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A VINDICATION OF THE Treatiſe of Monarchy, CONTAINING An Anſwer to Dr Fernes Reply; ALSO, A more full Diſcovery of Three maine Points;

  • 1. The Ordinance of God in Supremacie.
  • 2. The Nature and Kinds of Limitation.
  • 3. The Cauſes and Meanes of Limitation in Governments.

Done by the Authour of the former Treatiſe.

LONDON, Printed by G. M. for Iohn Bellamy, and are to be ſould at his Shop at the Signe of the three Golden-Lyons in Cornehill neare the Royall-Exchange, M.DC.XLIV.

A VINDICATION OF THE Treatiſe of Monarchie.The Preface.

PEruſing with a ſad heart and conſcience, deſirous of Information the Papers made publike by the Defenders of both ſides in this wofull diviſion; I found divers of them running out into irrecon­cileable extreames: among which this Reſol­ver, the Authour of the fuller Anſwer, and the Divines plea­ding for Defenſive Armes were the chief. In which I concei­ved there were paſſages contrary to all true policie, and the particular Frame of this State. Hereon a deſire of allaying mens ſpirits, and reducing them to a moderate compliance in one Truth induced me to a compoſing of that Treatiſe, In which how farre I have attained my ayme, I leave it to the world to judge.

But it fals out with me, as it did with Moſes endeavouring to ſet at one his contentious Brethren, I have hard words and cenſures laid on me for my labour. This Doctour tels me, I have ſowne ſeeds of ſedition, opened a way to Rebellion, and termes me an engaged man. But to whom I am engaged, un­leſſe to Truth, I know not: Engaged indeed I am to defend the Kings Supremacie againſt one part by my Oath of Allegi­ance; and engaged to defend the Priviledges of Parliament, and lawfull Liberties of the Subject, againſt the other part, by my Protestation: beyond theſe I know none, and perhaps if this cenſurer knew my condition, he would acknowledge as much. No, thoſe men are rather engaged, whom, ayming at Miters and a dominion over their fellow-Presbyters, it much con­cernes to prove the Power of Kings unlimited, that ſo they may be able to ſatisfie their unlimited deſires, and uphold them in a boundleſse juriſdiction over the conſciences of men; but for this Doctor, I know him not, I judge him not.

Then, for Sedition and Rebellion, The ſearcher of all hearts knowes how farre they were from being the ſcope of that diſ­courſe, rather it was an utmoſt aſſay of appeaſment, by ſhewing the way to a diſcreet moderation. Theſe Maſters of contro­verſie take a right courſe to ſubvert the Kingdom by diſputing men into a degree of Oppoſition beyond all Attonement, for as I am perſwaded the high ſpirit of Kings will rather incurre the worſt hazzard then ſubmit to ſuch termes, as to be Vniver­ſis minores, that is, ſubject to their Subjects, common ſervants and Officers of their Kingdomes, tyed up to an abſolute neceſ­ſity of aſſenting to the Determinations and Votes of the States: So I am as confident, that theſe two Britiſh Nations, yea very many now being in his Majeſties Armies, will ſpend their laſt bloud rather then come downe to this Doctors termes, ſc. a meere paſſive non reſiſtence of ſubverſive inſtruments of Arbi­trarie commands, a ſimple morall liberty, which the baſeſt ſlaves in the Turks gallies enjoy, becauſe it cannot be taken from them.

For my part, I doe not reckon my life and liberty worth ſo much pleading for; but the libertie of my Country is deare to me: The eſtabliſhed Government is deare to me, becauſe in it is bound up Religion, the publicke Good, yea the very Title of the King to this Crowne. Theſe I plead for againſt a man, who by his unconſcionable reſolves of Conſcience, hath done what by a pen can be done, to diſſolve them: who in three whole books hath undertaken the Patronage of Subverters of Religion, Laws and Government: and thinks it worth his pains if he can procure them an irreſiſtibilitie.

I thought I had weighed out Truth to both ſorts with ſo e­ven a ballance in that Treatiſe, that none had any cauſe to com­plaine. But, I ſee, this man muſt have all goe his owne way: He hath a high deſigne, no leſſe then a full conqueſt of all States; To bind the Conſciences and hands of Nations, and deliver them up to the Executioner to inflict on them the capi­tall doom of ſubverſion, if at any time the ſupreme Magiſtrate pleaſe to give the word. To this purpoſe having made ſome animadverſions on ſcattered paſſages of my Book. He is plea­ſed to publiſh them under the ſtile of a Reply; I may well call it a negative Reply. He denies what I have aſſerted; and layes downe his owne contradictorie Notions, and that is all; no Scripture nor Reaſon, but what is fully anſwered in my for­mer: It is ſo hollow a diſcourſe, that an ordinary eye may ſee through it, without the light of any further Anſwer; yet be­cauſe he gives me occaſion of fuller illuſtration, and juſtifying my ſuppoſals; and diſcovering the vanity of his, I have made him this Return, in which I have to my knowledge, left unan­ſwered no paſſage of moment which concernes me, in his Re­ply; other parts of it have I left untouched for them to whom they belong.

And now with proſtrate humility I beſeech that ſacred Au­thoritie, which here againe, is made the matter of this diſpute, not to impute iniquity unto me preſuming, for Truth and Con­ſcience ſake, to make inquiries into it. The Sun-beames ſtrike not dead the poor Mathematician, who ſtanding on this mole-hill, aſſaies by his inſtruments to take the dimenſions of that glorious bodie. Yea the great God of Power permits men without the guilt of ſin, to ſearch into his Perfections, and to ſet, not poſitive, yet negative bounds to Omnipotence it ſelfe. Let not then his Vicegerent be incenſed to diſdain, if we ſearch into the limits of his Power. I envie not it's extent, let it be as large as Truth and Law can ſtretch it: And my dutie binds me to beleeve that he would not have it larger. Princes require a reaſonable ſubjection, and that is beſt performed where the nature and meaſure of Power is beſt knowne: which to find out is all the drift of my former and this Treatiſe, unto which now we will paſſe over.

The Contents of the ſeverall Chapters and Sections.

  • CHAP. I.THE Caſe miſ-propoſed by the Doctor in his Reſolu­tion, Sect. 1. His uncharitable raſh Cenſures. His Intents in this Reply come not home to the Caſe in queſtion, Sect. 2. How far Scripture proofe is to be expected in theſe Caſes, Sect. 3.
  • Chap. 2.In the Queſtion of Reſiſtance the Doctors Diſtinction of Times and Perſons is vaine. How farre Reſiſtance is aſserted by me in this and the former Treatiſe.
  • Chap. 3.The Doctor and other of his ſort abuſe Scripture in this Queſtion, Sect. 1. Scripture warranting this reſiſtance: but having not a word againſt it. The Doctor in words profeſsing a­gainſt Abſoluteneſſe, but indeed pleading for it, Sect. 2. Go­vernment not only from God: but ſubordinately from the people, Sect. 3. Irreſiſtibleneſſe a Conſequent of Abſoluteneſſe. Limited Monarchie is in the very Power, Sect. 4. Mixture muſt be in the very Power. The Doctors ſtrange and ſenceleſſe conceit of Mixture, Sect. 5. Conqueſt gives no morall title before conſent, Sect. 6.
  • Chap. 4.The Doctors vaine and falſe ſuppoſals about Gods Ordinance in Soveraignty. It doth not exclude Limitation of Power, Sect. 1. His falſe ſuppoſals about the Nature and Quality of Limitation, Sect. 2. His falſe ſuppoſals about the Cauſes and Meanes of Limitation, Sect. 3.
  • Chap. 5.The Soveraignty of this Kingdome Limited in the very Power, and from its firſt Originall. The vanity of the Doctors three Titles by Conquest, Sect. 1. Arguments for Limitation and Mixture vindicated, Sect. 2. Seven Queries concerning this Go­vernment; Sect. 3.
  • Chap. 6.The ſtating of the Question of Reſiſtance aſserted. The Appeale ad conſcientiam generis humani, in the utmoſt con­tention vindicated, Sect. 1. His arguments againſt Reſervation of Power of Reſiſtance, are anſwered, Sect. 2.
  • Chap. 7.The vanity of his conceit about jus Regis. His de­ceitfull citing of Calvin. The Government of the Kingdome of Iſrael proved abſolute, Sect. 1. Inſtances for Reſistance out of the Old Teſtament juſtified, Sect. 2.
  • Chap. 8.The Text, Rom. 13. nothing concernes this Reſi­ſtance. His unjuſt charging of me in this Queſtion. His ſlighting of Doctor Bilſon, and other Divines. Reſistance of exceeding Acts, no Reſistance of the Power, Sect. 1. Emperours of Rome in S. Pauls time proved abſolute, Sect. 2.
  • Chap. 9.His nine Reaſons againſt Reſistance anſwered, Sect. 1. The five reaſons for Reſiſtance made good, Sect. 2. The Doctor re­cedes from his firſt Aſſertions, And yeilds us the Queſtion. No evils follow this Reſistance; but many its deniall, Sect. 2. The Conclu­ſion of the whole, Sect. 3.

A VINDICATION OF THE Treatiſe of Monarchie. OR, An Anſwer to Dr FERNES Reply.

CHAP. I. An Anſwer to the firſt Section of his Reply.

THE firſt Section containes his Preface, where p. 2. HeSect. 1taxes me, that I looke not with a ſingle eye on what he hath written, miſconſtruing it many times: but whether I have ſo done or no, it will be manifeſt in the ſequell. Then more then once, he cenſures me for being engaged. What engagements I have, appeares before in my Preface: But, I ſet up my rest upon a groundleſſe fancie of ſuch a mixture and conſtitution of this Monarchy, &c. Whoſe ſuppoſals are groundleſſe fancies, his or mine, I doubt not will fully appeare in this enſuing diſ­courſe. Neither had I any other purpoſe to which I have fitted that2 Treatiſe then the ſimple finding out of truth, God knowes how ever the Doctor pleaſeth to cenſure the purpoſes of my heart, Viewing this Reſolvers diſcourſe, for the ſatisfaction of my conſcience, I found it con­fuſed, and not approaching the Caſe which now troubles the world: Men enquire about the Lawfulneſſe of Reſiſtance of Inſtruments: He anſwers concerning Reſiſtance of the King: Men demand, Whether Reſiſtance of ſubverſive Inſtruments be the Reſiſtance of Gods Ordi­dinance forbidden, Rom. 13. He ſuppoſeth that which is the Queſtion; and makes that the ground of his Reſolve which is the ſole thing at which the conſcience ſcruples. This put me on a Diſcourſe of Monar­chy, that ſo by a diſtinct conſidering of the grounds of true Policie, I might both ſatisfie my ſelfe and others: and not ſuffer mens conſci­ences, ſeriouſly deſiring found information to be either puzled or miſled by ſo confuſe and indirect a Reſolution. Yet ſomething there is which he likes in me, that is, as much as ſerves his own turne. I doe with much ingenuity diſclaime, and with no leſſe reaſon confute ſeverall Aſſertions of other writers, &c. in p. 2. Would he could as well have ſeen my confutation of his, as of other errours: What I have ſaid againſt him, as it proceeds from the ſame impartiall ſpirit, ſo it containes the ſame truth; as, I doubt not, the judicious Reader will diſcerne. But yet I hold the ground on which their Abſurd aſſertions are raiſed, ſc. that the Mixture is in the Supremacie of Power, only I give the King, apicem poteſtatis, the top or excellency of Power, that is, the King is the crown or top of the head, &c. Thus is he pleaſed to jeere me, but how juſtly, it will hereafter appeare. And wheras I place the Authority of determining the laſt controverſies in a mixt Government, not in the two Houſes, this he commends in me: but that I doe not aſcribe it to the King; This he exclaimes againſt, as a ready way to confuſion, but why, and how it is ſo, he tells us not; only promiſeth to ſpeake of it more below, but where that below is, I cannot find.

