A VINDICATION OF THE Treatiſe of Monarchie. OR, An Anſwer to Dr FERNES Reply.
CHAP. I. An Anſwer to the firſt Section of his Reply.
THE firſt Section containes his Preface, where p. 2. HeSect. 1taxes me, that I looke not with a ſingle eye on what he hath written, miſconſtruing it many times: but whether I have ſo done or no, it will be manifeſt in the ſequell. Then more then once, he cenſures me for being engaged. What engagements I have, appeares before in my Preface: But, I ſet up my rest upon a groundleſſe fancie of ſuch a mixture and conſtitution of this Monarchy, &c. Whoſe ſuppoſals are groundleſſe fancies, his or mine, I doubt not will fully appeare in this enſuing diſcourſe. Neither had I any other purpoſe to which I have fitted that2 Treatiſe then the ſimple finding out of truth, God knowes how ever the Doctor pleaſeth to cenſure the purpoſes of my heart, Viewing this Reſolvers diſcourſe, for the ſatisfaction of my conſcience, I found it confuſed, and not approaching the Caſe which now troubles the world: Men enquire about the Lawfulneſſe of Reſiſtance of Inſtruments: He anſwers concerning Reſiſtance of the King: Men demand, Whether Reſiſtance of ſubverſive Inſtruments be the Reſiſtance of Gods Ordidinance forbidden, Rom. 13. He ſuppoſeth that which is the Queſtion; and makes that the ground of his Reſolve which is the ſole thing at which the conſcience ſcruples. This put me on a Diſcourſe of Monarchy, that ſo by a diſtinct conſidering of the grounds of true Policie, I might both ſatisfie my ſelfe and others: and not ſuffer mens conſciences, ſeriouſly deſiring found information to be either puzled or miſled by ſo confuſe and indirect a Reſolution. Yet ſomething there is which he likes in me, that is, as much as ſerves his own turne. I doe with much ingenuity diſclaime, and with no leſſe reaſon confute ſeverall Aſſertions of other writers, &c. in p. 2. Would he could as well have ſeen my confutation of his, as of other errours: What I have ſaid againſt him, as it proceeds from the ſame impartiall ſpirit, ſo it containes the ſame truth; as, I doubt not, the judicious Reader will diſcerne. But yet I hold the ground on which their Abſurd aſſertions are raiſed, ſc. that the Mixture is in the Supremacie of Power, only I give the King, apicem poteſtatis, the top or excellency of Power, that is, the King is the crown or top of the head, &c. Thus is he pleaſed to jeere me, but how juſtly, it will hereafter appeare. And wheras I place the Authority of determining the laſt controverſies in a mixt Government, not in the two Houſes, this he commends in me: but that I doe not aſcribe it to the King; This he exclaimes againſt, as a ready way to confuſion, but why, and how it is ſo, he tells us not; only promiſeth to ſpeake of it more below, but where that below is, I cannot find.
Sect. 2After he hath thus touched upon thoſe things which he is pleaſed to tax in my Treatiſe. He proceeds, p. 4. to ſhew us what his intent was of firſt undertaking and now proceeding in this Argument. Well: let us heare what it was. The intent of his firſt Treatiſe was to reſolve the Conſciences of miſled people, touching the unlawfulneſſe of Armes now taken up againſt the King. He erres in his propoſing of the very Caſe. I believe he knowes no conſcience miſled touching this matter: The Caſe which he ſhould have reſolved, if he had done any thing, was3 touching the unlawfulneſſe of Armes now taken up againſt ſubverting inſtruments of the Government of the Kingdome; and that the reſiſting of theſe is a Reſiſting of the King; No wonder if he who ſhootes at a wrong marke looſeth all his arrowes. This wrong propoſing and proſecuting of ſo weighty a caſe (which I doubt was purpoſely done) ſet me firſt on work in this buſineſſe. Heare then the caſe more ſimply propoſed: and I refer me to the conſciences of men, whether I come not neerer the truth of it, then this proponent hath done. The Houſes declare Religion and eſtabliſhed Government to be in apparent danger, by meanes of ſome ſubverſive Counſellours and Inſtruments about the King. This being ſuppoſed, they proceed according to Vote to the Ordinance and execution of the Militia, ſo to reſiſt and apprehend thoſe Counſellours and Inſtruments from whom they had declared the danger to ſpring. This put on the Doctor to his firſt booke, to reſolve the conſciences of men, that it was unlawfull: Now ſee what courſe he tels us he took to reſolve men in this caſe. He undertakes to make good two Aſſertions. 1. Were the King ſo ſeduced, it were not ſafe to beare part in the reſiſtance of Armes now uſed againſt him. 2. That the caſe is not ſo, as they ſuppoſe, but rather apparently contrary. In the proofe of theſe two, he ſpends his whole book. Concerning the latter I intend no controverſie with the Doctor: Would he could make it cleare to the ſatisfaction of the conſciences of all men; that were the way indeed not only to ſatisfie mens conſciences, but to calme the Kingdome into a bleſſed peace. But the Doctor is but ſlight in that part; and ſayes nothing, but what, as appeares in the Debate in the end of my Treatiſe, may ſoone be anſwered out of the Declarations of the Houſes, and the freſh memory of paſt occurrents: And in this reply he hath not ſo much as touched upon that Chapt. of my book: But that which in his firſt Tract he mainely, and in this Reply he ſolely labours to make good is the firſt Aſſertion, which is a univerſall one, and worthy to be examined in all Ages and Governments, whatſoever becomes of this preſent contention in this Kingdome. Now concerning that Theſis, in my Treatiſe of Monarchy I have affirmed and confirmed two things. 1. That if he could make it good, yet it were nothing to the buſineſſe he hath undertook; which is to ſatisfie the conſcience concerning the Unlawfulneſſe of Reſiſting Inſtruments, not the King, of which hee hath ſpoken very little or nothing at all. 2. That if he could prove that in ſome Kingdomes where the will of the King is the4 peoples Law, Reſiſtance of Inſtruments were unlawfull, if actuated by the Soveraignes will: Yet in Legall and Limited Governments, it doth not follow to be true: yet this he muſt make good, if in our preſent caſe he ſatisfie mens conſciences as he undertakes. Theſe two are the ſumme of my Anſwer to the Doctor in that Treatiſe, and if in this Reply he doth any thing, he muſt ſpeake to theſe points. Something he hath here ſpoken concerning the Ordinance of God in Supremacy, Of Caſes of Reſiſtance; of Kinds of Monarchy, of the Conſtitution of this Monarchy; but how truly and ſatisfactorily, it is my part to examine, and let the world judge.
But as if he had already cleared the matter, he proceeds to give ſentence before the cauſe be heard: And doubts not to call the contrary Reſolution a Blaſpheming of God and the King, p 4. I anſwer, If there be any which will defend the lawfulneſſe of taking Armes againſt the King, and in any caſe to reſiſt the Powers, They croſſe the evident truth of Scripture, and I condemne them: Yet me thinks the Doctor deales ſomewhat ſeverely with them, to call them Blaſphemers of God, for every errour about the word is not Blaſphemie; but a wilfull and obſtinate ſpeaking evill of the things of God. Likewiſe concerning a King, if it be true that he be ſeduced; then it is no blasphemie, which alwayes is a falſhood. If it be falſe, yet it is inhumane to call it a blaſpheming, when it imputes nothing to him, but to be ſeduced, which the beſt and moſt innocent Prince may be; ſure, if it be a blaſpheming, it is of the Counſellours and ſeducers, for to them the evill is imputed.
Then p. 6. He comes to ſpeake of what he intends in this preſent booke: ſc. that he will cleare this point, That the Doctrine teaching that ſubjects may take Armes againſt their Soveraigne for the defence of Religion and Liberties, when in danger of ſubverſion, is destitute of Scripture and true reaſon. As I ſaid, ſtill he drives at a vaine ſcope; to prove that which none denies: Let him prove, that in our Kingdome, Reſiſtance of ſubverſive inſtruments is a taking Armes againſt their Soveraigne, and he does the work; elſe he proves in vaine. But let us ſee how in the proceſſe of this booke, that will be cleared which none doth deny. Firſt upon examination of places of Scripture it will appeare, that Gods people were continually under Kings which they might not reſiſt, &c. What then? muſt it needs follow, that all other people muſt too? But whether the word containes any thing againſt Reſiſtance, and how far, we ſhall enquire in the proceſſe of this5 diſpute. Secondly, Ʋpon the examination of Reaſon, it will appeare how inconſiſtent ſuch a Power of Reſiſtance in ſubjects is with Government, &c. Indeed he will make appeare a great matter; would he would ſpeake ſomething to the Queſtion, and not proceed ſo indiſtinctly; I hope in the proceſſe of his book he will come neerer to the buſineſſe then here he promiſeth, or elſe all our labour will be to little purpoſe.
After he hath told us what great matters we are to expect in hisSect. 3booke; he complaines how much his expectation hath been deceived by his Adverſaries. He confeſſes, They have great appearance of Reaſon raiſed on Ariſtotles grounds or principles; ſo that at first ſight it ſeemed unreaſonable that ſubjects ſhould be left without this remedy. If he ſpeake all this of Reſiſtance of their ſoveraigne, ſure it ſeemes not at all unreaſonable, but agreeable to all reaſon that ſubjects ſhould be without this remedy: It is directly againſt the word and all ſound reaſon, that a people lifting up a Perſon above themſelves, and by ſacred Covenant giving him a Power above themſelves, ſhould afterward on any pretence aſſume a power of Reſiſting that Perſon and power, and violate their own Covenant and Oath of due ſubjection. But if that Perſon be inveſted with a limited Power: and he proceed to acts of meere arbitrarineſſe without the limits of that Power conferred on him: Then it is all the reaſon in the world, that the Limiting States ſhould exerciſe an effectuall reſtraining Power by reſiſting inſtruments of ſuch arbitrary and ſubverſive acts, and we have not a ſillable of Scripture contradicting it. But if it ſeemed ſo unreaſonable to the Doctor, that ſubjects ſhould be without this remedy; why doth he contradict Reaſon in a buſineſſe within its compaſſe? He tells you, He found Reaſon preſently checked with that ſaying of our Saviour, Mat. 10.25. It is enough for the Diſciple that he be as his Maſter. And was this all the check. your Reaſon had? It is a very weake Reaſon which would yeeld to ſuch a check. What? is every Chriſtian bound for his outward ſtate to be in no better caſe then Chriſt was? If he were pleaſed to be borne under an abſolute Government, to be of low and poore condition, doth this impoſe a neceſſity on all to be no freer, no richer then he was? A man would think his Reaſon were not only checked, but broken, which ſhould ſo argue. Let it be proved that by the providence of God we are brought forth under ſuch a Governement as our Maſter was, then will we hold our ſelves bound by his example, to abide6 quietly in that condition we are borne to; but if God, as he hath diſpenſed to many a richer eſtate then Chriſt was pleaſed to have, ſo hath to us a freer Government; then the Apoſtle adviſeth us to uſe it rather, and not to be trifled out of it, by a ſhew of our Maſters example, in a caſe in which it binds no man.
But in what hath his Adverſaries ſo much deceived his expectation? He expected expreſſe Scripture, but he finds them altogether fayling; only their faith aad perſwaſion is reſolved into an appearance of reaſon raiſed upon Ariſtotles grounds and principles, p. 6. Mr Hooker might have taught him that the intent of the Scripture is to deliver us credenda; but in matters within the compaſſe of Reaſon, it is enough if we have evident reaſon for it, Scriptura non contradicente: and I am confident the Scripture hath not a tittle againſt ſuch a Reſiſtence as I doe maintaine; and we have reaſon enough for it. The Scripture was not given to preſcribe frames of Policie, which are various according to the diſpoſition of people; Generall Rules there are for Government, which being obſerved, Particulars, which fall under no ſetled Rule, are left to reaſon and the poſitive Lawes of Nations to determine. Yet we are not wholy deſtitute of warrant from Scripture, as the Doctor affirmes, but are better furniſhed then he, as it will appeare in the ſequell. If Buchanan, and Junius Brutus, or any elſe have raiſed any doctrines on Ariſtotles grounds which will not conſiſt with Gods Ordinance ſet downe in Scripture concerning Authority, I am not bound to make good other mens exceſſes: This Replier knowes, that as I repudiate his Aſſertions tending to the ruine of all Liberties of States: So I hold it unlawfull to uſe any force againſt the perſon, or Authority of the Supreame, even in the moſt Legall and limited Monarchy. Therefore he doth me exceeding wrong in the cloſe of his firſt Section, to ſay, that, I agree with the rest to uſe what force they can againſt ſuch a Monarch for ſuppreſſing of his tyranny, &c. All I ſay is, that Force may be uſed; but neither againſt the Perſon nor Authority of the Monarch, which in all Governments of that nature are to be held ſacred and inviolate.
CHAP. II. An anſwer to the ſecond Section concerning Caſes of Reſiſtence.
I Could have wiſhed, that if it had pleaſed this Doctor to reply any thing, he would have followed the ſteps of my Treatiſe; but ſith he7 intends no full returne, but doth only catch at here and there a paſſage, without obſerving any order, I will frame my Anſwer to the courſe of his Reply; and cleare the parcels of my book as I find them aſſaulted in my reading of his. The Title of this Section being Caſes of Reſiſtence, the firſt part of it is ſpent about ſuch Caſes as are put by the Divines who plead for Defenſive armes. At length, p. 9, 10. He comes to the alone Caſe in which I defend Reſiſtence, in the p. 51. of my Tract, where I put the Queſtion of Perſons miſimployed to ſerve the illegall deſtructive commands of the Prince. And I affirm in ſuch caſe, and of ſuch Perſons Forceable Reſiſtance to be lawfull by the two Eſtates of Parliament. This I prove by five Arguments, which here the Doctor doth not touch, but referres them to the p. 93. of this Reply. Only here he gives us a Magiſteriall determination without any proofe at all. But let us heare his Reſolution upon the caſe. He dares not openly to pronounce it unlawfull: but diſtinguiſhes of Perſons and Times, as if he would yeeld it lawfull in ſome, but not in others; Certes, if for any, then for the two Estates; if any, then Inſtruments of ſubverſion: if ſimply none, why doth he with ſo great cautele diſtinguiſh. Well, audiamus diſtinguentem: If by thoſe miſimployed perſons be underſtood the Commanders and Souldiers of the Kings Armies, I cannot ſee (nor any man els, I think) but that the reſiſting of them by a contrary Militia, is a reſiſting of the King, and unlawfull, p. 9. I anſwer, I cannot ſee, nor any man elſe, I think, why Commanders and Souldiers ſhould have a priviledge of ſubverting States and Governments more then other men: Can the Royall Power extend to give them an irreſiſtibility, and not to others? Certes, if others may be reſiſted, much rather Commanders and Souldiers, becauſe there is greater danger of ſubverſion from them then from others: Their being Commanders and Souldiers makes them more dangerous, but not more priviledged: But, he nor none elſe can ſee, how ſuch can be reſiſted, but it muſt be a reſisting of the King, and unlawfull. Perhaps he is miſtaken in others, they may have clearer eyes then he hath: In the p. 52. of my Treatiſe, I have made it luce clarius, that in a Legall Monarchy it is not a Reſiſting of the King. Then he proceedeth to another ſort of men which I hope may be reſiſted. But if by thoſe miſimployed perſons be underſtood other inſtruments of oppreſſion in times of peace, before it come to Armes. What of theſe, may ſuch be reſiſted? Here he reſolves very cautelouſly and timorouſly, after many words, p. 10. without prejudice to other8 aſſertions of his of other reſiſtance, He conceives it not unreaſonable to ſay, Firſt, if private men be ſodainely aſſaulted, and life imminently endangered, and no meanes of avoiding by flight, then is perſonall defence lawfull, for ſuch ſodaine aſſault carries no pretence of authority with it. What is this to the matter? we enquire not of reſiſting aſſailants carrying no pretence of authority with them; but of ſubverters of Government warranted by the Kings will; and carrying pretence of Authority, though they have none. Secondly, If they come with pretence of Authority, there may be ſeeking redreſſement above from Authority, but if that may not be had, yet no reſiſtance. And who then minding to kill or rob, may not make a pretence of Authority, that ſo he may effect his miſchiefe without repugnance? But yet the Doctor will give us a little more, The Ministers of Power in each County, and the Houſes of Parliament alſo (for with him they be equall) may at firſt ſtay, reſtraine, and commit ſuch miſimployed inſtruments, and ſo repreſent the matter againe to the King. But is not this to reſiſt them? No; he tells us, this is not to reſist. No? if miſimployed inſtruments may be staid, reſtrained, and impriſoned, ſure they may be reſiſted: Elſe what if they ſhould chooſe, and will not be committed; The Parliament muſt not lay hands on them to compell them; for ſo there may chance to be fight, and ſlaughter in the apprehenſion; and then the Doctor would call it Reſiſtance I think. But ſuppoſe the Houſes of Parliament doe commit ſuch perſons and repreſent the matter to the King, and a King ſhould be ſo obſtinate as to perſiſt in the maintenance of thoſe illegall courſes, and to that end imploy the Militia, it is neither Legall nor Reaſonable, they ſhould purſue the oppoſition to the ſetting up of a contrary Militia or Power, p. 11. Here we ſee the upſhot of the Engliſh freedome, and priviledge of Parliament. This is that which I ſaid; Thoſe men overturne all liberties, The reſult of their doctrine deſtroyes all policies, reducing them all to that which is arbitrary: If the King ſhould ſet Souldiers to deſtroy Lawes and Parliaments, They may (if they be able) ſtay their hands till they goe to the King, and know whether it be indeed his will and pleaſure to have them deſtroyed or no; If he ſay, Yea; then they muſt returne and ſubmit to the vileſt inſtruments of ſubverſion, and not lift up a hand to reſiſt them. But let us ſee, on what weighty reaſon the Doctor builds this fatall Reſolution. This were a conteſtation of Power with him whoſe Miniſters they are, a levying of warre, an oppoſing of9 Armies against Armies. Sure this man doth much abhorre a Civill Warre: I cannot blame him: but yet we may buy an immunity too deare, at the prize of a ſubverſion of Religion, Laws and Government, which is the caſe in diſpute. This were to chooſe to be killed, rather then to ſight: To have a State ſubverted, rather then diſturbed by a warre to prevent it. I grant, There muſt be no conteſtation of Power with him whoſe Miniſters they are: But this is the point to be proved, that in this caſe, it is ſo: I utterly denie the Royall Power in our State can be communicated to ſubverting Inſtruments: And I doe in vaine expect, while the Doctor prooves that, which every where he ſuppoſeth: For he builds all on this foundation, ſc. That Gods Ordinance is an Abſolute unlimited Power, investing the whole will of the Supreame, and cannot be determined in the exerciſe, but onely morally; the vanitie of which conceit will appeare hereafter, yet note here in the cloſe, that while he pretends a deteſtation of Civill Warre, he could doe nothing more to foment it, then by defending ſuch Poſitions of intolerable ſervitude: Did not ſuch rigid Counſellours of the King of Iſrael cauſe the greateſt Rent and Civill Warre that ever was made in any Kingdome?
CHAP. III. An Anſwer to the third Section which concerns ſeverall kinds of Monarchy.
IN my opinion it had been fitter to have treated firſt of ſeverall kindsSect. 1of Monarchy; and then of Caſes of Reſiſtance; for the ſubject in which ſhould precede the Queſtion whereof, in all methodicall proceeding. Here againe in the firſt place, this Replier would make his Reader believe that penury of Scripture-proofe put me upon diſtinguiſhing of ſeverall kinds of Monarchy, That ſo I might lay all the defence of Reſiſtance upon Reaſon drawne from the ſeverall condition of Monarchies, p. 11. I have ſufficiently before diſcovered my intention in that Treatiſe. The Reſiſtence which I defend hath as much proofe from Scripture, as a matter of that nature need to have. Then he abuſes me, as finding fault with Divines, that pleading for abſoluteneſſe of Monarchicall Power in this Kingdome bring proofes from places of Scripture, p. 12. I complaine not of all Divines, but ſome, ſuch as this Reſolver is: Some, and that but of late yeares; and that but in this kingdome, where ſuch doctrines are the rode to preferments: nor doe I blame them for bringing proofes for ſubjection, and against Reſiſtance from places of Scripture,10 as he calumniates me; but I blame their groſſe perverting of Scripture; bringing prohibitions of Reſistance of Powers againſt them who condemne it as much as themſelves; And of violating the Lords annointed againſt them who hold them as ſacred and inviolate, yea on more ſolid grounds then themſelves doe. And their fraudulent reaſoning from one kind of government to another, as if all Politicall proviſions of States for their Liberties did make no variation in the caſe; but that ſtill they were in the ſame State, as the people ſubject to the moſt abſolute vaſſallage.
