The Grand CASE OF CONSCIENCE STATED, about Submiſſion to the new and preſent Power. OR, An impaſſionate ANSWER to a modeſt BOOK concerning the law­fullneſſe of ſubmitting to the preſent Government. By one that profeſſeth himſelf a friend to Presbytery, a lover and em­bracer of Truth whereſoever he find's it.

ALthough I love not contention, yet I deſire ſatisfaction: that whilſt I live amidſt a tumultuous generation, and unquiet times, I may be delivered from a troubled ſpirit and diſcalm'd minde; A wounded ſpirit who can bear? I was willing to have ſate down in ſilence, re­ſolving to have kept my conſcience, as void of offence to others, ſo free from diſturbance in it ſelf, chuſing rather quietly to ſuffer for not doing what was commanded, than knowingly to act what is (at leaſt to me) unlawfull: ſuch a Liberty of Conſcience I conceive none will deny me. But ſince that Book came to mine hands, I (although unwillingly) undertook this task, not only out of an earneſt deſire I had to finde out truth, but for the unuſuall modeſty of the Tract it ſelf, knowing that the fowleſt corn is beſt winnowed in a gentle gale; a tempeſtuous winde blowes away chaffe and corn too.

I ſhall take a brief view of the book,Pag. 1. and ſubmit what I ſhall ſpeak to the Au­thours judgement, A Declaration hath been lately publiſhed, &c. Indeed there was ſuch a Declaration publiſhed, which I deſired with much earneſtneſſe, and read with ſome deliberation, expecting to have found the very quinteſſence of reaſon, and ſtrength of argument, whereby judicious men might have been wholly convinced, and abundantly ſatisfied; but my ſcruples were not anſwered by it. For ſuppoſe that had been proved, which was there much argued, That the government of a free State were in ſome reſpects more convenient than that of Monarchy; that might have been a prevalent argument to an irregulated people, who were (de novo) to conſtitute a Government, not to thoſe, who had before an antient form ſuited to the people, eſtabliſhed by Law, confirmed by Oath, and engaged to by the ſeverall Declarations of them who are ſo ſollicitous for the altering of it. Surely if conve­nience or inconvenience only can break a promiſe, and diſingage an Oath, David was much miſtaken in the 15^th Pſalm, and others may be eaſily cheated, who ex­pect2 ready performance of, not needleſſe diſputing about Oaths, in which men ſtand bound to them,Pag. 21. Of the Declaration. What is there ſaid concerning Declararions [That the Lords and Commons were of that minde when they made them] may ſerve their turns for the preſent, but would equally ſerve others turns for the future; For by the ſame reaſon; when thoſe that penned and publiſhed that Declaration, ſhall borrow money of men, and declare to pay them, imploy Souldiers with an engagement to ſatisfie them, people may ſuſpect that their mindes may alter, and then (by this rule) their former Declarations will be of no ſtrength.

What is further ſpoken in the Preface for a lawfull obedience to an unlawfull change of Government, will be touched on in the further proſecution of this diſ­courſe. It is ſaid [The Apoſtle commands obedience to higher powers, Rom. 13. and thence it is inferred, that he ſpeaks not in that place meerly of power or authority ab­stracted from perſons,Pag. 1, 2. but of perſons cloathed with that authority.] The Apoſtle ſpeaks there directly of Authority, of men only in ſubordination to that Authority; no further than as the executioners of that power, becauſe it is impoſſible Authority ſhould be exerciſed, but where men are to manage it. The Apoſtle in that place re­quires ſubmiſſion to legall Authority,It is not〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉but〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. by whomſoever executed, not to any men commanding by an illegall power.

Higher powers are there expreſſed indefinitely, not pointing at any particular go­vernment: In a Monarchy, an Ariſtocracy, a Democracy, the people under the ſe­verall conſtitutions may, yea muſt, by the Apoſtles command obey the higher pow­ers, thoſe who by their legall conſtitution are in Authority, not in power, over them: there is a law of nature, that will make man obey a power if he cannot re­ſiſt, but the injunction of the Apoſtle (there) is only to lawfull Authority. I beleeve the Authour of that Book knows, that thoſe only can be the higher powers, or legall Authority of any Kingdom, which the conſtitution of that Kingdom makes ſuch, and that only can exact obedience according to the Scripture rule. Now what the Higher powers of England are, by the conſtitution of this Kingdom, is ſufficiently known.