Sect. 2After he hath thus touched upon thoſe things which he is pleaſed to tax in my Treatiſe. He proceeds, p. 4. to ſhew us what his intent was of firſt undertaking and now proceeding in this Argument. Well: let us heare what it was. The intent of his firſt Treatiſe was to reſolve the Conſciences of miſled people, touching the unlawfulneſſe of Armes now taken up againſt the King. He erres in his propoſing of the very Caſe. I believe he knowes no conſcience miſled touching this matter: The Caſe which he ſhould have reſolved, if he had done any thing, was3 touching the unlawfulneſſe of Armes now taken up againſt ſubverting inſtruments of the Government of the Kingdome; and that the re­ſiſting of theſe is a Reſiſting of the King; No wonder if he who ſhootes at a wrong marke looſeth all his arrowes. This wrong propoſing and proſecuting of ſo weighty a caſe (which I doubt was purpoſely done) ſet me firſt on work in this buſineſſe. Heare then the caſe more ſimply propoſed: and I refer me to the conſciences of men, whether I come not neerer the truth of it, then this proponent hath done. The Houſes declare Religion and eſtabliſhed Government to be in apparent dan­ger, by meanes of ſome ſubverſive Counſellours and Inſtruments about the King. This being ſuppoſed, they proceed according to Vote to the Ordinance and execution of the Militia, ſo to reſiſt and apprehend thoſe Counſellours and Inſtruments from whom they had declared the dan­ger to ſpring. This put on the Doctor to his firſt booke, to reſolve the conſciences of men, that it was unlawfull: Now ſee what courſe he tels us he took to reſolve men in this caſe. He undertakes to make good two Aſſertions. 1. Were the King ſo ſeduced, it were not ſafe to beare part in the reſiſtance of Armes now uſed againſt him. 2. That the caſe is not ſo, as they ſuppoſe, but rather apparently contrary. In the proofe of theſe two, he ſpends his whole book. Concerning the lat­ter I intend no controverſie with the Doctor: Would he could make it cleare to the ſatisfaction of the conſciences of all men; that were the way indeed not only to ſatisfie mens conſciences, but to calme the Kingdome into a bleſſed peace. But the Doctor is but ſlight in that part; and ſayes nothing, but what, as appeares in the Debate in the end of my Treatiſe, may ſoone be anſwered out of the Declarations of the Houſes, and the freſh memory of paſt occurrents: And in this reply he hath not ſo much as touched upon that Chapt. of my book: But that which in his firſt Tract he mainely, and in this Reply he ſolely labours to make good is the firſt Aſſertion, which is a univerſall one, and wor­thy to be examined in all Ages and Governments, whatſoever becomes of this preſent contention in this Kingdome. Now concerning that Theſis, in my Treatiſe of Monarchy I have affirmed and confirmed two things. 1. That if he could make it good, yet it were nothing to the buſineſſe he hath undertook; which is to ſatisfie the conſcience con­cerning the Unlawfulneſſe of Reſiſting Inſtruments, not the King, of which hee hath ſpoken very little or nothing at all. 2. That if he could prove that in ſome Kingdomes where the will of the King is the4 peoples Law, Reſiſtance of Inſtruments were unlawfull, if actuated by the Soveraignes will: Yet in Legall and Limited Governments, it doth not follow to be true: yet this he muſt make good, if in our preſent caſe he ſatisfie mens conſciences as he undertakes. Theſe two are the ſumme of my Anſwer to the Doctor in that Treatiſe, and if in this Re­ply he doth any thing, he muſt ſpeake to theſe points. Something he hath here ſpoken concerning the Ordinance of God in Supremacy, Of Caſes of Reſiſtance; of Kinds of Monarchy, of the Conſtitution of this Monarchy; but how truly and ſatisfactorily, it is my part to examine, and let the world judge.

But as if he had already cleared the matter, he proceeds to give ſen­tence before the cauſe be heard: And doubts not to call the contrary Reſolution a Blaſpheming of God and the King, p 4. I anſwer, If there be any which will defend the lawfulneſſe of taking Armes againſt the King, and in any caſe to reſiſt the Powers, They croſſe the evident truth of Scripture, and I condemne them: Yet me thinks the Doctor deales ſomewhat ſeverely with them, to call them Blaſphemers of God, for every errour about the word is not Blaſphemie; but a wilfull and obſtinate ſpeaking evill of the things of God. Likewiſe concerning a King, if it be true that he be ſeduced; then it is no blasphemie, which alwayes is a falſhood. If it be falſe, yet it is inhumane to call it a blaſ­pheming, when it imputes nothing to him, but to be ſeduced, which the beſt and moſt innocent Prince may be; ſure, if it be a blaſpheming, it is of the Counſellours and ſeducers, for to them the evill is imputed.

Then p. 6. He comes to ſpeake of what he intends in this preſent booke: ſc. that he will cleare this point, That the Doctrine teaching that ſubjects may take Armes againſt their Soveraigne for the de­fence of Religion and Liberties, when in danger of ſubverſion, is destitute of Scripture and true reaſon. As I ſaid, ſtill he drives at a vaine ſcope; to prove that which none denies: Let him prove, that in our Kingdome, Reſiſtance of ſubverſive inſtruments is a taking Armes againſt their Soveraigne, and he does the work; elſe he proves in vaine. But let us ſee how in the proceſſe of this booke, that will be cleared which none doth deny. Firſt upon examination of places of Scripture it will appeare, that Gods people were continually under Kings which they might not reſiſt, &c. What then? muſt it needs follow, that all other people muſt too? But whether the word containes any thing againſt Reſiſtance, and how far, we ſhall enquire in the proceſſe of this5 diſpute. Secondly, Ʋpon the examination of Reaſon, it will appeare how inconſiſtent ſuch a Power of Reſiſtance in ſubjects is with Govern­ment, &c. Indeed he will make appeare a great matter; would he would ſpeake ſomething to the Queſtion, and not proceed ſo indiſtinct­ly; I hope in the proceſſe of his book he will come neerer to the bu­ſineſſe then here he promiſeth, or elſe all our labour will be to little purpoſe.

After he hath told us what great matters we are to expect in hisSect. 3booke; he complaines how much his expectation hath been deceived by his Adverſaries. He confeſſes, They have great appearance of Reaſon raiſed on Ariſtotles grounds or principles; ſo that at first ſight it ſee­med unreaſonable that ſubjects ſhould be left without this remedy. If he ſpeake all this of Reſiſtance of their ſoveraigne, ſure it ſeemes not at all unreaſonable, but agreeable to all reaſon that ſubjects ſhould be without this remedy: It is directly againſt the word and all ſound reaſon, that a people lifting up a Perſon above themſelves, and by ſacred Covenant giving him a Power above themſelves, ſhould afterward on any pretence aſſume a power of Reſiſting that Perſon and power, and violate their own Covenant and Oath of due ſubjection. But if that Per­ſon be inveſted with a limited Power: and he proceed to acts of meere arbitrarineſſe without the limits of that Power conferred on him: Then it is all the reaſon in the world, that the Limiting States ſhould exerciſe an effectuall reſtraining Power by reſiſting inſtruments of ſuch arbitrary and ſubverſive acts, and we have not a ſillable of Scripture contradicting it. But if it ſeemed ſo unreaſonable to the Doctor, that ſubjects ſhould be without this remedy; why doth he contradict Rea­ſon in a buſineſſe within its compaſſe? He tells you, He found Reaſon preſently checked with that ſaying of our Saviour, Mat. 10.25. It is enough for the Diſciple that he be as his Maſter. And was this all the check. your Reaſon had? It is a very weake Reaſon which would yeeld to ſuch a check. What? is every Chriſtian bound for his outward ſtate to be in no better caſe then Chriſt was? If he were pleaſed to be borne under an abſolute Government, to be of low and poore condi­tion, doth this impoſe a neceſſity on all to be no freer, no richer then he was? A man would think his Reaſon were not only checked, but broken, which ſhould ſo argue. Let it be proved that by the providence of God we are brought forth under ſuch a Governement as our Ma­ſter was, then will we hold our ſelves bound by his example, to abide6 quietly in that condition we are borne to; but if God, as he hath diſ­penſed to many a richer eſtate then Chriſt was pleaſed to have, ſo hath to us a freer Government; then the Apoſtle adviſeth us to uſe it ra­ther, and not to be trifled out of it, by a ſhew of our Maſters example, in a caſe in which it binds no man.

But in what hath his Adverſaries ſo much deceived his expectation? He expected expreſſe Scripture, but he finds them altogether fayling; only their faith aad perſwaſion is reſolved into an appearance of reaſon raiſed upon Ariſtotles grounds and principles, p. 6. Mr Hooker might have taught him that the intent of the Scripture is to deliver us cre­denda; but in matters within the compaſſe of Reaſon, it is enough if we have evident reaſon for it, Scriptura non contradicente: and I am confident the Scripture hath not a tittle againſt ſuch a Reſiſtence as I doe maintaine; and we have reaſon enough for it. The Scripture was not given to preſcribe frames of Policie, which are various according to the diſpoſition of people; Generall Rules there are for Govern­ment, which being obſerved, Particulars, which fall under no ſetled Rule, are left to reaſon and the poſitive Lawes of Nations to deter­mine. Yet we are not wholy deſtitute of warrant from Scripture, as the Doctor affirmes, but are better furniſhed then he, as it will appeare in the ſequell. If Buchanan, and Junius Brutus, or any elſe have raiſed any doctrines on Ariſtotles grounds which will not conſiſt with Gods Ordinance ſet downe in Scripture concerning Authority, I am not bound to make good other mens exceſſes: This Replier knowes, that as I repudiate his Aſſertions tending to the ruine of all Liberties of States: So I hold it unlawfull to uſe any force againſt the perſon, or Authority of the Supreame, even in the moſt Legall and limited Mo­narchy. Therefore he doth me exceeding wrong in the cloſe of his firſt Section, to ſay, that, I agree with the rest to uſe what force they can againſt ſuch a Monarch for ſuppreſſing of his tyranny, &c. All I ſay is, that Force may be uſed; but neither againſt the Perſon nor Authority of the Monarch, which in all Governments of that nature are to be held ſacred and inviolate.

CHAP. II. An anſwer to the ſecond Section concerning Caſes of Reſiſtence.

