A DISCOURSE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF ANIMALS.The Introduction.

IT's ſtrange, that Man, who believes him­ſelf Natures maſterpiece, and that it is his right to command all that is in the Univerſe, ſhould not have informed himſelf of that Title which gives him theſe advan­tages; and that he knows not wherein the excel­lency conſiſts wherewith he flatters himſelf, not2 whereon the Soveraignty he claims, is founded. And what is the more wonderful, is. That he who hath given himſelf the liberty to aſſign to every thing the rank and order which they ought to hold in the world, and to preſcribe them the function they are to exerciſe, ſhould have forgot himſelf in this general diſtribution which he hath made, have­ing reſerved for himſelf no employment worthy of his ambition, or of the quality he hath taken. For although he boaſts, that he hath Reaſon for his portion, and that he believes it belongs to him in propriety, and that it gives him the ſoveraign com­mand over all creatures; yet hath he ſo ill explain'd himſelf therein, and ſo weakly maintained the right which may be his, that in all Ages there hath lived very great Philoſophers, who have aſſured that Beaſts had Reaſon; ſo that even there hath been Times wherein it was hardly permitted to doubt it: And that ſince the contrary hath crept into the Schools, the moſt cleer-ſighted have held it as ſuſpected, and the moſt moderate have rank'd it amongſt thoſe Queſtions which might be main­tained on either ſide. And certainly if we conſider the wonderful induſtry wherewith Beaſts perform the moſt part of their works; the ingenious fore­ſight they uſe to ſhun evil, and ſeek what is uſeful for them; the ſleights and niceties they practiſe the one againſt the other; the ſociety and the com­munication they have together, and all thoſe exam­ples of prudence, of gratitude, and of generoſity which they have given us, and which have con­vinced ſuch Great perſons: It's impoſſible but we muſt believe, or at leaſt ſuſpect that Actions which3 appear ſo reaſonable, cannot but be managed by Reaſon. For if we would refer them to Inſtinct, the nature thereof is ſo hidden, that there is no likelihood to deſtroy ſuch clear and ſtrong con­jectures, by ſo obſcure and ill eſtabliſh'd a thing; And which perhaps, if it were well known, would be found nothing different or eſtranged from Reaſon.

In effect, whatſoever may be ſaid of the Inſtinct, it muſt either be an exterior cauſe which forceth Animals and works upon them, without their con­tributing any thing but obedience; or elſe it muſt be a faculty natural unto them, by reaſon whereof they agitate themſelves, and are truly the cauſe and principle of their actions: now, as a man cannot main­tain that it is a ſtranger power, without falling into great inconveniences, and particularly in this, That we ſhould give an aſſault to the Almightineſs and infinite wiſdom of God, for having left his works imperfect, and having deprived them of the greateſt part of thoſe vertues, which are moſt neceſſary for their preſervation. We muſt conclude, it is a faculty born with them, which ought to be of an order as elevated, as its effects are excellent, and which con­ſequently acts with a great knowledge. If it be ſo, who will not have cauſe to believe, that actions whoſe ſucceſſes are ſo well ordered, which have ſo well regulated a progreſs and a concatenation, which ſo juſtly ties together the means with their ends, muſt needs be enlightned by Reaſon.

But, what renders theſe preſumptions yet ſtrong­er, is the weakneſs of the proofs whereon the con­trary opinion is grounded. For it is a thing which4 is hardly conceiveable, that Ratiocination ſhould be taken from Beaſts, without knowing the nature of Ratiocination. For certainly, hitherto no man hath exactly diſcovered wherein it conſiſts, nor what the ſoul doth when it reaſons, not what difference there is betwixt this operation of the mind, and the two others. We are well aſſured, that in the firſt the Underſtanding forms the images of things; but when we come to examine the latter where Ratio­cination conſiſts, we fall ſhort. And it is apparent, that Diſcourſe, which like light makes known the moſt obſcure things, remains it ſelf unknown, and hides it ſelf as that doth in darkneſs.