Sect. 2But becauſe he boaſts ſo much of ſetling mens Conſciences on warrant from Scripture, that he expects command or allowance of Reſiſtance from Scripture, p. 6. That his Adverſaries reſolve all their faith and perſwaſion on an appearance of Reaſon drawne from Ariſtotles grounds, ib. and here that I obſerve there is but little pretence from Scripture for Reſistance; and thus would perſwade men, as if he had all Scripture for him; we nothing but a few huskes of reaſon for us: Let him not thinke to carry it thus away with vaunts and big words: I will profeſſe here once for all. He hath not a ſillable of Scripture or right reaſon to ſatisfie the conſcience with in this controverſie: If it pleaſe this Doctor, let us joyne iſſue upon it, and put the whole caſe on this point. The Queſtion betweene us is, Whether in a limited Monarchie, Reſiſtance of ſubverſive Inſtruments be unlawfull. He affirmes, I denie. He undertakes to ſatisfie mens conſciences that it is unlawfull: bringing not one Text of Scripture, which ſpeakes to the point: Something he brings to proove it unlawfull to reſiſt the Ordinance of God: that the Magistrate which is ſupreame under God is above all Reſiſtance, p. 84. He doth great matters; who doubts of theſe things: Then p. 84. he accumulates nine Arguments, but all ſo non concluding, that nineſcore of them will not make one ſound proving Reaſon of the point in queſtion, as it will appeare when we come to conſider them. On the other ſide we have both to ſettle mens conſciences on. 1. Examples of Scripture, ſc. The peoples reſcue of Jonathan: Davids armie againſt the cut-throats of Saul, that is, ſubverſive Inſtruments: Theſe being particular men, and in an abſolute Monarchie proove the point the more ſtrongly, ſo ſtrongly that the Doctor is faine to flie to that ordinary evaſion, of an extraordinarie priviledge. Beſides all thoſe places which prove it lawfull to reſiſt private men, ſeeking to ſubvert Lawes and Religion, and the publike good; ſith in a limited State they are but private men, though11 backed with a Commiſſion from the Kings will and pleaſure. 2. Then for Reaſon; I have ſet downe five, p. 53. all unanſwerably concluding the point in Queſtion, as I doubt not the conſiderate Reader will acknowledge.
He profeſſes, p. 12. That it was never his intent to plead for abſoluteneſſe of Power in the King, if by abſoluteneſſe of Power be meant a Power of Arbitrary Command. What his intent is I know not, but he hath fully done the thing, or I have no underſtanding to ſee when a thing is done. In the precedent Section, he reſolves all caſes into the Arbitrium Regis, the meere pleaſure of the King: allowing the Houſes of Parliament only a power of ſtaying the hands of deſtroyers, till it be expreſſely knowne whether it be the Kings pleaſure they ſhall be deſtroyed: And I am confident the meaneſt apprehenſion will diſcerne, that they who make the Monarchs ſole Will the laſt judge of all controverſies: and ſimply deny in the laſt caſe of ſubverſion, all Power of Reſiſtance of Inſtruments, even to the ſupreame Courts of Law and juſtice, doe without any controverſie, reſolve all government into an Arbitrarie Abſoluteneſſe. He adds, We allow a diſtinction of Monarchies and admit the Government of Kingdomes to be of divers kinds, and acknowledge a legall reſtraint upon the Power of the Monarch in this Kingdome. Verba datis, rem negatis; you allow indeed a kind of diſtinction of Monarchies, but all within the compaſſe of Abſolute: A legall reſtraint you ſeeme to acknowledge; but ſuch an one as reſolves into the Arbitrary Will of the Monarch, as I have made it appeare in my former Treatiſe; and you will never be able to wipe off by this, or any other Reply. Then he promiſes that in this Booke certaine points will appeare to be truth, agreeable to Scripture and Reaſon: ſc. That Government is not the invention of man, but the inſtitution of God: That Governours have their Power not from the people, but from God: That Governing Power is one and the ſame in all ſupreames, and can only be limited in the exerciſe. And that where a Prince ſtands ſupreme, and next to God above all the people, there the Subiects may not take armes and make forceable reſiſtance for any exorbitances. Theſe ſeverall Propoſitions how farre they contain Truth, and how far not, I ſhall in the ſequell make appear.
After theſe great promiſes, he proceeds, p. 13. to ſpeake ſomewhat of the Originall of Governing Power: and accuſeth me as if I ſeemed toSect. 3affirme it to be from God; but in the proceſſe of my booke, he finds me deriving it indeed from the people. I perceiving two contrary opinions12 concerning the Originall of Government, did in that Treatiſe endeavour to reconcile them, and to ſhew in what ſence both are true. To that end, as there is manifeſt, p 4. I diſtinguiſhed 3 things. 1 It's conſtitution; 2 It's Limitation to one kind. 3 It's determination to one individuall Perſon and Family. The firſt of theſe I did affirme to be from God: The two latter from Men, and then concluded, In theſe things we have Doctour Fernes conſent. Let us ſee what exceptions he can take at this peaceable aſſay of Reconcilement. In the proceſſe of my Diſcourſe he findes me deriving it from the people. What then? Doe I denie it thereby to be from God? as if Subordinates did exclude one another. God hath ordained that Powers ſhould be: People by vertue of that Ordinance give them exiſtence in this or that kind and ſubiect. The Doctor acknowledges all this, but not in my ſence, p. 14. He grants the Deſignation of the Perſon, and the Limitation of the Power to ſeverall kinds to be from the conſent of the People. I ſay no more; why doe we not then agree? The plaine truth is, The Doctor will not have Limitation of Power to be at all from the people, what ever he pretends: How then the Limitation of the Power to ſeverall kinds is from the people, as the Doctor yeelds, I cannot tell. Is not Limitation of it into kinds, Limitation of the Power it ſelfe? But he is poſſeſſed that my ſound ſence is another ſence from his; what other he doth not ſhew: but it is another which he likes not. Why? Becauſe ſometimes I ſay, the people reſerve a Power to oppoſe or diſplace the Magiſtrate: Sometime they diveſt themſelves of all ſuperiority. 'Tis true, I ſay ſo, but withall I ſay, that when they reſerve ſuch a Power, they conſtitute no Monarchy. Is it not ſo, in the higheſt Miniſters of Power in Ariſtocracies and Democracies? What can he ſay againſt ſo apparent a Truth? 2. I call them, p. 63. Architectonicall Powers. This he derides and ſaies, This is the riddle of this Governing Power originally in the people. They are Architectonicall Powers, but build upon foundations laid in the aire, p. 14, Then he gives his reaſon, For before Government eſtabliſhed they have not any politique Power, whereby a Command may be laid upon others, but only a naturall power of private reſistance. This is falſe, that they have onely a naturall power of private Reſiſtance. They have indeed no formall politique power, for we ſpeake of a people free from all government; but they have a virtuall radicall power, by publike conſent and contract to conſtitute this or that forme of Government, and reſigne up themſelves to a condition of ſubjection on Termes and after a form13 of their owne conſtitution; ſo the Athenians, Lacedemonians and Romans of old having expelled their Kings: and the Ʋnited Provinces, with others of latter times have done: This is that which I called Architectonicall Power; and the Replier vainly carpes at the name, when he cannot denie the thing. But I know what he aimes at in all this, ſc. That Gods Ordinance is an abſolute boundleſſe Power in all Supremes, uncapable of any limitation, but in the exerciſe. Of which fully afterwards. Sect. 4
At length He takes a nearer view of the Formes of Monarchie, ſpoken of by me, and makes a few obſervations upon ſuch particulars at him pleaſeth, p. 14. Let us follow his ſteps. Firſt, for Abſolute Monarchie, whereas I ſay it is, when Soveraignty is ſo fully in one, that it hath no limitation under God, but the Monarches owne will. He approoves my deſcription; but threatens to remember it below, p. 15. Let him doe ſo; and make his beſt advantage of it, only here he cannot forbeare one note, that then it is not the deniall of reſiſtance which makes a Monarch abſolute; but the deniall of a law to bound his Will. I doe grant it; but with all I ſay, that it is neceſſariò conſequutivum, though it be not conſtitutivum: for ſith a Monarch which is obſolute hath no Law to bound his Will; but his very Will is the Subjects Law, then every act of his Will is Gods Ordinance, and ſo by conſequence it is unreſiſtible. Alſo, p. 15. He allowes it, when I ſay, A limited Monarch is he who hath a Law beſides his owne Will for the meaſure of his power. But yet he diſlikes that I ſay, He muſt be limited in the Power it ſelfe, and not only in the exerciſe; and I added a reaſon, for an Abſolute Monarch may ſtint himſelfe in the exerciſe of his Power, and yet remaine abſolute. What ſaies he to this? True, if ſuch a Monarch limit himſelf and reſerve a Power to vary, — but if he fix a Law with promiſe not to varie, then in thoſe caſes he is limited. Note the fraud of this Replier, he alters his terms and puts things as oppoſite which are not ſo: He ſhould ſay, if be limit himſelfe, and reſerve a power to varie; then he is abſolute; but if he limit himſelfe and reſerve no Power to varie (for then the oppoſition is direct) then he is limited. But in ſtead of ſaying (and reſerve no power to varie) he ſaies, but [if he promiſe not to vary] I ſay that promiſe not to vary, if it be a ſimple promiſe of not varying, it doth not make him limited in his Power, any more then morally, and ſo every Abſolute Monarch is limited. I affirme ſtill, it is Limitation of the Power it ſelfe, not barely of the exerciſe, which conſtitutes a Limited Monarch: for Monarchy is a ſtate of Power, and therefore it's ſpecificative diſtinction14 muſt be from ſomething which diſtinguiſheth Powers, and not the exerciſe of Powers; but this is enough proved in the 5t page of that Treatiſe.
Secondly, he blames me for that I ſuppoſe a Limited Monarch muſt be radically, that is, originally inveſted with ſuch a meaſure of limited Power, and that limited, ab externo, and not from the free determination of his owne Will. Here he adds originally of his owne; that ſo he might ſeeme to finde a contradiction, when I afterward ſay, that it may be done by originall conſtitution, or by after condeſcent; but yet he confeſſeth, I have a ſalve, when I make it ſuch a condeſcent, as is equivalent to an Originall Conſtitution, becauſe amounting to a change of Title, and a reſolution in the Monarch to be ſubjected to, no other way. I make no ſalve, nor doe I need any; he who weighes the Uniformity of Truth in that Treatiſe will ſee it needs no ſalves: Onely I diſtinguiſh thoſe things which are in their natures diſtinct, which if the Doctour had done, this Contention either had not been begun, or would ſoon have an end: Who ſees not that a Promiſe, whereby a Monarch may bind himſelfe may either be with a limitation of the bond of ſubjection, or without: And that this makes a reall difference: for in this the Government remaines the ſame, becauſe the Dutie of ſubjection received no variation; but in that there is for ſo much a Tranſitus into a limited condition. But theſe things cannot be more fully and clearly expreſſed then they are in the page 13. of that Treatiſe. But he anſwers, Where there is ſuch a change of Title, it is done at once, and by expreſſe and notorious reſignation of former Power; but it is not neceſſary that an abſolute Monarch ſhould come to a limited Condition after that manner. I ſay, if he will paſſe into a limited condition, it is neceſſary there be a limitation of his Power, elſe he is not truly limited: But that all ſuch limitation be done at once and by notorious reſignation, it is not neceſſary, as will appeare afterward where this matter of Limitation is more diſtinctly handled.
Sect. 5His next complaint is againſt ſomething I have in the page 25. ſc. That in a mixed Government (if it be of three) the Soveraign Power muſt be in all three originally, and from fundamentall conſtitution. He judges this not neceſſary, p. 17. and he gives a wonderfull Reaſon: For as Limitation may be only of the exerciſe of the Power, and not of the Power it ſelfe; ſo mixture is in regard of Perſons ioyned to the Monarch for certain acts and purpoſes; but that they ſhould have any ſhare in the Soveraign power,15 the nature of Monarchy will not admit. 1. Juſt ſo; for as a Monarchy is not limited unleſſe there be a limitation of Power, for Monarchy is a Power; ſo a Monarchy cannot be mixed, unleſſe there be a mixture of Powers, for Monarchy is a Power; and to ſay a mixt Monarchy, and yet the Power not mixt, is to ſpeake contradictories. 2. If the mixture be not of divers concurrent Powers; wherof is it? He tells us, of the Monarch and certaine other Perſons joyned with him for certaine acts and purpoſes. Theſe joyned Perſons, have they any concurring Power to doe thoſe acts for which they are joyned? If not; then the adjoyning is futulous and vaine, and the Power of Monarchy is mixed of a Perſon having Power, and of others having no Power to doe that for which they are joyned. You will ſay, They have Power, but not diſtinct from that of the Monarch: that is, they have none; for in mixture, if it be not diſtinct, it is none at all. Againe if they have any, it muſt be diſtinct, for ſubordinate it cannot be; if the Acts to which they concurre be ſupreme Acts, unleſſe we ſhould be ſo abſurd as to ſay, They may concurre to ſupreme Acts, by a ſubordinate Power. But let us ſee, what a maine Reaſon he hath for averring a conceit ſubject to ſuch abſurdities. Such a mixture would make ſeverall independent powers in the ſame State or Kingdome, which is moſt abſurd. I grant it is abſurd, if he ſpeake of ſeverall complete independent powers; but to affirme ſeverall incomplete independent powers concurring to make up one integrall mixt power, it is no abſurdity at all for ſo it is, in all Ariſtocracies and Democracies, and muſt be acknowledged in all mixed States, where the ſupremacie is not wholy in the hands of one perſon. Yet here we doe not ſo make them independent, but that we give a large predominancie to One, as, in nature, in all mixed bodies there is, as I have at large explained my ſelfe in the next Section, if the Doctor had been at leaſure to have taken notice of it. I yeild to that which he ſayes, p. 17. that it is not neceſſary the Mixture ſhould be ſo Originall, but that it may alſo come afterwards by condeſcent: It matters not, ſo it be originall, that is, radicall: of Powers, and not of meere Acts: And indeed, there cannot be a mixture of Acts, unleſſe it be alſo of Powers: for Acts are from Powers: and where Powers are ſubordinate, there can be no mixture in their Acts; the Acts of cauſes ſubordinate, are alſo ſubordinate, and not coordinate and mixed. But I there brought two Arguments to prove that in a Mixed Government, the Concurrents muſt have independent16 and diſtinct Powers. Let us ſee how he anſwers them. 1. Becauſe elſe it would be no mixture, but a derivation of Power, which is ſeen in the moſt ſimple Monarchy. He anſwers, that derivation of Power is either upon ſubſtitute Officers ſupplying the abſence of the Monarch in the execution of Power: and this is in the moſt ſimple Monarchy. Or elſe upon Perſons whoſe concurrence and conſent is required to certaine Acts of Monarchicall Power; and this makes a mixture, though they have no ſhare in the Power it ſelfe, p. 17. I anſwer, 1. Abſence or preſence of the Monarch; whether they Act for him, or with him, varies not the caſe, If the Power they work by be derived from him, then it is his Power, and ſo conſtitutes no Mixture. 2. As if in the moſt ſimple Monarchy, the Soveraigne doth mannage the ardua imperij, the weightieſt matters of State alone; and not by conſent of his Counſell; without whom he is morally bound, (that is, on the ſinne of raſhneſſe) not to tranſact them, and that is all, which the Doctor yeilds to the Houſes of Parliament, ſc. that the King is morally bound to their concurrence and conſent in certaine Acts. This is nothing but the ſhadow of a Mixture; If the Power of Acting be ſo in one, that, if he pleaſe, he may doe thoſe Acts without the concurrence of thoſe adjunct Perſons, though he ought not, it is no Mixture, becauſe the Power is ſimple and One; and mixed Acts cannot flow from one ſimple Power. This the Doctor ſees, and therefore ſayes, If this Authour will not call this a Mixture, we cannot help it, p. 18. We doe not enquire of Names, but of things; nor whether it make a difference in Government or no; We treat of a Mixt Governement: and, I think, no man of common ſenſe will affirme, that a Government can be really mixed, and yet the Power be ſimple. 2. Becauſe the End of Mixture (which is Effectuall Limitation) cannot be had by a derivate Power. He anſwers; Though a Derivate Power cannot ſet new bounds to the Soveraigne Power, yet may it ſtand to keep in a legall way thoſe bounds which the ſoveraigne Power hath ſet to it ſelfe. Obſerve, He dares not to ſay, They may keep: but only ſtand to keep; nor ſtand neither, but by advice; that is morally: If he will exceed thoſe bounds, the Act is valid, and hath all its Authority without them: Only he ſins, if he doe ſo; becauſe he hath promiſed he would not doe it without them: Here's excellent Limitation and Confinement from exorbitancies: A bare promiſe, without ſuch adoe, in conſtituting States and Mixtures, would be altogether as good a17 bounds; but of this we ſhall have more occaſion to ſpeake afterward.
In the cloſe of this Section he turnes back to the p. 21. of my book,Sect. 6and hath ſomewhat to ſay to my Aſſertions about Monarchy by conqueſt. There firſt I ſay, If the invaſion be made upon pretence of Title, and the pretender doth prevaile, it is not Conquest properly, but a Vindication of a Title: and then the Government is ſuch as the Title is by which he claimed. He tells us, He ſees no injuſtice in it, if ſuch a one having prevailed ſhould uſe ſuch a people as a Conquerour, p. 19. The Lord keep us from this mans juſtice. What; No injuſtice? If the Pretenders Title allowed by a great part of the people, he by their aide ſubdues the reſt, ſhall he for their labour cruſh them into ſervitude, and uſe the power of a Conquerour, without injuſtice? 2. Suppoſe the people not convinced of the right of his Title make at firſt ſome oppoſition; but yet the pretence of his Title, and apprehenſion that he ſeekes no more power then his Title imports, work a yeilding diſpoſition in them, ſo that they withſtand not ſo univerſally, nor ſo long as they might have done; but at length ſubmit to him on his pretended termes: were it not high injuſtice to take advantage on ſuch a people, and having them under hatches to deſert thoſe termes on which they yeilded, and uſe the full right of a Conquerour: This was Englands caſe with Duke William. But the maine thing which ſticks by him is ſomething I have delivered, p. 23. It is an uncontrolable truth in policie, that the conſent of the people, either by themſelves or their Anceſtours, is the only meane in ordinary providence, by which ſoveraignty is conferred upon any perſon or family. Againſt this he is very angry; and oppoſeth it in many words; but to my Argument from the Morall bond of ſubjection, he ſayes nothing at all. He termes it good policie, but bad divinity, p. 20. And ſets up an Antipoſition, that when the invading Prince has perfectly ſubdued a people (there being no heyre to whom they are bound) and hath ſetled and conſtituted a frame of Government, then providence doth ſufficiently diſcover it ſelfe, and ſuch a people ought to ſubmit and take this Prince as ſet over them by the hand of providence. As if theſe two were contrary: I ſay, They are not bound untill they conſent: He ſayes, in ſuch a caſe they are bound to conſent, becauſe then providence diſcovers it ſelfe: And he brings Calvin at large to prove that which none denies: I grant a people (not preobliged,) fully overcome ſhould much ſin againſt Gods providence by obſtinacie, if on a meere will, they conſent not to reaſonable18 termes of ſubjection: But this I ſay, There is no morall obligation to Authority, before that conſent bind them: Conqueſt may be an Antecedent cauſe; but the immediate and formall cauſe is only the conſent of the people; which he cannot ſay againſt; for that muſt be morall, and not meerely violent. The call of providence challengeth a contented ſubmiſſion, if there be no reaſon hindring it; but if a precedent Oath or ſome other ſound reaſon intervene, then it is no call requiring ſubmiſſion: Neither can the fulleſt conqueſt make a people debtors, but they remaine free from any morall bond; for the providence of God being of it ſelfe externall, can induce no morall ſtate; but that providence which on one diſcovery calls to a ſubmiſſion: on a like diſcovery may free them againe, if nothing elſe come between, to render them morally bound: A Travellour, by the providence of God ſhut up into the hands of a Robber, hath his life and protection promiſed him in his journey, if he will promiſe to pay him ſo much money: I ſay, this Travailor ſhould ſin againſt his own life, and the providence of God, offering him thoſe termes, if obſtinately he refuſe ſubmiſſion: Yet no man will ſay he owes the robber ſo much money, becauſe he hath him at his mercy, untill he by promiſe make himſelfe a debtor: Thus have I made good that maxime of mine to be an uncontrouleable Truth, good Policie, and good Divinity too; maugre all the Doctor hath or can ſay againſt it.
CHAP. IV. Wherein the vanity and falſhood of the ſuppoſals whereon the Doctor hath built all his diſcourſes is made appeare.
