Predeſtination handled and maintained &c.
THE reviving and vigorous Errors of theſe dayes,Generall Redemption. Free will. too miſerably heard aſſerted, and maintained, from the mouthes of ſome of thoſe, who even pretend to greater devotion; abetted alſo with the confident ſuffrages, and earneſt acclamations2 of their Audients not a few, have ſomewhat prematurely haſtned to the birth, theſe our newly conceived meditations; which ſhould elſe have tarried for a more elaborate, and exact Recenſion. Howſoever, we hope, there's none will reprehend; when he may, with us, conſider, this may prove alſo an occaſion to others more able, of appearing in this ſame defence. And ſo paſſe we to the intended matter, that is, Predeſtination: touching which, for our more orderly progreſſe, we begin our diſcourſe from its definition: which, in the ſenſe we uſe it, may thus be formed. Predeſtination then is Gods deſigning, and appointing ſeverally, before time, a certaine3 number of perſons, to grace, and glory; and that abſolutely and of ſimple love to them. That this deſignation is before time, is expreſly by the Scriptures intimated: as, he hath choſen us in him, before the Foundation of the VVorld. Eph. 1.4. and 2 Tim. 2.9. &c. And that in the act of Predeſtination, God had before him, the certaine diſtinct notions, & particular repreſentations of all the Elect, i. e. of all men that are, or ever ſhall be glorified; is not onely atteſted by the Scriptures, but by Reaſon alſo. And firſt, we alledge Scriptures. Revel. 17.8. the words are theſe: And they that dwell on the Earth, ſhall wonder, whoſe Names were not written in the Booke of Life,4 from the foundation of the World. Here what have we hinted,4 Phil. 3.10. Lu. 20.13 Rev. 8. but a Regiſtrie, or Catalogue of the names of the Elect? whoſe names were not writen &c. And that before time: For in the occaſionally, or accidentally intimating the negation of that priviledge as to ſome, (a thing quite beſides the Authors chiefe purpoſe) is evidently, and cleerly implyed, a Graunt, and Conceſſion thereof to ſome others. Againe, Rom. 8.29.30. Whom he foreknew he alſo did Predeſtinate, &c. and whom he did Predeſtinate them he alſo called &c. Here, by foreknowing what is intended? If the word you will have taken in its vulgar, and ordinary ſenſe, then will it follow, that all being5 of God foreknowne, all likewiſe being accounted to the partnerſhip of thoſe glorious dignities, Sanctity, Glory, &c. which ſure none of any reaſon will admit. Some to this word foreknew, would have adjoyned, theſe words, [would believe] and that in a way of cauſing. Which whiles they conjecture, how unwarily skip they over a notable abſurdity? For (by them) thoſe ſame God foreknew would of themſelves believe, he alſo makes to believe: unleſſe they'l ſay believing, or faith is not, nor any part of vocation, and Sanctification: nor they of it, which were even to fly from a leſſe unto a greater abſurditie. We rather conceive the Author by that6 word, to intend Gods eternall love in Chriſt to his Saints, reflected upon by him with reference, and in order to thoſe graduall inferences: which love ſo reflected on, appear'd like a Crowne, intituling thoſe that wore it, to the Royall Preheminences, Calling, Sanctity, Glory. Nor do we want other Scriptures, many, that clearly owne, and confirme out ſaid interpretation; when the undoubted ſenſe thereof doth plainly exact ſuch an underſtanding of the queſtioned words, as we have delivered. GOD hath not caſt of His People, whom Hee foreknew, Rom. 11.2. and Mat. 25.12. I know you not. See 3 Amos 2. with many others. 