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A REPLY UNTO SEVERALL TREATISES PLEADING FOR THE Armes now taken up by Subjects in the pretended defence of RELIGION AND LIBERTY.

By name, unto The Reverend and Learned Divines which pleaded Scripture and Reaſon for defenſive Arms.

The Author of the Treaiſe of Monarchy.

The Author of the Fuller Anſwer his Reply.

By H. Fern D. D. &c.

OXFORD, Printed by Leonard Lichfield Printer to theniverſity. 1643.

The Contents of the ſeverall SECTIONS.

  • SECT. I. The Preface. In which the contradictory Aſſerti­ons of the Adverſaries, pag. 2, 3. The Generall Reſolution of the Cauſe, pag. 4. Doctrine of Sedition, pag. 5. 6.
  • SECT. II. Caſes of Reſiſtance, in regard of times of peace or War; and in regard of Perſons, Private or publique, pag. 7. &c.
  • SECT. III. A defence of Subjects Armes in vaine, ſought by the diſtinction of Monarchy, pag. 11. 12. The Governing Power is ſo derived from God upon Him, who is Supream, that the Peo­ple cannot leſſen or limit it, but onely in the exerciſe, pag. 13, 14. Of an Abſolute and Limited Monarch, pag. 15. Limitation and Mixture may be by after condeſcent of the Monarch, and onely reach the Exerciſe of the power, pag. 15. 16 17. Mixture differs from Derivation of Power to ſubſtitute Officers, pag. 17. 18. Of Monarchy by Conqueſt, pag. 18. Providence may ſo farre diſco­ver it ſelfe by Conqueſt, that the People Conquered ſhall be bound to conſent and yeeld obedience to the Conqueror, as to a Prince ſet over them by God pag. 19. 20
  • SECT. IIII. The Conſtitution of this Monarchy; The En­trance of the Saxon and Norman Conquerours urged, not to prove our Kings abſolute, but to diſprove ſuch an Originall Limitation and Mixture, as the Adverſary phanſyeth in this Monarchy, pag. 21. to 28. Reaſons for ſuch Originall Limitation and Mixture anſwered, pag. 28. 29. Proofes for it from His Majeſties Grants anſwered, pag. 30. 31. 32.
  • SECT. V. Of Reſiſtance in relation to an Abſolute Monarchy, pag. 33. 34. 35. in relation to a Limited Monarchy, pa. 36. 37. 38. Limitation and Mixture in Monarchy doth not infer a power of Reſiſtance in Subjects pag. 39. 40. &c.
  • SECT. VI. A Refutation of the moſt conſiderable paſſages of His Reply, that firſt ſtyled himſelfe Author of the Fuller Anſwer, pag. 43. to 56.
  • SECT. VII. Places of Scripture out of the Old Teſtament. The Inſtitution of the Iſraelitiſh Kingdome, in which the Jus Regis implyed a ſecurity from Reſiſtance, pag. 56, 57, 58, 59. The Reſcue of Jonathan, pag. 60. Davids demeanour towards Saul infers not a power of reſiſtance in Subjects, pag. 61, 62. His enquiry about the intent of the Kilites, pag. 63. Something extraordinary in the example of David, pag. 64 65. The Prophets never called upon the Elders of the People for this pretended duty of Reſiſtance, pag. 66.
  • SECT. VIII. Of Reſiſtance forbidden in the 13. to the Ro­mans. The place is conſiderable, as it ſpeakes of Government in Gener all, and as it relates to thoſe Times and Governours, pag. 67 That it is Powers in the plurall and in the Abſtract, vainly obſer­ved and applyed by the Reverend Divines, pag. 67, 68, 69. That Subjection is not here reſtrained to Legall Commands in Civill matters only, as they would have it, pag 69. to 77. That Chriſtians might not reſiſt, becauſe Religion then was not eſtabliſhed by Law, and becauſe the Emperours then were Abſolute (as the Author of the Treat. of Monarchy would have it) is not the reaſon of the A­poſtles prohibition, pag. 77. 78. Of the abſoluteneſſe of thoſe Em­perours before Veſpaſians time, and of the Power of the Senate, and of the Lex Regia, pag. 79, &c.
  • SECT. IX. Nine Reaſons againſt Power of Reſiſtance in Sub­jects, drawn from the Conſideration of the wiſdome of God, who put his people under Kings without power of Reſiſting them, in the Old and New Teſtament. pag. 84. Of the Ordinance of God, that places the Power of the Sword in Him that is ſupreme, which can­not be eluded by ſaying, they reſiſt not the Monarch, but miſim­ployed fellow Subjects about Him, pag. 85. 86. 87. Of the miſ­chiefes and inconveniences that would follow upon ſuch a power of Reſiſtance in Subjects, &c. pag. 90. 91. Their reaſons to the con­trary anſwered, pag. 93. &c.
  • A brief conſideration of the Caſe: That they are far from (what they pret nd) the defence of Religion, Laws, and Liberties, by theſe Armes, and the Reſiſtance now made, pag. 96. 97.

A REPLY TO SEVERALL TREA­tiſes, pleading for the Arms now taken up by Subjects in the pretended defence of Reli­gion and and Liberties.


IF it be enquired, why any Reply at all, or why ſo late? I may ſay, I had determined not to be any more troubleſome, and that there was no juſt cauſe why I ſhould be, were it well weighed what was ſaid on both ſides: but I muſt once again beg leave to ſay ſomething (the Importunity of Adverſaries or the expectation of Friends enforcing it) by way of Anſwer to ſome Books not long ſince iſſued forth.

There are two eſpecially which have drawn the eyes of many upon them; the one bears this title, Scripture and Reaſon pleaded for defenſive Armes, by Divers Reverend and Learned Divines. Who by laying their heads together have not found out any more forceable Arguments or ſatisfying Anſwers, then they which went before them; but only ſome newcaſes of Reſiſtance to amuſe the Reader, and new inſtances to inforce former Rea­ſons,2 and ſome popular amplifications to ſet off the old An­ſwers, thereby making the book ſwell to that bigneſſe it ap­pears in.

The other book bears this Title, A Treatiſe of Monarchie, by whom I know not: but ſurely the Author (however he looks not with a ſingle eye upon what I had written, miſconſtruing it many times) doth with much ingenuity diſclaime, and with no leſſe reaſon confute ſeverall Aſſertions of thoſe Learned Di­vines, and other Writers of the Party; aſſertions that have very much help't forward this Rebellion: ſuch as theſe, That the King is Univerſis minor. That the People, which make the King, are above Him, by the Rule, Quicquid efficit tale eſt magis tale. That the finall judgement of this State is in the two Houſes. That the Chriſtians in the Primitive times might have reſiſted, had they had force. Theſe and the like he ingenuouſly diſclaimes, but be­ing engaged he ſets up his Reſt upon a groundleſſe fancy of ſuch a mixture and conſtitution of this Monarchie, as muſtinable the Houſes to reſtrain the exorbitancies of the Monarch, by the Arms of the Kingdom: and to induce a beliefe of this, he has prefixed a diſcourſe of Abſolute, Limited, and Mixed Monarchies, ſo fra­med as is moſt applyable to his purpoſe.

He that wrote the Fuller Anſwer to my firſt Treatiſe had this conceit of Mixture, whereby he placed the Houſes in the very Supremacy of power, and did thence (as one falſhood being granted doth neceſſarily inferre another) conclude, that the Members of the Houſes were the Kings Subjects diviſm, taken ſeverally, not conjunctim, as they are gathered together in their Houſes; for indeed how could they be His Subjects, and He their ſupreame Head, if they be fundamentally mixed or joyned with Him in the ſupremacie of power? The Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy, did ſee that this was repugnant to Law and Reaſon, and therefore doth acknowledge them to be ſubjects conjunctim, under the King as their Supreame Head, yet being engaged he holds the ground upon which that abſurd aſſertion is raiſed, af­firming and endeavouring to prove, that the Mixture is in the ſu­premacie of power, pag. 40. How then will he make the King ſu­pream, and they His Subjects? for this; he gives the King Apicem poteſtatis, the top or Excellency of Power: that is, the King is3 the Crown or top of the head, but the two Houſes muſt be our head too and our Soveraignes, if they be joyned with the King in the very Supremacy of power: and ſo the matter will be well mended. Again, The Full Anſwer, did from the ſame falſe ſup­poſed mixture inferre, that the finall Reſolution of this States judgement reſided in the two Houſes, when the King refuſeth to diſcharge His truſt for the ſafety of the Kingdom; the Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy, did ſee and confeſſe, that it plainly overthrowes the Monarchy to place ſuch judgement in the Hou­ſes: Yet being ingaged, He gives them power to take the Armes of the Kingdom; but leaſt they ſhould ſeem Authoritatively to Iudge or command in that caſe, they muſt declare and make the appeale to the Community, as if there were no government, and as men are in Conſcience convinced they are bound to give aid and aſſiſtance; ſo he pag. 8. 29. and elſewhere. A ready way to confuſion; but of theſe and ſuch like contradictory conceits of the Aſſertors of Reſiſtance more below.

Of this Mixture there was not a little ſpoken in my Reply to the Full Anſwer: but this Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy, and Reverend Divin's take notice only of my firſt Treatiſe, Having therefore made ſome ſhort Animadverſions upon their Bookes as they came to my hand, I ſtill wayted to meet with ſomething directly againſt the Reply, but as yet have ſeen no­thing, beſides two trifling Anſwers; the one a wild diſcourſe by whom written I know not, but by ſuch a flirting phanſy, I am ſure, that he who reads one part, will not caſt away his time up­on the reſt: the other by him that ſtiled himſelfe Author of the Fuller anſwer, ſtill like himſelfe; if he can be but witty or faſten a ſeeming contradiction upon his Adverſary it is enough; what he has materiall about the Mixture of Government (which is the whole buſineſſe of his book) is more accurately delivered and urged by this Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy; yet be­cauſe he is extreamly confident, I ſhall beſtow a Section upon him below, and that is more then he deſerves.

Therefore what the Reverend Divines, or the Author of this Tract of Monarchy have drawn from Scripture or Reaſon, to ju­ſtify their grounds of Reſiſtance, I ſhall briefly examine, after that I have declared my intent at firſt, and my purpoſe now of proceeding in this Argument.


It was the intent of that firſt Treatiſe of mine, to reſolve the Conſciences of miſled People, Touching the unlawfulneſſe of Armes now taken up againſt the King: and becauſe Conſcience, if it re­ſolve for them, muſt conclude upon theſe premiſes (Subjects may take Armes againſt their Soveraigne for defence of Religion and Liberties, apparently in danger of Subverſion. But ſuch is the caſe now,) and muſt be certain of the truth of both of them, for if either of the premiſes be falſe or doubtfull, Conſcience is miſ­guided in the concluſion; therefore the whole Reſolution of the caſe was to this purpoſe, as here it lyes ope to the ſight in theſe two aſſertions.

Firſt, Were the caſe ſo as they ſuppoſe, that is, Were the King, as they would have people believe, ſeduced to proceed in a way tending to the ſubverſion of Religion and Liberties, it were not ſafe to bear part in the Reſiſtance of Armes now uſed againſt him, there being no warrant for taking Armes upon ſuch a caſe, but evidence againſt it both from Scripture and Reaſon. So that at the beſt the caſe can be even to them, that plead for reſiſtance, no better indeed then doubtfull, and then Conſcience according to its two Rules (what is not of Faith is Sin, and, in doubtfull caſes, the SAFER WAY is to be choſen) will tell them they ſhould forbeare and ſuffer, rather then reſiſt, for they may be ſure that is a SAFE WAY, were the King indeed what they ſuppoſe him to be.

Secondly, Seeing the caſe is not ſo as they ſuppoſe, nor is it ſo with the King as they would have the People believe, but moſt ap­parent, that He is conſtrained to take Armes for the defence of His juſt Rights, and the Protection of His Subjects; Every man may be clearly perſwaded in Conſcience that the Reſiſtance now made is unlawfull and damnable, and that he is bound not only to forbear from reſiſting, but alſo to aſſiſt His Majeſty in ſo juſt a cauſe.

The contrary Reſolution (which concludes, That it is Lawfull upon ſuch a caſe ſuppoſed to take Armes: & that the Caſe is now:) I doubt not to call a Blaſpheaming of God and the King; Of God, in charging ſuch an imputation upon his Word, as if it taught Subjects to take Armes for the defence of Religion and Liber­ties againſt their naturall Soveraigne: Of the King, in caſting ſuch aſperſions upon His Majeſty, as if He were ſeduced to the ſub­verſion of Religion and Liberties.