I Could have wiſhed, that if it had pleaſed this Doctor to reply any thing, he would have followed the ſteps of my Treatiſe; but ſith he7 intends no full returne, but doth only catch at here and there a paſſage, without obſerving any order, I will frame my Anſwer to the courſe of his Reply; and cleare the parcels of my book as I find them aſſaulted in my reading of his. The Title of this Section being Caſes of Re­ſiſtence, the firſt part of it is ſpent about ſuch Caſes as are put by the Divines who plead for Defenſive armes. At length, p. 9, 10. He comes to the alone Caſe in which I defend Reſiſtence, in the p. 51. of my Tract, where I put the Queſtion of Perſons miſimployed to ſerve the illegall de­ſtructive commands of the Prince. And I affirm in ſuch caſe, and of ſuch Perſons Forceable Reſiſtance to be lawfull by the two Eſtates of Parlia­ment. This I prove by five Arguments, which here the Doctor doth not touch, but referres them to the p. 93. of this Reply. Only here he gives us a Magiſteriall determination without any proofe at all. But let us heare his Reſolution upon the caſe. He dares not openly to pronounce it unlawfull: but diſtinguiſhes of Perſons and Times, as if he would yeeld it lawfull in ſome, but not in others; Certes, if for any, then for the two Estates; if any, then Inſtruments of ſubverſion: if ſimply none, why doth he with ſo great cautele diſtinguiſh. Well, audiamus diſtinguentem: If by thoſe miſimployed perſons be underſtood the Commanders and Souldiers of the Kings Armies, I cannot ſee (nor any man els, I think) but that the reſiſting of them by a contrary Mi­litia, is a reſiſting of the King, and unlawfull, p. 9. I anſwer, I cannot ſee, nor any man elſe, I think, why Commanders and Souldiers ſhould have a priviledge of ſubverting States and Governments more then other men: Can the Royall Power extend to give them an irreſiſtibi­lity, and not to others? Certes, if others may be reſiſted, much rather Commanders and Souldiers, becauſe there is greater danger of ſubver­ſion from them then from others: Their being Commanders and Soul­diers makes them more dangerous, but not more priviledged: But, he nor none elſe can ſee, how ſuch can be reſiſted, but it muſt be a reſisting of the King, and unlawfull. Perhaps he is miſtaken in others, they may have clearer eyes then he hath: In the p. 52. of my Treatiſe, I have made it luce clarius, that in a Legall Monarchy it is not a Reſiſting of the King. Then he proceedeth to another ſort of men which I hope may be reſiſted. But if by thoſe miſimployed perſons be underſtood other in­ſtruments of oppreſſion in times of peace, before it come to Armes. What of theſe, may ſuch be reſiſted? Here he reſolves very cautelouſly and timorouſly, after many words, p. 10. without prejudice to other8 aſſertions of his of other reſiſtance, He conceives it not unreaſonable to ſay, Firſt, if private men be ſodainely aſſaulted, and life immi­nently endangered, and no meanes of avoiding by flight, then is per­ſonall defence lawfull, for ſuch ſodaine aſſault carries no pretence of authority with it. What is this to the matter? we enquire not of re­ſiſting aſſailants carrying no pretence of authority with them; but of ſubverters of Government warranted by the Kings will; and carrying pretence of Authority, though they have none. Secondly, If they come with pretence of Authority, there may be ſeeking redreſſement above from Authority, but if that may not be had, yet no reſiſtance. And who then minding to kill or rob, may not make a pretence of Authority, that ſo he may effect his miſchiefe without repugnance? But yet the Do­ctor will give us a little more, The Ministers of Power in each Coun­ty, and the Houſes of Parliament alſo (for with him they be equall) may at firſt ſtay, reſtraine, and commit ſuch miſimployed inſtruments, and ſo repreſent the matter againe to the King. But is not this to reſiſt them? No; he tells us, this is not to reſist. No? if miſimployed in­ſtruments may be staid, reſtrained, and impriſoned, ſure they may be reſiſted: Elſe what if they ſhould chooſe, and will not be committed; The Parliament muſt not lay hands on them to compell them; for ſo there may chance to be fight, and ſlaughter in the apprehenſion; and then the Doctor would call it Reſiſtance I think. But ſuppoſe the Hou­ſes of Parliament doe commit ſuch perſons and repreſent the matter to the King, and a King ſhould be ſo obſtinate as to perſiſt in the main­tenance of thoſe illegall courſes, and to that end imploy the Militia, it is neither Legall nor Reaſonable, they ſhould purſue the oppoſition to the ſetting up of a contrary Militia or Power, p. 11. Here we ſee the upſhot of the Engliſh freedome, and priviledge of Parliament. This is that which I ſaid; Thoſe men overturne all liberties, The reſult of their doctrine deſtroyes all policies, reducing them all to that which is arbitrary: If the King ſhould ſet Souldiers to deſtroy Lawes and Par­liaments, They may (if they be able) ſtay their hands till they goe to the King, and know whether it be indeed his will and pleaſure to have them deſtroyed or no; If he ſay, Yea; then they muſt returne and ſubmit to the vileſt inſtruments of ſubverſion, and not lift up a hand to reſiſt them. But let us ſee, on what weighty reaſon the Doctor builds this fatall Reſolution. This were a conteſtation of Power with him whoſe Miniſters they are, a levying of warre, an oppoſing of9 Armies against Armies. Sure this man doth much abhorre a Civill Warre: I cannot blame him: but yet we may buy an immunity too deare, at the prize of a ſubverſion of Religion, Laws and Government, which is the caſe in diſpute. This were to chooſe to be killed, rather then to ſight: To have a State ſubverted, rather then diſturbed by a warre to prevent it. I grant, There muſt be no conteſtation of Power with him whoſe Miniſters they are: But this is the point to be proved, that in this caſe, it is ſo: I utterly denie the Royall Power in our State can be communicated to ſubverting Inſtruments: And I doe in vaine expect, while the Doctor prooves that, which every where he ſuppoſeth: For he builds all on this foundation, ſc. That Gods Ordi­nance is an Abſolute unlimited Power, investing the whole will of the Su­preame, and cannot be determined in the exerciſe, but onely morally; the vanitie of which conceit will appeare hereafter, yet note here in the cloſe, that while he pretends a deteſtation of Civill Warre, he could doe nothing more to foment it, then by defending ſuch Poſitions of intolerable ſervitude: Did not ſuch rigid Counſellours of the King of Iſrael cauſe the greateſt Rent and Civill Warre that ever was made in any Kingdome?

CHAP. III. An Anſwer to the third Section which concerns ſeverall kinds of Monarchy.

IN my opinion it had been fitter to have treated firſt of ſeverall kindsSect. 1of Monarchy; and then of Caſes of Reſiſtance; for the ſubject in which ſhould precede the Queſtion whereof, in all methodicall proceeding. Here againe in the firſt place, this Replier would make his Reader be­lieve that penury of Scripture-proofe put me upon diſtinguiſhing of ſeverall kinds of Monarchy, That ſo I might lay all the defence of Reſiſt­ance upon Reaſon drawne from the ſeverall condition of Monarchies, p. 11. I have ſufficiently before diſcovered my intention in that Treatiſe. The Reſiſtence which I defend hath as much proofe from Scripture, as a matter of that nature need to have. Then he abuſes me, as finding fault with Divines, that pleading for abſoluteneſſe of Monarchicall Power in this Kingdome bring proofes from places of Scripture, p. 12. I complaine not of all Divines, but ſome, ſuch as this Reſolver is: Some, and that but of late yeares; and that but in this kingdome, where ſuch doctrines are the rode to preferments: nor doe I blame them for bringing proofes for ſubjection, and against Reſiſtance from places of Scrip­ture,10 as he calumniates me; but I blame their groſſe perverting of Scripture; bringing prohibitions of Reſistance of Powers againſt them who condemne it as much as themſelves; And of violating the Lords annointed againſt them who hold them as ſacred and inviolate, yea on more ſolid grounds then themſelves doe. And their fraudulent reaſo­ning from one kind of government to another, as if all Politicall pro­viſions of States for their Liberties did make no variation in the caſe; but that ſtill they were in the ſame State, as the people ſubject to the moſt abſolute vaſſallage.

Sect. 2But becauſe he boaſts ſo much of ſetling mens Conſciences on warrant from Scripture, that he expects command or allowance of Reſiſtance from Scripture, p. 6. That his Adverſaries reſolve all their faith and perſwaſi­on on an appearance of Reaſon drawne from Ariſtotles grounds, ib. and here that I obſerve there is but little pretence from Scripture for Reſistance; and thus would perſwade men, as if he had all Scripture for him; we no­thing but a few huskes of reaſon for us: Let him not thinke to carry it thus away with vaunts and big words: I will profeſſe here once for all. He hath not a ſillable of Scripture or right reaſon to ſatisfie the conſci­ence with in this controverſie: If it pleaſe this Doctor, let us joyne iſſue upon it, and put the whole caſe on this point. The Queſtion be­tweene us is, Whether in a limited Monarchie, Reſiſtance of ſubverſive In­ſtruments be unlawfull. He affirmes, I denie. He undertakes to ſatisfie mens conſciences that it is unlawfull: bringing not one Text of Scrip­ture, which ſpeakes to the point: Something he brings to proove it unlawfull to reſiſt the Ordinance of God: that the Magistrate which is ſu­preame under God is above all Reſiſtance, p. 84. He doth great matters; who doubts of theſe things: Then p. 84. he accumulates nine Argu­ments, but all ſo non concluding, that nineſcore of them will not make one ſound proving Reaſon of the point in queſtion, as it will appeare when we come to conſider them. On the other ſide we have both to ſettle mens conſciences on. 1. Examples of Scripture, ſc. The peo­ples reſcue of Jonathan: Davids armie againſt the cut-throats of Saul, that is, ſubverſive Inſtruments: Theſe being particular men, and in an abſolute Monarchie proove the point the more ſtrongly, ſo ſtrongly that the Doctor is faine to flie to that ordinary evaſion, of an extraordi­narie priviledge. Beſides all thoſe places which prove it lawfull to re­ſiſt private men, ſeeking to ſubvert Lawes and Religion, and the pub­like good; ſith in a limited State they are but private men, though11 backed with a Commiſſion from the Kings will and pleaſure. 2. Then for Reaſon; I have ſet downe five, p. 53. all unanſwerably concluding the point in Queſtion, as I doubt not the conſiderate Reader will ac­knowledge.

He profeſſes, p. 12. That it was never his intent to plead for abſolute­neſſe of Power in the King, if by abſoluteneſſe of Power be meant a Power of Arbitrary Command. What his intent is I know not, but he hath fully done the thing, or I have no underſtanding to ſee when a thing is done. In the precedent Section, he reſolves all caſes into the Arbi­trium Regis, the meere pleaſure of the King: allowing the Houſes of Parliament only a power of ſtaying the hands of deſtroyers, till it be expreſſely knowne whether it be the Kings pleaſure they ſhall be de­ſtroyed: And I am confident the meaneſt apprehenſion will diſcerne, that they who make the Monarchs ſole Will the laſt judge of all con­troverſies: and ſimply deny in the laſt caſe of ſubverſion, all Power of Reſiſtance of Inſtruments, even to the ſupreame Courts of Law and juſtice, doe without any controverſie, reſolve all government into an Arbitrarie Abſoluteneſſe. He adds, We allow a diſtinction of Monarchies and admit the Government of Kingdomes to be of divers kinds, and acknow­ledge a legall reſtraint upon the Power of the Monarch in this Kingdome. Verba datis, rem negatis; you allow indeed a kind of diſtinction of Mo­narchies, but all within the compaſſe of Abſolute: A legall reſtraint you ſeeme to acknowledge; but ſuch an one as reſolves into the Arbi­trary Will of the Monarch, as I have made it appeare in my former Treatiſe; and you will never be able to wipe off by this, or any other Reply. Then he promiſes that in this Booke certaine points will ap­peare to be truth, agreeable to Scripture and Reaſon: ſc. That Govern­ment is not the invention of man, but the inſtitution of God: That Gover­nours have their Power not from the people, but from God: That Gover­ning Power is one and the ſame in all ſupreames, and can only be limited in the exerciſe. And that where a Prince ſtands ſupreme, and next to God above all the people, there the Subiects may not take armes and make forcea­ble reſiſtance for any exorbitances. Theſe ſeverall Propoſitions how farre they contain Truth, and how far not, I ſhall in the ſequell make appear.

After theſe great promiſes, he proceeds, p. 13. to ſpeake ſomewhat of the Originall of Governing Power: and accuſeth me as if I ſeemed toSect. 3affirme it to be from God; but in the proceſſe of my booke, he finds me de­riving it indeed from the people. I perceiving two contrary opinions12 concerning the Originall of Government, did in that Treatiſe endea­vour to reconcile them, and to ſhew in what ſence both are true. To that end, as there is manifeſt, p 4. I diſtinguiſhed 3 things. 1 It's con­ſtitution; 2 It's Limitation to one kind. 3 It's determination to one indi­viduall Perſon and Family. The firſt of theſe I did affirme to be from God: The two latter from Men, and then concluded, In theſe things we have Doctour Fernes conſent. Let us ſee what exceptions he can take at this peaceable aſſay of Reconcilement. In the proceſſe of my Diſcourſe he findes me deriving it from the people. What then? Doe I denie it thereby to be from God? as if Subordinates did exclude one a­nother. God hath ordained that Powers ſhould be: People by vertue of that Ordinance give them exiſtence in this or that kind and ſubiect. The Doctor acknowledges all this, but not in my ſence, p. 14. He grants the Deſignation of the Perſon, and the Limitation of the Power to ſeverall kinds to be from the conſent of the People. I ſay no more; why doe we not then agree? The plaine truth is, The Doctor will not have Limi­tation of Power to be at all from the people, what ever he pretends: How then the Limitation of the Power to ſeverall kinds is from the people, as the Doctor yeelds, I cannot tell. Is not Limitation of it in­to kinds, Limitation of the Power it ſelfe? But he is poſſeſſed that my ſound ſence is another ſence from his; what other he doth not ſhew: but it is another which he likes not. Why? Becauſe ſometimes I ſay, the peo­ple reſerve a Power to oppoſe or diſplace the Magiſtrate: Sometime they di­veſt themſelves of all ſuperiority. 'Tis true, I ſay ſo, but withall I ſay, that when they reſerve ſuch a Power, they conſtitute no Monarchy. Is it not ſo, in the higheſt Miniſters of Power in Ariſtocracies and Democracies? What can he ſay againſt ſo apparent a Truth? 2. I call them, p. 63. Architectonicall Powers. This he derides and ſaies, This is the riddle of this Governing Power originally in the people. They are Architectonicall Powers, but build upon foundations laid in the aire, p. 14, Then he gives his reaſon, For before Government eſtabliſhed they have not any politique Power, whereby a Command may be laid upon others, but only a naturall power of private reſistance. This is falſe, that they have onely a naturall power of private Reſiſtance. They have indeed no for­mall politique power, for we ſpeake of a people free from all govern­ment; but they have a virtuall radicall power, by publike conſent and contract to conſtitute this or that forme of Government, and reſigne up themſelves to a condition of ſubjection on Termes and after a form13 of their owne conſtitution; ſo the Athenians, Lacedemonians and Ro­mans of old having expelled their Kings: and the Ʋnited Provinces, with others of latter times have done: This is that which I called Architect­onicall Power; and the Replier vainly carpes at the name, when he can­not denie the thing. But I know what he aimes at in all this, ſc. That Gods Ordinance is an abſolute boundleſſe Power in all Supremes, unca­pable of any limitation, but in the exerciſe. Of which fully afterwards. Sect. 4