'Tis evident then that knowing in the7 Scriptures Dialect, is put for loving: And as evident it is alſo, that Calling, Juſtification, Glorification in the foreſaid place mentioned, do receive limits,Act. 2. laſt v. & 13.48 and meaſure from that foreknowing, or foreloving: which is in the text aſſur'd us, by that often repeated Relative, whom. Thoſe Hee foreknew, Hee predeſtinated, called &c. Thoſe and no others; Thoſe and no more. Which ſeeing tis ſo, then vaine and inconſiderate is that opinion of many, who think the number, and perſons of the foreknown, were to God in the ſaid act of Predeſtination not determinate, nor ſeverally conſidered; but that they lay deepe ſunke in the Abyſſe of obſcuritie, and confuſion; either neceſſarily,8 or willingly by God ſo ſuffered to bee: So as any one has in himſelfe Free-will, and Power; by believing, to make himſelf of the number of thoſe Foreknowne. But to paſſe by this Errour of theirs, we will add to this word foreknowne, another of the ſame Apoſtles words uſ'd in the like matter & that is choſen 1 Eph. 4. an act likewiſe plac'd before all time:〈…〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, tis in the Greeke cull'd out. Now in chuſing, or picking out as it were of ſome from out of others; is had a diſcering, and diſtinction, elſe 'tis no chooſing, no Election, and where chooſing is, there is alſo a taking out of ſome, a leaving of others. God then did take ſome for his Sonnes, and heirs of glory, did he not know9 them? who they would bee?Pſal. •39.15.16. how many? But he knew Davids ſubſtance yet being imperfect, and in his booke were written all his Members, when as yet there was none of them. If you will have this to be ſpoken of Davids Perſon, even ſo it doth make much for us: If of the Elect, (as more probable) then much more; yea then it amounts to no leſſe then a cleare and plenarie confirmation of the point we aſſert. Rom. •.11.12.13.He knew alſo Jacob and loved him yet unborne. Lu. •.15.He knew Iohn the Baptiſt,Ier. 2.5. and ſanctified him in the wombe. And Ieremiah did he know before he formed him in the belly, and before he came forth out of the wombe, he ſanctified him, and ordained him a Prophet, &c. All theſe10 you'l grant God did foreknow ſeverally,See alſo 1 Gal 15. Act. 15.18. did he not alſo know the reſt? But known unto God (ſaith the Apoſtle) are all his workes from the beginning of the World.
Iohn 1.3. 1 Col. 16. Epheſ. 3.9. Act. 4.24.Again, hee formeth and maketh all things; witneſſe the Scriptures: From whence we will inferre he foreknew all things; For he does either make things raſhly, and without precognition of their future Formes, or contrariwiſe:See Act. 4.28. but doubtleſſe the latter; elſe ſhall we put the Creator beneath that perfection he has given his Creature: (for not man ſets himſelfe to operate, without having a preſcript, or preconceiv'd type, and pattern of the work he intends to.) And then this precedencie of knowledge, to operation11 in God, was before time: for a Creature it is not, but it is in God alone, and ſo God himſelfe, according to the Schoolmen;**vvhatſoever is in God, is God himſelfe. Quicquid eſt in Deo eſt ipſe Deus. And ſecondly, if this precognition was in God not eternall, then did there ſomething from without, occaſion and beget the ſame; (for God is one, ſimple, entire, and not mixed) and ſo it will follow, God is paſſible, imperfect; yea, the firſt Cauſe then, ſhall in a manner bee the effect of a ſecond; of its owne effect; and ſo there will follow a confuſion of Cauſes: which all are moſt abſurd. The like may be ſaid alſo of Gods love to men ſeverally, in reference to that of Ieremiah, Chap. 31. Verſ. 23. (I have loved thee with an everlaſting love) if any would have it reſtrain'd to the future only. But an irrefragable place alſo to our purpoſe is, that in the Pſalms, Pſalm. 90. Verſ. 1. Lord thou haſt been our dwelling place in all Generations. Heb: From Generation, to Generation, the ſame in ſenſe.What, would hee bee their dwelling place, ſo long, and yet not know them? doubtleſſe no. Wee ſay again, if God did not ſeverally know, eternally, the perſons of thoſe he preordain'd to life eternall, 'twas either becauſe he would not, or becauſe he could not. That wee embrace not the former, the admirable love of God to them exhibited, more eſpecially in the wonderfull act of Redemption. diſſwadeth: And the latter wee now come to refute by reaſon.
