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OR, A ſuccinct Examination of the Fundamentals of Monarchy, both in this and other Kingdoms, as well about the Right of Power in Kings, as of the Originall or Naturall Liberty of the People.

A Queſtion never yet diſputed, though moſt neceſſary in theſe Times.

LUCAN. Lib. 3.

LIBERTAS () Populi quem Regna cohercent Libertate Perit:

Nequeenim libertas gratior ulla eſt Quam Domino ſervire bono


Printed in the Year, 1648.

[blazon or coat of arms

The Preface.

WE do but flatter our ſelves, if we hope ever to be governed without an Arbitrary power. No: we miſtake, the queſtion is not, whe­thher there ſhall be an Arbitrary power; but the only point is, who ſhall have that Arbi­trary power, whether one man or many: there never was, nor never can be any people governed without a power of making Laws, and every power of making Laws muſt be Ar­bitrary: for to make a Law according to Law, is contradi­ctio in adjecto: It is generally confeſſed that in a Demo­cratie, the Supream or Arbritrary power of making Laws is in a multitude; and ſo in an Ariſtocracy the like Legiſlative or Arbitrary power is in a few, or in the Nobility. And therefore by a neceſſary conſequence in a Monarchy the ſame Legiſlative power muſt be in one; according to the rule of Ariſtotle, who ſaith, Government is in One, or in a Few, or in Many.

This antient Doctrine of Government, in theſe latter daies hath been ſtrangly refined by the Romaniſts, and won­derfully improved ſince the reformation eſpecially in point of Monarchy, by an opinion that the people have original­ly a power to create ſeverall ſorts of Monarchy, to limit and compound them with other formes of Government, at their pleaſure.

As for this naturall power of the people, they find neither Scripture, reaſon, or practice to juſtifie it: for though ſeve­rall Kingdomes have ſeverall and diſtinct Laws one from an other: yet that doth not make ſeverall ſorts of Monar­chy: Nor doth the difference of obtaining the Supreame power, whether by Conqueſt, election, ſucceſsion, or by any other way make different ſorts of Government. It is the difference onely of the Authors of the Laws, and not of the Laws themſelves that alters the forme of government, that is, whether one man, or more then one make the Laws.

Since the growth of this new doctrine of the Limitation and Mixture of Monarchy, it is moſt apparent that Mo­narchy hath bin crucified (as it were) between two Theeves, the Pope and the People; for what principles the Papiſts make uſe of for the power of the Pope above Kings; the very ſame by blotting out the word Pope, and putting in the word People, the Plebiſts take up to uſe againſt their So­veraignes.

If we would truly know what Popery is, we ſhall find by the Lawes, and Statutes of the Realme, that the main, and in­deed, the only point of Popery is the alienating and with­drawing of Subjects from their obedience to their Prince, to raiſe Sedition and Rebellion: if Popery and Popularity agree in this point, The Kings of Chriſten­dome that have ſhaken off the power of the Pope have made no great bargain of it, if in place of one Lord abroad, they get many Lords at home within their own Kingdoms.

I cannot but reverence that form of Government which was allowed and made uſe of for Gods own people, and for all other Nations. It were impiety, to think, that God who was carefull to appoint Judiciall lawes for his choſen people would not furniſh them with the beſt forme of government: or to imagine that the rules given in divers places in the Goſpel by our bleſſed Saviour and his Apoſtles for obedience to Kings ſhould now, like Almanacks out of date, be of no uſe to us becauſe it is pretended we have a Forme of Govern­ment now, not once thought of in thoſe daies. It is a ſhame and ſcandal for us Chriſtians to ſeek the originall of Go­vernment from the inventions or fictions of Poets, Orators, Philoſophers, and heathen Hiſtorians, who all lived thou­ſands of years after the Creation, & were (in a manner) ig­norant of it: and to neglect the Scriptures which have with more authority moſt particularly given us the true grounds and principles of Government.

Theſe Conſiderations cauſed me to ſcruple this moderne piece of Politicks touching Limited and Mixed Monarchy, and finding no other that preſented us with the nature and meanes of Limitation and Mixture, but an anonymus Au­thour: I have drawn a few brief obſervations upon the moſt conſiderable part of his Treatiſe, in which I deſire to receive ſatisfaction from the Author himſelf if it may be, according to his promiſe in his Preface; or if not from him, from any other for him.



THere is ſcarce the meaneſt man of the multitude but can now in theſe daies tell us that the Go­vernment of the Kingdome of England is a LIMI­TED and MIXED Monarchy: And it is no mervail ſince all the diſputes and arguments of theſe diſtracted times both from the Pulpit and the Preſſe do tend and end in this Concluſion.

The Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy hath copiouſly hand­led the nature and manner of Limited and Mixed Monarchy, and is the firſt and onely man (that I know) hath undertaken the task of deſcribing it, others onely mention it as taking it for granted.

Doctor Ferne gives the Author of this Treatiſe of Monarchy this teſtimony, that the Mixture of government is more acuratelyp. 3. delivered and urged by this Treatiſe then by the Author of the Ful­ler Anſwer. And in another place Doctor Ferne ſaith, he allows his diſtinction of Monarchy into Limited and Mixed. p. 13.

I have with ſome diligence looked over this Treatiſe, but can­not approve of theſe diſtinctions which he propounds, I ſubmit the reaſons of my diſlike to others judgements. I am ſomewhat confident that his doctrine of Limited and Mixed Monarchy is an opinion but of yeſterday, and of no antiquity, a meer innovation in policy, not ſo old as New England, though calculated properly for that Meridian. For in his firſt part of the Treatiſe which con­cerns Monarchy in Generall, there is not one proof, text, or ex­ample in Scripture that he hath produced to juſtifie his conceit of Limited and Mixed Monarchy. Neither doth he afford us ſo much as one paſſage or reaſon out of Ariſtotle, whoſe books of Politicks, and whoſe naturall reaſons are of greateſt autho­rity and credit with all rationall men next to the ſacred Scrip­ture: Nay, I hope I may affirme, and be able to prove that A­riſt. doth confute both limited and mixed Monarchy, howſoever Doctor Ferne think theſe new opinions to be raiſed upon Ariſt.p. 6. principles. As for other Polititians or Hiſtorians, either divine or humane, ancient or modern, our Author brings not one to con­firm his opinions, nor doth he, nor can he ſhew that ever any Na­tion or people were governed by a limited or mixed Monarchy.

Machivell is the firſt in Chriſtendome that I can find that writ of a Mixed Government, but not one ſyllable of a Mixed Mo­narchy: he, in his diſcourſes or diſputations upon the Decades of Livy falls ſo enamored with the Roman Common-wealth, that he thought he could never ſufficiently grace that popular govern­ment, unleſſe he ſaid, there was ſomething of Monarchy in it: yet he was never ſo impudent as to ſay, it was a mixed Monarchy. And what Machivell hath ſaid for Rome, the like hath Contarene for Venice; But Bodin hath layed open the errors of both theſe, as alſo of Polibius, and ſome few others that held the like opini­ons. As for the Kingdome of England if it have found out a form of Government (as the Treatiſe layeth it down) of ſuch perfecti­on as never any other people could; It is both a glory to the Nation, and alſo to this Author who hath firſt decipher'd it.

I now make my approach to the Book it ſelf: The title is, A Treatiſe of Monarchy. The firſt part of it is, of Monarchy in Ge­nerall: Where firſt, I charge the Author, that he hath not given us any definition or deſcription of Monarchy in Generall: for by3 the rules of method he ſhould have firſt defined, and then divi­ded: for if there be ſeverall ſorts of Monarchy, then in ſome­thing they muſt agree, which makes them to be Monarchies, and in ſomething they muſt diſagree and differ which makes them to be ſeverall ſorts of Monarchies: in the firſt place he ſhould have ſhewed us in what they all agreed which muſt have been a defini­tion of Monarchy in Generall, which is the foundation of the Treatiſe; and except that be agreed upon, we ſhal argue upon we know not what; I preſſe not this maine omiſſion of our Author out of any humor of wrangling, but becauſe I am confident that had he pitched upon any definition of Monarchy in Generall, his own definition would have confuted his whole Treatiſe: Beſides I find him pleaſed to give us a handſome definition of Abſolute Monarchy, from whence I may infer, that he knew no other defi­nition that would have fitted all his other ſorts of Monarchy, it concerned him to have produced it, leſt it might be thought there could be no Monarchy but Abſolute.

What our Author hath omitted, I ſhall attempt to ſupply, and leave to the ſcanning. And it ſhall be a reall as well as nominall definition of Monarchy. A Monarchy is the government of one a­lone. For the better credit of this definition, though it be able to maintain it ſelf, yet I ſhall deduce it from the principles of our Author of the Treatiſe of Monarchy.

We all know that this word Monarch is compounded of two Greek words,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉and〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is imperare, to govern and rule,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉ſignifies one alone. The underſtanding of theſe two words may be picked out of our Author. Firſt, for government he teacheth us, it is Poteſtatis exercitium, the exerciſe of a morallp. 1. power; next he grants us, that every Monarch (even his limitedp. 12. Monarch) muſt have the Supream power of the State in him, ſo that his power must no way be limited by any power above his, for then he were not a Monarch, but a ſubordinate Magiſtrate. Here we have a fair confeſſion of a ſupreame unlimited power in his limited Monarch: if you will know what he meanes by theſe words ſu­pream power, turn to his 26 page, there you will find, Supream power is either Legiſlative, or Gubernative, and that the legiſlative power is the chief of the two, he makes both ſupream, and yet one chief: the like diſtinction he hath before, where he ſaith, The4 power of Magiſtracy, in reſpect of its degrees, is Nomotheticall orp. 5. Architectonicall: and Gubernative or Executive: by theſe words of Legiſlative, Nomotheticall and Architectonicall power, in plain Engliſh, he underſtands, a power of making Laws; and by Guber­native and Executive, a power of putting thoſe Laws in execution by judging and puniſhing offenders.

The reſult we have from hence is, that by the Authors acknow­ledgment, every Monarch muſt have the Supream power, and that ſupream power is, a power to make laws: and howſoever the Author makes the Gubernative and Executive power a part of the Supream power; yet he confeſſeth the Legiſlative to be chief, or the higheſt degree of power, for he doth acknowledge de­grees of Supream power; nay, he afterwards teacheth us, that the Legiſlative power is the height of power, to which the other partsp. 4. are ſubſequent and ſubſervient, if Gubernative be ſubſervient to Legiſlative, how can Gubernative power be ſupream?

