A VINDICATION OF THE Oath of Allegiance IN ANSWER TO A Paper diſperſt by Mr Sam: Eaton, pretending to prove the Oath of Allegiance voyd, and non-obliging.
Wherein his POSITJONS Againſt it are Examined and Confuted.
By the Author of the Exercitation concerning Uſurped Powers.
It is a ſnare to a man after Vows to make enquiry.
Printed in the Year, 1650.
EVery Oath, to make it lawful and warrantable, ought to be taken in Iudgment and Righteouſneſs, Jerem. 4.2. The Oath then of Allegiance, that it may be in Righteouſneſs and Iudgment, muſt be
Firſt, Conditional, not Abſolute; mutual, not ſingle; taken by both parties, not by one onely; by the Ruler or Governor, not alone by the Ruled; by the Prince, as well as by the Subject.
Reaſ. It is againſt the Ground and Reaſon of the Primitive Inſtitution of Government, which is the good of the Subject, that there ſhould be any Oath to binde the Subject abſolutely, whether the Prince or Governor rule for the Subjects good or not: Therefore ſuch an Oath cannot be taken by the Subject in Judgement or Righteouſneſs; Therefore ſuch an Oath is not lawful. So again, it is againſt Equity and Reaſon, and againſt the good of the Subject, That he ſhould be further or longer bound to the Prince or Ruler to ſubmit to him, then the Prince or Ruler is bound to the Subject to rule well, and adminiſter Juſtice rightly: If therefore the Obligation be not mutual, but ſingle, it is not lawful.
Conſequence. Then if the Oath of Allegiance, taken to the late King, were in Iudgment and Righteouſneſs, and ſo lawful, the King was, or ought to have been, as ſtrongly bound to all the Subjects by Oath, as any of them to him: Then if he break his Oath, all the Subjects are abſolved if they will: Then at what time the King levyed War againſt his Subjects, they were diſcharged by that breach of Oath in him of their Allegiance, elſe the whole Parliament and Parliamentary party were both perjured perſons, ſo many of them as have taken this Oath; and are Rebels, that have taken up Arms againſt the King.
4Secondly, Nor to His Heirs.
Reaſ. Becauſe who knoweth (as Solomon ſaith, Eccleſ. 2.19. ) whether the Heir will be a wiſe man, or a fool? a juſt, or righteous man? or a wicked man, and Tyrant? Now if no man know this, then it is not an Oath in Iudgment, if any man ſwear Allegiance to an Heir, nor is it a righteous Oath; for the Subject may binde himſelf to his own hurt, yea ruine and deſtruction.
Conſeq. Then the Oath of Allegiance was, in that branch of it that reſpected Heirs, an unlawful Oath: for who knows what any of the late Kings poſterity might have proved? whether they would have upheld Religion, or changed it? whether they would have upheld the Liberty and Property of the Subject, or ſubverted it? We know what their education was, who then could take an Oath in Righteouſneſs and Iudgment in reference to them? It is good to know firſt, and ſwear afterwards.
Thirdly, Nor to any one kinde of Government, Monarchical, or any other, to uphold and continue it in a conſtant way, without changing of it.
Reaſ. Becauſe though civil Government in general be an Ordinance of God, tending to mans good, therefore to reject it would be ſinful; yet this or that kinde of Government is not an Ordinance of God, but an Ordinance of man, 1 Pet. 2.13. and if an Ordinance of man, then man may change it, for his own greater good and benefit; and muſt change it, when he hath proved any kinde of government inconvenient and hurtful: Then to ſwear not to change it, is ſinful, and in Righteouſneſs and in Iudgment may not be done; for all kindes of Government are not equally good, nor are they equally ſuitable to all people: and experience makes perſons wiſe, to diſcern what is better, and what is worſe, for themſelves; and therefore an Oath to uphold any one kinde of Government longer then it continues to be moſt ſafe and profitable, is unlawful.
Conſequ. Then the Oath of Allegiance, ſerving to uphold Kingly Government againſt all others, was an unlawful Oath; for who knows not what a plague this kinde of Government hath been to this Nation? and who knoweth not that the moſt of our Kings have been Tyrants? and who knows not what a Bleſſing the Change of Government hath brought to the united Provinces?
5Object. But ſuppoſe there was ſome Ʋnlawfulneſs in the taking of ſuch Oaths, yet is there not a neceſſity of keeping them, being taken?
Anſw. If that Oath, taken againſt the life of one man by Herod, becauſe unrighteous and cruel, was not onely ſinfully taken, but more ſinfully kept: then ſuch Oaths of Allegiance which are abſolute, and not conditional, which are ſingle, and not mutual, which are to Heirs, whether wiſe men, or fools, whether of juſt men, or Tyrants, which are to uphold Monarchy, the woful fruits whereof, though they have been long taſted and felt by this Nation, ſeeing they are dangerous, and may prove (as often they have done) deſtructive to the lives of many men, they are not onely unlawful to be taken, but unlawful to be kept.
Reaſ. Becauſe the Repreſentative of the People, which in Reaſon are the Supreme Power of the Nation, impoſed this Oath upon the Subject by an Act made in Parliament, by which they obliged the Subject to Allegiance to the King then in being, and to his Heirs: And this Act done by their Repreſentatives, was their own Voluntary Act, to which they were not obliged by any Law of God or Nature: for there is no Rule requiring them to accept of ſuch a perſon to be their Prince, and his Heirs after him, and to ſwear Allegiance to him and them: but this was the Subjects free Act in their Repreſentatives; Therefore if the Repreſentatives take away this Act, and repeal it, they thereby ſet the Subjects at liberty from ſuch Allegiance, and from their Oath by which they are bound unto it: Abraham that impoſed the Oath upon his ſervant, might acquit him of it, becauſe not bound by any Rule from God, but obliged by Abraham onely.
Conſequence. This Preſent Parliament having taken away that Oath of Allegiance which which was enacted to be impoſed, there remains no more Conſcience of it to ſuch who have taken it: But6 then it will come to this. Whether the Parliament be the Supreme Power: Whether the Repreſentative of the People be the Parliament: Whether the preſent Repreſentatives, that now ſit in Parliament, be the Repreſentatives of the People?
To the firſt, I ſay, it is evident that the Norman Kings, coming in by Conqueſt, had never any true Right to the Crown of England, but what the Parliament gave them: Then the Power of the Parliament was greater then theirs, becauſe that Power that is the cauſe of Power, is greater then that Power that is the effect of Power. Secondly, The Power of the Parliament is the Power of the People: Now in Reaſon the Power of the People is the Supreme Power, becauſe thence, as from the root, all Power firſt ſprung and proceeded.
To the ſecond, I ſay, if the Parliaments Power be the Peoples Power, and the Supreme Power; Then the Repreſentatives, or the People, are the Parliament, and none elſe: for the Repreſentatives are the People in them, and there is the root of Power; therefore they are the Parliament.
To the third, I ſay, That the preſent Repreſentatives, that now ſit in Parliament, are, firſt, all of them choſen by the People, therefore of right they ſit in Parliament. Secondly, The preſent Repreſentatives are all that are left to ſit in Parliament: for the moſt of the reſt have deſerted their Truſt without any force upon them: For though ſome were ſecluded and ſecured, yet the reſt were not at all interrupted, but have voluntarily departed from the Houſe. Thirdly, The Repreſentatives, that remained and continued to ſit in Parliament, were always, when feweſt, and ſtill are, above the number allowed of by Law, and therefore are a Parliament. There is one Objection that may be urged againſt the Parliament abſolving men from their Allegiance to the Kings heirs, and againſt their aboliſhing Kingly Government.
Object. It may be ſaid, That Kings have the ſame Rights to their Kingdoms, Crowns, and Revenues, as others have to their Mannors and Demains.
Anſw. Such Right as Kings have had, they never juſtly came by it, but by force and flattery have obtained it, and have uſurped upon the birth-right of the People, to whom it belongs to chooſe them that muſt rule over them; and Kingdoms, with their7 appurtenances thereto, were never intended for particular mens advancement, to lift up ſuch Families in glory and greatneſs, or that the Hereditary Right of any ſhould be in them: but Wiſdom, Righteouſneſs, and Virtue was to lift up men unto them; and crowns & revenu's were to incourage them in acting in ſuch places; and men that were ſo qualified, were to be Heirs & Succeſſors, ſet up by the People after them; and the People themſelves, nor their Repreſentatives, could neither give, nor ſell away this priviledg from their poſterity, in which the welfare of the People is ſo mainly concerned, and without which a People are given up, and ſold to ruine. This cannot be ſaid of Mannors and Demains, which are things fall under Commutative Juſtice, and are things vendible, and wherein particular men are concerned, and not the Common-wealth.
THe drift of the firſt Poſition, and the proſecution thereof (with which I begin) is to ſhew the ſaid oath to have bin unlawful & unwarrantable in the taking of it, and ſo voyd in the fact or making.
Firſt, I ſhall premiſe, for the clearing partly of what follows, That an Oath may be unlawful**Dr Sandoſ. de Juram oblig. proel. 2. ſect. 14. : 1. Either in regard of the matter, or thing ſworn, as if a man ſwear to do any impoſſible or ſinful act. 2. Or in the manner or circumſtances of ſwearing, as if a man ſwear unadviſedly, or with a falſe intention, or otherwiſe unduly for manner. The former way of unlawfulneſs makes an Oath voyd in the taking, but not the latter. So that though a man ſwear an Oath (in ſome ſort) not in truth, that is, not intending to be tyed to, or to keep it; or not in judgment, that is, not con•iderately enough; yet if the Oath be in Righteouſneſs, that is, of a juſt and lawful matter or thing, it is of force, otherwiſe no Oath could binde in foro externo, or be of any uſe for confirmation; for who can diſcern with what minde another man ſwears? Again, this evidently appears by the validity of that unadviſed Oath of the Princes to the Gibeonites, Joſh. 9.15, 18, 19. 2 Sam. 21.2. and of that Oath of Zedekiah and his people to Nebuchadnezzar, 2 Chro. 36.13. Ezek. 17.13, 21, 23. which they entred into treacherouſly,**Anotat. of Divines, & Dioda:. on. Hoſ. 10.4. Hoſ. 10.4.
Secondly, I obſerve, what a groſs imputation the firſt Poſition layeth upon the King and Parliament, that framed and ordained the Oath of Allegiance, and all other Parliaments ſince, that have Conſcience, and the Succeſſive Houſes of Commons that have ſworn it, with thoſe multitudes of Magiſtrates, Miniſters, and of other profeſſions in the Kingdom, that have taken, and ſtill hold themſelves bound by it (having had all the while ſo much Divine and Goſpel Light ſhining forth to, and in them) as if they had publiſhed, preſſed, taken, and juſtified (as againſt the Papiſts by writing) an Oath in the matter of it unjuſt and ſinful: This man had need bring clear Reaſons for what he here thus chargeth upon ſo many WORTHIES for Place, Piety, and Judgement; and declare them more publiquely then by a PRIVATE PAPER, that he may9 call to repentance the whole Nation that is (as he ſuppoſeth) involved in this impiety of an unlawfull Oath. But let us firſt by the triall of his Reaſons, ſee whether he hath not more need to repent of this his charge.
His generall exception againſt the lawfulneſſe of the Oath, is: That it is not according to the rule, Jer. 4.2. in judgement and in righteouſneſſe. Were it defective in judgement, that is, in deliberateneſſe of taking, that would not be (as I have ſaid) a ground to invalidate its obligation ipſo facto, ſeeing it were but a failing in the manner, not a corruptneſſe in the matter; a fault in the perſon ſwearing, not in the Oath ſworne; and in the perſon a defect internall, or of the mind, not externally viſible in the Act, and to be preſumed to be found only in ſome perſons ſwearing, not in all: That part therefore of the Allegation, were it true, might have been left out, and as often as it is brought in to prove the Oath unlawfull, ſo as not to bind, it addes no ſtrength to the concluſion: But to deſcend to his particulars.