At length He takes a nearer view of the Formes of Monarchie, ſpoken of by me, and makes a few obſervations upon ſuch particulars at him plea­ſeth, p. 14. Let us follow his ſteps. Firſt, for Abſolute Monarchie, whereas I ſay it is, when Soveraignty is ſo fully in one, that it hath no li­mitation under God, but the Monarches owne will. He approoves my deſcription; but threatens to remember it below, p. 15. Let him doe ſo; and make his beſt advantage of it, only here he cannot forbeare one note, that then it is not the deniall of reſiſtance which makes a Mo­narch abſolute; but the deniall of a law to bound his Will. I doe grant it; but with all I ſay, that it is neceſſariò conſequutivum, though it be not conſtitutivum: for ſith a Monarch which is obſolute hath no Law to bound his Will; but his very Will is the Subjects Law, then every act of his Will is Gods Ordinance, and ſo by conſequence it is unreſiſtible. Alſo, p. 15. He allowes it, when I ſay, A limited Mo­narch is he who hath a Law beſides his owne Will for the meaſure of his power. But yet he diſlikes that I ſay, He muſt be limited in the Power it ſelfe, and not only in the exerciſe; and I added a reaſon, for an Abſolute Monarch may ſtint himſelfe in the exerciſe of his Power, and yet remaine abſolute. What ſaies he to this? True, if ſuch a Monarch limit himſelf and reſerve a Power to vary, but if he fix a Law with promiſe not to varie, then in thoſe caſes he is limited. Note the fraud of this Replier, he alters his terms and puts things as oppoſite which are not ſo: He ſhould ſay, if be li­mit himſelfe, and reſerve a power to varie; then he is abſolute; but if he limit himſelfe and reſerve no Power to varie (for then the oppoſition is direct) then he is limited. But in ſtead of ſaying (and reſerve no pow­er to varie) he ſaies, but [if he promiſe not to vary] I ſay that promiſe not to vary, if it be a ſimple promiſe of not varying, it doth not make him limited in his Power, any more then morally, and ſo every Abſolute Monarch is limited. I affirme ſtill, it is Limitation of the Power it ſelfe, not barely of the exerciſe, which conſtitutes a Limited Monarch: for Monarchy is a ſtate of Power, and therefore it's ſpecificative diſtincti­on14 muſt be from ſomething which diſtinguiſheth Powers, and not the exerciſe of Powers; but this is enough proved in the 5t page of that Treatiſe.

Secondly, he blames me for that I ſuppoſe a Limited Monarch muſt be radically, that is, originally inveſted with ſuch a meaſure of limited Po­wer, and that limited, ab externo, and not from the free determination of his owne Will. Here he adds originally of his owne; that ſo he might ſeeme to finde a contradiction, when I afterward ſay, that it may be done by originall conſtitution, or by after condeſcent; but yet he con­feſſeth, I have a ſalve, when I make it ſuch a condeſcent, as is equivalent to an Originall Conſtitution, becauſe amounting to a change of Title, and a reſolution in the Monarch to be ſubjected to, no other way. I make no ſalve, nor doe I need any; he who weighes the Uniformity of Truth in that Treatiſe will ſee it needs no ſalves: Onely I diſtinguiſh thoſe things which are in their natures diſtinct, which if the Doctour had done, this Contention either had not been begun, or would ſoon have an end: Who ſees not that a Promiſe, whereby a Monarch may bind himſelfe may either be with a limitation of the bond of ſubjection, or without: And that this makes a reall difference: for in this the Go­vernment remaines the ſame, becauſe the Dutie of ſubjection received no variation; but in that there is for ſo much a Tranſitus into a limited condition. But theſe things cannot be more fully and clearly expreſ­ſed then they are in the page 13. of that Treatiſe. But he anſwers, Where there is ſuch a change of Title, it is done at once, and by expreſſe and notorious reſignation of former Power; but it is not neceſſary that an abſo­lute Monarch ſhould come to a limited Condition after that manner. I ſay, if he will paſſe into a limited condition, it is neceſſary there be a limi­tation of his Power, elſe he is not truly limited: But that all ſuch li­mitation be done at once and by notorious reſignation, it is not neceſſary, as will appeare afterward where this matter of Limitation is more diſt­inctly handled.

Sect. 5His next complaint is againſt ſomething I have in the page 25. ſc. That in a mixed Government (if it be of three) the Soveraign Power muſt be in all three originally, and from fundamentall conſtitution. He judges this not neceſſary, p. 17. and he gives a wonderfull Reaſon: For as Limitation may be only of the exerciſe of the Power, and not of the Power it ſelfe; ſo mixture is in regard of Perſons ioyned to the Monarch for certain acts and purpoſes; but that they ſhould have any ſhare in the Soveraign power,15 the nature of Monarchy will not admit. 1. Juſt ſo; for as a Monar­chy is not limited unleſſe there be a limitation of Power, for Monarchy is a Power; ſo a Monarchy cannot be mixed, unleſſe there be a mixture of Powers, for Monarchy is a Power; and to ſay a mixt Monarchy, and yet the Power not mixt, is to ſpeake contradictories. 2. If the mixture be not of divers concurrent Powers; wherof is it? He tells us, of the Monarch and certaine other Perſons joyned with him for certaine acts and purpoſes. Theſe joyned Perſons, have they any concurring Power to doe thoſe acts for which they are joyned? If not; then the ad­joyning is futulous and vaine, and the Power of Monarchy is mix­ed of a Perſon having Power, and of others having no Power to doe that for which they are joyned. You will ſay, They have Pow­er, but not diſtinct from that of the Monarch: that is, they have none; for in mixture, if it be not diſtinct, it is none at all. Againe if they have any, it muſt be diſtinct, for ſubordinate it cannot be; if the Acts to which they concurre be ſupreme Acts, unleſſe we ſhould be ſo abſurd as to ſay, They may concurre to ſupreme Acts, by a ſub­ordinate Power. But let us ſee, what a maine Reaſon he hath for aver­ring a conceit ſubject to ſuch abſurdities. Such a mixture would make ſeverall independent powers in the ſame State or Kingdome, which is moſt abſurd. I grant it is abſurd, if he ſpeake of ſeverall complete in­dependent powers; but to affirme ſeverall incomplete independent powers concurring to make up one integrall mixt power, it is no ab­ſurdity at all for ſo it is, in all Ariſtocracies and Democracies, and muſt be acknowledged in all mixed States, where the ſupremacie is not wholy in the hands of one perſon. Yet here we doe not ſo make them independent, but that we give a large predominancie to One, as, in nature, in all mixed bodies there is, as I have at large explained my ſelfe in the next Section, if the Doctor had been at leaſure to have taken notice of it. I yeild to that which he ſayes, p. 17. that it is not neceſ­ſary the Mixture ſhould be ſo Originall, but that it may alſo come af­terwards by condeſcent: It matters not, ſo it be originall, that is, ra­dicall: of Powers, and not of meere Acts: And indeed, there cannot be a mixture of Acts, unleſſe it be alſo of Powers: for Acts are from Powers: and where Powers are ſubordinate, there can be no mixture in their Acts; the Acts of cauſes ſubordinate, are alſo ſubordinate, and not coordinate and mixed. But I there brought two Arguments to prove that in a Mixed Government, the Concurrents muſt have in­dependent16 and diſtinct Powers. Let us ſee how he anſwers them. 1. Be­cauſe elſe it would be no mixture, but a derivation of Power, which is ſeen in the moſt ſimple Monarchy. He anſwers, that derivation of Power is either upon ſubſtitute Officers ſupplying the abſence of the Monarch in the execution of Power: and this is in the moſt ſimple Monarchy. Or elſe upon Perſons whoſe concurrence and conſent is re­quired to certaine Acts of Monarchicall Power; and this makes a mixture, though they have no ſhare in the Power it ſelfe, p. 17. I an­ſwer, 1. Abſence or preſence of the Monarch; whether they Act for him, or with him, varies not the caſe, If the Power they work by be derived from him, then it is his Power, and ſo conſtitutes no Mixture. 2. As if in the moſt ſimple Monarchy, the Soveraigne doth mannage the ardua imperij, the weightieſt matters of State alone; and not by conſent of his Counſell; without whom he is morally bound, (that is, on the ſinne of raſhneſſe) not to tranſact them, and that is all, which the Doctor yeilds to the Houſes of Parliament, ſc. that the King is mo­rally bound to their concurrence and conſent in certaine Acts. This is nothing but the ſhadow of a Mixture; If the Power of Acting be ſo in one, that, if he pleaſe, he may doe thoſe Acts without the concur­rence of thoſe adjunct Perſons, though he ought not, it is no Mixture, becauſe the Power is ſimple and One; and mixed Acts cannot flow from one ſimple Power. This the Doctor ſees, and therefore ſayes, If this Authour will not call this a Mixture, we cannot help it, p. 18. We doe not enquire of Names, but of things; nor whether it make a difference in Government or no; We treat of a Mixt Governement: and, I think, no man of common ſenſe will affirme, that a Govern­ment can be really mixed, and yet the Power be ſimple. 2. Becauſe the End of Mixture (which is Effectuall Limitation) cannot be had by a derivate Power. He anſwers; Though a Derivate Power cannot ſet new bounds to the Soveraigne Power, yet may it ſtand to keep in a legall way thoſe bounds which the ſoveraigne Power hath ſet to it ſelfe. Obſerve, He dares not to ſay, They may keep: but only ſtand to keep; nor ſtand neither, but by advice; that is morally: If he will exceed thoſe bounds, the Act is valid, and hath all its Authority without them: Only he ſins, if he doe ſo; becauſe he hath promiſed he would not doe it without them: Here's excellent Limitation and Confinement from exorbitancies: A bare promiſe, without ſuch adoe, in conſtituting States and Mixtures, would be altogether as good a17 bounds; but of this we ſhall have more occaſion to ſpeake afterward.

