nothing was proclaimed in their lifetime to their praiſe, but to their diſcredit; ſo in their death they wanted the honor of ſolemn and ſumptuous burials, which were17 given to good Kings, after their death. The fear of this, hedged-in their wayes, and made them ſtand in awe. (2) We deny not, but Diadore in that ſame place inſinuates, there were many evil ancient Egyptian Kings. Yet we ſay not, tyrannous, as Salmaſius would have it: for we do not think, that though many of their Kings were wicked in themſelves, they got liberty to tyrannize over the People. The Egyptian Laws were more ſtrict then that they would diſpence ſuch a liberty to any of their Kings. Diodore ſaith, they were tied to the Law no leſs then private men. And withal he ſaith, their Judges were moſt impartial, and could not be bought-by, either by favour or gain. Which maketh us imagine, that they hemmed-in the wayes of the moſt diſſolute King amongſt them, and did not give him liberty to tyrannize over the People. Therefore it is very obſervable that Amaſis getting power in his hands, did tyrannize over the Egyptians: Whoſe tyranny the Egyptians did tolerate, ſo long (as Diodore ſaith) as they wanted the opportunity of puniſhing him, till Actiſanes King of Ethiopia came down into Egypt. And then (ſaith the ſtory) the Egyptians called to mind old quarrels againſt Amaſis, and falling from him to Actiſanes, they unkinged him, and ſet-up Actiſanes in his room, who governed them moſt gently and amicably. Rer. ant. l. 2. c. 1. (3) Let it be ſo, many of the Egyptian Kings in old did tyrannize over them, and they, notwithſtanding, were not puniſhed, and cut-off by the People and inferiour Judges. What then? That will never conclude their unwillingneſs and unreadineſs to execute judgment on their tyrannous Kings, but that they wanted opportunity and power to do ſuch a thing. So it went (as is ſaid already) with the People and inferiour Judges under Amaſis tyrannous yoke. But ſo ſoon as they got the opportunity, they verified the old Maxim,Quod differtur, non aufertur.Yea, Diadore telleth us. That the People did withſtand the Prieſts and thoſe, who with-held honourable and ſolemn burials from the bad Egyptian Kings in old. Which affordeth us matter to aver, That if the inferiour Judges in Egypt did not execute judgment on their wicked and tyrannous Kings, it was not becauſe they were unready to do ſo, but becauſe the People were refractory thereto. No queſtion, they would much more have withſtood the off-cutting of their Kings, then the want of ſolemnities at their death: for18 what is it, I pray you, that draweth People on to act and engage for their Princes, but becauſe they take them up in the notion of half-gods, and far above the reach of ordinary men? Whereupon they conclude, that both their Perſons and Authority are altogether inviolable. They dote ſo much upon them, that they think they ſhould in no terms be reſiſted, far leſs cut-off and puniſhed according to their deſerts. This, daily experience teacheth. Therefore the People of Egypt would far more have withſtood the inſeriour Judges in cutting-off their Kings, then in denying them ſumptuous and ſtately burials for their offences. (4) It is eaſie to belearned from Diadore, that the Egyptians eſteemed the want of honourable burials to their Kings more then any puniſhment could have been inflicted upon them. Know this, they were a moſt ſuperſtitious People, tainted with a world of blind zeal. And withall (as Diadort ſtor eth) the fear of the want of honourable and ſolemn burials provoked their Kings to live circumſpectly, and keep themſelves within bounds. Whereupon we conclude, That both King and People, thought no puniſhment more capitall, and more hurtfull to the King, then the want of an honourable buriall. And ſo the inferiour Judges imagined, that in with-holding from tyrannous Kings ſumptuous and ſtately burials, they executed more judgment upon them, then if they ſhould have brought them to the Scaffold, and cauſe ſtrike the heads from them. Therefore if Salmaſius ſhall not admit the third Reaſon, (which though it be true in general, yet not in this particular caſe, as is moſt probable, though not demonſtrative) he muſt needs confeſs, that the Prators of Egypt, not only in their apprehenſion, but alſo in the up taking both of the King and People, acted more againſt ſome tyrannous King or other, in depriving him of an honourable and ſumptuous buriall after his death, then the Repreſentative of England did in bringing King Charle: to the Scaffold, and cauſing his head to be cut-off.