1. To manifeſt the Oaths diſagreement with the ſaid rule of Jeremiah, his firſt particular exception is, That it ought to have been conditionall, not abſolute; mutuall, not ſingle; his argument in effect runs thus: That it may be in judgement and righteouſneſſe it must be conditionall, not abſolute, mutuall, or taken both by Ruler and ruled, not ſingle, or taken only by one party, but this Oath is not ſo: Ergo,
That the Reader may underſtand us both, and I may more clearly paſſe on in my Anſwer, I muſt interpoſe a diſtinction or two upon the termes.
Firſt, ſaith he, the Oath muſt be conditionall, not abſolute: Firſt, I conceive the words conditionall, and abſolute, may be taken,
1. Either in reference to the thing ſworne, which is Obedience or Allegiance to the King; thus the Oath muſt be conditionall, not abſolute, that is, the obedience which we bind our ſelves to, muſt be with limitation and condition, reſtraining it (as all obedience to men in any relation is to be) to juſt, honeſt, lawfull things, or ſo as to conſiſt with our obedience to God, not abſolute or illimited in that ſenſe.
2. Or in reference to the tie or obligation of the Oath, as the qualification thereof: and ſo I ſay, it may be abſolute, and muſt not of neceſſity be conditionall, that is, the ſubordinate and limited10 obedience, which is due to the Prince or Magiſtrate, I may ſwear unto abſolutely, or without any ſpeciall condition annexed to my Engagement. Speciall condition I ſay, for I muſt once againe diſtinguiſh, to wit, of conditions.
1. Some are generall, and ſuch as no promiſſary Oath that is lawfull can be without; thoſe are, I think, all of them reduced to theſe two heads: namely, that the thing ſworne be honeſt and poſſible; theſe conditions are preſuppoſed, and not wont to be expreſſed, and notwithſtanding the including of them an Oath may be ſaid to be abſolute.
2. Others are ſpeciall and proper conditions, which are ingredients in ſome Oaths, the which (by reaſon of them) termed conditionall; they are uſually either ſomewhat that is contingent, as when a Marchant covenants, and ſwears to give a hundred pounds to another man, or to a publike uſe, if his ſhip (that is gone to Sea) returne home ſafe with her Merchandize, or that which is arbitrary, or in the choice of mans will, his (commonly) to whom the Oath is ingaged, as if a Maſter covenant and ſwear to maintain his ſervant with meat, drink and ſuch wages, if he be a true and diligent ſervant to him: It is not the former, but this latter conditionality which he requireth in the Oath of Allegiance, to wit, that the Subject be only bound to his duty of Allegiance, if, and ſo long as the Prince obſerveth his duty of Government inviolate; and this in truth is not in that Oath, nor is it neceſſary to make the Oath lawfull. The Major therefore of this Oath-impugners Syllogiſme I deny in that firſt part of it, viz. It muſt be conditionall, not abſolute: To make good my deniall, firſt, I will ananſwer what he ſaith to prove it. Secondly, bring in my reaſons againſt it, and leave the Reader to judge betwixt us.
1. All that he ſaith for proof of that aſſertion, is this: It is aagainſt the ground and reaſon of the Primitive inſtitution of Government, which is the good of the Subject, that there ſhould be any Oath to bind him abſolutely, whether the Prince rule for the Subjects good or not. This were ſomething if it were proved, but the Reader is left either to take it upon his word, or to remain unſatisfied both of it, and the concluſion which depends upon it; if he like to do neither, let him try whether I can ſatisfie him to the contrary.
1. The Parliament that enacted this Oath, and all ſubſequent Parliaments who were intruſted with, and moſt able (in all probability) to judge what would be for the Subjects good, and who11 (without all controverſie) were more ſufficient and competent Judges thereof then this man, have adjudged it not againſt, but for the Subjects good.
2. It hath conſiſted with the publike good (yea contributed to it, or els the Papiſts would not have ſo oppoſed it) from the time it was firſt ſet forth, untill now, in impartiall mens judgements, and no complaint hath been at all heard againſt it from the Kingdome, nor ſcarcely if at all from particular men, till within theſe few dayes, what the ſuppreſſing of it on the other hand will tend to, a little time may fully enough manifeſt.
3. A thing may be ſaid to be againſt the peoples good in two very far different ſenſes: 1. Either in it ſelf of its own nature or ſimply conſidered: of this ſort are injuſtice, impunity of offences, ſedition, conſpiracy, hoſtile invaſion, and the like; ſuch things are in their own nature oppoſed to the publike good. 2. Or accidentally and contingently, thus any thing almoſt that falls under a politicall conſideration, and comes under the deliberation of the Law-givers, though lawfull in it ſelf, and for the preſent probably, yea, or neceſſarily good for a Common-wealth, may prove in the event ſomewhat incommodious and hurtfull. There is a goodneſſe of the end, which is one and the ſame in all States and Governments, viz. the happineſſe of the Community, and this is intended, not deliberated on, or choſen by the Law-givers:**Ac deliberamus quidem non de finibus ſed de tis quae referuntur ad ſines. Ariſtot. Eth. l. 3. c. 3. And there is a goodneſſe of the means tending to that end, and this is variable in relation to times and people; that may be good in the nature of a means for one people, or time, that is not ſo for another. ††Eſt enim genus hominum natura varie comparatum atqueaffectum, aliud ſervile, aliud colendis regibus accommodatum; aliud Democraticum & populare; atquehorum generum ſuum cuique eſt ac diſtinctum commodum. Ariſtot Polit. l. 3. c 12. num. 112. Itaque manifeſtum eſt ejuſdem diſciplinae eſſe conſiderare, non ſolum quae ſit, & qualis optima Respublica, cujus ſtatus ſi nulla vis obſtiterit, maximè deſideretur, & optetur; ſed etiàm, quae cuique congrua & conſontanca eſt, permulti enim optimam conſequi nequeunt, quare neque Legiſlator, neque is qui verè civilis habeatur, ignorare debet quae reſpub. tam abſolutè perfecta ſit, tum pro ſtatu rerum praeſentium maximè laudanda, tum denique quae pro conditione aliqua non ſit improbanda. Idem lib. 4. cap. 1 num. 2. Itaque cognoſcendae erant rerum publicarum ſpecies, ac differentiae, & quot modis inter ſe commiſceantur, cumque hac eadem prudentia optimarum legum ſcientia & unicuique Reipub. convenientium conjurgenda eſt, ad reſpublicas enim leges ſunt accomodauda non autem ad leges res ipſa publicae. Idem eodem Num. 6.27. It is the means and its goodneſſe which falls under the conſultation of the Legiſlators, and becauſe of the uncertainty thereof, they are occaſioned often to change their adviſements and Lawes: But by reaſon that12 in things which approach neer the foundation, or do conſtitute it, changes are very perillous in a State, and in thoſe things it is better to bear an inconveniency, then run the hazard of an innovation; therefore it hath been the honeſt and neceſſary wiſdome of moſt States to ſettle them by a firmer Sanction then they uſe in other things, and to ordaine a kind of immutability in them, and conſequently to ratifie them by Oaths, fore-ſeeing that no inconvenience in the Conſtitution of a Government, in it ſelf lawfull and eligible, can match the miſchief of an alteration; and therefore that the uncertaine danger of that is rather to be choſen, then the inevitable miſeries of this: Such things as may by reaſon of their changeable nature prove in the iſſue ſomewhat diſadvantagious, may yet, if for the preſent good, and probably hopefull ſo to continue, be ſworne to abſolutely, as in voluntary Promiſes, Leagues and Contracts, both publike and private, among all Nations hath been the practiſe, and by good Scripture-preſidents it is juſtified,**Geneſ. 47.31. Exod. 13.19. Ioſh. 9.15.14.9. Iudg. 21.5.18.15.12.13. 1 Sam. 14.24.19.6.20.12.17. 1 King. 1.13.29. 2 Sam. 29.23. and the reaſon is, becauſe if any future prejudice do redound, it can be (the obligation of the Oath remaining) at the worſt, but in outward incommodity, the which is compenſated by the avoiding of a greater evill, which the leaving of the matter free and unſecured would more certainly breed and bring. To apply all this to the caſe in hand: If any Impeachment of the Subjects good can be ſuppoſed to reſult out of his ſwearing to his Prince abſolutely, whether he rule well or no, it is but accidentall, and ſuch as it is, it is overballanced with a greater miſchief which would accrue by leaving the Subjects uningaged: for the ſhunning of which the leſſer evill, to wit, the being bound to a King, though he ſhould prove a bad Governour, is to be choſen; for that, in compariſon of a greater evill, hath the conſideration of good, and is ſo eligible: It is a leſſe evill for a people to be bound to a Prince that poſſibly may prove bad, then to be ſo looſe, as to be at the liberty to caſt him off when they ſhall judge him to rule ill, that is, when they pleaſe; the former doth not ſo neerly and probably tend to the Subjects hurt as doth the latter: For, firſt, the Prince may prove juſt and vertuous. Secondly, the Subject is only bound by his Allegiance to legall13 obedience, which obedience (be the Prince never ſo bad) can do the people no harme. Thirdly, in his lawleſſe Acts there may be a remedy (as the puniſhment or reſiſtance of his bad inſtruments by the Parliament, without whom though he may will unjuſt things, yet he cannot execute them) and yet his Government be continued. Fourthly, and ſuppoſe the caſe that there be no remedy, as when he hath got a party ſtronger then can be reſiſted, or ſubjected to puniſhment, then to caſt off his power and depoſe him (ſuppoſe it lawfull to do) will be no relief, his ſtrength will command ſubjection. Fiftly, the miſcarriages of a Prince ordinarily (unleſſe it come to publike conteſtation, wherein the Subjects ſworne and unſworne, if their cauſe be juſt, and the Parliament authorize their ſtanding up, are in the ſame capacity of reſiſtence) extend but to the detriment of ſome particular perſons, rarely doth any Nero-like, ſeek the deſtruction of the whole. But on the other hand, ſet the people free to ſhake off the reines of their preſent Government, when they ſhall think it unequall, and firſt, you deſtroy the nature of Government, as will afterwards be ſhewed. 2. You expoſe the people to an immediate loſſe of the very uſe and injoyment of any Government, the power of mobility and change being ſure to invite all ill diſpoſed perſons immediately to put that power in ure, and hurrie all [if they may prevaile] into confuſion. In ſhort, a bad Government is better then none; it is more tolerable for a people that one or a few, then that every man do that which is right in his owne eyes. To be bound to Allegiance, may lay the people open to the former; to be looſe, will precipitate them into the later: The former inconvenience cannot be ſo univerſally extenſive, ſpeedily deſtructive, and remedileſſe, or unreſiſtible, as the later.
2. The later thing I premiſed, is to give my Reaſons for the contradictory to his major Propoſition in that firſt part, It must be conditionall, not abſolute: Againſt which I ſay, the Oath of Allegiance may be abſolute or unconditionall, in the ſenſe before given, and for this Aſſertion I render theſe Reaſons:
1. Were there no Oath, the limited obedience which is due to Princes and Magiſtrates is due to them abſolutely, that is, whether they rule well or no, and that which is abſolutely due, may be abſolutely ſworne; the former Propoſition I ground thus.
1. The Precept of obedience to Civill Governors, is without any condition or reſerve of a diſingagement of the Subject14 in caſe of the Governours miſcarriage, read the fifth Commandement, and thoſe other Injunctions, Rom. 13.1.2. &c. Tit. 3.1. 1. Pet. 2.13. &c.
