Problemes Neceſſary to be determined by all that have or have not taken part on either ſide In the late unnaturall Warre.

1. WHether uncertaine feares, and jealouſies of wrong intended to be done, contrary to a mutuall Co­venant interchangeably ſworne, be not an in­ſufficient plea for the juſtification of doing the leaſt wrong in violation of that Covenant, by way of prevention; and much more for one of the Cove­nanters hazarding the life of the other, becauſe he was jea­lous, or afraid that the other would have killed him.

2. Whether it be lawfull for a private Chriſtian to go to law with his neighbour, upon the occaſion of any wrong actually done to him, if he may recover his right, or be offered, juſt and full reparation of the wrong done, without2 Law: And whether the plaintife may refuſe the offer of an equall Arbitrement in a doubtfull caſe.

3. Whether it be not more unlawful for a Chriſtian Prince, and his people to go to warre one againſt the other, either for the maintenance of their reſpectively claimed rights, or for the reparation of pretended wrongs, or for any cauſe whatſoever, that might have been determined by the law of the Land without warre. And whether the party that refuſeth the offer of reparation, or arbitration, or any other indiffe­rent meanes to avoid warre, be not ſo much more to blame, as a warre is more hard to be managed without the ſinne of the parties, and the damage of many other inno­cent perſons, then a ſuit in law.

4. Whether it be not more common for Superiours to op­preſſe their inferiours, but more monſtrous, as well as more rare, for Inferiours to oppreſſe their Superiours, and ſo ad­judged in our Law. And whether the later be not the more abhominable before God, though the former be the more generally hatefull among men; becauſe he that hath the moſt power, is commonly preſumed to have done, even when he hath ſuffered wrong.

5. Whether it be not at leaſt as lawfull for a Soveraigne Prince to defend the juſt rights of his Crown againſt his people by thoſe Armes wherwith he is intruſted by the poſitive Law of the Land, as for a free People to defend their juſt Liberties a­gainſt their Prince, by having recourſe to the unwritten equity of that Law, or to the Law of nature. And whether if ſeverall ſorts of the people have ſeverall laws, Cuſtoms and Franchiſes, which their Prince hath confirmed to them by his Oath, he be not thereby obliged to protect every ſort of them in their reſpective rights, againſt the other, though greater in number and power, till the Rights of the3 weaker party may be found incompatible, with the good of the whole State, by the free judgement of the major part of them in whom under him, or with him the legiſlative power is, after a full hearing of all intereſſed parties. And whether the Prince having the whole Soveraignety in him, may diſaſſent, if after this, he yet be of a contrary judge­ment.

6. Whether a Soveraigne Prince, may not be as well de­poſed by the States of his Countrey, taking the power be­longing to him, to themſelves, as by ſetting up another Prince in his place: And whether a free people under a Monarch may not be aſwell enſlaved by their own lawfull Prince uſur­ping an arbitrary power over them, as by the Conqueſt of a for­reine Prince or State; And whether it be equally lawfull for Prince, or people to reſiſt in either caſe.

7. Whether a Soveraigne Prince whoſe Crowne is not forfeitable can forfeit any of the known, and acknowledged rights of his Crown, by any unwarrantable act he may have been drawn into, through the miſinformation, and ſeduce­ment of evill Councellors; And whether he be not bound in conſcience to diſcover, and deliver up ſuch evill Counſel­lors to a due Tryall by Law, in charity to himſelfe, and to his people. And whether the people be not under the ſame ob­ligation, and may not be aſwel ſeduced by their Leaders, or Demagogues; and whether their rights ought not to be as un­forfeitable in the ſame caſe.

8. Whether any man ought to be puniſhed for having gi­ven evill counſel either to Prince, or people, unleſſe it can be made appeare, that he gave it againſt the light of his owne conſcience; or with an evil minde either to hurt the one, or the other of them; or to advantage himſelf, or others; or unleſſe his Counſel were wicked aſwel as damagable, and ſuch as is4 puniſhable either by ſome law of the land already made, or de­ſerveth that a new law ſhould be made upon that occaſi­on to puniſh his offence, and all of like nature in time to come.