In the cloſe of this Section he turnes back to the p. 21. of my book,Sect. 6and hath ſomewhat to ſay to my Aſſertions about Monarchy by con­queſt. There firſt I ſay, If the invaſion be made upon pretence of Ti­tle, and the pretender doth prevaile, it is not Conquest properly, but a Vindication of a Title: and then the Government is ſuch as the Ti­tle is by which he claimed. He tells us, He ſees no injuſtice in it, if ſuch a one having prevailed ſhould uſe ſuch a people as a Conquerour, p. 19. The Lord keep us from this mans juſtice. What; No injuſtice? If the Pretenders Title allowed by a great part of the people, he by their aide ſubdues the reſt, ſhall he for their labour cruſh them into ſervitude, and uſe the power of a Conquerour, without injuſtice? 2. Suppoſe the people not convinced of the right of his Title make at firſt ſome op­poſition; but yet the pretence of his Title, and apprehenſion that he ſeekes no more power then his Title imports, work a yeilding diſpo­ſition in them, ſo that they withſtand not ſo univerſally, nor ſo long as they might have done; but at length ſubmit to him on his pretended termes: were it not high injuſtice to take advantage on ſuch a people, and having them under hatches to deſert thoſe termes on which they yeilded, and uſe the full right of a Conquerour: This was Englands caſe with Duke William. But the maine thing which ſticks by him is ſome­thing I have delivered, p. 23. It is an uncontrolable truth in policie, that the conſent of the people, either by themſelves or their Anceſtours, is the only meane in ordinary providence, by which ſoveraignty is con­ferred upon any perſon or family. Againſt this he is very angry; and oppoſeth it in many words; but to my Argument from the Morall bond of ſubjection, he ſayes nothing at all. He termes it good policie, but bad divinity, p. 20. And ſets up an Antipoſition, that when the invading Prince has perfectly ſubdued a people (there being no heyre to whom they are bound) and hath ſetled and conſtituted a frame of Government, then providence doth ſufficiently diſcover it ſelfe, and ſuch a people ought to ſubmit and take this Prince as ſet over them by the hand of providence. As if theſe two were contrary: I ſay, They are not bound untill they conſent: He ſayes, in ſuch a caſe they are bound to conſent, becauſe then providence diſcovers it ſelfe: And he brings Calvin at large to prove that which none denies: I grant a people (not preobliged,) fully overcome ſhould much ſin againſt Gods pro­vidence by obſtinacie, if on a meere will, they conſent not to reaſonable18 termes of ſubjection: But this I ſay, There is no morall obligation to Authority, before that conſent bind them: Conqueſt may be an Ante­cedent cauſe; but the immediate and formall cauſe is only the conſent of the people; which he cannot ſay againſt; for that muſt be morall, and not meerely violent. The call of providence challengeth a con­tented ſubmiſſion, if there be no reaſon hindring it; but if a precedent Oath or ſome other ſound reaſon intervene, then it is no call requiring ſubmiſſion: Neither can the fulleſt conqueſt make a people debtors, but they remaine free from any morall bond; for the providence of God being of it ſelfe externall, can induce no morall ſtate; but that providence which on one diſcovery calls to a ſubmiſſion: on a like diſ­covery may free them againe, if nothing elſe come between, to render them morally bound: A Travellour, by the providence of God ſhut up into the hands of a Robber, hath his life and protection promiſed him in his journey, if he will promiſe to pay him ſo much money: I ſay, this Travailor ſhould ſin againſt his own life, and the providence of God, offering him thoſe termes, if obſtinately he refuſe ſubmiſſion: Yet no man will ſay he owes the robber ſo much money, becauſe he hath him at his mercy, untill he by promiſe make himſelfe a debtor: Thus have I made good that maxime of mine to be an uncontrouleable Truth, good Policie, and good Divinity too; maugre all the Doctor hath or can ſay againſt it.

CHAP. IV. Wherein the vanity and falſhood of the ſuppoſals whereon the Doctor hath built all his diſcourſes is made appeare.

Sect. 1AFter a ſcattered gleaning of paſſages in the former Sections, the Doctor undertakes the two great Queſtions. 1. Of the Conſtitution of this Monarchy, in his Sect. 4. 2. Of Reſiſtence, in the remainder of his book. Which two, we ſhould now immediately purſue; but that an­other work more conducent to the ending of this contention will for a while divert me.

Errour in the ſearch of controverted truths doth more often ariſe from the judgement, then from the reaſon: Men doe more offend in laying falſe grounds; then in deducing falſe inferences from true grounds; This I have obſerved in the Doctors bookes: He truly ar­gues, but from falſe principles; and then the ſuperſtructure muſt needs be anſwerable, ſo that, overthrow his foundations, and then all his buil­ding19 will of it ſelfe ruine into apparent falſhood. I confeſſe he every where ſayes the ſame of my Grounds, on which I have built that Trea­tiſe: He cals them falſe and groundleſſe ſuppoſals, and fancies, and what elſe he pleaſeth: I will therefore make him a fayre offer: Let us make a ſhort work of it: let us joyne iſſue upon our ſuppoſals, on which both our diſcourſes are built.

This Doctors ſuppoſals which he ſcarce ever makes ſhew to prove and on which he hath built his Reſolves and Diſcourſes I doubt not to call unſound and falſe: and doe profeſſe the contrary to be my grounds whoſe truth I will maintaine. His may be reduced to foure heads. 1. Concerning the Ordinance of God in Soveraignty. 2. Con­cerning the Nature and Quality of Limitation. 3. The Meanes and cauſes of Limitation. 4. The Conſtitution of this Monarchy. And ac­cording to this order we will take them into examination.

Firſt, Of the Ordinance of God in Magiſtracy,Of Gods ordinance in ſupre­macie. He proceeds on two falſe principles. 1. That the Governing power is one and the ſame which God gives and ſettles upon the perſon that is ſupreme, p. 13. that is, it is abſolute and unlimited in the power it ſelfe; and may be limited on­ly in the exerciſe thereof, p. 17. 2. Which followes from the former, that Conſent of people may be the meane of deſigning the perſon, and yeilding ſubjection to him, who elſe could not challenge it more then an other man; alſo a meane of limiting that power in the exerciſe of it; but not the meaſure of the power it ſelfe, which in ſuch a meaſure is given of God to all Soveraignes, p. 41. ſo then;Queſtion propoſed. let this be the Que­ſtion, Whether it be Gods Ordinance that Governing power in all So­veraignes be one unlimited thing; and can receive no meaſure from the people? The Doctor affirmes it; and p. 84, tells us he hath often inſi­nuated it; but he ſhould once directly prove it, if he be able, ſo he might have preſcribed to the whole controverſie; for if he can make this good, in vaine doe we enquire about the conſtitution of this Mo­narchy; or the lawfulneſſe of reſiſtance of ſubverſive inſtruments of the Princes will. Doth he think a covert inſinuation would ſerve the turne to impoſe ſuch an Aſſertion, which fruſtrates the intent of man­kind in framing limitations of Governing power; and captives all in­to an abſolute paſſive ſubjection to the vileſt inſtruments of the will of him who is ſupreme. In all his reply I find but two places which have any ſhew of proofe of this overbold Aſſertion. One is p. 14. Before Go­vernment eſtabliſhed the people have not any power of a community20〈1 page duplicate〉21〈1 page duplicate〉20or politick power whereby a command may be laid upon others; but only a naturall power of private reſiſtance. The other is p. 42. The people have not of themſelves out of Government, the maine power, the power of life and death, how then can they give it either for Go­vernment, or reſerve it for Reſistance? Here be weake foundations to build ſuch an Aſſertion, and three ſuch inſulting books on. What a no­thing this is, I ſhall make appeare anon.

Queſtion ſtated.Now I hold the Negative of this Queſtion; and doubt not to ap­prove it firme truth: To that end, firſt I will premiſe ſuch things as we agree in, that ſo the point in queſtion may the more diſtinctly appeare. Which I apprehend are or may be theſe. 1. That Governing power is originally from Gods Ordinance. 2. That it being ſo, is unreſistible in its whole latitude, in all the acts which flow from it. This the Apoſtle is cleare for, Rom. 13. and for no more, that I know. Alſo that this is true as well in Limited as Abſolute Governments; v. g. In abſolute Monarchy, where Authority doth inveſt the whole will; the Monarch is unreſiſtible in all the acts of his reaſonable will; becauſe all are acts flowing from Gods Ordinance. So in limited Monarchy, where Autho­rity doth not ſimply inveſt the will of a Monarch, but ſo far forth as it is regulated by ſuch a law, the Monarch is unreſiſtible in all the acts of his will which are according to that law; becauſe they are acts flow­ing from Gods Ordinance: Yea though either of theſe doe limit him­ſelfe in the exerciſe of his power, no way thereby diminiſhing the ful­neſſe of his power; and afterward exceed thoſe limits, yet he is unre­ſiſtible, and to be ſubjected to actively in lawfull things, and paſſively in unlawfull: my reaſon is, becauſe even thoſe acts, notwithſtanding limitation, flow from Gods Ordinance of Authority, which remaines the ſame, and not leſſened by ſuch limitation. 3. This governing power is ordinarily conveyed to perſons by publick conſent, which is a point made good in my former Treatiſe, and in the former chapter hereof. 4. That this publick conſent is not only a meane, but hath a cauſall in­fluence in conveying Authority to perſons. 5. That men working by ſuch conſent as ſecond cauſes, doe neceſſarily convey ſuch Authority, as God hath ordained; ſo that, if it can be proved either by Scripture or ſound reaſon, that it is Gods ordinance, that ſupremacie ſhould be un­limited, and as large as all the acts of his will which hath it, then what­ever men capitulate about limitation of it, is vaine, ſo that the Doctor need prove only that point; and for my part I will give him the cauſe. 216. Limitation of Power may be either of Acts, when Power is convey­ed to Perſons to doe certaine Acts of Power; but not all. Or elſe of Manner of working; when Power is conveyed to doe all Acts of Au­thority, but according to ſuch a preſcribed Rule. Now I grant the former cannot be in the conveyance of Soveraigne Power, an inferiour Officer may be limited by commiſſion to certaine acts of Power; and have no Authority to do other Acts of power; but when Soveraignty is conveyed, and the Perſon is ſet up next to God, above all the people, as the Doctour ſaith. He muſt have an unlimited Pow­er in reſpect of Acts of Government: for Gods Ordinance is not one­ly that there ſhould be Power for ſuch an end; ſc. a Peaceable life in godlineſſe and honeſtie; but ſufficiencie of Power for the attainment of that end: So that all Power of doing any Act needfull for that end, muſt be in him who is ſupreme, and the comprehenſive Head of Pow­er to inferiour Magiſtrates. So that all the Queſtion truly ſtated is a­bout the other ſort of Limitation, ſc. Whether Soveraigne Power be ſo unlimited in its Rule of Acting, that it inveſteth the whole Reaſonable Will of him who hath it: So that all the acts which proceed from him who hath it according to the rule of his owne Reaſon, be potestative, and from Gods Ordinance.

Secondly, having thus punctually ſtated the Queſtion,Queſtion determi­ned. the Determi­nation muſt proceed in a double way, ſc. 1. In ſimple Governments. 2. In mixed Governments. I do maintain the Negative in both: and my proof ſhall be formed accordingly.

Firſt then, In ſimple Government, Power is not one Ʋnlimited thingAſſert. 1in the ſupreme: But may be limited in the very being and root of it. 1. The cauſe or meane by which alone it is conveyed, if it beſtow orReaſ. 1convey only a limited Power, then it is limited in the very Being of it. For there can be no more then is conveyed: Now we know, the people by their publike act of conſent and compact, may either bind themſelves to a full ſubjection to the Monarchs Will guided by his owne Reaſon; or by ſome conſtituted rule or law ſet him to governe by; which latter if they doe, then is his Authority radically limited: For they owing no more ſubjection; He can have no farther Power. 2. If ſoveraignty may be ſo limited, that Active Obedience is notReaſ. 1due to the commands which exceed thoſe limits, but may lawfully be denied to them (as the Doctour acknowledges it may, p. 16.) Then it may be limited in the Power it ſelfe: For in ſuch caſe the Power22 exceeds not the limitation; for if the exceeding Acts were poteſtative, we owe Active ſubjection to them, in as much as they are the Ordi­nance of God, to which in omnibus non prohibitis, Active ſubjectionReaſ. 3is due. 3. If Power in the ſupreme be ſuch, that it cannot be li­mited, then either becauſe it is Gods Ordinance; or elſe becauſe it is ſupreme: but its being Gods Ordinance hinders not; for we ſee, Rom. 13. All Powers as well ſupreme, as ſubordinate are Gods Ordinance, yet ſubordinate Powers may be limited, not only in the Rule of Acting, but in the kind of Acts; as none can denie. Neither its being ſupreme doth hinder its limitableneſſe; indeed, as before it hinders it from be­ing capable of confinement, in the kind of Acts: but in the meaſure or rule of working, it doth not hinder, in as much as a Soveraigne Power may as well attaine its end, by being confined to another Law from without, as by the Law of its own Reaſon, if not much better; alſo we no where finde Gods Word making any difference or giving pow­er to confine ſubordinate Powers; but forbidding it of Soveraignes. Reaſ. 44. That is to be granted, which denied makes all Soveraignes arbi­trary, and of equall Power; but to affirme that Power is one, unli­mited, and inveſting all the Acts of the Soveraignes Will doth ſo, for then is ſoveraignty arbitrary, not when it hath no morall bounds, for then none were or could be arbitrary; but when Power is ſo fully inReaſ. 5one that every Act of his Arbitrium or Will is Poteſtative and ſove­raigne. 5. I have the judgement of all the Reformed Churches and Divines in Germany, France, Belgia, Scotland, on my part; who have both allowed and actually uſed forceable Reſiſtance againſt ſub­verſive Inſtruments of their Soveraignes Will; yea our owne famous Princes Elizabeth, James, and our preſent Soveraigne, both by edicts, and Aſſiſtance have juſtified the ſame: which they would not have done, had they been perſwaded of ſuch an unlimited Ordinance of God inveſting all the Acts of the Will of him who is ſupreme. So that by all this it appears that the Doctors conceit of ſuch an unlimited Or­dinance of God, which he brings not a tittle of Gods word to prove, is a meere chimera and groundleſſe conceit.