As for that which Salmeſius ſaith, alledging that Ariſtotle ſaith, that the Oriental Kings in old did not ſimply govern〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, according to Law. Well, let it be ſo. If they were any wayes ſubjected to Law, as Ariſtotle in even-down terms confeſſeth they were, it is far from Salmaſius his cui quod libet licet. Qui legibus ſolutus ect. Yea, and (which is more) Ariſtotle ſaith, That the very government of the Heroes was〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, according to Law,19 and in ſome things their power was determinat, and not abſolute. This is far from Salmaſius his mind, who will have the King to be of an infinit and illimited power. The man would have a care, that he do not ſpeak blaſphemy and knoweth not of it. I take infinacy in power to be only proper to GOD. And 'tis not good to abuſe it, in applying it to the creature. Howſoever, I heartily ſubſcribe to what Ariſtotle ſaith concerning the Orientall Kings. I do not think but in old, as namely, in, and about the dayes of the Heroës, Kings, as Gods, were adored by men. But Salmaſius muſt give me leave to ſay, that even then Kings were puniſhed by the People. We read how the heroick Theſeus was baniſhed by the Athenians. Val. Max. l. 5. c. 3. Diod. Sic. rer. ant. l. 5. c. 5. Plut. in Theſ. I do not deny, but as theſe Hiſtoriographers report, as likewiſe Heraclid de Pol. Ath. Theſeus before that time had reſtored liberty to the Subject, and had put Power in the People's hand. It is alſo reported, that Agamemnon the King of Kings, was thruſt from his Charge, becauſe he would not ſuffer his eldeſt Daughter to be facrificed to ſatisfie the fury of Diana, for the Roe which he killed feeding about her grove. Dict. Cret. l. 1. That of Theſeus, and of Agamemnon were done about the time the Children of Iſrael did ſeek a king to reign over them. We might alſo here alledge examples of other ancient kings, who were brought into ſubjection to the ſentence of inferiour Judges. But we paſs them as not beſeeming the purpoſe in hand: for they are relative to after ages, of latter years then what Ariſtotle ſpeaketh of. Yet we find one example or two more then what we have alledged already, anſwering to this purpoſe. It is reported that Sardanapalus, becauſe of his beaſtlineſs and ſenſuality, was dethroned by his Subjects. Ariſt. Pol. l. 5. c. 10, Metaſth. an. Perſ. lib. Juſt. l. 1. Diod. Sic. l. 3. c. 7. Miltiades was incarcerated by the Athenians, and died in priſon. Val. Max. l. 5. c. 3. Aemil. Prob. in vit. Milt. Plut. in vit. Cim. Albeit he was not the Athenian king, yet was he their great Generall, and crowned king of Cherſoneſus. Herod. l. 6. Aem. Prob. in vit. Mil. It is needleſs to exampliſie this any more; for afterward it ſhall be ſhewed by multiplied examples, how that kings in all ages have been brought to the Stage, and puniſhed by the People.
Therefore Salmaſius ſhall do well, not to imagine, that in old times all Kings were abſolute, and the inferiour Judge did not ſit20 upon the Bench againſt any of them. And for my ſelf, I do not deny, but in old, Kings were of a vaſt and abſolute power, though I cannot be moved to think that either all of them were abſolute, or any of them ſo abſolute as Salmaſius dreameth of. But more of this afterward. And, I do alſo think, that the Aſſyrian Monarchy, coeteris paribus, was in it-ſelf rather more, then leſſe abſolute, then either the Median, or the Perſian; though by ſome accidental occurrents, as afterward ſhall appear, it was not. Indeed it had the firſt ſtart of them, and was in the time wherein Royal Power was more in requeſt then either before or after. This makes Aeſchylus to call the king of the Argives,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉a governour that may not be judged. at this time the Inachides did reign: whoſe kingdom began about the reign of Baleus, the eight king of the Aſſyrians. Herod. lib. 1. Diod. Sic. rer. ant. lib. 6. cap. 14. compared with Beroſ. ant. lib. 5. ARAL VII. BAL. VIII. MAM XVI. SPAR. XVII, and Xenoph. de aquiv. PHOR. And as for Homer, I do not doubt but the man idolized Kings. But in the interim you will be pleaſed to give me leave to ſay, that it follows not: Homer calleth kings, Divine, and ſuch who are educated and brought-up by Jupiter: Ergo Homer opinionateth, that they were abſolute and ſubjected to none but to GOD. He telleth us, that Agamemnon, in a convention of the general Perſons of the Army, was greatly upbraided. Iliad. 9. And yet he calleth him, a king begotten of Jupiter, and trained-up by him. And, it is very well known, that Agamemnon was not an abſolute King over the Grecian Princes: for both Dict. Cret. lib. 1. and Dar. Phr. de exc. Tro. lib. report, that Agamemnon was put from his Office, and Palamedes choſen in his room. See alſo Ariſt. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10. I ſtand not here to diſpute at what time Homer lived, but leave it arbitrary to the Reader, either to follow Archil. lib. de temp. who ſaith, that he lived in his time, an. D. after the deſtruction of Troy. Or Herod. de vit. Hom. who ſaith, that he lived, CLXVIII after the Trojan battel. Yet one thing I may determine on, that Homer calieth thoſe kings of the nations, who lived about the time wherein the People of Iſrael did ſeek a king to reign over them,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And whatever be Homer's meaning in theſe words, yet I am not of another opinion, but do think that he was much, if not all the way for abſolute Monarchy. The temper of his21 times did lead him that far on. But though I ſubſcribe to this, yet wil it never therefrom follow, that all the Kings of the Nations at that time, when the People of Iſrael did ſeek a King to reign over them, were abſolute & not ſubject to law. This we have made good already.