Sect. 1AFter a ſcattered gleaning of paſſages in the former Sections, the Doctor undertakes the two great Queſtions. 1. Of the Conſtitution of this Monarchy, in his Sect. 4. 2. Of Reſiſtence, in the remainder of his book. Which two, we ſhould now immediately purſue; but that another work more conducent to the ending of this contention will for a while divert me.
Errour in the ſearch of controverted truths doth more often ariſe from the judgement, then from the reaſon: Men doe more offend in laying falſe grounds; then in deducing falſe inferences from true grounds; This I have obſerved in the Doctors bookes: He truly argues, but from falſe principles; and then the ſuperſtructure muſt needs be anſwerable, ſo that, overthrow his foundations, and then all his building19 will of it ſelfe ruine into apparent falſhood. I confeſſe he every where ſayes the ſame of my Grounds, on which I have built that Treatiſe: He cals them falſe and groundleſſe ſuppoſals, and fancies, and what elſe he pleaſeth: I will therefore make him a fayre offer: Let us make a ſhort work of it: let us joyne iſſue upon our ſuppoſals, on which both our diſcourſes are built.
This Doctors ſuppoſals which he ſcarce ever makes ſhew to prove and on which he hath built his Reſolves and Diſcourſes I doubt not to call unſound and falſe: and doe profeſſe the contrary to be my grounds whoſe truth I will maintaine. His may be reduced to foure heads. 1. Concerning the Ordinance of God in Soveraignty. 2. Concerning the Nature and Quality of Limitation. 3. The Meanes and cauſes of Limitation. 4. The Conſtitution of this Monarchy. And according to this order we will take them into examination.
Firſt, Of the Ordinance of God in Magiſtracy,Of Gods ordinance in ſupremacie. He proceeds on two falſe principles. 1. That the Governing power is one and the ſame which God gives and ſettles upon the perſon that is ſupreme, p. 13. that is, it is abſolute and unlimited in the power it ſelfe; and may be limited only in the exerciſe thereof, p. 17. 2. Which followes from the former, that Conſent of people may be the meane of deſigning the perſon, and yeilding ſubjection to him, who elſe could not challenge it more then an other man; alſo a meane of limiting that power in the exerciſe of it; but not the meaſure of the power it ſelfe, which in ſuch a meaſure is given of God to all Soveraignes, p. 41. ſo then;Queſtion propoſed. let this be the Queſtion, Whether it be Gods Ordinance that Governing power in all Soveraignes be one unlimited thing; and can receive no meaſure from the people? The Doctor affirmes it; and p. 84, tells us he hath often inſinuated it; but he ſhould once directly prove it, if he be able, ſo he might have preſcribed to the whole controverſie; for if he can make this good, in vaine doe we enquire about the conſtitution of this Monarchy; or the lawfulneſſe of reſiſtance of ſubverſive inſtruments of the Princes will. Doth he think a covert inſinuation would ſerve the turne to impoſe ſuch an Aſſertion, which fruſtrates the intent of mankind in framing limitations of Governing power; and captives all into an abſolute paſſive ſubjection to the vileſt inſtruments of the will of him who is ſupreme. In all his reply I find but two places which have any ſhew of proofe of this overbold Aſſertion. One is p. 14. Before Government eſtabliſhed the people have not any power of a community20〈1 page duplicate〉21〈1 page duplicate〉20or politick power whereby a command may be laid upon others; but only a naturall power of private reſiſtance. The other is p. 42. The people have not of themſelves out of Government, the maine power, the power of life and death, how then can they give it either for Government, or reſerve it for Reſistance? Here be weake foundations to build ſuch an Aſſertion, and three ſuch inſulting books on. What a nothing this is, I ſhall make appeare anon.
Queſtion ſtated.Now I hold the Negative of this Queſtion; and doubt not to approve it firme truth: To that end, firſt I will premiſe ſuch things as we agree in, that ſo the point in queſtion may the more diſtinctly appeare. Which I apprehend are or may be theſe. 1. That Governing power is originally from Gods Ordinance. 2. That it being ſo, is unreſistible in its whole latitude, in all the acts which flow from it. This the Apoſtle is cleare for, Rom. 13. and for no more, that I know. Alſo that this is true as well in Limited as Abſolute Governments; v. g. In abſolute Monarchy, where Authority doth inveſt the whole will; the Monarch is unreſiſtible in all the acts of his reaſonable will; becauſe all are acts flowing from Gods Ordinance. So in limited Monarchy, where Authority doth not ſimply inveſt the will of a Monarch, but ſo far forth as it is regulated by ſuch a law, the Monarch is unreſiſtible in all the acts of his will which are according to that law; becauſe they are acts flowing from Gods Ordinance: Yea though either of theſe doe limit himſelfe in the exerciſe of his power, no way thereby diminiſhing the fulneſſe of his power; and afterward exceed thoſe limits, yet he is unreſiſtible, and to be ſubjected to actively in lawfull things, and paſſively in unlawfull: my reaſon is, becauſe even thoſe acts, notwithſtanding limitation, flow from Gods Ordinance of Authority, which remaines the ſame, and not leſſened by ſuch limitation. 3. This governing power is ordinarily conveyed to perſons by publick conſent, which is a point made good in my former Treatiſe, and in the former chapter hereof. 4. That this publick conſent is not only a meane, but hath a cauſall influence in conveying Authority to perſons. 5. That men working by ſuch conſent as ſecond cauſes, doe neceſſarily convey ſuch Authority, as God hath ordained; ſo that, if it can be proved either by Scripture or ſound reaſon, that it is Gods ordinance, that ſupremacie ſhould be unlimited, and as large as all the acts of his will which hath it, then whatever men capitulate about limitation of it, is vaine, ſo that the Doctor need prove only that point; and for my part I will give him the cauſe. 216. Limitation of Power may be either of Acts, when Power is conveyed to Perſons to doe certaine Acts of Power; but not all. Or elſe of Manner of working; when Power is conveyed to doe all Acts of Authority, but according to ſuch a preſcribed Rule. Now I grant the former cannot be in the conveyance of Soveraigne Power, an inferiour Officer may be limited by commiſſion to certaine acts of Power; and have no Authority to do other Acts of power; but when Soveraignty is conveyed, and the Perſon is ſet up next to God, above all the people, as the Doctour ſaith. He muſt have an unlimited Power in reſpect of Acts of Government: for Gods Ordinance is not onely that there ſhould be Power for ſuch an end; ſc. a Peaceable life in godlineſſe and honeſtie; but ſufficiencie of Power for the attainment of that end: So that all Power of doing any Act needfull for that end, muſt be in him who is ſupreme, and the comprehenſive Head of Power to inferiour Magiſtrates. So that all the Queſtion truly ſtated is about the other ſort of Limitation, ſc. Whether Soveraigne Power be ſo unlimited in its Rule of Acting, that it inveſteth the whole Reaſonable Will of him who hath it: So that all the acts which proceed from him who hath it according to the rule of his owne Reaſon, be potestative, and from Gods Ordinance.
Secondly, having thus punctually ſtated the Queſtion,Queſtion determined. the Determination muſt proceed in a double way, ſc. 1. In ſimple Governments. 2. In mixed Governments. I do maintain the Negative in both: and my proof ſhall be formed accordingly.
Firſt then, In ſimple Government, Power is not one Ʋnlimited thingAſſert. 1in the ſupreme: But may be limited in the very being and root of it. 1. The cauſe or meane by which alone it is conveyed, if it beſtow orReaſ. 1convey only a limited Power, then it is limited in the very Being of it. For there can be no more then is conveyed: Now we know, the people by their publike act of conſent and compact, may either bind themſelves to a full ſubjection to the Monarchs Will guided by his owne Reaſon; or by ſome conſtituted rule or law ſet him to governe by; which latter if they doe, then is his Authority radically limited: For they owing no more ſubjection; He can have no farther Power. 2. If ſoveraignty may be ſo limited, that Active Obedience is notReaſ. 1due to the commands which exceed thoſe limits, but may lawfully be denied to them (as the Doctour acknowledges it may, p. 16.) Then it may be limited in the Power it ſelfe: For in ſuch caſe the Power22 exceeds not the limitation; for if the exceeding Acts were poteſtative, we owe Active ſubjection to them, in as much as they are the Ordinance of God, to which in omnibus non prohibitis, Active ſubjectionReaſ. 3is due. 3. If Power in the ſupreme be ſuch, that it cannot be limited, then either becauſe it is Gods Ordinance; or elſe becauſe it is ſupreme: but its being Gods Ordinance hinders not; for we ſee, Rom. 13. All Powers as well ſupreme, as ſubordinate are Gods Ordinance, yet ſubordinate Powers may be limited, not only in the Rule of Acting, but in the kind of Acts; as none can denie. Neither its being ſupreme doth hinder its limitableneſſe; indeed, as before it hinders it from being capable of confinement, in the kind of Acts: but in the meaſure or rule of working, it doth not hinder, in as much as a Soveraigne Power may as well attaine its end, by being confined to another Law from without, as by the Law of its own Reaſon, if not much better; alſo we no where finde Gods Word making any difference or giving power to confine ſubordinate Powers; but forbidding it of Soveraignes. Reaſ. 44. That is to be granted, which denied makes all Soveraignes arbitrary, and of equall Power; but to affirme that Power is one, unlimited, and inveſting all the Acts of the Soveraignes Will doth ſo, for then is ſoveraignty arbitrary, not when it hath no morall bounds, for then none were or could be arbitrary; but when Power is ſo fully inReaſ. 5one that every Act of his Arbitrium or Will is Poteſtative and ſoveraigne. 5. I have the judgement of all the Reformed Churches and Divines in Germany, France, Belgia, Scotland, on my part; who have both allowed and actually uſed forceable Reſiſtance againſt ſubverſive Inſtruments of their Soveraignes Will; yea our owne famous Princes Elizabeth, James, and our preſent Soveraigne, both by edicts, and Aſſiſtance have juſtified the ſame: which they would not have done, had they been perſwaded of ſuch an unlimited Ordinance of God inveſting all the Acts of the Will of him who is ſupreme. So that by all this it appears that the Doctors conceit of ſuch an unlimited Ordinance of God, which he brings not a tittle of Gods word to prove, is a meere chimera and groundleſſe conceit.
Object.Now the onely difficulty, which I can thinke on, is this. Gods Ordinance in ſoveraignty, as before, is not onely Power to ſuch an end; but ſufficiencie of Power to the aſſecution of that end: now a limited Power ſeemeth not to be ſufficient for the end of Government, becauſe there are two Powers neceſſary to the end of Government, ſc. Power23 of making and authentique Interpreting of Laws, which are not conſiſtent with a Limitation of Power.
I anſwer: It is true of Limitation in reſpect of Acts;Sol. and therefore I averre, that ſuch a Limitation cannot be where Power is ſupreme: but for Limitation to a Rule and defined way of Working, I cannot ſee how it with-ſtands the end of Government: So that ſuppoſing Power of making and Interpreting Laws be neceſſary to the end of Government, yet that they be Abſolutely reſident in him who is ſupreme, ſc. To make Lawes and Interprete Lawes authoritatively without being bound to follow any Light or Rule therin, but his owne Reaſon is not neceſſary to the end of Government: In theſe Acts a regulated Power is enough in the moſt ſimple State, ſc. a Power to make new Lawes, if any be needfull; and Interpreting the old, if ambiguous, according to the Rule of the former eſtabliſhed Laws; and by the adviſe of his learned Counſell and Judges of his ſupreme Courts of Juſtice. We ſee in matters ſpirituall, there is no Legiſlative Power reſident, to ordain or give authentique ſence in matters de fide, yet the Church ſtands well enough; one ſtanding Rule of Scripture being ſufficient with a miniſteriall Interpretation: So it is probable a State might, by a complete ſtanding Rule of Law, and a Miniſteriall Power of Interpretation, were there no Legiſlative Power reſident in any Supreme Magiſtrate thereof.
But the matter is farre more cleare in a mixed Government; ſo thatAſſert. 2were it neceſſary in a ſimple Government, that the Supreme ſhould be unlimited in his Power, yet in a Mixed (which is enough for us in this Kingdome) evidently it is not ſo: And to make this appeare, I will lay downe three grounds. 1. Such a Government may be eſtabliſhed that the ſupreme Power may be placed in many perſons, either of the ſame, or divers condition, that is, in a mixed Subject: elſe all formes were unlawfull except ſimple Monarchie. 2. If this ſupreame Power be inequally placed in theſe Perſons or States of men; ſo that a reall ſublimity and Principality be given to one, then the denomination may be taken from that Principall: and ſo it is a Monarchy, or Ariſtocracy, or Democracy mixed in the Power it ſelfe; however it pleaſeth this Replier to deride it, with the top, or Crowne of the head: of which more hereafter. 3. Where the Supremacy of power is thus in many, although all taken together have an unlimited Power, as in ours, yet neither of them ſeverall by himſelfe hath, or24 can have; for it is a contradiction, that it be reſident in many, and yet unlimitedly in One.
Now to thoſe two ſhewes of Argument, which in the beginning I produced out of this Reply, I ſay, before Government be eſtabliſhed it is true the people have no formall Politique Power of Life and Death; yet they have a ſeminall; that is, every one for himſelfe, his family and poſterity hath a power of reſigning up their naturall liberty, to be governed by One, or many; after this or that forme as they ſhall judge fitteſt. God ordaining that Powers ſhould be to ſuch an end, hath thereby legitimated and ratified any Conſent or Contract which people may make of parting with their liberty and giving Magiſtrates a common Power over them to that end. And Gods not preſcribing any Rule or Meaſure of Power by his Ordinance of Authority, hath left it in the peoples liberty, to reſigne up themſelves according to ſuch Rule and Termes, as they judge fitteſt, ſo it be ſuch as the end of his Ordinance may be attained thereby. Thus although by it ſelfe, and excluding Gods Ordinance they have no immediate Power to lay a command on others, nor Power of life and death, yet in vertue of Gods Ordinance their common conſent and contract is ſufficient to ſet up ſuch a Power which is endowed with a ſufficiency of Command for Government and the end of Government over thoſe which have, each man for himſelfe and his, ſet it up. So although ſecond Cauſes have no Power by themſelves to produce their effects, yet working in vertue of the firſt Cauſe they have Power to produce effects, ſometimes farre beyond their own Meaſure. Therefore I deſire this Doctour either to bring ſome Ordinance of God expreſſely forbidding to ſet any bounds or Rule of Power upon the Will of the Magiſtrate; or elſe let him ſuffer Man-kind to uſe their Right in reſigning up that liberty which God and nature hath given them upon ſuch termes and conditions as they apprehend beſt for their own good: and the due end of Government.
Summe.In the cloſe of this Queſtion, I will lay downe three Concluſions concerning the Ordinance of God, and the Nature of Soveraigntie.
Concluſ. 11. God hath ordained that in Societies of Men there ſhould be a Politike Power, for a peaceable and godly life: This Ordinance hath put a Seminall Power in all the Societies of Men, ſc. a Liberty and Power by common Conſent to reſigne up themſelves and theirs to one Supreame; thereby conſtituting a common Politique Power.
252. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined any kindConcluſ. 2or forme of Power; hath left it to the libertie of Societies of men to chooſe to which kind they will reſigne up themſelves, either to a ſupreme regulated in the Acts of his Will by his owne Reaſon, as in abſolute Government; or to one regulated by a Common Reaſon or Law conſtituted by publike conſent, as in Limited.
3. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined the ſubjectConcluſ. 3of this Power, hath left it to the choice of Societies to inveſt with this Soveraigntie, either one Perſon or many, and thoſe either of the ſame, or divers ſorts and rankes of men; Whence ariſe ſimple or mixed Governments, and this is the Architectonicall Power left in ſocieties before they are engaged in a Government, which the Doctour doth ſo cauſleſly deride: Here is the ſumme of what I do averre concerning Gods Ordinance in Soveraigntie, which I challenge the Doctour or any elſe to gain-ſay.
The ſecond ſort of the Doctors falſe ſuppoſals reſpect the Nature andSect. 2Quality of Limitation,Of nature and Quality of Limitation. where alſo I obſerve that he proceeds on two falſe and fallacious Principles, ſc. 1. He every where confounds Morall and Civill or Legall Limitation, ſo p. 18. 93. 39. 2. That Soveraignty is capable onely of a morall Limitation, p. 39, 42., So that if any other be in any State ordained, He cannot beleeve but ſuch a condition is unlawfull, and unreaſonable againſt the Order of Government. p. 39. If the nature of Limitation be well knowne, it will appeare that the Doctor hath done very inconſiderately, or rather very fraudulently (for he hath obſcured the Truth much by it) in confounding morall and Civill Limitation. We will therefore conſider the nature of Limitation ſomething more accurately then I have done in my former Treatiſe; for it will be a great light to the whole controverſie.
Firſt, We muſt conſider a diſtinction of Power, which is either, APoſ. 1ſimple Power of Willing or Doing, which is in every Morall Agent. 2. A Power of Authoritative and obligatorie Willing or Doing; ſo that an act of it, whether a Will of Command or Cenſure expreſſed, hath in it a binding power to ſubjection, this is that which we call Magistracy, of whoſe Limitation now we treat.
Secondly, concerning Limitation; we muſt know that it inducethPoſ. 2an abſolute neceſſity of not producing any Act beyond thoſe Limits. For a Power having bounds beyond which it can exceed, if it pleaſe, though with difficulty, it is not properly limited, but hindred.
26Poſ. 3Thirdly, This neceſſity of not exceeding thoſe bounds is ſuch as the bounds themſelves are; ſo that it is ever true, That a Power in what way it is limited cannot exceed thoſe limits.
Poſ. 4Of Moral limits.Fourthly, There are of this Power but two ſorts of Limits, ſc. 1. Morall, and 2. Civill or Politique. Of which two we muſt diſtinctly conſider. 1. Morall Limits is the Morall Will or Law of God; and a Power is ſaid to be limited by this, not when it cannot produce any Act at all: but when it cannot morally produce it, that is, without ſin. For the ſupervening of a morall bond, doth not take away the Power of doing, but of right or ſinleſſe doing: v. g. in Naturall Powers. Gods prohibition of eating Swines fleſh, did not take away from the Jew the naturall Power of eating it; but the power of ſinleſſe eating it. So in Civill power a prohibition of God comming upon it, doth not take away the Power of Civill and Authoritative Doing; but of lawfull, or ſinleſſe doing. And hence it followes, 1. That Morall Limitation is only of the Exerciſe of Power; not of the power it ſelfe: for the power is not thereby taken away, but remaines equally extenſe and able to all its acts, as it was before; only now it cannot put forth it ſelfe unto certaine Acts without ſinne, which it could before: Thus an Abſolute Monarch who hath a power of doing, as extenſe as his Reaſonable Will, promiſes to doe but this, or in this manner: now he is morally bound, by vertue of this promiſe; and cannot without ſinne doe otherwiſe: yet if he doe, his Commanding Power is the ſame, and its act binding to the Subject. And ſo it is proportionably in Legall Governments. Cyprian Biſhop of Carthage hath by the Canons a power of judging Eccleſiaſticall cauſes committed to him: He reſolves and promiſes to doe nothing of moment herein, but by the conſent of his Clergie, now he is morally bound: and if afterward he doe a thing by himſelfe without their conſent, he ſins: yet no man will ſay his Epiſcopall power is leſſened; or the act he ſo doth, is canonically invalid, and not obligatorie. 2. Yea it followes alſo that it is not properly a Limitation of the Exerciſe of power neither: for by a morall bond, the Power is not ſo bound up, but that it can exerciſe it ſelfe, and that validly too, though not without ſinne, as appeares before. 3. Alſo that it is no detraction from Abſoluteneſſe of Power; nor is it ſufficient to make a diſtinction of it into Abſolute and Limited. For, 1. It cauſes no reall Limitation of power, either in the nature, or exerciſe of it. 2. It is not diſtinctive, being to be found in27 the moſt abſolute power under heaven,Legall Limits. all being bounded by Gods Law, the Law of Equity, and many promiſes by themſelves made.
2. Civill or Legall Limits cauſe a Civill and Legall definement of Authority, ſo that, its exceeding acts are not Legall and binding, that is, are non Authoritative: for as a Morall bond induces a neceſſity of confinement in eſſe morali; ſo a Civill and Legall bond doth in eſſe legali & obligatorio. Hence follows, 1. It is theſe Legall and civill bounds which conſtitute a Government in a limited condition, not thoſe morall; for this is diſtinctive and is never found in an abſolute Governement, for there the Soveraigne by promiſe or Oath binding himſelfe to a ſtated courſe doth put no Law civill upon his power, or the exerciſe of it; for though he ſinne in exceeding afterwards, yet his acts are truely Legall and Authoritative. 2. This induceth a reall Limitation of power, neither can it be only of exerciſe; for ſith it brings an illegality and unauthoritativeneſſe on acts exceeding, that is, makes them none in eſſe civili & politico, it is a limitation of Power it ſelfe; for when a Power can produce no potentiall acts beyond ſuch limits, then it is limited in the very being. 3. Acts exceeding politique and legall Limitation, being not Legall nor authoritative in that State can give no authoritie to the Inſtruments, and therefore they may be reſiſted without reſiſtance or violation of Authoritie. Whereas it is otherwiſe in Acts exceeding morall Limitation; for being authoritative, they authorize the Inſtrument, and give him an unreſiſtance.