Yet herein is the foundation whereon the deciſi­on of this famous Controverſie ought to be eſta­bliſhed. And there had been no more ſubject to doubt, if after having ſhewn how Ratiocination is formed, it had been remonſtrated that that action ſurpaſſed the forces of all thoſe faculties which are in Beaſts. So that a man need not be aſtoniſhed, if for default of having well obſerved that fundamen­tal Truth, a man is not ſure of the party he ought to take; and if we doubt of thoſe Concluſions, which are drawn from Principles which are without evidence and without proof.

Let them oppoſe as long as they pleaſe, That Reaſoning requires Propoſitions and univerſal No­tions; and that it cannot be made without abſtra­ction, and ſome reflection of the knowledge it hath of its ſelf; which are things whereto it's certain the ſoul of Beaſts can never attain: Yet ſome will ſtill ſay, that it is not therein in which the reaſoning of Beaſts conſiſts; that all theſe conditions are5 ſtrange unto it; and that the Sillogiſm which is called expoſitive, is an evident ſign thereof, ſince it cannot be formed of terms purely ſingular with­out any abſtraction, and there being no need for the ſpirit to reflect on it ſelf. Whence it follows, the difficulty is not taken away ſo, but that the con­jecture which we have of the Reaſon of Beaſts, re­main in full force, and that nothing is objected which deſtroys or weakens it.

After which, who dares affirm that it is Reaſon which raiſeth Men above Beaſts, without rendring that Right doubtful which cannot be conteſted againſt him, and without putting a Soveraigncie in competition, to which all Nature hath ſubjected it ſelf? No, no; There muſt be a more ſolid foun­dation which muſt maintain his dignity, he muſt draw his perfection and excellency from a higher ſource: In a word, he muſt have ſome vertue which muſt be ſo eminent, which muſt be above all thoſe which are in Nature, and whereto the moſt perfect Animals can never attain. But we muſt yet confeſs, that he who ſhould have diſcovered ſo important a matter, hath done no ſmall ſervice to all the ſociety of Mankind; and that perhaps he hath little leſs obliged them, then thoſe who invented the moſt profitable Arts and Sciences. Beſides that he would have taught them the greateſt and moſt precious things it hath, that it would have put the advanta­ges and prerogatives it hath out of conteſt, and it would have juſtified the Empire it pretends, ſhew­ing that it is not a Tyranny as it's reproached with­all, but a juſt and legitimate dominion. It would without doubt withdraw them from the danger6 they are in at every moment, not only to commit an injuſtice againſt Beaſts and againſt it ſelf, but even alſo ſome kind of impiety towards God. For, in the doubt wherein we are, that Beaſts have reaſon; if it be found that in effect they have any, as it is not perhaps impoſſible, would not the Man then be unjuſt to raviſh a good from them, which belongs to them as well as to him? Would he not do himſelf wrong, to ground his excellency and his ſuperiority on a thing which he hath only in com­mon with them? And will he not thereby ſenſibly offend the Author, in ſeeking to ſuppreſs ſo glori­ous a badg of his power and of his wiſdom?

All theſe conſiderations had ſometimes perſwa­ded me, that every Man ought to contribute with all his power to the finding out of a thing, in which every Man had an intereſt, and ſince Truth is like thoſe unknown Lands which from time to time are diſcovered, and often rather by hazard then by ad­dreſs, that it might happen, that the leſs intelligent might advance the diſcovery of thoſe noble functi­ons of the Soul which have hitherto been unknown, at leaſt whereof the paſt Ages have left us but ſome imperfect relations. Upon this confidence I had, as they ſay, ſet ſail; and neither the fear of ſhipwrack, nor an unprofitable voyage, could ever hinder me from hazarding my ſelf in ſo high an enter­priſe.