9. Whether it be probable that in a well eſtabliſhed go­vernment of long continuance, the manner of legall procee­ding in any common, great, criminal cauſe ſhould be doubtful, or unknowne: And admitting it to be ſo in ſome caſe fal­len forth, whether all and every of the reſpective States in whom the Legiſlative power is, being aſſembled together at the time, be not bound in Conſcience to agree the difference by ſuch an indifferent Law, or Ordinance, as may be enacted by their joynt conſent, rather then to go to warre one againſt another, and to draw the whole State into partialities upon ſuch an occaſion.

10. Whether he who giveth the firſt ſtop to the proceed­ing of juſtice according to law in that Cauſe, which thereup­on becomes a pretence to begin a juſt Civil warre, and will not agree to remove that ſtop, be not the offender. And whether the other, though he happen to be the aggreſſor in the action at warre, as he was to have been Plaintife in the action at Law, if the cauſe had been tryed by law, yet be not on the defenſive part in the warre.

11. Whether any warre of any Prince upon his own peo­ple, or of any people againſt their Prince can be lawfull, but a pure defenſive; and whether it be poſſible, or can be conceived, how a warre between them, ſhould be purely defenſive on doth parts, without ſuppoſing a failing on both ſides, in giving way to the courſe of Juſtice, or a great miſ­underſtanding between them.

12. Whether it be not as poſſible, that a Civil warre be­tween Prince and people may be unjuſt on both ſides, as a5 forraine warre between Prince and Prince, State and State, or a Suite in law between man and man, and all theſe upon many and all the ſame grounds: as if the matter in queſtion be not worthy to be ſtriven about by law or armes, or if ſome third perſon be wronged by their ſtrife, or have better right to that they ſtrive for, then either of the parties, &c.

13. Whether obedience to the forcible commands of Prince, or people, will be a ſufficient-plea for having ſhed, or any way communicated in the ſhedding of blood in ſuch a warre, at his tribunal, who will not admit of obedience to any Law made by their joynt Authority, for a defence of the leaſt breach of any law of his.

14. Whether Neutrality, or Partialitie be more agreea­ble to the duty of good ſubjects, in ſuch a Warre as aforeſaid; and whether willing contributers to both ſides in ſuch a War, be not guilty of the ſinnes of both, and greater ſinners then the partakers on either ſide caeteris paribus, if they con­tribute to both ſides for meere private reſpects; and whe­ther ſuch be properly called Neuters, being indeed Vter­ques.

15. Whether the perſonall, or the Authoritative com­mand of the Prince iſſued out of his ſupreme Court ſitting in the time of ſuch a Warre, will more excuſe (though nei­ther of them can abſolve) them on either ſide, that have ſin­ned of ignorance in ſuch a Warre as aforeſaid: And whether the perſon, or the Court of the Prince will be lyable to a more heavie judgement for having drawne others into ſinne, at that day when there will be a review of all things done in this world, before him who is no reſpecter of perſons.

16. Whether a Soveraign Prince, or State, being a Poli­tique head, can, or cannot do any wrong? And whether the major part of the true body of the State can, or cannot be in6 rebellion? And whether the major part of the repreſentative body of the State, or of the ſupreme Court of Judicature, taking the major part as it ſtandeth for the whole, can, or can­not erre in judgement, or be, or be not lyable to any guilt: And in what ſenſe, or ſenſes, all theſe are, or are not true.

17. Whether the ſinnes of a Community, as a Communi­ty, can be done away by the Confeſſions of the particular guilty perſons of the Community; Or whether they by confeſſing their ſinne, and the innocent particular perſons by not conſenting thereunto, ſhall thereby onely ſave their owne ſoules; and ſuch a publique acknowledgement of the ſinne by the Community, or at leaſt by their heads, and Repre­ſentants, as was enjoyned under the Law, be not ſtill requi­red in the time of the Goſpel?

