Aphoriſms Political.

I. OBſequium amicos, veritas odium parit. The Errours and Sufferings of the People are from their Governours.

II. When the Foundation of a Government cometh to be changed, and the Governours change not the Superſtructures accordingly, the people become miſerable.

III. The Monarchy of England was not a Government by Arms, but a Government by Laws, though imperfect or ineffectual Laws.

IV. The Latter Governments in England, have been Govern­ments by Arms.

V. The people cannot ſee, but they can feel.

VI. The people having felt the difference between a Govern­ment by Laws, and a Government by Arms, will always de­ſire the Government by Laws, and abhor that of Arms.

VII. Where the ſpirit of the people is impatient of a Govern­ment2 by Arms, and deſirous of a Government by Laws, there the ſpirit of the people is not unfit to be truſted with their Liberty.

VIII. The ſpirit of the people of England, not truſted with their Liberty, driveth at the Reſtitution of Monarchy by Blood and Violence.

IX. The ſpirit of the people of England, truſted with their Li­berty, if the form be ſufficient, can never reſtore Monarchy; and if the form be inſufficient, will reſtore it without Blood or Violence.

X. The ſufficiency of the form wherein the ſpirit of a people may be truſted with their Liberty, amounteth to a well-or­dered Commonwealth, or Democracy.

XI. Where there is a well-ordered Commonwealth, the peo­ple are generally ſatisfied.

XII. Where the people are generally diſſatisfied, there is no Commonwealth.

XIII. The parties in England declaring for a Commonwealth, hold every one of them ſomething that is inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth.

XIV. To hold that the Government may be managed by a few, or by a party, is inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth.

XV. To hold that there can be any National Religion or Mini­ſtry without publick Indowment and Inſpection of the Ma­giſtracy, or any Government without a National Religion or Miniſtry, is inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth.

3XVI. To hold that there may be Liberty, and not Liberty of Conſcience, is inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth that hath the Liberty of her own Conſcience, or that is not Po­piſh.

XVII. Either Liberty of Conſcience can have no ſecurity at all, or under Popular Government muſt have the greateſt ſecuri­ty.

XVIII. To hold that a Government may be introduced by a little at once, is to wave prudence, and commit things unto chance.

XIX. To hold that the Wiſdom of God in the Formation of an Houſe, or of a Government, goeth not univerſally upon na­tural principles, is inconſiſtent with Scripture.

XX. To hold that the wiſdom of man in the Formation of an Houſe, or of Government, may go upon ſupernatural princi­ples, is inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth, and cometh to a kind of breaking of Jeſts; as if one ſhould ſay, God ordai­ned the Temple, therefore it was not built by Maſons; He ordained the Snuffers, therefore they were not made by a Smith.

XXI. To hold that Hirelings, or an endowed Miniſtry, ought to be removed out of the Church, is inconſiſtent with a Commonwealth.

XXII. Nature is of God.

XXIII. Some part in every Religion is natural.

XXIV. An univerſal Effect, demonſtrateth an univerſal Cauſe.

4XXV. An univerſal Cauſe is not ſo much natural, as it is Nature it ſelf.

XXVI. Every man, either unto his terrour or conſolation, hath ſome ſenſe of Religion.

XXVII. Man may rather be defined a Religious, then a Rational Creature; in regard that in other Creatures there is ſome­thing of Reaſon, but nothing of Religion.

XXVIII. Government is of humane Prudence, and humane Pru­dence is adequate unto mans nature.

XXIX. The prudence or Government that is regardleſs of Reli­gion, is not adequate nor ſatisfactory unto mans nature.

XXX. Where the Government is not adequate or ſatisfactory unto mans nature, it can never be quiet or perfect.

XXXI. The major part of mankinde giveth it ſelf up in the mat­ter of Religion unto the publick leading.

XXXII. That there may be a publick leading, there muſt be a Nati­onal Religion.

XXXIII. Where the minor part taketh away the National Religi­on, there the major part is deprived of the Liberty of Con­ſcience by the minor.

XXXIV. Where the major part is deprived of the Liberty of Con­ſcience by the minor, there they will deprive the minor of that Liberty of Conſcience which they might otherwiſe en­joy.