In ſumme: Limitation morall and civill or legall doe differ in three main particulars.
1. Morall, ſith it is no politique or Authoritative Act,Concluſ. 1makes no reall detraction either in power or exerciſe of it, and therefore agrees with the moſt abſolute Government: whereas Legall, being a politique and authoritative Act makes a reall diminution; and ſo is the ratio formalis, or diſtinctive conceit conſtituting Limited government; nor can be found in abſolute.
2. Hence, Exceeding Acts notwithſtanding morall limitation areConcluſ. 2authoritative, proceed from Gods Ordinance, and challenge ſubjection: but they are otherwiſe which exceed a legall limitation. Concluſ. 3
3. Exceeding Acts in morall limitation being authoritative have the Sword or compelling power annexed to them, which may not be reſiſted: but in Legall, being not authoritative, they have not the ſword or compelling power annexed, and therefore may be reſiſted in their28 Inſtruments: I will illuſtrate all this by a familiar inſtance. In our Government, a Iudge hath a Commiſſion to heare and determine Cauſes according to the Verdict of twelve men. Here is a Power limited in the very being, that is Legally and Civilly. This Iudge uſeth indirect meanes to corrupt the Iurie to bring in an unjuſt Verdict; but judgeth as his Commiſſion binds him according to their Verdict: Here is a morall exceeding, yet the Act of judgement is Authoritative, becauſe according to his Commiſſion, and muſt not be reſiſted. Againe, He paſſeth ſentence in another cauſe expreſſely againſt the Verdict of the Iury, in an arbitrary way. Here is a Legall exceeding, and the ſentence is non authoritative. He having no ſuch Power committed to him, the ſentence can have no binding power in it. Hereby it appeares how without any ground of Truth, the former ſuppoſals are.
Sect. 3Thirdly concerning the Cauſes and Meanes of Limitation the Doctors ſuppoſals are,Cauſes & meanes of Limitation. 1. That Radicall Limitation, that is, of the Power it ſelfe requires an expreſſe and notorious act, it muſt be done in the beginning and at once. p. 15. 24. 39. 2. That a Prince may ſo limit himſelfe, as not to require to be actively ſubjected to, and yet be limited only in the exerciſe, not in the power it ſelfe, p. 16. 3. That no Limitation by after condeſcent, is of the Power it ſelfe, p. 28. this being a conſequent from the firſt. Now that the falſhood of theſe and the like grounds every where ſcattered in his bookes may appeare; Let us a little more diligently handle the Cauſes and Meanes of Limitation, which, as before,Cauſes of Moral Limitation. being twofold, Morall and Civill; We will begin with Morall. 1. Now the Formall cauſe of a meere Morall Limitation, is that which morally bounds or makes ſinfull any act of Power. We are therefore to enquire what it is which can doe that. And this is, 1. Principally the Morall Law of God forbidding ſuch an exerciſe of Power. This is an univerſall, perpetuall and invincible Limitation of all power of Government, either abſolute or legall, yea of all Active Power of reaſonable creatures. 2. There is another meane of Limitation morall, ſc. a Promiſe, Oath or poſitive constitution, whereby a Prince puts a bond upon himſelfe, making that now ſinfull to be done, which before was not ſo. This alſo induces a morall Limitation, as well in abſolute as legall Governments; as if an Abſolute Monarch promiſe to follow ſuch a Rule, which hath a Power to uſe any which his reaſon ſhall dictate. Or if a Legall promiſe to abridge himſelfe in a courſe, in which the Law29 hath left him indeterminate: in this reſpect, they come under a morall limitation. But concerning this poſitive meane we muſt note. 1. This promiſe, how ſolemne ſoever it be, muſt be a ſimple bond: It muſt extend to no diminution of power, or diſcharge from duty of ſubjection; for then it is not meerely morall, it makes the exceeding act not only ſinfull, but non obliging: whereas it is the note of a meere morall bond, that it extends not to any leſſening of Authority, or diſcharge of duty: as if a Captaine take his enemy priſoner; he to ſave his life ſweares him a full vaſſalage afterward, his Maſter promiſes to command him only ſuch ſervices, never abſolving him from his former bond of abſolute ſlavery: here is a morall bond; yet ſtill a full debt of ſubjection in caſe the Maſter ſhould breake his word, and put him on other employment. 2. If the matter be more throughly looked into, this poſitive meane of limitation is either none at all; or elſe addes nothing to the former, of the morall law of God: For in ſuch promiſe or Oath whereby a Governour limits himſelfe there is an expreſſe or tacite condition, if it conduce to the end of Government, the glory of God, and publick good: For if ſuch Oath or bond hinder the end of Government, it is eo nomine, unlawfull and invalid; but if conduce to it, then it was no more, then was virtually required of him before by the morall Law; this promiſe or Oath being but a more ſolemne profeſſion and proteſtation to doe that which before implicitely he was bound morally unto. Thus we ſee all that Doctor ſpeakes of Morall and irrevocable limitation by promiſe and oath comes to nothing in the iſſue: ſo that this being granted that the Monarchs power in this State were only Morally limited in the Doctors ſenſe; We are as much under and owe as much ſubjection as the captive ſlave to his Maſter; and all our Laws and Statutes being but morall limitations of this ſecond ſort, are not ſo much as morall limitations any farther then the Prince ſees them conduce to the end of Government, if any ſeem to ſtand in his way, and hinder him therein, he is no longer bound to it; but may account it an ill made promiſe or Oath which is better broke then kept. 2. Cauſes of Legall limitation.Of the Cauſes and Meanes of Civill and legall limitation, whereby not only the exerciſe, but the power it ſelfe is confined. 1. The formall cauſe hereof is the limitation of the duty of ſubjection in the people: The duty of ſubjection is the originall of the power of Authority. People by becomming debtors of ſubjection doe ſet up Authority; and by ſtinting and terminating the duty of ſubjection doe put bounds and termes30 to the power of commanding. 2. Let us ſee then by what meanes the duty of ſubjection may be terminated. I conceive it may be done two wayes. 1. At firſt, when a people reſigning up themſelves to a ſtate of ſubjection doe it not abſolutely, but impoſe only a limited bond on themſelves; for if they impoſe no more duty: the Governour can aſſume no more power. Now this may be done, not only by poſitive, expreſſe and notorious act, as the Doctor ſpeakes; but alſo by a negative; a meere not impoſing of an abſolute bond of duty on themſelves is enough: ſo that if it cannot be proved either by records of the firſt inſtitution, or preſent obligation that a people have put themſelves into a ſtate of abſolute ſubjection, then it is to be held but limited: For whatſoever is ours by the law of nature, cannot be taken from us but by ſome poſitive act done by our ſelves or Anceſtors: Thus in private men; Liberty which is mine by nature, none can take from me, unleſſe he can bring a title or right whereby it became his, and I his ſervant. Nor am I any farther his ſervant, then he can bring proofe of his right. The ſame is true of a ſociety of men. In this caſe it belongs to the challenger, and not to the defendent to bring his poſitive notorious act for proofe of his title, and meaſure of his title: So that the Doctors demand is unreaſonable, who ſtanding for a full right in our Government, puts on the peoples part to bring evidence that they have not. Rather it is juſt, that he ſhould bring ſome poſitive and notorious act wherein it appeares that this people have fully reſigned up their liberty to an abſolute Government; or make it appeare that it is Gods ordinance that where ever a people doe conſtitute a ſoveraigne power, they muſt make an abſolute reſignation of their liberty. 2. By after-condeſcent, for this may be a meane of civill limitation, unleſſe any will imagine that a people once putting themſelves into abſolute ſubjection, are irrevocably ſo. And thus a Monarch becomes limited, when the promiſe or Oath he limits himſelfe by, is not ſimple, but amounts either expreſſely or equivalently to a relaxation of the bond of ſubjection: whether it proceed from meere grace, or conſcience of equity, or by Petition, or importunity of the people, it matters not what was the ground of it, if it carry with it a relaxation of the dutie of ſubjection, it is a meane of civill limitation, in the very root of power; for power can be no larger in the Prince, then duty of ſubjection is in the people; for theſe two have a neceſſary dependence, and relation of equality either to other. Thus if a Monarch, taking advantage of31 force of armes, impoſe a new Oath of full ſubjection on his people, who before were but legally bound; and prevaile ſo farre, that the whole or major part of his people doe take it for themſelves and theirs, here is a chang of Government from Legall into Abſolute, an enlargement of power: ſo on the contrary. And for this matter we need looke no farther, then the Nationall Oath, or Eſtabliſhed Lawes; for if they bind the people to an abſolute ſubjection; ſuch is the power; and though it have morall, yet it hath no legall limitation: And ſo on the contrary if they bind only to a ſubjection according to the Law; the Government is limited in the very power of it. Hence it appeares to be falſe which the Doctor hath, p. 16. that a Monarch may ſo tye himſelfe as to require not to be ſubjected to but according to ſuch Lawes, and yet not be civilly limited, in his very power; for if he ſo far require not to be ſubjected to, that he untye the bond of ſubjection beyond thoſe Lawes; then is his Authority limited, and can proceed no farther; neither are the inſtruments of his will exceeding thoſe lawes, authorized, but private perſons, and reſiſtible: And alſo falſe, which he ſayes, p. 28. That limitation by condeſcent cannot be radicall. Now if enquiry be made concerning the ſimplicity of antient formes of aſſuming into ſoveraignty, as when the people are ſaid to make one King; to endue him indefinitely with Kingly power; not confining his Government by any expreſſe limitations. Anſ. I conceive in ſuch caſe to know how far a people are bound by ſuch an indefinite contract, theſe things are to be looked into. 1. If the intent of the people can be diſcovered in ſuch a conſtitution, for if it can, doubtleſſe the contract binds ſo far, and no farther. Thus Lyra concludes concerning the requeſt of the people of Iſrael for a King, that it is to be underſtood of an Abſolute King, by that clauſe in the petition, 1 Sam. 8.5. a King to judge us like all the Nations, for all thoſe Eaſterne Nations having Abſolute Monarchs, they deſiring to be governed like them; muſt be conceived to intend ſuch a government. 2. If there be no expreſſion of their intention: then a light concerning it muſt be borrowed for circumſtances; ſc. the kind of government whereunto they have been formerly accuſtomed; or that of the Nation from which they proceeded: And thus the Saxons giving Kingly ſtate to their Captaines in this Land, cannot in reaſon be interpreted to intend any other, then that whereunto they were accuſtomed, and which was the forme of the Nation whence they came. This Rule is ever to be kept as well in publike,32 as in private contracts of that ſimple indefinite forme, that they are to be construed, as far as may be, in fovour of the granter.
CHAP. V. An Anſwer to the Sect. 4. concerning the Conſtitution of this Monarchy.
Sect. 1A Fourth ſort of the Doctors ſuppoſals are concerning the Conſtitution of this Monarchy, which in words he granteth to be limited and mixed, but comming to explaine himſelfe, he makes ſuch a limitation of it and ſuch a mixture as is indeed none at all, being to be found in the moſt Abſolute and ſimple governments in the world: for he every where ſuppoſeth it limited only morally in the exerciſe, not in the power: And ſo mixed, that there is but one ſimple power; a mixture made of one ſimple principle, ſuch a one as never was heard of in the world before. And this he delivers on his bare word, never bringing any proofe of it, thinking it enough if he can except againſt that which I have ſet downe concerning theſe things in my Treatiſe. Among other Aſſertions which I have there about the ſtate of this Government: there are two which this Replyer doth oppoſe. One is p. 31. That the ſoveraignty of our Kings is radically and fundamentally limited: which I have made good by five Arguments, and added a ſolution to the two chiefe which may be made againſt it. The other is, p. 39. That the Authority of this Land is of a compounded and mixed nature in the very root and conſtitution of it. This I have confirmed by three Reaſons; and have anſwered three Objections which may be made againſt it. Now I deſire the Reader impartially to weigh what I have there ſaid; and to compare it with this Doctors Reply; and then judge whether thoſe truths ſtand not firme againſt all that is brought to infringe them. But let us ſee what he oppoſeth. He proceedes not in any orderly courſe, to ſet downe his Antitheſes and prove them; and to give Anſwer to what I have brought on the contrary; but firſt ſpends ſome time in conſidering what this Government was in its Originall; as if it muſt needs remaine ſtill ſuch as it was at firſt; and could not receive any alterations, and graduall accompliſhment in proceſſe of time. And then he ſets on my Arguments, but how feebly we ſhall eaſily diſcover.
Here the firſt thing I did tax in the Doctors booke, was that he affirmed things contradictory: for he tells us he is againſt Abſolute power33 in our Kings; and arbitrary Government: And yet he alſo affirmes, that our Kings hold by right of conqueſt, yea of three conqueſts. And that the Houſes of Parliament are more ſubject to our Kings, then the Senate of Rome was to their Emperours. Alſo that the finall judgement is in One. Now how theſe ſo openly contradictorie Aſſertions can ſtand together he doth not ſhew us. Only he challengeth my ingenuity, if either he propoſed this as a concluſion to be proved, that our Kings are abſolute, p. 21. Neither doe I affirme that he did: Only I ſay, he holds things contradictory; that he holds ſuch grounds which make all Kings abſolute, ſc. that no ſupreme is or can be more then morally limited. Indeed he ſpeakes much of limitation morall; of limitation in the exerciſe of power; this makes a great noiſe of limitation, but indeed are but meere vailes to cover over Abſoluteneſſe, and make it the more paſſable, which he is aſhamed to propoſe to the world in expreſſe termes. Suppoſe he did not mention thoſe conqueſts to win an arbitrary power to the King. Yet ſure in affirming more then once, that he hath ſuch a right, he doth as much as if he ſaid he may uſe an arbitrary power if he will; for if he hath a right of Conqueſt, he hath an Arbitrary right, by the Doctors own confeſſion, p. 22. and if he hath a right of Arbitrarineſſe, it is his lenity he doth not uſe it. In the Anſwer to the firſt Argument which I brought for the Abſoluteneſſe of our Kings (which was that They hold by conqueſt, and therefore are Abſolute.) I do not ſay, the Doctor drawes ſuch a concluſion: No; but he layes down the Antecedent; and then any body elſe may draw out the concluſion.
I fetch not the root of ſucceſſion, ſo farre backe as the Saxons,Originall of this Monarchy. as this Replier traduces, to cut off advantages which may be made from the Normans entrance, p. 22. But becauſe himſelfe began there to make up a Trinity of Conqueſts: This drew me on that diſcourſe of the Originall of this Monarchy; nor that the cauſe had any need of it; for it is his work to prove the Government abſolute, if he will have it ſo; alſo ſuppoſe it were as abſolute as the Norman Conqueſt, by him improved can make it; yet that hinders not, but that it may become really and radically limited afterward, by condeſcent, as appeares in the former chapter. Concerning the Saxon entrance, I ſaid it was not a conqueſt, ſc. properly and ſimply, but an expulſion. He anſwers, This is neither true, nor greatly materiall, p. 22. I ſay, it is both true and materiall: It is true; for all the Britaines which retained their name and Nation,34 were they many or few, were expelled into Wales: All the reſt in gentem, leges, nomen, linquamque, vincentium conceſſerunt; as himſelfe cites for me out of Mr Cambden. And it is very materiall; for if they which only remained here in gentem & leges vincentium conceſſerunt; Then the Conquerers, as I ſaid, kept their old forme of Government; the Saxons came not into the condition of the conquered Brittaines; but they into the old liberty of the Saxons. Hereupon grew there a neceſſity of inquiry into the Government of the Nation, before they came hither; that ſo we might know what a one they eſtabliſhed here; and brought the remaining Brittaines into. And a record of more unqueſtionable authority then Tacitus I could not imagine; nor a more expreſſe teſtimony for a limited forme in the very potestas of it; of which ſort he affirmes the Governement of all the Germane Nations was. How ever the Doctor is pleaſed to call it a conjecture, a dreame and uncertainty; No, the expreſſe teſtimony of ſuch an Authour is not ſo: Rather that probability of theſe Saxons not being then a people of Germany, but did afterward breake out of the Cimbrica cherſoneſus, is ſo; which himſelfe dares call no more then a probability. I ſay, 1. It is a greater probability, that they were a people of Germany before they came in hither; for the Angli which accompanied them in that invaſion, were queſtionles Germanes, and reckoned by Tacitus among that people, doubtleſſe they were neighbours in habitation which were joyned in that voyage and conqueſt. 2. Suppoſe the matter were not cleare of the Saxons, yet is it of the Angli which gave denomination to the Land and people, who no doubt retained their Laws and Government, ſayes Cambden; which was limited in the very royall power ſaith Tacitus. But this Doctor would make men believe, as if I endeavoured to deduce the very Modell of our preſent Government from that Saxon ingreſſe: Whereas all that I ayme at, is to make it appeare that in ſemine, in the rude beginnings it is ſo ancient; and ſhall affirme the limited power of the Engliſh Kings, and liberty of the ſubjects to have been from thence continued till now, unleſſe he can bring ſome better proofes of its interruption, and induction of an unlimited power, then as yet he hath. Alſo to ſhew that the Doctors Tenure by Conqueſt is vaine in the firſt of the Three, for the Saxons gave none ſuch to their Princes, but kept their Lawes, and came not under the Title of a conquered people. Next, the Doctor cenſures my delineation of the preſent platforme of our Government,35 p. 44. (for it is nothing with him for advantage to skip over 9. or 10. Pages) that ſo he might make a ſhew as if I ſet down that modell as derived from the Saxons out of Germany; and ſo ſpends neere two pages in this unreaſonable way of traducing me; Whereas he cannot be ignorant, that in many places, yea at preſent is forced to confeſſe, p. 24. that I acknowledge our Government came up to this exactneſſe and full height by degrees and in continuance of time; but indeed he had nothing elſe to ſay againſt that Deſcription of this platforme or any one of thoſe 6. Suppoſals of which it conſiſts; and therefore when he had fained as if I had derived it from the beginning of the Saxon Government in this Land, he calls it a phanſie, againſt the credit of all Histories and Chronicles, p. 24. and ſo lets it goe. Let the Reader judge, whether I doe not there apparently ſet it down as a deſcription of our now exiſtent Frame of Government: And whether any thing therein is not according to paſt hiſtorie, and preſent experience: Yea I challenge the Doctor to except againſt the leaſt part of it, as not ſo: if he cannot, he doth wrong ſo to miſcall and deride it. After this Excurſion, he returnes back to the 36. page of my Book, and the proper buſineſſe of that Chapt. which was his three Titles by Conqueſt. I looked that after his firſt, he ſhould have made good his ſecond Conqueſt, ſc. the Daniſh, and made good what he had ſaid, that our Kings hold by that too, as one of the three. But not a word of that for ſhame: He paſſes p. 26. to the Norman entrance: And to prove that William held this Land by conqueſt, he cites out of Mr Cambden that in victorie quaſi Tropheum, he diſpoſed of the Lands of the Conquered, changed their Tenure, abrogated what Engliſh Lawes and customes he pleaſed, &c. Indeed when he had gotten full poſſeſſion, he did what he pleaſed; but ſactum non probat jus. I have proved, and the Doctor hath not gainſaid, 1. That his Title by which he claimed was a ſucceſſive and Legall Title. 2. That this Title got the favour of a great party, and was a maine Meane facilitating his acquirie. 3. That he was inaugurated by virtue of that Title. 4. After he had gotten the Kingdome, though he did many things arbitrarily, yet he ſetled himſelfe and his ſucceſſours in the state of Legall Monarches, as the Doctor confeſſes, p. 27. What then is become of his Triple Tenure by Conqueſt; when heres not one can be made good; when it comes to a due ſcanning? That of Mr Cambden, that the Kings of this Land have Poteſtatem ſupremam, & merum imperium, is no more then that of the Statute which36 the Doctor ſpeakes of, p. 47. that it is an Empire governed by one ſupreme head, which we acknowledge; for that merum imperium muſt be underſtood in a moderate ſenſe; elſe it ſayes more then the Doctor himſelfe profeſſes to own: Though Mr Cambdens judgement in this caſe is not of the authority of a proofe.