18. Whether there be not, or ought not to be ſuch a ſupreme Judicatory erected in every Chriſtian State, as was among the Jewes for the finall determining of all controver­ſies whether Eccleſiaſticall, or Civil, that may happen be­tween man, and man; or between Community and Community; or between private man and Community, for the preventing of civill Warre: And whether in mixed governments, where the whole ſoveraign power, or the uſe of any part, or parts thereof, is either equally, or unequally divided between ſeve­rall Eſtates, there ought not to be ſuch a Judicatory erected, for the preventing of their encroaching upon one anothers power, and of diſcord and warre between the ſaid reſpe­ctive States upon that occaſion, if there be any Chriſtian State which is yet defective in this point?

19. Whether the plotting, and attempting to empeach the freedome, and to corrupt the ſentence of ſuch a ſupreme Judi­catory by open violence, be not a much greater crime, then the doing any thing preſumptuouſly contrary to the judge­ment7 of ſuch a Court as was inſtituted Deuteron. ch. 17. ver. 8, 9, 10, & 11. which was death by the Law of Moſes, v. 12; or then the ſlaying of the Chancellor, Treaſurer, or the Kings Juſtices of the one Bench, or of the other, or of any other juſtices aſſigned to hear, and determine, being in their places doing their offices, which is high treaſon by the law of the Realme.

20. Whether the like practiſing, and indeavouring to overawe that Soveraigne Majesty in which a State hath placed the whole arbitrary legiſlative power, whether they have placed it in one, or in the major part of many perſons conſenting in one, be not the higheſt treaſon that can be committed in any State. And whether this may not be done by ſeditious tu­mults of the common people, as well as by men of higher rank. And likewiſe whether the contriving and indeavou­ring to do the ſame things by cunning and malicious practi­ces, be not a hainous crime alſo, though of an inferiour na­ture?

21. Whether the refuſing to deliver up notorious Delin­quents to juſtice, be not a juſt cauſe of making Warre with rigor againſt a whole City, or Countrey ſo protecting them, though no otherwiſe partaking in the ſinne, in the judge­ment of God himſelfe in the Caſes of Gibeah of Benjamin, and of the City of Abel protecting Sheba: And whether pro­tectors of ſuch Delinquents have good ground to promiſe themſelves a good iſſue of ſuch a Warre, by their proſperous ſucceſſe in a battel, or two, if they doe well conſider the for­mer of thoſe ſtories?

22. Whether the keeping of perſons duly accuſed from being brought to a due legall triall, either upon preſum­ption of their innocence in reſpect of their former good life, and fame, or for their good deſerts, or for feare and jealouſy of vn­due8 proceedings againſt them, or upon pretence of ſome queſtionable priviledge, or all theſe laid together, can amount to any more then a probable ground of a juſt defenſive Warre? And whether it be ſafe to run into a demonstrable great ſinne in the generall upon a probable ground that in this, or that ſpeciall Caſe it is no ſinne?

23. Whether it be poſſible that a ſuit in Law, or a Warre may be juſt on both ſides, in reſpect of the matter in queſtion, to which it is impoſſible that both parties can have a good ti­tle, or cauſe of action: And whether their thinking they have ſo, which may in ſome meaſure juſtifie both parties in an action at law (eſpecially if both, or either of them be truſtees, who may with good conſcience ſtand for the queſtionable rights of thoſe for whom they are truſted) can be a ſufficient juſtifica­tion in an action at Warre, which in reſpect of the many un­avoidable miſchiefs that ever accompany all armes ought not to be commenced, or continued but upon clearly juſt, great, and neceſſary cauſes.