Secondly: Whileas Samuel taught the Jews, of what temper kingly-government is, leſt afterward they ſhould pretend ignorance of the power and right of the king, he plainly declareth unto them, That he might do any thing, without fear of puniſhment, not ſubject to any but to GOD. Salmaſ. def. reg. cap. 5. Friend, this is rather ſaid, then proved. But afterward, nolis, velis, we ſhall evidence, That Samuel thought no ſuch thing.
Thirdly: If Kings had been ſubjected to the Sanhedrin, and ought to have been arraigned before it, either to have been accuſed or condemned, then had there been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of the Jewes. But the latter is falſe: Ergo. This is Salmaſius his great gun. And for proof of the Major he faith, The Judges of the people of Iſrael did judge, led forth their Armies, made Lawes, executed judgement, and did exerciſe all other ſuch-like functions which are exerciſed by Kings. Therefore unleſſe the Kings of the Jewes had been unliable to the Sanhedrin, there had been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of Iſrael. The Aſſumption he maketh it good thus. It had been altogether in vain (ſaith he) to have changed the government of the Judges into the government of Kings, if they had been both one. Thus the difference had onely been in name, and not in reality, Def. Reg. cap. 5. But the man cap. 2. proveth the Aſſumption more largely and moſt pertinently. There (ſaith he) the Judges amongſt the people of the Jews were ſubject to the Sanhedrin. And ſo he ſaith, the Judges amongſt the Jews were called in the Hebrew〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉sophetim. Whence the Paenans derive the word Sufetes. Now, the Judges in the Senat of Carthage were called Sufetes. And Feſtus obſerveth, that Sufetes in the Punick language ſignifieth and denotateth a Conſul. And out of Caelidus he citeth theſe words: Senatus cenſuit referentibus Sufetis. So the Roman Conſuls referred to the Senat, and the Senat judged of their refer. Therefore ſeing the Judges of Iſrael were but like Conſuls who were ſubject to the Senat (as the caſe was amongſt the Carthaginians and Romans,)22 they were not of a kingly power, but ſubject to the Sanhedrin, though they retained the government ſo long as they lived, whereas the Roman Conſuls, and Carthaginian Sufetes, were only but yearly Magiſtrates. And this is further cleared from the Holy Ghoſt's contradiſtinguiſhing, Judg. 9. the government of Abimelech, (who took upon him a kingly government) from the government of the reſt of the Judges. Yea, the Iſraelites, Judg. 8. offered to Gideon that ſame power over them, which his ſon Abimelech uſurped. This was a kingly government that they offered to him. Which Gideon refuſed. And yet nevertheleſſe he was a Judge. And conſequently if both Judges and Kings amongſt the people of Iſrael had one and the ſame power, not onely the people of Iſrael had offered to Gideon, no new power, but what he had before, but alſo Gideon had refuſed to enjoy that power which actually he did enjoy.