Now let us examine the Authors Limited Monarch by theſe his own rules, he tells us, that in a moderated, limited, ſtinted, con­ditionate,. 12. legall or allayed Monarchy, (for all theſe tearms he hath for it) the Supream power must be reſtrained by ſome Law accor­ding to which this power was given, and by direction of which this power must act, when in a line before he ſaid, that the Monarchs power muſt not be limited by any power above his: yet here he will have his Supream power reſtrained; not limited, and yet reſtrai­ned; is not a reſtraint, a limitation? and if reſtrained, how is it ſupream? and if reſtrained by ſome law, is not the power of that law, and of them that made that law above his ſupream power? and if by the direction of ſuch law only he muſt govern, where is the Legiſlative power which is the chief of Supream power? when the Law muſt rule and govern the Monarch, and not the Monarch the Law, he hath at the moſt but a Gubernative or Executive power: if his authority tranſcends its bounds, if it com­mandp. 14. beyond the Law, and the Subject is not bound legally to ſubje­ction in ſuch caſes, and if the utmoſt extent of the Law of the land be the meaſure of the Limited Monarchs power, and Subjects duty, where ſhall we find the Supream power that Culmen or apex po­teſtatis,p. 16. that prime〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which our Author ſaith, muſt be in every Monarch: The word〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which ſignifies, principality and power, doth alſo ſignifie, principium, beginning; which doth teach us, that by the word Prince, or principality, the principium or beginning of Government is meant; this, if it be given to the Law, it robs the Monarch, and makes the Law the primum mobile, and ſo that which is but the inſtrument, or ſervant to the Monarch, becomes the maſter. Thus much of the word〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

The other word is〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ſolus, one alone: the Monarch muſt not only have the Supream power unlimited, but he muſt have it a­lone (without any companions.) Our Author teacheth us, He is nop. 15. Monarch if the Supream power be not in one. And again he ſaith, if you put the apex poteſtatis, or ſupream power, in the whole body, orp. 17. a part of it, you deſtroy the being of Monarchy.

Now, let us ſee if his mixed Monarchy be framed according to theſe his own principles: Firſt, he ſaith, in a mixed Monarchyp. 25. the ſoveraign power muſt be originally in all three Eſtates. And a­gain, his words are, the three Eſtates are all ſharers in the Supream power the primity of ſhare in the ſupream power is in One. Here we find, that he that told us the ſupream power muſt be in one, will now allow his mixed Monarch but one ſhare only of the ſu­pream power, and gives other ſhares to the Eſtates: thus he de­ſtroies the being of Monarchy by putting the Supream power or culmen poteſtatis, or a part of it in the whole body, or a part thereof, and yet formerly he confeſſeth, that the power of Magiſtracy can­notp. 5. well be divided, for it is one ſimple thing or indiviſable beam of di­vine perfection, but he can make this indiviſable beam to be divi­ſable into three ſhares. I have done with the word〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ſolus, alone.

I have dwelt the longer upon this definition of Monarchy, be­cauſe the apprehending of it out of the Authors own grounds quite overthrows both his Monarch Limited by law, and his Mo­narch Mixed with the States. For to Govern, is to give a Law to others; and not to have a Lave given to Govern, and limit him that Governs: And to govern alone is not to have ſharers or companions mixed with the Governor. Thus the two words of which Monarchy is compounded contradict the two ſorts of Mo­narchy which he pleads for; and by conſequence his whole Trea­tiſe, for theſe two ſorts of limited and mixed Monarchy take up (in a manner) his whole Book.

I will now touch ſome few particular paſſages in the Trea­tiſe.

Our Author firſt confeſſeth, it is Gods expreſſe ordinance therep. 2. ſhould be Government, and he proves it by Gen. 3. 16. where God ordained Adam to rule over his Wife, and her deſires were to be ſub­ject to his; and as hers, ſo all theirs that ſhould come of her. Here we have the originall grant of Government, & the fountain of all power placed in the father of all mankind, accordingly we find the law for obedience to government given in the tearms of honor thy Father: not only the conſtitution of power in generall, but the li­mitation of it to one kind (that is, to Monarchy, or the govern­ment of one alone) and the determination of it to the individual perſon & line of Adam are all three ordinances of God. Neither Eve nor her Children could either limit Adams power, or join o­thers with him in the government, and what was given unto A­dam was given in his perſon to his poſterity. This paternal power continued monarchicall to the Floud, and after the Floud to the confuſion of Babel when Kingdomes were firſt erected, planted, or ſcattered over the face of the world; we find Gen. 10. 11. It was done by Colonies of whole families, over which, the prime Fa­thers had ſupream power, and were Kings, who were all the ſons or grand-children of Noah, from whom they derived a fatherly and regall power over their families. Now if this ſupream power was ſetled and founded by God himſelf in the fatherhood, how is it poſſible for the people to have any right or title to alter and diſpoſe of it otherwiſe? what commiſſion can they ſhew that gives them power either of limitation or mixture? It was Gods ordinance, that ſupremacy ſhould be unlimited in Adam, and as large as all the acts of his will: and as in him, ſo in all others that have ſupream power, as appears by the judgement and ſpeech of the people to Joſhuah when he was ſupream Governour, theſe are their words to him, All that thou commandeſt us wee will do, whoſoever he be that doth rebel againſt thy commandement, and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandeſt him, he ſhal be put to death: we may not ſay that theſe were evill Coun­ſellours or flattering Courtiers of Joſhuah, or that he himſelf was a Tyrant for having ſuch arbitrary power. Our Author, and all thoſe, who affirm, that power is conveyed to perſons by publick con­ſent,7 are forced to confeſſe, that it is the fatherly power that firſt inables a people to make ſuch conveyance, ſo that admitting (as they hold) that our Anceſtors did at firſt convey power, yet the reaſon why we now living, doe ſubmit to ſuch power is, for that our Fore-fathers every one for himſelf, his family, and poſterity, had a power of reſigning up themſelves and us to a ſupream power. As the Scripture teacheth us, that ſupream power was o­riginally in the fatherhood without any limitation, ſo likewiſe reaſon doth evince it, that if God ordained that Supremacy ſhould be, that then ſupremacy muſt of neceſſity be unlimited, for the power that limits muſt be above that power which is limited, if it be li­mited it cannot be ſupream: ſo that if our Author will grant ſu­pream power to be the ordinance of God, the ſupream power will prove it ſelf to be unlimited by the ſame ordinance, becauſe a ſupream limited power is a contradiction.

The monarchicall power of Adam the Father of all fleſh, being by a general binding ordinance ſetled by God in him & his poſte­rity by right of fatherhood, the form of Monarchy muſt be pre­ferr'd above other forms, except the like ordinance for other forms can be ſhewed: neither may men according to their relations to the form they live under to their affections and judgments in divers reſpects prefer, or compare any other form with Monarchy. The point that moſt perplexeth our Author and many others is, that if Mo­narchy be allowed to be the ordinance of God, an abſurdity would follow, that we ſhould uncharitably condemn all the cōmunities which have not that form, for violation of Gods ordinance, and pronounce thoſe other powers unlawfull: if thoſe who live under a Monarchy can juſtifie the form they live under to be Gods ordinance, they are not bound to forbear their own juſtification, becauſe others cannot do the like for the form they live under; let others look to the defence of their own government: if it cannot be proved or ſhewed that any other form of government had ever any law­full beginning, but was brought in, or erected by rebellion, muſt therefore the lawfull and juſt obedience to Monarchy be denied to be the ordinance of God.

To proceed with our Author, in the 3 page, he ſaith, the Higher Power is Gods ordinance: That it reſideth in One or more, in ſuch or ſuch a way, is from humane deſignment, God by no word binds any8 people to this or that form, till they by their own act bind themſelves. Becauſe the power and conſent of the people in government is the burden of the whole Book, and our Author expects it ſhould be admitted as a magiſteriall poſtulation without any other proof then a naked ſuppoſition, and ſince others alſo maintain that ori­ginally Power, was or now is in the People, and that the firſt Kings were choſen by the People: they may not be offended, if they be asked in what ſenſe they underſtand the word [People] becauſe this, as many other words hath different acceptions, being ſome­times taken in a larger, other whiles in a ſtricter ſenſe. Literally, and in the largeſt ſenſe the word People ſignifies the whole multi­tude of mankind, but figuratively and ſynecdochecally it notes many times the major part of a multitude, or ſometimes the better, or the richer, or the wiſer, or ſome other part; and oftentimes a very ſmall part of the people, if there be no other apparent op­poſite party hath the name of the people by preſumption.

If they underſtand that the entire multitude, or whole people have originally by nature power to chuſe a King, they muſt re­member that by their own principles, and rules by nature all man­kind in the world makes but one People, who they ſuppoſe to be born alike to an equall freedome from ſubjection, and where ſuch freedome is, there all things muſt of neceſſity be common, and therefore without a joynt conſent of the whole people of the world, no one thing can be made proper to any one man, but it will be an injury, and an uſurpation upon the common right of all others; From whence it follows, that naturall freedome being once granted, there cannot be any one man choſen a King without the univerſall conſent of all the people of the world at one in­ſtant, nemine contradicente. Nay, if it be true that nature hath made all men free; though all mankind ſhould concur in one vote, yet it cannot ſeem reaſonable, that they ſhould have power to alter the law of nature; for if no man have power to take a­way his own life without the guilt of being a murtherer of him­ſelf, how can any people confer ſuch a power as they have not themſelves upon any one man, without being acceſſories to their own deaths; and every particular man become guilty of being felo de ſe?

If this generall ſignification of the word People be diſavowed,9 and men will ſuppoſe that the people of particular Regions, or Countries have power and freedome to chuſe unto themſelves Kings; then let them but obſerve the conſequence: Since nature hath not diſtinguiſhed the habitable world into Kingdomes, nor determined what part of a people ſhall belong to one Kingdome, and what to another, it follows that the originall freedome of mankind being ſuppoſed, every man is at liberty to be of what Kingdome he pleaſe, and ſo every petty company hath a right to make a Kingdome by it ſelf, and not only every City, but every Village, and every Family; nay, and every particular man a li­berty to chuſe himſelf to be his owne King if he pleaſe, and he were a mad man that being by nature free would chuſe any man but himſelf to be his own Governour. Thus to avoid the having but of one King of the whole world, we ſhall run into a liberty of having as many Kings as there be men in the world, which upon the matter, is to have no King at all, but to leave all men to their naturall liberty, which is the miſchief the Pleaders for naturall liberty do pretend they would moſt avoid.

But if neither the whole People of the world, nor the whole people of any part of the world be meant: but only the major part, or ſome other part, of a part of the world: yet, ſtill the ob­jection will be the ſtronger. For beſides that nature hath made no partition of the world, or of the people into diſtinct King­domes, and that without an univerſal conſent at one and the ſame inſtant no partition can be made: yet if it were lawfull for par­ticular parts of the world by conſent to chuſe their Kings, never­theleſſe, their elections would bind none to ſubjection but only ſuch as conſented; for the major part never binds, but where men at firſt either agree to be ſo bound, or where a higher power ſo commands: Now there being no higher power then nature, but God himſelf; where neither nature nor God appoints the major part to bind, their conſent is not binding to any but only to them­ſelves who conſent.

Yet, for the preſent to gratifie them ſo far as to admit that ei­ther by nature, or by a generall conſent of all mankind, the world at firſt was divided into particular Kingdomes, and the major part of the people of each Kingdom aſſembled, allowed to chuſe their King: yet it cannot truly be ſaid that ever the whole people, or the major part, or indeed any conſiderable part of the whole peo­ple of any nation ever aſſembled to any ſuch purpoſe; For ex­cept by ſome ſecret miraculous inſtinct they ſhould all meet at one time, and place; what one man, or company of men leſſe then the whole people hath power to appoint either time, or place of elections, where all be alike free by nature? and without a lawfull ſummons it is moſt unjuſt to bind thoſe that be abſent. The whole people cannot ſummon it ſelf, one man is ſick, another is lame, a third is aged, and a fourth is under age of diſcretion: all theſe at ſome time or other, or at ſome place or other might be able to meet, if they might chuſe their own time and place, as men naturally free ſhould.