24. Whether the juſtice of every action at warre, as well as at Law, doth not depend intirely upon the tryall of the point in iſſue between the parties: and whether all other, whether intereſſed perſons, or by-ſtanders, ought not to take that as it may be found in their reſpective Declarations, ma­nifeſtoes, and other pleadings, leaving the judgment of ſecret motives to God who only can judge of their hearts, and who may judge otherwiſe of the justice of warres, then man may, becauſe he ſeeth not as man ſeeth. And whether they be not bound in conſcience to give equall credit, to the reſpective Declarations of both parties, in all matters of fact that have not fallen within their own private certain knowledge; and to uſe the ſame weights and meaſures in pondering the validity of their reſpective allegations, and to judge of them without paſſion, prejudice, or partiality.

25. Whether all other things that may come into conſi­deration in a warre, beſides the point in iſſue, how important ſoever they may be in themſelves, yet in this triall by battell ought to be regarded either by the parties, or by any other per­ſon intereſſed in the warre ſo far as to ſway him in the giving of his aſſiſtance to the one ſide, or to the other, any more then the like things ought to ſway a Juror in the giving of his verdict in a tryall at Law. And particularly,

26. Whether the extrajudiciall qualifications of the per­ſons either between whom a ſuite at Law, or a warre is, or by whom the one or the other is managed, as whether they be Proteſtants, or Papiſts, religious, or prophane, civill, or debauched, make any thing to the juſtice of the warre, or ſuit, or ought to encline Jurors, or Partakers to the one ſide or to the other.

27. Whether the good, or ill manner of managing a ſuite, or a warre ought to be of any more weight with Jurors, or Partakers, ſeeing a good Cauſe may be ill managed, and an ill well: And whether a Suite, or a Warre undertaken, and commenced upon juſt grounds can turne to be unjuſt by any ſubſequent miſcarriages in the one, or in the other, except the point in iſſue happen to be altered through the cleare diſ­covery of ſome concealed further deſigne in one, or other of the parties, or ſome other intervening accident, as it frequent­ly falleth out in long-breathed ſuites at Law, and came to paſſe in the Bohemian warre by the death of the Emperour Matthias, which made a very conſiderable difference in the Caſe from that it was when the troubles began in his life time.

28. Whether the accidental preſent intereſt, or the future advantages, or diſadvantages, of what kinde ſoever, which may accrew either to the parties themſelves, or to the parta­kers,10 or to any third perſon, or to the publique by the reſpe­ctive iſſue of a warre, or ſuite; and whether the ſuſpected or knowne deſignes, or intentions either of the parties, or of their partakers to make ill uſe of the victory, ought to be of any more force with Jurors, or Partakers, or whether they ought to be blinde to them alſo, and to all other like cir­cumſtances, and reſpects.

29. Whether the conſideration of the accidental, and conſequential intereſt of God himſelfe in the iſſue of a matter in debate between two parties that are in warre ought to engage ſouldiers, or contributers to take part with the one, or with the other, more then Jurors in a like caſe, the reaſon to the contrary being the ſame in both, to wit, becauſe God hath no need of mans ſinne in either to maintaine his Cauſe, or glory, and it being a manifeſt ſinne in a Juror to have a­ny reſpect thereunto, how conſiderable ſoever ſuch intereſt of God may be, as will be cleare to the meaneſt capacity by putting the caſe between an Atheiſticall Church-Papiſt and a godly zealous Proteſtant, or Puritane touching the per­petual advowſon of a great Rectorie, and no leſſe cleare in the caſe of a warre between two Princes ſemblably qualifi­ed touching their title to a Kingdome divided in the profeſſion of Religion.

30. Whether a meerly civil cauſe of cleare juſtice in which true Religion is much intereſſed, though but by conſequent, may not juſtly be called Gods cauſe, and ought not to be un­dertaken more heartily, and maintained more vigorouſly by all good Chriſtians in that reſpect, eſpecially when the inte­reſt of religion is the onely, or maine motive to the oppoſition made by the adverſe party, which was the caſe of the great Henry the fourth of France, who in that regard was com­monly prayed for as fighting the Lords battels, and is the caſe11 of the Prince Elector Palatine, and of Prince Rupert his bro­ther, who in all appearance might ere this have recovered their ancient eſtates and dignities (to which by the lawes of the Empire their title is unqueſtionable) by the ſame means that the ſaid King did his Crowne, if God by his grace had not made his example too fearfull to them.