If God therefore did not13 know the preciſe number of his Saints, before the world made, and ſo upwards, then did he waite untill he ſhould be informed thereof, either from the events, and determinations of his own Actions, or elſe from ſome other Minde and Power, and this Minde and Power is either ſubordinate to God, or co-ordinate with him: If ſubordinate; (as neceſſarily) then ſimply and totally ſubordinate to him, or not: if not; then ſtill muſt it be mounted into the throne of a Deitie: but if ſimply, and totally ſubordinate, then did it, and doth receive of God the Precepts, formes, rules, and preciſe meaſures of all its actions: And other then ſuch an Agent, (if yet even ſuch a one) no man but ſees14 God would not ordaine, to ſo great a detraction, and blemiſh, and even emulation of his divine Soveraignty. (we ſpeak of a Power procreative of thoſe wee call Naturall and Subſtantiall Formes, as ſuch) Nor would we by any meanes admit of ſuch a Preter-divine Agent, directly over the very perſons, of men. What may be brought againſt us out of Geneſis 1.11. And God ſaid let the Earth bring forth graſſe, &c. Is limitted to things vegitative onely. The 24. verſe, where its ſaid, Let the Earth bring forth the living Creature, &c. Is declared by that which followes, viz. And God made the beſt of the, Earth. &c. We then here finde any Aſſignation, of delegation of ſuch a Productive15 Power or Faculty, as to the forme ſubſtantiall, extended to man: whoſe ſupereminent Dignity is in the ſame Chapter pointed out in the words; Let us make man, &c. Nor (as for the other member) is God to deduce ſuch a knowledge, from the events, and determinations of his own Actions: For then it may be truly to be ſaid of Him, Hee's about to do he knowes not how much: or he knowes not the quantity of his own intended actions, which were doubtleſſe abſurd. It will then alſo be true, if one ſhall ſay at the period of humane Generation, or ſome ſhort time before; Now knowes God ſomewhat of his nobleſt Creatures, which before he was ignorant16 of. Nor may our diſcourſe much ſtick at that Objection. What then (may ſome ſay) did God know before time every blade of graſſe that ſhould be? every duſt on the earth? &c. To ſtep beſides this block (which yet we could undertake to clear the way of) we anſwer: Our Treatiſe is of man; whom alone his Creatour would have ſublimed above others, by the Impreſſe even of his own Reſemblance: not of Plants or meere Animalls: of Immortalls not mortalls, and amongſt theſe, of the Saints principally: members of the Lords own myſticall body: His Children, His Saints, &c. who, what if we ſhould tell you, have a Seminall or radicall being eternal: which though (as being a thing beſide17 our ſcope) we ſhall forbeare, yet is there enough ſaid to marre the conſequence, viz. from things inanimate or vegetative onely, to Intellectives: from mortalls, to immortalls; and all this in a certaine reſpect of Dignity alſo.
Againe, Whatſoever thing moſt excellent can incur into, or be deviſed by the Imagination of man, That ought we to believe to be in God, in ſome equall, or eminent manner; elſe would it prove to the diſparagement, and indignity of the great Creator that he ſhould have enabled his Creature to imagine that Excellency, which is not in Himſelfe; which is above Himſelfe. Now this numerical foreknowledge is eaſily by man both immaginable, and18 comprehenſible. But Eternitie, Infinitude are without all doubt attributed to God: either of them is greater then the contended for preſcience of number: we grant him the former, how can we denie him the latter? So much for this point, wherein if we ſhall ſeeme to any more prolix then is needefull, let them have this anſwer. Both they that aſſent, may have now more ground ſo to do; and they that diſſent, may hereby of this their Errour be the more fully convinced. And now paſſe we to the other branch of our Definition; namely, That the Predeſtination aforementioned was abſolutely, and of ſimple love.
Deſtination, or purpoſe19 (largely taken) is an act of the minde, begotten of the underſtanding and wil concurring, and is related to ſomthing by the Perſon to be done. But this definition haply is too large for our purpoſe, which is to treate of ſuch purpoſes, as are about things of more conſiderable moment, and conſequence. We ſhall firſt therefore devide, and then deſcribe them in more ample, and familiar termes. Purpoſes then are either more perfect, or leſſe perfect; that is abſolute or conditionall. The more perfect or abſolute are when the Perſon purpoſing, having projected or cogitated ſomthing to be done, and then riſing up to a conſideration, and pondering of things already hapned,20 preſent, or for the future happenable, (to wit) events, caſes, non-events, conditions, ſtates of things; forcible and of importance, as to the deſtroying, or impeding of the thing purpoſed, doth at length ſit downe with a reſolution to do or execute. The Imperfect or conditionall are, when the minde, projecting or imaginating ſomthing to be done, and having made enquiry and eſtimation of all important and forcible impediments, as to the execution thereof, and then finding ſome poſſible but uncertaine intervention, accident, defect, or ſtate of things, or thing, that in the judgement of the Perſon purpoſing, ought to or will hinder & forbid execution, drawes at length to this21 reſolution that if this or that intervene, or this or that intervene not, the purpoſe ſhall proceed to execution.