The Apoſtle commands wives to ſubmit to their husbands, Epheſ. 5.22. ſurely the injunction is for obedience to husbands, quà husbands, not quà men, indeed not abſtracted from their perſons,Eph. 5.22. becauſe it is impoſſible the authority of an husband ſhould be ſubmitted to, where a man is not to exerciſe it: But ſhould a ſtranger come to anothers wife, and call himſelf husband (having before either impriſoned or ſlain the rightfull husband) and require ſubmiſſion, I ſcarce think the Authour himſelf (eſpecially if he be married) would preſſe for obedience to ſuch an uſurped power: ſuch a woman may be forced, and overpowr'd, but to ſubmit to him as an husband, were a ſinne.

What is there urged as the great argument to prove the lawfullneſſe of obedience to the preſent Government, hath been my main deſwaſive (viz.) the Apoſtles com­mand to obey higher powers for conſcience ſake: Had I been convinced that the King in his perſon had been the higher powers of England, and that his perſonall command had by the Apoſtles rule exacted undeniable obedience, although he had been viſibly acting what we ſuſpected, and palpably introducing what we feared, I ſhould3 have ſubmitted for conſcience ſake. The great inducement I had to adhere to the Parliament, was (beſides the hopes of better reformation) that thorow conviction that lay upon me, both by mine own reaſon, and Parliamentary practices, that the two Houſes of Parliament, in caſe of the Kings abſence, weakneſſe or refuſall, had in them ſuch a part of the higher powers, and ſupream authority, as to defend, and pre­ſerve the people without, yea againſt the King, doing, commanding or exa­cting any thing beſides or againſt the law. And this is that main block, at which I ſtumble in yeelding obedience to this new power, becauſe I am yet convinced, that they are not the higher powers of our Kingdom, to which the Apoſtle requires obedience.

I acknowledge a government may be altered (although I think it not ſafe, but up­on urgent and evident neceſſity) to which being altered obedience is required, but it muſt be done by the higher powers ſtill, whom we ought equally to obey in ſub­mitting to an altered, as a continued form; but for any party by force to lay low the higher powers, and to exact obedience as to the legall Authority, is to me a ſinne.

I am not ignorant what pleas there may be from inconvenience in ſuch a do­ctrine, but according to the light I have, where lawfull or unlawfull are in queſtion,Rom. 13.1. Pag. 2. Diſcernendum eſt inter pote­ſtatē quoe ſem­per eſt a Deo, inter acquiſiti­onem & uſur­pationem. Paraeus in Ro•13. Hoſ. 8 4. Subditis merè privatis, ſi Tyrannus tanqu•latro in ipſo faciat impetum & ipſi nec poteſtatem ordi­nariam implo­rare, nec aliâ ratione effug•re periculum poſſint in pra•ſenti periculo•& ſuos contr•Tyrannum ſic•contra privat•graſſatorem d•fendere licet. Paraeus in R•1• their convenience and inconvenience muſt keep ſilence.

It is to be obſerved what is ſpoken by the Apoſtle in the ſame place, the powers that are, are ordained by God: to which in the ſecond page of the book is a little ad­dition, viz. Rulers and thoſe that were in authority were ordained of God: the Scripture enjoins obedience to powers, to men only as intitled to thoſe powers: the autho­rithy was ordained by God, not the Rulers, they were conſtituted by men, the pow­er may be Gods Ordinance, when the deputing of perſons to the exerciſe of that power may be (at moſt) but Gods permiſſion: nay, that men in Authority (Rulers in the Apoſtles expreſſion) are to be obeyed no further then as acting according to that Authority, is the judgement of one much uſed by the compoſer of that book. When a Tyrant ſhall offer violence to his private Subjects ▪ which they can by no other means avoid, they may defend themſelves and theirs againſt that Tyrant as againſt a thief; when are men properly called tyrants, but when they either uſurp or exerciſe a power contrary to the law and uſage of thoſe places where they rule? when a conſciencious obedience is required to the Authority, but not to thoſe, who by their own will, or procured force, either uſurp or exerciſe a power beſides that Authority.

Should we grant that men aſſuming to themſelves the place and power of Magi­ſtrates, by what right or means ſoever they came by it, muſt be obeyed, ſurely it would be the greateſt inlet to tyranny in the world, and the ſpeedieſt means of deſtroying ſtates that could be invented: for then ſhould none govern in any King­dome any longer, then their ſwords and their ſtrength could bear them up.