After having therefore carefully enquired the Nature of theſe Faculties, and having made (as I thought) ſome conſiderable Obſervations, and which had not been made before, I thought I was obliged to divulge them, and that I could not ſup­preſs7 them without betraying the common cauſe. So that the Treatiſe of the Characters of the Paſſi­ons, wherein I have engaged my ſelf, having given me way to acquit my ſelf of that duty, I had added to the Second Volume of that Work, a particular Treatiſe of the Knowledge of Beaſts; where all theſe Queſtions are examined, and wherein I pre­tended to ſhew by new and very probable proofs, That Beaſts reaſon, and their reaſoning is formed only of particular notions and propoſitions, wherein it is different from that of Men, who have the fa­culty of reaſoning univerſally; and that this fa­culty is the true difference of Man, which marks the ſpirituality and immortality of his ſoul. This Diſ­courſe having appeared in the World with a very happy fate, and if I may ſo ſpeak, with more ap­probation then I ever hoped; To that height, that ſome men perſwaded themſelves, that the Propo­ſitions I had therein eſtabliſhed ought hereafter to be received for Truths which were not to be doubt­ed; and that no body would venture to write againſt ſo plauſible and ſo ſolidly proved a Doctrine. For mine own part, who could never have had ſo ad­vantagious a ſenſe of mine own work, and who believe beſides, that it is impoſſible for the Mind of Man to penetrate theſe profound depths, and to take off thoſe thick vails which hide the Nature of every thing; which withheld me from falling into that vanity. And I always thought, that an Opinion ſo far eſtranged from common belief, would never fail of Enemies, which would aſſault it as ſoon as it ſhould appear in publick.

Indeed, a little while after, Monſieur Chanet8 publiſhed his Book of the Inſtinct and Knowledge of Beaſts: The Title of which promiſeth an Exa­men of all what I had written on that Subject; the main deſign whereof was to ſhew, That Beaſts can­not reaſon. As ſoon as his Diſcourſe came to my hands, I fancied him to be ſome Hero of the Schools, and ſome new Hercules, whoſe Commiſſion was to damn Paradoxes, and to maintain Vulgar opinions. And I ingenuouſly confeſs, that at that time fear and hope equally divided my mind: I was afraid to find ſuch ſtrong Reaſons, that they would have ob­liged me to abandon thoſe Opinions which had been ſo well received, and which had afforded me ſo much reputation. On the other ſide, the ardent love I have for the Truth, made me hope that I ſhould therein learn divers things which were un­known unto me, and that my loſſes would be re­paired by thoſe fair inſtructions I ſhould gather from thence. But in once reading of it, all thoſe vain thoughts were taken away; and, far from making me change my opinion, it fortified me in my firſt ſentiment, and made me believe, that thoſe things which before I eſteemed but probable, might now paſs for demonſtrative, ſince they had been diſputed againſt with all the endeavours of a man of metal, who hath meditated and written ſo much on theſe things. For, this is worthy conſideration, that M.C. hath deduced no proofs to deſtroy my Reaſons, in which he hath not uſed ſome Sophiſm or Para­logiſm, as I ſhall make it appear in this Diſcourſe: And that neceſſarily his cauſe muſt be ill, ſince that with all the Memory and all the Reading which they ſay he hath, they could furniſh him with no9 lawful defence, he having made uſe of ſleights and artifices only, which ſuch men uſe who miſtruſt the ſoundneſs of their own right.