2. God commands his people to be ſubject to Heathen Princes, and the moſt abſolute and oppreſſive tyrants that likely ever have been, Ier. 27.12. Mat. 22.21. 1 Pet. 2.13. I ſpeak not here of Tyrants in regard of Title, or Right, that is, Uſurpers; but of Tyrants whoſe title is juſt, but their Government unjuſt and oppreſſive.
3. Servants are to be ſubjects to their Maſters, not only that are good and gentle, but thoſe that are froward, that do them wrong, and from whom they ſuffer for doing well, 1 Pet. 2.18, 19, 20. and by analogy Subjects are tyed in the ſame terms to their Governours.
4. David would not ſtretch out his hand againſt Saul upon this ground, for that he was his Maſter the King of Iſrael, and the Lords Anointed, though he was then in actuall, violent, and unjuſt purſuit his life, 1 Sam. 24.5. &c. 26.9. &c.
5. Otherwiſe you leave no place for paſſive obedience to pray for, & patience towards Magiſtrates in caſe of their wrong doing, & your innocency, which yet is generally acknowledged to be a duty**Ameſ. medulla Theol. l. 1. c. 17. p. 57. Vrſin. Catech. pa. 3. qu. 104. .
6. Els you diſſolve all Magiſtracy, it will be impoſſible in mans corrupt eſtate to retain or continue any, in as much as no man, or men, can in the vaſt multitude, and difficulty of magiſtraticall affairs avoid offending every day, 2 Sam. 23.3, 5.
7. The Doctrine of Orthodox Proteſtant Divines generally is, that obedience is due (in lawful things) to the moſt degenerate, oppreſſing, and tyrannicall Princes**Calvin. Inſtit. l. 4. c. 20. S. 24, 25. &c. P. Martyr loc: C. claſ. 4. C. 2. S. 12. 18. 19. Alſted. Theol. caſe 17. Reg. 8. Mr. Perkins caſes of Gonſc. l. 3. c. 6. ſ. 1. Bucan. Inſtit. Theol. loc. 49. quaeſt. 21. Synopſ puc. Theol. diſp. 50. Theſ. 18.27. Scharp. ſymphon. Epoch. 5. Quaest. 44. 45. .
2. VVe find Oaths of Allegiance in Scripture, ſworn to Princes without any conditions inſerted, Judg. 11.9, 10. 2 Kings 11.4. 2 Chron. 36.13. Ezek. 17.13. & Nehem. 10.29. their Oath was to obſerve all the Commandements of the Lord, whereof the fifth Commandement, with application to their preſent and future Magiſtrates, was one.
3. It is a thing within our power to ſettle our allegiance abſolutely, as well as it is within a mans power to diſpoſe of himſelf to ſervice ſo, whether his Maſter prove good, or evill, or as it is in a man or womans power to beſtow themſelves in marriage, whether the mate be obſervant of duty or no.
4. A Conditionall Oath is not conſiſtent with a neceſſary duty; obedience to magiſtrates is not leſſe arbitrary, but commanded, and that though they be bad, but now the duty being neceſſary, if you15 would have it ſworn with a proviſo of the Rulers performing his duty, you nullifie the end of an Oath, which is to confirm, put out of doubt, and give ſecurity of what is due. A thing ſworn may become due, either by the Rule of Equity, or by a voluntary Covenant: that which is due the later way, if the Covenant be conditionall; the Oath that is to ratifie it, may be alſo ſo far conditionall, but what is due in the former kind, to wit, by abſolute and unalterable rule, or precept of Juſtice, cannot be ſworn to conditionally; for that would be no ratification to it, nay it would be a debilitating, and rendering more inſecure of that which was ſimply due without an oath, a condition being put into your Oath being a very probable medium to perſwade the ſwearer that he is no otherwaies bound to the things ſworn then upon that condition, which being broken by the party ſworn to, he will eaſily conceive himſelf altogether free: thus the abſolute Rule will receive impeachment, and not ſtrength in it's obligation by the conditionall Oath: ſuch an Oath therefore is in it's end inconſiſtent with it.
2. I come to the lrtter part of his Major which exacteth, That the Oath be mutuall, or taken both by Ruler, and Ruled; not ſingle, or taken only by the ruled. Some explanation of his terms, more then is here he might have uſed: for lack whereof I ſhall as I go obſerve ſome difference of ſenſe appliable to his words, and ſo expreſſe how I deny this branch of his poſition, and why.
1. His words ſound, as if he would have the ſame Oath to be taken mutually both by Prince and Subjects, which (if he remember that the Oath ſpoken of, is the oath of a Subjects Allegiance, obedience, or ſubjection to be yeelded to his Soveraign, and that the King is the perſon ſworn to) he will not, cannot I ſuppoſe own to be his ſenſe.
2. But the apter ſenſe, and that which I ſuppoſe was in his intention, is, that the Ruler and Subject ſhould each ſwear to his reſpective duty; the Prince that he will command and govern lawfully, the Subject that he will perform all lawfull homage, and obedience: and to this I ſay, although it be true it in fact, in our caſe, that the King hath ſworn his duty on his part, as well as the Subject doth in this oath ſwear his, yet the Propoſition is falſe in this, and it cannot be ſaid, that thus it univerſally ought of neceſſity to be betwixt every Prince and his Subjects, much leſſe can it hold that unleſſe it be thus mutuall, the Subjects oath is not in righteouſneſſe according to Ier. 4.2. but that for want of this mutuality it it is null. for,
161. We read of many undoubtedly righteous Oaths in Scripture undertaken in Covenants betwixt man and man, wherein one party only ſweareth, and not both mutually**Gen. 24.2.47 31. Exod. 13.19. Ioſh. 2.12.9.15.14.9 Iudg. 15.12. 1 Sam. 19.6. 1 Kings 1.13.29.51. 2 Sam. 19.23. Noh. 5.12. Ier. 38 10..
2. We find in Scripture Oaths of Allegiance taken by Subjects to their Rulers, without the reciprocall ſwearing of the Rulers to them**2 Reg. 11.4. Iudg. 11 10. Chron. 36.13. Ezek. 17.3.; ſuch was that ingagement, Joſh. 1.16, 17, 18.
3. Oaths are never to be taken but neceſſarily, that is, when not only the matter is of great weight, but it cannot otherwiſe be ſufficiently confirmed or aſſured then by Oath**D. Sanderſ. de Iuram. ob. pral. 7. S. 12. Tholoſ. ſyntag. dur. 1.50. c. 3., but in ſolemne humane Covenants it comes to paſſe that ſomtimes the performance lies only on one party, the other is to receive advantage, but not to do any thing; ſomtimes the danger of breach lies only or more on one part then on another, ſomtimes there is other ſatisfactory aſſurance given beſides ſwearing, and ſometimes there is other remedy, if there ſhould be a breach then the forfeiture of an Oath: in ſuch and other caſes an Oath on the one party may not need, and conſequently is not be exacted.
4 But ſuppoſe the caſe that it be as neceſſary for ſecurity that the King ſweare to the people, as that they take an Oath to him, yet if through over much credulity, or otherwiſe it be that the people do ſwear, and not the Prince, this cannot be the leaſt colour for the nullifying of the Peoples Oath; for whether the King ſwear or no, that which makes the Oath obliging is, that in a juſt and poſſible matter promiſed, God is invocated as a witneſſe of the promiſe.
3. There is another ſenſe of mutual ſwearing more ſtrict then the former, and that is, when not only two parties ſweare to each other their reſpective parts, but they both ſweare with a mutuall reſpect, that is, the obligation of the one party hath a reſpect to, & a dependence on the performance of the other party; as when one man ſwears to another to give him ſo much money for his land, that other ſwears to conveigh to him his land for ſo much money: in this kind a breach of the one is a releaſement to the other. And here that Adage holds good,
As alſo that Rule of the Law, Fruſtra quis fidem poſtulat ſibi ſerv•…i ab eo, cui fidem à ſe praeſtitam ſervare recuſat: But this ſenſe〈…〉ll ſwearing cannot come in to be meant in our caſe: For,〈…〉an oath is plainly conditionall, the one party ſweares not〈…〉the other abſolutely and clearly ſo much money, but to give17 him ſo much for his land: the having of the land then is an expreſſe condition of his Oath, but the Oath of the Subjects Allegiance is granted to be abſolute, and is as ſuch diſputed againſt by him here, and I have above proved an Oath of Allegiance cannot be conditionall. 2. The Kings Oath is alſo abſolute, and binds without dependence on the Subjects Loyalty, no man will ſay (I thinke) that the King is diſcharged from ruling juſtly, and may become an abſolute Tyrant, if his Subjects exceed the bounds, or faile of the bonds of their oath, or duty; nay, if the Subject tranſgreſſe his duty, the King is bound by his oath to cauſe juſtice according to the law and tenour of his oath to be done, and cannot otherwiſe eſcape violation of his oath. 3. Such mutuall oaths are entred into by both parties at the ſame time, and have their mutuall reſpects expreſſed, but neither doth the King and Subjects ſweare to each other at the ſame time; neither is there any ſuch mutuall reſpect mentioned, or ſo much as implied in either of their oaths. 4. Such mutually reſpective oaths have only place in matters arbitrary, or that are in mens choice to do, or not to do untill they bind themſelves by Covenant, but ſuch are not the relative duties of Kings and Subjects, there being a divine Law obliging each to the duties of their offices before they ſwear.
We ſee no ſenſe imaginable of mutuall nor ſingle will fit this mans turne, but it will make his Propoſition falſe, either predicated of the Oath of Allegiance at all, ſo doth the firſt and third acception afore-mentioned, or if predicated with that modus of a neceſſe est, ſo doth the third: But let us heare his Reaſons for this clauſe of his major, whatever be the ſenſe of it.
It is (ſaith he) againſt equity and reaſon, and the good of the Subject, that he ſhould be further or longer bound to the Prince, to ſubmit to him, then the Prince is bound to the Subject to rule well, and adminiſter Juſtice rightly. Grant all this, and it will no way follow: therefore the Oath of Allegiance to make it righteous muſt be mutuall, in any ſenſe; for the Prince may be bound, and that as long to his part, as the Subject is to his,19 (and ſo he is, and it is impoſſible to be otherwiſe; for Prince and Subject, his tie to rule in juſtice, and his to obey in juſt things, are relatives, and doe inferre neceſſarily each other) to wit, by the tie of Scripture, conſcience, and poſitive Laws, and yet not be ſworne at all. His major being thus (I hope) fully refuted, I need not to take notice of his conſequences, as he calls them, but in a word I ſhall touch on them.
The firſt is nothing but a hypotheticall repetition of ſome part of the major Propoſition, which I have been ſo long in diſproving: If the Oath of Allegiance were in judgement and righteouſneſſe, the King was as ſtrongly bound to the Subjects as any of them to him; this therefore I paſſe by, as the ſame that was ſaid before, and no conſequence from it.
The ſecond is, Then if he break his Oath, all the Subjests are abſolved if they will. This conſequence I deny; I have I thinke, fully made it cleare before, that the Oath of Allegiance taken by the Subject is abſolute, not depending upon any thing to be performed by the King, whether ſworne or not ſworne; and that it could not have been otherwiſe: and though the King and people have each ſworn their duties mutually,See D. Sanderſ. de Iuram. oblig. Prael. 4. S 8. yet not with a mutuall reſpect, by vertue whereof a breach on one ſide might be a diſcharge on the other, and that neither the tenor of their Oaths hold forth any ſuch thing, neither is the matter of them capable thereof, being neceſſary, not arbitrary.
The third is, Then at what time the King levied war againſt his Subjects, they were diſcharged by that breach of Oath in him of their Allegiance. This is a conſequence of the former conſequence, and ſtands or falls with it; that therefore being anſwered and diſproved, this vaniſheth.
The fourth thing is no conſequence, but a reaſon of the two laſt conſequences, and in method of arguing is therefore an antecedent to prove them, it is thus; ellſe the whole Parliament18 and their party were periured perſons ſo many of them as have taken this Oath, and are Rebells in taking up Armes againſt the King.