In Aſſemblies that are by humane politique conſtitution, the ſu­perior power that ordains ſuch aſſemblies, can regulate and con­fine them both for time, place, perſons, and other circumſtances: but where there is an equality by nature, there can be no ſuperior power, there every Infant at the hour it is born in hath a like in­tereſt with the greateſt and wiſeſt man in the world. Mankind is like the ſea, ever ebbing or flowing, every minute one is borne, another dies, thoſe that are the people, this minute, are not the people the next minute, in every inſtant and point of time there is a variation: no one time can be indifferent for all mankind to aſſemble, it cannot but be miſchievous alwaies, at the leaſt to all Infants, and others under age of diſcretion; not to ſpeak of wo­men, eſpecially Virgins, who by birth have as much naturall free­dome as any other, and therefore ought not to loſe their liberty without their own conſent.

But in part to ſalve this, it will be ſaid that Infants and Chil­dren may be concluded by the votes of their Parents. This reme­dy may cure ſome part of the miſchief, but it deſtroies the whole cauſe: and at laſt ſtumbles upon the true originall of govern­ment. For if it be allowed, that the acts of Parents bind the Children, then farewell the doctrine of the naturall freedome of mankind, where ſubjection of Children to Parents is naturall, there can be no naturall freedome. If any reply, that not all children ſhall be bound by their Parents conſent, but onely thoſe that are under age: It muſt be conſidered, that in nature there is no nonage, if a man be not borne free, ſhe doth not aſſigne him any other11 time when he ſhall attaine his freedome: or if ſhe did, then Chil­dren attaining that age ſhould be diſcharged of their Parents contract. So that in concluſion, if it be imagined that the people were ever but once free from ſubjection by nature, it will prove a meer impoſſibility ever lawfully to introduce any kind of go­vernment whatſoever without apparent wrong to a multitude of people.

It is further obſervable, that ordinarily Children and Servants are far a greater number then Parents and Maſters, and for the major part of theſe to be able to vote and appoint what govern­ment or Governours their Fathers and Maſters ſhall be ſubject unto, is moſt unnaturall, and in effect to give the Children the government over their Parents.

To all this it may be oppoſed, what need diſpute how a People can chuſe a King, ſince there be multitude of examples that Kings have been, and are now adaies choſen by their People? The an­ſwer is. 1. The queſtion is not of the fact, but of the right, whe­ther it have been done by a naturall, or by an uſurped right. 2. Ma­ny Kings are, and have bin choſen by ſome ſmall part of a People, but by the whole, or major part of a Kingdom not any at all. Moſt have been elected by the Nobility, Great men, and Princes of the bloud, as in Poland, Denmarke, and in Sweden; not by any col­lective or repreſentative body of any Nation: ſometimes a facti­ous or ſeditious City, or a mutinous Army hath ſet up a King, but none of all thoſe could ever prove they had right or juſt title ei­ther by nature, or any otherwiſe for ſuch elections: we may re­ſolve upon theſe two propoſitions. 1. That the People have no power or right of themſelves to chuſe Kings. 2. If they had any ſuch right, it is not poſſible for them any way lawfully to exerciſe it.

You will ſay, There muſt neceſſarily be a right in ſome body to e­lect, in caſe a King die without an Heir. I anſwer, No King can die without an Heir as long as there is any one man living in the world, it may be the Heir may be unknown to the people, but that is no fault in nature, but the negligence or ignorance of thoſe whom it concerns. But if a King could die without an Heir, yet the Kingly power in that caſe ſhal not eſcheat to the whole people, but to the ſupream Heads and Fathers of Families; not as they are the people, but quatenus, they are Fathers of people, over whom they have a12 ſupream power divolved unto them after the death of their ſove­raign Anceſtor, and if any can have a right to chuſe a King, it muſt be theſe Fathers by conferring their diſtinct fatherly powers upon one man alone. Chief fathers in Scripture are accounted as all the people, as all the Children of Iſrael, as all the Congregation, as the Text plainly expounds it ſelf, 2 Chr. 1. 2. where Solomon ſpeaks to All Iſrael, that is, to the Captains, the Judges, and to every Go­vernour, the CHIEF OF THE FATHERS, and ſo the Elders of Iſrael are expounded to be the chief of the Fathers of the Children of Iſrael, 1 King. 8. 1. and the 2 Chr. 5. 2.

If it be objected, That Kings are not now (as they were at the firſt planting or peopling of the world) the Fathers of their People, or Kingdoms, and that the fatherhood hath loſt the right of governing. An anſwer is, That all Kings that now are, or ever were; are, or were either Fathers of their People, or the Heirs of ſuch Fathers, or Uſurpers of the right of ſuch Fathers: It is a truth undeniable that there cannot be any multitude of men whatſoever, either great, or ſmall, though gathered together from the ſeverall corners and remoteſt regions of the world, but that in the ſame multitude conſidered by it ſelf, there is one man amongſt them that in nature hath a right to be the King of all the reſt, as being the next Heir to Adam: and all the others ſubject unto him, every man by nature is a King, or a Subject: the obedience which all Subjects yeild to Kings is but the paying of that duty which is due to the ſupream fatherhood: Many times by the act either of an Uſurper himſelf, or of thoſe that ſet him up, the true Heire of a Crown is diſpoſſeſſed, God uſing the miniſtry of the wickedeſt men for the removing and ſetting up of Kings: in ſuch caſes the Subjects obedience to the fatherly power muſt go along and wait upon Gods providence who only hath right to give, and take away Kingdomes, and thereby to adopt Subjects into the o­bedience of another fatherly power: according to that of A­riſt:〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. A Monarchy or King­dome will be a fatherly government. Ethic. l. 8. c. 12.

However the naturall freedome of the People be cried up as the ſole means to determine the kind of government, and the Gover­nours: yet in the cloſe, all the favourers of this opinion are con­ſtrained to grant, that the obedience which is due to the fatherly13 power is the true and only cauſe of the ſubjection, which we that are now living give to Kings, ſince none of us gave conſent to go­vernment, but only our Fore-fathers act and conſent hath conclu­ded us.

Whereas many confeſſe that government only in the abſtract is the ordinance of God, they are not able to prove any ſuch ordi­nance in the Scripture, but only in the fatherly power, and there­fore we find the Commandement that enjoynes obedience to Su­periours given in the tearms of Honour thy Father: ſo that not onely the power or right of government, but the form of the power of governing, and the perſon having that power, are all the ordi­nance of God, the firſt Father had not onely ſimply power, but power Monarchicall as he was a Father immediately from God; For by the appointment of God as ſoon as Adam was Created he was Monarch of the World, though he had no Subjects; for though there could not be actuall government untill there were Subjects, yet by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be Governour of his poſterity: though not in act, yet at leaſt in ha­bit Adam was a King from his Creation: And in the ſtate of in­nocency he had been Governour of his Children, for the integri­ty or excellency of the Subjects doth not take away the order or eminency of the Governour. Eve was ſubject to Adam before he ſinned, the Angels who are of a pure nature are ſubject to God: which confutes their ſaying, who in diſgrace of civill government or power ſay it was brought in by ſin: Government as to coa­ctive power was after ſin, becauſe coaction ſuppoſeth ſome diſ­order which was not in the ſtate of innocency: But as for dire­ctive power the condition of humane nature requires it, ſince civil ſociety cannot be imagined without power of Government: for although as long as men continued in the ſtate of innocency they might not need the direction of Adam in thoſe things which were neceſſarily and morally to be done, yet things indifferent that de­pended meerly on their free will might be directed by the power of Adams command.

If we conſider the firſt plantations of the world which were after the building of Babel when the confuſion of tongues was, we may find the diviſion of the earth into diſtinct Kingdomes and Countries by ſeverall families, whereof the Sons or Grand-chil­dren of Noah were the Kings or Governours by a fatherly right, and for the preſervation of this power and right in the Fathers, God was pleaſed upon ſeverall Families to beſtow a Language on each by it ſelf, the better to unite it into a Nation or Kingdome, as appears by the words of the Text, Gen. 10. Theſe are the Fa­milies of the Sons of Noah, after their generations in their Nati­ons, and by theſe were the Nations divided in the earth after the floud: Every one after HIS TONGUE AFTER THEIR FAMI­LIES in their Nations.

The Kings of England have been gratiouſly pleaſed to admit, and accept the Commons in Parliament as the repreſentees of the Kingdom, yet really and truly they are not the repreſentative bo­dy of the whole Kingdom.

The Commons in Parliament are not the repreſentative body of the whole Kingdome, they do not repreſent the King who is the head and principall member of the Kingdome, nor do they repreſent the Lords who are the nobler and higher part of the body of the Realme, and are perſonally preſent in Parliament, and therefore need no repreſentation. The Commons onely re­preſent a part of the lower or inferior part of the body of the People, which are the Free-holders worth 40s. by the year, and the Commons or Free-men of Cities and Burroughs, or the ma­jor part of them. All which are not one quarter, nay, not a tenth part of the Commons of the Kingdome, for in every Pa­riſh for one Free-holder there may be found ten that are no Free-holders: and anciently before Rents were improved there were nothing neer ſo many Free-holders of 40 s. by the year as now are to be found.

The ſcope and Concluſion of this diſcourſe and Argument is, that the people taken in what notion or ſenſe ſoever, either dif­fuſively, collectively, or repreſentatively, have not, nor cannot ex­erciſe any right or power of their own by nature either in chuſing or in regulating Kings. But whatſoever power any people doth lawfully exerciſe, it muſt receive it from a ſupreame power on earth, and practice it with ſuch limitations as that ſuperior power ſhall appoint. To returne to our Author.

He divides Monarchy into
  • Abſolute,
  • Limited.

Abſolute Monarchy (ſaith he) is, when the Soveraignty is ſop. 6. fully in one, that it hath no limits or bounds under God but his owne will. This definition of his I embrace; And as before I charged our Author for not giving us a definition of Monarchy in general, ſo I now note him for not affording us any definition of any o­ther particular kind of Monarchy but onely of abſolute, it may peradventure make ſome doubt that there is no other ſort but only that which he calls abſolute.

Concerning abſolute Monarchy, he grants, that ſuch were the antient Eaſtern Monarchies, and that of the Turk and Perſian at this day, herein he ſaith very true. And we muſt remember him though he doe not mention them that the Monarchs of Judah and Iſrael muſt be comprehended under the number of thoſe he calls the Eaſtern Monarchies: and truly if he had ſaid that all the an­tient Monarchies of the world had been abſolute I ſhould not have quarreld at him, nor doe I know who could have diſproved him.

Next it follows, that Abſolute Monarchy is, when a people are abſolutely reſigned up, or reſigne up themſelves to be governed by the will of One man where men put themſelves into this utmoſt de­gree of ſubjection by oath and contract, or are borne and brought unto it by Gods providence. In both theſe places he acknowledgeth there may be other means of obtaining a Monarchy beſides the contract of a Nation, or peoples reſigning up themſelves to be governed, which is contrary to what he after ſaies, that the ſolep. 12. mean or root of all Soveraignty is the conſent and fundamentall con­tract of a Nation of men.