Aſſuredly, if this manner of acting were to be permitted any man, it were to be allowed me, who have ſtragled out of the ordinary road, who have brought to light new Paradoxes, and whoſe proofs at worſt may paſs for the diſports of the mind, as well as thoſe of thoſe men who have made Elogies of Nero, and of the Quartan Ague. But that M.C. ſhould make uſe of them to maintain an Opinion which is ſo generally approved by all the World, and which is held as an undoubted Maxim in Philo­ſophy, is an unexcuſeable abuſe, and which muſt charge him with ſo reproachful a ſhame amongſt thoſe of his own party, that he could not defend a good cauſe but by ill means, or that he ſhould have prevaricated in his own cauſe: I fear even leſt I ſhould be entangled in his diſgrace, and that thoſe of the moſt judicious ſeeing my Writings, may not ſuſpect an intelligence betwixt us two, and that he is an Adverſary I have appointed to ſuffer himſelf to be overcome, and by his weakneſs to give credit to my party. But to juſtifie my ſelf from this ſuſpi­tion, I have nothing to ſay, but that I had never heard any ſpeak of M.C. till the Book he had writ­ten againſt me came to light: And that there is no likelihood, that under colour to give ſome luſtre to my opinions by this artifice, I ſhould engage a man of honor in ſo baſe a deſign, without the fear leſt he ſhould have doubly made againſt me, and leſt he might quit himſelf of the faint, that in good earn­eſt he might handle me the worſe.

10I ſhould indeed have been juſtly chaſtiſed for my imprudence, had I afterwards met with in his Book ſo many picquant and malicious words which he vented againſt me, and which he hath mixt with ſome praiſes, as thoſe who infuſe poiſon with ſugar. When I ſaw thoſe ſhameful reproaches he made me; ſometimes, That my mind was diſtorted, and that I had not thought of what I had written, (p. 124) That there is not the least appearance of truth, and that it is a ſhame to ſtick at them, (p. 148.) And then. That I am ignorant of the Rules and terms of Philoſophy, (p. 240.) That I every minute fall into contradictions; and, That he can hardly believe I am Author of the Work, (p. 242.) with a hundred ſuch like, which he utters with ſcorn and reproach. No, no; this proceeding makes it evidently appear that he had no intelligence with me, that he hath defended his cauſe the beſt he was able; and that if he have brought ill reaſons to maintain it, it is becauſe he believed them good, and was ignorant of their defects. Neither would I abſolutely con­demn him for the incivility he hath treated me withall; and I ſhould rather attribute it to heat of diſpute, or the natural ſharpneſs of a Critick, then to any ill will he could have againſt me. I know, that in combats of pleaſure and divertiſement, it is almoſt impoſſible but ſome angry touches muſt be given; and that blows cannot be handled ſo dex­terouſly, but ſome will be ruder then they were in­tended. But what was to have been deſired in thoſe of M.C. 'tis, that he ſhould have behaved himſelf pleaſantly, and like a gallant Fellow, and not have accompanied them with a pedantick ſeverity, which11 appears through all his Diſcourſe, and which will oblige many men to believe, that Paſſion rather then Truth hath armed his pen againſt me. There are even ſome already who have made this judg­ment, having obſerv'd how he introduced my Name to the Title of his Book, and that he affected to repeat it in all the paſſages he was able. For, ſince it not at all concerned the queſtion, and that he might have examined my reaſons without name­ing me, even as I had done thoſe of other men. They did believe that it muſt needs have been ſome ſecret malignity, which moved him to place my Name for a Trophy in the front of his Work, and to lead it as it were in triumph through all the Pages of his Book. For my part, I durſt not judge ſo ſiniſterly of his intentions: So far was I from complaining of him in that encounter, that I find I have reaſon to thank him for putting me in the rank of the Great men he hath aſſaulted; and I ſhall never be aſham'd to have my Name appear with the Names of Mr. de Charron, and Mr. de Montagne, ſhould he even reckon them amongſt thoſe he had conquered.

It's true, if he had been well adviſed for his own glory, he ſhould never have made mention of me, nor have diſcovered that I was the man with whom he was to combat: Some might have thought, after having ſeen him enter the lifts againſt ſuch great perſons, that I were of the ſame rank, and that he choſe me as an Enemy worthy both of his ſtrength and courage. But when it ſhall be known, that it is againſt me he hath made this ſtir to lift up his buckler, and that it will afterwards appear, that12 weak and freſh as I am in theſe kind of trials, I ſhall have ſo eaſily defeated a man who would paſs for the Bravo of our Age, and who in his Writings preſents all Comers with a Challenge; it is to be feared, it may much diminiſh the credit he may have, and leſt he be accuſed for a weak and quarrelſom perſon, who ſeeks to gain reputation at the expence of another man's.