Sect. 2Then he paſſes to my Arguments, p. 28. But, by the way, let me tell him,My Arguments for Limitation and Mixture vindicated. I brought 5. Arguments to prove this Government limited, and 3. to prove it mixed: and it had been meet he ſhould have brought ſomewhat, beſide his bare word, to prove it limited only in the exerciſe, that is, Abſolute in the power; but he brings no proofe, becauſe he had none: Yet perhaps though he had not wherwithall to confirm his own, yet he hath to demoliſh my Aſſertions: Let us ſee therefore his ſolutions of my Arguments. But before we come to weigh them, becauſe he tells us p. 28. it were an Argument fit for a skilfull Lawyer to labour in, and ſlights my endeavour becauſe I bring not Hiſtory and Antiquity, but doe goe about to reaſon him into a beliefe of thoſe Aſſertions, Let me premiſe ſomething concerning that courſe of proving them. 1. The work of bringing History and Antiquity doth belong to him who affirmes ſuch a Title of Power in our Kings; Let him ſhew how and when it was conveyed to them: He which challenges a right to that which was once undoubtedly mine, muſt prove his right and he can have no more then he can bring evidence for. 2. On his defaut, if I undertake a needleſſe office to prove my Negative, there are but two wayes imaginable to doe it, one is by records of hiſtories ſetting out the firſt conſtitution of a ſtate, and the Termes on which〈◊〉people reſigned up their liberty to a ſubjection. So in the Antient Romane State, the Venetian, the late Belgik Ʋnion, and others which have at once, viſibly and lately been compoſed, it is likely that way might be taken. The other is by demonſtrative collections drawn from the inſtitution of the preſent compoſure of a State. Thus alone is it poſſible to diſcerne and prove the conſtitution of a Government which ſprings not up at once, but by unſeen degrees and moments, whoſe fundamentall conſtitutive acts ſtand upon no record. This is the condition of moſt Governments in the world which have ſprung from ſmall, rude and unknown beginnings. And of this in particular. For 1. A limitation of Royall Power was brought hither by the Saxons and Angli our Anceſtours, hath been proved. This was, as thoſe times were, very rude and unpoliſhed, it is likely ſuch as Captaines in Armies37 have, who can doe nothing of moment without the adviſe and conſent of the Counſell of warre. 2. This Limitation of Power and Libertie received ſome more formall and ſetled bounds afterwards by cuſtomes and Lawes before the Conqueſt, as appeares by the Common Lawes, which are, as it were, the baſis and foundation of this Government, the Statute Lawes being but after ſuperstructives; Theſe Common Lawes did not grow up at once, but by degrees, and were unwritten Customes and Ʋſages gaining authority by unknowne preſcription, above all written Lawes; and were afterward committed to writing by men skilfull in the Lawes. 3. At length, and after the Conqueſt it was perfected to this Parliamentarie Forme; and even this being at firſt but rude, grew to this exactneſſe by length of Time, and infinite Contentions. This latter way only being left us; that I took, and the Doctour hath no cauſe to deſpiſe it. For when a thing of preſent State is made evident by Reaſon drawne for palpable experience of it's preſent compoſure, it is madneſſe to denie it to be ſo, becauſe I cannot tell when it began to be ſo: Yea when the Queſtion is of preſent ſtate, it is a ſurer way to find out the Truth, then by records of its Originall conſtitution: For in time the Frame of a State may receive reall variations from what it was at firſt, as the Romane State, and moſt others have done; for the contracts of men are at pleaſure alterable; and an argument drawne from Monuments of firſt coalition, would then be fallacious.
Well; be the way never ſo juſtifiable, which I have taken, yet the Doctor dares pronounce my Arguments inſufficient to cleare what I have undertaken. Tis eaſie to pronounce it; let us ſee how he makes good his ſentence. I proceeded diſtinctly firſt to lay down my Arguments proving Limitation, p. 31. Then thoſe which proove Mixture, p. 40. He mingles them together: And to my firſt, third, fourth and fift proving Limitation, Anſwers that They prove only limitation in the exerciſe of power, p. 28. Why ſo? Neither the Denomination of Liege, nor any preſcription can make us believe, that the Limitations of power had any other beginning then voluntary condeſcent. As if a Government by voluntarie condeſcent might not receive a radicall Limitation. But it lies on him to proove, it was by ſuch condeſcent; if he can bring no record for it, it muſt in juſtice be held originall, and ab initio. Thoſe two denominations of Leige Soveraigne: And Liege people doe prove the very Soveraignty and Subiection Legall; but that is not ſo which hath only38 a morall Limitation; the denominations argue the bond 'twixt them to be Legall: And when Subjects have ſuch a Libertie by cuſtome and Law, that they owe no farther ſubjection, then (when, or how ever they came by it) yet the very power of the Monarch is limited, as we heard in the former Chapter, unleſſe any will put a vaine power in the Prince, to which no Subjection is due; but of this enough there. Then he paſſeth to my Reaſons proving mixture, which are three, p. 40. of my Treatiſe. The firſt is, That it is confeſſedly mixed of a Monarchie, Ariſtocracie and Democracie, therefore radically, and in the very Power. He anſwers, It is not neceſſarie the mixture ſhould be in the Power: but it is ſufficient if there be a concurrence of Perſons whoſe conſent is required to the exerciſe of Power, p. 39. Thus he anſwers to the concluſion; but ſayes nothing to the Antecedent. 1. And indeed if it be mixed of theſe three, his anſwer is againſt common-ſenſe; that a mixture of Monarchie, Aristocracie and Democracie ſhould be ſatiſfied by annexion of perſons to the Monarch, having meere conſent: for theſe are names of Power of Government; for Ariſtocracie and Democracie are Powers not Perſons, as well as Monarchie: therefore a compoſition of theſe three muſt be all of Powers. 2. And indeed this chimera of a mixture in the exerciſe of Power, is plaine non-ſenſe. For a mixture in the Acts or Exerciſe ſuppoſeth a mixture in the principles of Action, that is in the very Powers: A mixt Act proceeding from a ſimple Power is ſuch ſtuffe that I never heard before. Now if a mixture in Acts argues a mixture in Powers: Theſe Powers muſt be coordinate and ſupreme: for ſubordinates make no mixture; alſo Powers concurrent to ſupreme Acts, ſuch as Legiſlation is confeſſed to be, cannot be but ſupreme Powers. Neither can any man living cleare that paſſage which he ſpeaks of p. 45. from pure non-ſenſe, ſc. This coordination is but to ſome Act or Exerciſe of the Supreme Power, not in the power it ſelfe: For Concurſe to an Act, im•lies a Power of Concurrence: and Concurſe to a ſupreme Act, argues a ſupreme Power; for an inferiour Power cannot afford a coordinate concurrence to a ſupreme Act. So that his Over-ſeers were not miſtaken when they checked him for that paſſage, and ſaid, He granted a coordination of Subjects with his Majeſtie in the ſupreme Power. But here he brings a ponderous Reaſon, ſo often before urged. If the mixture be in the Supremacie of Power, how can the King be the Only ſupreme and Head. He cannot ſalve it with his Apex poteſtatis, unleſſe the King muſt be the Crowne or Top of the Head39 onely; for they alſo muſt be our Head and our Soveraignes, if they be mixed in the Supremacie of Power, p. 29. Here I anſwer once for all to this ſo frequent an injection. 1. That the Titles of Head and Supreme are fully ſatisfied by this, that he is the ſole Principle and fountaine from whence the execution of all Law and Juſtice flowes to his people by inferiour Officers and Courts, all whoſe Authoritie is derivatively from him as its head. 2. That theſe Titles in proper conſtruction import only Ʋtmoſt chiefty, nor doe they agree to any kind of right in the fundamentall and radicall Powers of a Kingdome; but to the principall and tranſcendent Intereſt: Another may have a right in the ſupreme Power, yet not be ſupreme, nor Head: becauſe not having a ſupremacie in that Power: So it is in the Colledges, the Fellowes have a fundamentall intereſt in the power of Government, yet that hinders not, but that the Title of Head and Chiefe is given to him who is Governour; will the Doctour jeſt at it, and ſay they be Heads and Supremes too, and the Warden or Maſter is but the crowne or top of the head. Alſo in the naturall bodie, from whence the Metaphor of Head is borrowed, are three Fundamentall and radicall powers ſcituate in the three Principall parts: yet none will ſay, the Heart and Liver are Heads too, becauſe they partake the ſupreme Powers of nature. Let not the Doctour therefore ſtraine a Metaphor ſo farre as to make himſelfe merry with it. Let him really anſwer my Arguments by which I prove a radicall Limitation and mixture. Let him anſwer; is not the Legiſlative Power the ſupreame? Have not the Houſes an Authoritative concurrence and Influx into that buſineſſe? If he avoyd a punctuall anſwer hereto by carping at words, he will prove himſelfe a ridiculous Argumentatour while he ſeekes to make others ſeeme ſo.
My ſecond Argument for radicall mixture, is from the Legiſlative Power being in all three. He anſwers, That Phraſe is ſatisfied and explained by that concurrence and conſent in the exerciſe of ſupreame Power. It ſeemes that invention of his muſt ſerve all turnes. Is a Legiſlative Power ſatisfied by a bare powerleſſe conſent? I demand: is that Conſent cauſall and Authoritative; or meerly Conſiliarie and unauthoritative? And whereas I prove that they have an enacting Authority by that received and ſet clauſe in the beginning of Acts; Be it enacted by the Kings moſt excellent Majeſtie, and the Authoritie of the Lords and Commons aſſembled in Parliament. He tels us a Vote and Power of aſſenting is a great Authority, p. 29. I enquire not how great it is: I aske whether that40 be all; whether that clauſe, which as expreſſely as words can, aſcribes an enacting Authority to them, be ſatisfied by ſuch a Power of Aſſenting? He ſees it doth not, and therefore tels us of a former phraſe which ran thus: The King by the adviſe and aſſent of the Prelates, Earls and Barons, and at the inſtance and requeſt of the Commonaltie hath ordained, &c. Suppoſe anciently ſome ſtatutes runne under that forme: that adviſe and instance, muſt be underſtood of an Authoritative and enacting advice and inſtance; as the latter formes explaine it: for it is equall that the latter expound the former; and not the contrary, as the Doctor would perverſly have it, eſpecially conſidering the Doctors Expoſition cannot ſtand with the latter; but mine agrees very well with the former. But how bold is this man, when during ſo many yeares and Parliaments, both Kings and States by this received Forme, have acknowledged and eſtabliſhed a concurrent enacting Authoritie in all three, yet he dares argue and oppoſe ſo expreſſe and confeſſed a truth? But in this anſwer, he diſcovers a great deale of ſuperficialnes, in granting the Houſes a Power of conſenting to the eſtabliſhment of laws; and yet denie them a Legiſlative, enacting Power: for ſuch a Power of conſenting (if it be neceſſary) is indeed a Power of enacting; for though in tranſeunt Acts one may ſtand by and conſent to the doing, and yet not be Efficient; yet in immanent Acts which are done, per immediatam volitionem, by a meere expreſſion of the Will, A concurrence in conſenting, and a concurrence in doing is one and the ſame thing: Now Legiſlation is an imminent Act, conſiſting in a meer expreſſion of an Authoritative Will.
My third Argument for Mixture, was from it's end, which was Reſtraint from exceſſe. 1. He grants ſuch a Reſtraint, but morall and legall, not forceable, p. 30. I anſwer, He deceitfully confounds morall and legall, as I ſhewed before. 2. The End of Mixture in a State, is that there may be a power of reſtreyning more then ſufficient (as his Majeſtie expreſſes it) but the Doctors meere morall power, is very inſufficient; It limits not the Power at all; nor the Exerciſe properly, no more then an Oath, or Promiſe without it, would doe: that is, makes it ſinne to exceed. But of this before. But here, which is very rare, He doth not onely denie, but give a reaſon of it. If the fundamentall Conſtitution had intended them ſuch a Power, it would not have left a power in the Monarch to call, or diſſolve them, which would make this power of theirs altogether ineffectuall, p. 30. This Reaſon ſeemes to have ſome41 weight in it, I will therefore, the more ſeriouſly conſider it. 1. Whatever ſtrength it hath had in it; now it hath none, becauſe that power of diſſolving is now by Law ſuſpended, for this Parliament; and after it, a neceſſity by Law impoſed of reducing that Power of Calling Parliaments, into Act, every Three yeares. 2. Neither was it true before theſe Acts, that ſuch a Power was left in the Monarch at pleaſure to uſe or not; for it was by ancient Law determined how often they ſhould be convocated. 3. But being granted that this Power is ſimply and fully in the Monarch, yet I denie, that hence it followes, that it would make that Power of the Houſes altogether ineffectuall; becauſe that de facto, though it hath been in the Monarch ſo long, yet it never hath made it voyd; but they have exerciſed a limiting Power, as Hiſtories relate, enough yea and ſometimes too much, over the Monarch, notwithſtanding his Power of calling and diſſolving them. Thus in the Colledges, the Fellowes have an effectuall, and more then morall limiting Power, though the Governour hath the Power of calling and diſſolving their meetings. And anciently the prime Patriarch had the power of Calling and diſſolving generall Councels, yet they had a Power of limiting, yea of Cenſuring him for exorbitances for all that. The Reaſon is, becauſe many things fall out oft in a Government, inducing ſuch neceſſities on the Monarch, that he for their ſupply will chooſe to reduce ſuch power into act of Calling, and ſuſpend ſuch power of diſſolving, although he know thoſe States will uſe their Limiting Power in reducing ſuch exorbitances, and puniſhing thoſe deareſt inſtruments which have been uſed in them. This the Conſtitutors of this Frame preconſidering might put in the Monarch this Power, and yet intend to the other States a Legall and effectuall power of reſtraining his exorbitancies, by uſing Force, not againſt him, but it's procurers and Inſtruments. Thus we ſee, there is no need of entring on that diſpute, Whether this Power of calling and diſſolving the Houſes be placed in the Monarch, as all his other are, not abſolutely, but with limitation of neceſſary reducing it into act, on the laſt exigencies of the Kingdome.
After this he returns to my other Arguments for limitation; One of which, drawne from radicall Mixture, he fully omits; but now having ſhewed the invalidity of his exceptions againſt my arguments for it, I have given force to this argument for Limitation, drawne therefrom. That which he ſets on laſt is my firſt for Limitation in the very42 Power: ſc. the Kings owne expreſſe confeſſion: That the Law is the meaſure of his power: That the Powers which he hath are veſted in him by Law, p. 31. of my Tract. And, as if this were not more then he could anſwer, the Doctor addes a third for us, in which he aſcribes to the Houſes a power more then ſufficient to reſtraine his Exceſſes, p. 30. Here are Authorities as punctuall and expreſſe as can be imagined. Yet the Doctor reſolving not to be reaſoned into a beliefe of theſe things, out faces all this evidence; and to that end frames three Anſwers ſuch as they are. 1. He ſayes, His Majeſtie had few of his learned Counſell about him. 2. His gracious expreſſions ought not to be drawne out to his diſadvantage. 3. All that can be gathered from them doth not come up to theſe Concluſions, p. 31. In the two firſt he openly enough taxeth his Majeſtie of unadviſed expreſſions, excuſing it from abſence of his learned Counſellours (you may ſoone imagine whom he meanes) Thus diſparaging the Kings judgement and all then about him; and tels us we muſt not be unjuſt to ſet thoſe ſayings on the racke; that is, we muſt not take them in their plaine meaning; but on this mans wreſted and ſenceleſſe interpretation: What doe not theſe men dare doe and ſay? Before we heard him correcting the expreſſions of all Moderne Parliaments, teaching us to reforme them by the old. Here the King and his Counſell ſetting out in ſuch a time Declarations to all his Subjects to informe them about the nature and extent of his Royall Power: He compares thoſe ſerious expreſſes to Trajans ſudden and exceſſive ſpeech: He will correct Kings, Counſels, Parliaments and all, but he will have his way: To him they muſt come to learne how to ſpeake, and what powers they have. But let us heare his Doctorall Expoſition of his Majeſties expreſſes. Hee ſayes, The Law is the meaſure of his Power: Wee muſt underſtand his meaning to be that his power is bounded by Law: but it doth not follow, that his power wherein it is not limited by Law is not abſolute and full, p. 31. Here is profound interpreting: If his Power be limited by Law? is there any part of it not limited by Law? If the Law be the meaſure of it, ſure it is even with it; for the meaſure is equall in extent with the thing meaſured: Thus he papally interprets againſt the direct meaning of the Text: But he doth not ſhow us how that can be underſtood, when he ſaith, His powers are veſted in him by Law, if the Law be a limitation only of exerciſe: Nor how their Reſtraining power is more then ſufficient, if it be only morall; which, how unſufficient43 a reſtraint for exorbitance it is, every ones experience can enough teſtifie. I admire a man who pretends to conſcience and judgement ſhould take ſuch liberty of interpreting. Certaine if thoſe Reaſons and Teſtimonies doe not clearly proove a radically limited and mixed Conſtitution of this Monarchy I ſhall deſpair of ever proving any thing by way of Argument any more.
I had an intent to have ſubnexed other Arguments to make goodSect. 3thoſe Aſſertions: but I ſee it is to no purpoſe,7 Queries concerning this Governement. for he is reſolved not to be reaſoned into them: He can denie all as failing either in the Antecedent or Conſequent, p. 32. The Power of this Kingdome he muſt have unlimited: He will give no Reaſon for it; nor heare no Reaſon againſt it. Yet, ſith he profeſſeth himſelfe a Reſolver of Conſcience, Let me therfore be ſo bold as to propoſe certaine Caſes to him. 1. Why in the late Oath propoſed to be taken by all his Majeſties Subjects the Power of enacting Statutes is ſworne to be joyntly in the Kings Maieſtie, Lords and Commons in Parliament. Certes the Doctor writ this Reply before that Oath was printed in Oxford, or elſe he did not conſider of it. He cannot ſay, I hope there were but few of his counſell about him when that was framed: if the Doctor hath taken it, He hath forſworne this paſſage of his Reply; and ſworne them a joynt enacting power. 2. Why we are enjoyned to ſweare that we doe beleeve that the Subiects of England are not obliged by any Act made either by the Kings Maieſtie ſolely, or the Houſes ſolely, &c. Sure the Doctor hath abjured his other Aſſertion of the unlimited Power of the King, if he hath taken this Oath; for if Power be ſolely his, then an Act made by him ſolely is obliging: If they be not obligatorie, they are not Authoritative; and ſo the mixture and limitation is in the Authority it ſelf. Here is no place left for his diſtinction of Active and Paſſion ſubiection. For, 1. Will any thinke that the intent is to ſweare men to be bound not to doe, but to ſuffer? 2. The Beliefe of a non-Obligation proceeds indifferently and as fully concerning the ſole Acts of the King, us the Houſes but I beleeve the Doctour will not ſay we are obliged to paſſive ſubiection to the ſole Acts of the Houſes. 3. I would know if the States doe limit onely morally, what they doe, which is not done without them? A Promiſe and Oath do limit morally without them. He will ſay they may admoniſh him; and denie their conſent, and ſo iudge his Acts invalid: He meanes ſtill morally invalid; and ſo would they be without them. 4. Suppoſe the Monarch minded to eſtabliſh a Law,44 which he judges needfull; and the States being averſe, he enacts it without them; Is it not a Law? It hath all the Legiſlative authoritie in it. He will ſay it is not duly made. 1. I grant it: but yet it is a Law, for it hath all the Power of a Law. 2. But is it not duly made? Why, the power of last deciſion is in the King alone: Suppoſe he define that the Intent of his Predeceſſours in granting this conſenting power to the Houſes had no intent to hinder, but further themſelves in eſtabliſhing good lawes; and therefore now they not concurring by aſſent to this needfull Act, He ought not to be hindred, but may lawfully doe it without them. He is the laſt Judge in this caſe; and it muſt be held ever lawfully enacted. So that in the reſult here is left to theſe States by the Doctors grounds neither Civill nor Morall Limitation, but at pleaſure. 5. If Limitation in our Government exempt Subjects from a neceſſity of active Subjection; but not from paſſive; How is it that our Lawes doe not only determine what the Monarch ſhall command, but alſo what he ſhall inflict: what ſhall be accounted Rebellion, what Felonie, &c. and what not; alſo what he ſhall inflict for this crime, and that crime, and what not? Sith the Lawes limiting what he ſhall command, doe limit our neceſſity of active Subiection; it will follow, that the Lawes limiting what he ſhall inflict, doe limit our neceſſity of paſſive Subiection. Here's no evaſion by ſaying the Laws do limit him morally what he ſhall inflict, and if he inflict beyond Law, he ſinnes in it; but we muſt ſuffer: for the Doctor acknowledges, that the Lawes defining what he ſhall command doe ſo limit our active ſubjection, that we have a ſimple exemption from any neceſſity of Doing; and therefore alſo the Laws defining what he ſhall inflict, doe ſo limit our paſſive ſubjection, that we have a ſimple exemption from any neceſſity of ſuffering, beyond thoſe Limitations; for alſo, if they did not free us from paſſive ſubjection, it were unlawfull not only to reſiſt, but alſo to avoid ſuffering even by flight. 6. When the liberties of magna Charta, and other grants have been gotten and preſerved, and recovered at the rate of ſo much trouble, ſute, expence and bloud, whither by all that adoe was intended only a morall liberty, definement in the Monarch, and not alſo of the power it ſelfe; only that he might not lawfully exorbitate from eſtabliſhed Lawes, and not alſo that he might have no Authority or Power to exorbitate at all? Sure this was their aime, for the former he could not doe before. 7. The Law granting a writ of Rebellion againſt him who refuſeth to obey the45 ſentence of the Judge, though he have an expreſſe Act of the Kings will to warrant him: doth it not ſuppoſe thoſe exceeding and extrajudiciall Acts of the Kings will to be unauthoritative, and unable to priviledge a man from Reſiſtance?