Moreover the Author determins, that Abſolute Monarchy is a lawfull government, and that men may be borne and brought unto it by Gods providence, it binds them, and they muſt abide it becauſe an oath to a lawfull thing is obligatory. This poſition of his I approve, but his reaſon doth not ſatisfie, for men are bound to obey a law­full Governour, though neither they, nor their Anceſtors ever took oath.

Then he proceeds, and confeſſeth that in Rom. 13. the powerp. 7.16 which then was, was Abſolute: yet the Apoſtle not excluding it, calls it Gods ordinance, and commands ſubjection to it; ſo Chriſts com­mands Tribute to be paid, and paies it himſelfe; yet it was an arbi­traryax, the production of an abſolute power. Theſe are the loyall expreſſions of our Author touching abſolute or arbitrary Monar­chy: I doe the rather mention theſe paſſages of our Author, be­cauſe very many in theſe daies doe not ſtick to maintain, that an arbitrary or Abſolute Monarch not limited by law, is all one with a Tyrant, and to be governed by one mans will, is to be made a ſlave: It is a queſtion whether our Author be not of that mind when he ſaith, abſolute ſubjection is ſervitude, and thereupon a late friend, to limited Monarchy, affirmes in a diſcourſe upon the que­ſtionp. 54. in debate between the King and Parliament, That to make a King by the ſtandard of Gods word is to make the Subjects ſlaves for conſcience ſake. A hard ſaying, and I doubt whether he that gives this cenſure can be excuſed from blaſphemy. It is a bold ſpeech to condemn all the Kings of Judah for Tyrants, or to ſay all their Subjects were ſlaves. But certainly the man doth not know nei­ther what a Tyrant is, or what a Slave is: indeed the words are frequent enough in every mans mouth, & our old Engliſh Tranſla­tion of the Bible uſeth ſometimes the word Tyrant, but the Au­thors of our new Tranſlation have been ſo carefull as not once to uſe the word, but onely for the proper name of a man, Act. 19. 9. becauſe they find no Hebrew word in the Scripture to ſignifie a Tyrant, or a ſlave. Neither Ariſt: Bodin, nor Sir Walter Rawleigh (who were all men of deep judgement) can agree in a definition or deſcription of tyranny, though they have all three laboured in the point. And I make ſome queſtion whether any man can poſ­ſibly deſcribe what a Tyrant is, and then tell me any one man that ever was in the world that was a Tyrant according to that de­ſcription.

I return again to our Treatiſe of Monarchy, where I find three DEGREES of abſolute Monarchy:

1. Where the Monarch, whoſe Will is the law, doth ſet himſelf no law to rule by, but by commands of his own judgement as he thinks fit.

2. When he ſets a law, by which he will ordinarily governe, re­ſerving to himſelf a liberty to vary from it as oft as in his diſcretion17 he thinks FIT, and in this the Soveraign is as free as the former.

3. Where he not only ſets a rule, but promiſeth in many caſes not to alter it, but this promiſe or engagement is an after condiſcent or act of grace not diſſolving the abſolute Oath of ſubjection which went before it.

For the firſt of theſe three, there is no queſtion but it is a pure abſolute Monarchy; but as for the other two, though he ſay, they be abſolute, yet in regard, they ſet themſelves limits or laws to govern by, if it pleaſe our Author to term them limited Monarchs, I wil not oppoſe him, yet I muſt tell him that his third degree of abſolute Monarchy is ſuch a kind, as I believe, never hath been, nor ever can be in the world. For a Monarch to promiſe and engage in many caſes not to alter a law, it is moſt neceſſary that thoſe many caſes ſhould be particularly expreſſed at the bargain making: Now he that underſtands the nature and condition of all humane laws, knows that particular caſes are infinite and not comprehen­ſible within any rules or laws, and if many caſes ſhould be com­prehended, and many omitted, yet even thoſe that were com­prehended would admit of variety of interpretations and diſpu­tations, therefore our Author doth not, nor can tell us of any ſuch reſerved caſes promiſed by any Monarch.

Again, where he ſaith, An after condiſcent or Act of grace doth not diſſolve the abſolute Oath of ſubjection which went before it, though in this he ſpeak true, yet ſtill he ſeems to inſinuate, that an Oath only binds to ſubjection, which Oath, as he would have us believe, was at firſt arbitrary: whereas Subjects are bound to obey Mo­narchs though they never take oath of ſubjection, as wel as children are bound to obey their parents, though they never ſwear to do it.

Next, his diſtinction between the rule of power, and the exerciſep. 7. of it, is vain; for to rule, is to exerciſe power: for himſelf ſaith,p. 1. that Government is, poteſtatis exercitium, the exerciſe of a morall power.

Laſtly, whereas our Author ſaith, a Monarch cannot break his promiſe without ſin: let me adde, that if the ſafety of the people, ſalus populi, require a breach of the Monarchs promiſe, then the ſin, if there be any, is rather in the making, then breaking of the pro­miſe, the ſafety of the people is an exception implied in every Mo­narchicall promiſe.


But it ſeems theſe three degrees of Monarchy do not ſatisfie our Author, he is not content to have a Monarch have a law or rule to govern by, but he muſt have this limitation or law to be abp. 12. externo, from ſomebody elſe, and not from the determination of the Monarchs own will, and therefore he ſaith, by originall conſtitution the ſociety publick confers on one man a power by limited contract, re­ſigning themſelves to be governed by ſuch a law, alſo before he toldp. 13. us, the ſole means of Soveraignty is the conſent and fundamentall con­tract, which conſent puts them in their power, which can be no more nor other then is conveyed to them by ſuch contract of ſubjection. If the ſole means of a limited Monarchy be the conſent and funda­mentall contract of a Nation, how is it that he ſaith, A Monarch may be limited by after condiſcent? is an after condiſcent all one with a fundamentall contract with originall and radicall conſtitution? why ye: he tells us, it is a ſecundary originall conſtitution, a ſecun­dary originall, that is, a ſecond firſt: And if that condiſcent be an act of grace, doth not this condiſcent to a limitation come from the free determination of the Monarchs will? If he either for­mally, or virtually (as our Author ſuppoſeth) deſert his abſolute or arbitrary power which he hath by conqueſt, or other right.

And if it be from the free will of the Monarch, why doth he ſay the limitation muſt be ab externo? he told us before, that ſubjection cannot be diſſolved or leſſen'd by an Act of grace commingp. 8. afterwards, but he hath better bethought himſelf, and now he will have acts of grace to be of two kinds, and the latter kind may a­mount (as he ſaith) to a reſignation of abſolute Monarchy. But can any man believe that a Monarch who by conqueſt or other right hath an abſolute arbitrary power, will voluntarily reſigne that abſoluteneſſe, and accept ſo much power only as the people ſhall pleaſe to give him, and ſuch laws to govern by as they ſhall make choice of? can he ſhew that ever any Monarch was ſo gratious or kind-hearted as to lay down his lawfull power freely at his Sub­jects feet? is it not ſufficient grace if ſuch an abſolute Monarch be content to ſet down a law to himſelf by which he will ordinarily govern, but he muſt needs relinquiſh his old independent commiſ­ſion, & take a new one from his Subjects clog'd with limitations?

Finally, I obſerve, that howſoever our Author ſpeak big of the radicall, fundamentall, and originall power of the people as the19 root of all Soveraignty: yet in a better moode he will take up and be contented with a Monarchy limited by an after condiſcent and act of grace from the Monarch himſelf.

Thus I have briefly touched his grounds of Limited Monarchy; if now we ſhall aske, what proof or examples he hath to juſtifie his doctrine, he is as mute as a fiſh: only Pythagoras hath ſaid it, and we muſt believe him, for though our Author would have Mo­narchy to be limited, yet he could be content his opinion ſhould be abſolute, and not limited to any rule or example.

The maine Charge I have againſt our Author now remaines to be diſcuſſed, and it is this, That inſtead of a Treatiſe of Monar­chy, he hath brought forth a Treatiſe of Anarchy, and that by his owne confeſſions ſhall be made good.

Firſt, he holds, A limited Monarch tranſcends his bounds if he commands beyond the law, and the Subject legally is not bound to ſub­jection in ſuch caſes.

Now if you aske the Author who ſhall be judge, whether the Monarch ••nſcends his bounds, and of the exceſſes of the ſove­raigne power. His anſwer is, There is an impoſſibility of conſtitu­tingp. 16. p. 17. a judge to determine this laſt controverſie I conceive in a limited legall Monarchy there can be no ſtated internall Judge of the Monarchs actions, if there grow a fundamentall variance betwixt him and the community there can be no Judge legall and constituted within that form of government. In theſe anſwers it ap­pears, there is no Judge to determine the Soveraignes or the Mo­narchs tranſgreſſing his fundamentall limits: yet our Author is very cautelous, and ſuppoſeth onely a fundamentall variance be­twixt the Monarch and the Community, he is aſhamed to put the queſtion home. I demand of him if there be a variance be­twixt the Monarch and any of the meaneſt perſon of the Com­munity, who ſhall be the Judge? for inſtance, The King com­mands me, or gives judgment against me: I reply, His commands are illegall, and his judgment not according to law: who muſt judge? if the Monarch himſelf judge, then you deſtroy the frame of the State, and make it abſolute, ſaith our Author, and he gives his reaſon: for to define a Monarch to a law, and then to make him judge of his owne deviations from that law, is to abſolve him from all law. On the other ſide, if any, or all the people may judge, then you put the Soveraignty20 in the whole body, or part of it, and deſtroy the being of Monarchy. Thus our Author hath caught himſelf in a plaine dilemma: if the King be judge, then he is no limited Monarch. If the people be judge, then he is no Monarch at all. So farewell limited Mo­narchy, nay farewell all government if there be no Judge.

Would you know what help our Author hath found out forp. 14. this miſchief? Firſt, he ſaith, that a Subject is bound to yeild to a Magiſtrate, when he cannot, de jure, challenge obedience, if it be in a thing in which he can poſſibly without ſubverſion, and in which his act may not be made a leading caſe, and ſo bring on a preſcription againſtp. 17. publike liberty: Again, he ſaith, if the act in which the exorbitance or tranſgreſſion of the Monarch is ſuppoſed to be, be of leſſer moment, and not ſtriking at the very being of that Government, it ought to be borne by publick patience, rather then to endanger the being of thep. 49. State. The like words he uſes in another place, ſaying, if the will of the Monarch exceed the limits of the law, it ought to be ſubmitted to, ſo it be not contrary to Gods law, nor bring with it ſuch an evill to our ſelves, or the publick, that we cannot be acceſſary toby obeying. Theſe are but fig-leaves to cover the nakedneſſe of our Authors limited Monarch formed upon weak ſuppoſals in caſes of leſſer moment. For if the Monarch be to govern only according to law, no tranſgreſſion of his can be of ſo ſmall moment if he break the bounds of law, but it is a ſubverſion of the government it ſelf, and may be made a leading caſe, and ſo bring on a preſcription againſt publick liberty, it ſtrikes at the very being of the Govern­ment, and brings with it ſuch an evill, as the party that ſuffers, or the publick cannot be acceſſory to: let the caſe be never ſo ſmall; yet if there be illegality in the act, it ſtrikes at the very being of limited Monarchy which is to be legall: unleſſe our Author will ſay, as in effect he doth, That his limited Monarch muſt governe according to law in great and publick matters onely, and that in ſmaller matters which concerne private men or poor perſons, he may rule according to his own will. p. 17.