Object.Now the onely difficulty, which I can thinke on, is this. Gods Or­dinance in ſoveraignty, as before, is not onely Power to ſuch an end; but ſufficiencie of Power to the aſſecution of that end: now a limited Power ſeemeth not to be ſufficient for the end of Government, becauſe there are two Powers neceſſary to the end of Government, ſc. Power23 of making and authentique Interpreting of Laws, which are not conſi­ſtent with a Limitation of Power.

I anſwer: It is true of Limitation in reſpect of Acts;Sol. and therefore I averre, that ſuch a Limitation cannot be where Power is ſupreme: but for Limitation to a Rule and defined way of Working, I cannot ſee how it with-ſtands the end of Government: So that ſuppoſing Pow­er of making and Interpreting Laws be neceſſary to the end of Govern­ment, yet that they be Abſolutely reſident in him who is ſupreme, ſc. To make Lawes and Interprete Lawes authoritatively without being bound to follow any Light or Rule therin, but his owne Reaſon is not neceſſary to the end of Government: In theſe Acts a regulated Power is enough in the moſt ſimple State, ſc. a Power to make new Lawes, if any be needfull; and Interpreting the old, if ambiguous, according to the Rule of the former eſtabliſhed Laws; and by the adviſe of his lear­ned Counſell and Judges of his ſupreme Courts of Juſtice. We ſee in matters ſpirituall, there is no Legiſlative Power reſident, to ordain or give authentique ſence in matters de fide, yet the Church ſtands well enough; one ſtanding Rule of Scripture being ſufficient with a miniſte­riall Interpretation: So it is probable a State might, by a complete ſtan­ding Rule of Law, and a Miniſteriall Power of Interpretation, were there no Legiſlative Power reſident in any Supreme Magiſtrate thereof.

But the matter is farre more cleare in a mixed Government; ſo thatAſſert. 2were it neceſſary in a ſimple Government, that the Supreme ſhould be unlimited in his Power, yet in a Mixed (which is enough for us in this Kingdome) evidently it is not ſo: And to make this appeare, I will lay downe three grounds. 1. Such a Government may be eſta­bliſhed that the ſupreme Power may be placed in many perſons, either of the ſame, or divers condition, that is, in a mixed Subject: elſe all formes were unlawfull except ſimple Monarchie. 2. If this ſu­preame Power be inequally placed in theſe Perſons or States of men; ſo that a reall ſublimity and Principality be given to one, then the de­nomination may be taken from that Principall: and ſo it is a Monar­chy, or Ariſtocracy, or Democracy mixed in the Power it ſelfe; how­ever it pleaſeth this Replier to deride it, with the top, or Crowne of the head: of which more hereafter. 3. Where the Supremacy of power is thus in many, although all taken together have an unlimited Power, as in ours, yet neither of them ſeverall by himſelfe hath, or24 can have; for it is a contradiction, that it be reſident in many, and yet unlimitedly in One.

Now to thoſe two ſhewes of Argument, which in the beginning I produced out of this Reply, I ſay, before Government be eſtabliſh­ed it is true the people have no formall Politique Power of Life and Death; yet they have a ſeminall; that is, every one for himſelfe, his family and poſterity hath a power of reſigning up their naturall liber­ty, to be governed by One, or many; after this or that forme as they ſhall judge fitteſt. God ordaining that Powers ſhould be to ſuch an end, hath thereby legitimated and ratified any Conſent or Contract which people may make of parting with their liberty and giving Ma­giſtrates a common Power over them to that end. And Gods not preſcribing any Rule or Meaſure of Power by his Ordinance of Autho­rity, hath left it in the peoples liberty, to reſigne up themſelves ac­cording to ſuch Rule and Termes, as they judge fitteſt, ſo it be ſuch as the end of his Ordinance may be attained thereby. Thus although by it ſelfe, and excluding Gods Ordinance they have no immediate Power to lay a command on others, nor Power of life and death, yet in vertue of Gods Ordinance their common conſent and contract is ſufficient to ſet up ſuch a Power which is endowed with a ſufficiency of Command for Government and the end of Government over thoſe which have, each man for himſelfe and his, ſet it up. So although ſecond Cauſes have no Power by themſelves to produce their effects, yet working in vertue of the firſt Cauſe they have Power to produce effects, ſometimes farre beyond their own Meaſure. Therefore I de­ſire this Doctour either to bring ſome Ordinance of God expreſſely for­bidding to ſet any bounds or Rule of Power upon the Will of the Magi­ſtrate; or elſe let him ſuffer Man-kind to uſe their Right in reſigning up that liberty which God and nature hath given them upon ſuch termes and conditions as they apprehend beſt for their own good: and the due end of Government.

Summe.In the cloſe of this Queſtion, I will lay downe three Concluſions concerning the Ordinance of God, and the Nature of Soveraigntie.

Concluſ. 11. God hath ordained that in Societies of Men there ſhould be a Politike Power, for a peaceable and godly life: This Ordinance hath put a Semi­nall Power in all the Societies of Men, ſc. a Liberty and Power by com­mon Conſent to reſigne up themſelves and theirs to one Supreame; thereby conſtituting a common Politique Power.

252. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined any kindConcluſ. 2or forme of Power; hath left it to the libertie of Societies of men to chooſe to which kind they will reſigne up themſelves, either to a ſupreme regulated in the Acts of his Will by his owne Reaſon, as in abſolute Government; or to one regulated by a Common Reaſon or Law conſtituted by pub­like conſent, as in Limited.

3. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined the ſub­jectConcluſ. 3of this Power, hath left it to the choice of Societies to inveſt with this So­veraigntie, either one Perſon or many, and thoſe either of the ſame, or di­vers ſorts and rankes of men; Whence ariſe ſimple or mixed Govern­ments, and this is the Architectonicall Power left in ſocieties before they are engaged in a Government, which the Doctour doth ſo cauſ­leſly deride: Here is the ſumme of what I do averre concerning Gods Ordinance in Soveraigntie, which I challenge the Doctour or any elſe to gain-ſay.

The ſecond ſort of the Doctors falſe ſuppoſals reſpect the Nature andSect. 2Quality of Limitation,Of nature and Qua­lity of Li­mitation. where alſo I obſerve that he proceeds on two falſe and fallacious Principles, ſc. 1. He every where confounds Mo­rall and Civill or Legall Limitation, ſo p. 18. 93. 39. 2. That Sove­raignty is capable onely of a morall Limitation, p. 39, 42., So that if a­ny other be in any State ordained, He cannot beleeve but ſuch a conditi­on is unlawfull, and unreaſonable againſt the Order of Government. p. 39. If the nature of Limitation be well knowne, it will appeare that the Doctor hath done very inconſiderately, or rather very fraudulently (for he hath obſcured the Truth much by it) in confounding morall and Civill Limitation. We will therefore conſider the nature of Li­mitation ſomething more accurately then I have done in my former Treatiſe; for it will be a great light to the whole controverſie.

Firſt, We muſt conſider a diſtinction of Power, which is either, APoſ. 1ſimple Power of Willing or Doing, which is in every Morall Agent. 2. A Power of Authoritative and obligatorie Willing or Doing; ſo that an act of it, whether a Will of Command or Cenſure expreſſed, hath in it a binding power to ſubjection, this is that which we call Magistracy, of whoſe Limitation now we treat.

Secondly, concerning Limitation; we muſt know that it inducethPoſ. 2an abſolute neceſſity of not producing any Act beyond thoſe Limits. For a Power having bounds beyond which it can exceed, if it pleaſe, though with difficulty, it is not properly limited, but hindred.

26Poſ. 3Thirdly, This neceſſity of not exceeding thoſe bounds is ſuch as the bounds themſelves are; ſo that it is ever true, That a Power in what way it is limited cannot exceed thoſe limits.

Poſ. 4Of Moral limits.Fourthly, There are of this Power but two ſorts of Limits, ſc. 1. Mo­rall, and 2. Civill or Politique. Of which two we muſt diſtinctly con­ſider. 1. Morall Limits is the Morall Will or Law of God; and a Power is ſaid to be limited by this, not when it cannot produce any Act at all: but when it cannot morally produce it, that is, without ſin. For the ſupervening of a morall bond, doth not take away the Power of doing, but of right or ſinleſſe doing: v. g. in Naturall Powers. Gods prohibition of eating Swines fleſh, did not take away from the Jew the naturall Power of eating it; but the power of ſinleſſe eating it. So in Civill power a prohibition of God comming upon it, doth not take away the Power of Civill and Authoritative Doing; but of lawfull, or ſinleſſe doing. And hence it followes, 1. That Morall Limitation is only of the Exerciſe of Power; not of the power it ſelfe: for the pow­er is not thereby taken away, but remaines equally extenſe and able to all its acts, as it was before; only now it cannot put forth it ſelfe un­to certaine Acts without ſinne, which it could before: Thus an Ab­ſolute Monarch who hath a power of doing, as extenſe as his Reaſona­ble Will, promiſes to doe but this, or in this manner: now he is mo­rally bound, by vertue of this promiſe; and cannot without ſinne doe otherwiſe: yet if he doe, his Commanding Power is the ſame, and its act binding to the Subject. And ſo it is proportionably in Legall Governments. Cyprian Biſhop of Carthage hath by the Canons a power of judging Eccleſiaſticall cauſes committed to him: He re­ſolves and promiſes to doe nothing of moment herein, but by the con­ſent of his Clergie, now he is morally bound: and if afterward he doe a thing by himſelfe without their conſent, he ſins: yet no man will ſay his Epiſcopall power is leſſened; or the act he ſo doth, is canoni­cally invalid, and not obligatorie. 2. Yea it followes alſo that it is not properly a Limitation of the Exerciſe of power neither: for by a morall bond, the Power is not ſo bound up, but that it can exerciſe it ſelfe, and that validly too, though not without ſinne, as appeares before. 3. Alſo that it is no detraction from Abſoluteneſſe of Pow­er; nor is it ſufficient to make a diſtinction of it into Abſolute and Li­mited. For, 1. It cauſes no reall Limitation of power, either in the nature, or exerciſe of it. 2. It is not diſtinctive, being to be found in27 the moſt abſolute power under heaven,Legall Li­mits. all being bounded by Gods Law, the Law of Equity, and many promiſes by themſelves made.

2. Civill or Legall Limits cauſe a Civill and Legall definement of Authority, ſo that, its exceeding acts are not Legall and binding, that is, are non Authoritative: for as a Morall bond induces a neceſſity of confinement in eſſe morali; ſo a Civill and Legall bond doth in eſſe lega­li & obligatorio. Hence follows, 1. It is theſe Legall and civill bounds which conſtitute a Government in a limited condition, not thoſe mo­rall; for this is diſtinctive and is never found in an abſolute Governe­ment, for there the Soveraigne by promiſe or Oath binding himſelfe to a ſtated courſe doth put no Law civill upon his power, or the exer­ciſe of it; for though he ſinne in exceeding afterwards, yet his acts are truely Legall and Authoritative. 2. This induceth a reall Li­mitation of power, neither can it be only of exerciſe; for ſith it brings an illegality and unauthoritativeneſſe on acts exceeding, that is, makes them none in eſſe civili & politico, it is a limitation of Power it ſelfe; for when a Power can produce no potentiall acts beyond ſuch limits, then it is limited in the very being. 3. Acts exceeding politique and legall Limitation, being not Legall nor authoritative in that State can give no authoritie to the Inſtruments, and therefore they may be reſiſted without reſiſtance or violation of Authoritie. Whereas it is o­therwiſe in Acts exceeding morall Limitation; for being authoritative, they authorize the Inſtrument, and give him an unreſiſtance.

In ſumme: Limitation morall and civill or legall doe differ in three main particulars.

1. Morall, ſith it is no politique or Authoritative Act,Concluſ. 1makes no reall detraction either in power or exerciſe of it, and therefore agrees with the moſt abſolute Government: whereas Legall, being a poli­tique and authoritative Act makes a reall diminution; and ſo is the ratio formalis, or diſtinctive conceit conſtituting Limited government; nor can be found in abſolute.