31. Whether the entitling of God to any purely ci­vil, and clearly unjuſt cauſe in reſpect of the intereſt of his true Religion involved by conſequent only in the ſucceſſe thereof, be not a ſinne againſt the third Commandement, and of a high nature; and whether any damage which may happen to accrew to Gods true Religion by occaſion of the iſſue of ſuch a Warre will not be put to his account that was in the wrong in the point of the juſtice of the Warre, though he were in the right in the point of the truth of his religion, and whether that will not be a heavie aggravation of his ſinne.

32. Whether the parties, and others intereſſed in a purely Civil Cauſe of dubious juſtice, wherin Religion is no otherwiſe concerned then as aboveſaid, do well to engage themſelves, and to indeavour to ingage others therein under the title or colour of religion; or whether it be not a great ſin to do this wittingly and wilfully, eſpecially in them who being Am­baſſadours of a King that hath publiquely declared his king­dom not to be of this world, and that accordingly refuſed to make himſelfe a Judge of Civil inheritances between bre­thren, will hardly be able to ſhew that they have any Com­miſſion from him to entangle themſelves, and much leſſe to intereſſe his name in ſuch affairs of this world, and it be­ing well knowne that in the old Law it was death for a Pro­phet to preſume to ſpeak a word in his name that he had not commanded. Deut. 18.20.

33. Whether it be lawfull for Chriſtian ſubjects to take up Arms againſt their Soveraign for reformation of the Religion by law eſtabliſhed, or in defence of their Religion not eſtabliſhed by law, or of their lives, or livelyhoods in danger by due execu­tion of Law, our bleſſed Saviour having expreſſely forbiden them to ſave their lives by ſuch meanes, with the addition of a moſt peremptory threatning if they do, and of moſt gracious promiſes, if they patiently loſe their lives or livelyhoods, for his ſake. And whether the truth or falſehood of their Religion or the power, or number of them that attempt any of the things aforeſaid doth make any difference in the caſe, though they be the Major part of the true, or of the repre­ſentative Body of a kindome: Or whether all theſe be not Anti-Chriſtian proceedings directly contrary to the doctrine and practice of Chriſt, and of all his holy Apoſtles, and of the whole Church of God for many ages, and particularly of the Church of England ſince the Reformation.

34. Whether the defence of the Religion by law eſtabliſhed be not more properly a defence of the law then of the Religi­on: And whether it be not lawfull for Subjects of one Religi­on, or profeſſion to take up armes in defence of their lives, or livelyhood againſt the violence and force of their fellow-ſub­jects of a contrary Religion, or profeſſion though eſtabliſhed by Law, and though they pretend to have, or have autho­rity from their Soveraigne to maſſacre or plunder them for that Cauſe, unleſſe their ſaid fellow-ſubjects firſt bring, or endeavour to bring them to a due Legal triall: And whether the truth or falſehood of their Religion, or the number of the thus oppreſſed doth make any ſuch difference in the caſe in point of juſtice, that one man of what Religion ſoever hath not as much right to defend himſelfe againſt violence as an­other, or as a multitude: or that a multitude of what Reli­gion,13 or number ſoever ought not to forbeare ſuch defence of their perſons or eſtates as well as any one ſingle man of the ſame Religion or profeſſion if proceeded againſt one by one in a due Legall courſe: And whether in ſome occaſi­ons where ſummary proceedings againſt many at once are u­ſed, and allowed in other matters the ſame ought not to be ſubmitted unto in this alſo for conſcience ſake, provided that the proceedings be ſuch as may make it appeare that they ſuffer as Martyrs, or confeſsors for Chriſts ſake: And whether there be any danger that the gates of hell ſhould prevaile againſt the Church of Chriſt, if all true Chriſtians ſhould ſuffer themſelves thus to be killed like ſheep, or whe­ther it have not ever been moſt enlarged at thoſe times when Chriſtians were moſt willing to yeeld to be ſo robbed or killed.