Thus much I ſhall yeeld, That when any ſhall uſurp Authority, by whatſoever title or force he procures it, ſuch may be obeyed in reference to their power, while they command lawfull things, but not in reference to Authority: A man being overpower'd may yeeld for his own ſafety, but to ſubmit to that uſurp'd power, as4 to the legall Authority of that Kingdome where it is,Rev. 22.15. is to aſſert that as lawfull, which is but uſurp'd, and in the Scripture language to make a lie.

From this I ſhall take a juſt occaſion to ſpeak to thoſe inſtances there urged, from obedience to whom, the argument is drawn to prove the lawfullneſſe of our ſub­miſſion now.

Pag. 2, 3.Concerning Claudius Caeſar and Nero which are mentioned, pag. 2, 3. how they came in by force, yet were obeyed by the people, I ſhall not trouble my ſelf nor the Reader with any taedious ſearch into, or large recitall of the ſtory, but take it as there laid down, and give a brief anſwer to it.

But before I fall upon a plain anſwer to what is there fallaciouſly urged, and ſhew the inſufficiency thereof to prove that for which it is aſſerted: I conceive there will appear ſuch a diſproportion between the quoted inſtances and our preſent caſe, that ſhould we grant all the premiſes, yet the concluſion would not directly follow to prove the queſtion. The moſt that can be aſſerted from thoſe examples is, That people did obey a ſupream power as exerciſed by thoſe who had no true (at leaſt but a dubitable) title, when the ſame form of government was ſtill continued, for ſo it had been for many years before, during the reign of^aaIulius Caeſar. Auguſtus. Tiberius Caius Caligula 4 Emperours, yea, ſuch a government which was the priſtine conſtitution of that place, it being Monar­chicall for above^bbPrincipio Re­•es ibi ſeptem•mperarunt, a•­•i•ducenti••ua•ra•inta•uatuor. Sl•i. •an. de 4. Mo­•arch. 440. years, till Tarquinius, about the buſineſſe of his ſon with Lucretia, was rejected. Whether party had or pretended moſt right, and the beſt ends in their changing of the goverment, either J. Brutus from, or Julius Caſar to Monarchy, I ſhall not diſpute: nor ſhall I decide, whether God might not juſtly give them to ſee the evill of a change, who (it may be) chiefly out of a deſire of change, would wholly alter a conſtituted form. But this is not our caſe: The in­ſubmiſſion of people now, is not grounded upon a ſuggeſted ſcruple of a dubious title to the ſame, but upon an apprehended illegality of the new and needleſſe eſta­bliſhment of another government: It is one thing, and as in it ſelf more lawfull, ſo to people leſſe ſcrupulous, upon a pretended title to uſurp the exerciſe of an eſta­bliſhed Authority: another, and as in it ſelf leſſe juſt, ſo to people more doubtfull upon pretended apprehenſions to eradicate a lawfull Authority, and illegally to lay low thoſe which legally are the higher powers of a Kingdome: In the one, people leſſe able to examine titles, ſubmit to the eſtabliſhed government of that Kingdom where they are, and this is ſufficient to yeeld obedience, that they know not who hath the right: In the other, they muſt give themſeves up to a new-faſhioned mo­dell illegall to them, becauſe not the conſtituted powers of that place, and this is enough to withold Allegiance, that they know ſuch have not (nor pretend) a Title.

Pag. 1.Now to the inſtances themſelves, to ſee how farre they prove the lawfullneſſe of our ſubmiſſion to a change of government, although the change be beleeved unlawfull.

•ag. 2, 3.After the death of Caius Caligula, the Conſuls and Senate of Rome entred in­to to a conſultation, how they might reſtore the Common-wealth to her ancint free­dom, I think this argument will take in all that is therein ſpoken: if the peo­ple of the Roman Empire did ſubmit to the power of Claudius and Nero, who by5 force were put upon them, then the people of England may lawfully ſubmit to a change of government, though beleeved unlawfull: but they did ſubmit, therefore theſe may, I will finde no fault with the Syllogiſme, becauſe it is of mine own making, although it be the very ſumme of what is urged: what aequivocall terms there are whereby a ſpirituall eye would quickly ſee four terms (at leaſt) in it I ſhall diſcover in mine anſwer to the ſeverall propoſitions.