If the Doctor by his faculty can reſolve theſe Caſes, He will doe much in way of ſatisfaction of my conſcience; but if he cannot they will prove ſo many convincing arguments that the Power of the Monarch in this Frame is not unlimited.
Now having made good my Aſſertions, I expected another worke; ſc. an Examination of his Reaſons for unlimitedneſſe, and ſimplicity of Monarchicall Power, but he is not guilty of my fault, he doth not goe ſo much as to reaſon us into a beliefe of it. He doth in vaine expreſſe a deſire hee hath that ſome skilfull Lawyers or Divines would helpe him at this dead lift; yet he is like to goe alone in this wild untroden path of defending an unreſiſtibleneſſe on ſuch ſuppoſals: ſhall we think any Divine will ſecond him, in juſtifying his unwritten fancie about Gods Ordinance neceſſarily inveſting all the acts of his will, who is ſupreme? Or any ſound Lawyer will overthrow the grounds of his Profeſſion, that the Royall Right, Authority and Government of this Realme is both founded on, and meaſured by the Laws thereof. Yea it is very remarkeable, that his Majeſtie in all the Declarations and Expreſſes which I have ſeen, doth not once touch upon this way, ſc. a challenge of ſuch a latitude of Authority as can preſerve deſtructive inſtruments from force; but condemnes the now Reſiſtance, by ſolemne proteſtations of innocency, and intention of governing by the known Laws.
CHAP. VI. An Anſwer to his 5. Sect. of Reſistance in Relation to ſeverall kinds of Monarchy.
THE reſidue of his Book is ſpent about the Queſtion of Reſiſtance;Sect. 1I might well ſpare the labour of any farther Anſwer; for now having ſo apparently made good theſe two Aſſertions. 1. That ſoveraignty may be limited in the very power. 2. That de facto, it is ſo in this Government, every one may diſcerne the neceſſary truth of theſe inferences, 1. That in this Government, the exceeding Acts of the Princes will, being out of the compaſſe of his Authority, can not authorize their Inſtruments. 2. That hereon Reſiſtance of them is no other then of private men, not of Authority, or Gods Ordinance. But becauſe the46 Doctors chiefe confidence is in this part of his diſcourſe, and he is large in it, I will therefore goe on in my work, and will briefly make appeare that his Reaſons are infirme, and his Authorities impertinent, and his Anſwers very inſufficient: for having been ſo large in making good my ſuppoſals, and overthrowing his, I may the more contract my ſelfe in this remaining buſineſſe. In this Section he propoſeth two things. 1. To conſider how I ſtate the point of Reſiſtance in the kinds of Governments. 2. To prove that Limitation and Mixture in government doe not imply a forceable conſtraining Power in ſubjects, p. 39. I will follow him in both.
My ſtating the Queſtion vindicated.He begins with a charitable cenſure of my ſtating the Queſtion, and ſayes he finds it to be in a way that lies very open to Rebellion, p. 33. Let the Reader judge: I am ſure, his Reſolves and Determinations are not in a way to deſtroy all liberty, and make all Governments Arbitrary, but directly doe it. Then for my maintaining the Perſon of the Monarch in all Formes to be above the reach of Force, he approves it; yet ſayes I allow ſubjects to raiſe Armies, to give battle to thoſe that are about him as his guard. He wrongs me, I ſay not his guard but ſubverſive ſeducers and inſtruments: Thoſe which he called cut-throates in his firſt booke; now he repents he gave that hard name to his clients, whom he pleades ſo hard to ſave harmeleſſe, and makes them amends with the ſtile of a Guard. A guard which bring him into greater danger then all his enemies; who bring him into battell to ſave themſelves, where Ordnance and Musket can put no difference: No; They uſe him as their guard. If harme befall him, which God avert, the guilt and puniſhment will fall on them who are ſo prodigall of hazarding his ſacred Perſon, not on thoſe who could deſire nothing more then his ſecurity, by abſence from a multitude, who by undertaking the ſubverſion of Religion and Lawes (for that is the Doctors ſuppoſition) bring themſelves in danger of condigne deſtruction.
Then he proceeds to Reſiſtance in an Abſolute State. Where I affirme, If ſuch a Monarch ſhould ſeeke the deſtruction of the whole Community, his inſtruments of ſuch inhumanity may be reſiſted. He dares not deny it; but would know what I doe meane by the whole community. I meane the whole ſimely, or the whole interpretatively; that is, the greater part; and therefore his exception of the Jewes in the Kingdome of Ahaſuerus, or the Templers in the Weſterne Kingdomes, is not to the purpoſe: but the inſtance which I bring of the47 Law-Countries, comes home: for they were the whole community; but the Replier corrupts it, when he ſaith the Spaniſh King intended the extirpation of the Proteſtants only, p. 34. For he intended not only theirs, but of all, Papiſts and elſe, which would not admit the introduction of an Arbitrary Government, and the ſubverſion of their liberties, as the hiſtories thereof make plaine. Here in this 34. page, the Doctor ſhewes a bad mind: Taking occaſion to excuſe the Rebels in Ireland, as if they might juſtifie themſelves on theſe grounds; and intimating a falſhood, as if the Parliament did intend their extirpation, hereby declaring how ill he likes any effectuall courſe for the rooting out of Popery out of the Kingdomes. Indeed, he ſayes, he pleads not for them, but yet he doth it. He finds out arguments for them; and ſhews them a way, both how to excuſe themſelves, and accuſe the Parliament; and to call a reſolution of cleanſing that Iland from Popery, an extirpation of their Nation. He ſayes, the example of David proves not this, being but a particular Man. I ſay, it proves it the more ſtrongly, as ſhall appeare. Then if a particular mans life be invaded without any plea of reaſon, I ſuppoſe it hard to deny him the liberty of poſitive reſiſtance of agents; and prove it by the inſtance of the peoples reſcue of Jonathan; and Davids of himſelfe; where the peoples Oath; and Davids Army, with his enquiry at Keilah doe prove a ſerious and reall purpoſe of Reſiſtance, let the Doctor ſay what he pleaſe to the contrary; ſo that theſe examples come home to juſtifie reſiſtance in ſuch caſe, even in an Abſolute Monarchy; for here are particular men, in an abſolute Monarchy, aſſaulted without plea of reaſon; for that Jonathan, who had wrought ſuch a deliverance, ſhould die, for taſting in his ignorance a little honey, there was no colour of reaſon; the Kings raſh oath was none. And that David ſhould be put to death, whom Saul himſelfe oft with his own mouth profeſſed innocent, and abſolved, was as much without plea of reaſon: ſo that here I need not flie to the Doctors ſhift of an extraordinary caſe, as he tells me I muſt, p. 35. I acknowledge no extraordinary caſe in theſe examples: Take them in their due extent, and they juſtifie no more then I have aſſerted; and ſo much they doe. In my 5. Aſſertion, p. 11. Of ſubmitting States, Liberties and Perſons to the will of an Abſolute Monarch carrying any plea of reaſon; He faults my Order, and tells me, it ſhould have been firſt. It ſeems this mans eye can ſpie ſmall faults; but why firſt, he doth not ſay. I think in ſtating of the queſtion of reſiſtance I may as48 well begin with the Affirmative, and ſhew firſt when it may be uſed, and then when it ought not; as on the contrary; but he will make a fault, where he finds none. But what ſayes he to the Aſſertion? He grants it; but diſlikes the limitation, ſo it carry plea or ſhew of reaſon: and ſayes here the way is open enough to rebellion, p. 36. No opener then himſelfe makes it, p. 10. This is uſuall with him, when he diſlikes a thing: He can ſpeak no leſſe words then Rebellion. But why ſayes he ſo? Every man will be ready to think there is no reaſon nor equity in the will of the Monarch when he is oppreſſed by him. He may well enough, if hee be oppreſſed: but yet there may be a plea and colour of equity even for an Act of Oppreſſion; and in an Abſolute Monarchy it will little availe a man though he think there is no reaſon for it: for he muſt not be his own judge; nor hath he any outward judge to appeale to; but the Reaſonable will of the Monarch himſelfe; if he ſubmit to its determination, there is no feare of Rebellion; if not, I have done with him, in ſuch a Government. Of Saules cenſure of Jonathan and David I have ſpoken already and made it appeare it had no plea of reaſon, was not the act of a reaſonable will; and therefore I may hold their examples ordinary, without impeachment of this Aſſertion.
Then he proceeds to Reſiſtance in limited and mixed Rules, p. 36. Concerning which I ſaid, p. 17. If the exorbitances be of leſſe moment they ought to be borne, and p. 18. If mortall and deſtructive neither can be otherwiſe redreſſed, then prevention by Reſiſtance may be uſed. Here firſt he challengeth my ingenuity, for words ſpoken in my 49. page. He ſaid Sect. 1. of his firſt booke, We may and ought to deny obedience to ſuch commands of the Prince as are unlawfull by the Law of God; yea by the eſtabliſhed lawes of the Land. I cenſured this ſpeech, that it is more then ſhould be ſaid, ſure, a hainous fault in me: I ſay more; he hath ſaid more then ſhould be ſaid, by all theſe three bookes, in which he ſayes that which diſſolves all frames of Government into arbitrary, overthrowes all effectuall limitation of Power; and ſure that is more then ſhould be ſaid. And for that particular clauſe; Is it not more? He ſpeakes without reſtriction: Doth joyne things unlawfull by the law of God, and things unlawfull by the lawes of the Land: And puts the ſame may and ought to both; if the affirmation muſt be underſtood univerſally of one, how can it be underſtood otherwiſe of the other: It cannot be excuſed from the cenſure49 of a confuſed and unwary ſpeech. He paſſeth, p. 37. to the Queſtion, Who ſhall be the ultime judge of ſubverſive exorbitancies. He would know who? I have told him my opinion hereof at large in that Tract: Here I would faine know his; but he would rather carp at mine, then give his own. When I ſay there can be no Authoritative judge to determine it. He commends my ingenuity, p. 37. but I doe not only ſay it, but at large doe prove it, there p. 67. as well againſt him, as againſt thoſe others; why doth he not undertake that Queſtion againſt me, if he hath any mind to it. He much diſlikes when I ſay, p. 18. The fundament all Lawes muſt judge in every mans conſcience. This is, ſayes he, a ready way to anarchy and confuſion, p. 37. I referre not this caſe to the conſciences of men as to an Authoritative Judge, but a morall principle of diſcerning Right: And who can deny unto man ſuch a liberty to conceive of right according to the light he hath from the fundamentals of a State? Let the judicious reade what I have ſaid here-about, p. 67. of that Tract; and let him then tell how that Queſtion can be otherwiſe determined, unleſſe he overthrow. Monarchy, by giving a finall judgement to the States; or all Liberty, if he give it to the Monarch; and ſuppoſing the Ayme at ſubverſion be evident to mens conſciences, can we deny them a naturall power of judging according to that evidence; or liberty of aſſiſting the wronged? So when I ſay the wronged ſide muſt make it evident to every mans conſcience: alſo the appeale must be to the Community, as if there were no Government; and as every man is convinced in conſcience he is bound to give aſſiſtance, p. 29. of my Tract: He calls this good ſtuffe, p. 37. Why? becauſe I ſay, the people are at liberty as if there were no Government; and this appeale is diſadvantagious to the Monarch; for they will be more ready to believe their repreſentative: This would in the conſequence be dangerous, the high way to confuſion, p. 38. Anſw. 1. I ſay, not ſimply, that people are at liberty, as if there were no Government; but in this particular Question; bound ſtill, as before, in all beſides. 2. He takes me as if by Community I meant only the Commons; when I expreſſe it by genus humanum, eſpecially of that Kingdome. 3. He cenſures the Reaſon of Man-kind of partiality towards their Repreſentatives. Not ſo; for in ſo great a Queſtion Wiſe men cannot be blinded: Honest men will goe according to their conſcience, and Reaſonoble men according to evidence, and will ſee it concernes them as well to avoid Anarchy by aiding a wronged Monarch; as Tyranny by aiding an oppreſſed50 State. But ſith this Replicant is ſo bitter an enveigher againſt an Appeale ad conſcientiom generis humani, in this laſt caſe ſo uncapeable of an Authoritative deciſion: 1. Let him conſider on what foundation God hath built Monarchy and all other powers, but on the conſciences of men, Rom. 13. 2. Let him weigh whether, when he hath ſaid all he can ſay, ſuch an appeale be avoidable. For, 1. If a controverſie ariſe between the King and a particular perſon or place; the King ſhall Judge it in his Courts by his Judges, and the ſentence ſhall be executed by the force and armes of his other ſubjects. 2. If it be between Him and the Repreſentatives of his whole Kingdome, and ſupreme Court of Judicature in which the Acts and Perſons of all other Courts and Judges are to be judged. The King cannot judge this in his other Courts and by his Judges; nor yet by himſelfe; for a King out of his Courts cannot judge in a Legall Government, eſpecially the acts of his ſupreme Court. But be it ſo: ſuppoſe the Doctor and I ſhould agree in this, that the King by himſelfe is the ultime Judge of Controverſies: Yet it is very like thoſe States with whom the Contention is, will not yeild him ſo, to judge againſt them, in his own cauſe. But ſuppoſe they doe not ſubmit to his determination: He will ſay, then they ſin, and rebell againſt him. Well, let it be granted; yet ſubmit they doe not: I demand in this caſe, what courſe the King hath to make effectuall his ſentence? It muſt be by force of armes, by the ſword: but of whom? Either the peoples whoſe repreſentatives they are; or other mens: but what ſhall bind them to afford their Force to make good his ſentence? It muſt be their conſcience of his right: Thus when all is done and ſaid, To the conſciences of Men muſt his appeall be; and to them muſt he make evident his right, in this extreme contention. Yea this man in a controverſie of the like nature, is compelled to acknowledge as much: For the Pleaders put the caſe; If a King be diſtracted, I may adde, if his Title be dubious, &c. The Doctors anſwer is, if it be cleare that a King is ſo, &c. p. 8. but who ſhall determine this If? muſt not ſelf-evidence in the conſciences of Men? This is all the judiciall power the Doctour can referre us to in theſe caſes. Laſtly, He would know what power there is in a Community to make reſiſtance; and anſwers himſelfe, A Parliamentary and Legall; not Military and Forcible, p. 38. Thus he ſpeakes of theſe as contradiſtinct, when they are ſubordinate, Forcible being ſubſervient to Legall to make it valid and effectuall, which elſe were meerely51 morall and ineffectuall; but this is one of his ſuppoſals whoſe vanity I have before diſcovered: And p. 51. of my Treatiſe, in a full diſpute have I proved the Parliaments power in reſiſting deſtructive inſtruments; which I doubt not, will appeare cleare, notwithſtanding any thing ſaid in this Reply. But that is very ſtrange which he affirmes, p. 39. That if they uſe a Legall reſtraining power, the Monarch cannot alter the establiſhed frame. Sure, by cannot, he underſtands fallaciouſly, as he uſeth to doe, a morall cannot, that is, not without ſin; which is a poor ſmall cannot now adays: if he mean indeed cannot, that is, is not able, it is againſt reaſon, by his grounds; for what is not he able to doe, whoſe loweſt, moſt deſperate inſtrument of pleaſure is unreſiſtible? Let him remember where he ſaid, p. 19. A forcible conſent cannot be wanting to a Conquerour, and a Conquerours power is no more then unreſiſtible. Nay; I am ſenſeleſſe on the Doctors grounds, if he cannot lawfully; for ſuppoſe he be pleaſed to make it a Queſtion, whether he were not better governe by the Civill-Law, as more conducent to Gods glory, and the end of Government. He is by Law the laſt judge of this Queſtion, if he determine it beſt: then he may lawfully doe it.
Now we are come to the ſecond part of this Section: in which heSect. 2undertakes the proofe of this Aſſertion,His Arguments againſt power of reſiſtance reſerved. anſwered. that Limitations and Mixtures in Monarchy doe not imply a forcible conſtraining power in ſubjects for the preventing of diſſolution, but only a Legall, p. 39. Anſw. He failes in the very propoſall of his Aſſertion in three points. 1. He propoſeth it of Limitation in generall; whereas I grant it of that which is only in exerciſe; affirming it only of that which is of the power it ſelfe. 2. He ſayes, Forcible conſtraining power in ſubjects, when he ſhould have ſpecified againſt ſubverſive inſtruments, for I grant it of the Monarch himſelfe. 3. He oppoſeth forcible to Legall, when it ſhould be oppoſed only to meere Morall, not to Legall, as before. Now let us weigh his Arguments. Firſt, Such a power muſt be in them by reſervation, and then it muſt be expreſſe in the conſtitution of the Government and Covenant, or elſe by implication. I will anſwer diſtinctly concerning this Reſervation of power of forcible Reſiſtance. 1. There is a Reſervation of liberty, or power of not being ſubject neither actively nor paſſively to the exceeding Acts of the Monarchs will: This is by implication, for what they did not reſigne up, they did reſerve. 2. A power of Authoritative judging52 and reſiſting the Monarch thus exceeding. This neither expreſſely nor implicitly is reſerved; not becauſe it is unlawfull, as the Doctor imagins, but contradictory to the very inſtitution of a Monarchy, and ſo, under that intention, impoſſible. 3. A power of forcible reſiſtance of ſubverſive inſtruments. This by the Authority of the Law, is, not reſerved, but expreſſely commited, not only to the Houſes of Parliament, but all inferiour Courts; for the Law, whoſe execution the King committeth unto them, commands them not only to reſiſt, but puniſh its violaters, much more its ſubverters, without exceptions of Perſons, or reſpect of their number, or ground and reaſon why they doe it, whether with or againſt the Kings private and abſolute will or Warrant: ſuppoſing ſuch men to be without warrant. And this power of judging all violators and ſubverters of Laws being committed to them, includes a power of imploying the force or Armes of the County, or whole Kingdome, if need be, to make good the ſentence of the Law againſt them: This power being a neceſſary attendant to the former. And they who have the power of judging by Commiſſion, have the power of force by implication. To his five Arguments therefore by which he proves this power not reſerved by implication; I briefly Anſwer. 1. Limitation cannot infer it, &c. Anſwer, Limitation in exerciſe only doth not: but in the power it ſelfe doth infer it, as I have often ſhewed. 2. The inconveniencies of exorbitancie cannot infer it. Anſwer, They doe not infer it of themſelves, for they are the ſame in abſolute Rule: but ſuppoſing a people mind in their Frame effectually to prevent thoſe inconveniencies, that doth infer it. 3. The conſent and intention of the people, chooſing a Monarch cannot infer it, becauſe it is not the meaſure of the power it ſelfe. Anſwer, I have before proved the contrary, and made the Doctors ſuppoſall appeare a groundleſſe falſhood concerning unlimited power by Gods ordinance. 4. The intention of the people in procuring Limitations of power cannot infer it. Anſwer, If the peoples intention in it, be a greater ſecurity from oppreſſion then in an abſolute Government they can have, or a meere morall limitation can give them; then it doth inferre it. 5. If the Architects did intend ſuch a forceable power to theſe States, they would not have beſt it in his power to diſſolve them, p. 42. This hath had its full ſatiſfaction before. Theſe are poore infirme arguments, as the reader cannot but ſee, yet he ends in a triumph. Therefore I conclude here as I promiſed in the ſecond Section, where the Prince ſtands ſupreme, &c.53 there Subjects may not by force of armes reſiſt, though he be exorbitant, &c. p. 43. 'Tis true he concludes as he promiſed, but he hath not proved, as he promiſed; nor as we expected; for here is nothing, but that which fals to the ground with his ſuppoſals on which they are built; and which I have demoliſhed in the 4th Chapter.
CHAP. VII. An Anſwer to the 7th Section of his Replie, of places of Scripture out of the old Testament.