2. Hence, Exceeding Acts notwithſtanding morall limitation areConcluſ. 2authoritative, proceed from Gods Ordinance, and challenge ſubjecti­on: but they are otherwiſe which exceed a legall limitation. Concluſ. 3

3. Exceeding Acts in morall limitation being authoritative have the Sword or compelling power annexed to them, which may not be re­ſiſted: but in Legall, being not authoritative, they have not the ſword or compelling power annexed, and therefore may be reſiſted in their28 Inſtruments: I will illuſtrate all this by a familiar inſtance. In our Government, a Iudge hath a Commiſſion to heare and determine Cauſes according to the Verdict of twelve men. Here is a Power li­mited in the very being, that is Legally and Civilly. This Iudge uſeth indirect meanes to corrupt the Iurie to bring in an unjuſt Verdict; but judgeth as his Commiſſion binds him according to their Verdict: Here is a morall exceeding, yet the Act of judgement is Authoritative, becauſe according to his Commiſſion, and muſt not be reſiſted. A­gaine, He paſſeth ſentence in another cauſe expreſſely againſt the Ver­dict of the Iury, in an arbitrary way. Here is a Legall exceeding, and the ſentence is non authoritative. He having no ſuch Power commit­ted to him, the ſentence can have no binding power in it. Hereby it appeares how without any ground of Truth, the former ſuppoſals are.

Sect. 3Thirdly concerning the Cauſes and Meanes of Limitation the Do­ctors ſuppoſals are,Cauſes & meanes of Limitati­on. 1. That Radicall Limitation, that is, of the Pow­er it ſelfe requires an expreſſe and notorious act, it muſt be done in the be­ginning and at once. p. 15. 24. 39. 2. That a Prince may ſo limit him­ſelfe, as not to require to be actively ſubjected to, and yet be limited only in the exerciſe, not in the power it ſelfe, p. 16. 3. That no Limitation by after condeſcent, is of the Power it ſelfe, p. 28. this being a conſequent from the firſt. Now that the falſhood of theſe and the like grounds every where ſcattered in his bookes may appeare; Let us a little more diligently handle the Cauſes and Meanes of Limitation, which, as be­fore,Cauſes of Moral Li­mitation. being twofold, Morall and Civill; We will begin with Morall. 1. Now the Formall cauſe of a meere Morall Limitation, is that which morally bounds or makes ſinfull any act of Power. We are therefore to enquire what it is which can doe that. And this is, 1. Principal­ly the Morall Law of God forbidding ſuch an exerciſe of Power. This is an univerſall, perpetuall and invincible Limitation of all power of Go­vernment, either abſolute or legall, yea of all Active Power of reaſo­nable creatures. 2. There is another meane of Limitation morall, ſc. a Promiſe, Oath or poſitive constitution, whereby a Prince puts a bond upon himſelfe, making that now ſinfull to be done, which before was not ſo. This alſo induces a morall Limitation, as well in abſolute as le­gall Governments; as if an Abſolute Monarch promiſe to follow ſuch a Rule, which hath a Power to uſe any which his reaſon ſhall dictate. Or if a Legall promiſe to abridge himſelfe in a courſe, in which the Law29 hath left him indeterminate: in this reſpect, they come under a morall limitation. But concerning this poſitive meane we muſt note. 1. This promiſe, how ſolemne ſoever it be, muſt be a ſimple bond: It muſt ex­tend to no diminution of power, or diſcharge from duty of ſubjection; for then it is not meerely morall, it makes the exceeding act not only ſinfull, but non obliging: whereas it is the note of a meere morall bond, that it extends not to any leſſening of Authority, or diſcharge of duty: as if a Captaine take his enemy priſoner; he to ſave his life ſweares him a full vaſſalage afterward, his Maſter promiſes to command him only ſuch ſervices, never abſolving him from his former bond of ab­ſolute ſlavery: here is a morall bond; yet ſtill a full debt of ſubjection in caſe the Maſter ſhould breake his word, and put him on other em­ployment. 2. If the matter be more throughly looked into, this po­ſitive meane of limitation is either none at all; or elſe addes nothing to the former, of the morall law of God: For in ſuch promiſe or Oath whereby a Governour limits himſelfe there is an expreſſe or tacite con­dition, if it conduce to the end of Government, the glory of God, and publick good: For if ſuch Oath or bond hinder the end of Government, it is eo nomine, unlawfull and invalid; but if conduce to it, then it was no more, then was virtually required of him before by the morall Law; this promiſe or Oath being but a more ſolemne profeſſion and proteſta­tion to doe that which before implicitely he was bound morally unto. Thus we ſee all that Doctor ſpeakes of Morall and irrevocable limi­tation by promiſe and oath comes to nothing in the iſſue: ſo that this being granted that the Monarchs power in this State were only Moral­ly limited in the Doctors ſenſe; We are as much under and owe as much ſubjection as the captive ſlave to his Maſter; and all our Laws and Statutes being but morall limitations of this ſecond ſort, are not ſo much as morall limitations any farther then the Prince ſees them con­duce to the end of Government, if any ſeem to ſtand in his way, and hin­der him therein, he is no longer bound to it; but may account it an ill made promiſe or Oath which is better broke then kept. 2. Cauſes of Legall li­mitation.Of the Cauſes and Meanes of Civill and legall limitation, whereby not only the exerciſe, but the power it ſelfe is confined. 1. The formall cauſe hereof is the limitation of the duty of ſubjection in the people: The duty of ſubjection is the originall of the power of Authority. People by becomming debtors of ſubjection doe ſet up Authority; and by ſtin­ting and terminating the duty of ſubjection doe put bounds and termes30 to the power of commanding. 2. Let us ſee then by what meanes the duty of ſubjection may be terminated. I conceive it may be done two wayes. 1. At firſt, when a people reſigning up themſelves to a ſtate of ſubjection doe it not abſolutely, but impoſe only a limited bond on themſelves; for if they impoſe no more duty: the Governour can aſſume no more power. Now this may be done, not only by poſitive, expreſſe and notorious act, as the Doctor ſpeakes; but alſo by a ne­gative; a meere not impoſing of an abſolute bond of duty on them­ſelves is enough: ſo that if it cannot be proved either by records of the firſt inſtitution, or preſent obligation that a people have put themſelves into a ſtate of abſolute ſubjection, then it is to be held but limited: For whatſoever is ours by the law of nature, cannot be taken from us but by ſome poſitive act done by our ſelves or Anceſtors: Thus in private men; Liberty which is mine by nature, none can take from me, unleſſe he can bring a title or right whereby it became his, and I his ſer­vant. Nor am I any farther his ſervant, then he can bring proofe of his right. The ſame is true of a ſociety of men. In this caſe it belongs to the challenger, and not to the defendent to bring his poſitive notorious act for proofe of his title, and meaſure of his title: So that the Doctors demand is unreaſonable, who ſtanding for a full right in our Govern­ment, puts on the peoples part to bring evidence that they have not. Rather it is juſt, that he ſhould bring ſome poſitive and notorious act wherein it appeares that this people have fully reſigned up their liberty to an abſolute Government; or make it appeare that it is Gods or­dinance that where ever a people doe conſtitute a ſoveraigne power, they muſt make an abſolute reſignation of their liberty. 2. By after-condeſcent, for this may be a meane of civill limitation, unleſſe any will imagine that a people once putting themſelves into abſolute ſub­jection, are irrevocably ſo. And thus a Monarch becomes limited, when the promiſe or Oath he limits himſelfe by, is not ſimple, but a­mounts either expreſſely or equivalently to a relaxation of the bond of ſubjection: whether it proceed from meere grace, or conſcience of equity, or by Petition, or importunity of the people, it matters not what was the ground of it, if it carry with it a relaxation of the dutie of ſubjection, it is a meane of civill limitation, in the very root of power; for power can be no larger in the Prince, then duty of ſubjection is in the people; for theſe two have a neceſſary dependence, and relation of equality either to other. Thus if a Monarch, taking advantage of31 force of armes, impoſe a new Oath of full ſubjection on his people, who before were but legally bound; and prevaile ſo farre, that the whole or major part of his people doe take it for themſelves and theirs, here is a chang of Government from Legall into Abſolute, an enlargement of power: ſo on the contrary. And for this matter we need looke no farther, then the Nationall Oath, or Eſtabliſhed Lawes; for if they bind the people to an abſolute ſubjection; ſuch is the power; and though it have morall, yet it hath no legall limitation: And ſo on the contrary if they bind only to a ſubjection according to the Law; the Government is limited in the very power of it. Hence it appeares to be falſe which the Doctor hath, p. 16. that a Monarch may ſo tye him­ſelfe as to require not to be ſubjected to but according to ſuch Lawes, and yet not be civilly limited, in his very power; for if he ſo far re­quire not to be ſubjected to, that he untye the bond of ſubjection beyond thoſe Lawes; then is his Authority limited, and can proceed no far­ther; neither are the inſtruments of his will exceeding thoſe lawes, authorized, but private perſons, and reſiſtible: And alſo falſe, which he ſayes, p. 28. That limitation by condeſcent cannot be radicall. Now if enquiry be made concerning the ſimplicity of antient formes of aſſu­ming into ſoveraignty, as when the people are ſaid to make one King; to endue him indefinitely with Kingly power; not confining his Go­vernment by any expreſſe limitations. Anſ. I conceive in ſuch caſe to know how far a people are bound by ſuch an indefinite contract, theſe things are to be looked into. 1. If the intent of the people can be diſcovered in ſuch a conſtitution, for if it can, doubtleſſe the contract binds ſo far, and no farther. Thus Lyra concludes concerning the re­queſt of the people of Iſrael for a King, that it is to be underſtood of an Abſolute King, by that clauſe in the petition, 1 Sam. 8.5. a King to judge us like all the Nations, for all thoſe Eaſterne Nations having Abſolute Monarchs, they deſiring to be governed like them; muſt be conceived to intend ſuch a government. 2. If there be no expreſſion of their intention: then a light concerning it muſt be borrowed for circumſtances; ſc. the kind of government whereunto they have been formerly accuſtomed; or that of the Nation from which they procee­ded: And thus the Saxons giving Kingly ſtate to their Captaines in this Land, cannot in reaſon be interpreted to intend any other, then that whereunto they were accuſtomed, and which was the forme of the Nation whence they came. This Rule is ever to be kept as well in pub­like,32 as in private contracts of that ſimple indefinite forme, that they are to be construed, as far as may be, in fovour of the granter.

CHAP. V. An Anſwer to the Sect. 4. concerning the Conſtitution of this Monarchy.

Sect. 1A Fourth ſort of the Doctors ſuppoſals are concerning the Conſti­tution of this Monarchy, which in words he granteth to be limi­ted and mixed, but comming to explaine himſelfe, he makes ſuch a li­mitation of it and ſuch a mixture as is indeed none at all, being to be found in the moſt Abſolute and ſimple governments in the world: for he every where ſuppoſeth it limited only morally in the exerciſe, not in the power: And ſo mixed, that there is but one ſimple power; a mixture made of one ſimple principle, ſuch a one as never was heard of in the world before. And this he delivers on his bare word, never bringing any proofe of it, thinking it enough if he can except againſt that which I have ſet downe concerning theſe things in my Treatiſe. Among other Aſſertions which I have there about the ſtate of this Go­vernment: there are two which this Replyer doth oppoſe. One is p. 31. That the ſoveraignty of our Kings is radically and fundamen­tally limited: which I have made good by five Arguments, and added a ſolution to the two chiefe which may be made againſt it. The other is, p. 39. That the Authority of this Land is of a compounded and mixed nature in the very root and conſtitution of it. This I have confirmed by three Reaſons; and have anſwered three Objections which may be made againſt it. Now I deſire the Reader impartially to weigh what I have there ſaid; and to compare it with this Doctors Reply; and then judge whether thoſe truths ſtand not firme againſt all that is brought to infringe them. But let us ſee what he oppoſeth. He proceedes not in any orderly courſe, to ſet downe his Antitheſes and prove them; and to give Anſwer to what I have brought on the con­trary; but firſt ſpends ſome time in conſidering what this Govern­ment was in its Originall; as if it muſt needs remaine ſtill ſuch as it was at firſt; and could not receive any alterations, and graduall accom­pliſhment in proceſſe of time. And then he ſets on my Arguments, but how feebly we ſhall eaſily diſcover.