In the firſt Propoſition, it being hypotheticall, I ſhall deny the conſequence: For 1. A People may poſſibly do what is not in it ſelf lawfull either for themſelves or others to do, a facto ad jus non valet argumentum, had the author proved their ſub­miſſion legall, it had been more urgent. Indeed it is ſaid at the end of that para­graph,Pag. 4. We ſee Rulers put by ſouldiers into that power which is ſaid by the Scripture to be ordained of God, and even to theſe Rulers men muſt be ſubject for conſcience ſake. But the Apoſtle doth not command obedience to theſe men, but to the powers, nay not to any men, but as commanding according to thoſe powers (as was ſaid before) nor is it materiall who put men in, nor what men are put into powers, if they are the powers that are ordained of God: thoſe that command according to that Authority, muſt be obeyed: and whatſoever the ſouldiery of Rome did, had the ſouldiery of England (in this tacitely pleaded for) obſerved that doctrine be­fore, we had not been (I think) diſputing this queſtion now. But 2. What might be lawfull for the people in the Roman Empire, may not be lawfull for the people of this Kingdome: I finde not in any Hiſtory that ever they were ſworn to a par­ticular government as we have been: Things in themſelves indifferent are made neceſſary, when by an oath engaged to. But of that more afterward.

To the Minor propoſition, I ſhall ſay 1. That thoſe mentioned had (at leaſt ſeeming) titles to the Empire. Indeed it is agreed by all Hiſtoriars I have met withall, that they were firſt encouraged by ſouldiers: but what iniquity is in that, if they might pretend a Title? The very end of power and ſtrength is or ſhould be to conſerve and recover juſt right, we have alwaies acknowledged it lawfull and expedient by force of Arms to acquire a rightfull poſſeſſion illegally detained; But I could wiſh that this ſtory had been printed and read by the ſword-men in this kingdome five moneths agoe, that they might but have thought whether it had been greater honour to be recorded as men, that ſhould guard a King of a doubtfull title to the Crown, or to be ſtoried as men that ſhould bring a King of an indubitable right to the Scaffold.

I will not here diſpute by what title, or according to what law Julius Caeſar, nor yet his ſucceſſour Octavius aſſumed the Empire, but when that government and thoſe governours were received, and acknowledged by the Senate, it became law­full to that people. Although Conqueſt be no true Title, nor durable tenure any longer then ſtrength can keep it, yet compact upon that Conqueſt, gives a title to the Conquerour, and engageth ſubmiſſion from the other party to thoſe rules re­ſolved on at, or given out according to that agreement.

Tiberius from whom indeed both Claudius and Nero had their government,Tacitus Anna. lib. 1. did not only for a great part of his time, do all he did by the adviſe of the Senate, but would (at leaſt ſeemingly) be choſen by the Senate, as not contented ſecretly to4〈1 page duplicate〉5〈1 page duplicate〉4〈1 page duplicate〉5〈1 page duplicate〉6ſtep into a government either by the earneſt engagement of his mother,Tiberius Augu­ſti Octaviij pri­vignus & ge­ner, & filius adoptivus ad­modum invi­tus, ut prae ſe ferebat, & vix tandem exora­tus a ſupplice Sena•u princi­patum accepit. Slerdam. de 4. Monarch. Tiberius max­imos dolores & gemitus ſimula vit principatū tanquam onero­ſam ſervitutem recuſans. Pezel. Mel. Hiſtor. par. 2•. Pezel, Mel. Hiſt. part. 2•. Tacitus Annal. lib. 12. Pag. 3. or by the fond adoption of Auguſtus, but would have the call and election of the Com­mon-wealth too: now here ſurely was a lawfull title, if the conſent of the people could make it lawfull, although (it may be) not in it's firſt acquiſition, yet in it's after eſtabliſhment: and Claudius deriving his title from him, why ſhould not peo­ple obey it? yea, me thinks the Authour of that book intimates a title that Claudius had, where he ſaith, pag. 3. Claudius being frighted with the news of Caligula's death, and fearing himſelf might be enquired for, upon ſuspicion withdrew: had not he been the heir apparent to the Empire, what ground of fear, or what cauſe of withdraw­ing? nay, if he had not been looked on as the rightfull ſucceſſour, why ſhould the ſouldier primo intuitu ſalute him by the name of Emperour?

For Nero he deſcended in a direct line on the mothers ſide, from Livia Auguſtus his wife, and although Brittanicus was the naturall ſon of Claudius, yet Nero (by Agrippina's means) was his adopted ſon for the Empire, and brought to the Senate, where it was conſented unto, that he ſhould have his togam virilem, and he called Prince of youth: it being their uſage, as far as I have obſerved in the ſtory, that an Adoptive title aſſented to by the Senate, hath commonly been acknowledged, when a lineall ſucceſſion hath been rejected: yea, the Authour ſeems to grant a kinde of title to Nero too, where it is ſaid, pag. 3. that the ſentence of the ſouldiers was followed by the conſent of the Senate: if the Senate had any ſhare in either conſtituting or de­claring a King, Nero's title was hereby eſtabliſhed.