Now although His Majeſties Cauſe be juſtified not ſo much by the falſhood of this their Principle and ground of Reſiſtance (it is lawfull in ſuch a Caſe to take Armes) as by the clearneſſe of His innocency, He being farre from what they ſuppoſe or proclaime of him to be: Yet becauſe the very ſeeds of Rebellion are ſowne upon that ground, and there cannot want either made pretences to bring them forth, or Fears and Jealouſies to cheriſh and ripen them; it is needfull to ſhew, that as Rebellion is not a plant of Gods ſowing, ſo neither is that ground a Truth of His Laying.

The Author of the Fuller Anſwer, in his late Reply Pag 27. & 28. imputes the beginning of this controverſie (whether Subjects upon ſuch a Caſe may take Armes?) to my firſt unhappy and unchallenged Treatiſe (as he calls it) which has expoſed the other party to a neceſſity of a Reply, and cauſed ſo much to be ſaid, eſpecially by Divines, in this ſad and unwelcome ſubject. So he. Theſe men are loath to bee called to account for what they ſay or doe, as if they were the very rule of Juſtice and Truth. They have Preached and Printed this ſeditious doctrine over and over, welneere a twelve month before that unhappy Treatiſe was publiſhed, thereby perſwading the People into Armes, under pretence of defending their endangered Religi­on and Liberties; and now they thinke much it ſhould be called in queſtion or be made a Controverſie. It had beene happy for them if they could have carried the matter ſo clearly without being put to a Reply; or if now being put to Anſwer, they could make others the Incndiaries for the kindling of that fire which they have begun, and fomented with ſeditious doctrines, blowne over all the Kingdome. Surely if the Divines and Lawyers, that are of contrary judgement to them throughout the Kingdome, had in good time declared themſelves herein, it would have gi­ven a ſeaſonable and happy check to theſe ſeditious principles, and to the unhappy Rebellion that has been raiſed thereon; I for my part thought it concerned mee to examine a doctrine ſo much Preached and publiſhed, and could not think it poſſible that Conſcience ſhould be truly ſatisfied in the Concluſion, with­out being ſecured of the truth of both the Promiſes, of which this ſeditious doctrine is the firſt, That Subjects may take Armes6 againſt their Soveraigne for the defence of Religion and Liberties, when in danger of ſubverſion: for which as then I could ſee no warrant that Conſcience might reſt on, no more can I now, but doe finde it a Doctrine deſtitute of Scripture and true Reaſon, as will be cleared in the proceſſe of this book. For,

Firſt, Upon the examination of places of Scripture, it wil ap­peare, that Gods People were continually under ſuch Kings, a­gainſt whom they might not reſiſt, and that Gods word as it af­fords us no precept, ſo nor any juſt example for reſiſtance, but much every way againſt it.

Secondly, Upon the Examination of Reaſon it will appeare, how inconſiſtent ſuch a power of reſiſtance in Subjects is with Government, and that (which ſeemes to be the reaſon of the Wiſdome of God, putting his people under Kings without any power of Reſiſtance) moe inconveniences and miſchiefes would follow upon ſuch a power placed in the People, then if they were left without it.

I muſt needs ſay it doth at firſt ſight ſeeme unreaſonable, that Subjects ſhould be left without this Remedy, and I confeſſe my owne thoughts (according to that naturall inclination wee all have to Liberty) have been heretofore ready to ſuggeſt as much: till ſeeking warrant for conſcience from Gods word, I could meet with none, but found Reaſon preſently checked with that ſaying of our Saviour, Mat. 10.25. It is enough for the Diſciple that he be as his Maſter. It is enough for us now, if by the denial of Reſiſtance and Armes we can be in no worſe condition then our Saviour was, and the Chriſtians of the Primitive times, and Gods people were ever in.

Likewiſe when I expect the Adverſaries ſhould bring ex­preſſe Scripture (without which they profeſſe not to attempt any thing of ſuch moment) for commanding or allowing this ſuppoſed Duty of Reſiſtance, I find them altogether failing, and in their Anſwers to places of Scripture, much diſagreeing among themſelves. So that indeed all their faith and perſwaſion here is reſolved into an appearance of Reaſon, raiſed upon Ariſtotles grounds or Principles, laid for the framing of a government, and the meanes of reſtraining Tyranny.

Upon thoſe grounds and Principles, Buchanan, and Iunius7 Brutus goe ſo farre as to the Depoſing and taking away of an Exorbitant or Tyrannous Monarch, The writers of theſe dayes though they will not ſeem to harbour ſuch an intention, and the Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchie doth expreſly pro­nounce it unlawfull; yet do they all agree to uſe what force they can againſt ſuch a Monarch for the ſuppreſſing of his Ty­rannie, to give him battell in the field, and make him acceſſary to his own death, if he fall by their hand.

To cleare the way in the entrance of this Cauſe, I am called by the Learned Divines, and the Author of the treatiſe of Mo­narchie, in the firſt place to conſider the ſeverall Caſes of Reſi­ſtance, and the ſeverall kinds of Governments and Monarchies.

SECT. II. Caſes of Reſiſtance.

THe Reverend and Learned Divines, (who plead for Defen­ſive Armes) to ſhew what great paines they have taken for the ſatisfying, or rather troubling of the Conſciences of the people, doe every where blame the Reſolver as indiligent and careleſſe. Firſt in the explication of the Queſtion pro­pounded, that he undertaking to reſolve Conſcience about Re­ſiſtance, did not ſet down all poſſible Caſes, which they by laying their heads together have found out. Then in the clea­ring of the 13. to the Rom. that he mainly inſiſting upon that place did not Analyſe the Chapter, as they have done by brea­king it into ſo many pieces, as if they had meant to draw out ſo many points to preach upon, rather then arguments to di­ſpute by.

My Anſwer is, I did not intend that Treatiſe as a juſt Tractate of Reſiſtance, but as a Reſolution of a particular Caſe; and therefore did not undertake or endeavour to ſatisfie all doubts which every working braine (that ha's ſtrained it ſelfe to the diſturbance of this State and people) might raiſe concer­ning Reſiſtance in generall, but to reſolve the Conſciences of miſled People in relation to the reſiſtance now made. Now8 becauſe they muſt have things delivered in groſſe to them, if we meane they ſhould apprehend them, I did therefore think it ſufficient, firſt, in the Explication of the Queſtion to direct their thoughts upon the notorious Reſiſtance then uſed, viz. by ſetting up a Militia, raiſing Armies every where, and uſing them in Battell againſt His Majeſty, for unto that Reſiſtance the Caſe propounded did relate, as was intimated SECT. I. and then in the clearing of the 13 to the Rom. it ſeemed ſuffi­cient to let the people underſtand, That the King was the Higher or Supream power in this Kingdom; that All under the higher power were forbidden to reſiſt; that Tyranny and perſe­cution were not ſufficient cauſes of Reſiſtance, which appea­red upon the conſideration of thoſe times; laſtly, that the prohi­bition of Reſiſtance concerned all times, becauſe the Apoſtle's Reaſons againſt it, being drawn from the inſtitution of the Po­wer, and the end or benefit of it, are perpetuall and concerne all Governments. Theſe few neceſſary particulars deduced out of the Apoſtle, I thought more fit to let the People underſtand, then to puzzle them with many needleſſe termes of analyſe and diviſion.

And now let us conſider the Caſes propounded by the Plea­ders; amonſt them all, that onely is pertinent which enquires, whether the reſiſting of a Captain of the Souldiery having his commiſſion from the King, and comming to act any illegall commands with his bands of armed men, be a reſiſting of the King, and ſo forbidden? pag. 1. Anſ. They might eaſily have anſwered themſelves, who, I know, are perſwaded that the reſiſting of Captains having Commiſſion from the Houſes, and comming to plunder or take away the Eſtates of Malignants, is a reſiſting of the Parliament; but more to this caſe preſently. Onely let us conſider their leading Caſes firſt: What if it be doubted, ſay they, whether a King be diſtracted, or bewit­ched, or forced by ſuch as have him Priſoner, or otherwiſe a command upon him; are Subjects bound from reſiſting His il­legall commands? pag. 2. Anſw. If it be cleare that a King is ſo, I ſuppoſe it is cleare in Law what courſe is to be taken; but being doubted onely (as the caſe is put) and that perhaps up­on9 as little ground as ſome have endeavoured to make the People believe, their King is now held Priſoner by his Cava­leires, and forced to doe what he doth; then the Safer way is to be taken, which is to doe no more by way of reſiſtance, then is Lawfull to doe, when it is cleare He is not Forced or diſtra­cted, and that will better appeare by the Caſe following: ſup­poſe it be certain a King is not forced or diſtracted, yet doing as bad as any diſtracted perſon can doe by commanding Tyranni­call Acts, why ſhould His Subjects hands be bound frō reſiſting his followers, offering to act His Tyranny more then if he were forced or diſtracted? Pag. 2. Anſw. This is needleſſe and odious, and cannot concerne the Caſe in Queſtion, but by refle­cting upon His Majeſty, but put this caſe of any King ſo doing: I Anſwer. 1. There is much difference twixt habituate di­ſtraction, and actuall extravagances or Tyrannicall attempts, for by that a Prince is not maſter of his Will, and is made un­fit to bear the Power (i. ) the adminiſtration of it, but by theſe he is not ſo. 2. Becauſe this falls in with the Caſe, as it is propounded in better termes by the Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy, whether the forceable reſiſtance of inferiour Per­ſons miſimployed to ſerve the illegall deſtructive Commands of the Prince be unlawfull? pa. 51. I anſwer, if by thoſe miſim­ployed perſons be underſtood, the Commanders and Souldiers of the Kings Armyes, I cannot ſee (nor any man elſe, I think) but the reſiſting of them by a contrary Militia or Armes raiſed by Subjects, is a reſiſting of the King and unlawfull; and unto this Reſiſtance the Caſe, as I propounded it did relate, and ac­cordingly the firſt Reſolution was, That were the King what they ſuppoſed him to be, there was no warrant for ſuch reſiſtance. But if by thoſe miſimployed perſons be underſtood other in­ſtruments of oppreſſion in times of Peace before it come to Armes, ſuch as the pleaders for defenſive Armes doe ſuppoſe (in their laſt Caſe, pag. 2.) to have counterfeited the Kings Seal or Warrant, and by it to Spoyle and Murther all the Kings faithfull Subjects if they be not reſiſted; or ſuch as the Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy, doth (in his inſtances pag. 57.) ſuppoſe indeed to have the Kings Seale or Warrant, where­with10 they might range through the Kingdome, waſting and ſpoyling, taxing and diſtraining, yea might deſtroy the Mem­bers of Parliament as they ſit in their Houſes, if they might not be reſiſted. Anſ. For that of the counterfeited Seale, it is not to the purpoſe; if there be cauſe to doubt or ſuſpect ſuch a Seale, there are undoubted Miniſters of Power and juſtice to makeſtay of it till it be made known above; as we ſee thoſe dealt with, that bring counterfeit Briefes, and as ſome years a­goe, he that counterfeited a Commiſſion for taking up Chil­dren for Virginia, was ſtaid by authority and brought to Iuſtice. But ſuppoſe ſuch inſtruments of oppreſſion have indeed the Kings Seale, and Warrant to Taxe, Diſtreine, &c, May not private men reſiſt ſuch in their murthering aſſaults, and the Miniſters of Power and Authority ſuppreſſe them in each County by Force? I anſwer. This is an enlarging of the Caſe, which concernes the preſent reſiſtance as now it is underta­ken by Subjects with Armyes in the field. Yet for farther ſa­tisfaction, and without prejudice to that which clearly con­vinceth the preſent reſiſtance as unlawfull, I conceive it rea­ſonable to ſay. Firſt, if private men be ſuddainly aſſaulted in their Perſons by ſuch inſtruments, without any foregoing pre­tence or reaſon (as of Taxing, Diſtraining, Arreſting) ſo that their life is imminently indangered, and no meanes of avoiding by ſlight, then is perſonall defence Lawfull; for ſuch ſudden aſſault carries no pretence of authority with it; but if ſuch miſ­imployed inſtruments come firſt to Taxe, Diſtraine, Arreſt, (as it is ſuppoſed) private men ought not to reſiſt, and ſo draw on the endangering of life, but to ſeek redreſſe above from Au­thority, and, if it may not be had, yet not to reſiſt. Secondly, If the Miniſters of Power in each County doe at firſt ſtay, re­ſtrain, and commit ſuch miſ-imployed inſtruments, and ſo re­preſent the matter again to the King; if the two Houſes of Parliament alſo, deale in like manner with thoſe that by vir­tue of any ſuch Warrant ſhould notoriouſly treſpaſſe upon them, this is not to reſiſt; for here is only a deſire of informing the King aright, not a will of contending with him, if he will not be of another mind. Now (as the pleaders for defenſive11 Armes ſay pag. 2.) The Law ſuppoſing the King can doe no wrong ſuppoſeth wrong may be done in His name, and therefore teacheth the Miniſters of Power and Iuſtice under him, to pre­ſume ſuch illegall Warrants and ſurreptitiouſly or by fraud procured, and ſo at firſt to make ſtay of ſuch miſ-imployed in­ſtruments, and to bring the matter again to the knowledge of the King.