1. If their taking up Arms againſt the King (as he termes it) were rebellion, their abſolution from their Oathes (were it ſo indeed) by the Kings breach of his could not unmake, or make it no rebellion; for the debt of obedience is exiſtent in the Subject before any oath-taking, and is not founded on ſwearing, but only confirmed by it, and therefore ſurvives after the pretended diſſolution of it; and conſequently makes that taking up arms which would have been (if the Oath had not been (as he ſuppoſeth) nullified) rebellion nevertheleſſe.
2. We muſt therefore ſay, (as the Parliamentarian party hath believed, declared, and in many Treatiſes in print maintained all along the late warrs) that the Armes of the Parliament were not againſt any branch of the Subjects Allegiance, or the Oath for it, (which they profeſſed ſtill to owe, perſiſt in, yea, and in the Act of their Arms-bearing covenanted to yeeld & maintain) but concordant with the ſame. In as much as they enterprized not againſt the Kings Perſon, his State or Government, they went not againſt his Majeſty, his Heirs, or Succeſſors, they joyned not againſt his Crown and dignity, the rights whereof, and the bounds of the Subjects obedience are prefixed by the Laws of the Realm: the ultimate interpretation whereof is in the Parliament, which declared their arms to be for, and agreeable to the Laws.
The King as King acts only by his Court, and Laws, what he doth beſides or againſt theſe is the mans, not the Kings acting, what is done by Order of the Courts of Juſtice, and by vertue of the Laws, is done (though againſt his perſonall preſence or commands) yet for the King, his Crown and dignity.
202. His next exception againſt the Oath of Allegiance is, That it is an unlawfull oath, in that it is ſworn to the Kings Heirs; his reaſon for this Exception proceeds thus, Who knoweth (as Eccl. 2.19. ) whether he will be a wiſe man, or a fool, a juſt, or a wicked man, and tyrant? now if no man know this, then to ſwear to an Heir, is not an Oath in iudgement, nor is it righteous: for the Subject may bind himſelf to his own hurt, yea ruine. Conſequence. Then the Oath of Allegiance was in that branch, that reſpected Heirs, an unlawfull Oath, &c. I admit of the Antecedent, but utterly deny the Conſequence. For the whole Conſequence I anſwer.
1. This inference is directly contrary to that which Solomon in the place cited, Eccleſ. 2.19. makes from the words: Solomons is, yet ſhall he have rule over all my labours wherein I have laboured, and wherein I have ſhewed my ſelf wiſe under the Sun, this mans inference is (in effect) becauſe no man knows whether he will be a wiſe man, or a fool, therefore he ſhall not have Rule, &c. that is, we muſt not engage before hand that he ſhall rule, while it is uncertain what he will prove: though Solomon ſaith notwithſtanding that is uncertain, yet he ſhall have Rule, and ſo Rehoboam (none of the wiſeſt Princes) had Rule over Solomons labour, yet they that cleaved to him, did much better then they that revolted from him, and I ſuppoſe this gentleman dare not ſay, that an Oath of Allegiance to Solomon and his ſeed, or to Rehoboam himſelf after the manifeſtation of his weakneſſe was unlawfull.
2. The ſame reaſon (if it held) would lie againſt any Oath or Engagement to any Rulers, in being whatſoever they are, yea againſt the new Engagement to the preſent Government: for ſay that Rulers be come to maturity, and for time paſt and preſent have given proof that they are wiſe and (morally) juſt (which yet in ſome caſes is not evident) yet who knows what they may hereafter be.
The Scripture ſuppoſeth, that not only a juſt Father may have a wicked ſon, but a righteous man (in profeſſion and externall carriage) may turne from his righteouſneſſe, and commit iniquity, Ezek. 18.14. Neroes Quinquennium of reigning well is generally known, the good beginnings of Ioaſh and Ozziah,21 2 Chron. 23, 24. & 26. and thereafter degeneracies are ſufficient inſtances of the lubricity of men in authority. Yea it is well known how fearfully Solomon himſelf with Aſa, 1 Kings 11. 2 Chron. 16. and others fell in divers particulars of a groſſe nature, if we muſt firſt know, and ſwear afterwards, we muſt naver ſwear promiſſarily.
3. This conſequence (were it of force) would equally condemn in generall all promiſſary oaths, and other Covenants, and Engagements, betwixt man, and man, for it cannot be foreſeen in any what the perſons contracted with will prove, or whether the Covenant will be beneficiall, or hurtfull, and in particular the Laws and Sanctions of thoſe Nations in all ages which have ſetled ſucceſſive regality, or any other Government, for longer then the preſent poſſeſſors of the power endure, which yet is a way, not only more generally approved and practiſed then any other of viciſſicudinary Election, but a warranted by the word of God. Iſrael offered a ſucceſſive power to Gideon, Iudg. 8.22. and God himſelf inſtituted, and bound the people to a lineall Government in David and his ſeed**2 Sam. 12.15. 2 Chron. 13.5., The patriarchal power (which was political) was ſucceſſive, and could not have been caſt off at pleaſure: ſo was the Government of the Jewiſh Nation, for about a hundred years in the lineage of the Maccabees.
4. We have Scripture examples (of an uncontroverted integrity) of oaths, and Engagements to Princes and their Heirs, and to Princes in their young, unripe and untryed years: Take for inſtance that of Abrahams ſwearing to Abimelech King of Gerar, his ſon, and ſons ſon, 1 Chron. 23.29.22.29.1.22.5. and that of Davids making Solomon King in his own life time, and engaging the people to him when he was yet young and tender, 2 King. 11.4.22. and that of Iehoiadahs and the peoples making Joaſh King, and ſwearing to him when he was but ſeven years old.
2. For the two parts of the conſequence in ſeverall.
1. The Oath is not in Judgement, becauſe no man knows what the Heire will prove: I ſay, it may be in Judgment22 ſo far as a future contingency can be deliberated on: and this may be concluded on adviſedly (as morally certain) that it's better to have the Crown ſetled in a line, whereby ſometimes a vicious perſon may be advanced, then to have it under Election at every perſonall change: this hath been the experimented maxime of the wiſeſt ſtates, Judg. 21.7.15. Sam. 14.24.37. Joſh. 9.14.16. If it were not in Judgement, this defect makes not an oath unlawfull, as to the nullifying of it, a raſh Oath, if of a lawfull thing binds, as before was proved.
2. Nor is it a righteous Oath, for the Subject may bind himſelfe to his owne hurt, yea ruine.
1. Though the Subject may not bind himſelf to what is neceſſarily, or at the time of his ſwearing may appear probably to tend to his hurt, or ruine, yet he may ſwear (in ending the publike good) to that which is of a mutuall nature, and may in the event turne to his owne hurt, and ruine; and might he not ſo ſweare, yet having ſo ſworne, he is bound to ſtand to his Oath, Pſal. 15 4. Joſh. 9.15. Ezek. 17.13. 1 Sam. 14.26.28. Judg. 21.5.15.18. which is contradictory to what this man here ſaith.
2. If the Heir ſhould miſprove, his power is bounded by the Law, and commixed with the Parliaments: If he vary, the power of Parliament, the Laws & Liberties of the Subject are the ſame. The late King confeſſed and declared a remedy againſt Tyranny to reſide in the Parliament; there may be a prevention then of the Subjects23 ruine (whatever the Heir prove) if the Kingdome be faithfull to it ſelf.
3. His third exception againſt the Oath as unlawlawfull, and void, is, That it is to uphold one kinde of government for continuance, and in a conſtant way without changing. His argument to make good this exception, proceeds thus.
If of the ſeverall kinds of government, all are not equally good, nor ſuitable to all people: And man may change the government he is under for his owne greateſt good and benefit, and muſt change it when he hath proved any kind of government inconvenient and hurtfull, and muſt not uphold any one kind of government longer then it continues to be moſt ſafe and profitable; then to ſweare to uphold any one government continually and conſtantly, and not to change it is ſinfull, and in righteouſneſſe and judgment may not be done. But of the ſeverall kinds of government all are not equally good, nor ſutable to all people, and man may change the government he is under for his own greateſt good and benefit, and muſt change it, when he hath proved any kinde of government inconvenient and hurtfull, and muſt not uphold any one kinde of government longer then it continues to be moſt ſafe and profitable. Ergo,
For anſwer hereunto,
Firſt, I obſerve there is fault to bee found with the whole argument, as ſomwhat tranſgreſſing the rules of arguing.
1. In the conſequence there is ſomthing of the errour called ignoratio Elenchi; for we ſweare not in the Oath of Allegiance (indefinitely or indeterminately as his words import)24 to uphold one government continually, and not to change.
Firſt, wee ſweare onely to His Maiesty, his Heires and Succeſſors: ſo that when ever they are all extinct, (which may be ſooner or later, as divine providence diſpoſeth) the Oath of it ſelf ceaſeth and determines.
Secondly, Notwithſtanding the allegiance ſworn to the ſaid perſons, their Crown and Dignity, there is power of change in the government left to the mutuall conſent of both parties, to wit, the ſworn to, and them ſwearing, as it is in all humane contracts and oaths of this nature**Alsted. Theol. caſ. c. 15. Reg. 2. D. Sanderſ. de Iuram. oblig. prael. 7. S. 8. .
Secondly, In the Minor there is ſomwhat of the fallacy called petitio principii, namely, that any kind of government (granted to be lawfull) can prove inconvenient and hurtfull to the ſubjects. The Governours indeed may prove bad and noxious, and ſo the government comes to be abuſed, but a perniciouſneſſe cannot therefore be charged upon the government it ſelf, nor can that be a neceſſary ground for the change of government: if ſo, you will bring in a ground for endleſſe mutations; a change in the perſons, or a regulating of them is the apt remedy for that hurt; but the government, the abſtract or eſſence of the thing never can prove hurtfull, becauſe it is an Ordinance of God for mans good, and that in ſpecie, (as after will be ſhewed) and as a government it hath a politicall goodneſſe ſeated in its being, by the unchangeable law of Nature.
Secondly, But admit the argument were not peccant in form, yet the aſſumption in the main of it, which is, that man may change the government he is under for his own greateſt good, and muſt change it when he hath proved any government inconvenient and hurtfull, and muſt not uphold any one government longer then it continues moſt ſafe and profitable, I muſt flatly deny. What poſition more anarchicall could be delivered? for the diſproof I offer thus. 1. He ſaith, man may change the government, &c. but the Holy Ghoſt ſaith, Prov. 24.21. 25My Son feare thou the Lord and the King, and meddle not with them that are given to change: He alloweth a change to be for greater good, but the Holy Ghoſt tells us in the next Words, verſ. 22. for their calamity ſhall riſe ſuddenly, and who knoweth the ruine of them both. 2. If men may change for the better and muſt change upon a ſuppoſed hurt, then all oaths, ingagements, or promiſes of obedience, allegiance, or fidelity to Magiſtrates are unlawfull to be undertaken, for all ſuch bonds are in relation to a preſent and particular government, the Engagers are under: and they are not for the time preſent or for an inſtant, but for a future continuance. And there is in all ſuch Engagements a makeing over of the right which the Engagers have in the matter covenanted, to the perſons engaged to, according to that known rule, omne promiſſum cadit in debitum: either then ſuch a change to be made by the perſons under authority may not, muſt not be, or ſuch engagements may not, muſt not, be by them undertaken: the former imports a power and duty inherent in the ſubjects to reſerve in themſelves a liberty to alter and to practiſe it when they Judge it convenient; the latter ſpeaks a binding out from any ſuch deed, and an abandoning of any ſuch right, but the ſcripture is cleer enough for ſuch engagements, Eccl. 8.2. 2 Kings 11.4. Joſhua 1.16 17, 18. Iugdes 8.9.10. 2. Cr. 36.13.