But what is this to our caſe? A rightfull or doubtfull heir was brought by ſouldi­ers to the Senate, who among themſelves were contriving to alter their govern­ment: This heir was received by the Senate, and upon that ſubmitted unto by the people: But doth the Authour think that if the Senate had declared and acknowled­ged, yea, promiſed to preſerve the Title of a rightfull Prince, and the ſouldiers by the advice, counſell, or aſſiſtance of ſome party in this Senate, ſhould impriſon or ſlay their Prince, and take away the Major part of the Senate, only becauſe againſt their actings, and this minor part relict ſhould alter their government, yea, make themſelves without the conſent of the people their Rulers, that then the people would or lawfully could have ſubmitted to them as their legall and rightfull gover­nours, nay, would not rather have reſiſted them, as not being thoſe higher powers, whom they ought for conſcience ſake to obey?

Indeed had the King for ſome reaſon hid himſelf (as Claudius) or for other rea­ſons abſented himſelf, and the two Houſes of Parliament legally elected, and freely ſitting (at ſuch a time eſteemed) the higher powers, contrived a way for the altering the government, although I ſhould not have proclaimed their wiſdome, yea, ſhould have bewailed their ſin, in reſpect of the many ties and bonds of Declarations and Oaths upon them, I think I ſhould have ſubmitted to their power, yet I would not for my Oath's ſake (had I liked the thing) have acted in it. In which I think I yeeld more then many Anti-Malignant men in England will do: yet how far from our caſe this is, what hath been ſpoken will teſtifie.

But 2. Had the inſtance been of Julius Caſar, who by meer force and violence, without the leaſt pretence of Title acquired the government, which had better ſui­ted7 our buſineſſe, yet I ſhould ſay, that what ſubmiſſion the people yeelded, and what commands he gave, were in relation to a power which he by force had gotten, and did exerciſe without any pretence to a legall conſtituted power, till received and acknowledged by the Senate.

I confeſſe ſhould theſe Rulers now in our Kingdom command ſubmiſſion to them, as to a conquering party, and acknowledge they did by power exerciſe, what by force they had gotten, I ſhould in that ſenſe ſubmit to them, becauſe not able to defend my ſelf againſt them: but they call themſelves the legall Authority, and higher powers of England, under which notion I cannot ſubmit, becauſe poſi­tively to obey what is thus commanded, whatſoever ſecret reſervation I may have, I doe and muſt aſſert their power as lawfull, and their Authority as the legall Authority.

By this I ſhall fitly deſcend to thoſe inſtances of our Nation,Pag. 4, 5. to which what hath been already ſpoken, will give (me judice) ſufficient anſwer: For

1. What ſubmiſſion was given to the Conquerour, was yeelded as to a forc'd power, untill by after-compact it was acknowledged and made legall.

2. What was practiſed by the ſucceſſors mentioned (beſides the acknowledged force in their unrightfull acquiſitions, and violent exerciſe of power) it was only upon difference of Title, which people may not be able to judge of, as the Authour ſaies,Pag. 9. pag. 9. but amongſt us, here is an alteration of government, where a change only ſeems to be aſſerted, no Title at all pretended.

3. What is ſpoken of Hen. 7.Pag. 5. may be enough to anſwer the argument drawn from him and the reſt too. Although the Title might be unjuſt, and the power illegally gotten, yet when the Title was acknowledged, at leaſt, confirmed by Par­liament, and the Laws whereby he (or they) ſhould rule, were enacted in a Par­liament, that did engage the people to an unqueſtionable obedience, the conſtituted higher powers then commanding, to whom the Apoſtle requires obedience: for al­though a Parliament (ſuch I mean, which by the known law and continued u­ſage of the Kingdom as a Parliament) ſhould acknowledge or do any thing civilly evill (I mean in reference to the State) it is lawfull and juſt in reſpect of the people, and engageth obedience, which I think will be a ſufficient excuſe for peoples yeelding obedience to their laws, not only becauſe then enacted, but ſince confirmed by the higher powers of our Nation:Pag. 6. although in the mean time upon the ſame ground they reſt unſatisfied in the lawfullneſſe of ſubmiſſion to the preſent power. Pag. 6. Pag. 6.