Secondly, our Author tells us, if the Monarchs act of exorbitan­cy or tranſgreſſion be mortall, and ſuch as ſuffered diſſolves the frame of Government and publick liberty, then the illegality is to be ſet open and redreſment ſought by petition, which if failing prevention by re­ſiſtance ought to be, and if it be apparent and appeale be made to the21 conſciences of mankind, then the fundamentall laws of that Monarchy muſt judge and pronounce the ſentence in every mans conſcience, and every man (ſo farre as concernes him) muſt follow the evidence of Truth in his own ſoul to oppoſe or not to oppoſe, according as he can in conſcience acquit or condemne the act of the governour or Monarch.

Whereas my Author requires, that the deſtructive nature of ille­gall commands ſhould be ſet open: Surely his mind is, That each pri­vate man in his particular caſe ſhould make a publique remon­ſtrance to the world of the illegall act of the Monarch, and then if upon his Petition he cannot be relieved, according to his deſire, he ought, or it is his duty to make reſiſtance. Here I would know, who can be the judge, whether the illegality be made apparent; it is a maine point, ſince every man is prone to flatter himſelfe in his owne cauſe, and to think it good, and that the wrong or inju­ſtice he ſuffers is apparent, when other moderate and indifferent men can diſcover no ſuch thing: and in this caſe the judgement of the common people cannot be gathered or known by any poſſible meanes; or if it could, it were like to be various and erronious.

Yet our Author will have an appeale made to the conſcience of all Man-kind, and that being made, he concludes, the fundamentall Lawes muſt judge and pronounce ſentence in every mans conſcience. Whereas he ſaith, The Fundamentall Lawes muſt judge, I wouldp. 18. very gladly learne of him, or of any other for him, what a Funda­mentall Law is, or elſe have but any one Law named me that any man can ſay is a Fundamentall Law of the Monarchy: I confeſſe he tells us, that the Common Lawes are the foundation, and the Sta­tute Laws are ſuperſtructive; yet I think he dares not ſay that therep. 38. is any one branch or part of the Common Law but that it may be taken away by an Act of Parliament: for many points of the Common Law (de facto) have, and (de jure) any point may be ta­ken away. How can that be called Fundamentall, which hath and may be removed, and yet the Statute Lawes ſtand firme and ſta­ble? it is contrary to the nature of Fundamental, for the building to ſtand when the foundation is taken away.

Beſides, the Common Law is generally acknowledged to be no­thing elſe but common uſage or cuſtome, which by length of time onely obtaines authority: So that it followes in time after go­vernment, but cannot goe before it, and be the rule to Govern­ment,22 by any originall or radicall conſtitution.

Alſo the Common Law being unwritten doubtful and difficult, cannot but be an uncertaine rule to governe by, which is againſt the nature of a rule, which is and ought to be certaine

Laſtly, by making the Common Law onely to be the foundati­on, Magna Charta is excluded from being a Fundamentall Law, and alſo all other Statutes from being limitations to Monarchy, ſince the Fundamentall Lawes onely are to be judge.

Truly the conſcience of all Man-kind is a pretty large Tribunall for the Fundamentall Lawes to pronounce ſentence in. It is very much that Lawes which in their owne nature are dumb, and al­wayes need a Judge to pronounce ſentence, ſhould now be able to ſpeak, & pronounce ſentence themſelves: ſuch a ſentence ſure­ly muſt be upon the hearing of one party onely, for it is impoſſi­ble for a Monarch to make his defence and anſwer, and produce his witneſſes, in every mans conſcience, in each mans cauſe, who will but queſtion the legality of the Monarchs Government? Cer­tainly the ſentence cannot but be unjuſt, where but one mans tale is heard. For all this the concluſion is, Every man muſt oppoſe or not oppoſe the Monarch according to his owne conſcience. Thus at the laſt, every man is brought by this Doctrine of our Authors, to be his owne judge. And I alſo appeal to the conſciences of all man­kinde, whether the end of this be not utter confuſion, and A­narchy.

Yet after all this, the Author ſaith, this power of every mans judg­ingp. 18. the illegall acts of the Monarch, argues not a ſuperiority of thoſe who judge over him, who is judged; and he gives us a profound rea­ſon for it; his words are, it is not authorative and civill, but morall reſiding in reaſonable creatures, and lawfull for them to execute. What our Author meanes by theſe words, (not authorative and civill, but morall) perhaps I underſtand not, though I think I doe; yet it ſerves my turne that he ſaith, that reſiſtance ought to be made, and every man muſt oppoſe or not oppoſe, according as in conſcience he can acquit or condemn the acts of his governour; for if it inable a man to reſiſt and oppoſe his Governour, without queſtion tis authora­tive and civill, whereas he addes, that morall judgement is reſiding in reaſonable creatures, and lawfull for them to execute; he ſeemes to imply that authorative, and civill judgement doth not reſide23 in reaſonable creatures, nor can be lawfully executed: Such a con­cluſion fits well with Anarchy, for he that takes away all Govern­ment, and leaves every man to his owne conſcience, and ſo makes him an Independent in State, may well teach that authority re­ſides not in reaſonable creatures, nor can be lawfully executed.

I paſſe from his abſolute and limited Monarchy, to his diviſion or partition (for he allowes no diviſion) of Monarchy into ſimple and mixed, viz. of a Monarch, the Nobility and Community.

Where firſt, obſerve a doubt of our Authors, whether a firmep. 25. union can be in a mixture of equality, he rather thinks there muſt be a priority of order in one of the three, or elſe there can be no unity. He muſt know that priority of order doth not hinder, but that there may be an equality of mixture if the ſhares be equall, for he that hath the firſt ſhare may have no more then the others: ſo that if he will have an inequality of mixture, a primity of ſhare will not ſerve the turne: the firſt ſhare muſt be greater or better then the others, or elſe they will be equall, and then he cannot call it a mixed Monarchy where only a primity of ſhare in the Supream power is in one: but by his own confeſſion he may better call it a mixed Ariſtocracy or mixed Democracy, then a mixed Monar­chy, ſince he tells us, the Houſes of Parliament ſure have two partsp. 56. of the greatest legiſlative authority, and if the King have but a third part, ſure their ſhares are equall.

The firſt ſtep our Author makes, is this, The ſoveraigne power must be originally in all three; next he finds, that if there be an e­quality of ſhares in three Eſtates, there can be no ground to denomi­nate a Monarch, and then his mixed Monarch might be thought but an empty title: Therefore in the third place he reſolves us, that to ſalve all, A power muſt be ſought out wherewith the Monarchp. 25. muſt be inveſted, which is not ſo great as to deſtroy the mixture, nor ſo titular as to deſtroy the Monarchy, and therefore he conceives it may be in theſe particulars.

Firſt, a Monarch in a mixed Monarchy may be ſaid to be a Monarch (as he conceives) if he be the head & fountain of the power which go­vernsp. 26. & executes the eſtabliſhed Laws, that is, a man may be a Mo­narch though he doe but give power to others to govern and exe­cute the eſtabliſhed Laws, thus he brings his Monarch one ſtep or peg lower ſtill then he was before: at firſt he made us believe his24 Monarch ſhould have the Supream power, which is the legiſla­tive; then he falls from that, and tells us, A limited Monarch muſt govern according to law onely; thus he is brought from the legiſlative to the gubernative or executive power only; nor doth he ſtay here, but is taken a hole lower, for now he muſt not go­vern, but he must conſtitute Officers to govern by laws; if chuſing Officers to govern be governing, then our Author will allow his Monarch to be a Governour, not elſe: and therefore he that di­vided Supream power into legiſlative and gubernative, doth now divide it into legiſlative and power of conſtituting Officers for go­verning by Laws, and this he ſaith is left to the Monarch. Indeed you have left him a faire portion of power, but are we ſure he may enjoy this? it ſeems our Author is not confident in this nei­ther, and ſome others doe deny it him: our Author ſpeaking of the government of this Kingdome, ſaith, The choice of the Officersp. 38. is intruſted to the judgement of the Monarch for ought I know, he is not reſolute in the point, but for ought he knows; and for ought I know his Monarch is but titular, an empty title, certaine of no power at all.

The power of chuſing Officers only, is the baſeſt of all powers; Ariſtotle (as I remember) ſaith, The common people are fit for no­thing but to chuſe Officers, and to take accompts: and indeed, in all popular governments the multitude perform this work: and this work in a King puts him below all his Subjects, and makes him the onely Subject in a Kingdome, or the onely man that cannot Govern: there is not the pooreſt man of the multitude but is capable of ſome Office or other, and by that means may ſome­time or other perhaps govern according to the laws, onely the King can be no Officer but to chuſe Officers, his Subjects may all Governe, but he may not.

Next, I cannot ſee how in true ſenſe our Author can ſay, his Monarch is the head, and fountain of power, ſince his doctrine is, that in a limited Monarchy, the publick ſociety by originall conſtitu­tion confer on one man power, is not then the publick ſociety the head and fountain of power, and not the King?

Again, when he tels us of his Monarch, that both the other States as well conjunctim as diviſim be his ſworn ſubjects, and owe obedience to his commands: he doth but flout his poor Monarch, for why25 are they called his Subjects and his Commons? he (without any complement) is their Subject, for they as Officers, may governe and command according to Law: but he may not, for he muſt judge by his judges in Courts of Juſtice onely: that is, he may not judge or governe at all.

2. As for the ſecond particular, the ſole or chiefe power in capacita­ting perſons for the Surpeame power. And

3. As to this third particular, the power of convocating ſuch perſons, they are both ſo far from making a Monarch, that they are the only way to make him none, by chooſing and calling others to ſhare in the Supreame power.

4. Laſtly, concerning his Authority being the laſt and greateſt in the eſtabliſhing every Act, It makes him no Monarch, except he be ſole that hath that Authority: neither his primity of ſhare in the Supreame power, nor his Authority being laſt, no, nor his having the greateſt Authority doth make him a Monarch, unleſſe he have that Authority alone.

Beſides, how can he ſhew that in his mixed Monarchy the Mo­narchs power is the greateſt? The greateſt ſhare that our Author allowes him in the legiſlative power is a negative voice, and the like is allowed to the Nobility and Commons: And truly a ne­gative voice is but a baſe tearme to expreſſe a Legiſlative power, a Negative voice is but a privative power, or indeed no power at all to do any thing, onely a power to hinder an Act from being done.

Wherefore I conclude not any of his four, nor all of them putp. 26. into one perſon makes the ſtate Monarchicall.