Had he therefore followed the councels which Prudence would have given him in this encounter, he had ſaved himſelf from theſe reproaches, and had ſaved me the pains to have anſwered him, without having intereſted my ſelf in a Queſtion, wherein all Opinions are free: I ſhould not have diſturbed the pleaſure wherewith he flattered him­ſelf with an imaginary victory; and without envy I could have ſuffered him to have triumphed over an enemy which he had not overcome. But it had been a barrenneſs in me to have continued with mine arms acroſs, after the publick Defie he hath given me; and Honor obligeth me to the defence of the Truth, which I heard groaned under his cen­ſure, and which I perceived ready to fall into the ambuſhes he had laid for it.

Behold, I am ready to defend it, I am here ready to maintain the Propoſitions which M. C: hath conteſted. The Reader ſhall afterwards judg which of us two hath the better right. But that he may be inſtructed of all what may lawfully be neceſſary in my defence, he muſt be informed of the order which I have obſerved, and of the motives which have ob­liged me to another courſe then that which hitherto hath been followed.

13Having conſidered, that the proof which hath been uſed to ſhew, That Beaſts reaſon, did not not convince thoſe who hold the contrary opinion, and that they ſhifted off all the ſtrength of it by the word Inſtinct; which how vain ſoever it be, forbears not to intangle the queſtion, and render the deciſion the more doubtful; I imagined the Truth was to be ſought in the ſource; and leaving Experiments which were conteſted, it might be found in Ratiocination it ſelf. I therefore would examine the nature thereof, and ſee whether there were any thing which Beaſts could not do, and which ſurpaſt the force of the Imagination, and of the other faculties which all are agreed they are endowed withal. But as Reaſoning is a Knowledge, and that there are three ſorts of Knowledge, to wit, The firſt Conceptions, the Judgment, and the Diſ­courſe: I thought it was fit to be known, wherein all three of them conſiſted, and what action the ſoul performed in every of them. Having therefore found, That in the firſt ſhe forms the images of ob­jects; in the ſecond, ſhe unites or divides two of thoſe images; and in the third, ſhe collects together three, of which ſhe compoſeth ſeveral Propoſitions which form Diſcourſe: methought that all the dif­ficulty was reduced to this point, to wit, To know whether the Imagination can unite or divide images? For if it have that power, it muſt of neceſſity be able to make Propoſitions, and in purſuance, Reaſon­ings.

This is the principal Subject of the Treatiſe which I have brought to light: The firſt Part whereof is wholly employed to ſhew, that the Ima­gination14 can form and unite ſeveral images, and by conſequence, that it may conceive, judge and diſ­courſe. The other Part contains the Anſwer which is to be made to the ſtrongeſt Objections which may be propoſed againſt theſe Truths, and prin­cipally to thoſe which are drawn from Cuſtom and from Inſtinct; where I have explicated the Nature of thoſe Cauſes, and made it appear that they cannot act without the help of Reaſon.