I might adde, that what the whole body of a Nation did, if illegall, doth not engage our practice: for we know Papiſts (and ſuch they were all who ſubmitted to the fore-mentioned Rulers) make no conſcience of denying a rightfull Title, nor yeelding to an illegall power, when they may but probably carry on their own de­ſign: but what is ſpoken already will ſatisfie, and I had rather give a rationall anſ­wer, then queſtion the wiſdome or honeſty of Anceſtors, where it may be a­voided.

What is urged from the Caſuiſts and Paraeus (although I am not bound jurare in verba, being of D^r Moulins his minde,Pag. 6, 7. rather to like one argument then ten Au­thours) I ſhall agree to in that ſenſe, in which I conceive they delivered it, to8 ſubmit to ſuch power as forced, not to their Authority as legall, unleſſe it be ſuch an Authority which by conſtitution and uſage are the higher powers of our Kingdom.

The Authour after the example of others, proceeds now to give ſome reaſon of his own, which I ſhall alſo endeavour to examine, and ſo far as they carry ſtrength and truth (as leaſt to me) ſhall ſubmit: where otherwiſe, I ſhall give mine on the contrary.

Pag. 7.Indeed how can it be otherwiſe? For when a perſon or perſons have gotten ſupream power, and by the ſame excluded all other from Authority, either that Authority which is thus taken by power muſt be obeyed, or elſe all Authority muſt fall to the ground. Per­ſons may indeed get themſelves the greateſt ſtrength, and in that ſenſe may be ſub­mitted to, but they cannot illegally get themſelves the legall power, nor can they exclude others from their Authority, although by force they may keep them from the exerciſe of it, A man may be a man, yea a living man, although by the violence of diſeaſe, he may be kept from outward actings. An husband may be a husband ſtill although impriſoned and thereby kept from the exerciſe of his duty to his wife. A Parliament may be a Parliament ſtill, although by violence kept from ſitting and executing their Authority. I am ſo far from thinking that diſobedience to ſuch power will make all Authority and government fall to the ground, that I beleeve ſubmiſſion to ſuch will quickly lay all Authority waſte: for by the ſame reaſon that we obey this altered government and uſurped authority now, we muſt obey any other ſud­denly, if another party get more ſtrength, and what an unſetled ſtate and unknown Authority we ſhould then have may eaſily be judged: nor do I think the Authour himſelf would be of the ſame minde, ſhould the Prince with a potent army get the power into their hands. Surely were this doctrine true, thoſe renowned men ſhall be raſed out of the Calendar for Saints, that oppoſed the Kings power in Ship­money: nor muſt ſuch be ſequeſtred who under the Kings power formerly did lend or give whatſoever he required, whether men, money, horſe or arms: nor theſe put out of the Parliament, who obeyed him in ſitting at Oxon: nay, nor himſelf neither put to death for doing what was urged againſt him, if men in power how­ſoever they come by it are Rulers ordained by God, and to be obeyed for conſci­ence ſake.

Pag. 7.If Confuſion be worſe then titular Tyranny, I wiſh that ſeeing we had no titular tyranny, we had had no confuſion neither: and I ſhould be glad that confuſion may befall (if any) only ſuch, who in this Kingdome have been the greater introducers of it, either thoſe who acquire and aſſert, or thoſe who cannot receive or ſubmit to an uſurped government:Pag. 8. for although the end muſt not be deſtroyed for the means, yet he that deſtroies the means in it's tendency to the end, will ſcarcely preſerve the end at laſt.