3. This poſition not only diſallowes all ſuch engagements, but diſſolves the naturall, or morall bond it ſelf of duty, and ſubjection to Magiſtrates for to be free to change when a man judgeth it beſt, is to be free when he will, and that is not to be tyed at all, by this means any man is diſengaged from ſubjection both in foro interno & externo, when he will ſay, he thinks the preſent government not ſafe or profitable, or another to be better, and having ſo reſolved, he is abſolved, he may now diſobey the Commands, ſtand out againſt the Judgements, take up armes againſt the Perſon and Authority, and be exempt from the ſword of the Magiſtrate: yea although he have ſworn, or ſubſcribed allegiance, becauſe ſuch an Oath or promiſe (ſaith this Doctor) was ſinfull, not in righteouſnes, but I would fain have him declare what thing magiſtracy and what ſubjection is.
4. This Doctrine will acquit, and juſtifie all the conſpiracies and treaſons that ever were enterprized againſt the power of the Magiſtrate ſince the World was. Was not the conſpiracy of Abſolom,2. Sam. 15 1. Kings 11.26.12.1. &c. and that of Sheba againſt David, was not the Rebellion of Jeroboam againſt Solomon, and Rehoboam; were not the ſeditions of Thendas26 and Judas the Gaulnite againſt Caeſar;Acts 5.36 were not all the Treaſons againſt Magiſtracy that ever have bin, attempted for the parties (yea for the publique) greater good, as the Conſpirators iudged?
If it be ſaid that not particular men or a leſſe party are to Judge the expediency, and take in hand the change, but the whole people. Beſides that the people under authority collectively taken have no ſuch power (as I intend preſently to ſhow) it may be ſaid. 1. Seldome or never doth a whole nation under a lawfull government of themſelves affect or move to a change, it is the flatterers, and deceivers of the people〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉Anſt. poli•. lib. 5. c. 5. ordinaryly that deſire and miſlead the people to it, 2. How the Judgement and will of the whole body of a people ſhould be known and declared unto Execution before particular men act to a change of their own private judgment, to me is a thing unimaginable.
5. This neceſſity of retaining a power in Subjects to chang, and of uſing it for a greater good, or removall of a temporall hurt, in oppoſition to an Oath ſworn againſt, the change is directly againſt the Scriptures, tying men, that ſweare to their own hurt not to change Pſal 15 4 Joſh. 9.18.19. and condemning thoſe that for ſuch ends have receded from their oaths; Ezek 17 13, &c: Joſhua 9, 15, compared with 2 Sam. 21.2.
6. That poſition ſo much now adays inſiſted on of the Peoples power to depoſe, aboliſh, and alter the power of their Governors at pleaſure, which is actually ſetled, and both in it ſelf lawful, and lawfully ſet over them, I hold is a groſſe error, ſome of my Reaſons in ſhort are.
Firſt ſuch a courſe (ſuppoſing the governours diſſent to it all along) is no other then that reſiſtance of the ordinance of God, condemned Rom. 13.2.
2. It is directly oppoſite to that ſubjection commanded every ſoul that is in the relation of a Subject, Rom: 13.1. and that 1. Pet. 2.13.
3. If the people may do it, then it muſt needs be that they have a civill power and authority over their Magiſtrates. Which is contrary to thoſe Scriptures which make the King ſupreme, and call the powers which the people are ſubject to, the higher powers higher in relation to them, who are below and put in ſubjection to them, 1. Pet. 2.12. Rom. 13.1 and indeed if the people have a power over their Magiſtrates to Judge, or diſplace them, how are they magiſtrates, their ſuperiors, and rulers, the ſame perſons cannot be under and over others in the ſame kind of order or power. If the Magiſtrates be27 under the people, whom are they over? If the people be above the Magiſtrates whom are they under?
4. The Holy Ghoſt commands the people to render tribute, cuſtom, feare, honor (not at random to a Magiſtracy leaving them at liberty to what they pleaſe, but) to whom they are due, they are a debt then, which reſpecteth a determinate object, the preſent Magiſtrate, no debtor can pay a debt by transferring it from one to another, or giving what he oweth to another beſides the proprietor.
5. Magiſtrates are of God, his ordinance and miniſters, and they are Judges for him as his vicegerents. Rom. 13.1.24. 2. Cron. 19 6. and therefore tannot ſtand at the meer will of the people. God muſt have a hand in their removall as he hath in their admiſſion: or elſe it is injurious, he removes and admits now, not by immediate revelation (as ſometimes in Iſrael) but by the rule of his word executed by man; he hath given a rule for the ſetting up of Magiſtrates, but where hath he given any for their depoſing. 6. If it were in the peoples power to change at pleaſure their magiſtracy,1. Sam. 8.6.7.8.12.17. then how could it be ſuch a heinous ſin as it is challenged to be for the people to reject Samuells government, and deſire and move for a King?
But let us next hear what he alledgeth for this his aſſertion of mutabllity. Though civill government (he ſaith) in generall be an ordinance of God tending to mans good, therefore to reject it would be ſinfull, yet this or that kind of government is not an ordinance of God, but an ordinance of man, 1. Pet. 2.13 and if an ordinance of man, then man may change it &c.
Firſt Civill Government in the generall cannot be ſaid to be Gods ordinance, and therefore unrejectable, but this, or this, or that kind of government that is a legittimate and true ſpecies of it, muſt neceſſarily be yeelded to be alſo Gods Ordinance, and unrejectable, for it is a ſure rule, for whatſoever is directly and per ſe ſaid of the genus, or generall nature muſt be alſo ſaid of the ſpecies or particular kind, and again the whole nature of the genus or generall is conteined in every ſpecies or kind. Quicquid oredicatur de praedicato praedi, catur de ſubjecto, Hiſt. 1. vala bados Tota natura generis continctur in una quae que ſpecie.
2. The Apoſtle cannot be taken to ſpeak of power in generall only; and abſtractly, but muſt not be underſtood diſtributively of all lawfull powers in their ſpeciall kind, when he ſaith there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God. Whoſoever therefore reſiſteth the power, reſiſteth the ordinance of God. Rom. 13.1.2. He that ſhall ſay of this or that kind of lawfull government,〈1 page duplicate〉26〈1 page duplicate〉2728as of Monarchy, it is not of God, it is not the ordinance of God ſpeaketh direct Contradictories to the Holy Ghoſt here, no Subjects obedience to this or that government he is under could be urged upon him by vertue of this reaſon, There is no power but of God &c. If this, or that kind of government were not of God, and were not his ordinance. 3. And for his diſcretive, but an ordinance of man, it is no Inference of the former, therefore not the ordinance of God. For this, or that government is both an ordinance of God in Pauls ſtyle, and an ordinance of man in Peters, and you cannot ſay theſe two apoſtles, ſpeak of goverment two different wayes, the former in generall, the latter in particular, for as I have proved Paule muſt be taken of particular kinds ſo it is cleare Peter ſpeaks firſt in generall, ſubmit your ſelves to every ordinance of man &c. and then in particular, whether it be to the King as ſupreme, or unto Governors &c. This or that government Paul calls an ordinance of God. 1 In that it is inſtituted in its ſpeciall nature by God, and warranted for any people, but not commanded or impoſed (as Government in the generall is) upon every nation. For it is with goverments in relation to Nations as with callings, in Relation to Perſons; every man muſt have a calling, but it is diſtributively this, or that, or the other, all are not neceſſarily to have this one. 1. Cor. 77, 17
2 In that it is inveſted in the particuler perſon by God, when they are called to the government, according to his rule, though he doe not point them out imediately by his own finger, but mediately by men, in like manner as they are the miniſters of Chriſt in the Church, that are called according to his appointment, though men in the ſame office ordaine them. And in this regard, the Magiſtrats (not the government abſtractly) are caled Gods ordinance Rom 13 2. compared with 3.4. Peter terms it mans ordinance, either becauſe both the ſpeciall forme of government, and the perſons holding it, are choſen and ſo imediaaely conſtituted by men. Or rather becauſe it is converſent about humane affairs,Beza Marlor eſt Divines Anotat. Diodat. and mans benefit, not as if it were invented by, or had its originall from men, for ſo it is of God, as expoſtitors interpret and compare that place of Peter with the other of Paul and that Peter excludeth not, but taketh in the Divine authoritation to that government he treats of, is evident, in that he willeth ſubmiſſion to it for the Lords ſake. How for his ſake, if it be not his Ordinance.
Having thus anſwered the premiſes of his ſyllogiſme and what he29 brings to back the aſſumptions withall, his conſequence or concluſion following goes to the ground, and the lawfullnes of the oath of Allegiance remains unſhaken. But as his manner is, he amplyfied his conſequence with matters altogether in conſequentiall, and independant on the premiſes. Firſt he ſaith who knowes not what a plague this kind of Government (viz. Kingly) hath bin to this Nation? and that the moſt of our Kings have been Tyrants? I am one that know not theſe things but Judge the contrary and will he tryed by the experience and voice of this Nation. And in the mean while, I requeſt him to try theſe his words, by the ſcriptures following, 2. Pet. 2, 10, 11 12, Iude 8, 9, 10 and to take heed of the verdict and Judgment therein given upon government-blaſphemers.
2. Who knowes not what a bleſſing the change of government hath brought to the United Provinces? I am ſure this man knowes not, neither can ſay (if thoſe Provinces excell in bleſsings) that they are brought by a change of their lawfull Government, conſidering what Solomon obſerved of old, concerning the diſproportion of worldly ſucceſſes to mens wayes: and the inevidence of the goodnes or badnes of perſons, and actions if eſtimated by events, which every mans experience can ſecond.
Whether thoſe provinces have changed or recovered their government as Hugo Grotius conceiveth. Or whether they yet ſtand but as our Parliament did with the late King in the firſt War, defending, and demanding the ſecurity of their juſt priviledges, with the ſword in their hand, I leave him further to conſider, and I aſſure him this, there have been obſervations great ſtore, of Gods Judgments upon thoſe that have rebelled againſt, caſt off, or murdered their lawfull Governors, gathered by worthy men,Theatre of Gods Judgments by Doctor Beard, and Doctor Taylor. lib. 2. chap. 2.3.4.5. but I never before met with any that made obſervation of divine Bleſsings upon any of thoſe acts.
Thus far his exceptions by way of proof of his firſt poſition, goe; He in the cloſe makes one Objection againſt himſelfe, and giveth his anſwer to it thus. Ob; Suppoſe there was ſome unlawfullnes, in the taking ſuch Oathes, yet is there not a neceſſity of keeping them being taken? Anſwer, If Herods Oath againſt the life of one man being unrighteous and cruel was ſinfully taken, and more ſinfully kept, then theſe of allegiance which are abſolute not conditionall &c. and which are to uphold Monarchy, the wofull fruits whereof ſeeing they are dangerous, and may prove, as often they have done, deſtructive to the30 lives of many men, they are not only unlawfull to be taken, but to be kept. Not granting any unlawfullnes in the taking of this Oath, (having (I hope) made good its innocency againſt all that hath bin ſaid; yet ſuppoſe I had made this objection, I would not take this anſwer. My reaſon is, he cannot paralel Herods oath and ours in the matter wherein HERODS was unlawfulll both in the taking and keeping, what was that? it compriſed as he interpreted it the ſhedding Innocent bloud, the maſſacring of a guiltleſſe and holy perſon. Now what is the matter of ours? To yeeld obedience in lawfull things, to a lawfull power. Is it any more? and are not the matters of theſe two oaths, as farre unlike as light and darkneſſe? That which he heaps up to agravate our oath to the height of the unrighteouſneſſe of Herod is nothing but the three exception, which all this while I have been anſwering, and therefore ſhall content my ſelfe with what hath bin ſaid to them. Only in the cloſe he tels us Monarchy is dangerous, and may, as often it hath, prove diſtructive to the lives of many men, and therefore its unlawfull to ſweare or keep the upholding of it. This is nothing but what may be as truly ſaid of any kind of government how lawfull ſoever: none that hath bin as much practiſed as it can be affirmed to have bin leſs diſtructive, or to be leſſe dangerous then it; but the poſſibility of being, or experience of having been abuſed, is no valid reaſon why a government may not be upheld; if it be downe muſt all government fal? and if yet it may be upheld, to ſweare to uphold it may be an oath lawfull for the matter; and if it cannot in that reſpect be made a crime, it deſerves not to be paraleld with Herods oath. What paralel in point of unrighteouſnes Herod keeping his oath, & others violating theirs, his execution & theirs may have, it is not to my purpoſe in hand to ſhew.