This order was not pleaſing to M.C. and in the Examen he made, he hath not only begun his Book by a Diſcourſe of Inſtinct, but he would alſo have it believed that I had done ill in not following that Method, ſeeing I held, that the Inſtinct ſuppoſeth a natural knowledge, and that natural knowledges ought to be treated before thoſe which are acquir'd. But he ought to have conſidered, that all my deſign was to ſhew, that Beaſts reaſon; and that what was to be ſaid of Inſtinct, ought to be but an incident to the queſtion. So that if I had begun from thence, I ſhould have placed the Acceſſory before the Principal, and the Objection before the Concluſion. On the other ſide, had not this conſideration ob­liged me to follow this Method, could he not have remembred that there are two ſorts of it; the one which begins by thoſe things which in themſelves, and naturally are moſt evident; the other which begins by thoſe, which in reſpect of us and by the ſenſe, are moſt evident. That both the one and the other is good; but that the latter hath this advan­tage, that it is more conformable to our ordinary way of knowing, which begins always by ſenſible things. So although without a fault I might have15 firſt ſpoken of Natural knowledges, which are firſt in the order of Nature, and conſequently more evident in themſelves then thoſe which are acquired; ſtill methought it was better to begin by thoſe which were acquired, which are moſt ſenſible, and there­fore in our own reſpect the firſt and moſt evident. In effect, ſince I was to ſhew that Inſtinct ſuppoſeth a natural knowledge, and that before that I was to ſeek wherein Knowledge in general conſiſted; Could I have arriv'd by any ſurer way then by certain and indubitable Experiments which we have through acquired Knowledge, eſpecially having none through the Natural.

Let us trifle no longer therefore, neither he nor I, on the general Order we have obſerved in our Works: I think that his was not ill in that parti­cular; and that mine was neceſſary for my deſign. Neither will I change it here, having obſerved the ſame diſpoſition of Subjects, the ſame number of Reaſons, and the ſame ſequel of Conſequences which are to be found in my Treatiſe of the Knowledge of Beaſts. If there be any difference, it is, that there I have obſerved as much as I could a Rhetorical diſcourſe; and here I treat of things in the ordi­nary way of the Schools, who divide the matters by Chapters, which relate the Reaſons, and which do not ſeeek that exact concatenation of words which the Laws of Oratory require.

For, I thought it was fit to make an abridgment of all what I employed in my firſt Treatiſe, and afterwards faithfully to produce the objections of M. C. without troubling the Reader to ſeek elſ­where to clear himſelf concerning the ſubject of our16 conteſt. I therefore divided my Diſcourſe into four Parts.

In the firſt I ſhew, That the Imagination to know things, ought to form the images thereof.

In the ſecond, That the Imagination may unite thoſe images it hath formed, and conſequently make Propoſitions.

In the third, That it may unite ſeveral Propoſi­tions, and bind them together with common terms, wherein Ratiocination conſiſts.

The fourth contains the Anſwer which is to be made to thoſe Objections which are commonly propoſed againſt the Reaſon of Beaſts.

Now for as much as M.C. would not follow this order, I have been conſtrained to recollect the rea­ſons he hath ſcattered here and there, and to reduce under every of theſe parts, where I have examined them with all poſſible moderation For although in ſome places there are ſome touches of cenſure and raillery, which he may reſent; I believe he will con­ſider, that beſides that moſt commonly I do but de­fend my ſelf with the ſame arms with which he hath aſſaulted me; the Critical part is in it ſelf ſo ſevere and ſo crabbed, that if ſome divertiſement were not inſinuated, it would become loathſom both to the Author and to the Reader: And if it be lawful to ſay ſo, it's a food which eaſily diſguſteth, unleſs it hath ſome reliſh and ſome ſharpneſs.

But I have not only ſought for him this ſeaſoning in the civility of my cenſure, and in the innocency of my raillery, I have endeavoured to ſlip in ſeveral Queſtions, which by their novelty may divert the mind of the Reader, and untire him from the troubles17 which our Conteſt may have given him; for with­out doubt he will take pleaſure to know