5XXXV. In Iſrael there was an endowed Clergie or Prieſthood, and a National Religion under inſpection of the Magiſtrate: whence the Chriſtians in Apoſtolick times defraying their own Miniſtry, could have Liberty of Conſcience; whereas if the Chriſtians by going about to take away Tythes, and a­boliſh the National Religion, had endeavoured to violate the Conſciences of the unconverted Jews, theſe being far grea­ter in number, muſt needs have taken away the Liberty of Conſcience from the Chriſtians.

XXXVI. Paul in Athens could freely and undiſturbedly convert Dio­nyſius and others; therefore in Athens there was Liberty of Conſcience: but if Paul and his Converts had gone about to drive Hirelings, or an endowed Prieſthood or Clergie our of that Church, who ſeeth not that the Athenians would have driven Paul and his Converts out of Athens?

XXXVII. That there may be Liberty of Conſcience, there muſt be a National Religion.

XXXVIII. That there may be a National Religion, there muſt be an endowed Clergie.

XXXIX. Till a Commonwealth be firſt framed, how ſuch a Com­monwealth ſhould make an effectual Union with another Nation, is not poſſible to be ſeen.

XXXX. The Union with Scotland, as it is vulgarly diſcourſed of, is deſtructive both to the hopes of a Commonwealth in Eng­land, and of Liberty in Scotland.

XLI. The Union vulgarly ſpoken of, is by uniting Deputies of divers Commonwealths or Nations in the ſame ſtanding Councils.

6XLII. If the Commonwealth of England receive Deputies from Scotland in a greater number then that of her own, ſhe recei­eth Law from a forraign intereſt, and ſo loſeth her own Li­berty.

XLIII. If Scotland be received in an equal number, it obſtructeth the freedom of both, or occaſioneth War or Diſſention.

XLIV. If Scotland be received in an inferiour number, ſhe recei­veth Law from England, and ſo loſeth her Liberty.

XLV. VVhere Countries are divers in their Laws, and yet are to receive Laws one from the other, neither the Common­wealth giving Law knoweth what to give, nor the Common­wealth receiving Law, underſtandeth what ſhe receiveth: in which caſe the Union returneth unto force or confuſion.

XLVI. The beſt way of holding a Nation different or not diffe­rent in Laws, is by way of Province.

XLVII. A Province, eſpecially if ſhe have ſtrong holds, may by defraying of a ſmall guard, be kept unto a juſt League, and for the reſt enjoy her own Laws, her own Government, and her perfect Liberty: other ways of Union, will be found more chargeable, and leſs effectual, on both ſides: for if Eng­land have no Army in Scotland, Scotland will receive no Law from England; and if England have an Army there, her hold conſiſteth not in the Union, but in the force.

XLVIII. If a Country be very ſmall, and not able to ſubſiſt of it ſelf, as Wales, it may be ſafely united, and held: but the ad­vantage that Wales hath in participation of all Magiſtracies and Offices, is not that which England is able to afford unto ſuch a Country as Scotland, without ſubjecting her neck under the yoak.

7XLIX. The order of a Commonwealth requireth, that it conſiſt firſt of a Civil; ſecondly, of a Religious; thirdly, of a Mili­tary, and fourthly, of a Provincial Part. The manner of uniting Provinces or different Nations, appertaineth unto the laſt part; and in the formation of a Commonwealth, to be­gin with that firſt, which is naturally laſt, is to invert the or­der, and by Conſequence the Commonwealth, which indeed is nothing but order.

L. Where there can be any other Government, there can be no Commonwealth.

LI. Where there can be a Commonwealth, what tumults ſoe­ver there happen, and which ſoever prevail, there can be no other Government; that is to ſay, without forraign invaſion, which throughout, I muſt be underſtood to except.

LXII. If Sir George Booth had prevailed, he muſt either have intro­duced a Commonwealth, or have reſtored a King.

LIII. If a King were reſtored, he muſt either govern by an Ar­my, or by Parliaments.

LIV. A King governing now in England by an Army, would for the ſame Cauſes finde the ſame effects with the late Pro­tector.

LV. A King governing now in England by Parliaments, would finde the Nobility of no effect at all.

LVI. A Parliament where the Nobility is of no effect at all, is a meer popular Council.

LVII. A meer popular Council, will never receive Law from a King.

XVIII. A meer popular Council giving Law unto a King, beco­meth8 thereby a Democracy, or equal Commonwealth; or the difference is no greater then in the imperfection of the Form.