Here the firſt thing I did tax in the Doctors booke, was that he affir­med things contradictory: for he tells us he is againſt Abſolute power33 in our Kings; and arbitrary Government: And yet he alſo affirmes, that our Kings hold by right of conqueſt, yea of three conqueſts. And that the Houſes of Parliament are more ſubject to our Kings, then the Senate of Rome was to their Emperours. Alſo that the finall judgement is in One. Now how theſe ſo openly contradictorie Aſſertions can ſtand together he doth not ſhew us. Only he challengeth my ingenuity, if either he propoſed this as a concluſion to be proved, that our Kings are abſolute, p. 21. Neither doe I affirme that he did: Only I ſay, he holds things contradictory; that he holds ſuch grounds which make all Kings abſolute, ſc. that no ſupreme is or can be more then morally li­mited. Indeed he ſpeakes much of limitation morall; of limitation in the exerciſe of power; this makes a great noiſe of limitation, but in­deed are but meere vailes to cover over Abſoluteneſſe, and make it the more paſſable, which he is aſhamed to propoſe to the world in ex­preſſe termes. Suppoſe he did not mention thoſe conqueſts to win an arbitrary power to the King. Yet ſure in affirming more then once, that he hath ſuch a right, he doth as much as if he ſaid he may uſe an arbitrary power if he will; for if he hath a right of Conqueſt, he hath an Arbitrary right, by the Doctors own confeſſion, p. 22. and if he hath a right of Arbitrarineſſe, it is his lenity he doth not uſe it. In the Anſwer to the firſt Argument which I brought for the Abſoluteneſſe of our Kings (which was that They hold by conqueſt, and therefore are Abſolute.) I do not ſay, the Doctor drawes ſuch a concluſion: No; but he layes down the Antecedent; and then any body elſe may draw out the concluſion.

I fetch not the root of ſucceſſion, ſo farre backe as the Saxons,Originall of this Monar­chy. as this Replier traduces, to cut off advantages which may be made from the Normans entrance, p. 22. But becauſe himſelfe began there to make up a Trinity of Conqueſts: This drew me on that diſcourſe of the Originall of this Monarchy; nor that the cauſe had any need of it; for it is his work to prove the Government abſolute, if he will have it ſo; alſo ſuppoſe it were as abſolute as the Norman Conqueſt, by him improved can make it; yet that hinders not, but that it may become really and radically limited afterward, by condeſcent, as appeares in the former chapter. Concerning the Saxon entrance, I ſaid it was not a conqueſt, ſc. properly and ſimply, but an expulſion. He anſwers, This is neither true, nor greatly materiall, p. 22. I ſay, it is both true and materiall: It is true; for all the Britaines which retained their name and Na­tion,34 were they many or few, were expelled into Wales: All the reſt in gentem, leges, nomen, linquamque, vincentium conceſſerunt; as himſelfe cites for me out of Mr Cambden. And it is very materiall; for if they which only remained here in gentem & leges vincentium conceſſerunt; Then the Conquerers, as I ſaid, kept their old forme of Government; the Saxons came not into the condition of the conquered Brittaines; but they into the old liberty of the Saxons. Hereupon grew there a neceſſity of inquiry into the Government of the Nation, before they came hither; that ſo we might know what a one they eſtabliſhed here; and brought the remaining Brittaines into. And a record of more unqueſtionable authority then Tacitus I could not imagine; nor a more expreſſe teſtimony for a limited forme in the very potestas of it; of which ſort he affirmes the Governement of all the Germane Nations was. How ever the Doctor is pleaſed to call it a conjecture, a dreame and uncertainty; No, the expreſſe teſtimony of ſuch an Au­thour is not ſo: Rather that probability of theſe Saxons not being then a people of Germany, but did afterward breake out of the Cimbri­ca cherſoneſus, is ſo; which himſelfe dares call no more then a proba­bility. I ſay, 1. It is a greater probability, that they were a people of Ger­many before they came in hither; for the Angli which accompanied them in that invaſion, were queſtionles Germanes, and reckoned by Tacitus among that people, doubtleſſe they were neighbours in habita­tion which were joyned in that voyage and conqueſt. 2. Suppoſe the matter were not cleare of the Saxons, yet is it of the Angli which gave denomination to the Land and people, who no doubt retained their Laws and Government, ſayes Cambden; which was limited in the ve­ry royall power ſaith Tacitus. But this Doctor would make men be­lieve, as if I endeavoured to deduce the very Modell of our preſent Go­vernment from that Saxon ingreſſe: Whereas all that I ayme at, is to make it appeare that in ſemine, in the rude beginnings it is ſo an­cient; and ſhall affirme the limited power of the Engliſh Kings, and liberty of the ſubjects to have been from thence continued till now, unleſſe he can bring ſome better proofes of its interruption, and in­duction of an unlimited power, then as yet he hath. Alſo to ſhew that the Doctors Tenure by Conqueſt is vaine in the firſt of the Three, for the Saxons gave none ſuch to their Princes, but kept their Lawes, and came not under the Title of a conquered people. Next, the Doctor cenſures my delineation of the preſent platforme of our Government,35 p. 44. (for it is nothing with him for advantage to skip over 9. or 10. Pages) that ſo he might make a ſhew as if I ſet down that modell as derived from the Saxons out of Germany; and ſo ſpends neere two pages in this unreaſonable way of traducing me; Whereas he cannot be ignorant, that in many places, yea at preſent is forced to confeſſe, p. 24. that I acknowledge our Government came up to this exactneſſe and full height by degrees and in continuance of time; but indeed he had nothing elſe to ſay againſt that Deſcription of this platforme or any one of thoſe 6. Suppoſals of which it conſiſts; and therefore when he had fained as if I had derived it from the beginning of the Saxon Government in this Land, he calls it a phanſie, againſt the credit of all Histories and Chronicles, p. 24. and ſo lets it goe. Let the Reader judge, whether I doe not there apparently ſet it down as a deſcription of our now exiſtent Frame of Government: And whether any thing therein is not according to paſt hiſtorie, and preſent experience: Yea I chal­lenge the Doctor to except againſt the leaſt part of it, as not ſo: if he cannot, he doth wrong ſo to miſcall and deride it. After this Excurſion, he returnes back to the 36. page of my Book, and the proper buſineſſe of that Chapt. which was his three Titles by Conqueſt. I looked that after his firſt, he ſhould have made good his ſecond Conqueſt, ſc. the Daniſh, and made good what he had ſaid, that our Kings hold by that too, as one of the three. But not a word of that for ſhame: He paſſes p. 26. to the Norman entrance: And to prove that William held this Land by conqueſt, he cites out of Mr Cambden that in victorie quaſi Tropheum, he diſpoſed of the Lands of the Conquered, changed their Tenure, abrogated what Engliſh Lawes and customes he pleaſed, &c. Indeed when he had gotten full poſſeſſion, he did what he pleaſed; but ſactum non probat jus. I have proved, and the Doctor hath not gain­ſaid, 1. That his Title by which he claimed was a ſucceſſive and Le­gall Title. 2. That this Title got the favour of a great party, and was a maine Meane facilitating his acquirie. 3. That he was inaugurated by virtue of that Title. 4. After he had gotten the Kingdome, though he did many things arbitrarily, yet he ſetled himſelfe and his ſucceſ­ſours in the state of Legall Monarches, as the Doctor confeſſes, p. 27. What then is become of his Triple Tenure by Conqueſt; when heres not one can be made good; when it comes to a due ſcanning? That of Mr Cambden, that the Kings of this Land have Poteſtatem ſupre­mam, & merum imperium, is no more then that of the Statute which36 the Doctor ſpeakes of, p. 47. that it is an Empire governed by one ſu­preme head, which we acknowledge; for that merum imperium muſt be underſtood in a moderate ſenſe; elſe it ſayes more then the Doctor himſelfe profeſſes to own: Though Mr Cambdens judgement in this caſe is not of the authority of a proofe.

Sect. 2Then he paſſes to my Arguments, p. 28. But, by the way, let me tell him,My Argu­ments for Limita­tion and Mixture vindica­ted. I brought 5. Arguments to prove this Government limited, and 3. to prove it mixed: and it had been meet he ſhould have brought ſomewhat, beſide his bare word, to prove it limited only in the exerciſe, that is, Abſolute in the power; but he brings no proofe, becauſe he had none: Yet perhaps though he had not wherwithall to confirm his own, yet he hath to demoliſh my Aſſertions: Let us ſee therefore his ſolu­tions of my Arguments. But before we come to weigh them, becauſe he tells us p. 28. it were an Argument fit for a skilfull Lawyer to la­bour in, and ſlights my endeavour becauſe I bring not Hiſtory and An­tiquity, but doe goe about to reaſon him into a beliefe of thoſe Aſſer­tions, Let me premiſe ſomething concerning that courſe of proving them. 1. The work of bringing History and Antiquity doth be­long to him who affirmes ſuch a Title of Power in our Kings; Let him ſhew how and when it was conveyed to them: He which challenges a right to that which was once undoubtedly mine, muſt prove his right and he can have no more then he can bring evidence for. 2. On his de­faut, if I undertake a needleſſe office to prove my Negative, there are but two wayes imaginable to doe it, one is by records of hiſtories ſet­ting out the firſt conſtitution of a ſtate, and the Termes on which〈◊〉people reſigned up their liberty to a ſubjection. So in the Antient Ro­mane State, the Venetian, the late Belgik Ʋnion, and others which have at once, viſibly and lately been compoſed, it is likely that way might be taken. The other is by demonſtrative collections drawn from the inſtitution of the preſent compoſure of a State. Thus alone is it poſ­ſible to diſcerne and prove the conſtitution of a Government which ſprings not up at once, but by unſeen degrees and moments, whoſe fundamentall conſtitutive acts ſtand upon no record. This is the con­dition of moſt Governments in the world which have ſprung from ſmall, rude and unknown beginnings. And of this in particular. For 1. A limitation of Royall Power was brought hither by the Saxons and Angli our Anceſtours, hath been proved. This was, as thoſe times were, very rude and unpoliſhed, it is likely ſuch as Captaines in Armies37 have, who can doe nothing of moment without the adviſe and con­ſent of the Counſell of warre. 2. This Limitation of Power and Li­bertie received ſome more formall and ſetled bounds afterwards by cu­ſtomes and Lawes before the Conqueſt, as appeares by the Common Lawes, which are, as it were, the baſis and foundation of this Govern­ment, the Statute Lawes being but after ſuperstructives; Theſe Com­mon Lawes did not grow up at once, but by degrees, and were unwrit­ten Customes and Ʋſages gaining authority by unknowne preſcription, above all written Lawes; and were afterward committed to writing by men skilfull in the Lawes. 3. At length, and after the Conqueſt it was perfected to this Parliamentarie Forme; and even this being at firſt but rude, grew to this exactneſſe by length of Time, and infinite Contentions. This latter way only being left us; that I took, and the Doctour hath no cauſe to deſpiſe it. For when a thing of preſent State is made evident by Reaſon drawne for palpable experience of it's pre­ſent compoſure, it is madneſſe to denie it to be ſo, becauſe I cannot tell when it began to be ſo: Yea when the Queſtion is of preſent ſtate, it is a ſurer way to find out the Truth, then by records of its Originall conſtitution: For in time the Frame of a State may receive reall varia­tions from what it was at firſt, as the Romane State, and moſt others have done; for the contracts of men are at pleaſure alterable; and an argument drawne from Monuments of firſt coalition, would then be fallacious.

Well; be the way never ſo juſtifiable, which I have taken, yet the Doctor dares pronounce my Arguments inſufficient to cleare what I have undertaken. Tis eaſie to pronounce it; let us ſee how he makes good his ſentence. I proceeded diſtinctly firſt to lay down my Arguments proving Limitation, p. 31. Then thoſe which proove Mixture, p. 40. He mingles them together: And to my firſt, third, fourth and fift proving Limitation, Anſwers that They prove only limitation in the ex­erciſe of power, p. 28. Why ſo? Neither the Denomination of Liege, nor any preſcription can make us believe, that the Limitations of power had any other beginning then voluntary condeſcent. As if a Government by vo­luntarie condeſcent might not receive a radicall Limitation