Pag. 8.If a Maſters mate had thrown the Maſter over-board, and by power would ſuffer no other to guide the ſhip but himſelf, if the mariners will not obey him commanding aright for the ſafe guiding of the ſhip, the ſhip muſt needs periſh, and themſelves with it. I doubt here is a fallacy, and this caſe will not concern our queſtion, for I ſuppoſe, although I am not ſo well skilled in the diſcipline of marriners, as to know that a Maſters mate hath a kinde of Title to the government of the ſhip in caſe of the Maſters miſ­carriage,9 which ſuits not our condition: But ſuppoſe him to have no title, or ſtate the queſtion ſomewhat nearer our caſe, That if a party of the Sea-men ſhould throw the Maſter over-board, and aſſume to themſelves the government of the Ship: I ſhall then anſwer, That if that Mate or this party having the greater ſtrength, ſhould by power enforce and exact obedience of the reſt, the•e ought for the ſafety of their own lives, although not to obey the Authority, yet to do the commands of the enforcing party, and if ever they come aſho•r, to doe what they can to bring ſuch unworthy perſons to condigne puniſhment, who, beſides the murder of the Maſter, would ſo baſely hazard the ſhip too; But if th••〈◊〉or party ſhould command the Sea-men to obey them as the rightfull Maſter, I think (although with ſubmiſſion to better judgements) they ought nor, although for the ſafety of their lives thus to obey them. It is better to loſe a naturall life, then a quiet conſcience, and a ſpirituall ſoul: The greateſt advantage will not warrant the leaſt evil. In ſuch a caſe it would eaſily be judged both by God and men, to whoſe fault the loſſe of the ſhip ſhould be imputed, either to them that did unjuſtly require, or thoſe who dared not unwarrantably to do an unlawfull thing. I know not what the ſodain fear of unavoidable death might make ſuch men (de facto) do, and I can eaſily think what harſh cenſures their hazarding or••­ſing their lives upon ſuch refuſall, may bear from raſh and leſſe conſiderate men, as an empty product of meer peeviſhneſſe: but I am confident that a Synod of reli­gious and intelligent Divines would conclude, that (de jure) they ought rather to ad­venture the loſſe of all, than call him a lawfull, who is but an uſurped maſter, which they muſt by yeelding to his or their commands under that notion.

Whereas ſome speak of a time for ſettlement,Pag. •. they indeed do rather speak for a time of unſettlement, for they will have an unſettlement firſt and a ſettlement after. If I miſtake not the deſires of thoſe who withhold ſubmiſſion to the preſent power. the Authour of that Book is miſtaken in his apprehenſions of them: That they deſire a ſettlement (I think) is true, but that they deſire an unſettlement firſt, is beſides my thoughts of them; I know it is the grief of their ſouls, and cauſeth ſad ſearchings of heart, that ever they were brought into ſuch unſettlements, and thereby put upon ſuch racks of conſcience as theſe are. It is not unſettlement but a deliverance from unſettlement they long for: I ſcarce ſee how we can be more unſetled then now we are: Indeed being unſetled, we would uſe my means for a ſettlement, although for it's procurement our unſettledneſſe were more unſet­led; If a man be at the rivers brink, I would adviſe him to keep out of the water, but if at once he leap into the middle of the river, I ſhould perſwade him to come to the bank, although he wade through much water to come thither: I would counſell a man to prevent diſtempers, but when the diſeaſe is already contracted I ſhould preſcribe ſome Phyſick for the ſafety of his life, although for the preſent it ſhould more diſeaſe him.

What is ſpoken of the former Scriptures and Caſuiſts in the ſame Page, I ſhall refer to what was before anſwered.

But it is asked: Whether that may not be called a ſettlement,Pag. •• how ſoon〈◊〉it is, when there is ſuch a way ſetled, that men may have juſtice if they will, and may••­joy that main end of Magiſtracy, to live a peaceable life in godlineſſe and〈◊〉? To8〈1 page duplicate〉9〈1 page duplicate〉10ſpeak of what juſtice ſome have had at Weſtminſter, ſince the unſettlement of our times, or what to be expected, when Colonels appear as parties with their argu­ments by their ſides before Committees, (an argument too often uſed in the Houſe too, as I beleeve the Gentleman knows,) where to engage a buſtling daring Colonell is to carry a cauſe: as alſo what peaceable lives men live, when the ſouldiers ha­ving put other men in power in the State, put themſelves in command in mens houſes: and what godlineſſe and honeſty may be looked for, when blaſphemy muſt be tolerated,Ʋt judicium ſit actus juſtitiae, requiritur ut procedat ex authoritate praeſidentis: quando homo judicet de his de quibus non ha­bet authoritatē dicitur judiciū uſurpatum. Aquin. 22. Q. 60 cap. 2. 〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 wickedneſſe muſt not be puniſhed, when in the mean time godly men (if but of a contrary judgement, a liberty of conſcience formerly plead­ed for) are made offendors for a word, would be too large a field to walk in, and beſides the ſwelling of this tract, but give too wide an occaſion to further con­teſts. But this ſhall ſuffice, that the gentleman a little begs the queſtion in cal­ling it juſtice, for although men may have, or might expect, what he cals juſtice, viz. things in themſelves juſt, yet if he grant, as I have proved, that Authority illegall by which they act, what they do or is done by any under that Authority, although in it ſelf juſt, yet is not properly juſtice: Judgement (for I conceive the Authour means juſtitiam diſtributivam) is then only juſt, where it is exerciſed by the higher powers, the legall Magiſtracy of that Kingdome where it is acted. The Hebrews expreſſe juſtice by that word, which they likewiſe uſe for the uſage and cuſtome of that people, that are concerned in it.