This mixed Monarchy juſt like the limited ends in confuſion & deſtruction of all Government: you ſhall hear the Authors confeſ­ſion: That one inconvenience muſt neceſſarily be in all mixed Govern­ments,p. 28. which I ſhewed to be in limited Governmēts, there can be no con­ſtituted legall Authorative Judge of the fundamentall controverſies ari­ſing between the three Estates: If ſuch do riſe it is the fatall diſeaſe of thoſe Governments for which no ſalve can be applied. It is a caſe beyond the poſſible proviſion of ſuch a Government, of this queſtion there is no legall judge. The accuſing ſide muſt make it evident to every mans conſcience the appeale must be to the communi­ty, as if there were no Government, and as by evidence conſciences are26 convinced they are bound to give their aſſiſtance. The wit of man cannot ſay more for Anarchy.

Thus have I picked out the flowers out of his Doctrine about limited Monarchy, and preſented them with ſome brief Annota­tions, it were a tedious worke to collect all the learned contra­dictions, and ambiguous expreſſions that accur in every page of his platonique Monarcy, the booke hath ſo much of fancy that it is a better piece of Poetry then Policy.

Becauſe many may thinke that the maine doctrine of limited and mixed Monarchy may in it ſelf be moſt authenticall and grounded upon ſtrong and evident reaſon; although our Author perhaps have failed in ſome of his expreſſions, and be liable to exceptions. Therefore I will be bold to enquire whether Ariſtotle could find either reaſon or example of a limited or mixed Monar­chy, and the rather becauſe I find our Author altogether inſiſts upon a rationall way of juſtifying his opinion. No man I thinke will deny but that Ariſtotle was ſufficiently curious in ſearching out the ſeverall formes of Common-wealths and Kingdomes, yet I do not find that he ever ſo much as dreamed of either a li­mited or mixed Monarchy: Severall other ſorts of Monarchies he reckons up. In the third booke of his Politiques he ſpends three whole Chapters together upon the ſeverall kindes of Mo­narchy.

Firſt, in his fourteenth Chapter he mentions four kindes of Monarchy.

  • The Laconique or Lacedemonian.
  • The Barbarique.
  • The Aeſymneticall.
  • The Heroique.

The Laconique or Lacedemonian King (ſaith he) had only Su­preame power when he was out of the bounds of the Lacedemonian territories, then he had abſolute power, his Kingdome was like to a perpetuall Lord Generall of an Army.

The Barbarique King (ſaith Ariſtotle) had a power very neere to tyranny, yet they were lawfull and paternall, becauſe the Barbarians are of a more ſervile nature then the Grecians, and the Aſiatiques then the Europeans, they do willingly without repining live under a27 maſterly Government, yet their government is ſtable, and ſafe becauſe they are paternall and lawfull Kingdomes, and their guardes are Roy­all and not tyrannicall, for Kings are guarded by their owne Subjects, and Tyrants are guarded by ſtrangers.

The Aeſymneticall King (ſaith Ariſt. ) in old time in Greece, was an elective Tyrant, and differed only from the Barbarian Kings in that he was elective and not paternall, theſe ſorts of Kings becauſe they were tyrannicall were Maſterly: but becauſe they were over ſuch as voluntarily elected them they were Regall.

The Heroique were thoſe (ſaith Ariſtotle) which flouriſhed in the heroicall times, to whom the people did willingly obey, and they were paternall and lawfull, becauſe theſe Kings did deſerve well of the multitude either by teaching them arts, or by warring for them, or by gathering them together when they were diſperſed, or by dividing lands amongst them: Theſe Kings had Supreame power in war, in ſa­crifices, in Judicature.

Theſe four ſorts of Monarchy hath Ariſtotle thus diſtingui­ſhed, and after ſummes them up together, and concludes his Chapter as if he had forgot himſelf, and reckons up a fift kind of Monarchy, which is ſaith he, when one alone hath Supreame power of all the reſt, for as there is a domeſticall Kingdome of one houſe, ſo the Kingdome of a City, or of one or many Nations is a family.

Theſe are all the ſorts of Monarchy that Ariſtotle hath found out, and he hath ſtrained hard to make them ſo many: Firſt for his Lacedemonian King, himſelfe confeſſeth that he was but a kind of military Commander in war, and ſo in effect no more a King then all Generals of Armies: And yet this No-King of his was not limited by any Law, nor mixed with any companions of his Government, when he was in the wars out of the confines of Lacedemon, he was as Ariſtotle ſtiles him〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of full and ab­ſolute command, no Law, no companion to govern his Army but his owne will.

Next for Ariſtotles Aeſymneticall King, it appears he was out of date in Ariſtotles time, for he ſaith, he was amongst the anci­ent Greekes〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ariſtotle might well have ſpa­red the naming him (if he had not wanted other ſorts) for the honour of his owne Nation: for he that but now told us the Barbarians were of a more ſervile nature then the Graecians, comes28 here and tels us that theſe old Greeke Kings were elective tyrants. The Barbarians did but ſuffer tyrants in ſhew, but the old Graecians chooſe tyrants indeed: which then muſt we thinke were the grea­ter ſlaves, the Greeks or the Barbarians? Now if theſe ſorts of Kings were tyrants, we cannot ſuppoſe they were limited either by Law, or joyned with companions: Indeed Ariſt. ſaith ſome of theſe tyrants were limited to certaine times and actions, for they had not all their power for terme of life, nor could meddle but in certaine buſineſſes, yet during the time they were tyrants, and in the actions whereto they were limited, they had abſolute power to do what they liſt, according to their owne will, or elſe they could not have been ſaid to be tyrants.

As for Ariſtotles Heroicke King, he gives the like note upon him that he did upon the Aeſymnet, that he was in old time〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉in the heroick times. The thing that made theſe heroicall Kingdomes differ from other ſorts of Kingdomes, was only the meanes by which the firſt Kings obtained their King­domes, and not the manner of Government, for in that they were as abſolute as other Kings were without either limitation by law, or mixture of companions.

Laſtly as for Ariſt. Barbaricke ſort of Kings, ſince he reckoned all the world Barbarians except the Graecians, his Barbaricke King muſt extend to all other ſorts of Kings in the world, beſides thoſe of Greece, and ſo may go under Ariſtotles fift ſort of Kings, which in generall comprehends all other ſorts, and is no ſpeciall forme of Monarchy.

Thus upon a true accompt it is evident that the five ſeverall ſorts of Kings, mentioned by Ariſtotle are at the moſt but diffe­rent, and accidentall meanes of the firſt obtaining or holding of Monarchies; and not reall or eſſentiall differences of the manner of Government, which was alwayes abſolute, without either li­mitation or mixture.

I may be thought perhaps to miſtake, or wrong Ariſtotle in queſtioning his diverſities of Kings: but it ſeemes Ariſtotle him­ſelfe was partly of the ſame minde, for in the very next Chapter when he had better conſidered of the point, he confeſſed that to ſpeake the truth, there were almoſt but two ſorts of Monarchies worth the conſidering, that is his firſt or Laconique ſort, and his fift or laſt29 ſort where one alone hath Supreame power over all the reſt: thus he hath brought his five ſorts to two. Now for the firſt of theſe two, his Lacedemonian King he hath confeſſed before, that he was no more then a Generaliſſimo of an Army, and ſo upon the mater no King at all; and then there remaines onely his laſt ſort of Kings, where one alone hath the Supreame power. And this in ſubſtance is the finall reſolution of Ariſtotle himſelf, for in his ſixteenth Chap­ter where he delivers his laſt thoughts touching the kindes of Mo­narchy, he firſt diſchargeth his Laconick King from being any ſort of Monarchy: and then gives us two exact rules about Monarchy, and both theſe are point blanke againſt limited and mixed Mo­narchy, therefore I ſhall propoſe them to be conſidered of, as concluding all Monarchy to be abſolute and arbitrary.

1. The one rule is, that he that is ſaid to be a King according to Law,Ariſt. pol. l. 3. c. 16. is no ſort of government or Kingdome at all:〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

2. The ſecond rule is, that a true King is he that ruleth all accor­ding to his owne will,〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

This latter frees a Monarch from the mixture of partners or ſharers in government, as the former rule doth from limitation by lawes.

Thus in briefe I have traced Ariſtotle in his crabbed and broken paſſages touching diverſities of Kings, where firſt he findes but four ſorts, and then he ſtumbles upon a fift, and in the next Chap­ter contents himſelfe onely with two ſorts of Kings, but in the Chapter following concludes with one, which is the true perfect Monarch who rules all by his own will: In all this we find no­thing for a regulated or mixed Monarchy, but againſt it.

Moreover whereas the Author of the treatiſe of Monarchy affirmes it as a prime principle that all Monarchies (except that of the Jewes) depend upon humane deſignment, when the conſent of a ſo­ciety of men, and a fundamentall contract of a Nation, by originall or radicall conſtitution confers power. He muſt know that Ariſt. ſear­ching into the originall of government ſhewes himſelfe in this point a better Divine then our Author, and as if he had ſtudied the book of Geneſis, teacheth that Monarchies fetch their petigree from the right of fathers, and not from the gift or contract of people, his words may thus be engliſhed. At the first Cities were30 Governed by Kings, and ſo even to this day are Nations alſo: for ſuch as were under Kingly Government did come together, for every houſe is governed by a King who is the eldeſt, and ſo alſo Colonies are governed for kindred ſake. And immediately before he tels us that the firſt ſociety made of many houſes is a village, which naturally ſeemes to be a Colonie of a houſe, which ſome call foſterbrethren, or Children, and Childrens Children.

So in concluſion we have gained Ariſtotles judgement in three maine, and eſſentiall points.

  • 1. A King according to Law makes no kind of Government.
  • 2. A King muſt rule according to his own will.
  • 3. The originall of Kings, is from the right of Fatherhood.

What Ariſtotles judgement was two thouſand years ſince, is a­greeable to the doctrine of the great modern politician Bodin: Heare him touching limited Monarchy; Ʋnto Majeſty or Sove­raignty (ſaith he) belongeth an abſolute power not ſubject to any Law chief power given unto a Prince with condition is not properly Soveraignty or power abſolute: Except ſuch conditions annexed to the Soveraignty, be directly comprehended within the laws of God and nature. Albeit by the ſufferance of the King of England, controverſies between the King and his people are ſometimes determined by the high Court of Parliament, and ſometimes by the Lord Chief Juſtice of England: yet all the eſtates remaine in full ſub­jection to the King, who is no wayes bound to follow their adviſe, nei­ther to conſent to their requeſts. It is certaine that the lawes, priviledges, and grants of Princes have no force but during their life, if they be not ratified by the expreſſe conſent, or by ſufferance of the Prince following, eſpecially Priviledges. Much leſſe ſhould a Prince be bound unto the Laws he maketh himſelf, for a man may well receive a Law from an other man, but impoſſible it is in na­ture for to give a Law unto himſelf, no more then it is to command a mans ſelf in a matter depending of his owne will. The Law ſaith, Nulla obligatio conſiſtere poteſt, quae à voluntate promittentis ſtatum capit. The Soveraigne Prince may derogate unto the laws that he hath promiſed and ſworn to keep, if the equity thereof be ceaſed, and that of himſelf without the conſent of his ſubjects, the Ma­jeſty of a true Soveraigne Prince is to be known when the eſtates of all the people aſſembled in all humility preſent their requeſts and31 ſupplications to their Prince, without having power in any thing to command, determine or give voice, but that that which it pleaſeth the King to like, or diſlike, to command or bid is holden for Law: wherein they which have written of the duty of Magiſtrates have de­ceived themſelves in maintaining that the power of the people is grea­ter then the Prince: a thing which cauſeth oft true ſubjects to revolt from their obedience to their Prince, and miniſtreth matter of great troubles in Common-wealths, of which their opinion there is neither reaſon nor ground, for if the King be ſubject unto the aſſemblies and decrees of the people, he ſhould neither be King nor Soveraigne, and the Common-wealth neither Realme nor Monarchy, but a meer Ari­ſtocracy So we ſee the principall point of Soveraigne Majeſty and abſolute power to conſiſt principally in giving Laws unto the Sub­jects in generall without their conſent. Bodin de Rep. l. 1. c. 8.