Secondly, Should a King be ſo obſtinate, as to perfiſt in the maintenance of thoſe illegall courſes, and to that end imploy­ed the Militia or power of Armes, wherewith he is inveſted, it is neither Legall nor Reaſonable, that the Miniſters of pow­er under him, ſhould purſue the oppoſition to the ſetting up of a Militia or contrary power, to the introducing of a Civill Warre. For though ſuch Miniſters of Power ought to uſe all faire and Lawfull means for the reſtraining of ſuch miſ-imploy­ed inſtruments, and it is not for me to ſet bounds how farre they may proceed in preſerying the Kings Peace, by uſing that Pow­er againſt miſ-imployed Perſons, yet ſurely they cannot pro­ceed ſo farre as to a conteſtation of Power with Him whoſe Miniſters they are, much leſſe to a Levying of Warre, as at this day, and an appoſing of Armies againſt Armies. This is the Re­ſiſtance ſuppoſed in the Caſe, and in this Caſe to reſiſt the Kings Forces is to reſiſt Him.

SECT. III. Severall kinds of Monarchy.

IN the next place we are called to a conſideration of the ſe­verall kinds of Monarchicall government, that it may ap­peare, whether in any of them this Reſiſtance by force of Armes may find allowance or otherwiſe.

The Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy, obſerving there was but little pretence from Scripture, either by precept or Example, for Reſiſtance, confeſſeth that the Kings, under which the People of God were in the Old and New Teſta­ment, might not be reſiſted, and therefore layes all the defence of Reſiſtance upon reaſon, drawn from the ſeverall condition12 of an Abſolute and of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy. For which purpoſe he ſpends the firſt part of his book, in clearing the poynt according to his own principles, and then comming to apply what he had ſaid, touching Limited and Mixed Mo­narchyes, to the Government of this Land, he complaines of us Divines, that we plead for Abſoluteneſle of Monarchicall power in this Kingdome, never making any difference of Powers, but bringing proofes for Subjection and againſt Reſi­ſtance from places of Scripture (a ſore fault) and examples which concerne the manner of the government of Iudah, Iſ­raell, and the Romans: as if that which holds in our govern­ment, did alwaies hold in another, ſo he pag. 33. And then he endeavours to prove this Monarchy, to be ſo mixed, as that the Houſes of Parliament be originally joyned with the Mo­narch in the Soveraign Power. Whence he thinks he has both an anſwer to places and examples taken out of Scripture, that they belonged to abſolute Monarchies, are not appliable to ours; and alſo a demonſtration of his concluſion for Reſiſtance. viz. that by the Mixed condition of this Monarchy (as he phanſyeth it) the two Houſes are veſted with power to re­ſtraine with force of Armes the Exorbitances of the Mo­narch.

Anſ. It was never my intent (nor was, I ſuppoſe, of other Divines) to plead for abſoluteneſſe of Power in the King, if by abſoluteneſſe of power be meant (as it ſhould be) a power of Arbitrary command, but if by Abſoluteneſſe of Power this Author means (as he doth ſometimes) a Power not to be reſi­ſted or conſtrained by force of Armes raiſed by Subjects, ſuch a power we plead for, and do ſay, That as thoſe places and ex­amples out of Scripture did forbid reſiſtance then, and ſhew, no warrant for it can be had either by precept or example out of Gods word, ſo doe they condemne reſiſtance in this Go­vernment, though Limited, as ſhall be ſhewen.

We allow a diſtinction of Monarchies, and admit the Go­vernment of Kingdomes to be of divers Kinds, and acknow­ledge13 a Legall reſtraint upon the Power of the Monarch in this Kingdome; but when this Author has made all the ad­vantage he can of his Limited and mixed formes of Monarchy, it will not availe him for the Countenancing of Armes taken up by Subjects: for this will appeare to be truth, agreeable to Scripture and Reaſon. Thatovernment is not the inven­tion of man, but the inſtitution of God, whereby he rules men by men ſet over them in his ſtead; and though hee doth not now immediatly deſigne thoſe his Vicegerents, but by other meanes, bee it by the choice of the People; yet have they their power not from the People, (to whom it belongs to bee governed, and doe by chooſing a Governour, ſeeke a benefit ſafely) but fromod, by vertue of his inſtitution of Govern­ment. Alſo, that the Governing Power, is one and the ſame, which God gives and ſettles upon the Perſon that is Supreme, and ſtands immediatly next to God, betweene Him and the People: onely that Power may bee Limited in the exerciſe of it, as the People by agreement at firſt, or by Petition af­ter can procure. Alſo, that where the Prince ſtands Supreme, and next tood above all the People, there Subjects may not take Armes, and make forceable Reſiſtance, notwithſtanding he be exorbitant in the exerciſe and uſe of that Power, to the in­vaſion of ſuch Rights and Priviledges, as they enjoy by firſt compact, or after procurement.

The pleaders for reſiſtance on the other ſide, do wilfully em­brace and reſt upon the Opinion of Heathen writers, touching the beginning of Government, and the derivation of the Go­verning Power from the People, as if they had not Scripture (which the Heathen wanted) to give them better direction herein.

The Authour of the Treatiſe of Monarchy ſeemes to referre the beginning of Government to Gods ordinance, and to af­firme the power to be from God, Pag. 2. but in the proceſſe of his booke, wee ſhall finde him deriving it indeed from the People, and Pag. 4. he concludes thus for both. They, which ſay that Soveraignes have their Power from God, ſpeake in ſome ſenſe truth, as alſo they Which ſay that originallie power is in the14 People, may in a ſound ſenſe be underſtood; and in theſe things we have D. Fernes conſent in his diſcourſe upon this Subject, Sect. 3. Anſw. you had not his conſent in your ſenſe; for in that Sect. it was his intent to ſhew that the Governing Power, (i) ſuch an Authority or ſufficiency for command and coertion, was from God, though the deſignation of the Perſon be by choice of the People, and the limitations of that power in ſeverall kinds of Monarchy be by their conſent and agreement. Now if to de­ſigne the Perſon, or procure limitation of the power in the ex­erciſe of it, bee in your ſound ſenſe to give the power, there's no great harme to us, or advantage to you: you muſt have the power originally from the people in another ſenſe, or elſe you can make no pretence by it for your grounds of Reſiſtance; and ſo you doe, when you tell us, Pag. 16. they ſometime reſerve a power to oppoſe or diſplace the Magiſtrate: ſometime they make the Monarch Supreme, and then they diveſt them­ſelves of all Superiority, and have no power left to oppoſe him in Perſon, and Pag. 63. you call them Architectonicall powers, committing the power of Government and Armes, &c. This is the riddle of this governing power originally in the people, they are Architect. powers, but build upon foun­dations laid in the aire; they are inveſted with Superioritie, but none can tell over whom, beſides themſelves; they reſerve a power, but ſuch as they never had; for before Government eſtabliſhed, they have not any power of a community or po­litique power, whereby a command may be laid upon others, but onely a naturall power of private Reſiſtance, wherewith every one of them is in particular endued, which power they cannot uſe againſt the publique Magiſtrate, when once they have deſigned him.

Now let us take a neerer view of the formes of Monarchy ſpoken of by this Author, and make a few obſervations upon ſuch particulars, as wil be of more neceſſary conſideration, when we come to the examination of Scripture, of Reaſon, and of the Conſtitution of this Monarchy.

Firſt, he tels us, Abſolute Monarchy is when the Sove­raignty is ſo fully in one, that it hath no limits or bounds under15 God, but the Monarchs owne will: ſo it is when a People are abſolutely reſigned up or doe reſigne up themſelves to be gover­ned by one man, pag. 6. We allow this deſcription, but muſt re­member it below, when this Author will tell us, the Iſraelitiſh Kings were abſolute Monarchs, which will not appeare by this deſcription, alſo when he tels us that to make a Monarch irreſi­ſtible, is to make him abſolute, for we ſee by this deſcription it is not the denyall of reſiſtance that makes a Monarch abſolute, but the denyall of a Law to bound his will.

In the next place he tels us, He is a limited Monarch who hath a Law beſides His owne will for the meaſure of His pow­er, pag. 12. This alſo is true. But he ſuppoſeth firſt, that this Monarch muſt be limited in the very power it ſelfe, not onely in the exerciſe of the power, for an abſolute Monarch may ſtint himſelfe, in the exerciſe of his power, and yet remaine abſolute. Anſw. True, if ſuch a Monarch limit himſelfe to ſuch a Rule in ſuch a caſe, reſerving power to vary from it when hee ſhall ſee good cauſe: but if he that is Originally abſolute and unlimited doe in ſome particular caſes fixe a Law with promiſe not to va­ry from it, he is ſo farre forth, and onely ſo farre as concernes thoſe caſes, limited and not abſolute. Secondly, hee ſuppoſes, ſuch a Monarch muſt bee Radically (i.) Originally inveſted with ſuch a meaſure of limited power, and that hee muſt have his bounds or limitof power ab externo, not from the free de­termination of his own wil. pag. 12. yet at the beginning of the next page, hee tels us, that ſoeveraignty comes thus to bee deſined to a rule, (i) to bee limited, either by Originall con­ſtitution, or by after condeſcent, when a Monarch, originally abſolute, deſcends from His abſoluteneſſe to a more mode­rate power. That which he has to ſalve it is, that this limiting by after condeſcent, is equivalent to that which is by Origi­nall conſtitution; for there is in it a change of title, and a reſolu­tion in the Monarch to be Subject to in no other way, then according to ſuch a Law, pag. 13. Anſw. Where here is ſuch a change of title as this man ſuppoſeth, it is done at once, and by expreſſe and notorious reſignation of the Monarchs former title and power. But it is not neceſſary that an Abſolute Mo­narch16 ſhould come to a limited condition after that manner, for a Monarch that was unlimited at firſt, by degrees may li­mit and bind up his power, and give oath for greater ſecurity, that he will rule accordingly, and requires not to be ſubject to, but according to ſuch limitations or Lawes; and ſo it will ap­peare that the pious Princes of this Land have anciently done. Only when it is ſaid, they require not to be ſubject to but accor­ding, &c. it muſt be underſtood in regard of Active ſubjection, which they cannot expect, if they ſhall command againſt thoſe Lawes, nor in regard of Paſſive ſubjection, as if they allowed their Subject to reſiſt upon ſuch commands; for it can ſcarce be imagined, that any Prince ſhould condeſcend to a limited uſe of his power, and blinde himſelfe by Oath not to tranſgreſſe the limits, hee ſhould alſo have the bands of force and con­ſtraint caſt upon him, for the keeping of Him within thoſe li­mits.

The other diſtinction, which moſt concernes the buſineſſe in hand, is of Monarchy into ſimple, without any Mixture of A­riſtocracy or Democracy, and Mixed, that has an allay from one or both of thoſe. In the explication of which, that hee may lay convenient grounds for ſuch a Mixture as he would make in this Monarchy, he tels us; if the compoſition bee of three, then muſt the ſoveraigne power be in all three Originally, and not one holding his power from the other, but all equally from the fundamentall conſtitution; His Reaſons are. 1. Becauſe elſe it would be no Mixture but a Derivation of Power to o­thers, which is ſeene in the moſt ſimple Monarchy. 2. Becauſe the end of Mixture (whichs to keepe each ſtate from exorbi­tancy) could not be obtained by a derivate power; for ſuch a power cannot turne back, and ſet bounds to its beginning, ſo he, pag. 25.