HIs ſixt Section doth wholly concerne the Authour of the fullerSect. 1Anſwer, which I paſſe over, becauſe I am chargeable for no more then is my owne. And come to his ſeventh which containes an Examination of places alledged in this Queſtion out of the old Teſtament. Where he begins confidently that there is no warrant for Reſistance, p. 56. and he yeelds two Reaſons why. 1. Becauſe the Inſtitution of that Kingdom was ſuch as doth plainly exclude Reſiſtance. 2. Becauſe the Prophets never call for it. Anſ. I grant it doth exclude it, as farre as in an abſolute Monarchie it may be excluded; and therefore there is no need of anſwering his Arguments. But yet let us conſider them ſith he is ſo large in them.
To ſhew us the Inſtitution of that Kingdome he brings, 1 Sam. 8.11. Where he ſayes we have it. For Samuel is commanded, v. 9. To tell the people (Jus Regis:) Now this jus Regis he makes a great matter of, and tels us it implies not a Right of doing ſuch unjuſt Acts, but a ſecuritie from Reſiſtance and force, if he does them. p. 56.
Anſ. 1. It is no prejudice to the cauſe I defend, if I ſhould grant all he would worke out of this Text; for it prooves no farther then of that particular Kingdome, inducing no neceſſitie that all others muſt have the ſame Inſtitution. Alſo that which he concludes is but a ſecuritie for the Perſon of the Prince from force if he doe ſuch unjuſt Acts: which we grant him not only in that, but all Monarchies, even the moſt limited.
2. If he have any further reach, and would conclude out of it a generall binding Ordinance of ſecurity from Reſiſtance entending even to ſubverſive Inſtruments of Will. The world will wonder at him for ſuch an audacious concluſion from ſuch premiſes. And we will look a little nearer to what he ſayes. All is grounded on his Interpretation54 of Jus Regis. Which he ſeeks to confirme by Calvins Authority.
Firſt, for his Interpretation. I ſay the Originall words in this place are not to be tranſlated jus Regis, the Right of the King. Becauſe 1. There is another more fit ſignification of them: the words are〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉now the word〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉being applied to unjuſt Acts, as here it is ought not to be rendred jus, but mos, not Right, but manner, as appeares by another place anſwerable to this, 1 Sam. 27.11. 〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉ſpeaking of Davids roving, This will be his manner, 'twere ridiculous to render it, this will be his right or priviledge. This out laſt Interpreters knowing, did willingly depart from the Ʋulgar Latine; whoſe Authour either ignorantly or inconſiderately did render it jus Regis; which this Doctour for his advantage doth here make ſo much of. 2. That rendring of it, cannot be juſtified by any other Text of Scripture; for wherſoever it is rendred Jus, it imports a morall Right; not a priviledge or ſecuritie in ill doing. I challenge any skilfull in that tongue to bring one place where it is or can be ſo rendred.
Then for Calvins Authority. I anſwer. 1. What if Calvin or any other deceived by the vulgar Latine, or ignorance of the extent of the Originall word, have rendred it ill; muſt that be a preſcription to others who know a better? 2. Neither doth Calvin, though he follow the Latine and render it jus, meane ſuch a jus as the Doctour doth, ſc. An abſolute immunity, or ſecurity from Reſiſtance: but onely from private men. For after he hath in all thoſe paſſages, which the Doctour cites, exempted Kings from violence, truly and piouſly urging patience in Subjects under the injuries of their Princes, at length Inſtit. l. 4. c. 10. (the ſame out of the which the Doctor brings his proofes) num. 31. He explaines himſelfe, De privatis hominibus ſemper loquor, that all is to be taken of private men; not of the States of a Kingdome, in their publike meetings: never diſcerning of ſuch a univerſall immunitie, as the Doctour would put upon him to maintaine. And here I challenge not the Ingenuity, but the Conſcience of this Replier, who cites Calvin at large in the former place, as agreeing with him in this caſe of Reſiſtance, when he cannot be ignorant of the contrary, and therefore conceales his following words in the 31. num. Where he expreſſely teaches the ſame Truth which I have aſſerted in my Treatiſe. Heare him ſpeaking his judgement, De privatis hominibus ſemper loquor: Nam ſi qui nunc ſunt populares magiſtratus ad55 moderandum Regum libidinem constituti (quales olim erant, qui Lacedemonijs regibus oppoſiti erant, Ephori, aut Romanis Conſulibus, Tribuni plebis; aut Athenienſium Senatui, Demarchi; & qua etiam forte potestate (ut nunc res habent) funguntur in ſingulis regnis tres ordines, cum primarios conventus peragunt) adeo illos fenocienti Regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto, ut ſi Regibus impotenter graſſantibus, & humili plebeculae inſultantibus conniveant, eorum diſſimulationem nefaria perfidia non carere affirmem, quia populi libertatem cui ſe, Dei ordinatione, Tutores poſitos norunt, fraudulenter produnt. He is cleare, that the Eſtates in Parliament, not only may, but are Gods ordinance for it, and are bound to reſiſt, and not ſuffer the deſtruction of liberties, by exorbitating Princes; ſo that I may juſtly retort the Doctors words, p. 57. There can be nothing ſpoken more plainly for the power of reſiſtance in the Houſes of Parliament then this.
Then for his other reaſon from the 18. verſe, Ye ſhall cry out in that day, and the Lord will not heare you. As in my Treatiſe I called it inconſequent; ſo alſo now: He is a good Logician which can draw his concluſion out of thoſe premiſes. But he blames me, p. 58. for ſaying it was an abſolute Monarchy, and cannot ſee how it can be ſo, according to my deſcription of abſoluteneſſe. Why not? In Abſolute Monarchy, there are no limits but the Monarchs own will; but theſe had a fixed judiciall Law, p. 59. I anſwer, That judiciall Law was no limits of their power; but of the exerciſe only; for the non obſervance of it by the King did not amount to an untying of the bond of ſubjection in the people. The Judiciall Laws being from God, not from any contract of the people, were in the ſame nature to that people, and for the time, with the Morall Laws; and in the ſame manner did limit their Kings, and no otherwiſe. But for the Abſoluteneſſe of that Monarchy, here Lyra (more faithfully cited,Lyra, in 1 Sam. 8. then he did Calvin above) Conſtitutio Regis juxta poteſtatem ſibi conceſſum eſt duplex.) 1. Plena & legibus abſoluta, prout legiſte de Imperatore dicere ſolent. 2. Cum poteſtate limitata. Now ſayes he, the people ſinned, not ſimply in asking a King; but in asking a King of the firſt ſort, to judge them as the Nations, that is, abſolutely. He is expreſſe. 1. That limitation of power makes a limited Monarch. 2. That Iſrael deſiring ſuch a Government as the adjacent Nations, deſired an abſolute Monarch. And indeed as the definement of the morall Law doth not diſparage the Abſoluteneſſe of the56 Monarch, becauſe it is from God, not the people; ſo did not their judiciall, for the ſame reaſon.
Sect 2Next he comes to the peoples reſcue of Jonathan, p. 60. He may give their reſolute Oath what names pleaſeth him, a loving importunate violence, a ſouldierly boldneſſe, or the like; it was a peremptory expreſſion of no leſſe then an intent of reſiſtance, in caſe there had been need. Then for Davids purpoſe in having armed men about him; He ſays it was only to ſecure his perſon against the cut-throates of Saul, that is, againſt his private Emiſſaries. But who ſees not a large difference betweene ſecuring a mans ſelfe from private Emiſſaries, and appearing in the field with Armies against the Armies of the Prince, p. 61. Anſwer, 1. It is againſt reaſon, that he ſhould retaine an Army of 600. valiant Souldiers, yea a great Army, like the Hoſt of God, 1 Chron. 12.22. to ſecure himſelfe meerely againſt private Emiſſaries. 2. Let us grant him that there is a difference between ſecuring againſt private Emiſſaries, and the open Army: yet if he grant it lawfull to uſe force againſt one, he grants the cauſe by it, of all; for a warrant from an act of the Kings will is as valid to ſecure a few Emiſſaries, as a whole Army: and Gods Ordinance in one man, is no more reſiſtible, then in a multitude. Then for Davids intent to keep Keylah againſt Saul, it is ſo evident, by the hiſtory, that I will ſay no more about it; but doe refer him to that which the Pleaders for defenſive Armes ſay about it. The Doctor ſeeks divers evaſions, to get out of the reach of this example; but doth not ſatisfie himſelfe, much leſſe others, and therefore adds the fourth on which he muſt reſt when all is ſaid, That Davids example was extraordinary: Hereon he brings ſome things in him which were extraordinary; We grant it in many things; but we deny it in this. If the Doctor will prove him to have a ſpeciall priviledge to reſiſt Gods ordinance in his Soveraign, more then other men; he muſt bring the grant and warrant for it: otherwiſe David muſt come under the common condition for this matter: He himſelfe acknowledges he had none for violating the perſon of his Prince; and ſure then he had none for violating the Authority of his Prince, conferred on private Emiſſaries, if they had any. But in his p. 65. He layes hard at me, and challengeth not only my Reaſon for calling this a ſhufling Anſwer, but alſo my ingenuity, who confeſſe the people in that Government might not reſiſt; and yet doe urge theſe examples for Reſiſtance. Anſwer, 1. For my Reaſon: I have made it appeare I have reaſon to call57 it ſo; is it not a meere evaſion, to affirme in him an extraordinary priviledge, and can bring no word, nor warrant for it? 2. For my ingenuity it is without cauſe challenged by him; for from the lawfullneſſe of Reſiſtance of unreaſonable Acts of will, in an abſolute Monarchy, where Reaſon is the Princes law; I may a fortiori conclude the lawfulneſſe of reſiſting of inſtruments of illegall Acts in a limited Monarchy, where the Law of the Land is the Princes Law and bounds.
CHAP. VIII. The 8. Section concerning Reſiſtance forbidden, Rom. 13. anſwered.
NOw we are come to his principall ſtrength againſt Reſiſtance outSect. 1of Rom. 13. From whence nothing can be collected againſt any Reſiſtance, but that which is of the Powers, of the Ordinance: but that which I defend is of neither of them, therefore I have no cauſe to feare his inferences from that Text. Now ſuppoſing the truth which I have made good, that in a limited State the limitation is of the Power it ſelfe, and not only of the exerciſe; it followes evidently that in ſuch a State reſiſtance of deſtructive inſtruments, is neither of Power nor Gods Ordinance. I might therefore well omit that which at large here he ſpeakes of Reſiſtance of the Powers. The firſt part of the Section is ſpent in replying to the Exceptions of the Reverend Divines. The firſt thing I find which concernes me is, p. 77. I will therefore begin with him there. Where he accuſeth me that in my 59, 64, and 66. page of that Treatiſe, I grant they might not reſiſt in that Monarchy; but affirme that ſubjects may in this; and he brings me in giving two Reaſons for it. 1. Becauſe Religion was then no part of the Lawes, but here it is. 2. Becauſe that was an Abſolute Monarchy, this a Limited and mixed, p. 77. But may I not here challenge both the ingenuity and conſcience of this Replyer. Did I ever grant that Gods Ordinance of Power might be reſiſted here; or give any Reaſons for ſo unreaſonable an Aſſertion? It would be tedious to repeate here, what I have ſaid there. Let the Reader ſee; if he pleaſe. I will recite the ſumme. 1. The Doctor affirmed, that in the Apoſtles time the Senate of Rome might challenge more then our Parliaments can now, I denied it, and gave my reaſon, ſc. That State was then devolved into a Monarchy by Conqueſt, &c. of this the Doctor ſpeakes not a word, perhaps he is now aſhamed of that compariſon. 2. He ſaid, there was greater cauſe of Reſiſtance then, than now. I anſwered. There58 was then no cauſe at all: Not for Religion, being then, no part of the Law: Not Liberties; becauſe then that was paſt, the Government changed; and an Oath taken of abſolute ſubjection. Have I by theſe things granted a liberty of Reſiſtance of Gods Ordinance to this people; and deny it to thoſe? No; Neither They, nor We; not that enſlaved Senate; nor our free Parliaments, no cauſe, no priviledge can juſtifie this. Yea I aſcribe more to Gods Ordinance of Power, then He: He ſayes that in a limited ſtate we owe only paſſive ſubjection to exceeding commands of a Prince by promiſe limiting himſelfe in the uſe of his power. I ſay; though he ſin in exceeding ſuch promiſe; yet we owe him alſo Active obedience in ſuch commands which Gods Law forbids us not to be Active in. Neither doe I bring Doctor Bilſons teſtimony to prove that Religion was then no part of the Law, as he affirmes I doe, p. 77. but ſure he neither heeded what I had written, nor what himſelfe wrote. I laid down an Aſſertion that Gods Ordinance of which St Paul ſpeakes, is the Power and the Perſon of him which is ſupremely inveſted with that Power; and for this did I bring Dr Bilſon; who, explaining the Power there forbidden to be reſiſted, ſayes it is the Princes will not againſt his Lawes; but agreeing to his Lawes. Here he ſerves Dr Bilſon and other Divines, as before the King, and the Parliaments, teaches them a meaning contrary to their words: They meane ſuch ſtates as may by the knowne Laws uſe forceable reſtraint: No ſuch meaning of his words: He makes no diſtinction of ſtates; but expounds the Text in queſtion, ſpeaking of Gods Ordinance in generall, in all Rulers: He knowes it well enough; and therefore addes, They were willing to excuſe as much as might be thoſe motions of the Proteſtants in France and the Low-Countries; but had they lived now, they would have spoken more cautelouſly. That is, They ſpake raſhly, wronged the truth, and reached their conſciences to excuſe the commotions and rebellions of thoſe dayes. This is like a Doctor. But he likes the Homilie better then them all, that ſpeakes home, he ſayes; but what, he ſpeakes not, nor doe I anſwer. But he will try the force of this exception, becauſe I profeſſe, with Mr Burrowes, againſt Reſiſting of Authority though abuſed: And with Dr Bilſon, admit of reſiſting the Princes will againſt the Lawes: This is faſt and looſe, ſayes he. How ſo? In limited Monarchies, where the Prince hath no Authority beyond the Law: there an act beyond the Law is unauthoritative and meerely private; ſo that it is no abuſing of59 Authority; but an exceeding of Authority. Authority abuſed to undue acting of matters within its compaſſe, Mr Burrowes ſpeakes of, and that muſt not be reſiſted. But the Princes will acting againſt his Law, that is matters without the compaſſe of Authority is not Gods ordinance, ſayes Dr Bilſon, and ſo may be reſted in its inſtruments. I ſtill ſay, let him prove ſuch acts to proceed from Authority, I will diſclaime Reſiſtance of their inſtruments, either the meaneſt Constable in the Land, or Souldier in the army. But how cloudes he this truth which is cleare as the day? 1. In that Government under which the Apoſtle lived, men might not reſiſt, though the Powers commanded contrary to Law, as oft they did: Not under the Arrian Emperours, though religion was then a part of the law, p. 78. Anſwer, 1. Dr Abbot that learned Biſhop of Sarum was of another judgement; Demonſtrat. Antichrist, c. 7. In that Government he doth diſtinguiſh the Chriſtians carriage according to the diſtinction of times. At firſt before Religion was eſtabliſhed by Law, caedebantur, non caedebant, but after Conſtantines time when it was eſtabliſhed by Law. Caedebant, non caedebantur. 2. We may grant it in that Government, becauſe it was abſolute, and the Laws were to the Prince but morall limitations of exerciſe: And, as I have often acknowledged, Acts of the Princes will, exceeding ſuch limitation, are poteſtative, and muſt not be reſiſted: but it will not follow that therefore they are ſo, in governments where the Laws are limitations of the power it ſelfe, and exceeding acts are not poteſtative. Sure in thoſe times, as patient as the Chriſtians were, under their perſecutours, if their Religion and perſons had been aſſaulted without Authority, they would have made Reſiſtance: And this is all we affirme. 2. He makes two inquiries, 1. Whether the firſt Parliament in Qu. Elizabeths reigne might have reſiſted her endeavours to change the eſtabliſhed Religion? Anſwer, They had ſinned in withſtanding the introduction of truth, and the Abolition of Falſhood; yet civilly and legally they might have done it: and abrogate a Law without the States ſhe could not. But, bleſſed be God there was no ſuch oppoſition; but a joynt conſent of all three Legiſlative Powers. 2. How can the putting down of Epiſcopall Government, be now juſtified which ſtands by Law? Anſwer; It cannot, unleſſe there be a confluence of the conſent of all three; nor doe I believe it is intended without the Kings conſent, Unleſſe their conſtant doctrine and practiſe to overthrow the liberties and Government of this Kingdome60 into Arbitrarines doe prove them in all their ſort ſubverſive, and inconſiſtent with its ſafe being: Let therefore the Doctour and the reſt of them looke how they continue to maintain ſuch deſtructive Doctrins: for they will ſooner remove themſelves out of this Church, then the Subjects out of their ancient and juſt Liberties.
Sect 2At length let us ſee what he ſayes againſt the abſolute condition of the Romane Emperours. His other exception is, they were abſolute Monarches, and therefore not to be reſisted, p. 79. Anſ. He doth me manifeſt injury: See my Treatiſe, I no where ſo argue; nor have I any need; for I equally affirm it of limited, as of abſolute power, that they ought not to be reſiſted; for they are equally Gods Ordinance, wch extends to the powers that are: Neither have I any need of that diſtinction to ſatisfie the Apoſtles Text: I aſſerted not the abſoluteneſſe of the Imperiall authoritie for any ſuch reaſon: but againſt his falſe affirmation, That that Senate in St Pauls time, might challenge more then our great Councell can now. Here is apparent il dealing. But what can he oppoſe to what I ſaid about the abſolutenes of thoſe Roman Emperours? 1. It cannot be cleared that they were de jure abſolute. An. Yes, it can; according to the Doctors own grounds; for, 1. There was a full Conqueſt made by Julius Caeſar in that fatall battell againſt Pompey not only of him;Seneca. cōſol ad Marciam. but in and with him, of the whole Senate, for in eo prima acies ſenatus fuit, ſays Seneca. And the ſtrugling remainders of the free Senate were again vanquiſhed in that battle of Octavius againſt Caſſius and Brutus. From that time all being proſtrate to his Will. 2. There was a ſubmiſſion to an Abſolute yoake. Romae ruere in ſervitium Conſules,Annal. l. 1. ſ•. Patres, Eques, ſays Tacitus: yea the Senate was ſo forward to it, that Tiberius was wont to ſay, as oft as he went out of the Court,Ib. l. 3 ſ 11 O homines ad ſervitutem natos! 3. There was alſo an eſtabliſhment of this ſubjection by an Oath: for the Senate and Armies were brought under the ſame bond; and all this before St Pauls converſion. That which he brings out of latter Authours, p. 80. of the Lex regia, quâ populus principi omne ſuum imperium & potestatem contulit: and his conjectures of it's not being before Veſpaſians time, is not worth a looking into: It was a formall complement of flattery to give that to him in words, which he had in power and Ʋſe ſo many yeares before. Alſo that of their forbearing the Diadem and Title of King, being contented only with that of Prince, was but the putting on a ſilken vaile upon a rough government. Vnder that ſmooth Title the people and Senate were held as much under, as the61 grand ſeigneur or Perſian now hold their Vaſſals. But they did perquam aiu magnam poteſtatis partem cum ſenatu communicare, p. 80. They did ſo; 'Twas their indulgence, or rather policie to impart it. It is affirmed, not by uncertaine Collections of late Authours; but by Tacitus, who is inſtar omneum in this buſineſſe;Annal. l. 1. ſ. 1. l. 3. ſ. 10. of Auguſtus the firſt and beſt of them all, Poſito Triumviri nomine, conſulem ſe ferens, inſurgere paulatim, munia Magiſtratuum, ſenatus, Legum inſe trahere; and of Tiberius, that imaginem antiquitatis ſenatui praebebat. They conveyed their will through the old channell of the Senate, that it might reliſh the better with the people; yet at pleaſure did what they liſted, by them, and againſt them. 2. He ſayes, The Apoſtle in his reaſon againſt Reſistance hath no respect to the abſolute or limited condition of thoſe Roman Emperours. Nor doe I ſay, he hath: the Reaſon he urgeth is the Ordinance of God, which is true without diſtinction of the whole latitude of Power. 3. A limited condition doth no more inferre a lawfullneſſe of reſistance for exorbitances, then an Abſolute, p. 82. I ſay not, that it doth; no condition can inferre a lawfulneſſe of Reſiſtance of the Power, though abuſed; but here is the priviledge of a people under a limited Monarch, his exceeding Acts are not abuſes of Power; but ſimply non poteſtative; and therefore their Agents may be reſiſted, without reſiſting the power; which is not ſo in an abſolute Rule; if there were no priviledge, why did men trouble themſelves in conſtituting Limitations, and Mixtures in a State: In a word, unleſſe he can prove Power in all Limited States, to be illimited: and all the Acts of will in the ſupreme to flow from Gods Ordinance: He labours in vain from that text, or any elſe to conclude againſt Reſiſtance of ſubverſive Inſtruments in a mixed Government.