Exod 21.9. & Joſh. 6. ••.Another argument the Authour uſeth is, becauſe People cannot judge of Titles: when they cannot judge, then an uſurped Title is true to them, and will exact obedience: but if this be an Argument, then (for contrariorum eadem eſt rati•) when Titles are viſibly unlawfull, people are diſingaged from obedience. This is our caſe, where there is not any pretence of Title.

Pag. 9.But ſome ſay, There are Oaths that juſtifie diſobedience to the preſent government: There are indeed ſeverall Oaths that engage us to the continued obſervance of our formerly eſtabliſhed government, and then how far they juſtifie diſobedience to this, let the Authour judge. That Oaths are ſacred bonds and reverend oblige­ments, and where they do not themſelves leave or make us free, we are not to cut or break them in peeces: I ſhall equally aſſert, and could heartily wiſh it had been as truly practiſed in the Kingdome as plainly ſpoken in the book: But ſeeing there are indeed (as the Authour affirms) concerning theſe,Pag 9. faults on both hands, let us a little examine the faults he mentions, and ſee whether there are not other faults too, that he ſpeaks not of.

On the one ſide the ſlieghting of an Oath, &c. This is a fault indeed: Oaths and Covenants are the ſtrongeſt engagements, whereby we can binde our ſelves either to God or man, if theſe come once to be ſleighted and no longer obſerved, then they may conduce to the palpable advantage of thoſe that made them, I am afraid that may juſtly be written upon the door-poſts of England,Iſa. 11.1, 2. what was ſet in the front of Davids ſong, Pſa. 12.1, 2.

I am loth to misjudge any perſon, whom I finde ſo modeſt, elſe I ſhould fear that this fault was purpoſely argued, the more ſecretly to inſinuate another, though not under the name of a fault:Pag. 10. It is ſaid, We finde ſome part of the Covenant to ſpeak of all the daies of our lives: as if ſome part had been but of a temporary engagement:11 but if I miſtake not, the Covenant did in every part of it oblige us to a continued ob­ſervance of it: we did not ſwear conſtantly to keep this part, or that clauſe, but all our lives to keep this Covenant, which is known to comprehend every part of it.

True it is, that the obligation of ſome things end, becauſe they can no longer be kept,Pag. 10. as that of the Kings perſon, &c. I grant that the obligation of a people to any thing ends, when that thing obliged to, neceſſarily, and in its own nature ends; but if men ſhall by violence put an end to the thing, that thereby the obligation may end too, I doubt ſuch will be eſteemed by God as Covenant breakers; I do not think, that he breaks his Covenant, that doth not preſerve the Kings perſon, when he is dead; but I think he is guilty, that did not endeavour to preſerve it while he was living; had the Covenant, in that part, been obſerved then, for all that I know, it might have obliged now. A woman promiſeth to be faithfull to her husband ſo long as he lives, but if ſhe, out of love to another man, ſhall lay violent hands on her husband to end his life, that thereby ſhe might marry another, I beleeve ſhe would ſcarcely be thought to have performed her promiſe. A Tenant bargains with his Land-lord to pay him rent for his houſe, ſo long as he lives in it: but if he through malice ſhall pull down the houſe, that he cannot live in it, and thereby to extinguiſh his bargain, it may be eaſily thought what determination the Law would make in ſuch a caſe.

What is ſpoken here of the Kings perſon, might as well have been ſpoken of any other part of the Covenant: It is Covenanted to preſerve Religion, but if thoſe that made the Covenant ſhould by force extirpate, or by deceit undermine Reli­gion: would the Authour think himſelf or others diſingaged from that part of the Covenant, or rather look upon himſelf as bound to preſerve it, while it hath a being? If this liberty ſhould be given, no man would keep any Oath any longer, than he ſaw good, if it were in his power to put an end to that thing to which he is obliged. But let's ſee what faults are found on the other hand.

But on the other ſide there are other faults: ſuch are the urging of an Oath or Co­venant againſt enemies, and not againſt friends in one and the ſame action. In this I am wholly of his judgement, and could wiſh that he had inſtanced in ſome things, whereby I might have gueſſed what aim he had taken, and againſt what he had le­velled it. As I would not have any unequally excuſed, who are equally guilty, ſo I would not have him free from blame, who imputes guilt to one, when another ſhall be connived at, or incouraged in the ſame thing.