Anſ. We heartily ſubſcribe to the Minor, and do much cry-up Salmaſius in the probation thereof. I wiſh the man were as ſolid and pertinent in all the reſt, as in that. Yet I crave his leave to deny the Major. And I think, I have good reaſon to do ſo: for he only differenceth abſolute Kings from Judges, imagining that none properly can be a King eſſenitally diſtinct from a judge, but he who is abſolute and unlyable to the Law. He far miſtaketh the point. It is one thing to be an abſolute King, not ſubject to the Sanhedrin and Senat, and another thing to be a non-abſolute King and ſubject to Law. And yet both are properly and univocally Kinge. The nonabſolute King is eſſentially differenced from the Sophet or Sufet, the Judge, becauſe he is major ſingulis, but minor univerſis in ſyuedrie. But the Judge is but of equal authority with the reſt of his collegues in the Senat, though becauſe of his eminencie and perſonall endowments, he may praeſide and be as a leading man amongſt the reſt. Such was the caſe of the kings and Judges amongſt the Jewes, as after ward ſhall be ſhewed. There are ſome accidentall differences alſo between the Judges amongſt the people of the Jewes and their kings, as namely, 1. The Judges were in a moſt ſpeciall, immediat, and extraordinary manner, deſigned and appointed by GOD himſelf, to govern his people. Kings were not ſo, if we look to them in an ordinary way, and for the moſt part. 2. The Judges of Iſrael had no hereditary power and government over them. Such had their kings. 3. The kings of Iſrael both in their ordination and afterward,23 were attended with prodigall, ſumptuous and Royall Dignities, which were denied to their Judges. And whereas Salmaſius eſſentially diſtinguiſheth Melech a king, from Sophet a Judge, becauſe the one is of an abſolute power, and the other is not, he ſhal do well to advert, that he loſe not more this way then he gaineth: for ſo he putteth the eſſentiall frame of the king in an abſolute and uncircumſcribed power. But in our firſt argument againſt this, we have ſhewed the incongruity and abſurdity thereof. Which afterward ſhall more appear from what is ſpoken, as followeth.
Fourthly: There can be no example alledged in the Book of God, whereby is pointed-out the ſubjection of Kings to Law. We read not, that ever the Sanhedrin, or the people of the Jews did puniſh Kings for their faults. And yet many of their Kings were moſt guilty of many great and criminall faults, as namely David and Solomon. Def. Reg. cap. 5.
Anſ. This argument is like the firſt. Both of them ſpeak much de facto, but nothing de jure. This is a very bad conſequence: The people of Iſrael ſought an abſolute King to reign over them, and did ſet-up ſuch a King over them: Ergo the power of an abſolute King is lawfull, and Kings de jure are not ſubject to Law. Friend, you break-off too ſoon. Though I ſhould grant you the Antecedent, yet before I can approve the validity of the conſequence, you muſt prove the validity of their practice. You count your reckoning too ſoon, whileas you thus conclude: There is no practice in Scripture holding-out to us that the Jewiſh Sanhedrin did ever execute judgement, on any of their Kings, who tranſgreſſed the Law, and did violate it: Ergo Kings are not ſubject to Law. What if I ſhould grant the Antecedent? You have notwithſtanding to prove the lawfulneſſe of their non-executing judgement on their kings who tranſgreſſed, before I can at any time ſubſcribe to the conſequence. Philoſophs know (though many Humaniſts do not) that à facto adjus non ſtatim valet conſequentia, Aye, they can tell you, that argumentum negativum nihil concludit. Well, as I deny your conſequence, ſo I do not admit your Antecedent. I illuſtrate the vanity of it from examples in Scripture, both ordinary and extraordinary. Ordinary] Jehojadah in the face of the Aſſembly commanded to fall upon Athaliah, and kill her, 2 Kings 11.2 Chron. 