35. Whether all they who by a miſtake of the quarrell doe any way engage themſelves, or others in a juſt Warre up­on unjuſtifyable grounds be not murtherers before God, though not before men, as a man may committ adultery with his own wife if in the darke he chance to take her for another mans: And as a Juror may do unjuſtly in giving a juſt verdict if he do it upon unjuſt grounds through a miſtake of the evidence, or through ignorance of the Law.

36. Whether they who engage themſelves in an unjuſt Warre upon juſt grounds be therby wholly abſolved from the guilt of blood any more then a Juror is that giveth an un­juſt verdict to the taking away of his neighbours life upon juſt, but untrue grounds, or then he is free from adultery that lyeth with his neighbours wife taking her for his own, if the miſtake happen through their own fault in either caſe.

37. Whether all they, who though they underſtand the right of the quarrel in a juſt Warre, yet engage themſelves or others therein upon unjuſtifiable motives, as for private re­venge, or gaine, or with minds any otherwiſe diſpoſed then purely to procure a yeelding to the juſtice thereof, be not alſo guilty of all the bloodſhed therein: as a Juror may be a murderer in conſenting to the taking away of his neigh­bours life by a juſt verdict how cleare ſoever the Law, or evidence be to him, if he be induced thereunto by his owne private ſpleene, or by the bribery, or ſollicitation of ſome o­ther revengefull third perſon, or by any other by-reſpect, and not meerly by the merits of the cauſe.

38. Whether they who at one time have allowed, or ap­proved of the ſame proceedings, or actions, in themſelves or others of their owne opinion or party, which at another time they have condemned with ſeverity and puniſhed with rigour in others of a contrary opinion or party, in the managerie of one and the ſame true, or pretended cauſe of Warre, have not in ſo doing pronounced ſentence of condemnation a­gainſt themſelves; or can have any well-grounded hope long to eſcape the heavie judgement of God, and his re­venging hand, for this ſo wicked partiality, how holy, righ­teous, or ſober ſoever they may be in other paſſages of their lives. And whether they who will by no meanes a­gree that others ſhould have an act of Oblivion in this world, for thoſe faults or crimes whereof themſelves are no leſſe guilty then their neighbours, can have any hope of par­don for their owne tranſgreſſions of either ſort in that world which is to come.

39. Whether it may be lawfull for a People to depoſe that Prince to whom they, or their Repreſentants have ſworne Allegiance, in any imaginable caſe, conſidering and com­paring15 what is writen Exod: 20.7. Pſal. 15.4. Joſhua 9.1. to the end. 1 Sam. 8.10. to the 18. Deuteron. 17.14. and 15. Ezek. 17.11. to 21. Jerem. 52.3. to the 11. there being perhaps few ſtronger caſes to be imagined for the diſ­penſing with the obligation of an Oath then that was of Joſhua, and of the Princes of the congregation having ſworn to the Gibeonites, & Zedekiah to Nebuchadnezar: the firſt upon meere circumvention, both contrary to the expreſſe command of God, and yet the wrath of God having been revealed from heaven againſt the breakers of thoſe Oaths. *********************************************

40. Whether in the late great controverſy between his Majeſty and his two Houſes of Parliam. it was not the duty of every good Chriſtian and loyall ſubject of this Kingdome, deſirous to approve his heart to God, and his actions to men, eſpecially to thoſe whom God hath ſet over him, to the end before he took any part in that War carefully to peruſe, and with indifferency to weigh the reſpective Allegations, con­tained in thoſe many ſeverall Declarations publiſhed by the Kings Majeſty on the one part, and by the Lords and Com­mons on the other part ſince the firſt breach between them, and particularly thoſe whereby they have reſpectively given the people of this Kingdome, and the whole world an ac­count of the Reaſons of their having taken up Armes, whereof that of his Majeſty beareth date 12 Aug. 1642. being alſo the date of the Proclamation whereby his Ma­jeſty gave notice of his reſolution to ſet up his Royall Stan­dard at Notingham upon the 22^th of the ſame moneth: And that of the Parliament was ſet forth in the beginning of the ſame moneth, I think before his Majeſties.