I have done with his firſt poſition, and proceed to his ſecond, which is this.
Suppoſe the Oath of Allegiance to be lawfull, yet the ſubject is now abſolved from it by them that have power to abſolve from it. This poſition of a power in any to abſolve from a lawfull oath is new, (as far as I have read or heard) among proteſtants, and hath until now been accounted by Papiſts, the Popes and Prelates prerogative, by us their antichriſtian preſumption. But let us ſee where and upon what ground he builds ſuch power.
Reaſon. Becauſe the Repreſentatives of the people, which in reaſon are the Supream power, impoſed this Oath by an Act in Parliament;31 this was the Subjects free Act in their Repreſentatives, no law of God, or nature obligeing them to accept of ſuch a perſon as his heires, and to ſwear allegiance to them. If therefore the repreſentatives take away and repeale this Act (as this Parliament hath done) they thereby ſet the ſubjects at liberty from ſuch allegiance, and from their Oath bind•ng to it, there remains no more conſcience of it to ſuch as have taken it, Abraham that impoſed the Oath upon his Servant might acquit him of it &c.
1 For the antecedent I ſhall only note. 1 he ſets up a ſupreame power over us by reaſon, not by law, or the peoples conſtitution, and this reaſon is not the Nations, but firſt either his own privat judgment, and if that may treat a ſupream power to him, then every other privat mans reaſon is to ſet up on to him, even when there is one already over the people he is of. 2 Or is it the common reaſon that is in all men naturally, and if ſo, how comes it to paſſe that there is ſuch variety of kinds in ſupreame government, and that Repreſentatives have it not in all times and nations, yea that ſcarſe they ever had it?
2. That in citing the power that Enacted this Oath, he omits the King and Houſe of Lords, who in the then Parliament concurred in this Enacting and Impoſition.
3. That although the King then was rightfully and actually inthroned in the Regall power, and Dignity, and both the Law, and the Oath of Supremacy obliged the people to him and his heires, yet he dares to ſay no Law of God or Nature obliged them to accept of ſuch a perſon and his heirs, is not the 5th. Commandement the Law of God and Nature, and thoſe precepts. Rom. 13.1. Tit. 3.1. 1. Pet. 2.13. repetitions, and divine ratifications thereof: and doth not that Law command every people and perſon allegiance to their particular lawfull Governours, and was not the King in being, his heires in capacity, and deſignation ſuch?
2. But for the conſequence there is no truth in it nor colour of reaſon, or inference from the Antecedent for it. Beſides, that the act cannot (for ought appeares to me) be repealed but by the ſame power that made it; and the allegiance ſworn was not founded upon the Act or Oath, but due and paid before them both. The Oath in its own words terms it ſelf a recognition and acknowledgment, and the firſt words of it are; I. A. B. truly and ſincerely acknowledg, profeſſe, teſtifie, and declare in my Conſcience before God and the World, that King James is lawfull King of this32 Realm. &c. Suppoſe the Repreſentatives to be the ſupreme power, that the Impoſing of this Oath was their ſole act, and the Subjects in them, and that they did it voluntarily or unobliged to it: doth it thence follow, the Repreſentatives repealing that act the ſubjects that upon their Enacting ſwore it, are now abſolved from their allegiance, and from the Oath.
1. They that have power to impoſe an Oath were never ſaid (in any Divinity extant) to have power eo ipſo to abſolve from it, when the impoſers are alſo the partie ſworn to, there it is granted (both by Proteſtants and PapiſtsDoctor Sanderſ. de Juram. oblig. prael 7, S. 8. Thol•ſ. Syr. tag. Jur•, lib. 50. cap. 12. ) they have ſo farre as concernes themſelves power to releaſe from the Oath, not becauſe they are not the Impoſers, but becauſe they are the party ſworn to, for omnis qui promiſſit facit jus alteri, cui eſt facta promiſſio, the right of the thing ſworn is theirs to whom the Oath is made, therefore they may releaſe from it, and this is the true ground of that power he ſuppoſeth in Abraham to acquit his ſervant, being the impoſer of his oath (if that was not rather the interpretation then relaxation of the oath) but where the impoſers are a third party from the perſons ſwearing, and ſworn to, there they have no claim of power of relaxation. And thus the caſe is here, the Repreſentatives (as he ſaith) impoſe the oath, which is ſworn to the King, and bind in allegiance to him. If they that impoſe an oath may releaſe from it, then may any Court or Magiſtrate releaſe a juror or examinate from the oath they have given him, then if a man impoſe an oath upon himſelfe (as in ſome caſes he may) he may abſolve himſelfe when he will from it, though he therein obliged himſelfe to God or another man. And this is truly the caſe here as he himſelfe ſtates it, the ſubjects by their own Act in their Repreſentatives impoſe this oath, and by their own perſonall act ſwear it, and after by their own act in their Repreſentatives abſolve themſelves from it.
2 The repeale of the Act is no repeale or diſſolution of the oath, the Parliament that framed by their Act impoſed the oath, did not thereby make it an oath, but it was the ſubjects ſwearing, which made it an oath and an obligation to him, as the Miniſters rehearſing and dictating the words of marriage, to the couple Marying each other makes not the mariage, but the parties themſelves declaring in thoſe words. And as the clerk in a court reciteing the words of the Iurors oath to them makes not the oath, but the Iurors aſſent to it. The Parliament can injoyne, or puniſh the refuſall, or manifeſt33 breach of an oath, but a promiſſory oath being the act and covenant of him that ſwears, and a part of Divine worſhip, the bond of conſcience upon the ſwearer, and the validity of Gods ordinance, and the obligation that is therein entered into unto God, as the invocated witneſſe, and judge, cannot be within the Parliaments authority to nullifie in all ſubjects oaths which may be made with or without their impoſition. There are caſes indeed, wherein a ſuperiour, as a Husband, Maſter, Father, Magiſtrate, may make void the oath of their reſpective inferior, by analogy, or equity of that rule Numb. 30. but thoſe are 1 in matters that are belonging to the right or power of the ſuperior to diſpoſe of; as the Repreſentatives may acquit from an oath in point of their own right,**Animadvertendum tamen eſt penes hos non eſſe facultatem reſcindendi quodlibet jusjurandum ſubditorum ſed illud duntaxat cujus materia eſt eorum poteſta•i ſubjecta. Alsted: Theol. caſ. cap. 15. Reg 2. but the allegiance, in this oath ſworn is none of theirs, but the Kings, and therefore ſworn to him by the ſubjects, and in particular by them. 2. By that Law Numb. 30. the ſuperior may interpoſe to nullifie his inferiors oath made without his knowledge, and conſent, and that muſt be done in the day that he hears of it, but there is no further power given by that law in the matter of oathes. Now in this our caſe the Repreſentatives have bin ſo far from being ignorant of the making of this oath, and diſalowing it as ſoon as it was known to them, that they were the compoſers and commanders of it, yea and have taken it themſelves. Let any the leaſt warrant, yea or preſident be brought for releaſing an oath in this caſe, and I ſhall ſit down. Laſtly for a cloſe of my anſwer unto this poſition, I ſhall obſerve what the tennor of this oath hath in it. I doe beleeve, and in conſcience am reſolved, that neither the Pope, nor any perſon whatſoever hath power to abſolve me of this Oath or any part thereof. And doe renounce all pardons and diſpenſations to the contrary. This is not only the ſwearers declaration, but the Parliaments, in compiling and impoſing this oath, and all Repreſentatives have perſonally thus declared in taking it, ſhall we beleeve them concerning their power in this matter, or this man?
In the end he brings in three queſtions and anſwers to them, unto which though they have no immediate reference either to this latter poſition, or the proof of it, to which they are ſubjoyned, nor to the queſtion of the oaths obligatorineſſe, which is the ſubject of the precedent diſcourſe, yet leſt the over-paſſing them34 ſhould imply that they are unto me either currant, or difficult to be anſwered, I ſhall ſay ſomewhat.
1. His firſt queſtion and anſwer is after this manner.
But then it will to this. Whether the Parliament be the ſupreme gower. R. It is evident that the Norman Kings coming in by Conqueſt, had never any true right to the Crown of England, but what the Parliament gave them, then the power of Parliament was greater then theirs: becauſe that power that is the cauſe of power is greater then that power that is the effect of power. 2 The power of the Parliament is the power of the people, now in reaſon the power of the people is the ſupreme; becauſe thence as from the root all power firſt ſprung, and proceeded.
The Norman Kings did not come in by Conqueſt, the firſt of them ſurnamed the Conquerour did indeed ſo come in: although even he layd other claim to the Crown beſides Conqueſt, as the ground of the attempt thereof, namely a right both by vertue of the Covenant, and Oath of Harold, and the Donation of King Edward. Speeds H•ſt. Book 1. Chap. 7 Sect. 6. 13 14. 16. 30**Speed. B. 9. Ch. 2. S. 54 Chap. 3. S. 12.The next to him William Rufus neither came in by Conqueſt, nor by lineall ſucceſſion: his father on his death-bed being in remorſe of Conſcience for his cruell government of the Kingdome, durſt not (as he ſaid) diſpoſe of the Land to any other then to God, only he wiſht (if it might be the will of God) that William his ſon might flouriſh in the Throne,**Speed. B. 9. Ch. 2. S. 54 Chap. 3. S. 12. who accordingly notwithſtanding (Duke Robert was his elder brother) by a generall conſent and vote was made King, The reſt that have followed ſucceſſivly came in by diſcent, and title of inheritance [although in ſome happily it was wreſted] and were the moſt of them peaceably, and without conteſt of any, ſeated in the throne, and that which the Parliament uſually did, was not a creating of a title to them, but a recognition of that which they had, and a ſecuring of it to their poſterity, which was for the Kingdoms ſafety, as wel as the Kings intereſt. 2. It is well known this Land was governed by Kings in ſupreme power long before the Norman race begun, ſo that this exception from the manner of the Normans coming in lies rather againſt their title (who came in by Conqueſt) to be Kings then againſt the Kings Title to be ſupreme. 3. If the Judgment of Parliaments themſelves to whom he would appropriate the ſupremacy, may decide to whom it belongs, it will be35 yeilded to be in the King (though not excluſively, in reference to Parliament) witneſſe the Act of Parliament ſetting forth and enjoyning the Oath of the Kings Supremacy. 4 The cauſing or conveying of civill power, by way of conſent or election, whether it be by the Parliament to the King, or by the people to them both, or to either of them, is no argument of a power in the ſaid conveyers greater then that which is ſo conveyed by them: becauſe they that by Election, or conſent inveſt the Magiſtrate with power,Thoſe axiomes quicquid efficit tale illud eſt magis tale Nihil dat quod non habet, are not ment of Inſtrumentall but of principall efficients. are not the proper or principall efficient cauſes of that power but only the applyers of it to the perſon, and the inſtrumentall means of giving him a right therein. God by his inſtitution, and ordination is the efficient cauſe of the Magiſtrates power, and therefore he indeed is ſuperior to him; and he alone. In the advancement of men to that office, God only acteth authoritatively men by the choice of the perſon, and conſenting to him do it miniſterially. This propoſition, that which is the cauſe of power is it ſelfe of greater power may be true of the principall efficient, but cannot hold of the ſubordinate or inſtrumentall cauſe, a wife as the meanes giveth the power of a husband over her to him whom ſhe marryeth, by her conſent in marriage of him, a ſervant in like manner giveth power to his maſter over him by his voluntary agreeing to be his ſervant; yet can it not thence be concluded that the wife or ſervant, are greater in power reſpectively then the husband or maſter, an over topping, or ſuper-regall power then in the Parliament, or a ſuper-parliamentary and ſuper-regal power in the people cannot be bottomed on that reaſon. 5, As for that which is ſaid as the ad. reaſon, the power of the Parliament is the power of the people, now in reaſon &c. I anſwer 1. There is a petition of a principle not to be granted, not offered to be proved, which is, that Magiſtraticall power or authority (even ſupreme) is ſeated in the people. I have brought reaſons for the refutation of this before, and I ſhall only here ſay, firſt, Rulers are called the powers, the bearers of the ſword, the revengers to execute wrath upon him that doth evill, we read of their commiſſion and inſtructions for Magiſtracy in Scripture, but where find we any ſuch thing ſpoken of or granted to the people?