23. And though you ſhall deny this practice as concluding any thing againſt24 your purpoſe, yet I pray you, what can you ſay of that practice in killing Amaſiah? We have ſhewed elſewhere, that ſuch a thing was done in a Publick and legall way. Extraordinary] The Prophets rebuked the Kings of Iſrael and Judah for their faults and tranſgreſſions. And what is rebuke but a degree of puniſhment? And ſo Kings not having immunity from the leſſer degree of puniſhment, why are they not alſo lyable to the greater, according to their delinquency? Magis & minus non variant ſpeciem. Yea, Jehu executing the purpoſe of the Lord on the houſe of Ahab, ſlew both the King of Iſrael and the King of Judah, 2 King. 9. and withall he cauſed cut-off all the ſons of Ahab, 2 King. 10. O, but you will ſay, Theſe practiſes of the Prophets and of Jehu were extraordinary. And then; It is a very bad Argument: The Apoſtles preached by the extraordinary inſtinct of the Spirit: Ergo Miniſters, who have nothing but an ordinary ſpirit, ſhould not preach. So, it doth not follow: The Prophets and Jehu acted againſt delinquent kings through an extraordinary call thereto: Ergo thoſe, who have nothing but an ordinary call thereto, ſhould not do ſo. It may be you will ſay, The People can have no ordinary call, to act againſt their kings. Be not miſtaken. (1) Extraordinary things ſupply the room of ordinary things, whileas they are wanting. So Samuel killed Agag, becauſe Saul, the ordinary Judge, was wanting in his duty. 1 Sam. 15. (2) At leaſt it followeth, that the ſame thing, which is done extraordinarily, may alſo be done lawfully in an ordinary way. Otherwiſe many abſurdities and blaſphemies ſhould follow. (3) Datoun•oppoſitorum datur & alterum. And conſequently ſeing there is an extraordinary call for puniſhing Kings, there is alſo an ordinary call for doing it. The reaſon of this is, becauſe eſſe extraordinarioe vocationis is ſo called, and is ſo in it-ſelf, becauſe it ſtandeth in oppoſition to eſſe ordinaria vocationis, as we have ſhewed at length, curſ. Philoſophicotheolog. diſp. 4. Sect. 6. And therefore there can be no extraordinary call for puniſhing Delinquent Kings, unleſſe there be alſo an ordinary call for doing ſo. (4) Puniſhing of delinquent Kings either in it-ſelf is ſinfull and unlawfull, or not. If ſinfull and unlawfull, then neither ordinarily, nor extraordinarily may Kings lawfully be puniſhed: for no ſin can be committed by an extraordinary Divine providence. Otherwiſe God ſhould extraordinarily ſin. But we have25 ſhewed already, that Kings may be puniſhed by vertue of an extraordinary call. And conſequently, it is not a ſin in it-ſelf, to puniſh delinquent Kings. If lawfull and unſinfull, I ſee no reaſon why a thing which is in it-ſelf lawfull and honeſt, may not lawfully be done, by ordinary as well as by extraordinary midſes: for either the exerciſe of ordinary midſes is in it ſelf lawfull, or not. None, I am ſure, will ſay, that the exerciſe of ordinary midſes is unlawfull, Otherwiſe every thing that is done ordinarily, is done ſinfully. Which to ſay, is abſurd. And if you ſay that the exerciſe of them in it ſelf is lawfull, then it is lawfull in it ſelf by vertue of an ordinary call, to puniſh delinquent Kings. But if there be any fault and eſcape in the way and manner of imploying that cal that no whit hindereth, but the call in it ſelf is lawfull and commendable: for ſuch things are meerly extrinſecall to the nature of the call it-ſelf. And ab extrinſeco, ad intrinſecum, non eſt ſequela. (5) Jehu and the Prophets, had no other reaſons for them in ſpeaking and acting by vertue of an extraordinary call againſt delinquent Kings, but what thoſe may have in proceeding againſt them, by vertue of an ordinary call. They no otherwiſe proceeded againſt them by vertue of their extraordinary call, but as it was for the good of the LORD's People, and for executing Juſtice on their delinquency, that others might learn not to offend. But ſure we are, ſuch grounds are competent to an ordinary call, fo•proceeding againſt delinquent Kings. And 'tis an undoubted maxim, Idem eſt jus, ubi eadem eſt ratio juris.
I•ſt. That example concerning Athaliah (ſaith Salmaſius) deſerveth not an anſwer: for (ſaith he) ſhe uſurped the kingdom, and killed the whole Royall Family. And ſo there was leſſe executed againſt her, then ſhe deſerved. And with all according to the Jewiſh Lawes, it was not permitted to women to ſway the Scepter, and ſit on the Throne: for it is not ſaid Deut. 17. Thou ſhalt ſet a Queen over thee, but a King over thee. Def. Reg. cap. 4.