Anſw. We ſee by thiwhere he will place the two Houſes, in a Society of the Soveraigne Power, and that by Originall conſtitution, which will appeare but a phanſy when wee come to examine it below; but for the grounding of it, hee ſuppoſes17 that Mixture muſt be in the very ſoveraigne power, and that o­riginally, or from the beginning of the government; neither of which is neceſſary: for I conceive that as Limitation in go­vernment, is in regard of a Law or Rule, which bounds the will of the Monarch for thoſe particulars that Law concernes; and ſuch limitation may be onely of the exerciſe of the power not of the power it ſelfe; ſo Mixtures is in regard of Perſons joyned to the Monarch for certaine Acts and purpoſes; but that ſuch Perſons ſhould have a ſhare with the Monarch in the So­veraigne Power, is ſo farre from being neceſſary to that mix­ture which Monarchy will admit of, that indeed it cannot conſiſt with that Supremacy which is ſupped to be in the Mo­narch, for it would make ſeverall independent powers in the ſame State or Kingdome, which is moſt abſurd. If therefore the concurrence and conſent of ſuch perſons be required as ne­ceſſary to the exerciſe onely of the Soveraigne power in ſuch or ſuch Acts, it is ſufficient to make a Mixture in the Govern­ment.

In like manner as it was ſaid above of Limited Monarchyes, that it is not neceſſary they ſhould bee ſo Originally, but may become ſuch by after condeſcent, ſo may it be ſaid of Mixed Mo­narchies. And it is cleare that in moſt Monarchies of Europe, which have beene parts or branches of the Roman Empire and by force of Armes broken off from it, the Monarch at firſt had abſolute power, (like as the Roman Emperours had over their conquered Provinces) but by degrees have received Limitations to governe according to ſuch and ſuch Lawes, and have admit­ted Mixtures by a concurrence of ſuch and ſuch perſons, whoſe conſent ſhould be requiſite and neceſſary to ſome exerciſes of their ſoveraigne power.

Now to his Reaſons I anſwer, Derivation of power is ei­ther upon ſubſtitute Officers and Miniſters, which ſupply the abſence of the Monarch in the execution of Power and Juſtice for him upon his People, and ſuch derivation of Power is in the moſt ſimple Monarchy: or elſe it is upon ſuch Perſons or ſuch an order of men, whoſe concurrence and conſent is re­quired to certaine Acts of Monarchicall Power, and this18 makes a Mixture, though they have no ſhare in the very pow­er, but concurre to the exerciſe of it only, and have not that neither Originally, but upon condeſcent of the Prince; yet have it certainly and irrevocably by Law ſetled upon them. Now if this Author will not call this a Mixture, becauſe it is not Originally in the power it ſelfe, we cannot help it; we are ſure it makes a large and reall difference in Government, and may obtain its end (the keeping of each State from exorbi­tancy) in that way it's intended to doe it in; which will give anſwer to his other Reaſon. For though a Derivative power can〈…〉bounds to the Soveraigne power, yet may it ſtand to〈…〉way, thoſe bounds, which the ſove­raigpower has ſet to it ſelfe, and made the Derivate power the keeper of. The Kings of the Mdes and Perſians were in moſt things abſolute, yet in this had they bound themſelves, not to alter a Decree made by the advice of the Septemviri, or the Princes and chiefe Counſellors of the Kingdome, as we ſee Dan. 6.14. and Eſt. 1.19. So may it be eaſily conceived in any other State; the Prince, though unlimited at firſt, may bind up his Power from ſuch or ſuch Acts, unleſſe he has the con­ſent of ſuch Counſellors unto them; which conſent and con­currence does not give them a ſhare in the Soveraign power, but makes them as Bounders in the Exerciſe of it; nor does it imply in thoſe Perſons a power of forceable conſtraint, but on­ly of Legall and Morall reſtraint, as will appear in the fifth Section.

I will conclude this Section with a brief conſideration of what he delivers concerning Monarchy by Conqueſt. Firſt, If the Invaſion, ſaith he, be made upon pretence of Title, and the Pretender doth prevaile, it is not conqueſt properly, but a vindi­cation of a Title, and then the government is ſuch as the Title is by which he claimed, pag. 21. I will not diſpute whether a people ſo ſtanding out doe forfeit thoſe Priviledges and Liber­ties they formerly enjoyed, or whether a Prince ſo forced to vindicate His Titley ſubduing the People be not free from the former Limitations, to which Princes peaceably entring bound themſelves, and whether He may not uſe ſuch a People19 as a Conqueror? I ſhould commend the Clemency and Piety of that Prince, that would not, but I doe not ſee the injuſtice, if he ſhould ſo uſe them.

Secondly, He blames the Cenſure, which the Fuller An­ſwer gave of Conqueſt, that the title of it was ſuch as Plunde­rers have, &c. and tells us, the Right of Conqueſt is ſuch, as the precedent Warre is, if that he Lawfull ſo is the Conqueſt, yet is it not the Conqueſt that makes them Morally bound, but their own Conſent in accepting of the Government, pag. 22. Well, but a forced conſent will ſuffice, and ſuch will ſcarce be wanting to a Conqueſt, and they that plead title of Conqueſt doe not divide it from ſuch a forced conſent of People, but from a free limiting election.

Thirdly, He grants that while their naturall Soveraigne is in being, the People cannot by conſent devolve a Right to the Conquerour: But ſuppoſe they have not that tye upon them, may they perpetually ſtand out againſt the Conqueror, or ra­ther are they not bound to conſent and yeeld to His yoake, af­ter they ſee they are wholly ſubdued, and he has ſetled a frame of Government among them? Hee tells us Conqueſt may give title and power to diſpoſe of the Country, goods, and lives of the Conquered, but ſtill it is in the Peoples choyce to come to a Morall condition of Subjection: if they will ſuffer the utmoſt of Violence from the Conquerour rather, then conſent to any termes of Subjection, as Numantia in Spain, they dye or remain a free people, nor doe they reſiſt Gods Ordinance, if at any time of ad­vantage, they uſe force to free themſelves from ſo violent a poſ­ſeſſion: ſo he pag. 22. It is an uncontrouleable truth in Policy, that the conſent of the People, either by themſelves or their Ance­ſtors, is the only Mean in ordinary Providence, by which Sove­raignty is conferred upon any Perſon or Family; ſo he concludes pag. 23. Anſw. That conſent of People is the only meane, in your ſenſe, may be an uncontrouleable truth in the Policy lately framed; but it is certain, that God has power to diſpoſe of us in ordinary providence, without expecting our conſents and choice; it is plain by Scripture, that Conqueſt is a Mean of tranſlating Kingdoms and diſpoſing of People in the way of or­dinary20 providence; it was ſo when God gave Egypt to Nebu­chadnezzar as an hire for his ſervice done upon Iudah, ſo when the Ammonites and Edomites were ſubdued by David, of which ſee below, Sect. 6. againſt the Fuller Anſwer. Had theſe no right over thoſe conquered Nations, but by expecting their conſent? Yea, will he ſay, a Right to diſpoſe of their Lands and Goods, and lives, but not to challenge their Morall Subjecti­on, Well, we doubt not but ſuch Conquerors could force their conſent; but I aske, were they not bound to yeeld it? is there no way for that providence, which tranſlates Kingdoms, to diſcover it ſelfe, but by the conſent of the Conquered People, that if they pleaſe to be obſtinate, his providence ſhall give no Right? his ſetting up a King by Conqueſt over ſuch a people ſhall be no inſtitution oOrdinance? this is good Policy but bad Divinity: I conceive it all〈◊〉controuleable truth, that when the invading Prince has perfectly ſubdued a People (there being no preſent Soveraigne or apparent Heire of the Crown, to whom they are bound) as has ſetled & diſpoſed all things and conſtituted a frame of Government, then I ſay provi­dence doth ſufficiently diſcover it ſelfe, and ſuch a people ought to ſubmit, and conſent, and take their Prince as ſet over them by the hand of Providence; ſo that, if they will perſiſt finally to reſiſt (as this Author ſaith they may) they reſiſt the Ordinance of God. If he will not beleeve me, let him heare Calvin, who in his Inſtit. l. 4. c. 20. nu. 26, 27. doth inforce obedience to that Prince which is over us, by a reaſon drawn from that Provi­dence of God, which diſpoſeth Kingdomes, and ſets up over us what Kings he pleaſes, and from the example of Nebuchad­nezzar, Ier. 27.8. doth inferre; Cuicunqve ergo delatum fuiſſe regnum conſlabit, ei ſerviendum eſſe ne dubitemus: But how ſhall we diſcover his providence and will herein? the next words tell us: Atque ſimul ac in Regium faſtigium quempiam evebit Dominus, teſtatam nobis facit ſuam voluntatem, quòd regnare illum velit. So in his Comment upon 1 Sam. 26. Li­cet multi avaritiâ, ambitione, crudelitate invaſcrit regna & im­peria, tamen Dei voluntatem pluris eſſe, quam omnia illa, faci­endam ſciamus; ac proinde nos illis ultro ſubmittamus, quos Deus21 Reges nobis praefecit. This is very home againſt this Authors aſ­ſertion, wherein he denyes Conqueſt to confer a Soveraignty, and will not ſuffer God in the ordinary way of Providence to diſpoſe of a people without their own conſents. But enough of this; We come now to make Application of what hath been ſaid to the Particular Monarchy of this Land.

SECT. IV. Of the Conſtitution of this Monarchy.

BEfore we come to examine how this Author has ſtatedhe poynt of Reſiſtance in relation to the ſeverall kinds of Monarchy, it will not be amiſſe to conſider unto what kinde this Monarchy belongs; whether it be ſuch a Limited Mixed Monarchy, as this man would have it, Originally and Funda­mentally, by the placing of Nobles and Commons, as ſharers with the Monarch in the Soveraign power. It would be ſeeme the skilfull in the Law to ſpeak to this point (if they could be induced to deliver what they know) but ſeeing there is enough in Hiſtory and Reaſon, which ſpeaks the Frame and beginning of this Monarchy otherwiſe, then this Author or others before him have ſanſyed: it will not be hard to ſay ſo much, as may (which was heretofore endeavoured in••y Reply) let Conſci­ence ſee, it can have no plea for Reſiſtance from the ſuppoſed grounds, upon which theſe men lay the platforme of this Mo­narchy.

I had twice occaſion in my firſt Treatiſe to ſpeak of the be­ginning of this Government, in the Armes of the Saxons and Normans, which was not (as this Author feignes, pag. 33. 34. ) to prove our Kings Abſolute; herein I challenge his ingenuity, if either I propoſed this as a Concluſion to be proved, That our Kings are Abſolute, or urged the entrance of the Saxons and Normans, as an argument to prove it by; but onely all adged it twice by way of Anſwer to what was ſpoken by them, touch­ing a right in the People by virtue of ſuch a capitulating ele­ction at firſt, as they ſuppoſe to have given beginning to this Monarchy; in both which places I expreſſely intimated, thoſe22 Conqueſts were not mentioned to win an Arbitrary power to the King, but onely to exclude Reſiſtance and ſuch a ſuppoſed e­lection.

The beginning of this Engliſh Monarchy, and the root of ſucceſſion of the Monarchs we muſt fetch from the Saxons, and this Author bids us look ſo far back, when (to cut off the advantages that may be made againſt him from the Normans entrance) he tels us, pag. 35. that Duke William came upon the old limited Title, whereby the Engliſh Saxon Kings his Predeceſ­ſors held this Kingdome.

How the Saxons entred upon the Kingdome is well known: they made themſelves maſters of this Kingdome by Armes, which although it doth not inferre our Kings are now Abſo­lute, (an inference as farre from my intention as his) yet doth it plainly overthrow ſuch an originall Mixture in the ſoveraign power, as this Author has phanſyed: and herein (becauſe I have ſpoken to this point, as occaſion required, in the third Sect. of my Reply to the Full Anſwerer (who had the like conceit of ſuch an Originall Mixture, though not ſo refined as this Author has given it us) I ſhall be the briefer in my Anſwer to this.

Firſt, This Author ſaith, It was not a Conqueſt that the Saxons made, but an expulſion, pag. 35. Anſ. This is neither true nor greatly materiall. Not true, for it cannot be imagined but a great part of the Brittaines remained under the Saxon yoake; ſo M. Cambden tells us, they were the fewer that fled towards Wales, and defended themſelves againſt the Saxons in the Weſt: his words are, Victi omnes in gentem, leges, nomen, linguam­que vincentium, praeter paucos, quos locorum aſperitas in occi­dentali tractu tutata eſt, conceſſerunt. Camb, Britan. Saxon. Nor is it greatly materiall, for if we could imagine that the Brittaines were not brought under the yoke, but expelled, yet can we not imagine, that the Government of thoſe Saxon Kings (being made ſuch by the acclamation of their Souldiers, as when the Praetorian guard, or ſome Army abroad ſaluted a Roman Emperour) was at firſt any other, then is the govern­ment or command of Generalls over their Souldiers, that is23 unlimited; much leſſe ſo Limited and Mixed, as this Author phanſyeth it, who looking upon the Modell or Platforme of this Monarchy, pag. 44. 45. doth admire their Wiſdome (as more then humane) that had the contriving of it; but can any one ſuppoſe ſuch a Platforme laid, that conſiders the beginning of the Saxon Monarchy, or imagine ſuch admirable Wiſdome more than humane, in thoſe rude and violent beginnings?