1. Whether external Images enter into the Me­mory.

2. What the word Eſt (Is) ſignifies in Propo­ſitions.

3. How the Imagination may make negative Propoſitions.

4. Whether if a materiall power, ſuch as the Imagination is, can forme Univerſall Noti­ons.

5. Whether Beaſts doubt.

6. Whether they hope, and whether they fear.

7. How they know the time to come.

8. Whether they know the end and the means they uſe to attain it.

9. What Action the Soul performs in Rea­ſoning.

10. Whether one may reaſon in an inſtant.

11. Whether Reaſoning was given onely to clear doubtfull things.

12. What the Nature of ſpeech is, and of ſuch like, which I have inſinuated into this Diſcourſe; Wherein M. C. may if he pleaſe exerciſe himſelf, but whereof he is not to expect from me any re­ply; For if he produceth better reaſons then mine, I from this very time conſent unto them; and if they are as weak as thoſe which he hath already brought, it may be lawfull for me to continue in my opini­ons and to apply my ſelf to better things then to prolong a Proceſſe where all the profit rather ac­crews to him who hath loſt it; ſince he gaines both18 the time and the truth. Lets quickly diſpatch this therefore, and begin with the firſt Part.

But firſt of all it is fit, That the Reader ſhould be advertiſed, that the word of Imagination which is ſo frequent in this work may not be here taken for a diſtinct faculty of the common ſenſe of the phan­cy and of the eſtimative, as they do commonly in the ſchools; But for a generall Faculty which compre­hends all the powers of the Senſitive Soul which ſerve for knowledge. In the ſame manner as the word underſtanding comprehends all the faculties of the intellectuall Soul, which make things to be known. Such as is the Apprehenſive, the Cogitative, the, Diſcourſive the Agent and Patient Intel­lect &c. In effect all theſe different faculties which are to be found in the Senſitive Soul, have in com­mon amongſt them That they know, and conſe­quently there is a generall Faculty which knows, which is afterwards divided into as many peices as there are ſeverall ſorts of Knowledges. Now this generall faculty having no particular Name, may by the example of divers other genders take the Name of one of thoſe ſpecies, and principally that of the Imagination which is the moſt conſiderable, and moſt known. This is practiſed alſo when in the de­ſtinction of the parts of the Soul, the Imagination is oppoſ'd to the Appetite, even as we oppoſe the Underſtanding to the Will. For its certaine, that in this caſe the Imagination & the Underſtanding com­prehend all the knowing faculties, as the Appetite and the Will expreſſe all the motive faculties, of the Soul. Howſoever it be, by the word Imagination,19 I here underſtand the Senſitive faculty which knows the things without ſpecifying any of its diffe­rences, the examen whereof conduceth nothing to my deſigne.

I am alſo to add to this advertiſment, that the diviſion of the Chapters and Articles was made after the work was ended; for it interrupts not the ſe­quel of my diſcourſe, and requires not thoſe great pawſes which in other matters were requiſite. The Critick alſo who is oblig'd in a continuall combate, cannot regulare his quarters as an Army would do which hath no enemy before them. Without ſtop­ping it purſues its adverſary, and gives him no re­leaſe till it hath vanquiſhed him: Its thus that I have behav'd my ſelf in the heat of my diſputation, not minding the diviſion of my work into ſo many Sections, but becauſe a long Diſcourſe without any, diſturbs the mind and eyes of a Reader, I afterwards adviſ'd with my ſelf to make ſome, and to place thoſe things in the Title, which I eſteemed moſt re­markable, that at firſt ſight the Reader may chuſe thoſe Subjects which might be moſt pleaſing to him, without ingageing himſelf in others which were not according to his guſt; But as this manner of reading will be more advantagious to him then to me, and may leave him ſome doubts which may make him have a ill opinion of my reaſons, I ſhall begg thus far from him, that he will not condemne them untill he hath read the whole work, and without having examined the princip•es & foundations which I have therin eſtabliſhed And then if he cannot approve them, I ſhall condemn,20 them, my ſelf, and employ their excuſes which the weakneſs of humane minds and the difficulty there is to penetrate into ſecrets of nature furn­iſh them withall who have recourſe thereunto.

For the reſt what is printed in a great Italian Letter at the head of every Part, is the Abridgment of my firſt Diſcourſe of the Knowledge of Beaſts. The figures in the Margent deſigne the pages of M. C's book out of which I have drawn thoſe pro­poſitions which I examine.