To prove that one word, (uncertaine) to be that onely, which gives being to the purpoſe conditionall, as it is ſuch; and that without this uncertainty, the purpoſe, if it proceed and abide, muſt needs be abſolute, is an eaſie taske: For why doth one yet purpoſe to do this or that, when hee's wel aſſur'd there hath been, is, or will be ſomthing that (in this particular) ought and will hinder its accompliſhment? which cannot be. For examples ſake, A Father purpoſes to give his ſonne by will 100. l. on condition he pleaſe him well in the meane time. Here does the22 Father know or is he certaine, that his ſonne will ſoe pleaſe him? or is he not certaine? if he be certaine, to what then ſerves the condition? (ſith default or defect in the condition muſt deſtroy the purpoſe) If he knowes he will not ſo pleaſe him, and yet ſo purpoſes, then this is no more a condition, but the purpoſe may be, notwithſtanding this, abſolute and prefect. Hence therefore may we with clearneſſe deduce this concluſion: That the reaſon why purpoſes are conditionall is, a want in foreknowledge, or an uncertainty in the perſon purpoſing, of all ſuch things as will and ought to deſtroy the purpoſe. So that it alſo followes to be inconvenient with the23 properties of God, to purpoſe, or predeſtinate conditionally: it being a thing cleare that we ought to allow God ſuch a foreknowledge, eſpecially then too when he does intend to ſuch one; as happeneth in the caſe of purpoſes or Predeſtination. Beſides this, alſo it may be minded, that where a perſon purpoſeth or Predeſtinateeth to do any thing of free will, there the purpoſe partaketh ſomthing of deſire to execution. God now is both an abſolute purpoſer, and a deſirous one too: then what is it can hinder him therein.
Argument.
But if the Predeſtination aforementioned, was cauſed by24 the foreſight of Faith to come, (as is by many fancied,) then did the Predeſtinator foreſee ſome unavoidable, and unfruſtrable cauſe, or ſeries, or order of cauſes neceſſarily productive of the faith foreſeene: elſe how could it bee that God ſhould paſſe a certain act upon, or in reference to an uncertain, and unchangeable reſpect, or motive? which once granted, it is granted alſo that God may bee deceived. If any ſay, this productive cauſe may be conſidered of God, though yet to come; ſuch doe but trifle: For there muſt then alſo bee granted ſome preceding cauſe, equally certain and unfruſtrable as to the producing of that; we have therefore added, as above, (Order of Cauſes.) Now25 where was this cauſe, or order of cauſes before the creation? It muſt needs bee granted, it was in God alone. So then, the next and immediate cauſe of faith,Cauſa cauſae eſt cauſa cauſati. is but the remote effect of this its firſt cauſe.
Argument.
If the ſame that decreed glory to man, decreed alſo to work in him faith and grace, then glory depends not really upon the preceding habit of faith. But the former is true: Therfore the latter. Antecedent proved, Rom. 8, 29.30. Eph. 1.4.5.11, &c.
Here me thinks it is by ſome objected: Though Glory to man ſimply, depend not upon having of faith: Yet quoad26 hunc, as concerning this or that particular man, it may depend on his having of faith.
Anſw
God did then decree glory. To whom? Doubtleſſe to thoſe that are, or ſhall bee ſaved. But it is proved above, God knew them ſeverally and all, before they were exiſtent. It will follow then, that God afore decreed glory directly to the ſeverall perſons of men: For the indeterminateneſſe of all purpoſes, is of defect of knowledge, as above more at large.
Argument.
That which is not of Man, but is freely the gift of God,27 cannot, as ſuch, be a motive, or impulſive to God, of conferring another gift; eſpecially that may as much exceed the former, as infinite doth finite.
But faith is not of Man, but is the gift of God.
Ergo, Faith, &c.
There is no ground here from which to fix on God an obligation: If affectation you ſuggeſt, that is impious, nor can you with any colour of reaſon, flie to the merit of the gift. This for the Major.
The Minor is proved, Eph. 2.8. compared with Rom. 3.24.36. EZek. 22.26.27. Phil. 2.13.