But he tells us in the ſecond place, the Saxons planting themſelves here under their Commanders, no doubt continued the freedome they had in Germany, and ſo changed their ſoyle not their government, pag. 35, but what proof to put this out of doubt? a conjecture out of Tacitus, that wrote of the Ger­mans ſome hundreds of years before this entrance of the Sax­ons; Among the Germans ſaith he, Nec Regibus aut infinita aut libera potestas. True, but we may ſee by thoſe Authors, that M. Cambden alleadges for the Originall of theſe Saxons, that in probability theſe Suxons were not then among thoſe people of Germany, that Tacitus ſpeakes of, but did afterward break out of the Cimbrica cherſoneſus, into that part of Germany where now we find the Saxons, and into this Land; But why ſhould we reſt upon ſuch dreames and uncertainties, as theſe men would put us upon? this is certain, that the Saxons being entred, and having vanquiſhed the Brittaines did by degrees, as they could winne upon the Brittaines, raiſe ſeven King­domes or Monarchyes independant, yet ſo as that ſtill one of them, the moſt powerfull, was Monarch of All, or King of all England, as Mr Cambden and others ſhew out of Bede, till at length the King of the Weſt Saxons, Egbert, vanquiſhed the reſt, and ſetled the Succeſſion of the ſole Monarchy in his Line, and thoſe that ſhould come after him.

Now would I fain know, how this Author, or any other of their beſt phanſies can conceive, that ſuch a Mixture, as joynes Nobles and Commons in the Soveraign power with the Mo­narch (for ſo they would have it) can poſſibly conſiſt with ſuch a beginning of Government? was it in them all ſeven? or could it conſiſt with that ſoleneſſe or height of Monarchy which was ſtill in one of them, and transferred from Kingdom24 to Kingdome, not by any fundamentall conſtitution, but by power, and the perſonall Proweſſe of the Monarch? Or did Edgbert (that ſetled that condition of ſole and chief Monarch upon his own ſucceſſors by the ſubverſion of the other King­domes) know any Subjects of His to be ſharers with him in the Soveraigne power?

This Author indeed tryes what his phanſy can doe, pag. 44. Where by ſix ſuppoſitions he endeavours to bring the Reader to an apprehenſion of the platforme of this Monarchy; When you have made theſe ſuppoſitions (ſaith he) in your mind, you have the very Modell and Platforme of this Monarchy, Pag. 45. So the Reader muſt reſt upon his ſuppoſitions againſt the Cre­dit of all Hiſtories and Chronicles; and thoſe his ſuppoſitions begin thus pag. 44. Suppoſe a People (1.) Nobles and Commons ſet over themſelves by publique compact one Soveraign, & reſign up themſelves to Him and His heires, to be governed by ſuch and ſuch fundamentall Lawes; then ſuppoſe them Covenanting with their Soveraign, that if cauſe be to conſtitute any other Lawes, he ſhall not doe it by His ſole power, but they erſerve at first, or afterwards it is granted them (which is all one) a hand of concurrence therein, that they will be bound by no Lawes, but what they joyne with him in the making of. and ſo he goes on with ſix ſuppoſitions; but firſt he muſt have a ſtrong phanſy that can conceive (as I ſaid) this conſiſtent with the begin­nings of the Saxon Government, as if it could be laid in ſuch a platforme. Secondly, in giving us the briefe of this Platforme he ſtill tells us that by the Admirable wiſdome of the Archi­tects of this Government, the Nobles and Commons have their power and Authority, not depending on the Monarch, but radically their own, by fundamentall Mixture, ſo pag. 41. and elſewhere: but in the ſix ſuppoſitions wherein he would lay this platforme open to the view, he brings up the Houſes to this power they have, by ſteps of time; and comming to make thoſe ſuppoſitions, he ſpeaks doubtingly of the Originall con­triving of this government, whether (ſaith he) done at once, or by degrees found out and perfected, pag. 44. but this contriving muſt be made at once and at firſt, when they choſe the firſt25 King, or elſe they cannot have this power and Authority radi­cally their own. And we cannot imagine but Bede, and other Hiſtorians, would have obſerved ſuch convention of Nobles and Commons (as this Author ſuppoſed) for the contriving of this Government, in which they demeaned themſelves with ſuch admirable wiſdome; or if they could not tell us of ſuch a convention of them at firſt, for the contriveing and be­ginning of the Government, they could not but obſerve ſome meetings of them after, for the uſe of this power in the mana­ging of the Government.

Aſſemblies doubtleſſe there were for repreſenting of grie­vances to the Monarch, and for giving adviſe in the redreſſe; and among the Orders, of which thoſe Aſſemblies did ancient­ly conſiſt, there were Procuratores cleri, the repreſentatives of the Cleargy, (as I have heard good Lawyers affirme, and one of my former Anſwers had it in his Margin, though little to his advantage) but here we are call'd by this Authour to be­lieve or rather ſuppoſe an aſſembly conſiſting of Nobles and Commons, veſted with part of the Soveraign power by orgi­nall conſtitution; when as neither he nor any other Author could bring any one Record for it above the Norman Con­queſt; and thoſe Hiſtories or Chronicles, which mention the beginning of Parliaments as now they ſtand in Authority, doe not riſe ſo high as thoſe times; Now ſeeing the Parliament it ſelfe, 24 H. 8. c, 12. doth declare, that this Realme of England has beene ever accepted for an Empire, governed by one ſupream Head &c. and tells us, that Hiſtories and Chronicles ſhew as much, why ſhould theſe Chronicles be ſo many ages ſilent in the originall Conſtitution, by which this Anthor gives the two Houſes their power from the beginning of this Monarchy, if either ſuch a conſtitution ever was, or indeed could conſiſt with this Empire, and this one ſupream head?

This Author tells us, pag. 36. that the Tryall by twelve men and other fundamentalls of Government, wherein the Engliſh freedom conſiſts, were left untouched by the Conquerour. But why could not he tell us as well, that this power which he aſ­ſcribes to the two Houſes was left untouched? he would if he26 could have made it appeare to have been before the Conqueſt; Mr. Cambden names the King before the Conqueſt, that firſt or­dained the tryall by twelve Men, but what Chronicle can doe as much for the other? the like originall to that of the tryall by twelve men, had other Liberties of the Subject, to wit by af­ter condeſcent of the Prince, and yet this Author calls that Tryall a fundamentall: and ſo it is, not of the Monarchy, but of the Subjects liberty, or, as he ſaid, of the Engliſh freedome.

We need not after all this (which has been ſpoken of the beginning of the Engliſh Saxon Government (into which this Author ſaith Duke William ſucceeded, and in the ſame right of thoſe Saxon Kings) ſeek advantage from the entrance of that Norman Conquerour Yet this we can ſay (and it appeareout of ſeverall Authors cited by Mr. Cambdn in his Britan. Norman) that the Conquerour invictoriae quaſi Trophaeum, as a Trophy and memoriall of his Conqueſt, diſpoſed of the Lands of the Conquered, changed, their tenure, abrogated what Eng­liſh Lawes and Cuſtomes he pleaſed, and gave them what Lawes he thought good, and unto this the People were content to yeeld, which is more then can evidently be ſaid by this Author for the ſtating of the Roman Emperours in a condition irreſiſtable, as we ſhall ſee below upon the 13. to the Rom. as we can ſay this to the overthrow of their ground of reſiſtance (that fundamentall mixture or joyning the Houſes with the Monarch, as ſharers, in the Soveraign power) ſo do we ſay, that what Limitations, Lawes, Priviledges, Cuſtomes, have been after procured by, or reſtored to the People, all thoſe the King as He is ſworn, ſo is He bound to obſerve, becauſe of the Cath of God.

So that this Author ſpeakes but his own Phanſyes, when he concludes thus upon William the Conquerour. By granting the former Lawes and Government, he did equivalently put himſelfe and his ſucceſſours into the ſtate of Legall Monarchs, and in that Tenure have all the kings of this Land held the Grown unto this day, when theſe men would rake up and put a Title of Conqueſt upon them, which was never made uſe of by him who is the root of their ſucceſſion, pag. 37. How farre Duke William made uſe27 of his Title by Conqueſt, & how he granted the former Lawes and Government appeares, by that which was ſpoken even now out of M. Cambden, that is, he made uſe of it ſo farre forth as he pleaſed, and graunted what Lawes he pleaſed of the for­mer Government, and what new ones he pleaſed, thoſe he im­poſed on the people; and unto this they agreed, willingly or unwillingly it matters not, as is ſometimes graunted by this Author. But by this he did equivalentlie put himſelfe (ſaith he) and ſucceſſors into the ſtate of Legall Monarchs: He did ſo in a good ſence, but not as this Author meanes it; for we know (by that which was obſerved above Sect. 3 concerning a Monarch originally unlimited, but falling off into a more moderate and limited condition) that his meaning is, that Duke William by graunting ſuch Lawes did put himſelfe in ſuch a Condition, as if at firſt he had been limited ſo by the people, they reſerving to themſelves power of reſiſting his exorbitancies, which ſhould be deſtructive of thoſe Limitations and Lawes; this is a Legall Monarch in his ſenſe: but we ſay he became a Legall Monarch, that is bound himſelfe to rule according to ſuch Lawes as he had graunted. Nor doe we rake up a Title of Con­queſt for his Succeſſors, or would have them any other then Legall Monarchs; but by that (which has been ſhewen, and cannot be denied) it appears, that the Root of Succeſſion, whe­ther Engliſh or Norman, ſprang up by conqueſt, and that the Priviledges and Powers, wherewith we ſee the Subject in­veſted, were of an after ſpring, that is, of after agrement, or by condeſcent of the Monarch; which Powers & Priviledges, grants, Liberties, though not originall, yet are they irrevoca­ble, the Prince is bound, as was ſaide, to obſerve them becauſe of the Oath of God. I will but adde M. Cambdens expreſſion of the Monarchicall power. The Kings of this Land have pote­ſtatem ſupremam & merum imperium, ſo he in his Britan. which as it excludes all Subjects from haveing ſhare in the So­veraign power, for in that reſpect it is Merum imperium not mixtum; ſo doth it not exclude ſuch limitations and mixtures as have been by after condeſcent, for the bounding of that Sove­raign power in the exerciſe and uſe of it.


But now this Author will endeavor, againſt the credit of Hiſtory and Antiquiry, to reaſon us into a beliefe of ſuch a frame as he has moulded this Monarchy in. Firſt he would prove, That the Soveraignty of the King is radycally and funda­mentally Limited, not only in the uſe and exerciſe of it, but in the power it ſelfe, pag 31 then, That the Authority of this Land is Mixed in the very root and conſtitution of it. pag. 39.

This were an argument fit for a skilfull Lawyer to Labour in, yet ſoe much in conſequence I can at firſt ſight perceive in his prooſes, that I dare pronounce them inſufficient to cleare what he undertakes. His prooes are either his owne reaſons, or drawne from the Kings owne grants in his late expreſſes.

His reaſons for the Limited condition of our Kings, are from the denomination of Leige and Legall Soveraigne, and from Proſcription, which evinceth, that in all ages beyond record, the Lawes & Cuſtomes of this Kingdome have been the rule of Government. pag. 32 Anſw. This proves that our Kings are limited in the uſe or exerciſe of their power, and noe more for neither that Denomination, nor any preſcription can make us beleive that the Limitations of their power had any other begining, then from their voluntary and pious condeſcent to ſuch or ſuch moderations and allayes, which by conſtant uſage and cuſtome, or eiſe by expreſſe Lawes were made ever after inevitable and irrevocable by the Monarchs themſelves; the Oath alſo of ſucceeding Monarchs, binding them to the obſer­ving of ſuch Lawes and Cuſtomes.