2 Rulers are ſtiled powers of God, his ordained, his ordinance,36 his Miniſters, Judges for him, but where read wee that they are the peoples power, or ſubordinate miniſters?
3 The people are the object about which, the ſubject over which the power is ſet, and therefore cannot be the agent or ſubject in which it is ſtated.
4 If Supreme authority be in the people, then they may manage it themſelves (for in vain is that power that cannot be reduced into act) and hold it in their own hands, and need not chooſe or conſtitute any higher powers, or Magiſtrates over them, which cannot be if Magiſtracy be an Ordinance of God, and neceſſary by divine precepts, as it is Deut. 16.18. and to reject it would be ſinfull as this man tells us in his firſt poſition.
5 If the people be a power, and that ſupreme, they muſt have ſome to be their ſubjects; and who are their ſubjects? either themſelves or their Magiſtrates: not themſelves, for every relation (and therefore Magiſtracy, and ſubjection) muſt have two terms; never was ſuch a politicall ſtate heard of, wherein the ſame men are both under and over themſelves in the ſame power. Not the Magiſtrates for we read of no ſuch ordinance of God as a humane power over the Magiſtracy; but contrarywiſe they are ſaid in relation to the people, to be ſet over, to be the rulers, and heads of the people, and to be the higher powers and the ſupreme. **Deutr. 1 13.5.17.14.15. 2. Sam. 23 3. Ro. 13.1. 1. Pet. 2.13.
6 If it be ſo, then there is no ſpecificall diſtinction, or diſtribution of Government in generall into divers Species, as into Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy, as hath been generally held, and accordingly practiſed, but all government is Democraticall, Monarchy and Ariſtocracy are ſpecifically the ſame with, and but ſubordinate offices under it. 2 Suppoſe the power were indeed ſupremely in the people, how can he ſay, or doth he prove that the power of the Parliament is the power of the people, more then is the power of the King? he cannot mean that the power of the Parliament is ſubjectively or formally the peoples, for the Parliament and people being two diſtinct ſubjects, the ſame individuall power cannot totally be ſubjected or formally inherent to both, but he underſtands (doubtleſſe) that the Parliaments power is effectively cauſally the peoples, that is, it is derived and received from them, and ſo (granting the ſuppoſition) is the Kings alſo, and that as immediately (in the conſtitution of the37 Kingly office) as is that of the Parliament, it was never yet I think ſaid, neither is there the leaſt warrant for it, that in the firſt conſtituting of the government, the people choſe the Parliament and the parliament founded the Kingly office, but rather the people ordained both joyntly and immediately, appointing kings to reigne over them ſucceſſively, who ſhould governe with the advice, and authority of Parliament, which ſhould be called by him, and conſiſt of the Peers hereditarily, and the Commons by perſonall election. Which three eſtates are collaterally incorporated together in the fundamentall conſtitution, and Government of this Kingdome (as even the Commons have declared**D•clarat. of Apr. 17. 1646.) and therefore are not ſuperſtructory one to another.
3 And whereas he ſaith, to prove the power to be in the people, that from the power of the people as from the root, all power firſt ſprung and proceeded. The people are not the root from whence power firſt ſprung: they are rather the ſoyle in which it growes, by which it is fed and ſupported. God is the Root, Head, or Fountaine from whence all power ſprings. There is no power but of God &c. The people are only a channell, or inſtrument of its conveyance to the Magiſtrate by their election and conſent, which acts of theirs, do no more prove the ſupreme power to be in the people, then the Electorſhip of the ſeven Princes proves the imperiall power, and dignity to be in them: or the choiſe of a Major of a City by the aldermen, or freemen; proves the office, or authotity of the Major to be in them.
2 His ſecond Queſtion and Anſwer followes.
Whether the Repreſentative of the people be the Parliament? R. If the Parliaments power be the peoples, and the ſupreme power, then the Repreſentatives of the people are the Parliament, and none elſe: for the Repreſentatives are the people in them, and there is the root of power, therefore they are the Parliament. Here is an antecedent, a conſequence, a reaſon of the conſequence: but very feeble all. Firſt the Antecedent. If the Parliaments power be the Peoples, and the Peoples the ſupreme power.] This hath been diſproved above in the diſcuſſion of the 1 queſtion, I have therein manifeſted that the power of Parliaments as diſtinct from the King is neither the peoples, not the Supreme by way of peculiarity; and that the Kings power derives as ſtrongly38 and as nerely from the people as as doth the Parliaments, though both have their principall originall from God, and are but inſtrumentally from the people.
2. The Conſequent is [then the Repreſentatives of the people are the Parliament and none elſe] were the Antecedent granted, and moſt true, yet he that knows what an argument is, or hath but naturall Logick, may ſee that this hath no kind of inference, or conſequentiall force from it.
We ſay that the Lords and Commons of England aſſembled with the politicall power and preſence of the King are the Parliament: and for this we appeal to all the uſe of the word, ſince there was ſuch a thing as a Parliament in England, till within theſe very few dayes and the generall underſtanding of the word ſtill; to the Law common and municipal; to the Titles of Parliamentary Acts, and Statutes; and to the Declarations, and conſtant language of Parliaments themſelves, from firſt to laſt, He ſaith the Repreſentatives of the people, meaning the ſaid Commons, are the Parliament; for this he brings no proofe in the world, from the application or uſe of the word by any, though he cannot but know that words ſignifie according to the pleaſure of ſome Impoſer; all his medium is in thoſe term. [The Peoples power, and the ſupreme power] Whereas it is a queſtion betwixt us whether there be ſuch a thing as power, or ſupremacy belonging to the people: and if that were granted, yet it is ſtill a queſtion betwixt us whether the peoples, and the ſupreme power be any more appertaining to the Commons, then to the King, and Lords; I cannot aſſent to either; the affirmative of both are his poſitions and but barely affirmed by him; ſo that in making this inference he doth but prove one of his principles by another improved, and in ſo doing doth but petere principium. 3. His reaſon of this conſequence is [for the Repreſentatives are the people, in them, and there is the race of power.] This is ſtill but to infer the concluſion upon an unproved principle of his own, which I have denyed, and refuted above: but I ſhall here touch upon the wide miſtakes about this term and thing, Repreſentatives, with which hee, and others are, I ſee, overtaken. 1. he taketh for granted, that the Commons in Parliament are the peoples Repreſentatives, which me thinks cannot properly be ſaid, if we underſtand by the people39 all eſtates, members or parties in the Kingdome (and if he doth not ſo underſtand it I aske, how can he (after his own ſenſe) place the power, ſupremacy, & repreſentablenes only in one part of the Kingdom?) for the ſaid Commons are choſen but by, and in the name of the Commoners, in diſtinction from the Peers, and cannot, are not intended to repreſent any more then thoſe by, and in whoſe name they are elected, and therefore are called the Commons in Parliament, beſides the Peers are preſent, and therefore cannot be repreſented. If then all the people are not Commoners, nor repreſented, how are thoſe Commons truly and compleatly the Repreſentatives of the people?
2. He ſeems to found the Commons power, (and that in a degree above others that are undoubted powers) upon their being Repreſentatives of the people. Whereas (I think it will upon ſcanning appear that) their repreſentativeneſſe is not the riſe or ground of any Magiſtraticall power in them. 1. That which makes them, or any men a power (as I apprehend the matter) is that they are Gods Repreſentatives, and that which ordinarily makes them ſo is that they are choſen, or conſented to by the people, either perſonally, or in the originall conſtitution of government, unto the adminiſtration of an authority ordained by God; and thus are in this kingdom the Prince, the Peers, and the Commons in Parliament though not all the ſame way, but ſome perſonally, others hereditarily.
The ſaid Commons have indeed this addition (but it is not of Magiſtraticall power, but of popular action, and employment) that they are the Commons repreſentatives, becauſe the colective Commons cannot convene, or treat; which repreſentation empowers them not to any publique Magiſtracy, or Acts of diſtributive Iuſtice, but only intruſts and inables them to deeds of Commutative right or contract, on the Commoners behalf, as the agreeing on Taxes, Forces, or other requiſites to be borne in an equall proportion, and which are due as far as proportionable from the people to the publique Magiſtrates and ſervice. 2. If the power of the Commons be grounded on their repreſentativenes of the people, then it is neceſſary all the Members ſhould be preſent to make them a repreſentative of the whole Body of the people, and to inable them to act ſo as to bind the whole;40 becauſe the Members compoſe a Repreſentative; not ſo as that every one tepreſents the whole, but each one repreſents a part, and all of them collectively repreſents the whole. 3 He placeth the dimenſion and prerogative of the Office of the ſaid Commons in their Repreſentativenes of the people, where it ſeemeth to me they are not meere (but more then) Repreſentatives of the people. They that are meerly Repreſentatives are, 1. To act what they whom they repreſent might act if they were preſent. 2 To act nothing but what they have in charge from the repreſented. But this is not the latitude of the Commons in Parliament, they are not thus tyed up. For firſt, If they be an eſtate endued with civill authority, they may act authoritatively, and ſo could not the people whome they repreſent if they were preſent: no ſuch power being ſeated in them, as was a little before alleged. 2 If they be a power, they are impowred by God, and ſo have in charge from him to act the thing within their Commiſſion, whether they are charged from the people to doe them or not; yea though the people ſhould command the contrary. If they be no more then repreſentees, and ſo be bounden by the latter rule here given, perhaps ſome would aske what charge or Commiſſion did the people ever give either to any Former, or to the preſent Repreſentatives for ſome actings?