41. Whether upon the attentive reading of the ſaid reſpe­ctive Declarations it will not be evident to every intelligent man capable to judge of affairs of this nature that the preſent unhappy Warre is not, or at leaſt was not a Warre of Religion, otherwiſe then as Religion may be much concerned by con­ſequent in the iſſue thereof. And whether this will not be yet more evident by comparing the concluſion of his Ma­jeſties ſaid Declaration of the 12. ^th of Aug. from the para­graph beginning in theſe words [Our Caſe is truly ſtated, &c.] to the end thereof, with the Preface, of the Ordi­nance of the Lords and Commons for a weekly Aſſeſſment throughout the whole Kingdome for the maintenance of the Army raiſed by the Parliament 4. Martii. 1642. which beginneth in theſe words. [The Lords and Commons now Aſſembled in Parliament being fully ſatisfied and reſolved in their conſciences that they have lawfully taken up armes, and may, and ought to continue the ſame for the neceſſary defence of themſelves, and the Parliament from violence and deſtruction, and of this Kingdom from foreigne invaſion, and for the bringing of notorious offenders to condigne puniſh­ment, which are the only cauſes for which they have raiſed, and doe continue an Army, and forces, which cannot poſſi­bly be maintained, nor the Kingdome ſubſiſt without the ſpeedy raiſing of large and conſiderable ſums of mony pro­portionable to the great expences which now this Kingdome is at for the ſupporting of the ſaid Army, and for the ſaving of the whole Kingdome, our Religion, Lawes, and Liber­ties from utter ruine, and deſtruction.] In which words the Lords and Commons (it may be) occaſioned by many in­diſcreet defences of their proceedings made by well-mean­ing, but unſkilfull men, have with great prudence diſtin­guiſhed the justifying cauſes of their having raiſed, and con­tinuing17 an Army, and forces from the things which might by conſequent have come into danger, if they had not raiſed an Army, and forces to defend them, among which Religion is one. And this the penner of his Majeſties ſaid Declaration had done as carefully from the beginning, in theſe words [Our quarrel is not againſt the Parliament, but againſt par­ticular men &c.]

42. Whether by the peruſall of the ſaid reſpective De­clarations, and of the ſaid Preface it be not alſo moſt evi­dent, that his Majeſty, and his two Houſes of Parliament do both pretend to have taken up defenſive Armes, and in defence of all and every the ſame things; And whether it be not alſo evident, that his Majeſty in his ſaid Declaration maketh the protecting of Delinquents, whom he nameth, from being brought to a Tryall by their Peeres, according to the Law of the Land, the onely cauſe of the ſetting up of his ſtand­ard, and raiſing defenſive Armes againſt them, and as many of his ſubjeſts as ſhould riſe in Rebellion againſt his Majeſty, and the Law, in behalfe of the ſaid pretended offendors, and in juſtification of their actions ſpecified at large, and alledg­ed to be High miſdemeanors and Treaſon. And whether the three cauſes, upon which onely the Lords, and Commons pretend to juſtifie their having taken up defenſive Armes, in their ſaid Declaration of the fourth of March 1642, be not alſo reducible to one, to wit, that of bringing noto­rious offenders to condigne puniſhment, whoſe practiſes are ſet forth at length in their declaration of the fourth of Aug. 1642, and of whom they then named none but the Lord Digby. For the pretended violence, and deſtruction of the ſaid Lords and Commons, and of the Parliament, and the pretended foreigne invaſion of this Kingdome (which are the other two Cauſes) neither were then, nor by Law18 could have been charged on his Majeſty, but on the ſaid Lord Digby, and other unnamed Incendiaries; And whe­ther it be not thereby manifeſt, that there were two Actions at Warre on foot at the ſame time, the one between the King, and his Parliament, the other between the Parliament, and his Majeſtie.