His reaſons Iikewiſe for the mixed conſtitution of this Go­vernment doe prove a mixture, but not ſuch as he would have, nor from the begining or firſt conſtitution of the Monarchy; they are theſe: 1 Becauſe it is a Monarchy mixed with an A­iſtocracy in the Lords, and Democracy in the Commons, but thee is no Mixture which is not in the root and ſupremacy of power, pag. 40. 2. Becauſe it is a Monarchy where the Le­giſ••tive power is in all three, and therfore mixed in the ve­ry root and eſſence of it, ibid. 3 Becauſe it is a Monarchy in which three Eſtates are conſtituted to the end that the power of one ſhould moderate and reſtraine from exceſſe the power of29 the other, and therefore mixed in the root and eſſence of it, ibid: the ſame reaſons he uſes, Pag. 43. to prove the Authority of both Houſes to be no derived authority, but equally originall and fundamentall with that of the King; and ſaith, he cannot deviſe, what can reaſonably be ſaid in oppoſition to theſe Grounds proving a fundamentall mixture. Anſw. And I muſt ſay, I cannot deviſe what ſh uld move a man of reaſon, (as this Author ſeemes to be) ſo often to proſfeſſe as he doth, that he is convinced of ſuch a fundamentall conſtitution of this Monarchy; for I cannot be convinced but his grounds are falſe ſuppoſalls.

For firſt, it is not neceſſary, the mixture ſhould be in the root or Supremacy of power: but it is ſufficient, if there be a concu­rence of Perſons, whoſe conſent is required to the exerciſe of that Supreame power, as was explained above, Sect. 3. when we ſpoke of mixture. Nay, if it muſt be in the Supremacy of power, as he will have it, how can he make the King the only Supream, and that one Head, to which the whole Body poli­tique is bound and united, as he grants, pag. 42.43. He cannot ſalve it with his Apex potestatis, which he there gives to the King, unieſle the King muſt be the Crowne or top of the head only; for they alſo muſt be our Head and our Soveraignes, if they be mixed or joyned with him in the Supremacy of power, as this Author would have it,

Secondly, the phraſe of Legiſlative power, aſcribed to the two Houſes is ſatisfied and explained by that concurrence and conſent of theirs in and to the exerciſe of the Supream power, as above; but I cannot be convinced, that it argues the power it ſelfe, which gives life to a Law, to be in them, but their aſſent to be requiſite and neceſſary, ſo that without it no Law can be made; which is enough if men could be content. So when it is ſaid, Be it enacted by the Authority of this Parliament: None denies, but to have ſuch Vote or power of affenting is a great Authority, but not ſuch as makes them ſharers in the Suprema­cy of power, for then ſhould they alſo be our Head and our So­veraignes, as was ſaid above; before that phraſe was uſed, we find it rn thus, The King by the advice and aſſent of the Pre­lates,30 Earles, and Barons, and at the inſtance and requeſt of the Commonalty has ordained. &c: which tells us plainly, where the fountaine of the ordaining or Legiſlative power is; & how that power is excited or ſtirred up to Act, by the inſtance and requeſt of the Commons repreſenting to the King the grievan­ces of his People; and that the efflux of that fountaine, or the exerciſe of that power is not ſoly in his Will, that is, comes not to the Act of ordaining without the conſent of Lords and Commons.

Thirdly, to his third Reaſon I anſwer; The end of this mix­ture or concurrence is to reſtraine from exceſſe; but the reſtraint is morall and legall, not forcible by power of Armes, Parlia­mentary by way of aſſent or diſſent to the ordaining power, not military by Armies in the Field; as will more clearly ap­peare by the next Section concerning reſiſtance in mixed Mo­narchyes: Now ſuch a morall reſtraint doth not argue the Mo­narchy mixed in the Root and firſt conſtitution, for the Houſes may be veſted with ſuch a power afterward; but the Reſtraint that this Author intends is a forcible reſtraint by Armes, a meer phanſy, for if the fundamentall Conſtitution had inten­ded them ſuch a power, it would not have left a power in the Monarch to call them or diſſolve them, which would make this pretended power of theirs altogether in effectuall, but would have left them continually exiſting and in being.

His proofes from the Kings owne Grants for the Radicall Limitation of this Monarchy are theſe, Pag. 31. His Majeſty who beſt knowes by his Counſell the nature of his owne pow­er, ſaith, That the Law is the meaſure of his power, and in his Anſwer concerning the Militia, ſayes, If more power ſhall be thought fit to be granted them, then by Law is in the Crown, &c. whereby it is granted, The King has no more power then by Law is in him: ſo he. Alſo for ſuch a mixed Condition of this Monarchy as theſe men would have, they uſually urge what His Majeſty has graciouſly ſaid in His Anſwer to the 19 Propo­ſitions, That there is a power Legally placed in the two Houſes, more then ſufficient to prevent and reſtraine the power of Tyran­ny. To this purpoſe it is alſo, that ſome make advantage of the31 Kings ſpeaking of Himſelfe, as of one of the Three Eſtates.


1. It is well known, when the king was firſt forced to make his defence by writing, how few he had about Him, being drivē from his learned Counſell, or they one way or other kept from Him. Yet truſting to the juſtneſſe of his Cauſe, & integrity of his own intentiōs, He returned ſuch Anſwers as did for the preſent much ſattisfie all reaſonable people, and will one day (what ever advantage is now pickt out of them) be witneſſes againſt thoſe Troublers of our peace, that put him to his defence.

II. It is very unjuſt, that the gratious Expreſſions, which his Majeſty has had of his Intentions and deſires to rule and Command no otherwiſe then according to law, ſhould be ſet upon the Rack and drawn out to his diſadvantage, for the gain­ing of ſuch a power to the Houſes, as the law ſpeakes not to be in them. If Trajan, fully purpoſing to rule Iuſtly, doth out of ſuch Confidence give a Prefect his Commiſſion and power, delivering him a Sword with theſe words, Hoc prome vtere ſirecte impero, ſi male cotra me; If I Command aright, uſe this ſword for me, if not againſt me. Shall it be concluded, that Officer might acordingly uſe his Sword againſt the Emperours? 'And if the King ſpeake of himſelfe as of One of the three Eſtates, ſhall any Subject diligently watch what fal's from Him, and return him his words again to his own diſadvantage, (as Ben. hadads Meſſengers did 1. Kings, 20.33. Thy Brother Ben­hadad (your fellow States Sr?

III. That which can fairely be gathered out of theſe ex­preſſions as intended by his Majeſty, doth not come up to theſe mens concluſions; the firſt and ſecond ſpeeches do ſhew, how tender he is of doing any thing he may not do by law, acknow­ledging his power is bounded and limited by Law; but it doth not follow, that his power or Soveraignty, wherein it is not limited by law, is not abſolute and full; for ſo it is clearly, whereſoever a Monarchy, at firſt unlimited, doth afterward re­ceive Limits and Mixtures; of which Condition this Monarchy appeares to be by that which has been ſpoken in this Section.

So in his Anſwer to the 19. Prop. His Majeſty acknowled­ges32 a power Legally in the Houſes to restraine which can not be extended beyond a Morrall, Parliamentary reſtraint; other­wiſe let them produce any law that inables the Houſes to re­ſtrain Tyranny by the Armes of the Kingdom; for as for their deductions from ſuppoſed Fundamentalls, we can deny them, as faſt as they bring them, either as failing in thire Antecedents and falſe ſuppoſitions, or as altogether inconſequent. Alſo when this author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy doth in regard of that power, which is placed in the two Houſes to reſtraine the ex••bitancies of the Monarch, ſo much admire the frame of this Government, as compoſed by more then Humane wiſe­dom pag. 44. Doe's he fall into this admiration for the placing of a power of reſtraint by forceable reſiſtance? nothing admi­rable in that, were that the frame of this Government. That which is commendable indeed and admirable in the Limitati­ons and mixtures of this Government, is that Way of Legall, Morrall, or Parliamentary prevention and Reſtraint, which is eſtabliſhed by law foour ſecurity.

Laſtly when his Majeſty hath ſpoken of himſelfe, as of one of the three Eſtates, he has but ſpoken to them in their owne phraſe (for they firſt ſtiled him ſo) and that uſually in the point of his Negative Voyce; for every Bill comes to him in the third or laſt place, the Lords ſpirituall and Temporall, who in­deed are two of the three Eſtates, making a Concurrence in one Vote or Voice. But his Majeſty did never uſe that phraſe with any intent of diminution to his Supremacy or Headſhip; for properly the Prelates, Lords, and Commons, are the three Eſtates of this Kingdome, under his Majeſty as their head.

Thus if we will truſt our owne Eyes for what we read in Hiſtory and Chronicle, or ſtand to Reaſon for the cleare Infe­rences which may be drawne from the knowne lawes of this Land, or uſe any ingenuity in the interpretation of His Maje­ſlies Gratious Expreſſions, We can never be perſwaded that the begining of this Monarchy was ſuch, as theſe men ſup­poſe, that is, ſo Limited and mixed radically and fundamentally, as theſe Authors and others have deſcribed it.


SECT. V. Of Reſiſtance in relation to the ſeverall kindes of MONARCHY.

VVE are now to conſider, how this Author ſtates the poynt of forceable Reſiſtance in theſe ſeverall kinds of Government, Which we ſhall find to be in away that lies very open to Rebellion.

Firſt, He grants the perſon of the Monarch in all thoſe ſe­verall kinds of Monarchy to be above the reach of all force or poſitive Reſiſtance. This is true: but if this Author will allow as he doth, Subjects to rayſe Armes, and with them to give battle to thoſe that are about the Perſon of the Monarch, as his Guard, how ſhall His Perſon be ſecured from the Force and violence of the meaneſt hand? Nay the joyning of Battell with Him, as it is neceſſary conſequence of Refiſtance by Armes, which muſt come to that, if it be purſued, ſo is it a direct Force intended and offered againſt His Perſon.

Secondly, Concerning an Abſuolte Monarch, he reſolves it thus.

If ſuch a Monarch ſhould ſo farre degenerate as apparently to ſeeke the deſtruction of the whole Community ſubject to him, then might ſuch a community constreined by the laſt neceſſity reſiſt by force of Armes againſt any inſtruments imployed to effect the ſame, pag 9. for ſuch an intention cannot be the Act of a reaſo­nable will, pag. 10. But firſt, if he meanes by the whole Com­munity, the whole body over which the power is placed, as he ſpeakes, pag. 10 I grant it the Act of a moſt unreaſonable will, but cannot conceive, how ſuch an intention ſhould fall into the mind of the worſt Tyrant, as to leave himſelfe no people to reigne over. Secondly, if he meanes by that community a cer­taine ſort of people, as were the Iewes in the Kingdomes of Ahaſnerus, and the Templars in theſe Weſterne Kingdomes; the deſtruction of ſuch a people may be the Act of a reaſonable will; Haman makes a faire pretence and reaſon for the extir­pation of the Iewes, Eſt. 3.8. and Ahaſuerus his decree was34 the act of a reaſonable, though miſguided will; but that ſuch a Community, upon the knowledge of ſuch an intention may take Armes, is not proved by this Author; for to prove it as he doth) by Davias example, who was but a particular man, is to ſhew that a Community may doe it becauſe David in his owne particular might do it, and ſo to prove it by afferting a greater abſurdity, viz. that a particular or private man may take Armes againſt an abſolute Monarch. His other example he would prove it by, is the Revolt of the Ʋnited Provinces from the King of Spaine, who reſolved to extirpate the whole people, pag. 10. But it is evident, the Spaniſh King intended the extirpation of the Protestants only; and as this Author••s told us here his opinion of the Revolt thereupon in the Ʋnited Provinces, ſo I would deſire him to deliver his opinion of the Revolt and Rebellion of the Papiſts in Ireland upon their cer­taine knowledge that their extirpation was contrived here, this Author knowes by whom; I plead not for them but could wiſh that the aſſertions and practice of Theſe times did not give them too much advantage; I could tell him the opinion and Reſolution of the Iewes under Ahaſuerus, that they would not take Armes for their defence till it was permitted them by the King,ſt. 8.11. and the opinion of the Primitive Chri­ſtans, that they alowed not reſiſtance, although the deſtruction of their whole Community was evidently attempted. This may be objected againſt his Reſolution of the point, to make it doubtfull; I muſt needs ſay this Caſe of generall deſtruction and Extirpation (which ſome call extreme Neceſſity) is a very hard caſe; and whethert will excuſe a people, that in ſuch ne­ceſſity ſhall take Armes, I diſpute not, nor is it needfull I ſhould: for it neither concernes the Caſ, as now it ſtands be­tweene our King and his Subjects, He inviting them by all faire offers to return from their obſtinate diſloyalty, promiſing aſſuring them the Preſervation of Religion Lawes, Liberties; and what not? Nor doth it concerne the Queſtion now in hand which ſuppoſes not Extirpation of a People as cauſe of their Armes, but only Exorbitancies of the Prince tending to a ſub­verſion of Religion and Liberties, which Exorbitancies, if35 they ſhould be patiently born for the time that they ſhall cor­tinue, do not take away the being and ſubſiſtence of a people, as Extirpation doth; but only put them, for that time, under the inconveniences of arbitrary government; under which the people of God in the old Teſtament, and the Chriſtians in the New, were left without remedy by forceable Reſiſtance.