LIX. A Commonwealth or Democracy to be perfect in the Form, muſt conſiſt eſpecially of ſuch an Aſſembly, the re­ſult whereof, can go upon no intereſt whatſoever, but that onely which is the common intereſt of the whole people.

LX. An Aſſembly conſiſting of a few, may go upon the inte­reſt of one man, as a King; or upon the intereſt of one party, as that of Divines, Lawyers, and the like; or the intereſt of themſelves, and the perpetuation of their Government.

LXI. The popular Aſſembly in a Commonwealth, may conſiſt of too few, but can never conſiſt of too many.

LXII. If the popular Aſſembly conſiſt of ſo few, and ſo eminent perſons as are capable of any orderly debate, it is good for nothing but to deſtroy the Commonwealth.

LXIII. If the popular Aſſembly conſiſt of ſo many, and for the greater part of ſo mean perſons as are not capable of debate, there muſt be a Senate to help this defect.

LXIV. The Reaſon of the Senate, is, that a popular Aſſembly rightly conſtituted, is not capable of any prudent debate.

LXV. The Reaſon of the popular Aſſembly, is, that a Senate rightly conſtituted for debate, muſt conſiſt of ſo few and e­minent perſons, that if they have the reſult too, they will not reſolve according unto the intereſt of the people, but accor­ding to the intereſt of themſelves.

LXVI. The Senate and the popular Aſſembly being once rightly9 conſtituted, the reſt of the Commonwealth will conſtitute it ſelf.

LXVII. The Venetians having ſlain divers of their Dukes for their Tyranny, and being aſſembled by ſuch numbers in their great Council as were naturally incapable of debate, pitched upon thirty Gentlemen who were called Pregati, in that they were prayed to go apart, and debating upon the Exigence of the Commonwealth, to propoſe as they thought good unto the great Council; and from thence firſt aroſe the Senate of Ve­nice, to this day called the Pregati; and the Great Council, that is, the Senate and the popular Aſſembly of Venice: and from theſe two aroſe all thoſe admirable Orders of that Com­wealth.

LXVIII. The popular Aſſembly of Venice at this day, conſiſteth of about two thouſand: the popular Aſſemblies in the Pro­vince onely of Holland, conſiſt of about five hundred; by which I gueſs, that in all the united Provinces, they may a­mount unto about three thouſand: in Switz they come unto a far greater number; and all, or the moſt of theſe, are perpe­tually extant.

LXIX. If a popular Aſſembly conſiſting of eleven hundred or a thouſand, may be ſo framed in England as to be ſufficient to preſerve the intereſt of the people, ſuch an Aſſembly of ſo few, in a Territory of ſo large an extent, will be altogether new in the world, and without any example.

LXX. That a people of themſelves ſhould have ſuch underſtan­ding, as when they of Venice did inſtitute their Pregati or Se­nate, is rare.

LXXI. That a Senate or Council of Governours having ſupreme power, ſhould inſtitute a popular Aſſembly, and propoſe to it, though in all reaſon it be the far more facile and practi­cable, is that wich is rarer.

10LXXII. Where ſuch Elections are propoſed unto the people, as being made accordingly, muſt needs produce a well-ordered Commonwealth, and the people (who never ſtick at ſuch work) elect accordingly, there not the Propoſers of any pow­er in them, but the people by their peculiar and natural right and power, do inſtitute and ordain their whole Common­wealth.

LXXIII. An Aſſembly of men (being all Aſſemblies are naturally void of invention) is not capable of inventing any perfect Model or Method of Government.

LXXIV. The wiſeſt Aſſemblies (through this neceſſity) have in the Formation or Reformation of their Governments, ſtill pitch­ed upon ſome one man.

LXXV. It is not below the dignity of any Aſſembly, but accor­ding unto the practice of a good Commonwealth, to admit of any man that is able to propoſe to them.

LXXVI. One mans reaſon is as another mans judgment; yet is it in Art to ſay things which will do themſelves, at leaſt it is lawful for any man to appeal unto Event, and ſo do I in theſe Aphoriſms.

Aug. 25. 1659.