43. Whether the penner of the ſaid Declaration of the Lords, and Commons, of the fourth of Au­guſt 1642, did not with great prudence carefully, and frequently diſavow, and indeavour to diſprove their having poſſeſſed themſelves of Hull, or of the Militia, or Magazine, to be the grounds of the Warre: firſt in theſe ex­preſſe words to that purpoſe page. 496. of Huſbands Col­lection, Then if they will not come to help the Parliament, and ſave themſelves — eſpecially now that the queſtion is ſo clearly ſtated, and that it appeareth, that neither Hull, nor the Militia, nor the Magazine are the grounds of the Warre, which is ſo furiouſly driven on againſt us by a Malignant party, &c. And afterwards page 497 — All this before we med­dled with Hull, or Magazine, or Militia &c. to thoſe words [But to deſtroy the Parliament.^**See the words at the end of page 24.] And yet more fully and clearly ibidem: — Yet willingly would we give his Ma­jeſty ſatisfaction in theſe particulars, (and ſo have we offer­ed it) could we be ſecured, that diſarming our ſelves, and delivering them up to his Majeſty — we ſhould not for our own deſtruction put the military ſword into the hands of thoſe evill Councellors, and ill-affected perſons, who are ſo prevalent with his Majeſty. And whether the Penner of certain late Declarations of the Lords and Commons, par­ticularly that 4^o Martii 1647. concerning the Papers of the Scots Commiſſioners, wherein are theſe words, page 68. [As to the Militia, although that be the foundation of ſecurity19 to vs, and our proſterity, and was the principall immediate ground of our Quarell, &c. And theſe in the ſame page — Have we fought all this while with the King for the Militia, to ſubject it to the arbitrement of the Scots Commiſſioners?] were well adviſed in thoſe, and other like paſſages; there be­ing, as I humbly conceive, nothing more cleare, then that the Militia (by which word, brought into uſe, by this Parlia­ment, I doe not underſtand the power of araying, or charging the ſubjects of this Kingdome with ſuch, and ſuch armes, which regularly cannot be impoſed without the joynt authority of King, Lords, and Commons; but the power of aſſembling, and conducting the ſubjects ſo armed, for the ſuppreſſion of all Rebellions, inſurrections, and in­vaſions:) undoubtedly ever was in the King alone, and was clearly acknowledged to be ſo, by this very Parliament, when they petitioned his Majeſty to put the whole Militia into the hands of ſuch perſons as ſhould be recommended to his Majeſtie by both Houſes of Parliament 1^o. Martii 1641: When they made their firſt Ordinance for the order­ing of the Mllitia, whereby they give power to Collonels, and Captaines to lead, conduct, and employ his Majeſties ſubjects according as they from time to time ſhall receive dire­ctions by his Majeſties authority ſignified by both Houſes of Par­liament, 2^o Martii 1641: And when they reſolved upon the Queſtion, That in this caſe of extreme danger, and of his Ma­jeſties refuſall, the Ordinance agreed on by both Houſes for the Militia doth oblige the People, and ought to be obeyed by the fundamentall Laws of this Kingdome 15^o. Martii 1641. And whether the true ground of the fracture of the Parliamentarian party into Preſbyterian, and Independent, and of the ſharp controverſy ariſen between them, upon other pretences, be not which of them ſhould have the Li­ons20 ſkin, before he be dead. And whether if the Indepen­dent could have gone ſheere away with it whole, it be not already manifeſt, that they would have been ſubdivided againe upon the ſame ground. And whether there be any hope of ſeeing an end of theſe bitter diſputes, till the ſword be put again into the hand, where it hath been of old: And whether there be not meanes to place it there in ſuch a way, as may be much ſafer for the people, and no leſſe ſafe for the Houſes of Parliament, then to have it in their hands, who being Two, may at length alſo come to ſtrive about it.