To confound the ſtate of Monarchy, with the popular or Ariſto­craticall eſtate is a thing impoſſible, and in effect incompatible, and ſuch as cannot be imagined for Soveraignty being of it ſelf indiviſible, how can it at one and the ſame time be divided betwixt one Prince, the Nobility, and the people in Common? The first marke of Sove­raigne Majeſty is to be of power to give Laws, and to command over them unto the ſubjects, and who ſhould thoſe ſubjects be that ſhould yeild their obedience to the Law, if they ſhould have alſo power to make the Laws? who ſhould he be that could give the Law? being himſelf conſtrained to receive it of them unto whom himſelf gave it? ſo that of neceſſity we muſt conclude, that as no one in particular hath the power to make the Law in ſuch a ſtate, that then the ſtate muſt needs be a ſtate popular. Never any Common-wealth hath been made of an Ariſtocracie, and popular eſtate, much leſſe of the three eſtates of a Common-weal ſuch ſtates wherein the rights of Soveraignty are divided, are not rightly to be called Common-weals, but rather the corruption of Common-weals, as Herodotus has moſt breifly, but truly written Common-weales which change their ſtate, the Soveraigne right and power of them being divided find no rest from Civill wars and broiles, till they againe recover ſome one of the three formes, and the Soveraignty be wholy in one of the ſtates or other where the rights of the Soveraignty are divided be­twixt the Prince and his Subjects, in that confuſion of ſtate there is ſtill endleſſe ſtirs and quarrels for the ſuperiority, untill that ſome one,32 ſome few or altogether have got the Soveraignty. Id. lib. 2. c. 1.

This Judgment of Bodins touching Limited and Mixed Monar­chy is not according to the mind of our Author, nor yet of the Obſervator, who uſeth the ſtrength of his wit to overthrow Ab­ſolute and Arbitrary Government in this Kingdome, and yet in the main body of his diſcourſe lets fall ſuch truths from his pen as give a deadly wound to the Cauſe he pleads for, if they be in­differently waighed and conſidered, I will not pick a line or two here and there to wreſt againſt him, but will preſent a whole Page of his Book, or more together, that ſo we may have an en­tire proſpect upon the Obſervators mind, Without ſociety (ſaith the Obſervator) men could not live, without Laws men could not be ſociable; and without Authority ſomewhere to judge according to Law, Law was vaine: It was ſoone therefore provided, that Laws according to the dictate of reaſon ſhould be ratified by common con­ſent: when it afterward appeared, that man was yet ſubject to unna­turall distruction by the tyranny of entruſted Magiſtrates, a miſchief almost as fatall as to be without all Magiſtracy. How to provide a wholſome remedy therefore was not ſo eaſie to be invented, it was not difficult to invent Laws for the limiting of Supream Governors, but to invent how thoſe laws ſhould be executed, or by whom interpreted, was almoſt impoſſible, Nam quis Cuſtodiet ipſos Cuſtodes, to place a Superior above a Supream was held unnaturall; yet what a life­leſſe thing would Law be without any Judge to determine and force it? If it be agreed upon, that limits ſhould be prefixed to Princes and Judges to decree according to thoſe limits, yet an other inconvenience will preſently affront us: for we cannot reſtrain Princes too far, but we ſhall diſ-able them from ſome good: long it was ere the world could extricate it ſelfe out of all theſe extremities, or find out an or­derly means whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded Prerogative on this hand, and to exceſſive liberty on the other, and ſcarce has long experience yet fully ſatisfied the minds of all men in it. In the Infan­cy of the world when man was not ſo artificiall and obdurate in cru­lty and oppreſſion as now, and policy moſt rude. Moſt Nations did chuſe rather to ſubject themſelves to the meer diſcretion of their Lords, then rely upon any limits, and ſo be ruled by Arbitrary E­dicts then written Statutes. But ſince tyranny being more exquiſite, and policy more perfect, eſpecially where learning and Religion flou­riſh,33 few Nations will endure the thraldome which uſually accompa­nies unbounded and unconditionate Royalty: Yet long it was ere the bounds and conditions of Supream Lords was ſo wiſely determined or quietly conſerved as now they are: for at firſt when as Euphori, Tri­buni, Curatores, &c. were erected to poiſe againſt the ſeale of Sove­raignty, much blood was ſhed about them, and States were put into new broiles by them, and ſome places the remedy proved worſe then the diſeaſe. In all great diſtreſſes the body of the people were ever conſtrai­ned to riſe, and by force of the Major party to put an end to all inte­ſtine ſtrifes, and make a redreſſe of all publike grievances: But many times calamities grew to a ſtrange height before ſo cumberſome a body could be raiſed, and when it was raiſed, the motions of it were ſo di­ſtracted and irregular, that after much ſpoile and effuſion of blood, ſometimes only one tyranny was exchanged for another: till ſome was invented to regulate the motions of the peoples molimenous body. I think arbritrary rule was moſt ſafe for the world: But Now ſince moſt Countries have ſound an art and peaceable order for publick Aſſem­blies, whereby the people may aſſume its owne power to do it ſelfe right without diſturbance to it ſelf or injury to Princes: He is very un­juſt that wil oppoſe this art or order. That Princes may not be Now be­yond all limits and laws, nor yet to be tied upon thoſe limits by any pri­vate parties: The whole community in its underived Majeſty ſhall convene to do juſtice, and that the convention may not be without intel­ligence, certaine times and places, and formes, ſhall be appointed for it reglement, and that the vaſtneſſe of its own bulke may not breed con­fuſion, by vertue of election and repreſentation, a few ſhall act for ma­ny, the wiſe ſhall conſent for the ſimple, the vertue of all ſhall re­dound to ſome, and the prudence of ſome ſhall redound to all: and ſure­ly as this admirably compoſed Court which is now called a Parliament, is more regularly and orderly formed then when it was called mickle Synod of Wittena gemot, or when this reall body of the people did throng together at it: ſo it is not yet perhaps without ſome defects which by art and policy might receive farther amendment: ſome di­viſions have ſprung up of late between both Houſes, and ſome between the King and both Houſes by reaſon of incertainty of juriſdiction, and ſome Lawyers doubt how far the Parliament is able to create new formes and precedents, and has a juriſdiction over it ſelf: All theſe doubts would be ſolemnly ſolved: But in the firſt place the true privi­ledges of Parliament belonging not only to the being and efficacy of it,34 but to the honor and complement of it would be clearly declared, for the very naming of priviledges of Parliament, as if they were chimeras to the ignorant ſort, and utterly unknown unto the learned, hath been en­tertained with ſcorne ſince the beginning of this Parliament.

In this large paſſage taken out of the Obſervator which con­cernes the originall of all Government, two notable Propoſitions may be principally obſerved.

Firſt, our Obſervator confeſſeth arbitrary or abſolute government to be the firſt, and the ſafeſt government for the world.

Secondly, he acknowledgeth that the jurisdiction is uncertaine and the priviledges not cleerely declared of limited Monarchy.

Theſe two evident truths delivered by him, he labours mainely to diſguiſe. He ſeemes to inſinuate that arbitrary Government was but in the infancy of the World, for ſo he termes it, but if we en­quire of him, how long he will have this infancy of the world to laſt, he grants it continued above three thouſand years, which is an unreaſonable time for the world to continue under age: for the firſt oppoſers he doth find of arbitrary power were the epho­ri, tribuni, curatores, &c. The ephori were above three thouſand years after the Creation, and the tribuni were later; as for his curatores I know not whom he meanes, except the Maſter of the Court of Wards. I cannot Engliſh the word curator better. I doe not believe that he can ſhew that any curatores or et caeteras which he mentions were ſo ancient as the ephori. As for the tribuni he miſtakes much if he thinkes they were erected to limit and bound Monarchy, for the ſtate of Rome was at the leaſt Ariſtocraticall (as they call it) if not popular, when tribunes of the people were firſt hatched. And for the Ephori, their power did not limit or regu­late Monarchy, but quite take it away; for a Lacedemonian King in the judgement of Ariſtotle was no King indeed, but in name onely, as Generaliſſimo of an Army, and the beſt polititians reckon the Spartan Common-wealth to have been Ariſtocraticall and not Monarchicall, and if a limited Monarchy cannot be found in La­cedemon, I doubt our Obſervator will hardly find it any where elſe in the whole World; and in ſubſtance he confeſſeth as much when he ſaith, Now most Countries have found out an art and peaceable or­der for publique Aſſemblies, as if it were a thing but new done, and not before, for ſo the word Now doth import.

The obſervator in confeſſing the Jurisdiction to be incertaine and35 the priviledges undetermined of that Court that ſhould bound and li­mit Monarchy, doth in effect acknowledge there is no ſuch Court at all: for every Court conſiſts of Juriſdictions and Priviledges, it is theſe two that create a Court, and are the eſſentials of it: If the admirably compoſed Court of Parliament have ſome defects which may receive amendment, as he ſaith, and if thoſe defects be ſuch as cauſe diviſions both between the Houſes, and between the King and both Houſes, and theſe diviſions be about ſo maine a matter as Juriſ­dictions, and Priviledges, and power to create new Priviledges, all which are the fundamentals of every Court, (for untill they be agreed upon, the act of every Court may not onely be uncertaine, but invalid, and cauſe of tumults and ſedition:) And if all theſe doubts & diviſions have need to be ſolemnly ſolved, as our Obſervator confeſſeth: Then he hath no reaſon at all to ſay that Now the conditions of Supream Lords are wiſely determined and quietly conſer­ved, or that Now moſt Countries have found out an art, and peacea­ble order for publick affaires, whereby the people may reſume its own power to do it ſelf right without injurie unto Princes, for how can the underived Majeſty of the people by aſſuming its own power, tell how to do her ſelfe right, or how to avoid doing injury to the Prince, if her juriſdiction be uncertain, and Priviledges undetermined?

He tels us Now moſt Countries have found an art, and peaceable order for publick Aſſemblies: and to the intent, that Princes may not be Now beyond all limits and Laws, the whole community in tis unde­rived Majeſty ſhall convene to do Juſtice. But he doth not name ſo much as one Country or Kingdome that hath found out this art, where the whole Community in its underived Majeſty did ever convene to do Juſtice. I challenge him or any other for him to name but one Kingdome that hath either Now or heretofore found out this art or peaceable order; We do hear a great ru­mor in this age of moderated and limited Kings, Poland, Sweden, and Denmark are talked of for ſuch; and in theſe Kingdomes, or no where is ſuch a moderated Government, as our Obſervator meanes, to be found. A little enquiry would be made into the manner of the Government of theſe Kingdomes, for theſe Nor­thern people, as Bodin obſerveth, breathe after liberty.