Argument.
If we are ſaved freely, then not upon condition.
28But we are ſaved freely, Ergo &c.
The Minor is proved by the two laſt cited places, Epheſ. and Rom.
Argument.
Thoſe things that are equally related to God, as being their Author, and are the next and immediate effects of the ſelfe-ſame cauſe, cannot properly be ſaid to be the cauſe, or effect one of the other.
But ſuch are Faith and Glory. Ergo.
For proof of the Minor, turn to Rom. 8.29, 30. Eph. 1.4, 5. & 2.8. Rom. 6. ult. Iam. 1.17, 18. with many others. Where you read both conformity to the Image of Chriſt, vocation, juſtification; and glorification29 as proceeding of the ſame cauſe, viz. foreknowing, i. e. fore-loving. There alſo have you faith called the gift of God; ſo likewiſe, eternall life.
Argument.
That, according to which men are ſaved, was before the world began.
But faith was not before the world began: Ergo, faith is not that, according to which men are ſaved.
The Major proved, 2 Tim. 1.9. the words theſe: Who hath ſaved us, and called us with an holy-calling, not according to our workes, but according to his owne purpoſe, and grace, which was given us in Chriſt Jeſus, before the world began.
Argument.
If Glory proceed from Divine love, as the onely cauſe, and that freely; then is Faith neither the cauſe (whether ſociall or ſolitary) nor condition of glory.
But the former is true, therefore the latter.
That love is the onely cauſe, may hence bee demonſtrated. Where good, as good, is deſtinated to a proper and ultimate object; It is either ſo deſtinated from ſome engagement, obligation, or reſpect of merit, or elſe out of pure love. But on God lay no engagement, or obligation of predeſtinating good to man. Whence ſhould it ariſe? He was then alone. If you31 alledge the very purpoſe itſelf, what cauſed ſuch a purpoſe?
Was it not love ſtill? Nor is there much merit to be found in the Object, Man: of whō the perſon that predeſtinated, beareth witneſſe, that Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was onely evill continually. Iſaiah alſo acknowledgeth, that All our righteouſneſses are as filthy rags, &c. chap. 64. v. 6. Well then might Paul ſay, Rom. 3.24. Being juſtified freely, &c. Yea, and God pronounces, I wil love them freely, Hoſ. 14.4.
Argument.
For which Objects ſake ſimply, God had ordained, and to which hee properly did referre the greateſt accident poſſibly,32 the higheſt demonſtration, and moſt excellent inſtance of his love could be given. To that Object, it is incongruous, yea, abſurd to affirm; He would think much, and refuſe to adde alſo a gift of much leſſer value freely.
But for mans ſake God hath done the precedents, viz. in the Redemption. Ergo, &c. And this is in ſubſtance, the very Argument of the Apoſtle himſelfe, Rom. 8.32. where hee ſaith: He that ſpared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all: how ſhall hee not with him alſo freely give us all things?
Argument.
To whom God intended the beſtowing of a gift, for durance, eternall; for degree, moſt excellent: to them he did33 alſo intend to give a temporall, and far leſſe excellent gift; being yet ſuch as ought neceſſarily to antecede the other.
But to ſome men God intended the precedent, (glory wee mean:) Ergo, the conſequent alſo: Inherit the Kingdome prepared for you from the foundation of the world, Matth. 25.34. This Kingdome is afterwards called, Life eternall, verſ. ult.
Thus then you have it cleared to you from our fore-going diſſertation, Firſt, (to wit) That God before time knew the future perſons ſeverally, of all thoſe (without exception) that are or ſhall bee glorified. Secondly; that Gods conferring of glory to the ſame perſons, is, and was free, and abſolute, without having reſpect34 to any thing (as thereunto requiſite) in, of, or for them.
By the firſt, is refuted that opinion, according to which, even thoſe (all or ſome) who are dead, and**For they hold not of ſuffering hells torments, till after the day of judgment. reſerved for everlaſting woe, might, and had power to have beleeved, and conſequently been ſav'd eternally. For doubtleſſe, ſuch as are reſerv'd for hell, were never known of God, as being in the number of thoſe hee ordained to glory, or accounted for ſuch.
By the 2d Concluſion appears the falſity of their other opiniō, namely: That God preordained no man to life eternal, without reſpect to, and forſake of his future beleeving. So we end.