Againe, if any particular mans life be invaded without any plea or Reaſon for it, he thinkes that ſuch a one may uſe for­ceable Reſiſtance againſt any Agents in ſuch aſſault of murder, and that it is juſtified by the fact of David, and reſcue of Iona­than from the Cauſeleſſe cruell intent of Saul, pag. 10. The Rule here ſeemes to ſpeak no more then a Perſonall defence againſt a Murthering aſſault, which was allowed above Sect. 2 provided that it be ſuddaine without any foregoing reaſon or pretence of Authority, and alſo inevitable: but in the Exam­ples he would inferre more then he ſpeakes in the Rule; for he ſuppoſes the people would have reſcued lonathan by force, iSaul had perſiſted in his intent, and upon that falſe ſuppoſall, inſinuates thus much, that if particular mens lives be ſought after, others may interpoſe with Armes for their defence; and the Learned Divines doe expreſly inferre from it, that Coun­tries may aſlociate and bind themſelves by oath not to ſuffer any of the impeached Members to be cut off: good doctrines theſe from Scripture, as we ſhall ſee when we come to that place. So in Davids Example he would inſinuate that if par­ticular mens lives be ſought after, they may raiſe and enter­tame Forces for their defence, as David did; butf this ſeeme moſt abſurd & dangerous (aindeed it is) and if the Jſraelitiſh Kings were abſolute (as this Author often grants) then muſt be acknowledge (what he accounts but one of my ſhifts, pag. 57.) that Davids example is not herein appliable, but in this way of defence, extraordinary. Of which more particularly below, when we come to places of Scripture, that concerne Davids behaviour towards Saul.

Laſtly, he tells us, (which he ſhould have done in the firſt place) that Subjects of an abſolute Monarch muſt without reſi­ſtance ſubmit their eſtates, liberties, and perſons to his will,36 ſo it carry any plea or ſhew of reaſon and equity, pag. 11. Anſ. Here the way is open enough to Rebellion, for every man will be ready to thinke there is no reaſon or equity in the will of the Monarch, when he is oppreſſed by him; and if the plea or ſhew of reaſon and equity muſt be the barre to Reſiſtance, it will lit­tle availe him to anſwer below, that the Roman Emperors might not be reſiſted, becauſe they were abſolute, for never was there leſſe plea of Reaſon and Equity in the will of any Tyrants, then in theirs. But he will cloſe up the way by tel­ling us, abſolute Monarchy reſolves all judgement into the will of the Monarch; ſo that if his will judicially cenſue it juſt it muſt be yeelded to as juſt, ſo he, pag. 11. But did not Saul cen­ſure David is one affecting the Kingdome, and therefore wor­thy to dye, which was the act of a Reaſonable will, though following a〈◊〉ormed underſtanding; and did he not uſe a〈…〉••dicary proceſſe in the Cauſe of Ionathn, ſenecing him upon the tryall of Lots, why then were theſe examples brought, thAuthor in the former page for Reſiſtance, if ſuch a will othMonarch muſt be yeelded to? and why is there ſuch a condition added in the Rule, ſo it carry any plea of reaſon and〈…〉? this is faſt and looſe; he that would haverection for reſiſtance is here left upon uncertaintie.

Let us proceed to Limited and mixed Monarchies. In ſuch, he tells us, if the Exorbitancies of the Monarch be of leſſe mo­ment, and not ſtriking at the very being of the Government, they ought to be borne by publique patience, rather then to endanger the being of the State by a Contention betweene the head and the body. pag. 17. but if they be ſuch as being ſuffered doe diſſolve the frame of Government, and cannot be redreſſed by petition, then is prevention to be ſought by reſiſtance, pag. 18. and 29. Here I muſt firſt challenge the Ingeinuity of this Author, who citing my words pag. 49. taken out of my firſt Sect: (We may and ought to deny obedience to ſuch commands of the Prince as are unlawfull by the Law of God, yea by the eſta­bliſhed Lawes of the Land) could give this cenſure upon them, here he ſayes more then we ſay, yea, more then ſhould be ſaid; it is not univerſally true that we ought: conſidering, that the caſe37 was there put concerning exorbitancies, not of leſſe moment,ut tending to the ſubverſion of Religion, Lawes, Liberties,nd the queſtion upon it was, whether upon ſuch a caſe might we reſiſt, and the explication of the word Reſiſt was into a de­nying of Active obedience, and an uſing of forceable reſiſtance. Now my ſaying was, that to ſuch commands of the Prince we ought to deny obedience, but not uſe forceable reſiſtance; they ſay (as he doth here) we ought alſo forceably to reſiſt; and yet I ſay more then they ſay. Secondly, we would know who ſhall be Judge of the ſubverſive Exorbtances of the Monarch. He grants there can be no Authoritative Judge to determine it, for that would overthrow the Monarchy, pag. 17. This is in­genuous, and doth indeed ſufficiently overthrow the conceit of the Full Anſerer, placing the finall Reſolution and Judge­ment of this State in the two Houſes. But what then muſt be done? In a limited Monarchy, he tells us, the Fundamentall Lawes muſt judge & pronounce ſentence in every mans Con­ſcience, for in ſuch a caſe as tranſcends the proviſion of the go­vernment, people are unbound and in ſtate, as if they had no government, and the ſuperiour Law of Reaſon and Conſcience muſt be Judge; ſo he, pag. 18. This is a ready way to Anarchy and confuſion: The people by this have liberty enough to con­ceive of their fundamentall Rights as they pleaſe, and of the Exorbitancies of their Prince, as may be moſt for their advan­tage, eſpecially being upon ſuch a caſe (which themſelves may make) unbound and at liberty, as if they had no government. But theſe are fitting grounds for Reſiſtance.

Likewiſe, in mixed Monarchyes, he tells us, the accuſing and wronged ſide muſt make it evident to every mans Conſci­ence; alſo the appeal muſt be to the Community, as if there were no government, and then as every man is convinced in Conſcience, he is bound to give aſſiſtance, ſo, pag. 29. Here is good ſtuffe; not altogether ſo bad indeed as we ſee in the pra­ctice of theſe times, for here is no forcing of men to a Cove­nant, no forceable taking of their eſtates away, but a leaving of them to their Conſciences: yet is this bad enough; for he ſuppoſes it as a thing poſſible, that two. Eſtates may make a38 conſederacy againſt the third, pag. 28. therefore ſo oft as they ſhall combine and declare againſt the Monarch, the people are at liberty, as if there were no government, and then it ſeemes they have all the power againe in themſelves, which they had at firſt according to theſe mens principles. Alſo in this contro­verſy, ſaith he, the appeale is to be made to the Community (i. ) the people; which though we have ſeen practiſed at this day in many Remonſtrances, yet I thinke it was never given as a Rule before, it being in it ſelfe moſt unreaſonable and diſadvantagi­ous to the Monarch, for the people will be more ready to be­leeve their Repreſentatives; and in the conſequence moſt dan­gerous the high way to confuſion, as will more ſully appeare when we come to Reaſons againſt this Reſiſtance.

Laſtly, we would know, what power there is in the com­munity to make reſiſtance. He tells us, if the Monarch invade the power of the other Eſtates, or run a courſe tending to the diſſolution of the conſtituted frame of Government, they ought to imploy their power to preſerve the State from ruine; for that is the end why they have the power of reſtraint, and of providing for the publique ſafety, ſo pag. 28. but what power ought they to employ? any other then they are expreſly inveſted with by Law? which is a Parliamentary, not Military power, a Legall reſtraining power, not a forceable conſtraint by Armes.

Yea bu, ſaith he, it is not only Lawfull for the other Eſtates to deny obedience to illegall proceedings of the Monarch, as private men may, but it is their duty, and they are bound to prvent diſſolution of the eſtabliſhed frame, pag. 28. He doth not ſay to prevent it by Armes, but he meanes ſo by oppoſing their duty of prevention, to the duty of private men in denall of obedience. But we muſt conſider that the duty of pri••e men is concerned when the Lawes come to execution, the du­cy of the publique States is ſeen, when the making or aboli­ſhing of Lawes is taen in hand; alſo we muſt conſider that it is not the abuſe of power in the execution of Law that diſ­ſolves the eſtabliſhed frame, but the aboliſhing of old and ma­king of new Lawes; whereupon we ſay, that the perſons that39 make up thoſe ſtates taken out of their Aſſembly or Parliament, are but private men, and then have no more power to with­ſtand the illegall proceedings of the Monarch, then as private men by deniall of active obedience; in their Aſſembly or Par­liament, they have power of reſtraint by deniall or conſenting, to prevent diſſolution of the frame of Government, & indeed if they uſe that Legall reſtraining power, as they are bound in duty to doe, the Monarch cannot alter the eſtabliſhed frame; he may perchance make ſome actuall invaſions upon their Rights and Liberties (as they may often upon his Right and Prerogative) and runne a courſe in it ſelfe tending to ſubverſi­on, but alter the frame or change the Lawes without their conſent he cannot; and whether it be not better that ſuch arbi­trary illegall Acts of a Monarch (which are tranſient and ſixe no new frame of Government) ſhould not for ſome time be borne with, then to ſeek remedy againſt them, by a Civill warre or contention of the body againſt the head, will appeare more fully when we come to Reaſons againſt ſuch Reſiſtance.

I will conclude the examination of this part of his diſcourſe, with the proof of this aſſertion; that Limitations and mixtures in Monarchy, doe not imply a forceable conſtraining power in Subjects (as he ſuppoſeth) for the preventing of the diſſolution of the eſtabliſhed Government, but only a Legall reſtraining power, as was even now inſinuated: Firſt ſuch a power muſt be in them by reſervation, and then it muſt be expreſſe in the conſtitution of the Government, and in the Covenant twixt the Monarch and the People. But then, I muſt ſay, I cannot be­lieve but ſuch a condition is unlawfull and unreaſonable, againſt the order of Government, which will have the ſoveraign power ſecured, unprofitable for King and People, a ſeminary of Iealouſies and Seditions; we need not ſpend time about this, for it is confeſſed that in the conſtitution of this our govern­ment (to which all the contention relates) there is no Reſer­vation or Law expreſly enableing Subjects with ſuch power of Armes. This Author acknowledges, pag. 63. that when the Houſes by an Ordinance aſſume the Armes, wherewith the King is entruſted, and doe performe the Kings truſt, ſuch Or­dinance40 is not formally Legall (. ) there is no expreſſe con­ſtitution for it: yet is it Eminently Legall, juſtified by the intent of the Architects of this Government, when for theſe uſes they committed the Armes to the King; ſo he.

Secondly, therefore let us ſee, whether it followes by im­plication upon the Limiting and Mixing of Monarchy. It is a­geed, that an Abſolute Monarch is free from all forceable conſtraint by Armes, and ſo farre forth as he is abſolute, from allegall reſtraint of poſitive conſtiutions; now in Limitati­ons and mixture there is only ſought a Legall reſtraint upon the power of the Monarch; if any more were ſought or im­plyed, it muſt follow, either from the Nature of Limitation, or from the danger and inconveniencies of exorbitancy of the Limited Monarch, ofrom the conſent and intention of the People chooſing the Monarch.

But firſt, Limitation cannot inferre it, for an abſolute Mo­narch is limited alſo, not by civill compact indeed, but by the Law of God, of Nature and Nations, which he cannot juſtly tranſgreſſe; if therefore an abſolute Monarch, being exorbitant beyond his bounds, which the higheſt Lawes have ſet him, may not be reſiſted, how ſhall we think a limited Monarch may, for tranſgreſſing the bounds ſet him by civll agreement?