Firſt for Poland, Boterus ſaith, that the Government of it, is ele­ctive altogether, and repreſenteth rather an Ariſtocracie then a King­dome: the Nobility who have great authority in the Diets, chuſing36 the King, and limiting His Authority, making His Soveraignty but a ſlaviſh Royalty: theſe diminutions of regality began firſt by de­fault of King Lewis, and Jagello, who to gaine the ſucceſſion in the Kingdome contrary to the Laws, one for his daughter, and the other for his ſon, departed with many of his Royalties and prerogatives, to buy the voices of the Nobility. The French Author of the book cal­led the Eſtates of the world, doth informe us that the Princes Au­thority was more free, not being ſubject to any Laws, and having Abſo­lute Power, not onely of their eſtates, but alſo of life, and death: Since Chriſtian Religion was received, it began to be moderated, first by ho­ly admonitions of the Biſhops and Clergy: and then by ſervices of the Nobility in war: Religious Princes gave many Honours, and many liberties to the Clergy and Nobility, and quit much of their Rights, the which their ſucceſſors have continued. The ſuperiour dignity is reduced to two degrees, that is, the Palatinate and the Cha­ſtelleine, for that Kings in former times did by little and little call theſe men to publike conſultations, notwithſtanding that they had abſolute power to do all things of themſelves, to command, diſpoſe, recompence and puniſh of their own motions: ſince, they have ordained that theſe dignities ſhould make the body of a Senate. The King doth not challenge much right and power over His Nobility, nor over their estates, neither hath he any over the Clergy. And though the Kings Authority depends on the Nobility for His election, yet in many things it is abſolute after he He is choſen: He appoints the Diets at what time and place He pleaſeth, He chooſeth Lay Councelors, and nomi­nates the Biſhops and whom He will have to be His Privy Counſell: He is abſolute diſpoſer of the Revenews of the Crown: He is abſolute eſtabliſher of the decrees of the Diets: it is in His power to advance and reward whom He pleaſeth He is Lord immediate of His Sub­jects, but not of His Nobility: He is Soveraigne Judge of His Nobi­lity in criminall cauſes. The power of the Nobility daily encreaſeth, for that in reſpect of the Kings election they neither have law, rule, nor forme to do it, neither by writing nor tradition. As the King governs His Subjects which are immediately His with abſolute Authority, ſo the Nobility diſpoſe immediately of their vaſſals, over whom every one hath more then a regall power, ſo as they entreat them like ſlaves. There be certaine men in Poland who are called EARTHLY MES­SENGERS or Nuntios, they are as it were Agents of Juriſdictions, or circles of the Nobility: theſe have a certaine Authority, and as Bo­terus37 ſaith, in the time of their Diets theſe men aſſemble in a place neer to the Senate Houſe, where they chooſe two Marſhals by whom (but with a tribune-like authority) they ſignifie unto the Counſell what their requeſts are. Not long ſince their authority and reputation grew ſo mightily, that they now carry themſelves as heads and governours, rather then officers and miniſters of the publike decrees of the State: One of the Counſell refuſed his Senators place to become one of theſe officers. Every Palatine, the King requiring it cals together all the Nobility of His Palatinate, where having propounded unto them the matters whereon they are to treate, and their will being known, they chooſe four or ſix out of the company of the EARTHLY MESSEN­GERS, theſe deputies meet and make one body, which they call the order of Knights.

This being of late years the manner and order of the govern­ment of Poland, it is not poſſible for the Obſervator to find among them that the whole community in its underived Majeſty doth ever convene to do Juſtice: nor any election or repreſentation of the Community, or that the people aſſume its owne power to do it ſelf right. The EARTHLY MESSENGERS though they may be thought to repreſent the Commons, and of late take much up­on them, yet they are elected and choſen by the Nobility as their agents and officers. The Community are either vaſſals to the King, or to the Nobility, and enjoy as little freedome or liberty as any Nation. But it may be ſaid perhaps, that though the Com­munity do not limit the King, yet the Nobility do, and ſo he is a limited Monarchy. The Anſwer is, that in truth though the No­bility at the chooſing of their King do limit his power, and do give him an oath: yet afterwards they have alwayes a deſire to pleaſe him and to ſecond his will, and this they are forced to do to avoid diſcord, for by reaſon of their great power they are ſubject to great diſſentions, not only among themſelves, but be­tween them and the order of Knights which are the earthly meſ­ſengers: yea the Provinces are at diſcord one with another: and as for Religion, the diverſity of Sects in Poland bred perpetuall jars and hatred among the people, there being as many Sects as in Amſterdam it ſelf, or any popular government can deſire. The danger of ſedition is the cauſe, that though the Crown depends on the election of the Nobility; yet they have never rejected the Kings ſucceſſour, or transferred the Realme to any other family38 but once, when depoſing Ladiſlaus for his idleneſſe (whom yet afterward they reſtored) they elected Wencelaus King of Bohemia. But if the Nobility do agree to hold their King to his conditions, which is not to conclude any thing but by the adviſe of his Coun­ſell of Nobles, nor to chooſe any wife without their leaves, then it muſt be ſaid to be a Common-weal, not a Royalty, and the King but only the mouth of the Kingdome, or as Queen Chriſti­na complained that Her Huſband was but the ſhadow of a Sove­raigne.

Next, if it be conſidered how the Nobility of Poland came to this great power; it was not by any originall contract, or popular convention, for it is ſaid they have neither Law, rule nor forme writ­ten or unwritten for the election of their King; they may thanke the Biſhops and Clergy: for by their holy admonitions and ad­viſe, good and Religious Princes to ſhew their piety were firſt brought to give much of their Rights and Priviledges to their Sub­jects, devout Kings were meerely cheated of ſome of their Royalties. What power ſoever generall Aſſemblies of the Eſtates claime, or exerciſe over and above the bare naked act of Counſelling, they were firſt beholding to the Popiſh Clergy for it: it is they firſt brought Parliaments into requeſt and power: I cannot find in any Kingdome but onely where Popery hath been, that Parlia­ments have been of reputation, and in the greateſt times of Super­ſtition they are firſt mentioned.

As for the Kingdome of Denmarke I read that the Senators who are all choſen out of the Nobility, and ſeldome exceed the num­ber of 28, with the cheif of the Realme do chooſe their King. They have alwaies in a manner ſet the Kings eldeſt Son upon the Royall Throne. The Nobility of Denmarke withſtood the Coro­nation of Frederick 1559, till he ſware not to put any Noble man to death untill he were judged of the Senat, & that all Noble men ſhould have power of life and death over their Subjects without appeal, and the King to give no office without conſent of the Councell. There is a Chancelour of the Realme before whom they do appeal from all the Provinces and Iſlands, and from him to the King himſelfe. I hear of nothing in this Kingdome that tends to popularity; no Aſſembly of the Commons, no elections, or repreſentation of them.

Sweden is governed by a King heretofore elective, but now made39 hereditary in Guſtavus time: it is divided into Provinces: an ap­peale lieth from the Vicount of every teritory to a Soveraigne Judge called a Lamen, from the Lamens to the Kings Councell, and from this Councell, to the King himſelf.

Now let the Obſervator bethinke himſelf, whether all, or any of theſe three Countries have found out any art at all whereby the peopler community may aſſume its owne power, if neither of theſe Kingdomes have, moſt Countries have not, nay none have. The people or Community in theſe three Realms are as abſolute vaſſals as any in the world; the regulating power if any be, is in the No­bility: Nor is it ſuch in the Nobility as it makes ſhew for. The election of Kings is rather a formality then any real power, for they dare hardly chooſe any but the Heire, or one of the blood Royall: if they ſhould chooſe one among the Nobility, it would prove very factious; if a ſtranger, odious, neither ſafe. For the Government though the Kings be ſworne to raigne according to the Laws, and are not to do any thing without the conſent of their Councell in publick affaires: yet in regard they have power both to advance and reward whom they pleaſe, the Nobi­lity and Senators do comply with their Kings, and Boterus con­cludes of the Kings of Poland, who ſeem to be moſt moderated, that ſuch as is their valour, dexterity, & wiſdome, ſuch is their Power, Authority, and Government. Alſo Bodin ſaith, that theſe three King­domes are States changeable and uncertaine, as the Nobility is ſtron­ger then the Prince, or the Prince then the Nobility, and the people are ſo far from liberty, that he ſaith, Divers particular Lords exact not only cuſtomes, but tributes alſo, which are confirmed and grow ſtron­ger, both by long preſcription of time, and uſe of Judgements.

The End.

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TextThe anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy. Or, A succinct examination of the fundamentals of monarchy, both in this and other kingdoms, as well about the right of power in kings, as of the originall or naturall liberty of the people. A question never yet disputed, though most necessary in these times.
AuthorFilmer, Robert, Sir, d. 1653..
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Bibliographic informationThe anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy. Or, A succinct examination of the fundamentals of monarchy, both in this and other kingdoms, as well about the right of power in kings, as of the originall or naturall liberty of the people. A question never yet disputed, though most necessary in these times. Filmer, Robert, Sir, d. 1653.. [8], 39, [1] p. s.n.],[London :Printed in the year, 1648.. (Anonymous. Attributed to Sir Robert Filmer.) (Place of publication from Wing.) (The first leaf is blank.) (A reply to: Hunton, Philip. A treatise of monarchie.) (Annotation on Thomason copy: "Aprill: 19th.") (Reproduction of the original in the British Library.)
  • Hunton, Philip, 1604?-1682. -- Treatise of monarchy -- Early works to 1800.
  • Monarchy -- Early works to 1800.
  • Great Britain -- Politics and government -- Early works to 1800.

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The EEBO-TCP project was divided into two phases. The 25,363 texts created during Phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 January 2015. Anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source.

Users should be aware of the process of creating the TCP texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data.

Text selection was based on the New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature (NCBEL). If an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in NCBEL, then their works are eligible for inclusion. Selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. In general, first editions of a works in English were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably Latin and Welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so.

Image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. Quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in Oxford and Michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet QA standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. After proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. Any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. Understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of TCP data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. Users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a TCP editor.

The texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the TEI in Libraries guidelines.

Copies of the texts have been issued variously as SGML (TCP schema; ASCII text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable XML (TCP schema; characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless XML (TEI P5, characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or TEI g elements).

Keying and markup guidelines are available at the Text Creation Partnership web site.

Publication information

  • Text Creation Partnership,
ImprintAnn Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) : 2014-11 (EEBO-TCP Phase 2).
  • DLPS A85293
  • STC Wing F910
  • STC Thomason E436_4
  • STC ESTC R202028
  • EEBO-CITATION 99862460
  • PROQUEST 99862460
  • VID 114619

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. Searching, reading, printing, or downloading EEBO-TCP texts is reserved for the authorized users of these project partner institutions. Permission must be granted for subsequent distribution, in print or electronically, of this EEBO-TCP Phase II text, in whole or in part.