Thirdly, His third Queſtion and Anſwer is. Whether the preſent Repreſentatives that now ſit be the Repreſentative of the people. R. Firſt they are all of them choſen by the people, therefore of right they ſit in Parliament. Firſt, Whether they be all ſo choſen, I ſhall not enquire; but I have read in Maſter Prin (as I remember it is in his Speech upon the Treaty) who it is probable knew the houſe better then this Gentleman) the contrary of ſome whom he there names. 2 But if they all be legally choſen, that proves not that they of right ſit in Parliament, unles there be a right Parliament to ſit in. R. Secondly, the preſent Repreſentatives are all that are left to ſit in Parliamet, for the moſt of the reſt have deſerted their truſt without any force upon them, for though ſome were ſecluded and ſecured, yet the reſt were not at all interrupted, but have voluntarily departed from the Houſe. Firſt, he means they that ſit are all that are left de facto to ſit, I ſhall not gainſay him. But he might ſay thus if41 they were but two, and all the reſt were excluded by force of arms, and thoſe two were priſoners in the place, thoſe two in this caſe would be a Repreſentative, according to this his reaſon. If he would be underſtood, that they are all that are de jure left to ſit; I would heare that proved; all that he brings for it here i•. The moſt of the reſt have diſerted their truſt. 1 Say they had, would that prove they that are left are all that de jure are to ſit, what ſay you to the leſſe part of the reſt whom you accuſe not for deſerters? what ſay you to the ſecluded, and•ecured, whom you cannot accuſe of deſerting their truſt? I doe not know that the houſe, or thoſe you call the preſent Repreſentatives have tryed, or Judged any, or all of either ſort of them unto deprivation of the right of ſitting: nay what ſay you to thoſe moſt of the reſt taxed by you as deſerters of their truſt, as voluntarily, and without interruption departing? are they actually diveſted of their right to ſit? becauſe they doe not performe their truſt, therefore ought they not to do it? 2 But I can loke upon this charge of thoſe moſt of the reſt, no otherwiſe then as a railing occuſation brought againſt men in dignity, and a preſumptious ſlander, intollerably caſt upon thoſe who have otherwiſe ſuffered ſo much in their truſt.
firſt, It hath been currently, and without contradiction (to my knowledg) publiſhed that were ſecured, or ſecluded in two or three dayes; and how can he, or any man be able to know, or ſay that there is ſo much as one man of that houſe left at liberty, that hath not come to diſcharge his truſt and been actually debarred? much leſſe can any one ſay that the moſt of them have not.
2 I would aske whether all that diſclaimed not the vote about the Kings conceſſions were not declaredly excluded, and actually put back if they offered to enter, and if there be not ſtill forces there ready to do the ſame?
3 Not long before the laſt breaking of the houſe, they that for feare of the Apprentices departed the houſe, were counted the beſt performers of their truſt, and they that taried behind in the houſe were accuſed as faylers of it. Muſt now42 the charge be inverted, becauſe the perſons are varied 2. If they that ſit are all that are left to ſit de jure, yet unleſſe they be a number competent in Law to make a houſe, and free from force, I would be ſatisfyed how they can be qualifyed to ſit and act (eſpecially in ſo high matters as the taking away the King, and Houſe of Lords, and eſtabliſhing a new power, and way of goverment, which if don by that houſe at the fulleſt, and freeſt would be at leaſt queſtionable?) the ſuſpenſion and annulling the acts of the houſe upon the proceedings againſt the five Members, and the coming of the Apprentices to the Parliament doores are freſh in memory, and lively preſidents. And if the power of an Army not only captivating ſome Members, but keeping the houſe that only a few (ſcarce the eighth part of the number of them that conſtitute the houſe) may enter, and ſit, whom they diſtinguiſh by no known Character (much leſſe by any open or legall ſentence againſt the excluded) but only by a private roll of paper reſerved in their own hands, be not a taking away of the houſes freedom, I know not what can be ſo called: R. Thirdly, the Repreſentatives that remain were alwaies when feweſt, and ſtill are above the number allowed of by Law. What number is allowed of by Law, what Law that is, where written, and when made, that alloweth of that number, and what that number (ſuppoſe it were 40.) is allowed to do, this Gentleman tells us not; and yet theſe things ſhould be ſet downe and ſcanned before this reaſon can paſſe: There is a great difference betwixt forty and foure or five hundred, betwixt ſome acts of the houſe, and others in point of concernment. If the Members of the houſe do not each of them repreſent the whole, but all of them aggregatively, in that ſome repreſent this part, ſome another of the nation, how can an eight part of them be ſaid to make a repreſentative of the whole Nation, wherein poſſibly there is not one repreſentative from ſeven parts of eight of the Land? But the above alledged exception of a force upon the houſe muſt be wiped off, or elſe the cleering of this point of the number (could it be) wil not ſerve.
The laſt thing in the Paper (which he would, it may be, not have43 to be overſlipped) is a new doctrine concerning the intereſt of the people in the appointing of their Governors. Wherein he ſaith. 1. Such right as Kings have had, they never juſtly came by it, but by force and flattery have obtained it. What a blaſphemer of dignities is this, that preſumes to revile the whole order of Kings as Uſurpers, and unjuſt poſſeſſors of the higheſt civill property, Dominion? not one of them will he except from injurious attainment of their Crownes; no not Melchiſedech himſelfe, the interpretation of whoſe name beſpeaks him King of Righteouſneſſe! Surely he that is the King of Kings would never have ſtiled h•mſelf ſo, if the univerſality of them had been ſo bad: and the Apoſtle Pauls retractation Act. 23.5. The Angels modeſty, 2. Pet. 2.10.11. Nay the Prince of Angels his moderation, Jude 8.9. are high redargations of this inſolent evill ſpeaking of dominions. If his intention be to reflect more ſpecially on the Kings of this Realm, he is yet therein reproved by the current of Hiſtory, by which it is apparent the moſt of the Kings of this Land received their Crown by ſucceſſion, which is neither force nor flattery.
It were eaſie, beſides that, to derive to many of them that title which he himſelf accounts the only juſt one, viz. The conſent of the Kingdome, as for inſtance, thus were Caſſibelan of the Britiſh, Edward ſirnamed the Confeſſor of the Saxon, and William Rufus of the Norman Kings inveſted. **Speeds Hiſt. B. 5. chap. 6 P. 8. c 6. S. 1. B. 9. c. 3•….Yea all of them in a manner have had the Nations vote for their Crowns, either antecedent in their predeceſſors, concurrent in their perſonall entrance, or ſubſequent in their eſtabliſhment by after acts of Parliament, and not a few have had this threefold conſent.
Laſtly, the Parliament that Enacted the Oath of Allegiance, and all the Members of the houſe of Commons, with all other ſubjects that have taken that oath ſolemnly, give this man the lye (excuſe it if it be incivility) in the firſt words of it declaring the King ſworn to be lawfull King of this Realm.
I. A. B. Do truely, and ſincerely acknowledge, profeſſe, teſtifie, and Declare in my Conſcience before God and the World, that our Soveraigne Lord King James is lawfull King of this Realme &c.
44Secondly, Kingdomes were never intended (ſaith he) that the hereditary right of any ſhould be in them. With what forehead can he ſay that was never intended which the lawes and ſtatutes of Kingdomes have ordained and ſetled? Particulerly this Kingdome hath for divers ſucceſſions provided before hand both for acts, and oathes for the hereditary deſcent of the Crowne. Will he•verre that the eſtates of the Realme never intended that which they enacted, and cauſed to be ſworne?
3 He tells us, that men that were qualified with Wiſdome, righteouſneſſe, and vertue, were to be heires and ſucceſſors, and ſet up by the people after them that laſt poſſeſſed them and neither the people themſelves, nor their Repreſentatives could either give or ſell away this priviledg from their poſterity viz. of chooſing, and ſetting up Kings, and rulers over them.
He•…eth ſtill higher in abſurdneſſe of aſſerting, and in this paſſage he is not content to croſſe the common ſence of others, but he will needs overthrow his own way. 1 As to common reaſon how in conſiſtent is this that he delivers? for by this poſition the ariſing poſterity muſt firſt give their conſent and paſſe their elective vote to the power they find ſtanding, before they can either owe allegiance and ſubjection to it, or enjoy the benefit of protection of it, ſo that Children (ſuppoſe ours of this age) whilſt they are under years of conſent, and after that too untill they pleaſe t•conſent (which is at their own choiſe and may be denyed for ever if they will) are both accountable to the preſent Government, for any treſpaſſes, or crimes they may commit, be it murder, or whatſoever is the worſt, and left out of the lawes protection, and redreſſe, in any thing they may unjuſtly ſuffer. And ſuppoſe their judgment, or choice concurre not with their parents, they muſt during their parents lives, either continue in that eſtate, or choſe another government, and become another commonwealth, apart by themſelves. Yea & by this reaſon all thoſe that have ſitten downe under a preſent power, which they find in the thron, and have given no conſent to it, are in the ſame condition of outlawedneſſe, and liberty to choſe rulers for themſelves, yea by this means a Kingdome may come preſently to45 be divided into a thouſand peeces of ſtates, and petty cōmonwealths according as their different choices may ſway them, to the inflaming of the whole with endleſſe ſeditions, and the overthrow of all government.
2 As to his own way I aske, 1 upon what conſtitution of the people doth the preſent Houſe of Commons (ſo called) claime to be a power? not by any made in this age certainly, the preſent people having not as yet choſen any new government, but do either acquieſſe in the old received from their forefathers, or are ſubjected perforce, without their conſent to a new, if any ſuch be. I appeale to the ſeverall propoſers of the agreements of the people that have been lately publiſhed whether the people of this age have yet ſetled or choſen any government in their time. If it be here ſuggeſted, that the preſent people have choſen theſe Repreſentatives, I ſay to that. True the Countries or Corporations have choſen them to be Parliament men, but in ſo doing they ordained not, founded not, any Parliamentary power; they acting diſtributively within their ſeverall precincts and only nominating two, or a few perſons upon a writ ſent out in the Kings name, to conſult on the difficult affaires of the Kingdom, according to a known, and antient cuſtome, and conſtitution of the Realm, cannot be conceived to conſtitute a new power, it muſt then be ſaid they are a branch of the ancient and hereditary government of this Nation, and this is not oppoſed by me: but this Gentleman here contradicts this clame, and tells us this title is null, and could not be made by any of our predeceſſors in relation to us.
Secondly, Vpon what ground do the ſaid Commons challenge to be the ſole ſupreme power, without a King or houſe of Lords, in way of a Common-wealth or free-State? if it could be ſaid that in former times the people have placed ſuch a power in the Houſe of Commons, that will be of none effect, according to this principle, which denyeth that the people may conclude their poſterity in ſuch an act. If it be ſaid the preſent people in electing theſe Commons inveſted them with ſuch a power, my ſimplicity cannot comprehend it, at the laſt elections of Parliament Members, the people (for ought I have ever heard) neither reſolved46 on, nor ſo much as deliberated, or moved a word of making over any new power, they only elected them according to former cuſtome, and truſt which was (as I underſtand) to ſit in the Houſe of Commons, and to act in conſociation with the King and the Houſe of Peers, about the publick affairs of the Kingdome. •o that the upſhot is, this Gentleman by giving the people the priviledge is violably to choſe their own government, perſonally and not by their predeceſſors, hath utterly overturned the preſent power.
4thly. But to defend this his poſition, he inſtructs us in the laſt place thus. This Priviledg the welfare of the people is ſo mainely concerned in, as that without it a people are given up, and ſold to ruine. 1. Are not the Lawes which muſt regulate both, the rulers, and the ruler of as great a concernment, as the choice of the rulers to the people, and yet the people by their Laws, do conclude their poſterity, which are therefore called every mans birth-right? Again, is not a mans eſtate of Lands and goods of as great a concernment to his Iſſue being their earthly ſubſiſtence, as is their ſhare in the Election of the publique Magiſtracy? yet a man may involve his poſterity (undenyably) in any act concerning his eſtate. Yea is not Religion and Covenanting with God, a far greater concernment, then this of government? yet men may repreſent and act for their iſſue in ſetling religion, and entring into Covenant with God as is clear in the example of Iſrael. **Deut. 29 10.11.14.15. Joſhua 24.15.
2. This reaſon would make us beleive the welfare of the Nation of Iſrael was mainly prejudiced, and that they were given up and ſold to ruine, when there was an hereditary kingdome ſetled over them, as there was by the Lord himſelf in David and his ſeed. Nay we are rather to beleive becauſe he ſet ſuch a government over his own people, therefore it was the better way.
I have done anſwering this paper, and for a concluſion have only one word to the author of it. Seeing he hath undertaken to deal in the removall of mens doubts concerning their ſolemn engagements unto their Governors, I would propound to him a Quaery, and that of a neceſſary and ſeaſonable importance, and which is occaſioned by</