Anſ. That the example concerning Athaliah very much concludeth our purpoſe, we argue thus: Either Athaliah had the right and authority of a King, or not. If the had the right and authority of a King, ergo if the King be of an abſolute power, and not ſubject to Law, then Athaliah was no more ſubject to Law then any other King: for as Salmaſius, and all Royalliſts will have it, the26 King is of an abſolute power, and not ſubject to Law. And conſequently, Athaliah being inveſted with the right of a Kingly power and authority, ſhe was no more ſubject to Law, then any other of the Kings of Judah. Therefore if you ſay that Athaliah was inveſted with the right and authority of a King, you muſt either commend the practice of Jehojadah and the people in killing her, or elſe you muſt charge your opinion, and not imagine Kings to be abſolute, and not ſubject to Law. If ſhe had not the right and authority of a King then either becauſe ſhe uſurped the Kingdom, and intruded her-ſelf upon it, contrary to the conſent of the People, or becauſe ſhe did cut-off the righteous heirs of the Kingdom, and ſet up her-ſelf in the Kingdom, or elſe becauſe according to the Law women ought not to govern. Not the firſt, because according to the Doctrine of Royalliſts, conqueſt is a lawfull title to the Crown. But Athaliah conquered the Crown of Judah to her-ſelf. What more I pray you, did ſhe in intruding her-ſelf upon the Kingdom of Judah, then unjuſt Conquerers do, in thruſting themſelves in upon the kingdoms which they ſubdue? As ſhe intruded her-ſelf, without the free conſent and election of the People, ſo do they. And yet Salmaſius, with the reſt of his Brethren, will have ſuch Conquerers lawful heirs, and abſolute kings over theſe kingdoms, which they ſubdue. Nor can you ſay the ſecond, becauſe conquerers, who ſubdue other men's kingdoms, cut-off all thoſe who by pretended blood-right, claim a title to the Crown. And yet Royalliſts will have ſuch lawfull heirs, and abſolute kings over theſe kingdoms, to which they have no title but the ſword. Nor can you ſay the third, becauſe all Royalliſts admit Royal birth, a juſt and abſolute title to the Crown. But women no leſs then men may be and are of the Royall Off-ſpring. And conſequently, if the doctrine of Royalliſts be true, and unleſs Salmaſius will contradict himſelf, women may as lawfully govern as men: Therefore it doth not follow, that becauſe Athaliah was a woman, ſhe had not right to govern the People of the Jews, and reign over them. I confeſſe, by Royall birth ſhe had no title to the Crown. But ſhe conquered the Crown to her-ſelf, and did reign ſix years with the conſent of the People. But ſure I am, Salmaſius and all the Royalliſts, as they hold the conſent of the People, as a neceſſary ingredient to makeup the lawfulneſs of the title to the Crown, ſo they maintain conqueſt27 without all exception, to be a juſt and lawful title thereto. But what need I thus to ſtand? do not I know that Salmaſius and the whole nation of Royaliſts will have the formall and eſſentiall being of the King to conſiſt in an abſolute and illimited power? But any perſon, whether man or woman, uſurper or non-uſurper, is capable of ſuch a power, and may be inveſted therewith. And conſequently, though Athaliah was but a woman, and an uſurper, it doth not follow, that becauſe ſhe was ſuch, therefore ſhe was not of an abſolute and arbitrary power. The greateſt of Tyrants, and the worſt of women, is capable of ſuch a power. And the power is not changed, becauſe of the change of the perſon, and of ſuch and ſuch qualifications in him. Such things are meerly extrinſecal to the nature of the power it-ſelf. So then, if the King be formally a King, becauſe he is of an illimited and arbitrary power; I ſee no reaſon why Athaliah did not reign as a King: for ſhe was capable of ſuch a power, wherein, according to the doctrine of Royalliſts, the eſſentiall frame of a King doth conſiſt. And conſequently, ſeing ſhe did reign in ſtead of the King of Judah, and exerciſed his authority, there is no reaſon why ſhe was not abſolute and unſubject to Law, as well as he. Therefore Salmaſius muſt either leaveoff his opinion, and not imagine that the Kings of Judah were abſolute and not ſubject to Law, or elſe he muſt cry-down the laudable practice of Jehojadah, and of the People, in killing Athaliah. For ſhame he will not do this.
Propoſ. 2. Except the Lacoedemonian kingdom, there was no kingdom in old, wherein abſolute and uncircumſcribed Monarchy was not erected, though in ſome more remiſs, and in others more intenſe.
For proof of this Salmaſius ſheweth, what was the condition of Monarchy in the Aſſyrian, Egyptian, Jewiſh, Median, Perſian, Grecian, and Roman kingdoms. Of the Jewiſh kingdom we have ſpoken already, and more of it afterward in a more convenient place. As for the Aſſyrian kingdom,