Secondly, the inconveniencies of exorbitancy in Limited and mixed Monarchie cannot inferr a power of reſiſtance by Armes, becauſe the inconveniencies and evills (which are pretended as cauſes of reſiſtance in ſuch Monarchies) are the ſame in Abſolute; for Limitations and Mixtures, are butarres and ſ•••itie, againſt injuſtice, cruelty and oppreſſ••n, which are exorbitances alſo in abſolute Monarchies, and evills that bring as much detriment and ſuffering to the Subject, as they doe in Limited Monarchyes; as for example, The impſing of Taxes, if it be done when neceſſity requires not, or〈◊〉very unqually in regard of Perſons and eſtates, it is an injury and grievance even in an Abſolute Monarchy; only when neceſſi­ty calls for ſuch Lvies of Money, the Monarch (that is of a Li­mited and Mixed condition) is bound to take in the conſent of others, to which the Abſolute Monarch is nor bound. So in41 Tryalls for Life and Eſtate, an unjuſt ſentence is an oppreſſion in Abſolute as well as Limited Monarchy, only the limited or Mixed Monarch is bond to paſſe ſentence upon the verdict of twelve men, or the like, the Abſolute is not. Suppoſe then a Prince in ſuch a Limited or Mixed Monarchy ſhould, when ne­ceſſity doth truly require, impoſe taxes, lay them equally, ex­pend them faithfully; and in tryalls for Life or Eſtate, ſhould give right judgement without the verdictof twelve men, and in other poynts ſhould rule moſt juſtly, though not according to forme, unto which he is limited by poſitive Law; here would be the main Rule of Government obſerved, juſtice, and the end of Government (for which thoſe limits and Civill bounds were ſet him) obtained, peace and well-fare of the People; Will you then have ſuch a Prince reſiſted by Armes, and the Kigndome embroyled in Civil Warre, becauſe he ob­ſerved not the forme, when he gives you the ſubſtance? Yea but this would be an ill procedent and very dangerous; true, there is danger, but no preſent evill; and what are the dan­gers or evillfeared? Cruelty, Oppreſſion, which other Prin­ces might uſe, ſhould they have ſuch liberty; true, but theſe e­vills, when they are are evills in Abſolute Monarchies, and for them reſiance is not to be uſed there.

Thirdly, the conſent and intention of the people chooſing the Monarch cannot inferre: that a Limited Monarch may be reſiſted by Armes. This conſent and intention of the People is made by theſe men, not only the Ordinary meane of coner­ring the Power, but the very Meaſure of the Power itelfe, and the Barre or inlet of reſiſtance; for by that conſent is ſuppo­ſed, the people give what power they pleaſe, and reſerve what they will. To which I ſay. 1. That the conſent of the people, may be the mean of deſigning the perſon, and of yeld­ing ſubjection to him, who elſe could not challenge it, more then another man; alſo a mean of limiting that power in the exerciſe of it, according to agreement or procurement: but it is not the meaſure of the power it ſelfe, which in ſuch a mea­ſure is given of God to all Soveraignes, and is not according to the peoples will reſiſtible or irreſiſtible but according to the42 will of God above reſiſtance; forſeeing that people have not of themſelves, out of government, the main power, the power of life and death, how can they give it either for government, or reſerve it for reſiſtance?

Secondly, That the intention of the People, in procuring Limitations of the Monarch's power, is, that they may be under a moderate uſe of the power; and what's their ſecurity for that? thoſe limitations which the Monarch agrees upon Oath to obſerve; now this cannot infere reſiſtance here, more then in abſolute Monarchies: for when a people leaves a Monarch Abſolute truſting to his prudence and moderation, they doe not intend he ſhould oppreſſe them; yet is it granted, ſuch in­tention cannot enable them to reſiſt, in caſe he doe oppreſſe them. Now in agreeing for Limitations and ſet rules of Go­vernment, they gain a farther ſecurity of ſuch moderate uſe of the power according to thoſe limitations; for the obſerving of which, they have a tye upon their Monarch, not from a power of forceable reſiſtance in themſelves to conſtrain him by Armes if he exorbitate, but from His Oath or Covenant, and Gods vengeance thereupon, if he falſify it.

Thirdly, If the Architects (as this Author ſpeaks) of a limited or mixed Monarchy, that is, the people ſetting up ſuch a Mo­narch over them, did intend, that the ſtates joyned with the Monarch ſhould aſſume the Armes of the Kingdome to reſtrain his Exorbitancies, ſurely they would not have left it in his power to diſſolve them, and ſo make all ſuch power ineffectu­all. It appeares therefore, that by ſuch mixtures and limitati­ons no more can be inferred, then a Legall or morall reſtraint upon the power of the Monarch. And all this, that hath been ſpoken againſt the power of Reſiſtance or aſſuming the Armes of the Kingdome, inferred from the Limited condition of the Monarch, as it is good and concluſive in Monarchies originally limited, ſo is it much more in Monarchies, that have afterward received thoſe Limitations and Mixtures, upon which this power of reſiſtance and aſſuming the Armes of the Kingdome is inferred; as it appeares this Monarchy has done. And there­fore I conclude here, as I did premiſe in the ſecond Section,45 Where the Prince ſtands ſupream, und next to God, above all the People, there Subjects may not by force of armes reſiſt, notwith­ſtanding he be exorbitant in the exerciſe and uſe of his Power to the invaſion of ſuch Rights and Priviledges, as they enjoy by first compact or after procurement. And this being cleared already from thoſe ſhadowes of reaſons (which could be pretended againſt it from the ſeverall kinds of Monarchy) will farther ap­peare by that, which ſhall be ſaid out of Scripture and Reaſon.

SECT. VI. A Refutation of His Anſwer, that firſt ſtyled himſelfe the Author of the Fuller Anſwer.

ALthough the ſubſtance of his diſcourſe is already anſwered, by that which hath been ſaid concerning Mixture and Supremacy, againſt the Author of the Treatiſe of Monar­chy, yet becauſe he is extremely confident, and many times unfaithfull in his Reply's, I will briefly touch upon ſuch paſſa­ges, as may ſeem moſt materiall, or any way availeable to abuſe the unwary Reader.

It is his manner to gaine ſeeming advantages upon his Ad­verſary by his own willfull miſtakings; as in his Anſwer to the Preface; that which was ſpoken of ſome particular Members, the Conaivers of this Revolt and Rebellion, is by him taken, and given out againe to the Reader, as ſpoken of all the Mem­bers of the Houſes, that have by the cunning of thoſe Few been drawne to Vote any thing in order to this Rebellion. Alſo, what was ſpoken of private houſes, where thoſe few Contri­vers held their cloſe meetings (that it was Gods great forbea­rance, thoſe houſes did not breake downe, where the Conſultati­ons have been oft held for the direction of theſe wayes) he renders as ſpoken of the Houſes, where the Parliament ſits & Conſults. But let them all, that have been Leaders or followers in theſe perverſe wayes, looke to it, and conſider, how much they are concerned in that place of Eſay, to which the alluſion there was made; for every one that lookes neerly upon it, (Eſa. 30. verſ. 10, 11, 12, 13.) will eaſily ſee, (what ever application44 this Author makes of it) who they are, that have ſilenced their Orthodoxe, and not long agoe admired Teachers, ſuffering none to ſpeake right things, but ſmooth; ſuch new unheard off doctrines as pleaſe them; who they are that doe truſt in oppreſ­ſion and perverſenes, and doe ſtay thereon having no other way to uphold this Rebellion, but by perverſe obſtinacy, and horri­ble injuſtice exerciſed upon ſuch, as have not yet caſt off all Conſcience of juſt and right, or cauſed the feare of the Holy one of Iſrael to ceaſe from before them.

I would adviſe this Anſwereto looke upon two places more of Eſay, cap. 4. v. 4. where they that have been oppreſ­ſed, ſhall ſay of Babylon, how hath the Golden City ceaſed? and v. 10. art thou become weake as we, art thou he••••like unto us? and cap. 23. v. 8. where he may find〈◊〉threatned againſt Tyre, the Crowning City, whoſe Merchants are Princes, and then I would deſire him to conſider, whether he〈◊〉not cauſe to reflect upon that Golden, Crowning City, wherein he lives.

In his ſecond Section alſo, he would ſeeme to gaine advan­tages upon his Adverſary, by faſtning upon him ſeverall Con­tradictions or peices of non-ſence, as he calls them; but they are indeed ſo many wilfull or groſſe miſtakes of his owne. The firſt he thus delivers, as in my word, It's better to be under the Arbitrary Government of One, that challenges not obedience but according to Law: ſo he repeates them and then deſcants, Ar­bitrary government, and yet according to Law. But the words run thus in my Reply; Every man will thinke it more reaſonable to be under the Arbitrary government of One then of many: nay, under the government of One, that challenges not obedience as due, but according to Law, then of Many whoſe commands are Law unto us, as this Anſwerer makes them. In which the Compariſon, as any man may ſee, is double, firſt between the Arbitrary government of One, and of many; then a fortiori, betweene the Legall government of One, and arbitrary Com­mands of Many.

The ſecond Contradiction he thus expreſſes. The Dr un­dertakes to ſatisfy Conſcience, that the Parliament hath not this45 power, and yet ſaith, he does not undertake to ſet down, what power the Parliament hath. 'Tis true the Dr did undertake the firſt, and might doe it without undertaking to ſet downe the extent of the power and priviledges of the Houſes; tho e were the words, and where is the Contradiction? This Anſwerer may undertake to ſhew, the King has not ſuch or ſuch a power (as to make Lawes himſelfe, or the like) yet will not I hope, undertake to ſet downe the extent of the Kings power and Prerogative; it was the very Inſtance there uſed, and the Red­dition of it was, ſo may we without offence conclude of the two Houſes, that they have not ſuch a power by the firſt conſtitation of this Government, &c. A particular Negative may be clea­red by him, that cannot ſhew the extent of the Vniverſall Affirmative.

A third Contradiction or Nonſence he has found in theſe words. This Coordination is but to ſome Act or exerciſe of the ſupream Power, not in the power it ſelfe. I acknowledge the words, and doe thanke him, that he tooke notice of them for their ſakes, who have miſtaken that part of my Reply, as if I granted a Coordination of Subjects with His Majeſty in the ſupream power but then I muſt blame his ignorance. that can­not recontile this (as he ſpeakes) to any truce of Sence; for they that have written of Government and Policy, could have told him, that the concurrence and conſent of ſuch or ſuch perſons, required to ſome Acts of the ſupreame power, doth not al­wayes argue a communication of the Power; and the Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy doth every where teach him to make a wide difference betweene the Power and the Exerciſe of it. Out of this miſtake and ignorance of diſtinguiſhing be­tweene the Power it ſelfe and the Exerciſe of the Power, he runs away with it as a thing granted, that the Houſes are coor­dinate with His Majeſty in the very Supremacy of Power, ſo farre as the Legiſlative and ordaining goes, which is the prin­cipall, and that it remaines for him only to prove, they are coord••with His Majeſty in the other Act of power, as〈◊〉Emaſſyes, appointing Officers, Iuges, &c. which hundertakes in his fourth Section, where we ſhall m••wi••46him. It was the worke of my third Section to ſpeake of the beginnings of Government in this Land, and to ſhew they were inconſiſtent with his Conceit of the making of the firſt King, and the firſt Coalition of Government, as he call'd it. To which after ſome trifeling, he replyes in his third Section, pag. 17. If the Dr thinkes the uncertainties of the Britiſh or Saxon Conſtitutions not fit to ſatisfy Conſcience (as he ſpeakes) how being uncertaine, can he ſatisfy Conſcience (which is the title of his Boooke) that thoſe Conſtitutions were not ſuch? ſo he. Anſw. 1. If thoſe Conſtitutions be uncertaine, it ſatisfyes Conſcience that it can have no warrant from them, which was the task of that book. 2, The uncertainties, which I ſaid he runne Conſcience upon, were in ſeeking the firſt King before the Saxons, for if we go no higher for the beginning of this Engliſh government (as indeed we ſhould not) we have cer­tainly enough to ſatisfy Conſcience, that this Government was not ſuch in the firſt conſtitution, as this Anſwerer would make us believe.

But ſee him comming a pegge lower in the very next words. 'Tis enough that the Conſtitution of our preſent Government was ſuch, at leaſt from the beginning of it's being ſuch; that by the ſame conſent of the people, whereby the firſt ſuch King was made, His Majeſty, that now is, becomes ſuch a King, that the ſame rea­ſon of ſtate, which firſt contrived the Government (however ſooner or leter) ſuch as now it is, remaines ſtill ſpecifically the ſame in that, which the law places it in, the Councell of the Land to actuate and apply it. Anſwer, Nothing can be truer, then that the government was ſuch from the time, that it be­ganne to be ſuch, but he bore us in hand before, that it was ſuch from the very firſt beginning of the Monarchy. & ſo he ought to prove it to be; for elſe it muſt become ſuch by the conſent of the King in being, condeſcending from unlimited condition to a more moderate way of Government by ſeverall fixed laws; as was ſhewed above, when we ſpoke of Limitations and Mix­tures, Sect.