CHAP. IX. His ninth Section Anſwered: the Reaſons againſt Reſiſtance ſatisfied: and thoſe for Reſiſtance vindicated.
WE are now come to his laſt Section: In examination of whichSect. 1it will appeare that he hath as little Reaſon as Scripture aagainſt that Reſistance which I have aſſerted in my Treatiſe. Herein he doth two things. 1. Brings his Reaſons againſt Reſiſtance. 2. Endeavours to anſwer thoſe which I brought for it. But for more evident proceeding about both, we muſt diſtinctly call to mind the Queſtion, of what it is. 1. It is of Reſiſtance in this ſtate; that is, a ſtate62 which I have proved to be limited and mixed in the very power it ſelfe. 2. It is only of Reſiſtance of deſtructive Inſtruments: Therefore if his Reaſons doe not reach to ſuch a Reſiſtance, they are not to the purpoſe.
Now againſt Reſiſtance the Doctour brings no fewer then nine Reaſons; In his firſt booke he had only five, here he hath made up in number, what they wanted in weight. I will in few words anſwer them diſtinctly, for many need not. 1. His firſt is from the wiſdom of God putting his people under Kings, without power of Reſiſtance; this ſhould be to us inſtead of a moſt forceable Reaſon, p. 84. Anſw. Well it may be inſtead of one; but it is not one. For 1. It was their deſire to be under an Abſolute Government, as their neighbour Countries were; and they offended God in it, as Lyra obſerves; therefore he giving them ſuch a King as they deſired; did not in his wiſdome intend a binding forme for all people: I thinke the Doctour will not affirme he did. 2. If he meane Reſiſtance of their Prince his Authority and perſon, I grant they were ſo put under; and ſo are we, and all that are put under Monarches; but if he mean the Acts of the Princes will which were not Authoritative; I do denie it, and the former alledged inſtances prove they were not: and that is all I affirme in other Monarchies.
2. The word of God gives no direction for it. The Prophets call not on the Elders for it: The new Teſtament commends patience in ſuffering for well-doing, Anſw. 1. In Civill matters negative reaſonings from Scripture are not proving. 2. The word gives proving and imitable examples for it, as before: and indeed the Scripture doth every way juſtifie reſiſtance of cut-throats and private deſtructive Aſſaulters of Laws and Liberties, who have no Authority derived to them; and I defend no other.
3. The Apoſtle forbids Reſiſtance of the Powers, not from any compact of the people, but from the Ordinance of God. 'Tis true: for no compact of people could eſtabliſh an unreſiſtible Power without the Ordinance of God. I acknowledge the Apoſtles ground for it: and therefore allow no reſiſtance where there is Gods Ordinance to ſecure them, not for any abuſe.
4. To be ſupreme and next to God implies a ſecurity from Reſiſtance, p. 85. I grant all; His Perſon, his Power is hereby ſecured: I condemn all riſing up againſt the King: but inſtruments of ſubverſion, have nothing63 of the King in them: not his perſon nor Authoritie is riſen up againſt in them. For his conceits about jus Regis I have ſaid enough above. Neither doe I give to the Houſes the power of the Lacedemonian Ephori. They had an Authority over the very perſon of the King: which the Houſes claime not. I give them no more then Calvin doth to the three Eſtates in their generall meetings. The Doctor well knowes what I will anſwer him; which he ſeeks to evade, 1. By affirming that the Reſiſting of Inſtruments acting by his Power, which he hath committed to them, is a reſisting of him, p. 86. 'Tis true, it is ſo; but we ſpeake of inſtruments, which act not by his power, that is, his Authoritie; but by his will in a courſe exceeding the Limitation of his Authority. Could he prove that a limited Prince could commit Power to doe acts without the bounds of his Power, the Queſtion were anſwered, els he beggs it, but anſwers it not. 2. He would deſire me to look again upon the two Aſſertions of the Reverend Divines which I reject: He cannot conceive, how I can retaine my owne Aſſertion, and reject theirs. The Doctour hath a great mind to pick ſome contradiction in me; but ſtill failes in his endeavour. In good earneſt, doth he ſpeake really, when he ſayes, he cannot conceive, &c. Well, let us looke againe on the two Aſſertions which I reject in them. 1. Governours who under pretence of Authoritie from Gods Ordinance diſturbe the quiet and godly life, are farre from being Gods Ordinance in ſo doing. 2. This tyrannie not being Gods Ordinance, they which reſiſt it even with armes, reſist not the Ordinance of God. Doe I defend any Aſſertions equivalent to theſe. Rather I aſſert in that Treatiſe, and here alſo the contrary. 1. Governours whither in abſolute or limited States, keeping within the meaſure of their power, may diſturbe the quiet and godly life, and yet be Gods Ordinance in that act, though croſſing the end of Gods Ordinance in it. 2. Powers though abuſed, yet being Gods Ordinance, they which reſiſt even in abuſive acts of it, reſiſt the Ordinance of God. Is here no difference? Cannot I retaine this Aſſertion, that exceeding Acts in limited Monarchie are not Gods Ordinance, and may in inſtruments be reſiſted: And yet reject theirs, who maintain reſiſtance of Governours themſelves, in all acts of abuſed power? He makes no difference between Acts exceeding bounds of power: and Acts of abuſed power: but of this more then enough before. 3. But he will anſwer more particularly, ſo he had need. What is it? He that beares the ſword, that is, has the ſupreme Power, gives Commiſſion to under-Miniſters for64 Juſtice; and to other Officers for the Militia: If therefore the Reſiſtance of thoſe though abuſing their Power, be a reſistance of the Power; ſo it is alſo of theſe. Anſw. I grant all: for it proceeds only of Miniſters abuſing Power committed to them: not of Exceſſes of Power. I will retort it. Like as if when the ſupreme gives Commiſſion of Juſtice to a Judge; and he exceeding unto Acts without the compaſſe of his Commiſſion is but a private man in thoſe Acts and may be reſiſted: ſo if Commiſſion of Armes be given to a Generall, &c.
5. Subjection is due to a Prince, and the contrary forbidden without diſtinction of a good and bad Prince. I grant it, and give the reaſon, becauſe they are Gods Ordinance: but the Queſtion is of inſtruments of exceeding Acts, in which they are not Gods Ordinance.
6. Good reaſon that he which hath the ſupreme Truſt, ſhould have the greateſt ſecuritie, p. 87. Anſw. It is ſo; and ſo we grant him: for he hath a full ſecurity from all violence for both Perſon and Authoritie, what ever exorbitance he breakes out unto. The people have not ſo: Every Subject being under the penalty of the Law for it's tranſgreſſions. But the Doctor forgets his Clients, He is not arguing for ſecuritie of Soveraignes; but Subiects, if they may be ſo called, which endeavour to ſubvert lawes and governments. But may we not alſo ſay, as it is good reaſon the ſupreme ſhould have the greateſt ſecuritie; ſo the people alſo ſhould have ſome ſecuritie; and not be expoſed like bruit beaſts to the ſavage luſts of every inſtrument of cruelty: having only this to comfort them, that they ſin in ſo doing? and ſo they doe, which with cruelty deſtroy even the bruit creatures.
7. From the end and benefits of Government, for the enioying of which, it is good reaſon we ſhould beare with the exorbitances. Still he ſpeakes good reaſon; but nothing to the purpoſe; for we diſpute not of exorbitances of them who have the power; but of them who have no power for what they doe. In exorbitances of leſſer nature, their will may ſecure inſtruments; but it is againſt reaſon that the benefits we have by their Government ſhould cauſe us to beare with them who would deſtroy their laws and government, for of ſuch is the Queſtion. I wonder here againe he brings Calvin, when he cannot but know that he is expreſſely for power of Reſiſtance in the Houſes: and no doubt P. Martyr, and the reſt follow Calvin in this.
8. Power of Reſiſtance in Subiects would be a remedie worſe then the diſeaſe, and more ſubverſive of a State, then if it wore left without it, p. 90. 65Why would it be ſo? It would be a continuall Seminary of jealouſies twixt Prince and people, and confuſion through the continuance of the miſchiefes of Warre. Concerning this Argument of his, ſee p. 60. of my Treatiſe, where it is fully ſatisfied. 1. Who will believe the power of Reſiſting deſtructive inſtruments, ſhould be more deſtructive, then to let them alone without Reſiſtance? 2. Suppoſe by abuſe of this power thoſe evils ſhould happen (for it ſo fals out to the beſt phyſicke, where the nocumentous humours are prevailing) yet this is but by accident: ſuch Power per ſe and of its owne nature tends to the preventing of ſubverſion. On the contrary by woefull experience, this Doctrine of the unreſiſtibleneſſe of ſuch men, hath nurſed up a brood of audacious projectours, and where it is taught, a ſtate will never be without them. Whereas, if the Truth were knowne it would refraine the ſpirits of wicked men from paracide and State ſubverſion. Neither can any thing be more miſchievous, then to teach an impunitie for projectours, and Agents of miſchiefe: and he hath not the reaſon of a man who argues otherwiſe. 3. Neither can this doctrine, as the Replier traduces it, extend to the depoſing of Princes, or the deminiſhing of their Authority, for it concernes only their Inſtruments, not their Perſons; their Abſolute, extra-legall Will; not their Authority. And for iealouſies, they will be more bred by that Doctrine which gives the Prince a Power to undoe the State, then by that which terminates both; and gives neither a power to ſubvert the other; Danger is the nurſe of jealouſie: that which takes away power of hurting takes away Danger; and ſo removes iealouſies: but indeed ſuch which have a plot of breaking up the hedge of Government, and bringing lawleſſe powers into a State, care not for having ſuch a Power in thoſe Houſes whom it would cauſe them to feare, and looke on with continuall jealouſies. The Homily of Rebellion is in vaine cited againſt that which is no rebellion.
9. The laſt and weakeſt of all is that of the hearts of Kings being in Gods hands, Prov 21.1. and that of Gods Covenant with David and his ſeed, 2 Chron. 6.16. & 7.17. How the Doctor can draw hence a concluſion againſt Reſiſtance of ſubverſive inſtruments, I cannot imagine. Sure if theſe Texts had any proving force in them, they had not been brought ſo late: Rather then place had been in the former Section, where in the cloſe he ſaies, He choſe onely to inſiſt on thoſe Texts which are fit to beare argument but here he hath broke his word, yet he is excuſable, for he had no better.
66Sect. 2At length he comes to my Arguments brought for Reſiſtance. If they be not more concluding then his, would they had never ſeen the light, nor come to the eye of any judicious man. Let us ſee what he hath to ſay to them.
1. That Reſiſtance is lawfull which is no Reſiſtance of the Ordinance of God; but this of ſubverſive inſtruments is not, being neither of the Perſon nor Authority of the Prince. He ſayes, He hath propoſed and anſwered this above under his third and fourth Reaſons. And there I doubt not but the invaliditie of his Anſwer doth plainly appeare.
2. Without this Power of Reſiſtance all limitation of Government is vaine; and all formes reſolve into that which is arbitrary. He tels me, My Argument is inconſequent by my owne deſcription of Abſolute Monarchie: ſo that the reſtraint of a limited Monarch is Legall and Morall, not forceable and Military, p. 93. I anſwer, I deſcribe limited and Abſolute Monarchie not by Force; but the having or not having a bounds of Will; but how abſurd it is when the diſtinctive conceit in the definition of a limited Monarch, is a Law terminating his will to take it of a morall terminating, which is common to all, not only Monarches but men? Eſpecially ſith I explaine my ſelfe ſo fully afterwards, as I doe, there p. 7. in the three degrees of abſoluteneſſe. But I have above enough diſcovered the fraud and falſhood of his confounding of Legall and morall Limitation; and have prooved that to give a Limited Monarch only a morall Limitation, is to reſolve all into Abſolute and Arbitrary, for the moſt abſolute under heaven hath morall limitation.
3. Such Power is due to a publique State for its preſervation which is allowed to a particular perſon. He anſwers, this is not univerſally true. Why not? a State is more worthy, and comprehends a multitude of particular men: doth number detract from their priviledge? He would ſeeme to have reaſon for his deniall: A private man hath by the law of nature power of ſelfe-preſervation againſt the force of another private man; yet is this power yeelded up in regard of Civill Power, and not to be uſed againſt perſons indued with ſuch power, p. 94. 1. He ſtill ſpeakes Truth; but not to the Queſtion: which is not of perſons indued with civill power; but ſuch as we have proved to have no power; grant them endued with power, neither a particular man: or a whole Community muſt reſiſt them: but having none, it is much more allowable in a publique ſtate, then a particular perſon. 2. He ſpeakes of a power yeelded up,67 as if in all governments the people doe ſimply yeeld up all power of Reſiſtance into a full ſubjection unto all Acts of the Princes will: Whereas we have prooved, that in limited Governments it is not ſo: but to the Princes Will meaſured and regulated by a Law; and therefore they have that power ſtill, in reſpect of all inſtruments of acts of Will not ſo regulated.
But it is obſervable, that p 95. the Doctour is beaten off from his owne grounds, and yeelds up in the Cloſe of his booke a full Victory to Truth. Which will appeare if we looke backe to his firſt booke, and Sect. 1. where he propoſeth the Queſtion in his own termes, whither if a King be bent or ſeduced to ſubvert Religion, Laws and Liberties, Subjects may take up armes and reſiſt. He undertakes to maintaine the Negative; and here was the beginning of the controverſie. Now ſee in this Replie how he is ſunck and ſtollen off from that which he undertooke to defend; and upon the matter grants us the Cauſe. For, 1. By bent or ſeduced to ſubvert, he tels us, he means not a purpoſe of the mind, but doing many Acts arbitrarily tending to ſubuerſion; as if he would yeeld, that (ſuppoſing him bent, that is purpoſing and intending it in his mind and courſe) he might be reſiſted. 2. Nay, by [bent to ſubvert] he does not meane ſo much as Acts ſubverſive; but onely Acts tending to ſubverſion of themſelves; for the frame of government and Lawes cannot be ſubverted without the conſent of the two Houſes. So that now the Queſtion is rather, Whither ſubverſion be poſſible by ſuch inſtruments; then whether their Reſiſtance be lawfull: Sure it were pitty to diſturbe them by Reſiſtance in an impoſſible worke: Let them run on rather till they ſee their owne vanity and folly: but ſuppoſe they ſhould bring it to paſſe; then it would be too late to come to this Doctor and tell him, he was deceived, and did deceive. Certainly thoſe great Polititians who have had this deſigne in managing ſo many yeares, are not of his mind. Yea, ſuppoſe it cannot be done without the conſent of the Houſes; yet the Doctour can tell us in another caſe, that where there is an unreſiſtible power, Conſent cannot long be wanting. What then; will he yeeld us a power of Reſiſtance, if we can proove ſuch a deſigne poſſible?
Here alſo becauſe the Doctor ſayes this liberty which I allow a State for its preſervation, tends rather to its ſubverſion, p. 94. and every where calumniates me as an inducer of confuſion, and Anarchie, and my Aſſertions as opening a way to Rebellion. It concernes me effectually68 to vindicate my ſelfe, and the truth which I maintaine from theſe aſperſions; and make it appeare that the power of Reſiſtance I defend is not a remedy worſe then the diſeaſe of ſubverſion. Which I can doe no better way, then by a poſitive ſetting downe the naked truth which I averre in this and the former Treatiſe; and ſhew how it ſhuts up every way to theſe evills which he layes uncharitably to my charge. 1. I aſſert no forceable Reſiſtance in any caſe but ſubverſive and extreme. 2. Subverſive and extreme caſes reſpect either particular men; or the whole ſtate and Government. For particular men even in extreme caſes of ſtate or life, I allow no publike Reſiſtance: but appeale if it may be had; or if not, yet no publike Reſiſtance: for whether the wrong be done him by inferiour or ſuperiour Magiſtrates, either it is, 1. Under forme and courſe of Law, and power committed them; and then to reſiſt, is to reſiſt the power. 2. Or without all forme and courſe of Law and power committed to them: and then a man values his ſtate and life too high, to make publike reſiſtance, and bring on the ſtate a generall diſturbance for his private good, and ſins, though not againſt Gods ordinance of Power, in this caſe, yet againſt the publike peace and weale. For the whole ſtate or government, and the laſt caſes of its ſubverſion, of which the Doctor puts the Queſtion. 1. I condemne all force uſed againſt the Perſon of the ſupreme, or his Power and Authority in any inferiour Miniſters thereof. 2. I averre not publike forceable reſiſtance of Miniſters of acts of will which are only actuall invaſions, or exceſſes of limitation; and not ſuch as plainly argue a bent of ſubverſion, and apparent danger thereof, if prevention be not uſed: ſo that the Doctor goes from the Queſtion, and comes home to me, when he ſayes here that he ſpeakes only of the former ſort. 3. I affirme not force in this utmoſt caſe to be aſſumed by private men againſt deſtructive inſtruments of the Princes will: as if any man were warranted on his own imagination of publike danger to raiſe forces for prevention. But the Courts of Juſtice, and eſpecially the ſupreme Court, to whom the conſervation of Government and Law is committed, and a Power not only to reſiſt, but alſo cenſure and puniſh its violaters, much more its ſubverters without regard of number or warrant, (The Law ſuppoſing no warrant can be in ſuch caſe) This is the power of Reſiſtance which I have aſſerted: and it this be inducing of civill warre, or a way to ſubverſion and Rebellion: It is a warre raiſed by defenders of Law, againſt ſubverters of Law: A Rebellion raiſed by Magiſtrates69 having Authority, againſt inſtruments of arbitrarineſſe having no authority: A reſiſtance tending to ſubverſion, but of none but ſubverters. 'Tis good reaſon then, it ſeemes, if deſtroyers grow to the number and ſtrength of an Army, for Magiſtrates to let them alone, and not raiſe armes to ſuppreſſe them, leſt they open a way to confuſion and bring on the miſeries of a civill Warre. This is the Doctors preſervative Doctrine, and my contrary is destructive. 4. I argued from the end of the inſtitution of the Houſes, and their intereſt in making Laws, and preſerving the frame. He ſayes this is grounded on my falſe ſuppoſall of their being joyned with the King in the very ſoveraigne power, p. 96. Anſwer, I have juſtified that ſuppoſall; and manifeſted his ſtrange boldneſſe in denying it againſt the Kings, and ſo many Parliaments direct affirmations; and deſire the reader to take notice, that this is Calvins argument for Reſiſtance, in the place above recited, how ever the Doctor doth make ſo light of it.
5. From the power of inferiour Courts to puniſh violaters of Law, though pretending a warrant of the Kings will for it. He ſayes this Argument is inconſequent to prove power of rayſing Armies to oppoſe the Forces of their Soveraigne. He haſtens to a concluſion, and weighs not much what he anſwers. I ſay it concludes inevitably: for if the Kings warrant to violate Law, will not priviledge one from force of juſtice, then not a hundred, not an Army of violaters. Their multitude makes the danger greater, and the Kingdome more unhappy; not Malefactors more priviledged. The forces of the Soveraigne in truth, are the Forces raiſed to defend his Government; not thoſe which are raiſed to ſubvert it. They are his, which have his Authoritative will; not thoſe which have only his arbitrary. If ever Reaſons did demonſtrate a truth, I am confident theſe five have made good, The power of the estates in Parliament to reſiſt ſubverſive inſtruments, be they more or fewer.
Thus have I traced this Authour through his Reply; and whetherSect. 3I have not ſufficiently vindicated my Treatiſe from it, I referre my ſelfe to the conſcience of every one who hath the underſtanding of a judicious man; and the impartiality of a juſt man. In my cap. 8. is a moderate debate of the preſent contention; and divers Petitions tending to pacification if it had been poſſible: but he toucheth not on that chapt. His diſcourſe ſhewes him to have nothing to doe with Moderation; nor doth deſire Peace, but on the termes of a full dedition80 into the hands of ſubverſive inſtruments. I have done with him: He reſolved, I Anſwered. He hath replyed. I have returned on it. I am even with him; and in truth above him, I am ſure. Now I deſire to ſpin out this contention no longer. Yet if he, or any elſe pleaſe to rejoyne, I wiſh he would ſave himſelfe, and me a labour: to let alone the booke; and deale only with the 4th; and 5th Chapters concerning the Doctors ſuppoſals; if he can make good them; and invalidate mine, as much as in me lieth, I will yeild him the cauſe: but I judge it impoſſible, if I know what is impoſſible. The God of ſpirits allay the spirits of men from this extreme oppoſition: And give ſuch a iſſue to theſe wofull warrs, that the ſcepter of Chriſt, the Gospell of Peace may be fully ſubmitted to and maintained by a King enjoying inviolate his due ſoveraignty; and a People their due and lawfull liberties, Amen.
Let your moderation be known unto all men: The Lord is at hand.